Staudigl, M and Weidenholzer, S (2014) Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination. UNSPECIFIED. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Staudigl, M and Weidenholzer, S (2014) Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination. UNSPECIFIED. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Staudigl, M and Weidenholzer, S (2014) Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination. UNSPECIFIED. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.
Abstract
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff domination convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result is that whenever there is a small cluster of agents playing the efficient strategy other players want to link up to those layers and choose the efficient action.
Item Type: | Monograph (UNSPECIFIED) |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2014 18:14 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 18:37 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10007 |
Available files
Filename: dp747.pdf