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Agenda Setting Power in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players

Muthoo, Abhinay and Shepsle, Kenneth (2003) Agenda Setting Power in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.


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This paper presents an analysis of the allocation of agenda-setting (or bargaining) power in organizations with overlapping generations of players. Such powers are typically institutionalized within an organization’s structure, and, given the focus of this paper, we identify the former with the latter. Our analysis concerns organizations (such as the US Senate) in which the number of periods each player participates is endogenously determined by his or her past performance. We derive several results and insights concerning (i) optimal organizational structure and (ii) conditions under which the unique, dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained (in equilibrium) in organizations with suboptimal structures. For example, we show that under a broad set of conditions, the optimal organizational structure should involve a seniority system, in which most of the agenda-setting power is allocated to the oldest generation of players.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 14:23
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2014 14:23

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