Research Repository

Correlated Equilibrium and the Pricing of Public Goods

Ostroy, Joseph and Song, Joon (2006) Correlated Equilibrium and the Pricing of Public Goods. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.

[img]
Preview
Text
dp616.pdf

Download (225kB) | Preview

Abstract

Lindahl equilibrium is an application of price-taking behavior to achieve efficiency in the allocation of public goods. Such an equilibrium requires individuals to be strategically naive, i.e., Lindahl equilibrium is not incentive compatible. Correlated equilibrium is defined precisely to take account of strategic behavior and incentive compatibility. Using the duality theory of linear programming, we show that these two seemingly disparate notions can be combined to give a public goods, Lindahl pricing characterization of efficient correlated equilibria. We also show that monopoly theory can be used to characterize inefficient correlated equilibria.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 11:58
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2014 11:58
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8905

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item