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Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment

Bhaskar, V (2005) Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.

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Abstract

Bagwell (1995) argues that commitment in undermined by the slightest imperfectness in observation. Guth, Ritzberger & Kirchsteiger (1998) question this assertion: for any finite leader-follower game, with arbitrary many players in each role and generic payoffs, they show that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that is accessible, i.e. it can be approximated by the outcome of a mixed equilibrium of the game with imperfect observation. We show that accessibility fails in a class of games played in economic environments, where the payoffs to commitment actions depend upon prices set by other agents, prices being chosen from a continuum. Accessibility requires either that commitment is not required or that the price setting agents have no monopoly power. Our result follows from a generalized indifference principle which mixed strategies must satisfy in such economic environments.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: imperfect observation, mixed strategies.
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 13:19
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2014 13:19
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8887

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