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Eliminating the Inflationary Finance Trap in a Politically Unstable Country: Domestic Politics versus International Pressure

Bohn, Frank (2002) Eliminating the Inflationary Finance Trap in a Politically Unstable Country: Domestic Politics versus International Pressure. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.

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Abstract

This paper presents an intertemporal political economy model of public finance relevant for developing and transition countries where there is inherent political instability. As in Cukierman et al. (1992), it is shown that political instability causes myopic behaviour by a rational government resulting in high levels of revenue from seigniorage. It is then argued that inflationary finance also increases barter and currency substitution, but if the government tries to suppress them, seigniorage taxation rises even more. Only international financial pressure can help eliminate the inflationary finance trap, but becomes less effective as the instability increases.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: political instability, political economy, developing and transition countries, IMF conditionality, seigniorage taxation, government revenue
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 14:53
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2014 14:53
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8853

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