Mezzetti, Claudio and Renou, Ludovic (2017) Repeated Nash implementation. Theoretical Economics, 12 (1). pp. 249-285. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/te1988
Mezzetti, Claudio and Renou, Ludovic (2017) Repeated Nash implementation. Theoretical Economics, 12 (1). pp. 249-285. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/te1988
Mezzetti, Claudio and Renou, Ludovic (2017) Repeated Nash implementation. Theoretical Economics, 12 (1). pp. 249-285. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/te1988
Abstract
We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but non-trivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is "large" or "small."
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Dynamic Monotonicity, Nash Implementation, Maskin Monotonicity, Repeated Implementation, Repeated Games |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Feb 2016 12:03 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Oct 2024 11:07 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/16033 |
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