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Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes

Gartzke, Erik and Jo, Dong-Joon (2009) 'Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes.' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (2). pp. 209-233. ISSN 0022-0027

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Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: nuclear proliferation; nuclear weapons; militarized disputes; conflict diplomacy
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Carla Xena Galindo
Date Deposited: 11 Jul 2013 09:21
Last Modified: 11 Jul 2013 09:21

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