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Strategic immunization and group structure

Galeotti, A and Rogers, BW (2013) 'Strategic immunization and group structure.' American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (2). 1 - 32. ISSN 1945-7669

StrImmfile31-AEJrev.pdf - Accepted Version

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We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions generate highly asymmetric equilibrium outcomes between ex ante identical groups. When groups have an underlying difference, even a small amount of intergroup contact generates large asymmetries.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 30 Jan 2014 11:29
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2019 00:15

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