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Famine Mortality, Rational Political Inactivity, and International Food Aid

Pluemper, Thomas and Neumayer, Eric (2009) 'Famine Mortality, Rational Political Inactivity, and International Food Aid.' World Development, 37 (1). pp. 50-61. ISSN 0305-750X

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Abstract

Famine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. We develop a political theory of famine mortality based on the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. [Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. M., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2002). Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders. British Journal of Political Science, 32(4), 559–590, Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow J. M. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. We argue that it can be politically rational for a government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat. We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover, a larger share of people being affected by famine relative to population size together with large quantities of international food aid being available will lower the mortality in both regime types, but more so in democracies.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: famine; mortality; food aid; democracy; autocracy; developing countries
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 18 Sep 2013 06:36
Last Modified: 16 Jul 2015 12:07
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7605

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