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An Evolutionary Game Approach to the Issues of Migration, Nationalism, Assimilation and Enclaves

da Silva Rocha, Andre Barreira (2010) An Evolutionary Game Approach to the Issues of Migration, Nationalism, Assimilation and Enclaves. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.


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I use evolutionary game theory to address the relation between nationalism and immigration, studying how two different populations in a country, one composed of national citizens and the other of immigrants, evolve over time. Both populations depart from some polymorphic initial state. A national citizen may behave either nationalistically or may welcome immigrants. Immigrants may have an interest in learning the host country language or not. I also account for the presence of enclaves, which make the immigrants’ own population effects important. The results show that six types of evolutionary equilibria are possible, although they never co-exist in the state space. A low cost of learning the host country language leads to complete assimilation of immigrants over time. Enclaves make assimilation a less competitive strategy. A high cost of learning may lead to peaceful multiculturalism or to political instability depending on the ability of policy makers to prevent nationalistic attitudes.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Evolutionary games, replicator dynamics, migration, nationalism, enclaves
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 09:49
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2014 09:49

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