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Housing tenure choices with private information

Halket, Jonathan R and Pignatti, Matteo (2012) Housing tenure choices with private information. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]

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Abstract

We model the provision of owner-occupied versus rental housing services as a competitive search economy where households have private information over their expected duration. Owning solves the private information problem at the cost of double search. With public information, households with low vacancy hazard rates pay lower rents and search in thicker markets. With private information, housing is under-provided to long-duration households to discourage short-duration households from searching there. If a household has a high enough expected duration, rental distortions become large enough that she prefers to own. Customizing a house ameliorates the information problem while rent control exacerbates it.

Item Type: ["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]
Uncontrolled Keywords: HB;; adverse selection; competitive search; housing tenure
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 09:53
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2022 00:55
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8961

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