Bayer, R-C and Renou, Ludovic (2016) Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 56. pp. 39-59. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.005
Bayer, R-C and Renou, Ludovic (2016) Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 56. pp. 39-59. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.005
Bayer, R-C and Renou, Ludovic (2016) Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 56. pp. 39-59. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.005
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of cognitive abilities and preferences on behavior in games. We first measure subjects’ logical abilities and social preferences and then evaluate their influence on behavior in strategic-form games. For this purpose, we estimate how logical abilities and preferences relate to the probability of a subject being of a specific behavioral type. We find that better logical abilities increase the likelihood of sophisticated behavior. This shift is stronger for subjects who are classified as “selfish”. However, not even the most logically able, selfish subjects are identified as Nash types.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Logical ability; Behaviors; Strategic-form games; Experiments; Preferences; Sophistication |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 27 May 2016 13:53 |
Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2024 12:11 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/16824 |
Available files
Filename: cognitive-behavior-revjep2.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0