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Informed Trading and the "Leakage" of Information

Goenka, Aditya (2000) Informed Trading and the "Leakage" of Information. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.

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Abstract

This paper, in a Shapley-Shubik market game framework, examines the effect of "leakage" of information: private information becoming available to uninformed traders at a later date. We show that (a) If information acquisition by the informed traders is costless, this leads to faster revelation of information; (b) If information acquisition is costly, there may be no acquisition of information; (c) Information leakage leads to a fall in value of information and hence, increases the incentive for informed traders to sell the information.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Informed trading, insider trading, strategic market games, information revelation, arrival of information, market efficiency
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jenny Connolly
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 15:17
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2014 15:17
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8835

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