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Aggregation of endogenous information in large elections

Oliveros, S (2013) Aggregation of endogenous information in large elections. UNSPECIFIED. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.

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Abstract

We study aggregation of information when voters can collect information of different precision, with increased precision entailing an increasing marginal cost. In order to properly understand the incentives to collect information we introduce another dimension of heterogeneity: on top of the ideological dimension we allow for different levels of intensity in preferences. Contrary to traditional models of endogenous information, in equilibrium, there are voters collecting information of different qualities. After characterizing all symmetric Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies for arbitrary rules of election and fairly general distribution of types. We study information aggregation in symmetric electorates and show that information aggregates even when voters collect information of different qualities.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Endogenous Information, Aggregation of Information, Heterogeneity
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Users 161 not found.
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 09:32
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 17:53
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/8984

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