Freyenhagen, Fabian (2017) Autonomy's Substance. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34 (1). pp. 114-129. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12133
Freyenhagen, Fabian (2017) Autonomy's Substance. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34 (1). pp. 114-129. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12133
Freyenhagen, Fabian (2017) Autonomy's Substance. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 34 (1). pp. 114-129. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12133
Abstract
In this article, I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the qualifying condition for receiving the full set of individual liberal rights. I show that the common distinction between content‐neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy is riddled with confusion and ambiguities, and provide a clear alternative taxonomy. At least insofar as we are concerned with liberal settings, the real question is whether or not the value(s) and norm(s) implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether these accounts are content‐neutral, procedural or input‐focused. Finally, I demonstrate how substantive constraints are compatible with, or even implied in, the notion of autonomy at play in (Rawls's) political liberalism. Overall, I present a normative reconstruction, clarification, and internal critique of liberalism, drawing on case law and statutes from England and Wales.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Philosophical, Historical and Interdisciplinary Studies, School of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 28 Apr 2015 08:40 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 16:40 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/13628 |
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Filename: Freyenhagen-2015-Journal_of_Applied_Philosophy.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0