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Public Sector Reforms, Privatisation and Regimes of Control in a Chinese Enterprise

Xu, Wen and Uddin, Shahzad (2008) Public Sector Reforms, Privatisation and Regimes of Control in a Chinese Enterprise. Working Paper. EBS Working Papers, University of Essex, Colchester.


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The Chinese economic reform has recently become a major focus of attention around the world. The underlying rationale for the Chinese governmentís privatisation and public sector reforms is the view that reformed state enterprises and privately managed firms will demonstrate superior management control and better performance, and hence encourage economic growth and employment. There are very few intensive case studies published in English journals studying whether firms privatised in China have reversed previous losses and introduced better management controls, leading to increased investment, productivity, and overall organizational effectiveness and efficiency. The researchers do not seek to deny the control problems of Chinese SOEs, but question the consequences of the new controls installed during the post-privatisation period. The paper also reveals a declining tendency in employment; altered distributions of wealth - especially to the state - and labour, and a lack of improvements in the accountability of privatised companies. Overall, the paper argues, the aims of reform policies in China, including better control, increased profitability and an improved working life for Chinese people, have not materialized. The paper calls for more research on the above issues in the Chinese context.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Essex Business School
Faculty of Social Sciences > Essex Business School > Essex Accounting Centre
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 06 Jan 2014 12:57
Last Modified: 13 Nov 2015 16:07

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