Research Repository

Combinatorial Voting

Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2012) 'Combinatorial Voting.' Econometrica, 80 (1). 89 - 141. ISSN 0012-9682

[img]
Preview
Text
AHN_OLIVEROS_combinatorial_voting.pdf

Download (402kB) | Preview

Abstract

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi-issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner. © 2012 The Econometric Society.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 04 Sep 2013 14:37
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 16:17
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7533

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item