Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2016) Approval voting and scoring rules with common values. Journal of Economic Theory, 166. pp. 304-310. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002
Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2016) Approval voting and scoring rules with common values. Journal of Economic Theory, 166. pp. 304-310. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002
Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2016) Approval voting and scoring rules with common values. Journal of Economic Theory, 166. pp. 304-310. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002
Abstract
We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Approval voting; Scoring rule; Plurality rule; Information aggregation |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Nov 2016 14:18 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 20:04 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/18077 |
Available files
Filename: AHN_OLIVEROS_approval.pdf