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Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner's dilemma game

Grimm, V and Mengel, F (2011) 'Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner's dilemma game.' Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 78 (3). 333 - 348. ISSN 0167-2681

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Abstract

We experimentally investigate the effect of endogenous matching within a segmented population on peoples' willingness to cooperate as well as their attitudes towards cooperative norms. In the experiment participants can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them a (local) punishment institution fosters cooperation. The degree of population viscosity (i.e. the extent to which matching is biased towards within-group interactions) is varied across treatments. We find that both, the share of participants that choose into the group with the punishment institution and the share of participants that cooperate, increase monotonically with the degree of population viscosity. Furthermore - with higher population viscosity - significantly more subjects claim to support a punishment institution in a post-experimental questionnaire. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 13 May 2013 19:30
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 16:17
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5815

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