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Survival of Political Leadership

Nurmikko, Sanna (2008) Survival of Political Leadership. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.


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We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium, the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources available to the leader; the lower is army’s potential punishment and salary offered by the opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent’s potential punishment; and when the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is short-sighted enough.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 11:15
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2014 11:15

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