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Does collective responsibility for performance alter party strategies? Policy-seeking parties in proportional systems

Adams, J and Ezrow, L and Merrill, S and Somer-Topcu, Z (2013) 'Does collective responsibility for performance alter party strategies? Policy-seeking parties in proportional systems.' British Journal of Political Science, 43 (1). 1 - 23. ISSN 0007-1234

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Abstract

Adams and Merrill have developed a model of policy-seeking parties in a parliamentary democracy competing in a PR electoral system, in which party elites are uncertain about voters' evaluations of the parties' valence attributes such as competence, integrity and charisma. This article extends that model to situations where voters hold coalitions of parties collectively responsible for their valence-related performances, such as how voters evaluate governing parties' competence in handling issues like the economy, crime and foreign policy crises. It may also be relevant to voters' evaluations of proto-coalitions of opposition parties. Computations suggest the central substantive conclusions reported in Adams and Merrill extend to this generalized model, and that collective responsibility enhances coalition members' incentives to converge to similar policy positions but depresses their prospects of achieving their policy objectives. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2013 15:37
Last Modified: 05 Feb 2019 17:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7544

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