Research Repository

Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

Condorelli, Daniele (2013) 'Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources.' Games and Economic Behavior, 82. 582 - 591. ISSN 0899-8256

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics. I solve for the optimal mechanism. The choice between market or non-market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Non-market mechanisms, Rationing, Mechanism design
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HA Statistics
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 18 Oct 2013 12:14
Last Modified: 06 Feb 2019 12:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8189

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item