Research Repository

Abstention, ideology and information acquisition

Oliveros, S (2013) 'Abstention, ideology and information acquisition.' Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (3). 871 - 902. ISSN 0022-0531

[img]
Preview
Text
Abstention.pdf

Download (524kB) | Preview

Abstract

We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision. Voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology and intensity. In contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information, in equilibrium voters collect information of different qualities. We show that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated: some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are. We also discuss the manner in which incentives to acquire information are non-monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 04 Sep 2013 14:43
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 16:18
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7450

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item