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Housing tenure choices with private information

Halket, Jonathan R and Pignatti, Matteo (2012) Housing tenure choices with private information. [UNSPECIFIED]

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Abstract

We model the provision of owner-occupied versus rental housing services as a competitive search economy where households have private information over their expected duration. Owning solves the private information problem at the cost of double search. With public information, households with low vacancy hazard rates pay lower rents and search in thicker markets. With private information, housing is under-provided to long-duration households to discourage short-duration households from searching there. If a household has a high enough expected duration, rental distortions become large enough that she prefers to own. Customizing a house ameliorates the information problem while rent control exacerbates it.

Item Type: UNSPECIFIED
Uncontrolled Keywords: HB;, adverse selection, competitive search, housing tenure
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 09:53
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 17:53
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8961

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