Markose, Sheri M (1999) The liar strategy and surprises: Computability and indeterminacy in Nash equilibria games. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Markose, Sheri M (1999) The liar strategy and surprises: Computability and indeterminacy in Nash equilibria games. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Markose, Sheri M (1999) The liar strategy and surprises: Computability and indeterminacy in Nash equilibria games. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Abstract
| Item Type: | ["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined] |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | HB; |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2014 16:21 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2022 00:56 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10002 |
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