

# THE DIVERSIFICATION OF INEQUALITY

## Abstract

We examine intersectionality on the basis of increasingly complex interactions between gender and ethnic groups, which we argue derive from the growing diversity of these groups. While we critique the concept of superdiversity, we suggest that increased diversity leads to a ‘diversification of inequality’. This is characterised by an increasing incidence of inequality through the growth in migration and of the size and variety of ethnic minorities, and by a weakening of specific inequalities. We demonstrate this using the Labour Force Survey and conclude that there is a clear diversification of inequality but also that ethnicity is a more potent source of inequality than gender. Diversity also increases the reach of inequality through producing and increasing number of intersections.

**Keywords:** Intersectionality; superdiversity; wage gaps; gender; ethnicity, UK

## Introduction

The concept of inequality is fundamental to much social science research but has been used in many different ways. Perhaps the main approach, largely driven by economists, treats this as unidimensional, typically in terms of the distribution of income, represented by a single, cardinal measure such as the proportion of a population below the poverty line or by the Gini coefficient (eg Belfield *et al* 2017). Inequalities based on gender or ethnicity tend to be treated as distinct entities (eg Hills 1996; Salverda, Nolan and Smeeding 2009) rather than as integral to the structure of inequality.<sup>1</sup> An alternative, multidimensional approach sees inequality in terms of gaps between social groups, aligned with the concepts of human rights, discrimination (Vizard 2009), and diversity.<sup>2</sup>

A compelling approach to the concept of multiple inequalities comes through the theory of intersectionality, initially concerned with anti-discrimination laws that treat each form of discrimination singly and therefore ignore the intersection between ‘race’ (or ethnicity) and gender; gender claims effectively represent the interests of white women (Crenshaw 1989). A detailed analysis of the employment effects of such legislation in the US shows that this has at times benefited white women more than either black or Latino women *and* men (Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). However, adding more dimensions makes a clear comparison between different groups difficult. We have an increasingly diverse array of inequalities, potentially bringing intersectionality closer to another widely used concept, superdiversity. Through a ‘diversification of diversity’ arising from increased migration social divisions multiply and implicitly reduce more fundamental social divisions (Vertovec 2007). However, this in turn ignores the possibility that increased social complexity might give rise to new social inequalities. Growth in the numbers and size of ethnic minorities might in fact be associated with a *diversification of inequality*. The logical outcome of intersectionality is a greater range of inequalities based on the contrasts between the statuses and the welfare of diverse social groups. While intersectionality means ‘interlocking oppressions’ it also means ‘decentring’ dimensions such as feminism (Brah and Phoenix 2004). We can go further and perhaps say that ‘no single dimension of overall inequality can adequately describe the full structure of multiple, intersecting and conflicting dimensions of inequality’ (McCall 2005: 1791).

## The diversity of inequality

In a telling image Crenshaw describes the process of multiple disadvantage in hierarchical terms where a basement contains people simultaneously disadvantaged by race, class, gender,

sexual preference, age, and disability. These form a bottom layer of humanity supporting those with fewer dimensions, until the apex consists of people characterised by only one characteristic such as gender. The latter can escape oppression through a hatch in the ceiling, representing anti-discrimination processes, while those at the bottom can only do so through reducing to a single disadvantage and are told to wait ‘until they can be absorbed into the broader, protected categories of race and sex’ (1989: 151-2). This image of social intersections is also an image of increasing social complexity, where the lower layers are more diverse. Through splitting larger into smaller groups (eg white and black women, black men and women), diversity is an important aspect of intersectionality (McCall 2005). Diversity and inequality are intertwined. If professional white women in the US have little in common with their Latino female home-helps (Browne and Misra 2003: 491) this produces a new, within-gender inequality. As intersectionality has developed, incorporating additional dimensions such as class (Li and Heath 2016), and potentially many others such as geographical location (McCall 2001), it seems increasingly to describe a multidimensional view of inequality in which social divisions are fluid and variable (Browne and Misra 2003: 488-9).

We demonstrate this conceptually through a simple example, similarly utilised by McCall (2005: 1884-1791). If there are only two social groups (women/men) inequality has only one boundary. If we add a further dimension (black/white) then we have four cells but the total number of contrasts becomes six:

1. Black male-black female
2. White female-black female
3. White male-black female
4. White male-black male
5. White female-black male
6. White male-white female

If we add two social classes to this we have eight cells, producing 28 comparisons where the most oppressed group might be black/female/working-class. This inevitably becomes a very small group while many other outcomes are indeterminate. The more dimensions we add the more diverse the outcomes.

Diversity is given a different connotation in the case of ‘superdiversity’. The focus on a growth in migration from more countries, to more countries<sup>3</sup>, produces greater social variation (Vertovec 2007; Meissner and Vertovec 2015), but obscures the role of inequality. In response to criticism Vertovec (2013) refers to society becoming more layered and *unequal*, while Meissner and Vertovec argue that superdiversity provides the basis for novel insights in ‘rethinking patterns of inequality, prejudice and segregation’ (2015: 543). At the same time they deny that the concept challenges theories of intersectionality (p545). Nevertheless, the reference to inequality is undeveloped. Vertovec argues that ‘many basic features of super-diversity... tend to have highly gendered patterns’ (2007: 1040), but it seems this results entirely from the differing inward migration patterns of men and women.<sup>4</sup>

We argue instead that intersectionality supplemented by ideas from superdiversity offers insights into a complex network of inequalities. This can, for instance, be seen in two contrasting small-scale studies of language use. Johanssen and Sliwa (2016) in their research on Polish employment in Britain see language skills as a new dimension of intersectionality, which can be negative (lack of native language skills) or positive (through cross-border language repertoires). This is not dissimilar to the linguistics of Mutsaers and Swanenberg (2012), based on superdiversity, which sees language variation amongst ethnic minorities (in the Netherlands) as enabling a wider range of repertoires and resources.

Some analysts see gender and ‘race’ as unrelated forms of stratification, or at least that connections between them are an empirical question (Kilbourne, England and Beron

1994; Browne and Misra 2003). In the UK there is little overlap between ethnicity, gender and class in school achievement (Strand 2014a). However, there is a strong interaction between class (SES) and ethnicity, which means that we cannot simply add together the main effects. Strand notes, in particular, that for black Caribbeans and Africans there is almost no SES gradient while white British pupils benefit strongly from high SES (Strand 2014b: 229-33). However, much research finds little interaction between gender and ethnicity. Gender differences within ethnic minority groups are sometimes the reverse of gender differences in the majority group (Browne and Misra 2003; Hester, Meyer, Raphael 2012: 388; IWPR 2016; Lang and Lehman 2012; Longhi and Brynin 2017; Epstein, Gafni and Siniver 2015): The drivers are different and therefore intersectionality is not easily predictable. Further, while gender inequality persists, it is declining in many countries (Bukodi & Dex 2010; Gebel & Pfeiffer 2010; Olsen *et al* 2010; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005). Ethnic inequality, in contrast, is reinforced over time with the arrival of new migrants (Zhou 1997; van Tubergen 2006), giving rise to complex ethnic inequalities (Blackaby *et al* 2002; Heath and Cheung 2006; Heath and McMahon 1997; Longhi, Nicoletti and Platt 2013; Platt 2005; Longhi and Brynin 2017). Rather than viewing such results as a refutation of intersectionality they suggest that different combinations of inequality will occur over time and with different intensities.

Are intersections therefore merely a matter of empirical chance? We argue that this is not the case but that they are, rather, a reflection of an unequal opportunity structure. We examine this in terms of occupational segregation. In the form of occupational feminisation this is a key part of the opportunity structure in employment as it is associated with lower wages (eg Bettio and Verashchagina 2009; Levanon, England 2010; Murphy and Oesch 2016). It is particularly important in recessions as protective sectors where women do well are squeezed (Rubery and Rafferty 2013). Nevertheless, gender and ethnic segregations do not coincide.<sup>5</sup> While ethnic minorities tend to be occupationally specialised (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2005; Elliott and Lindley 2008; Heath and Cheung 2006; Longhi *et al* 2013) the wage effects are weaker (Brynin and Longhi 2015) because ethnic minorities are a small proportion of the workforce<sup>6</sup>. The two types of segregation also clearly have different causes and outcomes (Brynin and Güveli 2012; Johnston, Khattab & Manley 2015; Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). Yet we can view the skewed distribution of ethnic-minority women across occupations as an additional layer of segregation.

Even if wage discrimination, defined as unequal pay for the same work, is reducing through social, economic and political change, different groups often do different work, so their pay rates cannot be compared. If we interpret gender segregation as a form of occupational closure (eg England 1992; 2010) then we can surmise that ethnicity might add a further layer to this: which need not all be negative, however. Segregation can have positive effects for more highly educated women (Brynin and Perales 2016; Goldin 2008; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005). Double disadvantages might occur along some parts of the wage distribution but not others (Browne and Misra 2003: 498). If we examine multiple categories and dimensions of social welfare we also need to examine both advantage and disadvantage (McCall 2005: 1787).

## Methods

We must expect that intersectionality is reflected in pay from employment, which for most people is the main determinant of economic wellbeing. Our analysis uses hourly wages and is based on the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), 1993 to 2014. This is a repeated cross-section survey of individuals with detailed information on employment and a substantial sample size. We exclude the self-employed<sup>7</sup>, those with a marginal commitment to the labour force (less

than ten hours a week paid work), and those with extreme wage values (less than £1 and over £80 per hour). The age range is 17-65.

The analysis would ideally use the full ethnicity classification in the census, but changes in the ethnic categories at certain points in the LFS make use of a detailed classification over time impossible. For all but the first table we include the following categories over the period: White British, Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Chinese, therefore also excluding categories where ethnicity is unclear (such as 'other', 'mixed' or 'other Asian'). Inevitably, sample sizes sometimes limit the scope of our analysis. While the sample over the period includes 13,533 Indians, this is as low as 1,624 for Bangladeshis, of whom only 446 are women. As a study of ethnicity the sample includes both new migrants and long-resident members of the minority groups, though we separately measure the effect of being non-British (defined by country of birth).

We capture superdiversity's concern with the number of migrant groups by the size of the ethnic-minority population, arguing that any growth increases diversity. This is clear in the construction of diversity indices based on the statistical chance that someone in the host group is likely to meet a migrant, but also because no ethnic group is homogeneous. 'Indians' include Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims but also people from hugely different regions in India with different customs.<sup>8</sup> Ethnic diversity increases the number of people at risk of one or more forms of inequality even if each group's specific contribution to overall inequality becomes smaller. UK census data indicates that while 93% of UK residents were white in 1991, this was 86% in 2011 (Jivraj & Simpson 2015).

Occupations can be measured at different levels of complexity. We use the two-digit level of the System of Occupational Classification (SOC, which becomes three-digit after 2000) to produce around 80 categories. Because the occupational classification changed twice over the period, in 2000 from SOC90 to SOC2000 and in 2011 from SOC2000 to SOC2010, these classifications are not comparable. However, we do not use occupation directly, but develop variables such as the percentage of women and of graduates in occupations. As these depend on the level of coding detail rather than on the names of occupations, the changes in classification matter far less than if we were following specific occupations over time.

Our analysis has three sections. First we measure wage gaps based on both ethnicity and gender to demonstrate the complexity of inequality over time. For instance, we can define inequality on any of the six bases discussed above even with only two underlying dimensions.

We next proceed to test the role of gendered occupational segregation through OLS regression analysis of wages. We expect segregation to contribute to inequality and therefore to be a partial explanation of any intersectionality we might observe. We also expect that it can have positive effects for more highly educated women – demonstrating another aspect of both diversity and intersectionality.

Finally, we again use regression analysis to test intersectionality further, now controlling for a range of individual, job and occupational characteristics. In common with some other studies we do this through the use of interaction terms between gender and ethnicity. This provides a direct test of the intersection between the gender and ethnic dimension of inequality. We supplement this with an assessment of the role of educational qualifications as a further indicator of social differentiation, thus adding a further layer of complexity to intersectionality.

## **Results**

### *The diversity of inequality*

Table I examines ethnic and gender wage gaps in a number of ways. Column 1 takes ethnic-minority men as the focus while in the other three columns the focus is ethnic minority

women. A negative sign indicates a wage disadvantage for these groups, figures in bold a wage advantage. We also show change across two periods, comparing 1993-2000 to 2001-14. We include all groups in this table before restricting the analysis to the more homogenous groups listed in the methods section.

In the earlier period (Table Ia, column 1) ethnic-minority men mostly have a deficit relative to white British men, which is very substantial for Bangladeshis. In contrast, ethnic-minority women mostly do better than white British women (column 2). The main exceptions are Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, though their gaps are far smaller than for the equivalent men. Despite this gender difference women earn less per hour than the equivalent men in all ethnic groups bar one. If we add the gender gap amongst the white British (not shown), which is about 25%, then the overall gender gap becomes far more prominent. As women in most ethnic minority groups earn more than white British women, this implies that for women gender rather than ethnicity is the main driver of their inequality. Men in ethnic minorities experience very substantial ethnic inequality, but they do have a gender advantage.

White British women have the largest gender gap and do worse than women in most minority groups. This gives little support to intersectionality theory. We can examine this more directly through looking only at the middle two columns of the table. If column 2 provides the ethnic part of the picture (from the viewpoint of ethnic minority women), column 3 shows the gender part. Only two groups, Indians and Pakistanis, have a deficit on both counts while only for the latter is this substantial. The overall picture, therefore, is not one of a double disadvantage for ethnic minority women. However, if we compare columns 1 and 4, women in nearly all ethnic-minority groups suffer a much larger deficit relative to white British men than ethnic-minority men do. This contrast is to the detriment of minority women. If we view inequality in terms of multi-group contrasts, therefore, outcomes are diverse, but we also see greater support for intersectionality.

Another aspect of diversity is change over time. The later period (2001-14), shown in Table Ib, reveals a very different picture in some respects. Column 1 shows a significant deterioration for ethnic-minority men. The position of minority women relative to white British women also worsens for most groups. Overall, therefore, we observe a clear decline in ethnic equality, though the wage gaps between white British and ethnic-minority women remain in the latter's favour. When we move to the third column there is a very noticeable improvement for ethnic minority women relative to the equivalent men. The gap for white British women against white British men remains the largest, at 16%, even though it is smaller than in the earlier period.

Viewed in intersectionalist terms, in the second period no groups of women have deficits against both white British women and ethnic minority men. Overall, we observe a decline in ethnic equality for both men and women at the same time as an improvement in gender equality. Indeed, if we look only at the first and last five years of the period, we would get more extreme change. Comparing minority to majority women as in column 2 would show that in the final five years only three minorities have a positive gap. The ethnic comparison continues to deteriorate, therefore. At the same time the negative gaps between minority women and men continue to reduce, indicating an improving equality on the gender dimension.

#### TABLE I ABOUT HERE

The above shows a diversity of inequality which gives some, if only limited, support to intersectionality. While we are not able to infer this directly from the table, over the entire period if we were to rank all groups in broad terms we have white British men at the top, then

men and women from four ethnic minority groups (Black Caribbean and African, Indian, and Chinese), followed by white British women, and at the bottom Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and women.

### *The migration effect*

The aim of Table I is to give an overall picture of ethnic diversity and inequality in the UK, but this includes groups with no clear definition such as ‘other’. From this point we restrict the following to the most homogeneous groups: black Caribbeans and Africans, Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Chinese. Table I included migrants and the UK-born. In fact, based on the sample of employees used in the analysis, the majority by far of individuals within the ethnic groups (63%) are not born in the UK.

Table II compares migrant ethnic-minority women to white British men and women, and finally to ethnic-minority men. This shows a very striking difference to Table Ia. The wage gaps of non-British minority men against white British men in the first column are less than for the equivalent total ethnic groups and in two cases are even in favour of the minority groups. The equivalent gaps for women (relative to both white British women) are strongly in favour of the non-British groups, indicating a substantial ethnic advantage for migrant non-British women. The third column mostly shows an advantage for non-British women relative to their equivalent men. We therefore conclude that intersectionality for non-British women is in this period strongly positive. This picture reverses dramatically in the later period when outcomes are negative virtually throughout, with the recession probably being a major factor in this severe downturn (Fisher and Nandi 2015). Intersectionality is pronounced but, at least defined as here – as an additive effect – it is not a consistent social condition.<sup>9</sup>

### TABLE II ABOUT HERE

We argued above that inequality has also to be understood against a background of increasing diversity. Not only do we have a complex picture of inequality based on a range of contrasts, but as the minorities expand in size through both migration and fertility, then any inequalities we observe will affect more people. In the sample the ethnic minority employed population increases across the two above periods from 7.8% to 12.3%. It is clear from the above tables that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suffer the greatest consistent inequality (men and women) and these two groups combined have grown from about half of one percent to nearly one percent of the entire sample. For these groups inequality is increasing for two reasons. We observe an increase in the intensity of ethnic inequality but also that this potentially affects more people.

### *Occupational Segregation*

It was argued above that occupational segregation, which is linked to gender inequality, might be an important contributor to intersectionality if its negative effects are worse for ethnic minority women than for white British women. In Table III we provide results of a regression analysis, for men and women separately, where the dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. We include as explanatory variables the ethnic categories and the proportion of women in an occupation.<sup>10</sup> We do not include the proportion of ethnic minorities as this is collinear with ethnicity in some cases. In addition to a wide range of controls (not shown but listed at the bottom of the table) we include a variable denoting whether the respondents are British. This includes white British people and British minorities, so the coefficients of the ethnic minorities are as a result less affected by migrant status. Finally, we include interaction terms between the two occupational measures and the ethnic categories in order to see if their effects vary by ethnicity. As there is no clear change over time the results are for the entire

period.

The effects for the ethnic groups in the first block are all negative, especially for men, but vary by group. These are best understood as effects for ethnic minorities in occupations with zero feminisation and graduate density as the effects for these two variables appear elsewhere in the table. Feminisation is negative and graduate density positive, but the latter effect, interestingly, is far greater. This main effect refers to the reference category of white British workers. The interaction terms, showing how these occupational characteristics differ in their effect for minorities, are negative for men in the case of feminisation and positive for graduate density. Precisely the reverse applies to women. Ethnic-minority women gain from feminisation relative to white British women but lose out from working in more graduate occupations. One possible factor, though this is purely conjectural, might be an undervaluation of non-British qualifications in the case of women. Not all these effects are statistically significant but they are strong enough to indicate that occupational segregation has distinct wage effects for ethnic-minority men and women,<sup>11</sup> and that ethnicity has additional effects to those of gender. Occupational closure – whatever its causes – adds to the complex nature of intersectionality, though demonstrating positive as well as negative effects.

### TABLE III ABOUT HERE

#### *Intersectionality*

Table IV produces a direct test of intersectionality through the use of interaction terms between gender and ethnicity, showing their *joint* effects on the dependent variable. It is unclear in the literature whether there should be a reinforcement effect (or double penalty) for ethnic-minority women for intersectionality to hold, or rather that the intersection is simply represented by the presence of the two main effects separately – that is, gender *and* ethnicity rather than gender *plus* ethnicity (Browne and Misra 2003: 498). In general, it has been found that interaction terms do not produce significant effects: being female and being from an ethnic minority both lower wages independently, but this masks considerable complexity, which we describe below. Table I shows that there seems to be little support for a double disadvantage of gender and ethnicity. We replicate this in the regression analysis of Table IV, controlling for individual and other characteristics, while showing the same contrasts. Table IVa presents the estimated main effects for gender, ethnicity and their interaction for the periods 1993-2000 and 2001-2014. This clearly shows that the relative gender gap has decreased, from white British women earning approximately 14% less than their male peers in 1993-2000 to 10% less in 2000-2014. While the penalties of ethnic minority men compared to white British men have also reduced over time, particularly for Bangladeshi workers, large gaps remain and for some groups such as Black Caribbeans, Indian and Pakistani workers there has been no real change. The interaction terms indicate how this ethnic gap differs for women, for whom it is much smaller and for many groups even non-existent. In 1993-2000 it is only among Indian workers that there is a similar ethnic penalty among men and women, but in 2001-2014 Indian women have much lower penalties compared to white British women than Indian men compared to white British men. This sort of outcome is an important indicator of the complexity of the search for wage-based intersectionalities. The interaction term Indian\*female is 0.009 and not significant in 1993-2000, but 0.051 and significant in 2000-2014. This positive interaction term means the Indian penalty among men (-0.093) is larger than among women (-0.093+0.051 = -0.042).

### TABLE IV ABOUT HERE

It is therefore not enough to show only whether a specific interaction term is statistically significant. Table IVb shows the contrasts of minority groups compared to different reference groups, estimated from the coefficients presented in Table IVa. We are primarily interested in the gender and ethnic dimension of inequality, which means the second and third columns for the earlier period and the sixth and seventh for the latter in Table IVb. If both signs are negative for each group then we have a clear double disadvantage for minority women, where they are penalized for being female and being a minority. This applies to three groups in the earlier period but this joint effect is substantial only for Indian women, who earn 13% less than Indian men *and* 9% less than white British women. In no other case is it possible to say there is a significant intersection. Turning to the later period, Indian women still do relatively badly but far less so than previously.

Ethnic-minority women are not always badly paid relative to the equivalent men, taking into account factors such as education, age and job tenure which might influence outcomes. There is only one gap of over 10% in the earlier period and none in the second. In terms of the number of negative gaps in the earlier period both gender and ethnicity contribute to inequality, but in the later period ethnic inequality predominates (most minority women earn less than white British women).

Another way of looking at intersectionality is on the basis of the gap relative to white British men (incorporating both an ethnic and a gender dimension) and contrasting this with the gap between these and ethnic minority men (therefore adding a further gender dimension). It is very clear, if we compare the first and fourth columns in each half of the table, that the relative gaps are very much to the disadvantage of ethnic minority women. This, we might argue, is a clear vindication not only of intersectionality but of the need to take into account the diversity of inequality in assessing this.

One problem with the use of OLS which might contribute to the limited findings of intersection in studies employing this method is that it takes no account of the distribution of wages within each group. The essential point of intersectionality is the concept of a double oppression, which is of little relevance to more highly privileged women (Brown and Misra 2003; McCall 2005). We could include social class as another dimension of intersectionality but the close association between class and wages means this is not viable here. Instead we use education, noting first that ethnic minority women are more likely to be graduates than both white British women and some ethnic-minority men, while they are less likely to have low levels of education (GCSE or below) than both. Table V repeats the analysis of Table IV but now divided by educational level. Again only Indian women have significant wage gaps based on both gender and ethnicity, but this is greatest for those with limited education. Education is one way out of low wages based on both gender and ethnicity.

TABLE V ABOUT HERE

## Conclusions

In this paper we have analysed whether women from ethnic minorities suffer a double wage penalty on the basis of both their ethnicity and their gender while at the same time arguing that we must expect a complex set of effects which undermines the value of single categories of inequality. Some writers on intersectionality might argue that any categories on which such analysis can be based are socially constructed. However, while categorisation is necessary if we are to measure inequality (McCall 2005: 1785), the idea of deconstructing social categories is in some measure reflected in our emphasis on superdiversity as an



opposing theme. McCall's 'complexity of intersectionality' meets Vertovec's 'diversification of diversity' because with the growth in the salience of ethnic minorities in many societies, whether through population growth or migration, both add to and fragment the inequalities social groups face. This is the central argument we make in suggesting a 'diversification of inequality'.<sup>12</sup>

We showed that in the first period we examine (1993-97) there is indeed some intersectionality, but this largely disappears in the second period (2010-14). While it is possible that this is a temporary improvement it does seem that gender and ethnic inequalities are increasingly divergent: they move in opposite directions over time. It is also the case that while gender inequality remains, if at a declining level, the minorities vary greatly in the extent of inequality relative to white British employees. White British men are paid the most on average but some ethnic-minority men *and* women in broad terms come second. White British women come next and last of all Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, both men and women. We therefore find limited evidence of a general wage-based intersectionality though there is a partial double deficit for women from (or from families from) the Indian subcontinent.<sup>13</sup> Part of this may be related to occupational segregation as our results suggest that ethnic minority women seem to gain more than white British women from occupational feminisation while gaining less from working in more professional occupations.

If we find only limited evidence for intersectionality based on hourly wages we do find a great diversity of outcomes for ethnic-minority women, where migrant status, feminisation, and education all play a role in this differentiation. This, we argue, suggests that we need to take into account the growing size and diversity of the ethnic population in understanding the distribution of social welfare. While inequality is declining in intensity (wage gaps are getting smaller) it is expanding overall because the ethnic minorities themselves are expanding and becoming internally more complex. It is therefore difficult to pick up the myriad intersections that exist. If it were possible to sum these smaller intersections across the whole spectrum of society we might well observe not a decline but a widening reach of inequality. This more complex picture suggests to us both a diversification and an expansion of inequality.

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## Tables

**Table Ia: % pay gaps of ethnic minority men and women against white British men and women, and each other 1993-2000 (wage gaps in favour of ethnic-minority in bold)**

	1	2	3	4
	Ethnic minority men - white British men	Ethnic minority women - white British women	Ethnic minority women - ethnic minority men	Ethnic minority women - white British men
White non-British	<b>9.21</b>	<b>16.75</b>	-19.30	-11.87
Black Caribbean	-8.27	<b>11.06</b>	-8.60	-16.16
Black African	-8.04	<b>5.58</b>	-13.33	-20.30
Black other	- 7.88	<b>12.00</b>	-8.53	-15.43
Indian	-3.36	-0.08	-21.73	-25.14
Pakistani	-21.78	-8.79	-11.98	-31.15
Bangladeshi	-39.19	-4.55	<b>18.64</b>	-27.95
Chinese	-4.21	<b>18.20</b>	-6.85	-10.77
Other Asian	<b>4.37</b>	<b>9.93</b>	-20.49	-17.02
Other	-5.00	<b>11.17</b>	-11.67	-23.89

**Table Ib: % pay gaps of ethnic minority men and women against white British men and women, and each other, 2001-14 (wage gaps in favour of ethnic-minority in bold)**

	1	2	3	4
	Ethnic minority men - white British men	Ethnic minority women - white British women	Ethnic minority women - ethnic minority men	Ethnic minority women - white British men
White non-British	-2.19	<b>6.15</b>	-9.16	-11.14
Black Caribbean	-4.09	<b>10.78</b>	-3.30	-7.26
Black African	-11.14	<b>2.02</b>	-3.89	- 14.59
Black other	-10.08	<b>6.74</b>	-0.06	-10.65
Indian	-3.03	<b>5.73</b>	-8.73	-11.49
Pakistani	-23.27	-6.99	<b>1.47</b>	-22.14
Bangladeshi	-32.37	-9.60	<b>11.89</b>	-24.33
Chinese	-3.95	<b>9.43</b>	-4.62	-8.39
Other Asian	-12.62	-0.93	-5.08	-17.07
Other	-10.93	<b>2.70</b>	-3.41	-14.03

**Table IIa: % pay gaps of ethnic minority migrant men against white British men and ethnic minority migrant women against white British men, white British women and men from the same minority, 1993-2000 (wage gaps in favour of migrant group in bold)**

	1	2	3	4
	Migrant men - white British men	Migrant women - white British women	Migrant women - ethnic minority men	Migrant women - white British men
Black Caribbean	-1.17	<b>20.37</b>	<b>0.17</b>	-9.13
Black African	-4.21	<b>17.79</b>	-3.15	-11.08
Indian	<b>4.53</b>	<b>16.75</b>	<b>0.71</b>	-11.87
Pakistani	-18.19	<b>5.27</b>	<b>3.14</b>	-20.53
Bangladeshi	-32.08	<b>7.96</b>	<b>6.54</b>	-18.58
Chinese	<b>4.61</b>	<b>29.16</b>	<b>22.09</b>	-2.50

**Table IIb: % pay gaps of ethnic minority migrant men against white British men and ethnic minority migrant women against white British men, white British women and men from the same minority, 2001-2014 (wage gaps in favour of migrant group in bold)**

	1	2	3	4
	Migrant men - white British men	Migrant women - white British women	Migrant women - ethnic minority men	Migrant women - white British men
Black Caribbean	-10.72	-1.94	-15.77	-17.91
Black African	-13.47	-4.04	-11.88	-19.68
Indian	-5.57	-4.89	-18.95	-20.38
Pakistani	-26.09	-14.24	-10.07	-28.21
Bangladeshi	-38.65	-12.13	-10.16	-26.45
Chinese	-5.50	<b>5.22</b>	-8.56	-11.92

**Table III: OLS regression with log hourly wages as the dependent variables, showing effects of ethnicity and interactions between ethnicity and (1) proportion female and (2) proportion graduate in occupations, 1993-2014 (LFS)**

	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>
Black Caribbean	-0.05 <sup>***</sup>	-0.02
Black African	-0.13 <sup>***</sup>	-0.10 <sup>***</sup>
Indian	-0.08 <sup>***</sup>	-0.13 <sup>***</sup>
Pakistani	-0.14 <sup>***</sup>	-0.02
Bangladeshi	-0.20 <sup>***</sup>	-0.10
Chinese	-0.02	0.03
<i>Proportion female</i>	-0.15 <sup>***</sup>	-0.06 <sup>***</sup>
*Black Caribbean	0.04	0.06 <sup>*</sup>
*Black African	0.16 <sup>***</sup>	0.14 <sup>***</sup>
*Indian	-0.04 <sup>*</sup>	0.12 <sup>***</sup>
*Pakistani	0.04	0.02
*Bangladeshi	-0.02	0.07
*Chinese	-0.10 <sup>(*)</sup>	-0.00
<i>Proportion graduate</i>	0.66 <sup>***</sup>	0.75 <sup>***</sup>
*Black Caribbean	0.04	-0.09 <sup>**</sup>
*Black African	-0.04	-0.04
*Indian	0.15 <sup>***</sup>	0.07 <sup>***</sup>
*Pakistani	0.01	-0.19 <sup>***</sup>
*Bangladeshi	0.10 <sup>(*)</sup>	-0.17 <sup>*</sup>
*Chinese	0.13 <sup>**</sup>	-0.04
<i>British</i>	0.07 <sup>***</sup>	0.04 <sup>***</sup>
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.47	.52
<i>N</i>	332,195	341,779

Notes: \*\*\*= $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , (\*)  $p < .1$ ; other variables not shown: Age, age squared, marital status, children, education, job tenure, number employees, part-time, permanent, public sector, industry dummies, regional dummies, year of survey.

**Table IVa: Estimated ethnicity, gender and interaction terms 1993-2000 and 2001-14 on log wage, LFS**

Period	1993-2000	2001-2014
Female (main effect)	-0.136 (0.002)***	-0.099 (0.001)***
Ethnicity (main effect)		
Black Caribbean	-0.070 (0.012)***	-0.061 (0.009)***
Black African	-0.158 (0.015)***	-0.122 (0.008)***
Indian	-0.097 (0.008)***	-0.093 (0.005)***
Pakistani	-0.155 (0.013)***	-0.157 (0.008)***
Bangladeshi	-0.319 (0.022)***	-0.217 (0.012)***
Chinese	-0.114 (0.024)***	-0.088 (0.013)***
Ethnicity * female		
Black Caribbean	0.080 (0.016)***	0.067 (0.012)***
Black African	0.105 (0.022)***	0.109 (0.011)***
Indian	0.009 (0.012)	0.051 (0.007)***
Pakistani	0.114 (0.023)***	0.110 (0.013)***
Bangladeshi	0.312 (0.047)***	0.121 (0.023)***
Chinese	0.116 (0.032)***	0.083 (0.018)***
N	273,623	447,014
R2	0.53	0.48

Notes: \*\*\*= $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , (\*)  $p < .1$ ; other variables not shown: Age, age squared, marital status, children, education, job tenure, number employees, part-time, permanent, public sector, industry dummies, regional dummies, year of survey.

**Table IVb: Estimated wage gaps (%) of minority men and women to different comparison groups, from interaction terms between gender and ethnicity, 1993-97 and 2010-14 (percentage change in hourly wages, LFS)**

	1993-2000				2001-2014			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Women vs white British men	Women vs co-ethnic men	Women vs white British women	Men vs white British men	Women vs white British men	Women vs co-ethnic men	Women vs white British women	Men vs white British men
Black Caribbean	-13	-6	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	-9	-3	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>
Black African	-20	-4	-6	-1	-11	<b>1</b>	-1	-2
Indian	-23	-13	-9	-5	-14	-5	-4	<b>1</b>
Pakistani	-18	-3	-4	-1	-15	<b>1</b>	-5	-6
Bangladeshi	-15	<b>17</b>	-1	-17	-20	<b>2</b>	-10	-11
Chinese	-13	-2	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	-11	-2	-1	<b>2</b>



**Table V: Effects of women in minority groups relative to white British men, men in own minority group, and white British women, estimated through interaction term between gender and ethnicity at low medium and higher education (percentage change in hourly wages, LFS)**

	Up to GCSE			A-level			Degree		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	White British men	E-M men	White British women	White British men	E-M men	White British women	White British men	E-M men	White British women
Black Caribbean	-16	-11	-1	-11	-2	0	-7	-4	-4
Black African	-10	-2	5	-14	-1	-3	-16	2	-13
Indian	-22	-12	-7	-15	-3	-4	-11	-3	-8
Pakistani	-18	0	-3	-17	-2	-6	-10	5	-7
Bangladeshi	-27	4	-12	-17	2	-6	-11	8	-8
Chinese	-12	-4	3	-12	2	-1	-8	-1	-5

*Notes: As above; education is excluded as a control*

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<sup>1</sup> This is the case even though we know that social inequality in general is related to group inequalities because widening income dispersion stretches all income gaps (Blau and Kahn 2003) and general income inequality has been rising with the US and UK leading the way (Brandolini and Smeeding 2009: 83).

<sup>2</sup> These approaches are not absolutely distinct, because of course one can calculate, say, the proportion of ethnic minorities below the poverty line, but the two approaches tend to follow largely separate paths.

<sup>3</sup> Though this phenomenon has been disputed (eg Czaika and de Haas 2014). Further, while there is some apparent evidence that cultural diversity has a positive effect on local wage levels this seems to disappear when panel data – which help deal with unknowns such as the reasons for migration – are used (Longhi et al 2013).

<sup>4</sup> There are fundamental differences between these two conceptual frameworks. Intersectionality is essentially about origins (inputs) and fixed distinctions such as gender and ethnicity, while superdiversity is about outcomes and flows (social change arising from the growth in immigration). In fact, superdiversity is a mix of both inputs (migration) and outcomes such as labour market experiences (Vertovec 2007: 1025), which is a problem if the aim is to understand the causal relationship between these two.

<sup>5</sup> While there is evidence for a gender bias in promotions (eg Joshi, Son and Roh 2015), racial prejudice differs from the stereotyping of ‘appropriate’ jobs for men and women – views which are themselves changing. Further, while people with ‘foreign-sounding’ names are relatively less likely to be invited for a job interview there seems to be no additional gender bias (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016).

<sup>6</sup> Some analysts argue that ethnic segregation has very limited wage implications (Clark and Drinkwater 2007), but this is probably going too far.

<sup>7</sup> Though there is differential selection into employment and self-employment by ethnicity (Demireva 2011; Dustmann and Theodoropoulos 2010).

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<sup>8</sup> While Meissner and Vertovec are explicit in rejecting a sole focus on ethnicity (2015: 542), immigration adds a further source of potential inequality to ethnicity.

<sup>9</sup> However, the full regression results (which we do not show) indicate that the migration effect on hourly wages is due largely to differential individual characteristics and employment profiles. For instance, non-British minorities are far younger on average than their British counterparts.

<sup>10</sup> We also include graduate density within occupations as this provides a further indicator of how ethnic-minority women might map onto the occupational structure.

<sup>11</sup> We do not show these results but a simple regression with the same dependent variable but for each ethnic minority group separately shows that the effects of percentage female in occupations is close to zero or statistically non-significant for all British but strongly positive for most non-British groups. Feminisation has a positive effect on the wages of non-British minorities, again revealing the complexity of the overall picture.

<sup>12</sup> It is worth pointing out that complexity is not something that sits well with the academic endeavour. ‘Indeed, there is much hostility towards such complexity; most journals are devoted to additive linear models and incremental improvements in already well-developed bodies of research.’ (McCall 2005: 1787). It is also worth noting that the correlation between % ethnic and % female is .35 for men and .01 for women. This implies that segregation on both measures does not apply to women.

<sup>13</sup> Even in this case it might not be the proportion of women in an occupation that lowers wages but the specific characteristics of the occupations in which women tend to concentrate (Brynin and Perales 2016).