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Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values

Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2013) Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values. Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Consider the problem of deciding a winner among three alternatives when voters have common values, but private information regarding the values of the alternatives. We compare approval voting with other scoring rules. For any finite electorate, the best equilibrium under approval voting is more efficient than either plurality rule or negative voting. If any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information in large elections, then approval voting must do so as well.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 09:33
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 10:24
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8983

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