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Games Played in a Contracting Environment

Bhaskar, V (2004) Games Played in a Contracting Environment. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.

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Abstract

We analyze situations where a player must contract with the monopoly supplier of an essential input in order to play an action in a strategic form game. Supplier monopoly power does not distort the equilibrium distribution over player actions under private contracting, but may dramatically affect the equilibrium actions under public contracting. When a player randomizes between actions, suppliers for the different actions behave as though they are producing perfect substitutes when contracts are private; when contracts are public, it is as though they are producing perfect complements.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Additional Information: Updated March 2005
Uncontrolled Keywords: multi-party contracting, mixed strategy equilibria, marginal contribution, perfect substitutes, perfect complements
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 13:55
Last Modified: 27 Jan 2016 14:25
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8878

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