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Ending economic sanctions: Audience costs and rent-seeking as commitment strategies

Dorussen, H and Mo, J (2001) 'Ending economic sanctions: Audience costs and rent-seeking as commitment strategies.' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 (4). 395 - 426. ISSN 0022-0027

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Abstract

Little attention has been paid to how and when economic sanctions end, especially compared with the amount of research on their effectiveness. A game in which the ending of sanctions is part of interstate bargaining about a contested policy is analyzed. In case of audience costs, sanctions may occur because governments use strategies that commit them to their ideal policy position. Governments use as constraints domestic political groups that have an interest in the disputed policy. Alternatively, rent-seeking enables governments to obtain political gain from the opportunities for side payments provided by sanctions. Results show that commitment strategies help states improve their bargaining position and make the resolution of the conflict more difficult. Data on the duration and ending of sanctions initiated in the period between 1914 and 1990 are used to test these hypotheses. The analyses provide clear evidence that commit ment strategies affect the duration of sanctions.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Peter Josse
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2015 21:05
Last Modified: 15 Oct 2019 11:16
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10096

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