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Contesting Hybridity: *Evangelistas* and *Kataristas* in Highland Bolivia*

ANDREW CANESSA

Abstract. Two of the most striking aspects of social change in recent decades in Latin America have been the rise of indigenist movements and the spread of evangelical Protestantism. To date they have been analysed separately, but this article shows that a comparison of the two in the context of Bolivia can prove highly productive. Although in many respects *evangelismo* and *katarismo* are diametrically opposed, there are some striking similarities. They draw their adherents from the same social base, undermine the notion of a homogeneous nation-state and also clearly reject the position of cultural *mestizaje* at the root of Bolivian state ideology. Thus, at a time when ‘hybridised’ cultural forms are supposed to be becoming more common in Latin America and around the world, these two social movements explicitly contest hybridity.

Introduction

Two of the most striking aspects of social change in recent decades in Latin America have been the rise of indigenist movements and the spread of evangelical Protestantism. During the past decade indigenous groups have been organising and struggling for their rights, from the Zapatistas in Mexico to the Mapuche in Chile. Commentators have noted that ‘The Indian’ is returning to public consciousness in Latin America after centuries during which his disappearance has been predicted.¹ The project of creating homogenous nation-states in Latin America composed of a hybridised mestizo ‘raza cósmica’ is being seriously challenged by such movements. It is becoming increasingly clear that these indigenous groups, what Bonfil has described as ‘nations in potential’, are beginning to realise a very different vision of the contemporary nation-state.² No less dramatic, and equally challenging to Latin Americans’ sense of national

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¹ Xavier Albó, ‘El Retorno del Indio’, *Revista Andina*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1991), pp. 299–345; Phillip Wearne, *The Return of the Indian* (London, 1996).

² Guillermo Bonfil (ed.), *Utopía y revolución. El pensamiento político contemporáneo de los indios en América Latina* (Mexico, 1981), p. 30.

identity, is the phenomenal expansion of evangelical Protestant groups across the continent.³ The successful state religion of Catholicism no longer provides a unifying symbol of nationhood, and is being challenged on many different fronts, not least from within. Notable among these are the Protestant evangelical churches that have spread rapidly all over the region, and are particularly prominent in Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, El Salvador and Chile, among others.

At first glance, these two social phenomena seem to be entirely distinct, and have generally been treated as such. Whereas indigenous nationalism may seem to fall naturally under the rubric of 'new' social movements or within the rapidly-expanding literature on new nationalisms, the study of evangelical Protestantism has been assigned to an entirely different realm.⁴ Indeed, whereas Christian Base Communities and liberation theology are sometimes examined in terms of new social movements,⁵ the evangelicals are generally seen as being antithetical to the idea of a social movement, since they are widely considered to be politically conservative. It is not, however, a basic criterion of social movements that they be progressive and left-wing.⁶ 'New' social movements are characterised by their departure from class-based politics and a tendency to be more narrowly focused. Evangelical Protestant groups are not consciously organised around a political goal, but they do mobilise a large number of people around a particular end, and have as their goal a radical change of society. Although their aims may not be overtly political, their mobilisation has significant political consequences, as we shall see below. The exclusion of evangelical Protestant groups from the literature of new social movements may thus owe more to analysts' own subjective preferences and prejudices than to any intrinsic difficulty in applying the theoretical framework of social movements to evangelical groups. The principal aim of this article is not, however, to demand that evangelical Protestantism be incorporated into new social movement theory (although this may be seen as a small step in that direction), but rather to provide an analysis which allows for a productive comparison of evangelical Protestantism and indigenous nationalism.

This article examines evangelical Protestantism and indigenous nationalism in highland Bolivia. It will be shown that while they have contrasting, and even contradictory, views of 'traditional' native culture, modernisation and religion, they both, nevertheless, provide coherent

³ David Stoll, *Is Latin America turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth* (Berkeley, 1990), David Martin, *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America* (Oxford, 1990).

⁴ Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (London, 1997).

⁵ Joe Foweraker, *Theorising Social Movements*. (London, 1995). ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

critiques of a racially and culturally mixed mestizo state. That is, they both explicitly and fervently reject the kind of cultural mixing that has been state ideology in the past,⁷ and which in recent years has been seen as a central feature of cultures in Latin America,⁸ along with other parts of the world at the periphery of global capitalism.⁹ Or, to put it another way, instead of the multiplicity of identities, the fluidity of boundaries and cultural 'hybridisation'¹⁰ or 'creolisation'¹¹ which the prophets of postmodernity would have us believe is spreading inexorably around the world, significant groups in highland Bolivia are explicitly contesting these new cultural forms. They are, of course, 'hybrid' forms themselves (indeed, one could not imagine how they would be anything else),¹² and may be considered to be products of the globalisation of culture and capital, even though their adherents would reject this description. The central point, however, is that both of these movements insist on clear categories of identity and conspicuously challenge the kind of 'established' hybridity and normative models of *mestizaje* that have been promoted in Latin America.

There is something of an irony here, for cultural mixing has of course been happening in Latin America from the very day the Europeans arrived. In the areas of religion and art new 'hybrid' forms were created almost immediately,¹³ and the same is true for every other aspect of social life and production. In many countries, such as Mexico, Peru and Bolivia, hybridity in this sense has been the norm for at least the past five centuries, and has shaped state ideology for much of the present one. It appears that just as some scholars have discovered cultural synthesis and fusion, substantial groups of people are rejecting it.

One aspect of contemporary notions of hybridity is the spatial or cultural displacement of significant proportions of the population as communities and individuals migrate and create new 'hybrid' cultural

⁷ Mexico after the Revolution is perhaps the most striking example of this; see, for example, Jane Hindley, 'Towards a Pluricultural Nation: The Limits of *Indigenismo* and Article 4', in Rob Aitken et al. (eds.) *Dismantling the Mexican State?* (New York, 1996). Other countries, however, soon followed suit, including Bolivia.

⁸ Néstor García Canclini, *Transforming Modernity: Popular Culture in Mexico* (Austin, 1993); Roberto Schwarz, *Misplaced Ideas: Essays on Brazilian Culture*, edited and with an introduction by John Gledson (London, 1992), pp. 1–18.

⁹ Ulf Hannerz, *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organisation of Meaning* (New York, 1992).

¹⁰ Néstor García Canclini, *Culturas híbridas: estrategias para entrar y salir de la modernidad* (Mexico, 1990).

¹¹ Ulf Hannerz, *Cultural Complexity*.

¹² The idea of cultural hybridity implicitly depends on an idea of cultures which are not hybrids but any culture borrows and reinterprets elements as it goes through history. This process may be faster or slower, more or less visible, but it is surely universal.

¹³ See, for example, Sabine MacCormack, *Religion of the Andes* (Princeton, 1991) and Teresa Gisbert, *Iconografía y mitos indígenas en el arte* (La Paz, 1980).

forms. In the Central Andes, however, this is hardly a recent phenomenon. For at least the last two millennia people have been moving for economic, religious or political reasons. The city of Cuzco under the Inkas was a most cosmopolitan place, and in their Empire tens of thousands of people regularly moved hundreds of miles to pay tribute in mines and cities, or to colonise on behalf of the state. Indeed one of the characteristic patterns of Andean settlement is the archipelago,¹⁴ which created a patchwork of ethnicities and languages.

This pattern of largely economic and political migration continued in the colonial period as people settled in towns forming an urban *cholo* class while retaining cultural and economic links with their kin in the countryside. In the words of Gruzinski and Wachtel, 'the Andean world ... was, from the sixteenth century on, a theatre of multiple cultural confrontations, of intermixings, migrations, and interbreeding that engendered new collective identities'.¹⁵ In twentieth century Bolivia this is evidenced in the case of cities such as La Paz as well as Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí and others.¹⁶ Harris and Albó have demonstrated the important connections between indigenous miners and peasants in the Norte de Potosí up to the present day, where modern forms of industrial relationship not only co-exist with but also depend upon more 'traditional' economic and social structures.¹⁷ Others have noted that indian identity can only be seen as a product of an historical relationship with metropolitan Bolivian culture,¹⁸ which, in turn, is produced through its contrastive relationship with 'the indian'.¹⁹ In all these and myriad

¹⁴ J. Murra, 'El "Control Vertical" de un Máximo de Pisos Ecológicos en la Economía de las Sociedades Andinas', in J. Murra (ed.), *Visita de la Provincia de León de Huanuco [1562]. Inigo Ortiz de Zuñiga, Visitador*, Vol. II (Huanuco, 1972), pp. 429–76.

¹⁵ Serge Gruzinski & Nathan Wachtel, 'Cultural interbreedings: Constituting the Majority as a Minority', *Comparative Study of Society and History*, vol. 37 (1997), p. 240.

¹⁶ X. Albó, T. Greaves and G. Sandoval, *Chukiyawu: La Cara Aymara de La Paz*, vols I–IV (La Paz, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1987).

¹⁷ Olivia Harris and Xavier Albó, *Monteras y guardatojos: Campesinos y mineros en el Norte de Potosí* (La Paz, 1975).

¹⁸ I prefer the term 'indian' over 'indigenous'. 'Indigenous' is drawn from natural history and means 'belonging naturally to the region'. There is a certain absurdity in talking of indigeneity in the Andes since the vast majority of Andeans have some descent from the people the conquistadors met. Indigenous also implies being of 'pure' native descent. One would need to include millions of such people who do not see themselves as indigenous nor are seen by others as indigenous and thus the term has limited analytical purchase. 'Indian' on the other hand, in the American context, more clearly indicates a culturally constructed identity. In the American context, 'indian' is an ethnic, not national term, and therefore I follow the usage of writing this word in lower case in the same way as other such categories, e.g. mestizo, black, mulatto. See Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity*, p. 121.

¹⁹ Thomas Abercrombie, 'To be Indian to be Bolivian', in *Nation States and Indians in Latin America*, G. Urban and J. Scherzer (eds.) (Austin, 1991), pp. 95–130.

other circumstances, people and their cultures clashed, merged, fused, synthesised and, naturally, hybridised. We would thus expect the northern highlands of Bolivia, a metropolis surrounded by an Aymara-speaking peasant hinterland,²⁰ to provide good examples of hybrid cultural forms, examples of ‘a theatre of multiple cultural confrontations’, and this area does indeed provide many such.

The Aymara-speaking migrants to the city of La Paz and their descendants, or their kin in provincial towns with easy access to the metropolis, can be described as ‘deterritorialised’,²¹ a term which not only refers to being displaced from a point of origin, as in the case with migrants to cities, but also to ‘a “liberation” from cultural rootedness and filiation’.²² It is precisely such a group where one might suppose to find cultural hybridity, where ‘identities are formed out of “inbetweenness”’; and differences are not necessarily between nations, ethnic and linguistic groups, but rather are stylistic, and express the self-fashioning of sub-groups and inflection onto the generic international media culture’.²³ Indeed, in these highlands we find the very kinds of cultural forms which typify what is presented as hybrid culture in Latin America: the ceramics and *artesanía* echoing ‘traditional’ themes but clearly removed from them; practices which once had spiritual meaning now reproduced as folklore;²⁴ deities such as the *Pachamama* earth goddess reincarnated as the mother of all Bolivians celebrated in the in-flight magazine of the national airline.²⁵

It is equally clear, however, that not all ‘deterritorialised’ people in highland Bolivia embrace and generate hybrid cultural forms in the same way. By focusing on material culture, commentators have failed to notice that other members of this group explicitly reject hybrid forms of culture as being degenerate. The argument here is not that they are somehow ‘untainted’ by contemporary forms of popular culture, but rather that they consciously attempt to resist the merging of cultural forms. Most importantly, this resistance is located, not in the area of material culture and performance art, but in the less concrete realm of religion and ethnic identity. Here identities are not formed out of ‘in-betweenness’ since ‘in-

²⁰ The author conducted anthropological research among Aymara-speakers in the northern highlands of Bolivia in 1989–1992, 1993 and 1998.

²¹ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (New York, 1971); Jean Franco, ‘Globalization and the Crisis of the Popular’, in Tom Salman (ed.), *The Legacy of the Disinherited. Popular Culture in Latin America: Modernity, Globalization, Hybridity and Authenticity* (Amsterdam, 1996), pp. 264–5, William Rowe and Vivian Schelling, *Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America* (London, 1991), p. 231.

²² Jean Franco, ‘Globalization and the Crisis of the Popular’, p. 265. ²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ See William Rowe and Vivian Schelling, *Memory and Modernity*.

²⁵ Olivia Harris, ‘La Pachamama: significados de la madre en el discurso boliviano’, in *Latinoamericanas: Diez ensayos en una historia colectiva* (Lima, 1988), pp. 7–75.

betweenness' is precisely what is rejected; and not only is difference constructed as being rather more than stylistic but is rooted in the unfashionable essentialisms of nation, race, ethnicity and religion.²⁶ What is worthy of note here is not that one can find forms of hybridity, which is in any case to be expected, but that certain historical forms of hybridity are being rejected.

There are also those highland indians who are less 'deterritorialised', with cohesive and functioning communities that continue to organise on a 'traditional' basis. These groups, however, are much less concerned with defining clearly a national identity or religious orthodoxy. The apparent paradox is that in the northern highlands it is those who might be termed 'traditionalists' who continue to feel most comfortable with synthetic religious practices, assimilationist cultural ideologies and whose sense of identity is founded on relative and shifting categories;²⁷ it is amongst those who are at the forefront of modernisation that we find groups who denounce syncretism, reject cultural (and racial) *mestizaje*, and hold true to essentialist categories of identity.

It is in the metropolitan areas of the northern highlands of Bolivia where the most clearly-articulated rejection of standard forms of hybridity is to be found. The northern highlights of the department of La Paz is, in Bolivian terms, a densely-populated area and includes the capital city. The population is predominantly rural and largely Aymara-speaking. Even the capital city includes several hundred thousand Aymara-speakers. The region also includes the ruins of the capital of the Tiwanaku civilisation, which is now seen by many as the original site of the Aymara nation.²⁸ This area holds over a third of Bolivia's Protestants and it is also the area where indigenous nationalism has the largest number of supporters. Obviously, such nationalism is concentrated among indian groups, but so too is Protestantism.

How then to account for the rise of these kinds of movements in the northern highlands in recent years? It is quite common to see both as having something to do with (post)modernity and changing economic

²⁶ See Jean Franco, 'Globalization and the Crisis of the Popular'. In this they may be considered to be two more examples around the world of 'new' nationalisms and fundamentalist religions. Whereas it is perhaps more common for fundamental religion and resurgent nationalism to be closely allied in examples from the USA, India, Iran, Pakistan, etc., in Bolivia the 'new' nationalism of the *kataristas* and the fundamentalism of the *evangelistas* share a mutual antipathy.

²⁷ Andrew Canessa, 'Procreation, Personhood and Ethnic Difference in Highland Bolivia', *Ethnos*, vol. 63, no. 2 (1998), pp. 227-47.

²⁸ There is, however, no indication that Tiwanaku was anything like an Aymara *nation* although it is quite likely that at least some of its residents spoke Aymara. There is also considerable evidence that they may also have spoken Pukina and, in any case, Tiwanaku had important cultural links with Wari which is now situated in Peru.

and political structure, where conditions that promote diversity deepen.²⁹ This line of reasoning presents indian nationalism as an example of the fracturing of the nation-state as global economies erode the clarity of national boundaries and undermine the cohesion of national identity, while simultaneously increasing inequalities. These inequalities disproportionately affect indigenous minorities, as the case of the Zapatistas clearly attests. The spread of Protestantism, too, has been seen in the context of modernising economies and social structures.³⁰ As old social organisations such as the Roman Catholic Church and the hacienda system lose their legitimacy, confidence and power, charismatic evangelical groups provide a new sense of religiosity and community.³¹ Similarly, with economic changes undermining the collective structures of indigenous communities, evangelicals provide a new set of mores and practices more appropriate to a market-oriented and individualistic economy.³² For example, Protestants' rejection of fiestas and fictive kinship, important means of redistributing resources in the community, allows individuals to accumulate capital. Similarly, the stress on literacy and education provides Protestants with the intellectual capital increasingly necessary in the modern world. The response of two sectors of what one could term 'deterritorialised indian society' to these new challenges could not be more different. Evangelical Protestants, *evangelistas*, reject paganism and many important aspects of 'traditional' culture; they look towards the West, especially the United States, for examples and orientation; and believe in an individualistic ethic rooted in a moral community. *Kataristas*, that is Aymara nationalists, seek to revitalise indian culture and religion. They are highly critical of much of Western culture which they see as oppressive and imperialist, especially that exemplified by the United States; and they believe in a collectivist ethic rooted in the indian race and the Aymara nation. At its simplest, *katarismo* represents an attempt to produce a meaningful indigenous alternative to the Western model of modernity.³³

Despite these striking contrasts, it is the basic thesis of this article that *katarismo* and evangelical Protestantism are parallel but opposing responses to the same social dynamic. We shall now examine the

²⁹ Michael Kearney, 'Indigenous ethnicity and mobilisation in Latin America' vol. 23, no. 2, *Latin American Perspectives*, (1996), p. 8.

³⁰ David Martin, *Tongues of Fire*.

³¹ Andrew Canessa, 'Evangelical Protestantism in the Northern Highlands of Bolivia', *Studies in World Christianity*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1998), pp. 21–40.

³² Ted Lewellen, *Peasants in Transition: The Changing Economy of the Peruvian Aymara* (Boulder, 1978).

³³ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, 'Democracia liberal y democracia de ayllu: el caso de Norte Potosí, Bolivia', in Carlos Toranzo Roca (ed.), *El difícil camino hacia la democracia* (La Paz, 1990).

development of each in turn, particularly in the context of the profound social and political changes brought about by the 1952 Revolution in Bolivia.

Katarismo

The 1952 Revolution is a major landmark in modern Bolivian history. Despite providing the clearest expression of the homogenous nation-state under an ideology of *mestizaje*, it opened up the political space for indians to organise around a coherent identity. Resentment against the state and the status of metropolitan cultural ideology grew as it became apparent to indians that they continued to be marginalised and co-opted at best. By the 1990s indian groups had managed, at quite a profound level, to change the cultural ideology of the state, and to open up a more public space for their concerns *qua* indians to be aired.

In 1952 the land-owning oligarchy of Bolivia was overthrown in a revolution, and in the following year the revolutionary government, often under pressure, enacted a series of reforms which had far-reaching consequences. The Agrarian Reform of 1953, under the motto 'land to those who work it' returned land to the peasantry and ended the hegemony of the hacienda-owners. Schools were built in virtually every village over the next twenty years. Unable to eke a living off the land, many indians took advantage of their new freedom to travel, and migrated in their tens of thousands to the capital city of La Paz. The spread of education and improved communications meant that populations which were previously illiterate and monolingual were exposed to a very different way of life, one that was preached over the radio and in the schools in the middle of their villages. The principal aim behind these schools was quite explicitly to create new Bolivians, and to create a new homogenous national identity. In many communities, the chapel or church maintained by the *hacendado* fell into disuse and to some extent the school replaced it. Where the church had been the means through which indians were integrated into colonial and national culture, the school would now turn indians into Bolivians through the agency of the schoolteacher.

In this context, the word *indio* (indian) was legally prohibited and replaced in most contexts by *campesino* (peasant), with the aim of obliterating any kind of ethnic and racial difference between Bolivians: it was the role of schools to turn indians into mestizos. Thus, as was the case with the Mexican Revolution,³⁴ Bolivian nationalist ideology exalted a mestizo identity at the expense of an indian one. The new state needed the rural masses to lend it legitimacy while, at the same time, it felt the need

³⁴ Jane Hindley, 'Towards a Pluricultural nation', p. 226.

to eradicate the retarding cultural elements of an anachronistic indian population.³⁵ Thus indians, to borrow a phrase from Martín Barbero, were subject to an 'abstract inclusion but a concrete exclusion',³⁶ all the more so since they were no longer supposed to exist, and now only received recognition for their colourful folklore.

A distinct indian identity and culture was actively suppressed during this period but, at the same time, it was in the post-revolutionary period that Aymara nationalism had its roots. The revolution opened up political space (albeit small) for indianist groups by ushering in a period of relative democracy and pluralism. This post-Revolutionary period can be seen as the first phase of modern indian nationalism.

More importantly, it effected a massive migration of Aymara-speaking indians to the cities, as well as beginning a process of mass education in the country. With widespread education and expanding communication, indians were being exposed to metropolitan values and structures as never before. Not all indians of the period unequivocally embraced the assimilationist model, and one of the more articulate responses was from the Indian Party of Bolivia (Partido Indio de Bolivia). The PIB ideology was strongly anti-Western and anti-Christian, advocating the extermination of whites and mestizos.³⁷ For two decades after the Revolution, the PIB and its energetic leader, Fausto Reina, carried the torch of the Indianist movement. The movement had very limited success in this period because indian communities were successfully co-opted into a syndicalist structure³⁸ controlled from the metropolis and later on in a pact with the military, the Pacto Militar-Campesino (1966–1979). By the middle of the seventies, despite enthusiastically courting the indians for political support and conferring on them a central position, as *campesinos*, in political rhetoric, neither the democratic government of the post-revolutionary years nor the populist military regimes of the late sixties and early seventies had produced much of benefit for rural people.

By the mid-seventies, the hundreds and thousands of indians who had been drawn into metropolitan culture were becoming increasingly aware

³⁵ Indeed, this problem is not unique to Bolivia, or Latin America for that matter. European nations, too, had to deal with the subaltern masses which defined the nation and gave it legitimacy while being at the same time considered ignorant, superstitious and backward. See Néstor García Canclini, *Transforming Modernity*.

³⁶ Jesús Martín Barbero, *De los medios a las mediaciones* (Mexico 1987) in Néstor García Canclini, *Culturas híbridas*, p. 194.

³⁷ Policarpio Rojas Ramírez, *Historia de levantamientos indígenas en Bolivia, 1978–1985* (La Paz, 1989); Fausto Reina, *La revolución india* (La Paz, 1969).

³⁸ Indian communities were basically unionised with elected secretary generals, secretaries for justice, roads, education and a host of other offices. These were incorporated into the national syndicalist structure. Many indian communities continue to organise themselves internally along the lines of annual elections to these offices.

that, despite the inclusive rhetoric of the state, indians in Bolivia were a despised and marginalised people who were victims of systematic discrimination. Although the Revolution accorded citizenship to all Bolivians, this citizenship was based on the privatisation of communal lands, obligatory Spanish, and the disappearance of any vestiges of ethnic identity.³⁹ Indians had first to reject their own values, to absorb the denigration of their culture, before being accepted as citizens in the nation organised hierarchically on a clientelist basis. Some of these migrants and second-generation city dwellers began to investigate new forms of organisation that rejected the top-down approaches of the past. Moreover, they became concerned with issues of ethnic identity and personal dignity in the context of the hegemonic mestizo metropolitan culture.

In 1973 a number of these intellectuals travelled to the archaeological ruins of Tiwanaku and presented what is now known as the Tiwanaku manifesto, which proposed for the first time an Aymara nation. It was highly critical of one of the pillars of the 1952 Revolution, mass education. ‘La escuela no sólo busca convertir al indio en una especie de mestizo sin definición, ni personalidad, sino que persigue su asimilación a la cultura occidental y capitalista’⁴⁰ as one of its lines (in Spanish) reads. The manifesto clearly rejected the assimilationist model that had been taken for granted by liberal elites since the Revolution and indeed since independence from Spain.

The Tiwanaku Manifesto marked the start of the second phase of indian nationalism. Although Fausto Reinaga was recognised as an important contributor to indian nationalism, he was rapidly marginalised by the new groups congregating around the label, ‘*katarismo*’. *Katarismo*, though claiming roots in the distant past, is also a thoroughly modern phenomenon. The word *katarismo* is used here to describe Aymara-oriented nationalist groups because so many of them look for inspiration to the figure of Tupaq Katari,⁴¹ and regularly refer to themselves as

³⁹ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, ‘Democracia liberal y democracia de ayllu: el caso de Norte de Potosí, Bolivia’, in Carlos Toranzo Roca (ed.), *El difícil camino hacia la democracia* (La Paz, 1990), p. 48. ⁴⁰ P. Rojas Ramirez, *Historia de levantamientos*, p. 46.

⁴¹ Ejército Guerrillero Tupac Katari (EGTK), Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari (MRTK), Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari (MITKA), Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación (MRTKL), Frente Único de Liberación Katarista (FULKA) and Movimiento Katarista Nacional (MKN), to name the most significant. Some, such as the EGTK, are opposed to electoral politics and aim to achieve their ends through violent means. Others, such as MRTKL and FULKA, who do not reject constitutional means, stand at elections where the results give some measure of their support. In the 1988 general elections they were the only indianist parties to stand, and respectively won 14,595 and 11,002 votes in the Department of La Paz. See Diego Pacheco, *El indianismo y los indios contemporáneos en Bolivia* (La Paz, 1992), p. 216. In the elections of 1993, however, the MRTKL became a coalition partner of the MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario) and together they won the elections which

kataristas. Tupaq Katari was the name taken by Julián Apaza, the Aymara-speaking leader of the indian rebellion in 1780–83 caused by an increase in indian tribute, *mita*, and *repartimiento* by the Spanish Crown.⁴² Unlike his counterparts in Peru such as Tupaq Amaru, Tupaq Katari argued for the total banishment or elimination of the Colonial powers and proposed an indian-led government.⁴³ He is also known for his severe justice when it came to dealing with clerics, although he seems to have maintained his Christian faith. His anti-clericalism, which included the killing of priests and burning of churches is something which contemporary *kataristas* use as examples of his anti-Christian fervour.⁴⁴

One of the most salient features of the Katari myth is his demise. After two years of successful warfare, including twice laying siege to the city of La Paz in 1781, Julián Apaza was captured on 12 November of the same year and two days later he was quartered.⁴⁵ His dying words are said to have been: ‘Nayawa jiwtxa, nayjarusti waranqa waranqaranakawa kutanipxa – I die, but I shall return tomorrow as thousands and thousands.’ His brief successes against the Colonial powers and his prophecy of return continue to fire the imaginations of many today. Tupaq Katari is not dissimilar to King Arthur, the once and future king, who will come again to eject the invader and return things to their natural order.⁴⁶ The language of this return is that of the *pachakuti*, which can be

resulted in the leader of the MRTKL, Victor Hugo Cárdenas becoming Vice-president. Jenaro Flores (FULKA), Félix Cárdenas (Eje Pachakuti) and Fernando Untoja (MKN) were the other *katarista* candidates. The Eje Pachakuti was the only one of these to obtain enough votes for a seat in Parliament. See Xavier Albó ‘And from Kataristas to MNRistas? The Surprising and Bold Alliance between Aymaras and Neoliberals in Bolivia’, in Donna Lee van Cott (ed.), *Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America* (New York, 1994), p. 67. For a discussion of the evolution and splits that engendered many of these groups, see Javier Hurtado, *El Katarismo* and Diego Pacheco, *El indianismo y los indios*.

⁴² The revolt was actually started much further south by Tomás, Nicolás and Dámaso Katari from whom Julián Apaza took the name to signify the unity of the movement. See Victor Hugo Cárdenas, ‘La lucha de un pueblo’ in Xavier Albó (ed.), *Raíces de América – El mundo aymara* (Madrid, 1988), p. 502. The *kataristas* were also variously led by Julián’s wife, Bertolina Sisa, and sister, Gregoria Apaza, both of whom also took the name Katari and are well-remembered today.

⁴³ Javier Hurtado, *El Katarismo* (La Paz, 1986), p. 18.

⁴⁴ Felipe Qhispe Wanka, *Tupak Katari Vive y Vuelve ... ¡Carajo!* (La Paz, 1990), pp. 140–3. It should be noted, however, that not all *katarista* groups are equally anti-Christian, in particular not those who seek success in mass electoral politics.

⁴⁵ Bartolina Sisa, his companion and leader of the army, continued the struggle until she, too, was captured the following September, when she was hanged and quartered.

⁴⁶ In Peru the parallel phenomenon is that of ‘Inkarri’, the Inka king. Inkarri’s body is also believed to be growing underground or hiding in the jungle waiting for his triumphant return. See, for example, A. Flores Galindo, *Buscando un Inca: identidad y utopía en los Andes* (La Habana, 1986).

translated as the turning of the earth – literally, a revolution. But ‘kuti’ can also be translated as return and in this sense it refers to the return of Tupaq Katari and the values of the earth, ‘pacha’.⁴⁷ All over the northern *altiplano* one can see graffiti proclaiming that he still lives and will return. The language is strikingly similar to that of the evangelical Christians who proclaim that Jesus lives and who announce the second coming.

Although *katarismo* is a multifarious and somewhat inchoate movement, it taps into sentiments that stress a return to ‘traditional’ Aymara religion, a relationship with the pre-Inkaic and putatively Aymara civilisation of Tiwanaku, and the rejection of those elements of Western culture seen as oppressive and contrary to the basic tenets of the Aymara way of life. The political aim of this movement is the empowerment of Aymara groups on their own terms, and eventually political power on a national scale. ‘*Katarismo* is the recuperation of “long memory” obscured by the short memory of the Agrarian Reform’.⁴⁸

Katarismo has created what has hitherto never existed, a sense of an Aymara nation. Historically in the Andes, polities such as the Inka and Tiwanaku empires have been multilingual and multi-cultural. In contemporary Bolivia some very small ethnic groups may speak two languages and many other radically distinct groups may share a language. The idea of an ‘Aymara nation’, as in all other cases,⁴⁹ is rooted in a mixture of historical fact and contemporary invention. What the *kataristas* have discovered, as have other Latin American indians,⁵⁰ is that the language of nationhood is a coherent way of making the political elites recognise their concerns: economic and social issues are forcefully expressed through the language of nationhood and historical injustice.

It is important to note that the definition of ‘nation’, used here is not that in the sense of Gellner⁵¹ or Anderson⁵², who see it specifically in terms of the nation-state, but rather more broadly as the political action of a group which recognises itself as ethnically distinct. It is not necessary for this kind of nationalism to argue for a separate nation state. Whereas

⁴⁷ Pacha in Aymara is a highly evocative term and there is no room here to go into it in great detail but pacha is also the site of the tellurian deities to whom much indigenous ritual is directed. The pachakuti then is also the elevation of the indigenous nature gods to a position of hegemony as opposed to the domination by the sky gods of God the Father, Jesus and so on.

⁴⁸ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, ‘*Oppressed but not Defeated*’: *Peasant Struggles among the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia, 1900–1980* (Geneva 1987), p. 163.

⁴⁹ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1982).

⁵⁰ See, for example, Joanne Rappaport, *The Cumbe Reborn* (Berkeley, 1994).

⁵¹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1983).

⁵² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. (London, 1983).

many do, many others, such as the Zapatistas and most *kataristas*, do not. Nationalism can be minimally defined by the belief that ‘it is proper to expect from certain groups a specific sense of solidarity in the face of other groups’.⁵³ Weber stresses the normative aspect of this sense of nation. It is in this insistence that it is right and proper to see Aymaras as a distinct group that the multifarious *katarista* groups have had considerable success. That is, although *katarista* groups have not achieved great success in formal political terms, it is not the case that they have been unable to influence political agendas.

The first independent national peasant confederation, the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores de Bolivia, rose in the Aymara region out of the *katarista* movement in 1979, and was an important source of resistance to the dictatorship of García Meza (1980–1982).⁵⁴ The *kataristas* of the CSUTB, in regarding the peasantry not only as a class but also as an ethnic group, were strongly critical of some of the tenets of the 1952 Revolution. They were able to give political expression to the wide feeling of frustration and resentment in rural areas born of decades of manipulation and co-option by party and state.⁵⁵ At the same time, they were keen to maintain the syndicalist structure of peasant organisation even while they attempted to make it more representative of and responsive to the ethnic reality of its members.

If the advent of constitutional democracy as well as internecine strife damaged the *kataristas* in the second half of 1980s, the 1990s saw indian political demands making their way onto the national agenda. Even as the *katarista* movement split into ten parties, many of its proposals for a multinational state had been gaining broader support, partly in response to the national and international crisis on the left.⁵⁶ Especially since the march of thousands of indians to the capital in 1992, it has become increasingly clear to many non-indian Bolivians that the indian is not simply going to go away. The March for Territory and Dignity, which began in the eastern lowlands, comprised twelve ethnic groups who travelled 700 kilometres through the jungle and high Andean passes to the capital city, La Paz, where they were met by thousands of highlanders, many wearing ponchos and waving the multicoloured *wiphala* flag, the banner of the indian nation. The arrival of thousands of indians in the city rekindled old memories of the siege of La Paz by Tupaq Katari two

⁵³ Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley, 1978), p. 922.

⁵⁴ Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, ‘Cultura política de los aymaras y los quechuas en Bolivia. Acerca de las formas aymaras y quechuas en relacionarse con la modernidad’, in Max Peter Baumann (ed.), *Cosmología y música en los Andes* (Mexico, 1996).

⁵⁵ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, ‘Democracia liberal y democracia de ayllu’, p. 26.

⁵⁶ Xavier Albó, ‘And from Kataristas to MNRistas?’, p. 61.

hundred years previously,⁵⁷ memories of siege, starvation and death that still strike a highly emotive chord for many creole and mestizo Bolivians.⁵⁸

Whereas, up to the early 1990s, political parties made no concession to indian demands, today the current political discourses of the major parties stress the multicultural nature of Bolivian society. An important ideological space has been open up for celebrating difference, for valuing subaltern cultures in their own terms. This is partly, one supposes, in response to the pressure from populist parties such as *Conciencia de la Patria* (CONDEPA) in the city of La Paz which eloquently articulated the issues of marginalisation, racism and urban poverty and achieved various election successes in the late 1980s and nineties.⁵⁹ Even though led by the white 'Compadre' Palenque, CONDEPA was clearly directed at recent indian migrants to the city and even though Palenque's television programme was transmitted in Spanish, the Spanish spoken was frequently an 'Aymarised' Spanish. CONDEPA, according to Ströbel-Gregor, is in part an expression of a burgeoning urban Aymara identity although it expresses this identity in a rather unclear and diffuse way.⁶⁰

A much clearer and forceful expression of an Aymara consciousness is presented in the figure of Victor Hugo Cárdenas, the *katarista* Vice-president from 1993 to 1997.⁶¹ He wielded little power and exercised but moderate influence; the very fact of his presence in such a high office, however, may have changed the way indians are regarded in Bolivia. In particular, it was notable that he was in a coalition with the MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario) which led the national revolution in 1952 and had long been a vigorous advocate of the homogenous nation-state. Campaigning for the 1993 election, the leader of the MNR, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, talked of Bolivia as a 'nation of nations' a formulation which would have been unacceptable to the MNR four years previously.⁶²

At the time of the election there was much talk of Cárdenas, his electoral address in Aymara, Quechua and Guarani,⁶³ and the fact that his

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ It is not only in the distant past that indians have rebelled or laid siege to the city. There have been several uprisings this century and in 1979 Aymara miners and peasants successfully blockaded the city of La Paz for several days in protest at the military coup.

⁵⁹ Juliana Strobel-Gregor, 'Búsqueda de seguridad y formas propias de afirmación de la identidad social aimara urbana', *América Indígena*, vol. 3 (1992), pp. 165–77.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Victor Hugo Cárdenas, 'La lucha de un pueblo'. Cárdenas leads the MRTKL, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación.

⁶² Xavier Albó, 'And from Kataristas to MNRistas?', p. 56.

⁶³ Cárdenas was not only concerned with Aymara peasants. In 1993 he and the MRTKL assisted the Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani, a lowland indian organisation, in gaining a seat in parliament.

wife, Doña Lidia, still wore traditional indian dress. One upper-class white Bolivian half-jokingly commented to me that now when she was driving through certain areas of the capital city she had to be more careful because one of those *cholas* she almost knocks down could be the vice-president's wife! In this way she and Cárdenas, in the own persons, may have made some kind of a dent in the historical 'fact' that indians are, by definition, people of low status and marginal to Bolivian society.

Another of the important recent gains for indians inspired by *katarista* efforts is that La Paz is now officially a bilingual city, and citizens have the right to be addressed in Aymara as well as Spanish. Obliging functionaries to speak Aymara and having Aymara-speakers hear their language in an official capacity can only raise the status of the language and its speakers and undermine the notion of the mestizo Spanish-speaking nation.

Katarismo arose out of the landscape created by the 1952 Revolution and its aftermath. The economic, political and cultural changes that occurred during this period repressed and assimilated indian culture in accordance with government policy. Nevertheless, these same changes produced an educated and vociferous class of activists with enough symbolic capital to challenge state ideology at its very roots. The post-1952 state educated indians, improved communications and oversaw mass migration to the cities. It was also officially blind to the systemic racism at the very root of state ideology. As a result, the frustration of rural disadvantage and indian marginalisation became most coherently articulated in terms of the demands of an indian nation, an ethnically distinct group with certain rights within the state. That is, what might have been expressed in terms of problems of rural underinvestment or urban deprivation were seen as 'indian' issues because the state had for so long denied that there was an 'indian issue' at all. *Katarismo* in its various forms was able to articulate a whole range of issues, urban and rural, political and domestic, economic and religious, because people continued to be disadvantaged on account of their ethnic and racial identities. By ignoring difference and holding to naive ideologies of assimilation, the state allowed a strong sense of alienation and rejection to be felt by a large number of people – urban and rural, educated and uneducated – as they encountered metropolitan culture. *Katarismo* in its various forms was able to articulate the despair and frustration of many people through the trope of the indian nation.

Tupaq Katari is invoked by a variety of groups. Some, such as the Ayllus Rojos and the EGTK, are militant groups campaigning for an Aymara nation-state, others, such as the MRTKL, have their roots in social movements that seek to further the interests of indians within the existing nation-state, others still are myriad groups who use his name as

a mark of ethnic distinction and resistance. There are considerable differences between these groups, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article, but there is an important sense in which they all share fundamental assumptions about the position of indians in Bolivia.⁶⁴ They share an indianist discourse based on demands, which insists on seeing indians as sharing group rights (and injustices) rather than as individual citizens in a liberal nation state. To let off a bomb in the name of Tupaq Katari, or to name a woman's group after Bartolina Sisa is to articulate the distinctive nature of Aymara identity. This language of ethnic difference, whether spoken loudly or softly, has had an important effect on how Bolivians in general understand their nation and its composition.

Over time, the political party that has dominated electoral politics since 1952 has come full circle. From being the apotheosis of a party advocating a homogenous nation-state and pursuing policies with the expressed aim of deracinating indians, it has become the first important political player to express an idea of the nation that is multi-cultural and ethnically complex, and, most importantly, likely to stay that way. The ideology of *mestizaje* has given way to the ideology of multiculturalism; hybridity has been replaced by heterogeneity. An important part of this impulse to change has been the version of *katarismo* espoused by Cárdenas, which he has taken to the centre of national government. Cárdenas' *katarismo* asserts difference, but at the very centre of national power, and has thus managed to reverse the traditional position of indians in the ideology of the nation-state from one of 'abstract inclusion but concrete exclusion' to one of abstract exclusion but concrete inclusion,⁶⁵ for as it seeks to assert a distinct identity for indians it also introduces indians into the political process as players in their own right.⁶⁶

Indigenous movements, however, are not the only challenge to the homogenous mestizo nation-state. For five centuries, religion has been used to conquer, incorporate and unify a disparate society and nation. Catholicism, however perfunctorily practised, united all Bolivians in Christian civilisation, even as some were deemed more 'civilised' than others. Catholicism's cosmopolitanism, in that for centuries it attempted to assimilate local cultural practices into its own,⁶⁷ is concordant with the

⁶⁴ For a general discussion on *katarista* groups and their various unions and divisions, see Hurtado, *El Katarismo*. ⁶⁵ See Guillermo Bonfil, (ed.), *Utopía y revolución*.

⁶⁶ I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers of *JLAS* for this observation. It is worth pointing out, however, that other *katarista* groups see Cárdenas' willingness to engage with state institutions as a total betrayal.

⁶⁷ David Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit: Religious transformation and popular culture in Brazil and Latin America*, (London, 1996), p. 8. For an excellent Andean example of the Church's assimilation of indigenous practice see Sallnow's account of the cult of Q'oyllur Rit'i in Peru, Michael Sallnow, *Pilgrims of the Andes* (Washington, D.C., 1987). Sabine MacCormack, *Religion of the Andes* (Princeton, 1991) provides a thorough

ideology of *mestizaje* which attempted to assimilate indians into the nation. Both had as their goal a model of Western civilisation, if not quite the same model, and both sought to achieve this goal by absorption. Whereas *katarismo* has undermined the homogenising effects of ideological *mestizaje*, *evangelismo* has undermined the homogenising efforts of established Catholicism.

Evangelismo

The growth of *evangelismo*, evangelical Protestantism, also needs to be understood in terms of the cultural and economic landscape of post-revolutionary Bolivia. Institutional Catholicism was tightly bound to the hacienda system, and when the Agrarian Reform effectively abolished the hacienda system, the power of the Catholic Church concomitantly declined in rural areas. At the same time, rapid urbanisation and economic change put new pressures on rural people and migrants; pressures, it seems, that evangelical groups understood far better than their Catholic counterparts. These are the same pressures – of rapid change, dislocation and indeed racism – that produced the passion behind *katarismo*. However, in *evangelismo*, these pressures found a quite different resolution.

Even though Protestant groups have been active in Bolivia since the turn of the century – when the Catholic Church was disestablished – they made very modest gains in the first half of the century, despite sustained and even heroic efforts. By 1931 there were 17 Protestant missions in Bolivia, although by this time there was open opposition against Protestantism,⁶⁸ which had its effect on recruitment for several decades. During this period several groups, in particular the Seventh Day Adventists, continued to open schools and teach indians in the face of official and often violent opposition.⁶⁹ Even though they earned much respect, their numbers remained small. In 1950 the Adventists, the largest evangelical group in Bolivia, had only two thousand members. Since then the numbers have multiplied several fold. Today approximately ten percent of the Bolivian population is evangelical,⁷⁰ but they are not evenly

analysis of the process of evangelisation in the Andes at the time of European conquest and colonisation and the manner in which indigenous religious forms were incorporated into Andean Catholicism.

⁶⁸ Carlos Intipampa, *Opresión y Aculturación: La evangelización de los Aymara*, (La Paz, 1991), p. 136.

⁶⁹ Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, *Indios de piel blanca. Evangelistas fundamentalistas en Chukiyawu* (La Paz, 1989).

⁷⁰ The 1992 census had five categories under religious affiliation: católicos, evangélicos, otras religiones, ninguna, sin especificar; that is, Catholic, Protestant, other religions, none, did not specify.

distributed. According to the 1992 census,⁷¹ the department of La Paz has 35 per cent of all *evangelistas* compared to 30 per cent of total population. Most of these reside in the provinces of the northern highlands.⁷² The dramatic growth began after the 1952 Revolution. The Seventh Day Adventists quintupled their numbers in the following decade.⁷³ This growth continued through the sixties and not only occurred in long-established churches such as the Adventists, but also later arrivals such as the Assemblies of God, which, after arriving in 1957, was very soon exhibiting the dramatic growth rates of the other churches.⁷⁴ During this period of expansion, as before, missionaries concentrated on the Aymara-speaking indians. They were correctly identified as the most vulnerable sectors of the population, and the most amenable to conversion.

During the 1950s and 60s, at the time that the Protestants were offering indians education and new forms of community and spiritual life, the Catholic Church was facing an important crisis from which it has arguably never recovered. The rise of Protestantism must be seen in the context of the decline in power and influence of the Catholic Church. Since the Conquest, the Catholic Church has been highly successful in allying itself with the state, and indeed acting almost as an organ of the state. Catholicism was not incidental to the Spanish conquest of America; it provided the moral justification.⁷⁵ The Spaniards, moreover, were accustomed to seeing religion as a hegemonic tool since they had just finished a centuries-long war against the Muslims in Spain, the *Reconquista*, in which religion was used to justify the wars as well as providing a banner around which to rally support. Thus, when the Spanish arrived in the Andes, the politics of conquest and Catholicism had become inextricably linked and the concomitant subordination of religion to politics ensured that 'Catholicism in the Andes was to become first and foremost a mechanism of political and social control and only secondarily an ethical and spiritual teaching'.⁷⁶ By the middle of the twentieth century the Catholic Church was still quite clearly a pillar of the establishment and supported the land-owning oligarchy. For example, one ageing mestizo resident of a small town bemoaned the fact that thirty years ago the priest

⁷¹ Ministerio de Planeamiento y Coordinación/Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Censo nacional de población y vivienda 1992. Resultados Finales* (La Paz, 1993).

⁷² Murillo, Omasuyos, Pacajes, Camacho, Larecacha, Franz Tamayo, Ingavi, Loayza, Inquisivi, Los Andes, Aroma, Manko Kapac. The exception here is the jungle province of Pando which has a population which is 31.47 per cent evangelical out of a total population of under 5,000, and Gualberto Villaroel with 23.05 per cent out of a population of under 12,000.

⁷³ Quentin Nordyke, *Animistic Aymaras and Church Growth*, (Oregon, 1972), p. 137.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* ⁷⁵ Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 3.

⁷⁶ Michael Sallnow, *Pilgrims of the Andes*, p. 50.

could rely on the police to ensure indians' attendance and contributions to religious fiestas whereas now attendance was voluntary. Similarly it was the hacienda-owner who brought the priest to visit the communities and obliged people to attend mass. Moreover, Catholicism was, and frequently is, seen as the natural religion of Bolivia.⁷⁷

The Catholic institutions supported the agrarian oligarchy against the Liberals and were resistant to change in the status quo. In the 1930s, for example, the Church angrily denounced liberal reforms that provided for modest education for indians on the grounds that they would be corrupted. At the same time, the priest could sometimes function as an intermediary between indian communities and the hacienda-owner.

On the other hand, despite being very politically conservative, the Church was rather relaxed when it came to imposing its orthodoxy on indians. Since the mid-seventeenth century, when it gave up its campaign known as the Extirpation of Idolatries, the Church had become quite tolerant of indigenous religious practice. So long as the formal language was Christian, non-orthodox practices such as animal sacrifice or the invocation of pagan deities were tolerated. This is a mark of the cosmopolitanism of the Catholic Church,⁷⁸ but it is also perhaps a mark of the lack of engagement with its flock. This problem reflects the very small number of priests, and the even smaller number who spoke Aymara or Quechua, the native tongues of the majority of Bolivians until very recently.⁷⁹

However, by the fifties and sixties the Catholic Church was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with its support of authoritarian elites. As the liberalisation in Europe and North America filtered through, the Catholic Church in Latin America turned its focus to the spiritual and practical needs of the masses, its 'preferential option for the poor'. In Bolivia, with the dismantling of the mining and agrarian oligarchy, the Catholic Church was unable as well as unwilling to fulfil the social role it had so successfully occupied for centuries. As it sided more and more with the poor and powerless it also progressively lost the political clout to deliver. In any case, by the 1970s many rural communities were rarely if ever

⁷⁷ In 1991, for example, the bishop of La Paz announced on radio that Protestantism with its North American association and values was alien to Bolivia. Catholicism, he said, was the religion that most fully corresponded to the life and culture of Bolivia. The irony that it was the conquering Spanish who brought Catholicism to Bolivia escaped him, and it escaped him because, like most Bolivians of his class, he has a vision of Bolivian identity that necessarily includes a Spanish heritage. For him, as for many others, Catholicism is Bolivia's religion.

⁷⁸ David Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit*.

⁷⁹ It was not until 1992 that a census showed a majority of Bolivians as having Spanish as their first language.

visited by a priest,⁸⁰ and so the Catholic Church had neither the personnel nor the resources to achieve its aims. In contrast, Protestant groups were able to send hundreds or perhaps even thousands of pastors into areas where there were but a couple of priests.

While it takes at least seven years of higher education to make a Catholic priest, Protestant pastors frequently need little formal training beyond being able to read the bible. Whereas Catholic priests were few and often foreign-born, these pastors and missionaries were much more frequently from the same social and cultural background as those they were attempting to convert and, at a time when traditional social and economic structures were changing rapidly, they were better able to provide spiritual succour and new forms of community life. In particular, evangelical pastors found their message was received best among those people whose lives were changing most dramatically as metropolitan life impinged more and more on them, often finding themselves caught between a 'traditional' culture and a dynamic Western one.

Over the post-revolutionary decades many indians migrated to the capital city, but maintained important links with their communities that were often only a few hours' travel away. Many, then, found themselves riding between two worlds and subject to the stresses of social, cultural and economic dislocation.⁸¹ Protestant groups consciously exploit the disorientation and dislocation of recent migrants, being well aware that it is in the period when migrants first arrive in the city that they are most vulnerable, and most in need of the support and sense of community that membership of a small and dedicated group can bring.⁸²

In those rural settlements that are not evangelical, a system of religious *cargos*, communal rituals and fiestas bind the community together. Communal solidarity and identity are created through ritual. Patronal and agricultural feasts, first hair-cuttings,⁸³ deaths, wakes and many other ritual events are celebrated on a community basis, usually through sharing alcohol, coca leaves and food. In addition many of these feasts require sponsorship from a married couple. The couple and their kin, fictive and

⁸⁰ In one community where fieldwork was conducted in the 1990s, the priest visited once every two or three years. This is by no means atypical, and remoter communities may never see a priest at all.

⁸¹ X. Albó, T. Greaves and G. Sandoval, *Chukiyawu: La Cara Aymara de La Paz. Vol iii: Cabalgando entre dos Mundos* (La Paz, 1983).

⁸² Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, *Indios de Piel Blanca*; Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, 'Las comunidades religiosas fundamentalistas en Bolivia: Sobre el éxito misionero de los Adventistas del Séptimo Día', in *Allpanchis* vol. 40, (1992), pp. 219–53; Andrew Canessa, 'Evangelical Protestantism'.

⁸³ The first hair-cutting, *rutucha*, is an important ritual undertaken when a child is about 18 months to two years old. It is attended by the entire community, who welcome the child as a member.

real, will spend considerable amounts of their money and agricultural products and, as a consequence, the *cargo* system serves to distribute resources from the wealthier to the poorer members of the community, since it is the wealthier people who are chosen as sponsors. *Evangelistas* reject all these offices and rituals as pagan,⁸⁴ and it can be seen how being an *evangelista* in such a community would mean removing oneself from a wide range of social ties. Bernardo Guerrero has documented the manner in which Aymara communities in northern Chile are riven with strife as they go through the process of conversion to Protestantism.⁸⁵ It is quite clear that a mixed community is a virtual impossibility for any length of time in these small rural settlements.⁸⁶

In this context it is important to note that it is the churches of what can be described as the third Protestant reformation that are by far the most numerous.⁸⁷ It is not the older churches of the first reformation, the Anglican, Lutheran or Presbyterian churches that were able to exploit the disestablishment of the Catholic church; nor was it the Baptists and the Methodists (although they have had greater success than the churches of the first reformation); but the churches which by and large were founded in the United States in the last century, churches which can be described as spiritualist, fundamentalist and frequently ecstatic. These evangelical and fundamentalist churches are much less likely than their co-religionists of the historically more established churches to take an accommodating or relativistic view of what they consider pagan practices. They most certainly do not take the accommodating view of Roman Catholicism to variations from what they see as Christian orthodoxy. Whereas the Catholic Church moved from regarding local pagan practice as idolatry in the first hundred and fifty years of colonisation to regarding such practices as ‘harmless superstition’ by the middle of the seventeenth century,⁸⁸ in more recent years Roman Catholicism has positively embraced local practice. What were previously tolerated as syncretic forms of religiosity are now regarded as ‘inculturated’ forms of the true faith.⁸⁹ As a 1992

⁸⁴ See, for example, Carlos Intipampa, *Opresión y Aculturación*, p. 139 and *passim*.

⁸⁵ Bernardo Guerrero, *A Dios rogando ... Los pentecostales en la sociedad aymara del norte grande de Chile* (Amsterdam, 1996).

⁸⁶ See also Carlos Intipampa, *Opresión y Aculturación*, pp. 165–9.

⁸⁷ David Martin, *Tongues of Fire*.

⁸⁸ The extirpation of idolatry can be said to have ended by the time Peña Montenegro published his manual for priests in 1661. The fervour for extirpation was by now spent. Possibly, argues Pierre Duviols, because the most obvious examples of idolatry had by then disappeared and most parish priests were tired of the strife and conflict. See P. Duviols, *La lutte contre les religions autochtones dans le Pérou colonial. ‘L’extirpation de l’idolâtrie’ entre 1532 et 1660* (Lima–Paris, 1977).

⁸⁹ It appears that it is not only in the Catholic Church that ‘traditional’ Andean religion is regarded as an inculturated form of Christianity. Carlos Intipampa, for example

CELAM document attests,⁹⁰ the Church recognises that in the religion of the ancestors the 'seed of the Word' was already present in the faith of indigenous people, predisposing them to the discovery of 'the Creator in all his creation: the sun, the moon, mother earth, etc.'⁹¹ Through such an understanding, *all* religious practices and beliefs are valid forms of Christian worship in a non-European cultural form.

Among evangelical Protestants there is no such benign regard of indigenous religious practice, let alone a belief that the seed of the true faith resides in these practices. As Lehmann cogently points out, in Pentecostalism (and for Pentecostalism one can read other *evangelista* denominations)

there is...no ritual developed from below, no unauthorised borrowing from other cultures, of the sort which for centuries has alternately met with grudging tolerance, co-optation or repression from the Catholic hierarchy. The dialectic between the erudite and the popular which lies at the heart of religious culture in almost the entire Latin Catholic world simply does not exist in Pentecostalism.⁹²

There are, to be sure, numerous differences between these Protestant churches – which number over 200 in Bolivia⁹³ – and it is beyond the scope of this article to outline the numerous factions and distinctions. There are, nevertheless, a number of important common characteristics. One aspect of the successful Protestant churches is that they are all opposed to the consumption of alcohol and the chewing of coca.⁹⁴ Drinking and inebriation are central elements of cultural life across the Andes;⁹⁵ they are acts of communion with the members of one's community but also with the tellurian spirits which sustain existence. Likewise, coca is central to life in the rural Andes and appears to have

argues for this very interpretation, and even that Andean Christianity predates the European invasion, but his is an isolated voice and by no means representative, Carlos Intipampa, *Opresión y Aculturación*. Intipampa recognises that the vast majority of Methodists in Bolivia have not even heard of the rather tame theology of liberation espoused by certain sections of the Bolivian Methodist hierarchy (*ibid.*, p. 174) let alone his 'Andean theology', which owes so much to liberal Catholic commentators such as Xavier Albó. One wonders what the consequences would be if Methodists did adopt this 'Andean theology', and how they could distinguish themselves from the liberal Catholics.

⁹⁰ The Latin American Episcopal Conference.

⁹¹ David Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit*, p. 71.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁹³ Carlos Intipampa, *Opresión y Aculturación*, p. 165.

⁹⁴ There are some *evangelistas* who will chew coca, although without the reactive agent, *lluji'a*, which produces the narcotic effect (I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of *JLAS* for this point). Other groups, such as the Mormons, are against any kind of stimulant whatsoever, even coffee which, in many altiplano communities, is a weaning food offered in a weakened and heavily sweetened form.

⁹⁵ Thierry Saignes, 'Borracheras andinas: ¿porqué los indios ebrios hablan en español?' *Revista Andina* (1989), pp. 83–119.

been for millennia.⁹⁶ Coca chewing in the highlands is generally done in groups, with participants passing their coca pouches around so that all may share. The communal aspect of coca chewing is similar to the consumption of alcohol because it is emblematic of people relating to the spirit world as a community, an ethos that underlies life in many communities in the Andes.⁹⁷

Protestant groups are also opposed to other elements central to life in the Andes. Ritual co-parenthood, *compadrazgo*, is a Catholic institution adopted by many indigenous Andeans. Parents will seek as godparents for their child individuals who will assist the child in later life. Bonds between godparent and birth parent are very strong and they provide much mutual assistance for each other, assistance that can often mean the difference between destitution and survival in the vicissitudinous lives of Andeans. *Evangelistas*, however, reject *compadrazgo* as a pagan institution.

Evangelistas then, are critical of the most fundamental aspects of indian rural life. At the same time they do provide individuals with an ethic many think more effective in a market economy. Freed from the burdensome obligations of sponsoring fiestas and demanding compadres, *evangelistas* can accumulate capital and enter into new, more fluid and short-lived, economic relationships.⁹⁸

Protestantism also provides an important defence against the kind of racism that indians confront as they leave their communities.⁹⁹ Whereas in traditional communities an individual will have a position and a social status, once they enter the urban culture they are one of a mass of 'dirty indians', the lowest of the low. This racism is often phrased in terms of the distinction between civilised, urban, and Western, and uncivilised, rural and indigenous. Evangelical Christianity is seen as being quintessentially Western, more so than Catholicism, partly because the first missionaries all came from North America. Becoming a Protestant is

⁹⁶ Catherine Allen, *The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community* (Washington D.C., 1988).

⁹⁷ Coca leaves are also used for offerings to the earth and mountain spirits and the seer, the *yatiri*, will cast leaves onto a cloth made from woven llama fibre to divine the will and knowledge of the chthonic beings. On a more practical level, coca is a mild narcotic which assists frequently undernourished people doing hard physical labour in the rarefied atmosphere of the altiplano which is at an altitude of 3,900 m above sea level.

⁹⁸ See Ted Lewellen, *Peasants in Transition* and David Martin, *Tongues of Fire* for this kind of analysis.

⁹⁹ See, for example, Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, 'Búsqueda de seguridad y formas propias de afirmación de la identidad social aimara urbana', and Olivia Harris, 'Ethnic Identity and Market Relations: Indians and Mestizos in the Andes', in O. Harris, B. Larson and E. Tandeter, (eds), *Ethnicity and Markets in the Andes: Indian Economies and Commercial Adaptations 16th–20th Centuries*, (Nebraska 1995), for accounts of the dispiriting and denigrating situation that many indians face living in the city, and some of the strategies to overcome this.

in many ways a social advance: by adopting *evangelismo*, indians can gain an element of superiority over their erstwhile Catholic, mestizo ‘betters’.¹⁰⁰ One example of this is in fiestas described by Libbet Crandon-Malamud, where local Protestant indians can look down upon drunken mestizos and criticise them for their lack of control and sobriety.¹⁰¹ What is at play here is an appropriation of the stereotype of the ‘drunken indian’ which mestizos so often use. Thus, Protestantism is a means through which indians can overcome racism and become, in the words of Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, ‘white-skinned indians’; in other words, becoming an *evangelista* is also a racial advance in a racially hierarchical society. That is, they do not simply seek an adaptation to the way of life of the white middle class, since the members of the middle class themselves recognise that they are but a poor copy of the original ‘White Civilisation’. [The Aymaras] seek their identity in that very same ‘White Civilisation’, as the Adventists promise them and as they incarnate in themselves.¹⁰²

This article suggests that evangelical Christianity is partly an expression, not of defeat in the face of urban cultural superiority, but of a desire to gain cultural capital and status even higher than that of the dominant class.¹⁰³ In this context, with the cultural hierarchy going from Western to indian with mestizos in the middle, *evangelismo* can be seen as leap-frogging from indian to Western, rejecting *mestizaje* on the way.

The association of *evangelismo* with a more advanced civilisation is evident in other areas too. Turco is a small expanding and ambitious town of the highlands which has been studied by Pauwels for many years. He found that the people recognise, both implicitly and explicitly, the incompatibility between the customs of old which were richer, more powerful and efficacious with regard to rain and fertility than those of today, and a desire for ‘progress’. This is expressed in a nostalgia for the past and a feeling that ‘we are finally becoming civilised’.¹⁰⁴ Turco is exactly the kind of town where one would most expect to find the tension

¹⁰⁰ Bastide, working in Brazil, has noticed a similar aspect to Protestant conversion among Brazilian blacks: to the black, joining any Protestant denomination is in itself an advance. A cultural advance because Protestantism is the religion of the book and, therefore, of literate people. It is the religion of the United States, of a world power. A social advance because, on every level, the Protestant tends to rise and enter the middle class. Lastly, it is a religious advance. Roger Bastide, *African Religions in Brazil: Towards a Sociology of the Interpenetration of Civilizations* (Baltimore, 1978), p. 372 in David Martin *Tongues of Fire*, p. 68.

¹⁰¹ Libbet Crandon-Malamud, *From the Fat of Our Souls: Social Change and Medical Pluralism in Bolivia* (Berkeley, 1991).

¹⁰² Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, *Indios de piel blanca*, p. 189.

¹⁰³ Conversion can also expand social capital through the important networks that are opened up by church membership.

¹⁰⁴ Gilbert Pauwels, *Dorpen en Gemeenschappen in de Andes: Socio-culturele Veranderingen bij de Boliviaanse Aymara* (Leuven, 1983), p. 363.

between what is represented by old, autochthonous ways and modernism. There is much Protestant success in Turco, and Pauwels implies that part of the attraction of Protestantism is its uncompromising attitude to 'heathenism'. Those who do not convert are frequently described as 'underdeveloped' by *evangelistas* who clearly see themselves on the side of modernity and civilisation.¹⁰⁵

In a context of personal, economic and racial insecurity, *evangelismo* has provided a stable and coherent set of ideas and practices around which people can organise. These ideas are quite at variance with the cosmopolitanism of Roman Catholicism, and are equally antagonistic to the dominant ideology of cultural synthesis, *mestizaje*. *Evangelistas* shun this ideology, which embraces folkloric forms of indigenous practice as quintessentially Bolivian, such as the 'devil dances' of Carnival. Even though *evangelismo* developed in the wake of a great project that sought to integrate all aspects of the nation, *evangelistas* have rejected this (oppressively) inclusive model for one that marks difference. Moreover, they see religious and cultural compromise as inferior at best, if not absolutely degenerate and pagan. Almost 50 years after the Revolution, *evangelistas* are another group that has rejected some of its most cherished ideals.

Evangelistas and Kataristas

The previous sections have outlined the manner in which *evangelismo* and *katarismo* were formed in and by the landscape of post-revolutionary Bolivia. The movements both address some of the issues raised by the rapidly changing politic and economic scene, the dismantling of old hierarchies and the introduction of market capitalism into the lives of people who were largely sustained by close communal organisations, even if some of them did spend periods of time in cities and in mines. What is also evident is that there is a perceived tension between Western-oriented modernisation and indian culture. Whereas *katarismo* seeks to deal with the tension by revitalising a (mythical) indigenous past, *evangelismo* implicitly and explicitly embraces the Western model. Where *kataristas* and *evangelistas* agree is in rejecting the possibility of a middle ground. There is no resolution: *evangelistas* believe that pagan practices must be eradicated; *kataristas* reject many of the structures and ideas of Christianity.

Kataristas are often uncompromisingly opposed to *evangelistas*. One such writes 'nos han impuesto una religión católica apostólica y romana ayer; y hoy los gringos yankis de Norteamérica llegan y nos imponen también la religión evangélica'.¹⁰⁶ It is thus that his organisation, the

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 312 and *passim*.

¹⁰⁶ Felipe Qhispe Wanka, *Tupak Katari Vive y Vuelve... ¡Carajo!*, p. 10.

Ejército Guerrillero Tupaq Katari has focused a number of its attacks on Mormon churches, even killing two Mormon missionaries. Mormons seem to have been targeted because they are, among the new religious groups, the most visibly American.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, both *katarismo* and *evangelismo* reject the traditional middle way of cultural *mestizaje* and the manners and mores of the mestizo group which is socially and politically, if not numerically, dominant.

Evangelismo and *katarismo* may thus be seen as parallel responses to some of the cultural, political and economic changes in Bolivia – attempts, perhaps, to construct their ‘own modernity’.¹⁰⁸ As such, their ideas have a structural similarity, if only in inversion. Hurtado argues that they are substitutes for each other.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, in areas such as the province of Aroma, considered to be the cradle of *katarismo*, he argues that there are very few *evangelistas* because *katarismo* has sufficiently revitalised indian culture to counteract the fissiparous tendencies of modern life. He mentions *evangelismo* in particular, since he sees it as offering a more individualist and anti-nativist response to modernisation.¹¹⁰ However, while Hurtado argues that *katarismo* and *evangelismo* are geographically distinct in their areas of greatest prevalence, the 1992 census reported the proportion of *evangelistas* in Aroma to be as high as 20.35 per cent (exceeded by neighbouring Los Andes with 22.87 per cent).¹¹¹ Hurtado is right in seeing the two phenomena as responses to the difficulties produced by change, and his insight that they are on a fundamental level incompatible is correct. His analysis cannot, however, explain why *katarismo* and *evangelismo* are strong and weak in the same areas. More research needs to be done in this regard but, as argued above, both movements offer complementary but radically different solutions to the same set of social and existential problems. They are complementary in the sense that they share a perspective on what they see as the current social and economic malaise of (in particular) indian people: they are radically different in that their solutions are diametrically opposed. What the data appear to indicate is that, given a situation where the religious and social status quo is being challenged, it is very difficult to predict which side people will take in rejecting it.

¹⁰⁷ Although not, strictly-speaking, Protestants, Mormons fall under the general category of *evangelistas* to most Bolivians. They are notable for their North American missionaries who are easily identifiable, not only by their features and stature, but by their crew-cuts, short-sleeved white shirts and dark tie.

¹⁰⁸ Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, ‘Cultura política de los aymaras y los quechuas en Bolivia’, p. 510. ¹⁰⁹ Javier Hurtado *El Katarismo*. ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹¹¹ It is worth noting that this 20 per cent of the population almost certainly represents the great majority of church-going Christians, as attendance in Catholic mass is negligible, especially in indian areas.

Clearly, more work needs to be done on why a particular actor may choose one over the other. Interestingly enough, some of the founder members of the EGTK who targeted Mormons in their attacks were themselves once Mormons.¹¹² There are other prominent *kataristas* who were *evangelistas* in their youth, and would prefer this not be made public. This suggests that *evangelismo* and *katarismo* are seen as alternatives from actors' points of view. Since there are many more *evangelistas* than *kataristas* it appears that once the middle ground is rejected most people opt for the route that takes them to a higher status, on the side of Western modernity rather than its poor copy, a mongrelised mestizo state. For others, in contrast, it may well be that the prospect of rejecting wholesale all the fundamental elements of indian culture is more than they can bear, so they opt for a vision of the world which raises the status of that culture. This process, however, may be more dynamic than might be thought in that it is evidently the case that some *evangelistas* become *kataristas* and it may be that the sense of dignity that *evangelismo* gives many people is indeed at the roots of their 'conversion' to *katarismo*.¹¹³

What is much clearer, and important to recognise, is that both movements draw their greatest and most enthusiastic support from the same kinds of people: generally those with secondary and university education, and most frequently those who have either migrated to the city or have close connections with it. The freedom to travel and access to education are important benefits of the 1952 revolution, but it also exposed large numbers of people to the level of racial and social inequality in Bolivia, as well as providing the intellectual means to conceive of an alternative. This accounts for why it is the main public university of La Paz, the UMSA,¹¹⁴ as well as the small towns on the *altiplano* with good communications with the city, that are the great centres of *katarista* politics, rather than the remoter communities which more closely approximate the kind of cultural authenticity the *kataristas* are seeking.

The similarities and contrasts between *katarismo* and *evangelismo* can be illustrated in the accompanying diagram. In some respects they are very

¹¹² David Knowlton, 'Mormons and terrorism in Bolivia', paper given at the Society of Latin American Studies Conference, York, UK (1996).

¹¹³ See, for example, the case of Jaime in J. Ströbele-Gregor, 'Wir sind die Indios mit der weißen Haut', *Wege zum Menschen*, vol. 41, no. 2 (1989), p. 83. It may also be the case that the significant number of *ex-evangelistas* in *katarista* political organisations, despite the shunning of formal political action as worldly by many *evangelistas*, may be due to the fact that, in many rural areas, the only educated indians in previous generations were those educated by missionaries. See J. Ströbele-Gregor, *Indios de piel blanca*, pp. 274–5. This education provided them with the capacity for seeing beyond their condition in ways not open to others in what was then a highly regulated and repressive society for indians. ¹¹⁴ La Universidad Mayor de San Andrés.




Fig. 1. Evangelismo and Katarismo.

similar, whereas in others they are mirror images of each other. This suggests that even in their differences they have something in common.

Whereas the one looks to models of the past and the other to the future, they both reject an unsatisfactory present. The *katarista* model of the past is moralistic and seeks to reinvigorate a demoralised and decadent indian people with the ethics of a bygone indian golden age. ‘Don’t steal; don’t lie; don’t be lazy’ is one of the aphorisms most commonly seen, and is purported to be one of the tenets of Inka moral life. *Evangelistas* also see contemporary culture as decadent and provide a moralistic framework, not only in their avoidance of alcohol and coca, but in their stress on cleanliness and moral worth in general. Indeed, personal hygiene and self-respect is something both movements stress. Most significantly they clearly agree that there is a conspicuous lack of pride, dignity and self-worth among Aymara indians: they agree there is a moral deficit; they disagree on how to fill it.

On many of the details there are also significant similarities. Both groups hold a second coming and a spiritual revolution as central tenets of their beliefs. The *katarista* graffiti in Achacachi and surrounding areas, ‘¡Tupaq Katari vive y vuelve!’ is strikingly similar to the many signs heralding the advent of the Second Coming. The difference is that whereas in the *katarista pachakuti* revolution the autochthonous world of below will overcome the Christian world above and reign supreme,¹¹⁵ the

¹¹⁵ Not all *kataristas* agree as to exactly what a *pachakuti* might entail. In his inaugural speech in 1993, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas stated that his election would mark a new *pachakuti*, not quite the indigenous upheaval imagined by others. Historically, a *pachakuti* has marked the (violent) turning of one age into another (see Thérèse

evangelista version will banish all paganism and herald a new era of Christian righteousness. At least, according to these graffiti it appears that the Second Coming or the *pachakuti* is imminent.

Conclusion

Indian nationalism and evangelical Protestantism have not, to date, been analysed together. This is partly because the social movement literature has ignored evangelical Protestantism, but also perhaps because they appear to occupy different realms of social life, making such a comparison counter-intuitive. Indeed, in seeking the 're-establishment of the pre-Hispanic order' and in focusing on ethnic identity, *katarismo* is clearly antithetical to the central ideas of contemporary evangelical Protestantism in Bolivia.¹¹⁶ Similarly, in its hostility to 'paganism', *evangelismo* is frankly opposed to the revitalisation of Indian culture that the *kataristas* promote. Yet both phenomena have strong parallels: they both subvert the dominant national culture as it is presently constituted, and both endeavour to accord indians pride and respect in themselves. The Catholic Church and the Bolivian State are closely associated in the minds of many Bolivians.¹¹⁷ Protestantism, like *katarismo* can therefore become a focus of opposition to the dominant culture behind the state.

Even though they are themselves examples of cultural hybridity they are clearly opposed to the established notion of hybridity, that is ideological *mestizaje*, which seeks to assimilate indians into a metropolitan culture which has underlined the Bolivian state since 1952. In rejecting the cosmopolitanism of Catholicism and the syntheses of the state ideology, they seek, instead, essential and enduring categories of difference, eternal truths over compromises of the moment.

Cultural compromise is clearly not working in the minds of many highlanders, and *katarismo* and *evangelismo* are, the article argues, responses to the recognition that Indian culture and Western Christian culture provide mutually incompatible strategies for a meaningful future. The compromise solution does not provide the self-respect and community structures that people need and desire, and even less does it provide them with a defence against systematic racism and marginalisation; quite the contrary, *mestizaje* provides indians with an unenviable position in an

Bouysse-Cassagne and Olivia Harris, 'Pacha: en torno al pensamiento aymara', in T. Bouysse-Cassagne et al., *Tres reflexiones sobre el pensamiento andino* (La Paz, 1987), pp. 11–60.

¹¹⁶ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, 'Aymara Past, Aymara Future', *NACLA Report on the Americas* (1993), vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 18–23.

¹¹⁷ Gilbert Pauwels, *Dorpen en Gemeenschappen*, p. 316.

obviously hierarchical system. The political idea of *mestizaje* has always included indian culture but, while glorifying the majestic indian culture of the past, it resolutely ignores the realities of an indian present.¹¹⁸ By the same token, while *mestizaje* is predicated on a positive view of racial mixing, it is biased to the whiter and more Western end of the spectrum of racial and cultural mixing.¹¹⁹ In a country such as Bolivia where at least half the population speaks an indian language, the consequences of such ideological positions are naturally profound and extensive.

It is not surprising, then, that both *katarismo* and evangelical Protestantism are most prevalent in areas of greatest contact with the metropolitan culture, in those migrant communities in La Paz or the small towns with easy access to the big city. In those communities where communications with the metropolis are not as strong, both *evangelismo* and *katarismo* have yet to make serious headway.¹²⁰

Whereas the extent to which *katarismo* has changed public perceptions of how the nation is constituted is relatively clear, the impact of evangelical Protestantism in this regard is perhaps more muted but remains, nevertheless, significant. One of the curious things about *evangelistas* in Bolivia is that although they may not always be liked, they are widely respected as being honest, upstanding and industrious. Such indians may not behave in a stereotypical manner and may even possess a sense of moral superiority over their erstwhile 'betters'. But, perhaps more generally, the presence of a significant proportion of the population which adheres to a faith other than Roman Catholicism undermines the cohesion of a national religion even if most people practise that national religion in a somewhat perfunctory manner. The assumption that people will unite in national celebrations based on religious themes by dancing and drinking can no longer hold, since so many *evangelistas* absent themselves from these. As such, despite the fact that they are notoriously apolitical, *evangelistas* have an important political effect. They provide another example of the nation being made up of heterogenous elements, of how the ideal of the culturally and racially unified nation state is illusory.

In a region where hybridity has been a central feature of culture for centuries, the case of the northern highlands provides interesting examples of social movements which contest this hybridity and, moreover, do so quite explicitly. They provide a reminder that the globalisation of culture is resisted in often surprising ways.

¹¹⁸ See Jane Hindley, 'Towards a Pluricultural nation'.

¹¹⁹ Pete Wade, *Race and Ethnicity*.

¹²⁰ See Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, 'Democracia liberal y democracia de ayllu', for a complementary analysis of why *katarismo* has had such difficulty in gaining recruits in that most 'traditional' of highland areas, the Norte de Potosí.