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Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention

Keefer, Philip and Neumayer, Eric and Pluemper, Thomas (2011) 'Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention.' World Development, 39 (9). pp. 1530-1541. ISSN 0305-750X

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Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: disaster; mortality; political economy; democracy; risk; public goods
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
K Law > K Law (General)
T Technology > TH Building construction
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 30 Apr 2013 12:01
Last Modified: 08 Jan 2015 13:47

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