Renou, Ludovic and Tomala, Tristan (2015) Approximate implementation in Markovian environments. Journal of Economic Theory, 159. pp. 401-442. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.009
Renou, Ludovic and Tomala, Tristan (2015) Approximate implementation in Markovian environments. Journal of Economic Theory, 159. pp. 401-442. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.009
Renou, Ludovic and Tomala, Tristan (2015) Approximate implementation in Markovian environments. Journal of Economic Theory, 159. pp. 401-442. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.009
Abstract
This paper considers dynamic implementation problems in environments with changing private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if it is correctly implemented an arbitrary large number of times with arbitrary high probability in all (communication) equilibria. We show that if a social choice function is strictly efficient in the set of social choice functions that satisfy an undetectability condition, then it is approximately implementable.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Implementation; Undetectability; Efficiency; Dynamic; Mechanism design; Markov processes |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Jul 2015 15:08 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2022 14:39 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/14463 |