McMullin, I (2013) 'Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility.' Kantian Review, 18 (01). pp. 49-72. ISSN 1369-4154

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Abstract

The notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant's moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act ? a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant's moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant's theory, since the act of attributing radical evil to one's freedom is an inauguration into the autonomous stance.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	autonomy; obligation; incentive; innate propensity; intelligible act; maxim; moral law; radical evil; respect; responsibility
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy and Art History, School of
SWORD Depositor:	Elements
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	10 Dec 2013 11:20
Last Modified:	15 Jan 2022 00:52
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8247

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