The choice of terrorism in conflict

and the outcomes of mixed methods of dissent

Margherita Belgioioso

Department of Government

University of Essex

Date of submission (6th October 2017)

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for a number of dear friends, colleagues, and scholars in encouraging me and providing feedback to my ideas. I am grateful for my best ally, David. I am grateful for my parents that enabled me to go to University and first taught me how to think critically. I am also grateful for the scholarship from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) that made my PhD possible. Finally, I would have never been able to complete this dissertation without the wisdom, guidance, support, and patience of Prof. Kristian Gleditsch and Prof. Tobias Böhmelt. They taught me to be a political scientist.

Table of Contents

Table of Figures

Tables of Tables

.

Summary of the thesis

This thesis aims at understanding the choice of terrorism in mass dissident movements and the outcomes of civil resistance campaigns that coexist with the use of terrorist tactics by radicals. Towards this end, it focuses on dissident organizations and conflict dynamics and therefore contributes to the existing literature on terrorism and conflict, both methodologically and theoretically. Study one investigates the conditions under which groups that participate in mass dissent choose to initiate terrorist campaigns. I find that groups involved in either civil war or mass civil resistance might face strategic constraints that encourage them to resort to terrorism, due to perceived lower costs and higher tactical effectiveness. These constraints are higher repression and longer duration of mass dissent. Study two contributes to the literature on 'radical flanks effect'. I find that terrorism generates incentives for the state to accommodate civil resistance movement, especially if nonviolent movements have a centralized leadership and hierarchical structure and can thereby credibly commit to nonviolent discipline and to avoid the escalation of the conflict to large-scale violence. Study three focuses on international support to rebel groups as determinants of the variation in the portfolio of killings across rebel groups. I find that rebels that receive financial support from external non-state actors are less likely to target civilians than combatants. This is because investing financial support domestically is more economically efficient and increased rebel dependency on the local population generating incentives to restrain the use of terrorism. In turn, rebels that receive military support from external non-state actors are more likely to target civilians than combatants. Military resources are efficiently invested in warfare activities without the need to increase reliance on the population. To test these mechanisms empirically, I model the portfolios of killings of rebel groups as a proportion of terrorist-related deaths and battle-related deaths.

Introduction

This doctoral dissertation aims at contributing to our understanding of terrorism as a social and political phenomenon in the context of mass dissident campaigns as well as the repercussion that terrorist activities are likely to have on political outcomes when the majority of dissidents take part in sustained nonviolent civil resistance tactics. This dissertation investigates the motivations and circumstances leading dissident organizations participating in large-scale conventional civil wars and mass civil resistance movements to resort to and utilize terrorist tactics and the outcomes of mix dissent methods of dissent.

While the previous literature studied different methods of contention such as conventional civil war, non-violent civil resistance and terrorism extensively, these phenomena have largely been examined in isolation from each other. Recent work on methods of contention has looked at the relationship between civil wars and non-violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephen 2011; Dahl et al. 2014). Whereas transitions from non-violent contentious social movements to large-scale civil wars are relatively rare, many non-violent campaigns experience less organized, smaller scale irregular violence such as terrorist attacks against soft targets. Other recent studies have shown an overlap between terrorist attacks and conventional armed violence (Findley and Young 2012; Stanton 2013). Some researchers have examined how different organisational characteristics and structural conditions can increase the incentives and likelihood of terrorism in civil war (Polo and Gleditsch, 2014).

One might think that mass movements involving large numbers of participants that face the state in direct struggle and terrorist tactics that involve small underground cells are antithetical dissident methods and need to be studied in isolation from each other. However, these tactics of dissent appears to be

complements rather than substitutes. Findley and Young (2012) suggest that the current division in the analysis of terrorist tactics, conventional violence and mass civil resistance is limited when scholars and policymakers seek to understand conflict causes, processes and outcomes. Accordingly, Most and Starr (1984) point out that different violent and non-violent strategies need to be conceived form the outset as "commensurable behaviors or component parts of abstract conceptual puzzles" (383).

This dissertation aims to extend this line of research by examining violent and non-violent actions jointly to understand the choice of terrorist tactics, the use or non-use of terrorist violence and the outcome of mix methods of resistance drawing from contentious politics and rational choice theories.

Terrorism is conceptualized as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors with the intention to intimidate or transmit a message to a larger audience (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and to Terrorism, 2012: 6). Unlike many studies on the determinants of terrorist tactics, terrorism is here conceptualized such as one of the many possible tactics dissident groups can choose in conflicts against the states. The alternative tactics can be considered within the subset of contentious political behavior. Contentious collective behaviours consist of violent and non-violent methods of dissent ranging from petitions, assemblies and audiences, to strike, marches and public demonstration, to boycotts, occupations and obstructions, to inherently violent forms like attacks on propriety, on antagonists and on public authorities but also bombardments, pitch battles, armed assaults and terrorist attacks (Della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 609).

All these collective extra-institutional repertoires of dissent are a function of the three 'fields' of social life: collective action, contention, and politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Due to the fact that different violent and nonviolent contentious

behaviours are used by non-state actors as complements rather than as substitutes in open conflict situations in this dissertation I refer to 'dissidents who use terror tactics' rather than 'terrorists'. I avoid the use of the term 'terrorists' not only because this lack the emotional distance required to conduct scientific inquiry but also because the term 'terrorists' fails to identify coherently a typology of non-state actors (see Tilly, 2004; Moore et al., unpublished)[1].

Existing research has significantly contributed to improve our understanding of terrorism and highlights a number of reasons why non-state actors use terrorist tactics. Terrorism is fueled by physical integrity rights abuses and socioeconomic discrimination (Piazza and Walsh, 2010; Piazza, 2012). Terrorism aims at altering audiences believes about rebels' abilities and commitment to a political cause; it am- aims at provoking the state to indiscriminately repress civilians to win their support, intimidating civilians convincing them to oppose the state and at imposing enough destruction on state to obtain concession (Buneo de Mesquita and Dickerson, 2007; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Kalyvas, 2003). Terrorism has tactical advantages compared to conventional violence: it allows rebel groups to gain support and attention in competitive environment and in situations of severe power asymmetry (Crenshaw, 1981; 1985; Bloom, 2004; Kalyvas 2006). However, depending on ideology and political goals the costs of terrorism connected to the risk of alienating popular support might offset its tactical advantages (Polo and Gleditsch 2016; Stanton 2013). Rebels use terrorism more intensely when they face violent regimes, are militarily week, can exploit democratic regimes' rule of law, or have more opportunities for media dissemination (Polo and Gleditsch, 2016; Stanton, 2013;).

[1] Tilly, Charles (2004). Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist. *Sociological Theory 22*(1): 5–13.

However, many important questions on the emergence, use and consequences of terrorist violence remain unanswered. In fact, existing systematic literature on the causes of terrorism fails to comprehensively consider the domestic and international conflict dynamics that might alter the attractiveness of one tactic over another. For example, the literature of terrorism in civil war focuses on terrorism intensity and deadliness but does not systematically explain why terrorist campaigns emerge in civil wars in the first place. More crucially, there is not systematic empirical literature taking into account the emergence of terrorism in the context of mass nonviolent movements and civil resistance campaigns.

Another question that remains largely unanswered is the effect of the use of terrorist tactics in the context of mass nonviolent campaigns on the political outcomes of the nonviolent movement. Recent work has studied the strategic advantages of civil resistance to obtain maximalist demands as opposed to violence. However, many primarily nonviolent mass civil resistance campaigns coexist with the use of terrorist tactics by radical side-lined actors. Existing literature of the effect of 'radical flanks' does not explain which type of violence may genuinely modify the strategic environment in which primarily nonviolent mass dissident campaigns face opponent governments. In addition, it is not clear under which specific conditions the effect of violence is likely to help or hinder nonviolent collective actors in the struggle to reach their goals. Finally, with the exception of a recent study of Chenoweth and Shock (2015), the research exploring the effect of the actions of radical groups on the outcomes of moderate movements do not test their hypothesis using systematic comparative analysis.

Existing literature has highlighted a possible link between rebel-biased support and civilian victimization and other research indicates that external states' support to

rebel groups shape rebels use of civilian victimization according to supporters' regime type (Kalyvas 1999; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2007; Salehyan et al 2014). However, the effect of different kind of external support by external non-state actors on rebel groups' choice of conventional versus terrorist violence remains an understudied topic. This is particularly relevant because non-state actors support to insurgents is the most common form of external support to insurgents after the cold war. Additionally, existing literature leaves us without expectation on weather rebel groups' relative allocation of terrorist and conventional violence varies as a consequence of different types of rebel biased external support.

This dissertation encompasses three articles that aim at addressing these shortcomings. The figure below sketches out the relationship between the three papers of the dissertation. It is not meant as a comprehensive theoretical model of the mechanisms at work that determine the onset, intensity and consequences of terrorist violence in mass dissident campaigns but it serves as an expositional tool for the main points of tangency in the dissertation. The focus of the thesis lies between the relationship between terrorist tactics and mass dissident campaigns. Terrorist tactics take a centre stage and have their onset explained by internal mass dissident dynamics i.e. repression, size of dissent and duration of mass dissident campaigns, their intensity explained by international dynamics i.e. non-state actors' financial support and non-state actors' military support. Finally, the interaction between terrorist tactics and the structure of mass dissident campaigns serves as an explanation for non-violent mass dissident movement political outcome.

Sketch of dissertation



Overview of the articles

The first paper focuses on the determinants of the emergence of terrorist campaigns considering the full spectrum of mass contentious political activities, i.e. large-scale conventional civil wars and mass civil resistance campaigns. *Terrorist campaign onset* refers to the first year of a dissident campaign in which participants begin to systematically use terrorist tactics: at least three terrorist attacks within a year form the first terrorist campaign. For this paper, I used the Global Terrorism Database's (GTD) three basic coding rules and three additional criteria to identify terrorist attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and to Terrorism, 2012): attacks must be intentional, entail use of violence or the threat of violence, aimed at political, economic or social goals, have intention to coerce, intimidate or transmit a message to

a larger audience then the immediate victims, violate the international humanitarian law's prohibition to target civilians or non-combatants, and be perpetrated by non-state actors. Additionally, I included only terrorist attacks carried out by actors engaging in mass dissent and which share the dissident campaigns' broad political goals. I argue that groups involved in either civil war and mass civil resistance can face strategic constraints that encourage the resort to terrorism, due to perceived lower costs and higher tactical effectiveness. When participation is low, state repression against mass dissent is intense and with prolonged mass dissent groups become more likely to adopt terrorism. The empirical analysis uses new data on terrorism in mass dissident campaigns and provide empirical support to the hypotheses.

The second paper focuses on the mechanisms and processes through which terrorist violence perpetrated by minor factions sharing the political goals of nonviolent movements affect the movements' outcomes. The data on terrorism occurrence combines the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) on attacks from 1970 to 2014 with own coded data on terrorist attacks prior to 1970 (see Appendix Table 1). Also for this paper, GTD's three basic coding rules and three additional criteria to identify terrorist events are taken into consideration for inclusion (START, 2012: 6-7). However, differently form the first paper, this study considers terrorist attacks carried out by groups and actors that share the broad political goals of the civil resistance campaigns (e.g., regime change, independence) even if they did not take part in the non-violent campaign itself. Terrorist attacks that take place during massive nonviolent mobilization can represent a powerful "game-changer" for nonviolent organizations: they modify the strategic environment between nonviolent movements and opponent governments. I argue that terrorism gives governments greater incentives to try to accommodate the political goals of a civil resistance

movement, especially if nonviolent movements can credibly commit to nonviolent discipline and avoid escalation to large-scale violent conflict. This is more likely when nonviolent organizations have a *hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership*, The empirical analysis shows that mass civil resistance campaigns with hierarchical structure are more likely to succeed when terrorism occurs.

The third paper focuses on how different types of non-state actors' transnational support affect rebel groups' relative allocation between terrorist-related deaths and battle-related deaths. In this paper, my operationalization of terrorism relies on the GTD's three basic coding rules, and three additional criteria (START 2012, 6-7). However, to avoid the potential overlap between terrorist deaths coded in GTD and conventional-armed violence deaths coded in GED (see Croicu *et al*. 2015; Sundberg and Melander 2013), I exclude all attacks that target coercive apparatuses such as militaries and police. I argue that rebels receiving financial support are less likely to target civilians than combatants. This is because rebels have incentive to invest financial support domestically increasing their dependency on local population and, thereof generating incentives to restrain the use of terrorism. In turn, rebels receiving military support do not develop the same incentives and are more likely to target more civilians than combatants. The empirics support all the hypotheses and are consistent with the argument that the counterproductive effects of terrorism offset its tactical advantages when rebels depend on local population.

References

Bloom, M Mia (2004) Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding. *Political Science Quarterly* 119(Spring): 61–88.

Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan and Eric Dickson (2007) The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 364–381.

Crenshaw, Martha (1981) The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics* 13(4): 379-399.

Chenoweth, E. and Shock, K (2015). Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns? *Mobilization: An International Quarterly 2*(4): 427-451.

Della Porta, Donatella and Sidney Tarrow (1986) Unwanted Children: political violence and the cycle of protest in Italy, 1996-1973. *European Journal of Political Research*, 14(June): 607–632.

Humphreys, Macartan and Weinstein, Jeremy M. Handling and Manhandling (2006) Civilians in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science*, 100 (3): 429-447

Kalyvas, S.N. (1999). Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria. *Rationality and Society, 11*(3) 243-285

Kalyvas, N Stathis (2003) The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War. The Journal of Ethics 8(1): 97–138.

Kalyvas, N Stathis (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.

Kydd, H Andrew and Barbara F Walter (2006) Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security* 31(1): 49-80.

Moore, H. Will; Bakker, S. Rayan and Hill, W. Jr Daniel (unpublished) It's the Behavior, Stupid. A Contentious Politics Account of Why Terror Attacks Differ Across Countries

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and to Terrorism (2012) Global Terrorism Dataset. (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd).

Piazza A. James and Walsh James Igoe. 2010. Physical Integrity Rights and Terrorism. *Political Science and Politics*, *43* (3), 411–414.

Piazza, James (2012) Types of minority Discrimination and Terrorism. *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* 29(5): 521-546.

Polo, Sara and Kristian S Gleditsch (2016) Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 53(6): 815-829.

Salehyan, I.; David Siroky, and Reed M. Wood (2014) External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of War Atrocities. International Organizations 68 (Summer): 633–661

Stanton, A Jessica (2013) Terrorism in the Context of Civil War. *The Journal of Politics* 75(4): 1009-1002.

Tilly, Charles (2004) Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists. *Sociological Theory* 22(1): 5-13.

Tilly, Charles and Tarrow, Sideny (2006) Contentious Politics. Oxford University Press

Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge University Press. *Comparative Political Studies 40*(9): 1146-1151.

Going underground:

Resort to terrorism in mass mobilization dissident campaigns

Abstract

Under what conditions do groups participating in mass dissent choose to initiate terrorist campaigns? I argue that groups involved in either civil war and mass civil resistance can face strategic constraints that may encourage the resort to terrorism, due to perceived lower costs and higher tactical effectiveness. When participation is low, groups become more likely to adopt terrorism as a less mobilization-dependent tactics that allow them to signal resolve and political relevance. Moreover, prolonged mass dissent increases competition and fragmentation within dissident campaigns, making leaders in narrow militant subgroups more likely to initiate terrorism for gaining support and establishing themselves at the forefront of their movements. Finally, direct incentives for terrorism are generated by extreme state repression against dissidents as non-combatants are seen as comparatively 'easier' targets than the repressive and well-armed coercive state apparatus. The analysis provide empirical supports consistent with my claims that terrorism is more likely chosen with prolonged duration of mass dissident campaigns and when mass dissent faces extreme state repression. The findings also indicate no significant difference between civil wars and mass civil resistance movements with regards to the effects of duration and repression on the likelihood of terrorism, suggesting that terrorist campaigns have a coherent strategic logic across different types of mass dissent.

Introduction

Terrorism and other dissident tactics have largely been studied in isolation from each other and by different scholarly communities. Only recently have scholars pointed to how terrorism --- in the sense of indirect attacks by non-state actors against a government targeting non-combatants --- often occurs simultaneously with more conventional armed violence targeting the government directly (e.g. Asal et al., 2012; de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2015; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009). This research has led to a growing body of empirical studies on the use of terrorism in civil war (e.g. Findley and Young, 2012; Fortna, 2015; Polo and Gleditsch, 2016; Stanton, 2013). Existing research suggests that non-state actors may use terrorism for a number of different reasons. Terrorism aims to alter how audiences perceive the rebels' abilities and their commitment to a political cause, to provoke the state to indiscriminately repress civilians and impose sufficient costs to obtain concessions (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickerson, 2007; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Kalyvas, 2003). Terrorism can have tactical advantages compared to conventional violence as it allows week rebel groups to gain support in a competitive environment (Crenshaw, 1981; Bloom, 2004; Kalyvas 2006). Finally, rebels are likely to use more terrorism when they face abusive regimes, are militarily week, can exploit democratic rules (Piazza, 2012; Piazza and Walsh, 2010; Polo and Gleditsch, 2016; Stanton, 2013).

This scholarship, however, overlooks the use of terrorism in mass dissident campaigns more generally by either studying terrorism as a *sui gene*ris tactic or by restricting the empirical domain to conflict with heightened violence. The literature on terrorism does not systematically explain why terrorist violence emerges in civil resistance movements. Furthermore, no research to date investigates whether the

strategic rationale of terrorist tactics differs across types of mass dissident. Moreover, while existing studies have explained the variation of terrorism intensity in armed conflicts, we still lack a comprehensive explanation for why rebel groups participating in civil wars initiate terrorist attacks in the first place. Finally, previous research has not sought to systematically explain the emergence of terrorism across other types of mass dissident campaigns, defined as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics by non-state actors that coordinate among each other in pursuit of a common political objective (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013b).

Many case studies on individual organizations or social movements show that terrorism can be a typical by-product of mass nonviolent resistance movements (e.g. Clark, 1984; Della Porta, 1995; Pearlman, 2011; Reinhart, 2014; Wieviorka, 1993). These indicate that groups that use terrorism have often originated from, or operated within, mass civil resistance campaigns. For example, during the initially nonviolent Cedar Revolution of 2005, clandestine actors used terrorist attacks to pressure the Syrian government to withdraw troops from Lebanon and to replace the existing government with a more autonomous local leadership. The first terrorist attack occurred on July 12, 2005, when a car bomb detonated in a failed assassination attempt on the pro-Syrian Lebanese Defense Minister, Elias Murr (Alia, 2005). Moreover, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) also used terrorism during the initially nonviolent campaign for Tamil independence from Sri Lanka. According to Rinehart (2013: 109), the Tamils 'fought peacefully for their rights. However, as time progressed radical elements [began to] (…) use unmitigated violence towards its own Tamil people and the greater Sri-Lankan population'. As of 1975, LTTE mounted large-scale conventional military tactics to gain independence, while at times resorting to

terrorism. Yet, not all civil resistance campaigns see the emergence of terrorism. For instance, none of the organizations taking part in the campaign against the Kuchma regime in Ukraine, known as the Orange Revolution (2001-2004), ever used terrorism, nor did any groups participating in the nonviolent campaign against Milosevic in Serbia (1996-2000). What explains the emergence of terrorist tactics in some initially non-violent campaigns but not in others?

In this article, I apply an actor-oriented approach to study this puzzle, focusing on the dynamics that might motivate groups in mass dissent to initiate terrorist campaigns. I argue that groups involved in civil wars and mass civil resistance are both subject to similar strategic constraints on mass dissident tactics, which encourages the initiation of terrorism. This is explained by the lower material costs and higher tactical advantages involved in terrorism when compared to mass civil resistance tactics such as sit-ins, demonstrations and conventional armed tactics such as guerrilla activities, bombardment of military units and pitched battles. Mass dissident tactics require sustained levels of participation. However, the numbers of actual participants might vary greatly, ranging from a thousand to over a million (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Mass dissident campaigns have poor prospects for success when involving relatively *limited participation*. When participation is low, dissident groups are more likely to seek less mobilization-dependent tactics, such as terrorism, which may better allow them to signal resolve and political relevance (Biddle and Friedman, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita 2013; Record, 2007).

Disillusionment over the effectiveness of the pursued mass tactics motivates competition and fragmentation within dissident campaigns, both of which increase *the*

longer a campaign last.[2] These dynamics encourage the formation of narrow militant groups that are likely to initiate terrorism for gaining support. Finally, *higher repression* against mass dissent creates constraints on fostering mass dissident tactics and generates direct incentives for terrorism, especially if non-combatants are seen as relatively 'easy' targets, compared to the highly repressive and well-armed coercive apparatus of the state.

I present a new data set identifying terrorist attacks carried out in mass dissident campaigns between 1948 and 2006. The data considers whether terrorism occurred and if so whether it was initiated by actors that participated in mass dissident campaigns and which shared the campaigns' broad political goals. Using these data I show that, consistent with my expectation, repression against dissent is correlated with a higher likelihood of the onset of terrorism. Moreover, the longer mass dissident campaigns last, the higher the likelihood of terrorism. Finally, I demonstrate that civil wars and mass nonviolent movements do not appear to differ with respect to the effects of repression and duration on the initiation of terrorist campaigns.

Studies on terrorism in civil war tend to focus on a geographical overlap between terrorism and large-scale insurgencies, or considered only rebel groups that use terrorism without an explicit comparison with groups that do not use terrorism, or have neglected variation over time (de la Calle and Sánchez Cuenca, 2015; Findley and Young, 2012; Fortna, 2015; Polo and Gleditsch 2016; Stanton, 2013). Agency is necessary for disentangling strategic behaviors, and time-invariant data cannot

---

[2] Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show how campaigns with more participation are more likely to succeed. In turn, the longer a campaign lasts, the less likely it is to succeed. Hence, we might expect that as time elapses, participation in campaigns tends to decrease. However, participation can depend on several factors other than duration such as for example external support (Saleyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, 2010).

capture changes in the strategic contexts in which rebels operate and the choice of terrorism. I address the gaps in the literature by adopting an actor-oriented focus on how changes in strategic context motivate the choice to initiate terrorist violence in dissident campaigns. In this way, this research advances existing literature offering a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of the causes of terrorism and by providing empirical evidence that the choice of terrorism follows a coherent strategic logic across different mass contentious political behaviors.

Terrorism as a strategy and the price of its alternatives

Table I summarizes how the onset of terrorism varies across primarily violent and primarily nonviolent mass dissident campaigns, using new data (described in details in the research design below) on any terrorism occurrence in 189 mass dissident campaigns between 1948 and 2006.

I identified terrorist attacks by dissident actors or groups engaging in mass dissent and who share the same broad political goals of the mass dissident campaigns. *Terrorist campaign onset* refers to the first year of a dissident campaign in which participants begin to systematically use terrorist tactics: at least three terrorist attacks within a year form the first terrorist campaign. I used the Global Terrorism Database's (GTD) three basic coding rules and three additional criteria to identify terrorist attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and to Terrorism, 2012): attacks must be intentional, entail use of violence or the threat of violence, aimed at political, economic or social goals, have intention to coerce, intimidate or transmit a message to a larger audience then the immediate victims, violate the international humanitarian law's prohibition to target civilians or non-combatants, and be perpetrated by non-state actors. Additionally, I included only terrorist attacks carried out by actors

engaging in mass dissent and which share the dissident campaigns' broad political goals.

NAVCO 2.0 classifies mass dissident campaigns as nonviolent if this is the primary resistance method and participation is limited to unarmed civilians (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b: 418). In contrast, campaigns are classified as primarily violent when dissidents use armed force and the campaign has generated at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. These are 'ideal categorizations' and the primary mass tactic does not exclude participants' simultaneous use of other tactics, so long as they do not become dominant (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 12).

While previous literature finds that the percentage of rebel groups using terrorism is high[3], Table I demonstrates that terrorist tactics are by no means ubiquitous in civil war. In fact, 60 % of civil wars do not see any terrorism. Moreover, terrorist tactics also emerged in 15 % of mass civil resistance campaigns. To explain this variation, I assume that the motivations for starting terrorism develop over the course of mass dissent as participant groups may come to conceive terrorism as rational, effective and perhaps even necessary tactic to promote their political objectives.

[3] 79 % is found in Stanton's (2013: 1015) sample of 19 rebel groups. 62 % is cited by Polo & Gleditsch (2015: 16) in their data comprising 394 rebel groups.

Table I: Terrorism onset in mass dissident campaigns by primary methods

Primary mass dissident methods	**Terrorist campaigns onset**		
	No	Yes	Total
Conventional civil wars (violent mass dissident campaigns)	68 (59.65%)	46 (40.35%)	114 (100%)
Mass civil resistance (nonviolent mass dissident campaigns)	82 (85.42%)	14 (14.581((14.58%)	96 (100%)

***Note*:** Table entries are counts; percentages of row totals in parentheses

I argue that groups involved in either civil war and mass civil resistance can face similar strategic constraints that may encourage resort to terrorism. The constraints that I focus on are prolonged mass dissent, high repression on dissident, and low participation. These constraints apply irrespective of whether the mass dissent movement initially relies primarily on conventional armed violent or nonviolent methods, and stems from the potentially lower costs and higher tactical effectiveness of terrorism. Moreover, these constraints apply despite the potential costs of terrorism resulting from civilian victimization, which involve the alienation of the constituencies to which the groups belong (Polo and Gleditsch, 2016; Stanton, 2013). This assumption is based on the following claims. First, initiating terrorism might seem cheaper than participating in mass dissent, because terrorist tactics entail less risk of being prosecuted and repressed by the regime. While mass dissident activities expose groups to direct state repression, terrorism allows for concealment. In fact, members of underground dissident organizations can maintain their civilian lives while avoiding state detection and sanctions altogether (Monlar, 1966).

Second, targeting non-combatants and soft-targets makes fewer demands on resources and coordination capabilities than mass dissident activities. On the one

hand, conventional warfare requires armed forces and military control over large-scale operations, to integrate movement and indirect fire support, and to combine multiple arms and units in situations that require a high degree of flexibility (Biddle and Friedman, 2006; Guevara, 1960; Record, 2007; Tse-tung, 1978). On the other hand, mass civil resistance requires the ability to communicate effectively with the social base, media, and civil society, while the concentrated actions of a large numbers of volunteers have to be coordinated. This necessitates more material resources than terrorist activities may require (Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic, 2006). By contrast, small groups with few resources and poor capabilities can successfully carry out terrorism (Biddle and Friedman, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita, 2013; Record, 2007). A simple comparison of participation in terrorist organizations (Asal, Rethemeyer, and Anderson, 2009) and violent dissident campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2013b) reveals that the average size of active participants in terrorist groups is only 550 while the average participation in mass violent campaigns is 5,499.

Third, unlike mass dissent, terrorism does not aim at imposing direct costs on governments. One might expect that the use of conventional violence should entail a higher willingness to engage in violence against noncombatants (Eck and Hultman, 2007). However, terrorism differs fundamentally from conventional military actions, which attack the state coercive apparatuses (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009; Tilly, 2004). Terrorism seeks to coerce the government or the population into giving dissidents what they want by threatening violence against indirect illegal targets (Biddle and Friedman, 2008). The core strategic rationale of terrorist attacks is to signal commitment and resolve to the state and its population, rather than to win outright by brute force through conventional

military confrontation or to leverage the power of the people through civil resistance. On the contrary, terrorist campaigns maximize dissidents' relative power through their functions of propaganda and pressure (Kydd and Walter, 2007; Lake, 2003; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009).

When do participants choose to initiate terrorist campaigns?

The role of the duration of mass dissent

For campaign elites, it is easier to elicit participation in nonviolent rather than violent mass dissident tactics (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Cunningham, 2013; Dahl et al., 2014). Conventional armed violence requires more specialized training than civil resistance, more expensive equipment, and often involves extreme individual moral and physical commitment. By contrast, physical barriers are lower for nonviolent resistance and participation is easier to elicit in growing campaigns, although initial collective action can be difficult and often suffers from attrition. However, disciplining individual followers and coordinating conventional armed dissent after armed capabilities are developed may be easier than disciplining mass civil resistance. In civil wars, organizations tend to have consolidated command and control structures, making it easier for armed cadres to control contentious behaviors through mechanisms of reward and punishment. Additionally, individual participants become financially dependent on their organization. These factors professionalize dissidents and facilitate the sustainment of large-scale insurgencies (Connable & Libicki, 2010).

On the contrary, the leaders of mass nonviolent campaigns rarely have an incentive structure to reward and punish participants (Dahl et al., 2014). Civil resistance participants receive no material benefits but also do not depend financially on the campaign. The integration of dissidents into civilian life and their power of refusing

to participate in it are the most important sources of power that groups in civil resistance can leverage against states.

However, the organizations in dissident movements that are capable of successfully mounting mass civil resistance campaigns exert effective direct influence on dissent activities and, at least initially, can discipline individuals and coordinate the contentious behavior of mass nonviolent dissidents. In mass civil resistance, an effective labor division transforms the diffuse commitments of nonviolent collective actors into clearly defined roles. This maximizes the capacity of the movements as a whole to regulate the contentious behavior of their members (Gamson & Fireman, 1979). Additionally, effective coordination through formalized lines of communication facilitates the ability to carry out a coherent strategy for organizations within nonviolent mass dissident movements (Jenkins, 1983). In summary, the more cohesive a nonviolent movement, the more efficiently nonviolent discipline is maintained (Pearlman, 2011). Cohesiveness and effective coordination is also essential for the ability of violent campaigns to carry out disciplined mass armed tactics against the coercive apparatuses of states (Tse-tung, 1978).

Organizations that participate in mass dissident campaigns might face internal pressure that encourage groups to resort to terrorism, due to perceived higher tactical effectiveness when compared to mass dissident tactics. Pressure might emerge from within the organizations - internal organizational pressure - and endanger the ability of the organization to maintain commitment and coordination among its followers.

Leaders expect that followers will lose commitment over time due to frustration regarding the ineffectiveness of mass dissent. In fact, the protracted use of mass dissent tends to normalize this tactic and determine the loss of its initially threatening nature for opponent states (Taylor & Dyke, 2004). Mass dissent protracted

over time also signals to participants that this tactic is ineffective in obtaining the desired political goals. Over time, the normalization of mass dissent and its disclosed incapacity to produce desired political outcomes motivate participants' frustration and dissatisfaction (Della Porta & Tarrow, 1986; Nepstad, 2015; Pearlman, 2011). The expected frustration of followers exerts internal organizational pressure on leaders that aim at ensuring organizational survival. On the one hand, time is a very precious resource for leaders of nonviolent mass dissident movements. In their manual on how to successfully manage nonviolent mass dissent campaigns Popovic, Milivojevic and Djinovic (2006), the leaders of the Optor! campaign against Milosevic, dedicated one entire chapter stressing the importance of setting realistic goals and deadlines to maintain morale. On the other hand, protracted conventional violence also effectively undermines rebels' preferences and sympathies (Kalyvas 2006). To stimulate participants commitment and ensure organizational survival, leaders might decide to use more individually demanding tactics. Particularly demanding forms of dissent are not simply directed to the achievement of short-term political goals, but are also aimed at raising consciousness and to create solidarity (Taylor & Dyke, 2004; Della Porta & Diani, 1999). Carlos Fonseca Amador (Borge et al. 1982), the leader of the Sadanista National Liberation Front (SNLF) -- armed organization against the Nicaraguan Government -- claims that the organization preceding SNLF failed to survive due to the choice of the wrong method to let followers participate in the struggle. According to Fonseca, followers had not yet developed a high revolutionary consciousness and they became demoralized due to an accumulation of fatigue in participating to the activities of the 'regular columns'. Fonseca explains that once some of these followers deserted the guerrilla and arrived back in their own areas, they took part in armed assaults on local government (…), as well as execution of

known informers. He concludes: “this indicates that to a large extent some of the [followers] that become demoralized went through that crisis because they were not organized in the right manner. It means that they probably should have been irregular rather than regular guerrilla” (Borge et al. 1982: 45). Continuance commitment is effectively achieved when activists make extraordinary sacrifices for an organization because the failure of their organization would render their sacrifices worthless (Klandermans, 1997). As explained above, terrorist tactics require such extreme sacrifices and investments. Dissidents initiating terrorism isolate themselves from their lives and are in contact only with a small nucleus of dissidents. Additionally, the implication of illegally targeting civilians is, at best, a long-term exclusion from society. Individuals in organizations that use terrorism continue their involvement because surrendering implies ‘losing’ everything they had already paid as the costs for entering the underground and targeting civilians (Della Porta, 1992). Social psychological accounts for extremism also point to an indirect link connecting terrorism to a loss of collective significance through a heightened need for closure (e.g. Hogg et al., 2007; Webber et. al., 2017). An increased feeling of collective insignificance motivated by the frustration over protracted mass dissent might augment the appeal of terrorist tactics because groups engaging in terrorism embed their action in confidence-affording and clear-cut views consensually supported. Therefore, leaders might find terrorist tactics useful as a mean of maintaining commitment and secure the survival of their organization as the duration of mass dissent increase.

Hypothesis 1. *The onset of terrorism is more likely, the longer a mass dissident campaign lasts.*

The role of repression against mass dissent

Repression is used both to deter dissent and to control escalation (Carey, 2006; Davenport, 1996; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 2000; Nordås and Davenport, 2013; Regan and Henderson, 2002; Ritter and Conrad, 2016). The decision to repress reflects cost-benefit calculus by challenged political authorities. On one hand, states can engage in pre-emptive repression to avoid the emergence of challenges. On the other hand, aspiring dissidents may self-censor to avoid states' repressive responses. In other words, state repression and dissident activities are outcomes of dynamic interactions between state and dissidents, each side anticipating the other's moves, and thus endogenous processes. However, Ritter and Conrad (2016) show that if the level of repression is similar before and after observed dissent, then observed dissent is unlikely to predict repressive responses, and endogeneity is likely absent. Given that mass dissent tends to emerge only in highly repressive states, endogeneity between mass dissent and repression is less of an issue.

Groups that use mass dissent tactics openly confront the coercive apparatuses of states on the ground. While armed dissident organizations might be better materially equipped to withstand government repression than nonviolent ones, Chenoweth and Stephan (2008: 11) argue that organizations in nonviolent campaigns have a 'strategic advantage over violent resistance' since repression against nonviolent campaigns is more likely to backfire than deter dissent. Extreme physical repression against violent and nonviolent mass dissent raises the risk of death, injuries, or imprisonment for participants. This is likely to make participant organizations perceive mass dissent tactics as too demanding and to adopt a strategy they expect to be less costly and more effective in advancing their political objectives (Lichbach, 1987; 1998; Martin, 2007). To decrease the risk of being targeted by

repression, leaders or aspirant leaders of dissident groups may decide to go underground.

For example, before the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) dissident campaign in Algeria turned to terrorism, the military engaged in a wave of mass violence and torture. According to Dalacoura (2011: 107), '[f]ormer FIS activists argued that they were driven to a clandestine existence by fear of arrest and the terrible conditions of their imprisonments'. Additionally, the high coercive capacity of states that use extreme repression makes it difficult for dissidents to attack the police and military directly, especially compared to less protected targets such as non-combatants and buildings. To further decrease the costs and risks associated with facing state police and the military, participant organizations may thus initiate terrorism.

Hypothesis 2. *The onset of terrorism is more likely, the higher the state's repression against mass dissidents.*

The role of mass dissident campaign participation

Participation in large-scale conventional civil war and mass civil resistance signals the degree of support to potential dissidents and the ability of campaigns to succeed. Mass civil resistance tactics are more effective with high participation, while conventional armed tactics can be effective with a relatively smaller level of participation, provided that they have sufficient military resources and capabilities. Comparatively, however, low participation in either conventional violence or civil resistance is unlikely to lead to good prospects of success. In fact, when participation in mass dissent is low, both conventional violence and civil resistance are unlikely to succeed.

Mass dissident tactics with low participation are too weak to impose their force directly by conventional warfare or by leveraging the power of the people through civil resistance. Yet, dissidents may be strong enough to pressure the state and the population to respond to their activities by changing how they perceive dissidents' ability to impose costs and their commitment to political goals (Kydd and Walter, 2006). Actors in mass dissent with low participation might decide to initiate cheaper tactics that can credibly signal their willingness to endure the struggle and their ability to do so (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013).

Terrorism embodies these strategic functions. With terrorism, perpetrators might seek to increase active support from the aggrieved population and influence governments. Terrorism might be costly, yet it is less dependent on mobilization and resources than conventional violence and mass civil resistance (Biddle and Friedman, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita 2013; Record, 2007). Additionally, terrorism may appear as a helpful strategy to maximize relative power against the government, so as to obtain compliance. Following Kydd and Walter (2006) identification of the principal strategic logics of terrorist campaigns, when mass dissident campaigns face low support, organizations might engage in terrorism to outbid rivals or to provoke and pressure the state.

Terrorism as outbidding aims to convince the public of the greater worthiness of the perpetrators relative to other dissident actors. Ahmad-Zadeh (1971: 2), a founder of the Iranian People's Fadaee organization, which emerged from a mass nonviolent campaign against the Shah regime in Iran, explains that '[w]e certainly do not expect the direct support of the people immediately; […]. Conscious of the correctness of the armed struggle, influenced by it and with the moral support of the

people, these groups take up arms and extend the struggle, thereby increasing the possibilities of material support from the people'.

Terrorism as provocation aims to make the state respond by imposing hardship on the population (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). Hardship reveals information about states' motivation and induces expectations about states' future actions. This likely encourages support for fighting, since people conclude that the state disregards their welfare (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Piazza and Walsh, 2010). A dissident of the campaign against the Brazilian government in the 1970s explains the choice of terrorism as follows: '[T]he army always reacts against us in such a situation. By firing on workers, the army makes the people angry and brings them to the point of understanding action on yet another level - that is, action directed against the military' (Truskier, 1970: 32).

Finally, as a strategy of attrition, terrorism seeks to show states perpetrators' ability to impose costs and their willingness to endure an otherwise short-lived struggle. During the second intifada, Hamas-initiated terrorism achieved strength through the strategic logic described above. Hamas' master bomb maker illustrates the inefficiency of mass strategies and the need to cheaper and more effective attrition tactics: '[w]e paid a high price when we used only sling-shot and stones. We need to exert more pressure, making the price of occupation that much more expensive in human lives, that much more unbearable' (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 60). Ultimately, I argue that when mass dissent has poor prospects for victory due to low participation, participants may try to persuade the state and the population to comply with terrorism.

Hypothesis 3. *The onset of terrorism is more likely, the lower the participation in a mass dissident campaign.*

Research design and data

Building on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 2.0 (NAVCO) data (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a), I have compiled a new data set on any terrorism occurrence in 189 mass dissident campaigns between 1948 and 2006 (see p. 3 for NAVCO's definition of mass dissident campaigns).I identified terrorist attacks by dissident actors or groups engaging in mass dissent and who share the same broad political goals of the mass dissident campaigns (see 'Dependent Variable'). The unit of analysis is the mass dissident-campaign-year. I included only mass dissident campaigns observed from their on-sets in the analysis. This ensures that terrorism onset is subsequent to repression of mass dissent and mitigates endogeneity problems. The campaign is a more appropriate unit of analysis than groups, because it makes it possible to take into account changes in participants' most proximate strategic context. Additionally, focusing on the constraints of mass dissident campaigns as collective actors makes it possible to aggregate groups' characteristics and avoids artificially increasing the number of observations.

NAVCO 2.0 is limited to dissident campaigns where the underlying incompatibilities are regime change, institutional reform, major policy change, territorial secession, or greater autonomy and anti-occupation in independent states[4]. Additionally, campaigns must have at least 1,000 participants with evidence of coordination. As a result, the findings pertain only to 'campaigns with maximalist goals and a high level of sustained mobilization over time' (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013b: 420). The case of the Madagascan Active Forces Mass Civil Resistance and the case of the Islamic Salvation Front Mass Civil Resistance are discussed in detail in the Appendix as examples.

[4] See Appendix, pp. 43-44 for robustness checks on the role of mass dissident campaigns' political goals on the likelihood of *terrorism onset*.

NAVCO 2.0 classifies mass dissident campaigns as nonviolent if this is the primary resistance method and participation is limited to unarmed civilians (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013b: 418). In contrast, campaigns are classified as primarily violent when dissidents use armed force and the campaign has generated at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. These are 'ideal categorizations' and the primary mass tactic does not exclude participants' simultaneous use of other tactics, so long as they do not became dominant (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011: 12). Battle-related deaths accounted for in violent dissident campaigns 'occur in what can be described as 'normal' warfare involving […] traditional battlefield fighting' (UCDP). Thus, they do not include deaths due to attacks deliberately directed against civilians. Although battle-related deaths include collateral damage in the form of civilians killed in crossfire, my data on terrorist attacks considers only deliberate targeting of non-combatants.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating onsets of terrorist campaigns. *Terrorist campaign onset* refers to the first year of a dissident campaign in which participants begin to systematically use terrorist tactics: at least three terrorist attacks within 12 months period form the first terrorist campaign. The intensity of terrorist attacks is likely to differ across mass dissident methods after the onset due to the existence of armed resources and know-how in the case of civil wars. However, actors' rationale for initiating terrorism might be driven by a similar strategic calculus and three terrorist attacks within a year in the absence of civil wars can be considered a relevant threat to domestic stability.

I used the Global Terrorism Database's (GTD) three basic coding rules and three additional criteria to identify terrorist attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and to Terrorism, 2012): 1) Attacks must be intentional; 2) Attacks entail use of violence or the threat of violence; 3) Perpetrators are non-state actors; 4) Attacks must be aimed at political, economic or social goals (the exclusive pursuit of economic profit does not satisfy this criterion); 5) Attacks must have intention to coerce, intimidate or transmit a message to a larger audience then the immediate victims; 6) Attacks violate the international humanitarian law's prohibition to target civilians or non-combatants. Additionally, I included only terrorist attacks carried out by actors or groups engaging in mass dissent and which share the dissident campaigns' broad political goals. When perpetrators are known, I engaged in in-depth case research using scholarly literature and news media reports from Lexis Nexis to verify that organizations that choose terrorism participated in mass dissent. Participation in mass civil resistance is established when (1) groups contributed to coordinate the emergence of nonviolent mass movements and/or (2) took part in the broader coalition waging mass civil unrest.

Among the groups engaging in terrorism in nonviolent campaigns, there are cases of organizations that previously participated in large-scale civil war (such as the IRA, the Free Papua Movement, the CPN-M/UPF and New People Army). I considered these organizations as responsible for the onset of new terrorist campaigns, because the existence of resources to target the state coercive apparatus makes the initiation of violence against non-combatants and other soft targets a clear tactical choice. The Appendix summarizes the patterns of participation in and coordination of mass civil resistance campaigns for all groups carrying out terrorist attacks.

Similarly, among the groups engaging in terrorism in violent campaigns, there are cases of organizations previously engaging in mass civil resistance (e.g. the LTTE). The rationale behind including these groups in the analysis and considering them as responsible for the onset of new terrorist campaigns rests on the assumption that the mobilization of conventional violence against the state constitutes a substantial change in the strategic context for organizations previously engaged in mass nonviolent dissent.

When the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are unknown, I engaged in in-depth case-by-case research using the GTD advanced online research tool, and news media reports from Lexis Nexis to verify that attacks target the political opposition to civil resistance campaigns. In 2005, for example, nonviolent mass dissent was waged against Hezbollah's Syrian-friendly government (Cedar Revolution). Terrorist attacks that targeted Hezbollah officials, pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians, and Syrian citizens in Lebanon provide evidence that actors who share the broad political goals of the civil resistance engaged in terrorism even if the name of the perpetrator's group is unknown. The Appendix presents evidence of the identity of broad political goals between perpetrators and civil resistance campaigns.

I obtained detailed information on the systematic use of terrorism in mass dissident campaigns from GTD as of the 1970s. Prior to 1970, I coded the data on terrorism in mass dissent from Lexis Nexis' news reports, following the criteria outlined above. To obtain the data on terrorism in mass dissident campaigns with domestic political goals, I followed Endlers, Sandler and Guibulloev's (2011) protocol to extract domestic terrorist attacks from the GTD. Terrorist strategies must have direct consequences for the venue country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies.

Some dissident campaigns target foreign states and attacks thus fall under Endlers, Sandler and Guibulloev's (2011) definition of transnational terrorism. I manually coded these as domestic attacks, given their location and targets. For example, a terrorist attack perpetrated by Palestinian nationals targeting Israeli or Palestinians nationals in Israel during the mass dissident campaign for the Palestinian liberation territories is thus counted as a domestic attack. However, a terrorist attack perpetrated by Palestinians against US nationals abroad is considered fully transnational and thus is dropped from the data, even if it furthered the cause of the mass dissident campaign for the liberation of the Palestinians.

The data set covers 1,485 campaign-year observations[5], in which 275 years had (18.52%) terrorist attacks. To restrict attention to terrorism onsets or first use only, I dropped subsequent ongoing years where terrorism is used again in a mass dissident campaign. Subsequent years of terrorism are dropped from the sample because the incentives for and constraints on continuing or ending terrorist campaigns may be different from the incentives for avoiding terrorism before it begins and constraints which may lead to its onset. Including on-going terrorism would mean modeling terrorism onsets over and over again and could thus bias my findings (Bennett and Stam, 2000: 66-662).

Core explanatory variables

[5] I dropped the 2006 campaign 'CPN-M/UPF' against the Nepalese autocratic regime and the 2001 'New People's Army' campaign against the Filipino government (see Appendix, 'NAVCO's Double Counts').

My core explanatory variables are taken from the NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a). The first mass dissident campaign characteristic of my interest is *mass dissent duration*. I count the years elapsed since the start of the individual mass dissident campaign. In the sample of dissident campaigns used here, civil resistance lasts on average 5.7 years, while the average length of violent campaigns is 11.6 years.

The second variable of interest is state *repression on mass dissent*. It captures 'the most repressive episode or activity perpetrated by the state' to suppress dissidents' mass activities in a given year (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a: 13). Taking into account the most repressive episode of state repression addresses possible measurement errors and uncertainty in the measure. The variable is based on a four-point scale ranging from no repression, to repression with intention to kill (Appendix, 'Repression measure').

The third core variable is the level of participation in dissident campaigns: *size of mass dissent participation*. This item estimates the overall size of participation relying on scholarly articles and news reports on the maximum size of campaigns in a given year. Information on the size incorporates the total number of people mobilized towards a certain campaign from active organizing to popular participation in large scale street protests and other mass actions. It is coded on an order of magnitude scale, ranging as follows: 0: 1-999; 1: 1,000-9,999; 2: 10,000-99,999; 3: 100,000-499,999; 4=500,000 - 1 million; 5 > 1 million (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a: 9).

Control variables

To ensure that effects reflect core features, rather than just the primary tactic of mass dissent itself, I include a binary variable on the primary campaign method of mass resistance: *primary mass dissident method*. As explained above, mass dissident campaigns are considered nonviolent (1) based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013b: 418) and violent (0) when participants use primarily physical force through the use of arms.

Democracies are held by some to provide a favorable environment for the development of terrorism (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994; Li, 2005; Schmid, 1992). Democracies may also be better equipped to absorb challenging extra-institutional political demands into regular political procedures reducing the duration of mass dissent. I thus control for *democracy* in the previous year via a dichotomous item for countries with values of 6 or above on the *polity2 score* from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2014).

Widespread poverty may create grievances and a large pool of potential recruits for dissident activities. Low income tends to make large-scale conventional armed conflict more feasible (Collier, 2006), thereby increasing the duration of and participation in conflicts. Such grievances may also affect the resort to terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). I thus control for a country's *GDP per capita* (logged) using data from Gleditsch (2002).

Finally, I include a measure of *total population* (logged) from Gleditsch (2002). Countries with a larger population experience more domestic terrorism (Savun and Philipps, 2009). For states with a large population, effective security measures are difficult to implement. This, in turn, makes the state vulnerable to

terrorism. Additionally, larger populations increase the severity of state repression by raising the frequency on which coercive acts occur (Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999).[6]

Empirical analysis

I estimate logistic regression models on terrorism onset or the first new-year in which terrorism occurs during mass dissident campaigns. I include a cubic polynomial approximation using a variable on the years since the last terrorist attack to correct for time dependence, since terrorist campaigns are more likely to recur when there is a recent history of terrorism (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Finally, I cluster standard errors by country, since the variance may differ systematically across states.

Table II presents three model specifications. Model 1 includes only the three main explanatory variables, Model 2 accounts for the effect of primary mass dissident tactic, while Model 3 adds the control variables to the analysis. Sixty observations are dropped in Model 3 due to missing values of GDP per capita. All Models in Table II show that the effect of *mass dissent duration* is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of *repression on mass dissent* is also positive and significant at the 1% level in all Models in Table II. These results are robust to clustering standard errors by campaign or including the independent variables separately one at a time (Appendix, Tables IV-VII). In Model 3, every additional year of mass dissent increases the probabilities of terrorism onset by 3%, and one-unit increase in repression is linked with an increase in the probabilities of terrorism onset of almost 7%, holding the other variables constant at their means. The effect of the *size of mass dissent participation* is not significant in any of the Models in Table II.

[6] See Appendix, Tables II–III for descriptive statistics and collinearity diagnostics.

Table II: Determinants of terrorist campaigns onset

	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*
	Terrorism onset	Terrorism onset	Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation	-0.111 (0.171)	-0.111 (0.172)	0.107 (0.158)
Repression on mass dissent	0.883** (0.273)	0.882** (0.266)	1.043** (0.342)
Mass dissent duration	0.084** (0.013)	0.084** (0.013)	0.051** (0.014)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.004 (0.359)	-0.099 (0.436)
Population (log)			-0.388* (0.153)
Real GDP per capita (log)			0.370* (0.185)
Democracy (lag)			1.060** (0.349)
Constant	-4.404** (1.104)	-4.401** (1.117)	-5.791** (1.536)
Observations	952	952	885

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

To verify that the values of *size of mass dissent participation* do not influence my results, I consider various alternative participation measures. The results of these alternative measures remain virtually identical to those presented in Table II (Appendix, Tables VIII-XII). Moreover, there is no evidence of a curvilinear relationship of *mass dissent duration* and *repression on mass dissent* with the likelihood of *terrorism onset*, or that *repression on mass dissent* affects other core variables' coefficients (Appendix, Tables XIII-XIV Appendix).

Figure 1 displays how the predicted probabilities of terrorism onset increase for every additional year of mass dissent holding other covariates at mean. This is consistent with the expectation that participants are more likely to engage in terrorism

as duration increases. The 95 % confidence intervals get larger as very few mass dissident campaigns persist over 26 years and the number of observations decreases.

Figure 1: Predicted probability of terrorist campaigns onsets by duration (Table II, Model 3)



Note: This Figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value of mass dissident campaign duration (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.

Figure 2 shows how the predicted probabilities of terrorism onset increase with higher repression against mass dissents holding other covariates at their mean. It emerges that the increase in probability of terrorism onsets is particularly dramatic from repression without intention to kill (2) to repression-exhibiting intent to kill (3). Extreme repression is correlated with an increase by 88 % of the probability of

terrorism onset providing evidence that extreme repression is likely to create direct incentives to initiate terrorism.

Figure 2. Predicted probability of terrorist campaigns onsets by repression levels (Table II, Model 3)



Note: This Figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value of state repression on mass dissent (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.

Additionally, I check that the level of state repression against political opposition prior to mass dissident onset does not differ from the level of repression after mass dissident occurs. Following the logic of Ritter and Conrad (2016), if the level of repression is similar before and after mass dissent onset, then observed mass dissent does not predict responsive repression and endogeneity is absent. I examine a series of Kernel-weighted local polynomials smoothing, with phases of mass dissident campaign as regressor and levels of state repression against political opponents at t-1

as response (Appendix, pp. 30-32). Figures 1-3 (Appendix) show no indication of endogeneity. However, I cannot formally claim a strictly causal link between repression and terrorism onset.

As expected, Table II suggests that democracies provide a favorable environment for the use of terrorism. This finding remains consistent when using the lagged regular *polity2 score* (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2014) (Appendix, Table XV). The coefficients for population and GDP per capita are significant. Population is negatively associated with the likelihood of terrorism onset. This might suggest that in countries that are better able to implement effective security measures given a small population size, dissidents have incentives to turn to terrorism.

The effect of *GDP per capita* is positively associated with terrorism. Existing literature sees poverty as affecting terrorism through the apparent connection between the economy and the proclivity for countries to undergo civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2001). However, terrorism emerges in many countries that undergo different forms of mass dissent and terrorism does not emerge in every civil war (Krueger and Malečková, 2003). Therefore, previous findings on the relationship between GDP per capita might be driven by sample truncation.

Most importantly, while the effects of all principal variables are consistent with Model 1, the *primary dissent method* is not significant in Models 2 and 3[7]. Model 1 assumes that there is no difference in the parameters' effect across mass civil resistance and civil war. To allow the intercepts to differ by this, a dummy variable for primary mass dissident tactics is added in Models 2-3. The results show that the intercept of nonviolent mass dissent does not differ significantly from the intercept of

[7] The effects of the main explanatory variables on the likelihood *terrorism occurrence* are virtually identical. However, mass civil resistance has a significant negative effect on terrorism occurrence.

civil war. I estimated nested models for Models 2-3, Table II with interaction terms between *primary mass dissident method* and significant core explanatory variables (Appendix, Table XVI).

In these specifications, the coefficients of each parameter show the effect for conventional civil wars, while the coefficient of the interaction terms between *primary dissident method* and the other parameter is the effect of the parameter tested on mass civil resistance. I then test whether the effect of each parameter for mass civil resistance differs from the effect of the same parameter for civil wars. The results indicate that I cannot reject the null hypotheses of no difference between the two coefficients for each effect (Appendix, Tests 3-6).

In other words, no significant statistical difference exists for the effect of *mass dissent duration* on the likelihood of *terrorism onset* across violent and nonviolent methods (Appendix, Figures 4-5). Furthermore, no significant statistical difference exists for the correlation between *repression on mass dissent* and the likelihood of *terrorism onset* across mass civil resistance and civil war (Appendix, Figures 6-7). These findings remain robust when I use lagged regular *polity2 score* (Appendix, Table XV, Models 2-3, Tests 1-2) and when splitting the sample across *primary mass dissident method* and thus allowing the slopes of all covariates to differ (Appendix, Tests 7-8).

Since the estimates are uncertain due to variation in the data and mode uncertainty, I simulate 10,000 draws based on the estimates of Table XVI, Models 1-4 (Appendix). The distribution of the results across large-scale conventional civil wars and mass civil resistance is virtually identical (Appendix, Figures 8-11). The findings remain consistent also when re-estimating the core Models excluding from the sample mass dissident campaigns that contain 1970 (Appendix, Table XVII, Figures 11-12).

In summary, the effects of the covariates of interest do not change depending on control variables, a vast series of models' specification, Monte Carlo Simulation and data restriction. In conclusion, I find robust evidence that longer mass dissent and higher repression on mass dissent increase the likelihood of terrorism onset. Additionally, the findings show that these effects are robust for no statistical difference across civil war or mass civil resistance. In other words, the onset of terrorist campaigns appears to be a consistent strategic decision across different mass contentious activities.

Conclusion

The fact that terrorism can emerge from both violent and non-violent mass movements calls for explanations grounded on the constraints on mass struggle that motivate participant groups to choose indirect violence against civilians and other illegal targets. I provide the first actor-oriented systematic analysis of the onset of terrorist campaigns in mass dissident campaigns. The results provide strong and robust support for my claims that terrorist campaigns are chosen when (1) high repression hampers the perceived effectiveness of the use of mass dissident tactics and makes noncombatants an easier target than state coercive apparatuses, and (2) as a consequence of longer mass dissident campaigns that do not produce the desired political outcomes.

The results are also consistent with my claim that the choice to begin terrorist campaigns is due to the same strategic constraints for both mass dissident activities in civil wars and in civil resistance movements. I show robust indications of significant non-difference in the effects of longer mass dissent and the correlation between

higher repression on mass dissent and the likelihood of terrorism onset across different primary methods of mass contention. In summary, it emerges that dissident groups resort to waves of terrorist attacks in situations where the legal expression of opposition is blocked and more direct methods of contention are too risky to be pursued or perceived as ineffective.

In general, the findings highlight the utility of an integrated study of different types of contentious political behaviors for a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of government-opposition that lead to the emergence of terrorism. This article suggests a number of relevant extensions and topics for future investigations. For example, despite the fact that consistent null results on the effect of size of participation are worth reporting, available data on participation in mass civil resistance and in civil wars are rather aggregated across dissident campaigns. Less aggregated data at an event-level of analysis might capture enough variation to find a significant effect on the choice of terrorist tactics.

More could be done to investigate the role that nature of the groups, and the ideology and goals of dissident campaigns play with respect to the likelihood of terrorism onset. Systematic work on the effect of ideology and goals on terrorist tactics has so far been limited to civil wars contexts and terrorism intensity. Future research may also focus on the emergence of more spontaneous and less organized types of dissident activities, such as riots and mobs, and on whether and under which conditions mass dissident campaigns with tactical variation are more or less likely to succeed. Although mass dissent and terrorism are by no means the only choices available to dissidents, an integrated approach to their study provides a starting point for understanding how changes in dissidents' more proximate strategic environments lead to the emergence of different dissident tactics.

References

Ahmad-Zadeh, Massoud (1971) Armed Struggle; both a Strategy and a Tactic. (https://www.marxists.org/subject/iran/ahmad-zadeh/armed-struggle.pdf).

Alia, Ibrahim (2005) Car Bomb Target Pro-Syrian Lebanese Prime Minister. *The Washington Post,* 13 July.

Asal, Victor; Karl Rethemeyer and Ian Anderson (2009) Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Database 1-Lethality Data, Harvard (http://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/big-allied-and-dangerous-baad-database-1-lethality-data-1998-2005).

Asal, Victor; Luis de la Calle, Micheal Findley and Joseph Young (2012) Killing civilians or holding territory? How to think about terrorism. *International Studies Review* 14(3): 475–497.

Bennett, D Scott and Allan C Stam (2000). Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decision Matter. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(6): 699-717.

Biddle, Stephen and Jeffrey A Freidman (2008). *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implication for Army and Defense Policy*. Strategic Studies Institute.

Bloom, M Mia (2004) Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding. *Political Science Quarterly* 119(Spring): 61–88.

Borge, Tomas; Carlos Fonseca, Daniel Ortega, Umberto Ortega & Jamie Wheelock (1982). *Sandinistas Speak*. New York: Pathfinder.

Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan (2013) Rebel Tactics. *Journal of Political Economy* 21(2): 323-357.

Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan and Eric Dickson (2007) The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 364–381.

Carey, C Sabine (2006) The Dynamic Relationship Between Protest and Repression. *Political Research Quarterly* 59(1): 1-11.

Carter, B David and Signorino S Curtis (2010) Back to the Future: Modelling Time Dependence in Binary Data. *Political Analysis* 18(3): 271-292.

Chenoweth, Erica (2011) On Line Methodological Appendix Accompanying Why Civil Resistance Works (http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/data/navco_1-1_appendix-and-codebook.pdf).

Chenoweth, Erica and Lewis Orion (2013a) Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data Project. Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver

(http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html).

Chenoweth, Erica and Lewis Orion (2013b) Unpacking non-violent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 415-423.

Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J Stephan (2008) Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Non-violent Conflict. *International Security* 33(1): 7-44.

Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J Stephan (2011) *Why civil resistance works: the Strategic Logic of Non-violent Conflicts*. Columbia University Press.

Clark, P Robert (1984) *The Basque Insurgents: ETA 1952-1980*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Clauset, Aron; Lindsay Heger, Maxwell Young and Kristian S Gleditsch (2010) The strategic calculus of terrorism: Substitution and competition in the Israel-Palestine conflict. *Cooperation and Conflict* 45(1): 6-33.

Collier, Paul (2006) Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. Economics of Conflict, U.S. Institute for Peace.

Collier, Paul and Anne Hoeffler (2000) Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2355.

Connable, Ben & Libicki, Martin C (2010) How insurgencies end. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG965.pdf

Conrad, Justin and Kevin Greene (2015) Competition, Differentiation and the Severity of Terrorist Attacks. The Journal of Politics 77(2): 546-561.

Crenshaw, Martha (1981) The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics* 13(4): 379-399.

Cunningham, G Kathleen (2013) Understanding strategic choice. The determinants of civil war and nonviolent campaign in self-determination disputes. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 291-304.

Dalacoura, Katerina (2011) *Islamist terrorism and democracy in the Middle East*. Cambridge University Press.

Davenport, Christian (1996) The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression. *Political Research Quarterly* 49(2): 377-403.

Dahl, Marianne; Scott Gates, Kristian S Gleditsch and Belen González (2014) Apple and Oranges? Actor Profiles and the Choice of Violent and Non-Violent Tactic. Unpublished Manuscript.

de la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2015) How armed groups fight: Territorial control and violent tactics. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38(10): 795-813.

Della Porta, Donatella & Diani, Mario (1999). *Social Movement an Introduction*. New Jersey: Blackwell publishing.

Della Porta, Donatella and Sidney Tarrow (1986) Unwanted Children: political violence and the cycle of protest in Italy, 1996-1973. *European Journal of Political Research*, 14(June): 607–632.

Della Porta, Donatella (1992) Political Socialization in Left-Wing Underground Organizations. In: *Social Movement and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations*. Greenwich: JAI PRESS LDT.

Della Porta, Donatella (1995) *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State*. Cambridge University Press.

Della Porta, Donatella (2013) *Clandestine Political Violence*. Cambridge University Press.

Eck, Kristine and Hultman Lisa (2007) On-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data. *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 233-246.

Endlers, Walter; Todd Sandler and Khusrav Guibulloev (2011) Domestic vs. transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition, and dynamics. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(3): 319–337.

Eubank, William and Leonard Weinberg (1994) Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6(4): 417-463.

Fearon, James and David Laitin (2001) *Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War*. Mimeo, Stanford University.

Findley, G Micheal and Jhoseph K Young (2012) Terrorism and Civil War: a spacial and temporal approach to a conceptual problem. *Perspective on Politics* 10(2): 285-305.

Fortna, Virginia Page (2015) Do terrorists win? Rebels' use of terrorism and civil war outcomes. *International Organization* 69(3): 519–556.

Gamson, William and Bruce Fireman (1979) Utilitarian Logic in Resource Mobilization Perspective (eds. Mayer N. Zald and Jhon McCarthy) In: *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, Cambridge: Winthrop, 8-44.

Gleditsch, S Kristian (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(5): 712-724 (http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html).

Guevara, Ernesto Che (1960) *Guerrilla Warfare*. University of Nebraska.

Hogg, M. A., Sherman, D. K., Dierselhuis, J., Maitner, A. T., & Moffitt, G. (2007). Uncertainty, entitativity, and group identification. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 43: 135–142.

International Crisis Group (2011) The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines Tactics and Talks. (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/202 The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines Tactics and Talks.pdf).

Jenkins, J Craig (1983). Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology* 9: 527-553.

Kalyvas, N Stathis (2003) The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War. The Journal of Ethics 8(1): 97–138.

Kalyvas, N Stathis (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.

Kerkvliet, J Benedict (1996) Contemporary Philippine Leftist Politics in Historical Perspective. In Abinales P. (eds) *The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986*. Ithaca, 9-27.

Kydd, H Andrew and Barbara F Walter (2006) Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security* 31(1): 49-80.

Klandermans, Bert (1997) *The Social Psychology of Protest*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Krueger, B Alan and Jitka Malečková (2003) Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Cusal Connection? *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(4): 119-144.

Lake, A David (2003) International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices. *International Studies Review* 5(4): 81-89.

Li, Quan (2005) Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 278-297.

Lichbach, I Mark (1987) Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 278-297.

Marshall, G Monty; Robert T Gurr and Keith Jaggers (2014) Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013. Version: p4v2014 (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).

Martin, Brian (2007) *The Dynamics of backfire*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Monlar, R Andrew (1966) *Human factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*. Washington, D.C.: American University Center for research in Social System.

Moore, H Will (2000) The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(1): 107-127.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and to Terrorism (2012) Global Terrorism Dataset. (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd).

Nepstad, E Sharon (2015) *Nonviolent Struggle Theories Strategies and Dynamics*. Oxford University Press.

Nordås, Ragnhild **and** Christian Davenport (2013) Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression. *American Journal of Political Science,* 57(4): 926-940.

Piazza, James (2012) Types of minority Discrimination and Terrorism. *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* 29(5): 521-546.

Piazza, A James and James I Walsh (2010) Physical Integrity Rights and Terrorism. *Political Science and Politics* 43(3): 411-414.

Pearlman, Wendy (2011). *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement*. Cambridge University Press.

Poe, C Steven; Neal C Tate and Linda C Keith (1999) Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(2): 291-313.

Polo, Sara and Kristian S Gleditsch (2016) Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 53(6): 815-829.

Popovic, Srdja; Andrej Milivojevic and Slobodan Djinovic (2006) *Non Violent Struggle. 50 Crucial Points. A Strategic Approach to Every Day Tactics*. Centre for Applied Non Violent Action and Strategies.

Record, Jeffry (2007) *Beating Goliath. Why Insurgencies Win*. Potomac Books.

Regan, M Patrick and Errol, A Henderson (2002) Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent. *Third World Quarterly* 23(1): 119-136.

Reinhart, S Christine (2013) *Volatile Social Movements and the Origins of Terrorism: The Radicalization of Change*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Ritter, H Emily and Courtenay R Conrad (2016) Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression. *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 85-99.

Saleyan, Idean; Kristian S Gleditsch and David Cunningham,(2010). Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. *International Organization* 65(04): 709-744.

Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio and Luis De la Calle (2009) Domestic Terrorism: the hidden side of political Violence. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(June): 31-49.

Savun, Burcu and Brian J Phillips (2009) Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(6): 878-904.

Schmid, P Alex (1992) Terrorism and Democracy. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(4): 14-25.

Stanton, A Jessica (2013) Terrorism in the Context of Civil War. *The Journal of Politics* 75(4): 1009-1002.

Taylor, Van Dyke N (2004). Get up, Stand up: Tactical repertoires of social movements. In: Snow DA, Soule SA, and Kriesi H (eds) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Wiley

Tilly, Charles (2004) Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists. *Sociological Theory* 22(1): 5-13.

Truskier, Andy (1970) *The Politics of Violence. The Urban Guerrilla in Brazil*. Rampant Magazine.

Tse-tung, Mao (1978) *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Anchor Press.

Webber, D., Babush, M., Schori-Eyal, N., Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, A., Hettiarachchi, M., Bélanger, J. J., Moyano, M., Trujillo, H. M., Gunaratna, R., Kruglanski, A. W., & Gelfand, M. J. (2017, September 4). The Road to Extremism: Field and Experimental Evidence That Significance Loss-Induced Need for Closure Fosters Radicalization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000111

Wieviorka, Michel (1993) *The Making of Terrorism*. Translated by White, David G. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

UCDP, D. P. C. R. Definitions (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Battle-related_deaths).

Better the devil you know? Nonviolent movement success and terrorism

Abstract

Many nonviolent campaigns see some actors resorting to terrorism, seeking to escalate the conflict and win popular support. This modifies the strategic environment between the nonviolent groups and the state in ways that provide both challenges and opportunities. Although it is commonly thought that violence tends to crowd out nonviolence, we argue that nonviolent movements can exploit fringe terrorist activities to their advantage under certain conditions. Terrorism increases a government's incentives to offer concessions to a nonviolent resistance movement if the movement can credibly commit to nonviolent discipline and help prevent the escalation of the conflict to large-scale violence. This is more likely when nonviolent organizations have a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership. Such campaigns are more likely to remain cohesive and can more effectively isolate violent groups and thus prevent large shifts in supporters for violent groups and conflict escalation. Using new data on terrorist attacks in 109 nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1946 and 2006, we find that the use of terrorist tactics by violent organizations goes together with progress for nonviolent resistance campaigns with a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership.

Introduction

Recent scholarship has shown that dissident campaigns using nonviolent methods often fare better than campaigns that rely on violent tactics and highlighted the possible strategic advantages of nonviolent methods (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008; 2011). However, primarily nonviolent campaigns often coexist with other fringe actors that use political violence. Research on the effects of "radical flanks" examines how the use of violence by fringe groups can influence interactions between nonviolent movements and governments, and whether fringe violence tends to increase or decrease the likelihood that a nonviolent campaign will see progress towards its goals (e.g. Chenoweth and Shock, 2015; Wasow, 2017). However, existing research has not so far provided a clear answer, and the mechanisms and the process through which fringe violence can affect the political outcomes for civil resistance campaigns remain unclear. First, it is unclear what types of violence can modify the strategic environment of nonviolent campaigns confronting a government. Second, we lack insights about the specific conditions in which fringe violence hinders or helps nonviolent collective movements relative to the government. Finally, with the exception of Chenoweth and Shock (2015), most research in this area has focused on single case studies, often selective and largely illustrative, rather than systematic comparative analysis.

Terrorism is generally conceived of as a weapon of militarily weak organizations without the capacity for effective conventional armed violence (Crenshaw, 1981). However, terrorist violence during nonviolent mobilization can represent a powerful game-changer and lead to counterintuitive outcomes. We contend that terrorist attacks by organizations with political goals related to civil

resistance campaigns can modify the strategic environment between nonviolent movements and governments, indirectly helping nonviolent movements reach their goals. By potentially crowding out nonviolence and drawing participants from civil resistance into support for violence, terrorism constitutes a credible threat of conflict escalation (Schelling, 1970: 187–203).

Divisions among the opposition affect government responses (see Cunningham, 2011; 2013), but the net effect seems ambiguous. On the one hand, governments often try to exploit divisions and play factions off against each other. But, on the other hand, governments also have incentives to provide concessions to nonviolent campaigns and thus delegitimize violent factions. Since organizations using terrorist tactics are typically organized in clandestine cells (Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009), it is difficult to reassure governments about their future behavior. Thus, only nonviolent organizations with credible capacity to prevent large shifts by followers to support for violent segments will have prospects for achieving substantial political gains. We argue that a *hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership* provide plausible signals for governments. Better-organized nonviolent movements can act coherently, efficiently coordinate their support base of followers, and limit radicalization (Nepstad, 2015: 118). Such civil resistance campaigns can limit escalation dynamics and prevent the use of or support for violence by their own social base. As they can credibly reduce the risk of conflict escalation, governments become more likely to offer or accommodate concessions.

We test our argument using new data identifying the presence/absence of systematic terrorism in 109 primarily nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1946 and 2006. We find robust support for our argument that terrorism by violent segments

has often favored mainstream nonviolent resistance campaigns with a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership.

Radical flanks: harmful or helpful?

Previous research on how violent "radical flanks" on the fringe of a non-violent campaign can affect the strategic environment and the interactions between the movement and the state have reached contradictory findings. Some studies find that violence by radical flanks strenghtens moderate groups relative to the state (see, for example, Haines, 1983; Killian, 1972; McAdam, 1982; Oberschall, 1973; Ramirez, 1978; Rayback, 1966), while others find that radical flanks undermine the ability of non-violent resistance campaigns to reach their goals (e.g. Chenoweth and Shock, 2015; Shellengberger and Nordhaus, 2004; Wall, 1999).

Some claim that radical flanks can have a positive effect because they generate crises that "are resolved to moderate advantage" (Haines, 1983: 33), favouring normalization and greater acceptance of a nonviolent movement's more moderate goals and methods (Gupta, 2014; Killian, 1972; McAdam, 1982; Oberschall, 1973; Ramirez, 1978; Rayback, 1966;). Haines (1983) argues that radical violent activities in the US civil-rights movement enhanced the power of more moderate organizations by increasing donations to the latter. Similarly, Freeman (1975) shows that violent activities within the US women's liberation movement raised the bargaining power of reformist organizations. Muller (1978) finds that assaults on civilians and property damage during the black civil rights campaign in the US (1960s) increased the authorities' willingness to provide short-term symbolic reassurance to moderate organizations, even if it had no long-term effect on political commitment.

Other scholars argue that violent activities have negative effects as they can undermine the credibility of the whole movement, discrediting its goals and actions and driving away potential supporters and allies. Chenoweth and Shock (2015) find that radical flanks' violence is associated with lower participation in nonviolent campaigns. Their case studies of four civil resistance campaigns suggest a seemingly random combination of positive and negative effects of radical violence on political outcomes.

The mixed findings may, of course, reflect the lack of any consistent relationship. However, we believe existing research suffers from a number of theoretical and methodological shortcomings. First, most studies do not differentiate among different types of violence. This is problematic since different types of violence are likely to have different effects on the strategic environment between a government and a nonviolent dissident campaign. In particular, we argue that different violent activities will affect a government's threat perceptions in different ways, depending on the degree of organization involved as well as the conflict escalation potential. Second, although many recognize that any effects are likely to be highly contextual (e.g., Gupta, 2014), existing research offers little guidance on when we should expect positive or negative effects of radical violence for nonviolent campaigns. Finally, with the exception of Chenoweth and Shock (2015), most studies have been limited to selected cases or nonviolent movements with limited violence. We take a comparative approach and identify more general circumstances in which nonviolent movements are more vulnerable or stand to benefit from violent flanks, in terms of substantial political gains, and provide a broader comparative test using new data.

We assume that violent groups compete with mainstream civil resistance campaigns for the leadership of the aggrieved constituency. It can be difficult to

establish the precise relationships between violent fringes and civil resistance movements, especially as leaders of civil resistance campaigns have incentives to deny any ties or coordination with violent fringe groups. In the vast majority of the non-violent campaigns in our data we find no evidence that the mainstream nonviolent organizations orchestrated violent flanks (see Appendix, Table 1). The potential autonomy of fringe groups perpetrating terrorist attacks makes violent groups a threat to a nonviolent leadership, and trying to create violent fringe groups to threaten conflict escalation constitutes a very risky gamble. For example, Tamil political groups and organizations unified after 1972 under the umbrella of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) (Rinehart 2013, Swami 1994). The more radical Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was not formally part of this and, although TULF may have encouraged extremist violence, this clearly backfired as the LTTE eventually displaced the TULF. According to Rinehart (2013, 119)

> The TULF boss (…) was not adverse to a bit of violence. Overtly he would never admit his links with the 'boys' [LTTE], and (…) even told (…) the LTTE [to] operate from the underground parallel to the TULF (…). But as violence by the militants continued even after general elections, the TULF got worried.

The LTTE did not cease to carry out terrorist attacks; it eventually gained the leadership of the entire campaign, and escalated the conflict to a large-scale conventional civil war.

Finally, in many mass civil resistance campaigns the violent cells predate the emergence of nonviolent movements. Examples include the Popular Revolutionary Army in Mexico during the anti-PRI protests in the late 1990s and the Montoneros in Argentina during the pro-democracy campaign in 1977.

Terrorism as a "game-changer"

Existing work on radical flanks in political campaigns define radicals in terms of either extreme positions and ideology (Freeman, 1975; Killian, 1972; Oberschall 1973), or advocacy of more militant and violent tactics (Gamson, 1975; Isaac et al., 2006; Wasow, 2015).[8] We focus on actors that use terrorist tactics in the context of mass civil resistance campaigns and which seek to appeal to the same mobilized and/or aggrieved population as nonviolent organizations.

We posit that terrorism can modify the strategic environment between nonviolent organizations and opponent governments by providing a credible threat of conflict escalation (Schelling, 1970: 187–203; see also Cunningham, 2013). Unlike less organized low intensity violence such as riots and clashes with the police, terrorism reflects organized groups who deliberately plan violent acts and are willing to carry these out. Threats to use violence are normally "cheap talk" and insufficient to signal genuine commitment (see Kydd and Walter, 2006), but the use of terrorism crosses a barrier to make conflict escalation a concrete possibility if a group can attract sufficient support (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009: 38).

During periods of massive nonviolent mobilization, fringe groups can decide to pursue political objectives more forcefully through violence. Dissident groups might resort to violence during nonviolent campaigns, due to ideological and strategic disagreements or rivalries over the leadership of the movement (Bloom, 2004; Moretti, 1994). Violent factions might also advocate violence as the only realistic way to attain political change, arguing that nonviolent resistance is ineffective. Such

[8] See Chenoweth and Shock (2015) for a more detailed overview of this literature.

groups typically lack sufficient popular support and capabilities to mount a civil war during non-violent campaigns. However, they may believe that they can attract followers by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of nonviolent dissent when confronted with violent state repression (Della Porta, 2013; Della Porta and Tarrow, 1968). To this end, fringe groups can resort to terrorist tactics, which require less support and military resources to escalate a conflict and enhance its role in a movement (Bloom, 2004; Bueno De Mesquita, 2013; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Nemeth, 2013). Groups resorting to terrorism try to show absolute commitment to the cause and prove that civil resistance is its future, in the hope of attracting supporters.

Terrorism as outbidding or provocation aims to convince sympathizers to support the perpetrators over competing dissident organizations (Kydd and Walter, 2006). For example, Ahmad-Zadeh (1971: 2), a founder of the Iranian People's Fadaee during the nonviolent uprising against the Shah in Iran, notes how "[c]onscious of the correctness of the armed struggle, influenced by it and with the moral support of the people, these groups take up arms and extend the struggle, thereby increasing the possibilities of material support from the people". Terrorism as provocation aims to make the state respond by imposing repression or retribution (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). This encourages support for fighting, since people conclude that the state disregards their welfare (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Piazza and Walsh, 2010). A participant in a dissident of the campaign against the Brazilian government in the 1970s explains the choice of terrorism as follows: "the army always reacts against us in such a situation. By firing on workers, the army makes the people angry and brings them to the point of understanding action on yet another level – that is, action directed against the military" (Truskier, 1970: 32).

Although the government and dissidents in a campaign have opposing interests, they have some degree of shared interest in avoiding escalating terrorist violence. The government has a clear interest in avoiding the escalation of conflict, an increase in extremism, and a surge in violence, while nonviolent organizations have a clear interest in avoiding a loss of followers to fringe groups relying on terrorist violence. It is difficult for a government to treat groups using terrorism as a possible bargaining partner, as this action risks setting a dangerous precedent and legitimizing violence (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2015). Indiscriminate repression of civil resistance campaigns is likely to backfire, often polarizing the population and potentially alienating security forces (Piazza and Walsh, 2010; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008).[9] It might also radicalize moderate followers, as "provocation" strategies explicitly aim to do. Moreover, indiscriminate repression tends to decrease the opportunity costs of violence and motivate support for violent factions (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). Governments can resort to selective repression against the violent groups. However, effective counterterrorism is difficult and requires substantial resources and longer time horizons. Successful counterterrorism most often combines both coercive policing and military intelligence with integration initiatives to win hearts and minds through social and political concessions.

When repression is unlikely to work, a government can try to comply with some of the aims of a campaign in the hope of isolating terrorist groups and preventing the escalation of conflict. Terrorist attacks rarely represent a serious risk of conflict escalation outside major campaigns, since groups lack capacity and a large

[9] The concept of "moral" or "political" jiu-jitsu points to how harsh repression against unarmed civilians often lowers support for the regime (see Gregg, 1935; Sharp, 1973). Erickson (2011: 129) finds that one of the key factors accounting for security force defections and mutiny is the refusal to repress unarmed resistance campaigns.

mobilized audience who can share their political goals. Thus, coercive counterterrorism is normally a dominant strategy for the government. But when a government faces a major nonviolent campaign, wide participation brings enhanced resilience and higher costs of non-cooperation, which may induce a government to provide concessions (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Large-scale civil resistance coupled with terrorist groups gives the government a second reason, namely, the risk of escalation. In this more threatening and unstable situation, a government has incentives to offer concessions to avoid the outbreak of violent conflict, hoping to ensure a more controlled transition.

Concessions entail many risks for a government. The government has no guarantee that concessions will not encourage more violence and greater support for violent groups. The government also does not know whether nonviolent dissident organizations can really prevent their followers from shifting to support for violence after concessions. Thus, concessions to a campaign only become appealing if a nonviolent campaign can credibly prevent defection and guarantee that the conflict will not escalate further.

Hierarchical structure and centralized leadership

We argue that a hierarchical structure and centralized leadership makes it easier for a nonviolent campaign to avoid a massive shift of followers towards support for violence after concessions. A hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership allow nonviolent collective actors to implement coherent strategies and effectively regulate their base. As a result, such civil resistance campaigns can limit the escalation to large-scale violence.

A hierarchical structure transforms diffuse commitments into clearly defined roles, maximizing the leadership's capacity for regulating contentious political behavior (Gamson and Fireman, 1979). Formalized lines of communication and command can allow leaders to persuade participants to refrain from violence, even in emotionally charged situations (Nepstad, 2015: 119). Hierarchy and formal lines of authority favor internal cohesion and higher capacities for following a coherent strategy (Jenkins, 1983: 542). More cohesive nonviolent movements can more efficiently maintain nonviolent discipline (Pearlman, 2011). These characteristics enable mainstream collective actors to isolate terrorists and indirectly hamper escalation dynamics. Additionally, a centralized leadership means that states can deal with recognizable leaders who represent a movement. Centralized organizational structures enable moderate actors to co-opt resources and foster incorporation (Jenkins, 1983: 542). This is crucial, as states may use accommodation strategically to integrate mainstream actors into the larger political system, strengthening the position of moderate groups relative to violent flanks (Cunningham, 2011: 227).

Centralized leaderships and hierarchical structures do not always guarantee a strategic advantage for nonviolent movements or necessarily motivate the government to offer concessions. Coherent strategies and coordinated dissident activities under a centralized leadership decrease the costs of participation and facilitate increased contention (Gamson and Fireman, 1979: 41). But decentralized campaigns can be more effective in avoiding repression, thanks to operational resilience and the anonymity of participants (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008). However, a credible risk of conflict escalation makes centralized leadership more advantageous because governments are more likely to perceive moderate organizations as capable of avoiding radicalization and credibly preventing further escalation.

Accommodation will not automatically stop terrorism, but can prevent violent groups from winning a leading role and increase violence. Without new followers, terrorist activity cannot grow, and without manpower and support violent groups are likely to be isolated and politically defeated, and become increasingly vulnerable to governments' counterterrorism policies.

As an illustrative example of how the mechanisms described can work in practice, we briefly discuss the events that led the Prime Minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra, to step down and call for anticipated national elections, accommodating the civil resistance campaign that mobilized against him in 2005-2006. Thaksin Shinawatra's autocratic style of rule, with severe human rights violations and violation of civil liberties such as freedom of speech, and unpopular privatization measures generated fierce opposition from urban elites, NGOs, and royalist civil servants. The mass dissent started in 2005, when the government removed the talk show of publishing mogul Sondhi Limthongkul from state TV channel, due to his frequent allegations of government corruption and abuse of power. In only few months, Sondhi Limthongkul and other four central figures managed to mobilize a nonviolent mass dissident campaign calling for the resignation of Thaksin Shinawatra. The People' s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), formally established in February 2006, was developed as an umbrella organization to coordinate and regulate mass dissident activities across a large number of subordinate groups and organizations. In fact, the PAD leadership allied with several state-enterprise unions who were against Thaksin Shinawatra' s privatisation plans for state enterprises and with human rights activists who accused Thaksin Shinawatra of human rights abuses such as suppressing the freedom of press and extrajudicial killings, with various factions in the Thai military who claimed that Thaksin Shinawatra promoted only

those who were loyal to him, and finally with various political groups who criticised Thaksin Shinawatra for corruption (Mydans 2008).

In November 2005, Thaksin Shinawatra filed half a dozen lawsuits against Sondhi Limthongkul, who was drawing thousands of individuals to weekly anti-Thaksin rallies, accusing Thaksin Shinawatra of dishonouring the monarchy, among other things (Gray 2005). However, on 5 December 2005, King Bhumibol Adulyadej advised the government against further legal action against Sondhi Limthongkul, greatly legitimizing his movement. By then many believed that organized violence would arise in the streets of Bangkok during the protests (Levett 2005). In January 2006 terrorist violence targeting Thaksin Shinawatra and the Ministry of Justice did indeed emerge in Bangkok, and open threats of organized use of violence in Bangkok were issued by groups of university students that had joined the protest movement in February 2006 (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political 2006; Wannabovorn 2006b).

There is no evidence that the PAD itself was orchestrating these violent groups. Over the course of non-violent mass mobilization, Sondhi Limthongkul repeatedly called for the rallies of PAD to be peaceful and avoid violence (Wannabovorn 2006a). On 24 February 2006, two days before a scheduled national mass demonstration, Thaksin Shinawatra stepped down and dissolved the government, calling for new national elections. In a public speech to explain the reasons for his resignation, Thaksin Shinawatra disclosed that national intelligence was pointing to the existence of "ill-intentioned people" prepared to infiltrate the mass dissident campaign to cause violence, and that this contributed to his decision to dissolve the government (Pinyorat 2006).

H1: *Terrorism is especially likely to lead to the accommodation of the opposition when nonviolent dissident campaigns are hierarchically structured with a centralized leadership.*

Research design

Data

The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset records 109 primarily nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1946 and 2006 (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a).[10] We use new data on terrorist attacks occurrence by organizations with the same political goal as the resistance campaign (see "Explanatory variables" for more detail). Finally, we use the NAVCO data classification of whether civil resistance campaigns have a hierarchical structure and centralized leadership to evaluate our argument that terrorist attacks can help provoke concessions and accommodations for centralized and organized dissident campaigns.

NAVCO 2.0 classifies mass dissident campaigns as nonviolent if this is the primary resistance method and participation is limited to unarmed civilians (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013b: 418). This does not exclude the use of low-level violent tactics by other dissident organizations, as long as these do not become the dominant or primary tactic (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011: 12). Civil resistance campaigns are defined as a "series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics

[10] We exclude the anti-colonial civil resistance campaigns from the main analysis since these entail an overseas government and we do not have local covariates for colonies. We show in the appendix that analysis including anti-colonial movements with covariates for the colonial powers yields similar findings (Appendix, Tables 14–19). We also combined two campaigns against the Nepalese government in 2006 coded as separate in NAVCO, since the CPN-M/UPF Maoist groups contributed to a broader campaign identified as the "Democratic Movement" (Bindra and Banerjii 2006; Gobyn 2009). However, splitting these does not change our main results.

or events in pursuit of a political objective" (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013b: 416), "taking place outside the institutional realm of politics, and confrontational in nature" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011: 12). They must entail shared maximalist goals, have at least 1,000 observed participants, and there must be evidence of coordination among participants.[11]

Our main outcome variable is whether civil resistance campaigns see substantial gains. This is based on the ordinal *progress* variable in NAVCO 2.0. This variable codes the achievements of a campaign in a particular year and shows the type of political concessions the campaign has obtained from the targeted regime. First, if a state does not change its position at all, the status quo is coded zero. If the state does not make formal concessions but changes its behavior to accommodate the opposition, for example, allowing greater political openness, we have "visible gains short of concessions" (with a value of 1). Verbal statements of conciliation or changes in the stated position of the regime without additional action constitute "limited concessions" (2). Real actions short of ultimate capitulation, such as policy changes, the removal of state leaders or the initiation of negotiations with the opposition, constitute "significant concessions" (3). When the campaign entirely achieves its stated political aims we have "complete success" (4). Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) note that coders' judgments as to whether a campaign achieved a value of 3 or 4 were highly subjective. They suggest the creation of a "dichotomous variable indicating 'strategic success' (3 and 4) or 'otherwise' (0, 1, and 2)" (Chenoweth and Lewis

[11] Maximalist political goals include regime change, institutional reform, policy change, territorial secession, greater autonomy and anti-occupation. Maximalist demands are central to our claims and the assumption that states will perceive it as expensive to accommodate these demands in the absence of credible threat of conflict escalation, even when campaigns are hierarchically structured and have skilled participants and ample resources.

2013: 18). Following this suggestion, we here operationalize *substantial gains* as a dichotomous variable taking a value of 1 whenever civil resistance campaigns reach significant gains or complete success, 0 otherwise. Both significant political gains and complete success imply substantial material and political achievements, where the government substantially legitimizes civil resistance campaigns' political goals and actions. We also consider a stricter alternative measure restricted to campaigns that see complete success, treating all lower level concessions as 0s.

Explanatory variables

We consider *terrorism occurrence* by a dummy variable flagging evidence of systematic use of terrorist tactics by organizations with the same broad political goals of nonviolent organizations in civil resistance in a given campaign-year. We consider terrorist violence as *systematic* when at least three terrorist attacks occur within a year, thus excluding individual attacks that may be flukes or by weak violent groups or actors that do not represent a serious threat of conflict escalation. A threshold of three attacks is more appropriate than a count variable, since we are not interested in the intensity of terrorism *per se*.

Our data combines the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) on attacks from 1970 to 2014 with our own coding of data on terrorist attacks prior to 1970 (see Appendix Table 1). We use the GTD's three basic coding rules and three additional criteria to identify terrorist events (START, 2012: 6–7): 1) Attacks must be intentional; 2) Attacks entail the use or the threat of violence; 3) Perpetrators are non-state actors; 4) Attacks must be aimed at political, economic or social goals (the exclusive pursuit of economic profit does not satisfy this criterion); 5) Attacks must have intention to coerce, intimidate or transmit the same message to a larger audience

than the immediate victims; 6) Attacks must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities and violate humanitarian law with regards to targeting civilians or non-combatants.

We only consider terrorist attacks carried out by groups and actors that share the broad political goals of the civil resistance campaigns (e.g., regime change, independence). To verify the existence of common goals in a broad sense we consulted additional information on the perpetrators and audience of terrorist activities using the GTD on-line advanced search tool (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/) and news reports from Lexis Nexis. We follow Enders et al.'s (2011) protocol to extract domestic terrorist attacks from the GTD, which requires that terrorist strategies must have direct consequences for the venue country only, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. Some civil resistance campaigns included in NAVCO 2.0 have separatist goals and terrorist groups acting in those contexts target foreign states, considered as occupying forces. These cases fall under Enders et al.'s (2011) definition of transnational terrorism,[12] but for our purposes many of these entail actions by violent groups pursuing goals similar to a civil resistance campaign. We manually code these as domestic attacks based on their location when clearly related to the goals of an ongoing civil resistance campaign. For example, a terrorist attack perpetrated by Palestinian nationals targeting Israeli or Palestinians nationals in Israel during the mass dissident campaign for the Palestinian liberation territories is counted as a domestic attack. However, a terrorist attack perpetrated by Palestinians against US nationals abroad is considered

[12] "If the nationality of the perpetrators differs from that of one or more of the victims, then the terrorist attack is transnational. In addition, a terrorist attack is transnational when the nationality of a victim differs from the venue country. If terrorists transit an international border to perpetrate their attack, then the incident is transnational" (Enders et al., 2011: 321).

fully transnational and thus is dropped from the data, even if it furthered the cause of the mass dissident campaign for the liberation of the Palestinians.

In order to ensure that terrorist attacks are prior to any political progress we process-traced the timeline for terrorist activities in campaigns through secondary sources. We include only cases where the use of terrorism preceded concessions.

The final dataset includes 307 annual observations. The final dataset includes 307 annual observations. This is because we exclude anti-colonial campaigns that do not present variation in terms of political outcomes. Given the fact that they all terminate with a complete accommodation of the mass dissident movement, excluding them from the sample yields more conservative results. Table 1 displays the share of civil resistance campaigns with systematic terrorism occurrence against whether the campaign sees significant political gains. We see systematic terrorism in 30.6% of the campaign years. There is a marginally higher share of campaign years with substantial gains in instances where we see systematic terrorism, but the majority of observations both with and without terrorism are unsuccessful.

Table 1: Substantial gains for campaigns by systematic terrorism

	Systematic terrorism	
Substantial gains	Yes	No
No	134	50
	(63.51%)	(53.76%)
Yes	77	43
	(36.49%)	(46.24 %)
Total	100%	100%

***Note*:** Table entries are counts; percentages of column totals in parentheses.

Our second variable of interest is *Hierarchy*, a dummy variable coding whether nonviolent organizations participating in civil resistance campaigns are hierarchically organized and have a central leadership based on NAVCO 2.0, and coded 1 if "there is a clear centralized leadership structure, hierarchically organized and with clear lines of authority – often but not necessarily focused on a single leader" (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b: 12). Conversely, the variable is coded as 0 when different organizations participate in the same civil resistance campaigns with their own individual leaders, each of which has influence over the contentious political tactics and strategies of their individual organizations (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b).[13] Table 2 displays the share of campaigns with substantial progress by hierarchical structure. 31.33% of the campaign years have a hierarchical structure. However, the difference in the share with substantial progress between campaigns with and without hierarchical structure is modest, and the modal outcome for both is the absence of any substantial gains.

Table 2: Substantial gains by hierarchical structure

	Hierarchical Structure	
Campaigns' substantial gains	No	Yes
No	129 (62.62%)	56 (59.57%)
Yes	77	38

[13] Sources indicate that the Second People Power Movement to overthrow President Estrada had a central leadership and hierarchical chain of command in 2001 (Global Nonviolent Action Database, 2014).

	(37.38%)	(40.43 %)
Total	100 %	100 %

***Note*:** Table entries are counts; percentages of column totals in parentheses.

Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 are consistent with our claim that neither systemic terrorism not hierarchical structure by themselves are strongly associated with prospects for substantial gains. Finally, almost 23% of the observations correspond to occurrence of terrorism and existence of hierarchical structure and centralized leadership. In the analysis below, we consider the evidence for the interactive effect implied by our argument, considering a number of control variables possibly associated with either systematic terrorism or hierarchy

Control variables

To more formally evaluate our argument that only organized terrorist violence by fringe groups constitutes a genuine threat of conflict escalation for governments, we consider the effects of riots during campaigns. Riots can also be contagious and have a potential mobilizing effect, but we expect that more spontaneous types of violence and radical rhetoric without significant organization should not change the strategic environment in the same way as terrorism. We create a measure of *Riots Occurrence* based on the Cross-national Time Series Data Archive, defined as a binary variable flagging if there is at least one riot or clash with the police of more than 100 citizens involving physical force (Banks and Wilson, 2014: 12).

It is also possible that our findings could reflect more general consequences of radical flanks, including groups that do not use terrorism. To consider this we extract a binary measure from NAVCO2.0 indicating whether there is a "radical flank" in an

otherwise non-violent movement. Here, a radical flank is defined as a group that adopts extremist rhetoric and violent strategies to pursue their goals and represents a faction within the broader opposition movement (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a: 10).

Chenoweth and Stephan (2008: 19) find that nonviolent dissident campaigns are more likely to succeed in more democratic regimes. More democratic regimes offer greater opportunities for opposition groups to organize and coordinate, and some studies also show that democracies are a favorable environment for the use of terrorist strategies (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 1998, 2001; Eyerman 1998; Li 2005; Schmid 1992;). We thus control for democracy by the *Polity2* score from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2014) and then create a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the score is equal or higher than 6.

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) find that longer nonviolent campaigns are less likely to obtain political gains. Longer campaign duration might also motivate dissidents to conceive primarily non-violent methods of contention as ineffective and shift their support to more organized armed actions, thus encouraging violent groups engaged in terrorist activities. We thus control for the duration of the dissident campaign by using the log of years elapsed since the beginning of the mass civil resistance mobilization for each campaign (after adding 1 to the base).

Larger mobilization increases the likelihood of success for civil resistance campaigns (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 23), and larger campaigns may also increase the perceived threat to the state, especially if coupled with terrorism. We thus control for campaign size using data from NAVCO 2.0, coded on an order of magnitude scale, ranging from 0: 1–999; 1: 1,000–9,999; 2: 10,000–99,999; 3: 100,000–499,999; 4: 500,000–1 million; to 5: > 1 million (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a: 9).

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) argue that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed in the face of repression than violent ones. State repression against nonviolent resistance campaigns is also likely to be positively associated with the use of more violent tactics such as terrorism (Della Porta and Tarrow, 1986). We thus control for repression against campaigns based on data from NAVCO 2.0, which capture "the most repressive episode or activity perpetrated by the state" to suppress dissidents' mass activities in a given year (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a: 13). This is based on a four-point scale ranging from no repression to repression with intention to kill.

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) find that nonviolent campaigns occurring during the Cold War were less likely to succeed than nonviolent campaigns occurring prior to or after the Cold War. We thus add a post-Cold-War dummy identifying the period after 1992.

Low income tends to make large-scale conventional armed conflict more feasible and increases the expectation of violent groups to obtain more recruits (Collier, 2006). A low GDP per capita might also motivate a higher perception in the risk of armed conflict by governments and motivate concessions. We thus control for *GDP per capita* (logged) using data from Gleditsch (2002). We present descriptive statistics of all variables and collinearity diagnostics in the Appendix (Tables 6 and 7).

Empirical findings

In Table 3 we report probit regression models of substantial gains, with standard errors clustered by campaigns, since the variance may differ systematically across cases. We also control for time dependency, by using the log of the time without prior

political gain.[14] We comment first on the control variables, based on the estimates in Model 1, before turning to the main features of interest. In line with previous research, we find that larger civil resistance campaigns are more likely to see substantial political gains. We are more likely to see substantial gains the longer the duration of a campaign, although the absence of prior gains makes concessions decreasingly likely. We also find that repression appears to make substantial political gains less likely, and that campaigns are less likely to have seen concessions during the Cold War period. States with lower GDP per capita are more likely to issue substantial concessions to mass civil resistance movements.

[14] We use the log of time without substantial gains, since we do not expect the effect of time to be linear but to decay with a longer period without success. Since the campaigns are short, alternative non-linear approaches such as specification with time squared and cubed or cubic splines lead to over-parameterized models that fail to improve on the logged measure. However, we include models with alternative time controls in the Appendix (Table 14). The results remain consistent.

Table 3: Probit estimates, substantial gains in civil resistance campaigns

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Terrorism	0.587***	0.170				
	(0.212)	(0.224)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.373***				
		(0.473)				
Hierarchy	-0.055	-0.472*	-0.075	-0.219	-0.013	0.316
	(0.211)	(0.282)	(0.211)	(0.329)	(0.218)	(0.337)
Democracy (lag)	-0.547**	-0.683***	-0.552**	-0.549**	-0.438*	-0.467**
	(0.242)	(0.250)	(0.228)	(0.229)	(0.233)	(0.233)
Campaign size	0.401***	0.443***	0.368***	0.385***	0.352***	0.345***
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.089)
Duration (log)	0.000	0.082	0.153	0.151	0.145	0.169
	(0.216)	(0.209)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.230)	(0.235)
Repression	-0.182**	-0.200**	-0.224**	-0.232**	-0.264***	-0.262***
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Cold War	-0.532***	-0.511***	-0.561***	-0.554***	-0.685***	-0.692***
	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.189)	(0.203)	(0.209)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.072	-0.119	-0.102	-0.115	-0.188**	-0.189**
	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Years without progress (log)	-0.579***	-0.548***	-0.725***	-0.714***	-0.680***	-0.711***
	(0.188)	(0.192)	(0.201)	(0.193)	(0.204)	(0.216)
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.215	0.099		
			(0.220)	(0.244)		
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.323		
				(0.447)		
Riots					0.119	0.277
					(0.192)	(0.252)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.485
						(0.410)
Constant	0.245	0.565	0.668	0.779	1.451*	1.375*
	(0.831)	(0.788)	(0.861)	(0.856)	(0.798)	(0.806)
Observations	251	251	253	253	248	248

*Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

In Model 1 we consider what effect systematic terrorism occurrence and campaign hierarchical structure as independent components have on the likelihood of substantial political gains, in addition to control variables. We find some evidence of a modestly positive and weakly significant effect of terrorism occurrence and little evidence that hierarchal campaign structure by itself has any consistent effects on the likelihood of gains. In Model 2 we introduce the interactive term. As can be seen, we

find strong evidence for a positive interaction between terrorism and campaign structure, and it is clear from the coefficient that terrorism in the absence of a hierarchical campaign has no clear impact on campaign success. In Figure 1 we illustrate the impact of the variables for four profiles on the predicted probabilities for success, keeping other values at the median, with 90% confidence intervals. It is clear that only in the presence of both do we have a higher likelihood than not of substantial gains, and that neither hierarchal structure nor terrorism are by themselves sufficient to ensure success.

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of substantial gains for campaign profiles



Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of substantial gains for campaign profiles, all other variables at the median, with 90% confidence intervals

In Models 3 and 4 we consider whether these effects are specific to terrorism, or extend to radical flanks in general, using the indicator from NAVCO. We find no evidence of similar effects of radical flank indicator has any significant influence by itself (Model 3) or significant interaction with hierarchical campaign structure (Model 4). Finally, Models 5 and 6 conduct a similar analysis with riots, and again we find that the apparent effects of systematic terrorism for hierarchical campaigns do not extent to spontaneous riots without clear coordination or organization.

We have also conducted a number of robustness tests. The main findings reported in Table 3 do not change when clustering the standard errors by countries rather than campaigns (Appendix, Table 8). We have also checked whether the findings change with alternative control variables and standard errors clustered by campaign and country (Appendix, Tables 9–10 respectively). First, we substitute *campaign size* with a rougher estimate of the overall size of the opposition campaign extracted from NAVCO 2.0: 'camp_size_est'.[15] Second, we replace the dichotomous democracy indicator by the full Polity2 score. Finally, we replace the dichotomous variable accounting for the Cold War period with a dichotomous item accounting for the post-Cold-War period (the pre-Cold-War period is left out). Although the term for terrorism by itself is occasionally significant and at other times not, the main finding in Table 3 remains consistent, and the interactive term is consistently positive and significant.

[15] *Estimated campaign size* is an indicator of the basic size of the campaign as derived from the secondary literature and it ranges from 0 (small, hundreds to thousands) to 3 (extremely large, above one million) (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a: 6).

Table 4: Probit estimates, full success in resistance campaign

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Terrorism	0.222	-0.054
	(0.232)	(0.257)
Terrorism*Hierarchy		0.910*
		(0.528)
Hierarchy	-0.001	-0.265
	(0.231)	(0.288)
Democracy (lag)	-0.125	-0.222
	(0.260)	(0.258)
Campaign size	0.299***	0.311***
	(0.077)	(0.075)
Duration (log)	-0.104	-0.054
	(0.211)	(0.205)
Repression	-0.129	-0.136
	(0.091)	(0.093)
Cold War	-0.347	-0.319
	(0.228)	(0.226)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.167*	-0.196**
	(0.095)	(0.090)
Constant	0.321	0.565
	(0.833)	(0.818)
Observations	236	236

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To verify that the results are not driven by the way our dependent variable is measured, we further consider an alternative, more restrictive measure that only considers full success. We report the findings for the effect of terrorism occurrence, hierarchy and their interaction in Table 4 above. We do not include measures of time dependence in Table 4 because civil resistance can only be completely successful at the end of a civil resistance campaign.[16] The findings in Table 4 (above) further

[16] Success is observed only once for civil resistance campaigns with the exceptions of: Argentina's pro-democracy movement, which had two subsequent complete successes in 1982 and 1983; the Croatian Institutional Reform Movement, which had two subsequent complete successes in 1999 and 2000; the Mali Anti-Military Campaign, which had two subsequent complete successes in 1991 and 1992; and the Velvet Revolution, which had two subsequent complete successes in 1989 and 1990.

support our core argument: in Model 1 terrorism by itself is not significant on success, but we find the same positive interaction between hierarchical structure and systematic terrorism on success. We provide results for radical flanks and riots in the Appendix (Table 11), where we show that these have no consistent effect on success or interaction with hierarchical campaign structure. Again, we find no major changes when using the alternative control variables (Appendix, Table 12). The findings for the main explanatory variables also remain consistent when estimating a multinomial logit models[17] (see Table 13). Finally, including anti-colonial campaigns also yields similar results (Appendix, Tables 14–19).

Conclusion

We have applied an actor-oriented approach to explore the effect of terrorist activities on the outcomes of primarily non-violent mass resistance campaigns. We explained why the occurrence of terrorist attacks may unexpectedly help nonviolent movements to achieve their goals and which features these movements should have to profit from this phenomenon most effectively. We claimed that terrorist attacks actually modify the strategic environment between nonviolent collective actors and opponent governments because terrorism constitutes a credible threat of conflict escalation.

Contrary to other forms of violence, such as mobs and riots, which may spontaneously emerge during mass civil resistance activities, terrorist attacks imply an organized attempt to escalate the conflict. Neither nonviolent organizations nor opponent regimes can directly and easily control terrorism occurrence because violent

[17] The outcome variable in multinomial logit considers separately the status quo (0) from limited gains (1) and substantial gains (2). To obtain limited gain we consider separately levels 1 and 2 in the original ordinal scale for resistance campaigns' progress.

groups choosing terrorism operate underground and independently. Governments can respond to terrorism during civil resistance campaigns with indiscriminate repression; selective repression; or accommodation of the moderates' requests.

However, while indiscriminate repression can easily increase violent activities and create a backlash on the government, selective repression is a difficult and long process, during which terrorism can cause severe damage. Both governments and nonviolent organizations have clear interests in blocking terrorist groups. The government wants to avoid conflict escalation and nonviolent organizations want to avoid a flow of disappointed followers towards the radicals. Thus, an agreement could seem the best available option; but governments lack reliable information about the possible support of violent tactics within resistance campaign's mainstream organizations and whether complying with the requests of the resistance will avoid conflict escalation.

However, under specific circumstances nonviolent collective actors can overcome this strategic deadlock. In fact, opponent governments are more likely to accommodate the campaigns' maximalist political goals when these movements can signal their capacity to avoid conflict escalation through hierarchical structure and centralized leadership.

The empirical findings provide strong and robust support for the hypotheses that terrorism has a positive and significant effects on nonviolent campaigns' success and that hierarchically structured campaigns with central leadership are especially likely to profit from the occurrence of terrorism. This suggests that some of the inconsistencies of the previous literature on the effect of violence amid mainly nonviolent campaigns can be clarified by unpacking the specific tactics used by violent groups and the characteristics of moderate collective actors.

This study shed light on the conditions under which terrorism is unexpectedly likely to lead to the accommodation of moderate mainstream organizations, it does not look into the conditions under which terrorism is likely to have a negative effect. Further research is needed to understand the conditions under which terrorism undermines the support for nonviolent campaigns, leading to the emergence of large-scale civil wars.

References

Agence France Presse, (1998, December 02). Rebels Shoot East Timor Teacher Dead in Front of Students.

Ahmad-Zadeh, M. (1971). Armed Struggle: Both a Strategy and a Tactic. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/subject/iran/ahmad-zadeh/armed-struggle.pdf.

Banks, A. S. and Wilson, K. A. (2014). Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Jerusalem, Israel. Retrieved from http://www.databanksinternational.com

Bindra, S., and Prithvi, B. (2006, April 24). Rain, Police Douse Nepal protest. CNN.

Blakenship, B. (2016). When Do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, forthcoming.

Bloom, M. (2005). *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bueno De Mesquita, E., and Dickson, D. (2007) The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 364–381.

Bueno De Mesquita, E. (2013). Rebel Tactics. *Journal of Political Economy* 21(2): 323–357

Chenoweth, E., and Lewis, O. (2013a). Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project. Available at: http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html.

Chenoweth, E., and Lewis, O. (2013b). Unpacking Non-violent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research 50*(3): 415–423.

Chenoweth, E., and Stephan, M. J. (2008). Why Civil Resistance Works. *International Security 33*(1): 7–44.

Chenoweth, E., and Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press

Chenoweth, E. and Shock, K. (2015). Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns? *Mobilization: An International Quarterly 2*(4): 427–451.

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics 13*(4): 379–399.

Costalli, S., and Ruggeri, A. (2015) Forging Political Entrepreneurs: Civil War Effects on Post-Conflict Politics in Italy. *Political Geography 44*: 44–49.

Cunningham, K. G. (2011). Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists? *American Political Science Review 105*(2): 275–297.

Cunningham, K. G. (2013). Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science 57*(3): 659–672.

Della Porta, D. (2013). *Clandestine Political Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Della Porta, D., and Tarrow, S. (1986). Unwanted Children: Political Violence and the Cycle of Protest in Italy. *European Journal of Political Research 14*(2), 607–632.

Erickson, S. N. (2011). *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fortna, V. P. (2015). Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes. *International Organization 63*(3): 519–55.

Freeman, J. (1975). *The Politics of Women's Liberation*. New York, NY: Longman.

Gamson, W. (1975). *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.

Gamson, W. (1979). Utilitarian Logic and the Resource Mobilization Perspective. In *The Dynamics of Social Movements*, M. N. Zald and J. M. McCarthy (eds), pp. 8–45. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.

Gobyn, N. (2009). From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists' Strategic and Ideological Thinking. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32*(5): 420–438.

Gregg, R. (1935). *The Power of Non-Violence*. London: George Routledge.

Global Nonviolent Action Database (2014). Philippine Citizens Overthrow President Joseph Estrada (People Power II), 2011. Retrieved from https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/philippine-citizens-overthrow-president-joseph-estrada-people-power-ii-2001.

Gupta, D. (2014). *The Strategic Logic of Radical Flanks Effect. Theorizing Power in Divided Social Movements*. Retrieved from http://government.arts.cornell.edu/assets/psac/sp14/Gupta_PSAC_Feb7.pdf.

Haines, H. (1988). Black Radicalization and the Funding of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1970. *Social Problems 32*: 31–43.

International Associated Press (1998a, July 13). East Timor's Governor calls for Calm as Thousands Flee.

International Associated Press (1998b, November 5). E. Timorese Exiles Threaten Terrorist Attacks Against Indonesia.

International Associated Press (1998c, November 6). Indonesian Army Slams East Timor Terrorist Attacks Threat.

Jenkins, J. K. (1983). Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology 9*: 527–553.

Killian, L. M. (1972). The Significance of Extremism in the Black Revolution. *Social Problems 20*: 41–48.

Kydd, A. H., and Walter, B. F. (2006). The Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security 31*(1), 49–79.

McAdam, D. (1982). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

McCauley, C, and Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence 20*: 405–433.

Monlar, A. R. (1966). *Human Factors: Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*. Washington, DC: Social Science Research Institute.

Moretti, M. (1994). *Brigate Rosse: Una Storia Italiana*. Milano: Anabasi.

Muller, Carol McClurg (1978). Riot Violence and Protest Outcomes. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology 6*: 49–63.

Nemeth, S. (2013). The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 58*(2): 336–362.

Nepstad, S. E. (2015). *Nonviolent Struggle. Theories, Strategies and Dynamics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Obershall, A. (1973). *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Pearlman, W. (2011). *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Piazza, J. A., and Walsh, I. J. (2010). Physical Integrity Rights and Terrorism. *Political Science and Politics 43*(3): 411–414.

Pinto, C., and Jardine, M. (1997). *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance*. Boston, MA: South End Press.

Ramirez, B. (1978). *When Workers Fight: The Politics of Industrial Relations in the Progressive Era, 1898–1916*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Rayback, J. G. (1966). *A History of American Labor*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Sánchez-Cuenca, I., and de la Calle, L. (2009). Domestic Terrorism: the Hidden Side of Political Violence. *Annual Review of Political Science 12*: 31–49.

Sharp, G. (1973). *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.

Shellenberger, M. and Nordhaus, T. (2004). *The Death of Environmentalism: Global Warming Politics in a Post-Environmental World*. Oakland, CA: Breakthrough Institute

Schelling, T. S. (1970). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, R. (2006). *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. New York: Penguin Books

Stephan, M. J. (2006). Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination Movements. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30*(2), 57–79

Truskier, A. (1970) The Politics of Violence: The Urban Guerrilla in Brazil. *Rampant Magazine*. Available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/abstractdb/AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=62217.

Wall, D. (1999). *Earth First! and the Anti-Roads Movement: Radical Environmentalism and Comparative Social Movements*. Abingdon, Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Routledge.

Wasow, Omar (2017) Do Protests Matter? Evidence from the 1960s Black Insurgency. Working Paper.

Biting the hand that feeds?

External support, population dependence and rebel groups' portfolio of killings

Abstract

What explains the variation in the portfolio of killings across rebel groups? This study implements an actor oriented approach to explain how different types of non-state actors' transnational support affect rebel groups' relative allocation between terrorist and conventional violence. Rebels receiving fungible financial support are less likely to target civilians rather than combatants. Rebels have incentives to invest financial support domestically rather than internationally. This is more economically efficient and it maximizes the opportunity to secure less volatile resources from the population in the future. In turn, increased dependency of rebel groups on local populations generates incentives to restrain the use of terrorism. Rebels receiving military support are more likely to target civilians rather than combatants. Military resources are efficiently invested in warfare activities without the need to increase reliance on the population and it is hard to convert military resources in assets to be invested in future, less volatile returns from the population. I model rebel groups' portfolio of killings as the proportion of terrorist-related deaths and battle-related deaths. The empirics support all the hypotheses and are consistent with the argument that the counterproductive effects of terrorism offset its tactical advantages when rebels depend on local populations.

Introduction

Civil wars have destructive effects on societies. In addition to the devastation due to warfare, civilians may become targets for political violence. Rebel groups often complement "normal" warfare activities targeting military personnel and involving traditional battlefield fighting, hit-and-run attacks, ambushes and all kinds of bombardments of military units, with indirect use of violence against illegal targets, i.e. terrorist attacks against non-combatants. Crucially, the global increase in terrorist attacks seems to reflect a growing use in ongoing, increasingly complex civil wars (Clauset and Gleditsch, forthcoming). Yet, the degree to which rebel groups deliberately target civilians with terrorist violence as a complement to conventional warfare activities against state coercive apparatuses varies from case to case.

The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria has extensively used terrorist violence, not only against members of rival political groups but also to target the larger population. On the other hand, groups such as the Maoist insurgents (CNP/UPF) in Nepal used limited terrorism. Rather than extensively target the population, CNP/UFP invested in local businesses and development work and was effective in gathering material support from its constituencies (Bray et al., 2003). What motivates some rebel groups to seek cooperation with local populations rather than using them as a target for coercive purposes? What explain the observed variation in the allocation of terrorist and conventional violence across rebel groups?

Scholars have suggested that rebel groups in civil war strategically use civilians' victimization in general and terrorism in particular (Bueno De Mesquita, 2013; Findley and Young, 2012; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Kalyvas, 1999; Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009; Lake, 2003; Wood 2010). Terrorist violence offers tactical advantages when compared to conventional military actions that can be

beneficial for rebel groups under power asymmetry. However, under certain conditions, the costs of terrorism connected to the risk of alienating popular support offset its tactical advantages (Polo and Gleditsch, 2016; Stanton, 2013). Previous research has shown that rebel-biased external support affects the use of violent tactics (Kalyvas, 1999; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2007). Other research indicates that the ways in which rebels use civilian victimization varies according to the external supporters' regime type (Salehyan et al., 2014) and that violence increases when rebels do not rely on support from the population (Wood, 2014).

This study adds to the existing literature in two ways. First, it focuses on the relationship between transnational non-state actors' support to rebels and rebels' strategic choice of killings. In fact, while many studies have focused on external state support to rebel groups, little systematic work exists on the most prominent form of support to rebel groups after the Cold War: support from non-state actors (Hazen, 2013). Second, it studies systematically how different types of external support by non-state actors have different effects on rebel groups' strategic choice of killings. While the effects of financial and military aid on the behaviours of state actors in civil conflict have been routinely studied in separation (see, e.g., Dube and Suresh 2014; Ree and Nillesen 2009), the literature on rebels' choice of tactics has not disaggregated the effects of different types of support to rebel groups, possibly due to the absence of data.

To name just few examples of support of external non-state actors to rebel groups, between 1992 and 2009 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) received vast financial support from various Tamil diaspora groups operating all over the world. Al-Qaida provided military training to Abu Sayyaf until 1996, when its

interests in the Philippines diminished and shifted its support to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

I argue that rebel groups have incentives to invest financial support domestically rather than internationally. This is more economically efficient because it requires less logistic expense and it maximizes the possibility of securing less volatile resources from the population in the future. In turn, domestic investments increase rebel dependency on local populations and their internal social and cultural cohesion, generating incentives and capabilities to restrain the use of terrorism against civilians. Rebel groups that receive military support do not develop the same incentives and capability to restrain the use of terrorism against civilians. Military resources are efficiently invested directly in warfare activities without the need to increase existing reliance on local populations and it is harder to convert such resources into assets to invest for securing less volatile support.

I present a newly generated dataset on rebel groups' portfolios of killings and violence in civil war and disaggregated available data on external support to rebel groups by type and actor in 204 conflict-dyads from 1989 to 2009. Whereas previous empirical studies on the determinants of terrorism-related deaths in civil war use a simple count of terror-related deaths or events as the outcome variable, I model the relative allocation of terrorism and conventional violence as the proportion of terrorist-related deaths and battle-related deaths by rebel groups. This allows me to distinguish whether more terrorist violence reflects a tactical choice or simply a period of higher overall rebels' violence intensity.

The empirical findings are consistent with the argument that transnational non-state actors' financial support generates incentives and capabilities to restrain the use of terrorism, while transnational non-state actors' financial and military support

does not. Thus, the empirics are consistent with the argument that the counterproductive effects of terrorism offset its tactical advantages when rebels depend on local populations.

Advantages of terrorism over "normal" warfare

I define terrorism according to the Global Terrorism Database's (GTD) three basic coding rules and three additional criteria (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and to Terrorism, 2012: 6). Terrorism is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence with the intention to intimidate or transmit a message to a larger audience. In contrast, normal warfare activities concern the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state.

The main benefits associated with terrorist attacks are the tactical advantages that targeting civilians offers, compared to targeting state coercive apparatuses, in situations of power asymmetry. Unlike conventional military actions and guerrilla warfare, terrorist attacks do not aim at destroying the opponent state militarily but employ the use or the threat of the use of force or armed violence against non-combatants and other soft targets to coerce the opponent state (Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009). While conventional warfare works by achieving what rebels want through brute force without needing any meaningful decision on the enemy's part, terrorism is chiefly a coercive strategy: rebels persuade the enemy to give them what they want by threatening pain if they do not (see Schelling, 1966; Biddle and Friedman, 2008).

The aim of terrorist activities is to gain recognition or attention, altering audiences' beliefs about rebels' abilities, commitment to a political cause and to a certain course of action. Terrorism's strategic logic includes, among others, provoking

the state to indiscriminately repress civilians, persuading the latter to support the rebels; intimidating civilians to convince them to oppose the state; inflicting enough damage to the state's legitimacy to force the state to decide that the cost of fighting against the rebels exceeds the cost of concessions on the stake at issue in war (Crenshaw, 1981; Kalyvas, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Piazza and Walsh, 2010).

Terrorism has three main tactical advantages that make it less military costly when compared to 'normal' warfare activities. First, while conventional and guerrilla warfare exposes rebels to higher risk of death, injury or imprisonment over fighting against state coercive apparatuses, terrorism allows rebel troops to avoid direct exposure to retaliatory violence from the state. This, in turn, lowers the cost of fighting and allows rebel groups to progress political objectives while avoiding direct persecution (Monlar, 1966).

Second, unlike normal warfare activities against states' militaries, terrorist activities do not require mobilizing substantial numbers of fighters (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013). By implication, terrorism is less reliant on rebel groups' military proficiency. In fact, while normal warfare requires the ability to control large-scale manoeuvres, integrating movement and indirect fire support, combining multiple combat arms and reacting flexibly to changing conditions, even very small rebel units with poor military proficiency can effectively carry out terrorist actions (see Biddle and Friedman, 2008; Record, 2007). Third, terrorist attacks rely on less costly military technology then conventional and guerrilla warfare (Gunaratna, 2001: 1).

Thus, rebel groups that are incapable of prevailing outright by brute force can yet be strong enough to influence others' decision calculus through some combination of armed persuasion and coercive pain infliction. In this perspective, the tactical

advantage of dispersed, low-tech terrorist attacks is the ability to impose costs while evading detections and elimination by superior armed forces (Beckett, 2001; Buhaug et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2009; Hultquist, 2013). However, terrorist violence may come with high costs, due to civilian victimization, and involving the alienation of rebel groups' constituencies and the loss of popularity and support among local populations for the warring parties (Valentino et al. 2004).

Support volatility and incentives to restrain terrorist activities

"[T]he level of access to economic profits, military resources […] underlies the capacity of rebel groups forces to wage war" (Hazen, 2013: 3). For all rebel organizations, available military and financial resources are likely to derive from a mixture of internal and international sources of support. While the availability of external support varies depending on the changing domestic and international interests of external patrons, the ability to obtain resources is more stable when rebels enjoy the support of local constituencies (Gates, 2002; Weinstein, 2005; Salehyan et al., 2011; Hazen, 2013; Beardsley et al., 2015).

Local populations can assist rebel groups by providing the resources needed, they can ignore rebel groups, or they can actively resist them by fighting back on their own or by assisting the government. "Civilians often base their decisions to extend or withhold support on expectations regarding […] the ability of the group to provide selective benefits" (Wood, 2014: 466). Insurgents have incentives to create order, protect civilians and even provide services in their areas to win the hearts of the local populace. This is because the revenue from taxation and active support exceeds the expected value of victimizing and looting civilians in the long term (Olson, 1993; Beardsley, et al. 2015).

For example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone suffered heavily from the extreme volatility of the resources made available by its patron. Charles Taylor started to militarily support the RUF in 1991 because of a trade deal gone sour between his National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Sierra Leone National Army. In 1993 and 2001, however, Charles Taylor's problems with his own war led him to stop supporting the RUF with weapons and to recall his troops serving with the RUF (Hazen, 2013: 78–82). By contrast, the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador obtained financial and military resources beyond the fixed contribution necessary to remain in the contested areas by one-third of the local population over the entire duration of the civil war (Wood 2003).

Extensive use of terrorism might undermine the support of the local population and severely decrease availability of future revenues, ultimately depriving rebel groups of the capacity to wage war. Thus, despite the tactical advantages of targeting civilians with terrorism compared to conventional warfare and guerrilla activities against military personnel, under specific circumstances, the costs connected with the alienation of local supporters may be sufficient to motivate rebel groups to exercise restraint in their use of terrorist tactics. Polo and Gleditsch (2016) and Stanton (2013) found, for example, that rebel groups with political goals and ideologies that address wider constituencies are less likely to use terrorism and more likely to select lower-casualty civilian targets, because of the risk of alienating potential followers and to minimize public backlash.

How transnational non-state actors' military and financial support changes the rebels–population relation

Previous research has highlighted a link between foreign support, resource availability and rebels' civilian victimization (Kalyvas, 1999; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006;

Weinstein, 2007; Salehyan et al., 2014). Weinstein (2007) suggests that any change in external support to rebel groups tends to increase abuse against civilians (264)[18]. Kalyvas (1999) claims that violence against civilians is less likely where insurgents are dependent on external aid and local population defection is less costly. In turn, Salehyan et al. (2014) ague that rebels with access to foreign state sponsorship are more likely to be inclined to prey on civilians, according to their supporters' regime types.[19]

I claim that different types of transnational non-state actors' support, i.e. financial or military, are likely to have a different effect on rebel groups' incentives to restrain the use of terrorist attacks against civilians, depending on their fungibility. Resource fungibility might be easy or difficult depending on the resource in question. Additionally, "for fungibility to be possible the group must have the logistical capacity, resources and contacts to translate economic power into military power (and vice versa)" (Hazen, 2013: 14).

Transnational non-state actors' military support, such as logistics, training and manpower, do not provide rebel groups with very fungible resources. Rebel groups must use external troops to fight and military training to professionalize their troops and must do so in a timely manner (Sawyer, et al., 2015). Military resources such as arms are fungible to the extent that rebels invest in logistic capacity to trade them and

---

[18] The Hobbesian strand (Weinstein, 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006) connects higher rebel groups' abuse against civilians to the structure of rebel groups' organization, which is, in turn, determined by resource availability for recruiting soldiers at the onset of rebellion. Abuse of non-combatants is conceived as an accidental consequence of rebels' organizational strategy of appealing to short-term individual material benefits of – potential – recruits (Kalivas, 2007: 1146).

[19] The rational choice strand has an instrumental understanding of violence against civilians in its relationship with resource availability (Kalyvas, 1999; 2006; Hovin and Warker, 2005; Polo and Gleditsch, 2016; Stanton, 2013). In this view, targeting civilians is a coercive means for achieving various goals, such as, for example, compliance.

demand for them exists. On the contrary, transnational non-state actors' financial support such as funding and trading opportunities provide rebel groups with a very fungible resource. Contrary to transnational non-state actors' military support, financial support can be immediately invested, according to what rebels need the most.

For example, if rebel groups need to increase their fighting capability in the short term, they can invest transnational non-state actors' financial support in military resources. Salehyan et al. (2014: 636) observe that "[f]oreign financing can significantly and quickly augment an organization's capability". It is easier and more efficient for rebel groups to use this financial support to buy arms and recruit manpower and personnel domestically. In fact, international smuggling of arms, ammunition and equipment requires additional investment by rebel groups in logistic resources and resources needed to secure volatile international connections as well as the ability to exploit porous borders – if these exist at all – (Hazen, 2014: 54–55). Therefore, international smuggling of arms and people implies additional costs. As such, rebel groups have incentives to use transnational non-state actors' financial support domestically. In fact, arms, ammunition and other equipment can be pursued in the national black market, from national importers and manufacturers of weapons or even from opponent rebel groups within national boundaries.

In turn, rebel groups that do not need to increase their fighting capability in the short term are more likely to invest transnational non-state actors' financial support in order to maximize future returns in relative power. This long-term investment is likely to be aimed at reducing the volatility and uncertainty of resource availability for the group in the future. Thus, rather than investing in seeking additional external supporters, rebel groups seek to increase social and economic interdependency

between them and the local population. Sawyer et al. (2015: 10) observed that "[h]ighly fungible external support will not always lead to immediate or even medium-term increase in rebel power [over the state], it depends on how rebels invest it".

In summary, short- and long-term incentives to invest financial support domestically generate incentives to restrain the use of terrorist activities, because rebel groups became more dependent on the support of the population. In addition, recruiting from the local population increases rebels' social and cultural cohesion within the organization and between the organization and the population. In turn, enhanced cohesion between the rebels and the population improves rebels' organizational capacity to punish violence terrorist violence (see, e.g., Weinstein, 2007).

The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), for instance, received extensive financial support from international humanitarian NGOs and Eritrean diaspora groups from all over the world. In the contested areas, the EPLF was able to establish basic education and health care systems and integrated men and women from all the different ethnic groups into its structure, creating strong military and civilian institutions including mass organizations and an efficient secret police body (Cliffe and Davidson 1988; Connell 1997; Pateman 1990; Pool 2001). The reported use of terrorism by the EPLF is very limited: four terrorist attacks in total and just one civilian casualty.[20]

In contrast, rebel groups that receive transnational non-state actors' military support do not develop the same incentives and capacity to restrain the use of terrorist

[20] https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=2061&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

activities. In fact, transnational non-state actors' military support leaves rebel groups with only short-term prospects. On the one hand, rebel groups can invest transnational non-state actors' military resources directly in warfare, without the need to increase existing reliance on local populations. On the other, it is much harder to convert military resources into fungible assets or goods that can be invested to increase local populations' support and secure future, less volatile, resources.

It is generally argued that militarily stronger rebel groups use less coercive violence against civilians and target state coercive apparatuses instead (see, e.g., Kalyvas, 2006: 12). However, despite the fact that transnational non-state actors' military support may increase rebel groups' military capability in the face of opponent states, this kind of support might not generate the incentives to restrain the use of terrorist activities because terrorism might yet remain less militarily and politically costly than conventional and guerrilla violence (Wood, 2014).

Additionally, transnational non-state actors' military support might inhibit rebel groups' organizational capacity to refrain from the use of violence against civilians in anticipation of future rewards. In fact, external troops are likely to increase ethnic and social heterogeneity within rebel organizations and between rebels and the local population and diminish rebel groups' organizational cohesion and their capability to punish the bad behaviour of foot soldiers against civilians (Weinstein 2007).

For example, when the RUF initiated the war against Sierra Leone in 1991 it had neither a sufficient support network to ensure access to financial means nor sufficient military resources to fight a long war, because it expected a quick victory. Over the following years, the group's military capacity became increasingly dependent on the troops and artillery provided by Charles Taylor. RUF did not make a

significant effort to develop a sustainable and reliable local supply network and instead obtained basic goods and financing through looting the local population and confiscating and bartering agricultural goods (Hazen 2013, 76). Towards the end of the civil conflict, in 2000, 40 per cent of RUF killings consisted of terror-related civilian casualties.

H1. *Transnational non-state actors' military support increases the likelihood of rebel groups' terrorist activities.*

H2. *Transnational non-state actors' financial support decreases the likelihood of rebel groups' terrorist activities.*

Potential confounders

To assess accurately the effect of transnational non-state actor support on rebel groups' portfolio of violence, one needs to take into account why transnational non-state actors would support rebel groups and why rebel groups would seek external support in the first place. Transnational non-state actors' support to rebels may depend on rebels' ability to internationally signal commitment to the political cause despite their minor military capabilities. In this perspective, terrorist violence may serve the purpose of a signalling instrument, to attract and maintain the support of transnational non-state actors (Hovil and Warker, 2005; Kydd and Walter, 2006).

On the rebels' side, insurgents that cannot do well enough with their own internal resources might need to accept what they are offered transnationally, despite the costs in terms of loss of autonomy (Salehyan et al., 2015: 8). The compromise between increasing relative power and losing autonomy suggests that rebel groups

that rely on external patrons have a weak independent ability to target the government (Salehyan et al., 2015: 9). In turn, weak independent ability to target the government may imply more intensive use of asymmetric warfare such as terrorist violence in the first place.

As such, possible endogeneity biases the study towards finding higher terrorist activities with any type of transnational non-state actors' support to rebels. While this bias might affect the findings on transnational non-state actors' military support, which is expected to be positive, the bias goes in the opposite direction for my argument on the effect of transnational non-state actors' financial support. In fact, I expect the effect of financial support to affect negatively rebels' use of terrorist violence against civilians.

To mitigate endogeneity concerns, the empirical analysis models both types of external support lagged by one year. Additionally, I pay particular attention to any factor that might affect both the use of terrorism and rebel-bias support and whose omission could lead to spurious findings on the use of terrorist violence. The literature on terrorism violence and rebel-biased support suggests several potential confounders, which I discuss below.

First, it is necessary to test whether the effect of the type of support is independent from the effect of the sub-type of supporter. In fact, external rebel groups might have the ability to provide weapons, military trainings and military logistic support while diasporas might be more likely to provide financial resources and trade opportunities. In turn, diasporas might prefer to avoid civilian deaths while external rebel groups might have a preference for attacking civilians, affecting the tactical choice of the receiver rebel group accordingly. Support is not a gift and, typically, supporters have certain expectations about rebel groups' behavior.

A second obvious potential confounding variable is the military strength of rebel organizations compared to the relative opponent state military strength. Recent empirical works indicate that financial and military external support (by state actors, at least) is more likely to be offered to and accepted by moderately strong groups (Salehyan et al., 2011). On the other hand, militarily weak rebels are more likely to use terrorism in civil wars (Wood, 2010; Polo and Gleditsh, 2016).

Another possible confounder is rebel groups' territorial control. Rebels that are relatively weak compared to the government may control territory in remote regions where the government is relatively feeble and gain substantial local support in these peripheral areas. While territorial control may increase the cost of victimizing civilians using terrorist attacks, rebel groups with territorial control might be better able to obtain resources domestically, and prefer to do so in lieu of accepting external support, to minimize loss of autonomy (Salehyan et al., 2011).

State capacity is likely to affect rebel groups' opportunities to receive military and financial support from transnational non-state actors, as well as the availability of other resources, because stronger states are more likely better at controlling borders and the smuggling of arms and also more likely better at blocking transnational illegal currency transfer. State incapability of providing basic services may also increase grievances and affect the incentives to resort to terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Piazza, 2006).

Democratic states, with more legitimate institutions both domestically and internationally, may be less likely to fall victim to outside support for insurgent movements (Salehyan et al., 2011). Democratic institutions are also a favourable environment for the use of terrorist strategies because they provide political opportunities and resources incentivizing terrorism (Stanton, 2013; Eubank and

Weinberg, 1994; 1998; 2001; Schmid, 1992; Li, 2005; Piazza, 2006; Savun and Phillips, 2009).

States with a bigger population size experience more domestic terrorism because the implementation of effective security measure is more difficult and this makes the state vulnerable to terrorism (Savun and Philipps, 2009). Bigger populations might also be correlated with rebel groups' greater opportunities to obtain domestic resources and thus avoid accepting external military and financial support so as to minimize loss of autonomy.

Rebel groups with external state actors' support might be strong enough to accept additional transnational non-state support in order to minimize loss of autonomy. In turn, state support is likely to influence rebel groups' portfolio of killings. Finally, longer conflicts are usually associated with major use of asymmetric warfare activities such as terrorism. Lower duration might also be correlated to external support to rebel groups (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Collier et al., 2004b).

Research design and data

I test the hypotheses on a newly compiled dataset on annual rebel-government dyadic civil war observations in conflicts with at least 25 battle-related deaths. The rationality of choosing conflict-dyad as the unit of analysis reflects the focus on rebel groups as rational actors taking strategic decisions about tactics over the conflict. The dataset comprises 204 conflict-dyads from 1989 to 2009, for a total of 855 observations, and information on individual rebel groups' number of terrorist-related deaths, terrorist attacks, battle-related deaths, military capabilities, political

opportunities and different types of external supporters and support available to rebel groups.

To obtain the data, I merged the Terrorist Organizations v.2014 2.0 (TORG) crosswalk (Asal et al. 2014); the Global Terrorist Database (GTD) by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START 2015); the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset v1-2015 (Harbom et al., 2008); the Non-State Actor Data 3.4 (NSA) (Cunningham et al., 2012; 2013); the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset 0.4 (GED) (see Croicu and Sundberg, 2015; Sundberg and Melander, 2013); and the UCDP External Support Project – Primary Warring Party Dataset (Croicu et al., 2011).

The TORG (v.2014 2.0) comprises rebel organizations using terrorist attacks and identifiers found in the most recent versions of the GTD, UCPD Dyadic Dataset, etc. (Asal et al., 2015). It is important to notice that terrorist events with unknown perpetrators are dropped from the dataset. I obtain the measure for rebel groups' portfolio of killings using the proportion of the total number of terrorist-related civilian deaths and battle-related deaths by organization-year from the GTD and the GED respectively.

Measuring rebel groups' relative allocation of killings

To measure yearly allocation of terrorist killings and conventional killings by rebel groups, I consider the yearly proportion of the total number of terrorist-related deaths and the total number of battle-related deaths. To construct this measure, I build a yearly count by rebel groups of terrorism-related civilian casualties from the GTD and a yearly count of battle related-deaths from the GED.

My operationalization of terrorism relies on the GTD's three basic coding rules and three additional criteria (START, 2012, 6–7): 1) Attacks must be

intentional; 2) Attacks entail the use of violence or the threat of violence; 3) Perpetrators are non-state actors; 4) Attacks must be aimed at political, economic or social goals (the exclusive pursuit of economic profit does not satisfy this criterion); 5) Attacks must have intention to coerce, intimidate or transmit same message to a larger audience then the immediate victims; 6) Attacks must violate international humanitarian law's prohibition on targeting civilians or non-combatants. To avoid the potential overlap between deaths coded in GTD and in GED, I exclude from GTD all attacks that target coercive apparatuses such as militaries and police.

In operationalizing rebel groups' battle-related deaths, I aggregated yearly episodes of only state–rebel lethal violent incidents that resulted in at least one direct death in conventional military battles (Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). In fact, the scope of the theory applies to cases of rebels' conventional warfare against the state and not necessarily conflict between hostile rebel groups or one-sided violence by the state against civilians. Using the total number of rebel groups' battle-related deaths to capture rebel groups' rationale choice of targeting state coercive apparatuses implies rebel groups' capacity of avoiding this kind of armed violence via terrain concealment or dispersion.

The items named *rebel groups' portfolio of killings* is a proportion ranging from 0 to 1. Figure 1 (below) shows the distribution of *rebel groups' portfolio of killings*. Looking at Figure 1, it emerges that the number of terrorism-related deaths exceeds the number or battle-related deaths in 24.87% of the observations. Additionally, 58.68% of the observations correspond to years in which rebel groups killed exclusively combatants in conventional military battles, while 2.07% of the observations correspond to rebel groups with only civilians' terror-related casualties in a given year.

Figure 1: Rebel groups' allocation of violent-tactics-related-deaths, by year



Explanatory variables

To obtain data on transnational non-state actors' military and financial support to rebel groups, I coded the information contained in the variables 'external_type_text' and 'external_code' from the UCDP External Support Project – Primary Warring Party Dataset (Croicu et al., 2011). The variable 'external_type_text' contains a description of the types of support provided by an external supporter, while the variable 'external_code' expresses the type of support offered by an external supporter as a regular expression with each type of support expressed by a literal identifier (ibid.: 16–17).

Non-state actors are defined as those transnational actors that are not identifiable with the government of a country. These include transnational non-state

organizations such as non-state rebel groups, diaspora groups (including NGOs), political parties and private companies or individuals. I coded 'transnational non-state actors' military support' as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when I found evidence of the existence of transnational non-state actors providing support to a rebel group in terms of troops as second warring party, direct recruitment opportunity, joint operations, weapons and logistic support or training and expertise; 0 otherwise. I coded 'transnational non-state actors' financial support' as a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 when I find evidence of the existence of transnational non-state actors providing support to a rebel group in terms of trading opportunity, funding and economic support.

For example, I coded an instance of transnational non-state actor military support for the Naxalite People's War Group (PWG vs India) in 1992. In this case the variable 'external_type_text' codes: "The PWG (…) had links with the Tamil separatist group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and (…) the latter provided them with the equipment used by PWG for detonating explosives" and the variable 'external_code' codes: "LTTE: W [weapons] M [material/logistics]". I coded an instance of transnational non-state actors' financial support for the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK vs Turkey) in 1991. In this case, the variable 'external_codes' codes: "(…) Kurdish Diaspora: $ [money]". I included support that is alleged only if there is a clear indication of its kind and the supplier complies with the definition of transnational non-state actor presented above.

I used the External Support Primary Warring Party Dataset (Croicu et al., 2011) because its object of analysis is the primary yearly warring party, i.e., each side active (involved in fighting) in each conflict-dyad, for each year when the conflict was active. Thus, this dataset is best suited for analysis from the perspective of the

receiver of support. The External Support Primary Warring Party Dataset is also more compact than the External Support Disaggregated/Supporter Dataset – its analogous dataset containing identical data but using as the object of analysis the external supporter for each individual side supported – and thus "more appropriate for manual consultation" (ibid.: 4).

The final dataset contains 565 dyad-year observations, of which 80% do not contain transnational non-state actor military support; conversely, in about 20% of the data, rebel groups received such military support. Transnational non-state actor military support varies over time for almost 14% of rebel groups. In about 6% of the cases, rebel groups shift from not receiving transnational non-state actors' military support to receiving such support the following year. On the other hand, in almost 13% of the cases, rebel groups receiving transnational non-state actors' military support stop receiving it the following year (see Appendix, Variability Main Explanatory Variables, Tables 1 and 2).

The dataset also contains 565 dyad-year observations of which 80.71% do not contain transnational non-state actor financial support, while in 19.29% of the observations rebel groups appear to receive such financial support. Transnational non-state actors' financial support varies over time for almost 10% of the rebel groups. In 3% of the cases, rebel groups that do not receive transnational non-state actors' financial support start receiving such support the following year; and in almost 15% of the cases, rebel groups receiving transnational non-state actors' financial support stop receiving it in the following year (see Appendix, Variability Main Explanatory Variables, Tables 3 and 4).

I also test the hypotheses using two alternative measures of transnational non-state actors' military and financial support for rebel groups, which I extract from the

Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham et al. 2013). However, I use the self-coded measures from UCDP external support as the main dependent variables because both measures of transnational non-state actors' military and financial support extracted from the NSA appear to be extremely less variable over time and within groups (see Appendix Variability NSA measures, Tables 5–8).

Control variables

Following the discussion on possible confounders, I include in the empirical analysis the following control variables (see Appendix, Table 9, for 'Summary Descriptive Statistics', Table IXa shows that multicollinearity does not constitute a problem and, Table IXb shows that there is little overlap between cases of external non-states' financial and military support).

- A measure of *Military strength* I use the variable 'rebstrength' from the NSA to extract information on the rebel groups' military capacity with respect to the opponent state. Military strength is a dichotomous item taking the value of 1 when rebel groups are militarily 'weaker' or 'much weaker' than the state.
- A dichotomous measure of rebel groups' '*Territorial control'* extracting information from the variable 'terrcont' in NSA. '*Territorial control'* is equal to 1 when rebel groups control territory and equal to 0 otherwise.
- A measure of *State capacity* including in the models a measure of the country's logged GDP per capita, using data from Gleditsch (2002).
- A measure *Regime Type* in the previous year via a positive converted *polity2* score from the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2014).
- A measure of *Total population* (logged), from Gleditsch (2002).

- A measure of *Conflict duration*, obtained by generating a count of ongoing conflict years
- Measures of financial and military support by diasporas, rebel group, and states. These measures are obtained by coding information contained in the variable *external_type_text* from the UCDP External Support Project – Primary Warring Party Dataset (Croicu et al., 2011).

Empirical analysis

With the dependent variables ranging from 0 to 1 (proportion of terror-related deaths and battle-related deaths), I estimate the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) model for fractional response variables, i.e., a generalized linear model with a logistic link. I do not use a beta link because it is incapable of accounting for the zeros that represent 60% of the observations in the outcome variable. I cluster standard errors by conflict-dyad, since the variance may differ systematically across pairs of warring parties.

I also include a count of years since highly intensive use of terrorist attacks (years in which the number of terrorist attacks is twice the average), together with its cubic polynomial. The inclusion of these items accounts for time dependence in the occurrence of intense use of terrorism. In fact, high intensity terrorist attacks are likely to recur when there is a recent history of intensive use of terrorism, because it is likely to depend on rebels' organizational age and dimension (Clauset and Gleditsch, 2012; Carter and Signorino, 2010).

Table 1 presents three model specifications accounting for rebel groups' portfolio of killings. Model 1 includes the main explanatory variables and the basic control variables; Model 2 accounts for the effect of external state financial and military support; while Model 3 adds financial and military support by type of

transnational non-state actor. 189 data points in Model 1 and 205 data points in Models 2 and 3 drop out due to the inclusion of many lagged variables. The empirical findings in these models provide evidence supporting both hypotheses. The results for the main explanatory variables and the control variables remain virtually unchanged when the models are computed clustering standard errors by conflict (Appendix, Table 10). The main findings also remain consistent when including separately the main independent variables in each of the models in Table 1 (Appendix, Tables 11–12).

Table 1 Effect of transnational non-state actors' military and financial support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Portfolio of killings	Portfolio of killings	Portfolio of killings
Transnational non-state military support (lag)	0.481** (0.239)	0.573** (0.258)	0.863* (0.451)
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)	-0.767*** (0.297)	-0.709** (0.329)	-1.063** (0.502)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-0.120 (0.502)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-1.257 (0.793)
Rebel group military support (lag)			-0.568 (0.413)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			1.181** (0.495)
State military support (lag)		0.043 (0.234)	0.038 (0.255)
State financial support (lag)		0.309 (0.359)	0.202 (0.362)
Territorial Control	-0.102 (0.266)	-0.096 (0.275)	-0.148 (0.290)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.033 (0.523)	-0.155 (0.514)	-0.185 (0.516)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.105 (0.181)	-0.096 (0.180)	-0.012 (0.184)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.272** (0.115)	0.239** (0.109)	0.251** (0.103)
Total population (log)	-0.133 (0.147)	-0.0991 (0.152)	-0.0926(0.154)
Regime Type (lag)	0.000 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.0160)
Constant	-2.590** (1.023)	-2.667** (1.093)	-2.805** (1.192)
Observations	376	360	360

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on conflict dyad in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

The full model (3) shows that rebel groups receiving transnational non-state actors' military support are significantly correlated with the likelihood to kill more civilians than combatants at a significance level of 0.01. It also emerges that rebel

groups with transnational non-state actors' financial support are significantly more likely to kill less civilians than combatants at a significance levels of 0.05. Table 2 displays the predicted probabilities of rebel groups' portfolio of killings for all covariates in Models 3, Table 1. It emerges that transnational non-state actors' military support increases the probability that rebel groups adopt a portfolio of killings with more civilians' deaths than battle-related deaths by 12% keeping all the other variables at their means. By contrast, transnational non-state actors' financial support increases the probability that rebel groups adopt a portfolio of killings with more battle-related deaths than civilians' terrorism-related deaths by 15% keeping all the other variables at their means.

Table 1: Marginal effects transnational non-state actors' military and financial support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings Model 3

	(1)
VARIABLES	Marginal effects model 3
Transnational non-state military support (lag)	0.123** (0.060)
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)	-0.152** (0.073)
Diaspora financial support (lag)	-0.017 (0.071)
Diaspora military support (lag)	-0.179* (0.108)
Rebel group military support (lag)	-0.081 (0.057)
Rebel group financial support (lag)	0.168** (0.071)
State military support (lag)	0.005 (0.036)
State financial support (lag)	0.028 (0.051)
Territorial Control	-0.021 (0.041)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.026 (0.073)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.001 (0.026)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.035*** (0.013)
Total population (log)	-0.013 (0.021)
Regime Type (lag)	-0.000 (0.002)
Observations	360

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on conflict dyad in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Model 3 also shows that rebel groups' financial support is correlated with a higher likelihood of terror-related deaths over battle-related deaths at levels of 0.05.

This provides some evidence that type of supporter might influence the choice of targeting civilians with terrorist violence, at least in the case that the supporter is a rebel group. As explained above, however, the overall independent effect of financial support on the portfolio of killings remains consistent. Additionally, from Table 1 it emerges that higher GDP per capita significantly increases the likelihood that there will be more civilian killings than combatants at levels of 0.05 across all models. These might indicate that states with higher capacity better retain population support decreasing rebel groups' cost of targeting hostile civilians. Interestingly, when accounting for non-state actors support without distinguishing between military and financial, the variable does not bear a significant effect (Appendix XIIa).

As a further robustness check, I reproduce the analysis in Table 1 using alternative OLS models (Appendix, Tables 13–14). I use OLS functional form as a robustness check because, despite being able to account for the outcomes' continuous values, it is unable to restrict the estimates from 0 to 1. The findings of the OLS models remain consistent when clustering standard errors by dyads and conflict when including each independent variable individually and when substituting time control with the lagged count of terrorist-related deaths (Appendix, Tables 13–17).

As final robustness check, I test the hypotheses against alternative measures of transnational non-state actors' financial and military support extracted from NSA (see 'Dependent Variables'). I estimate the full GLM models with logistic link function also with these data and cluster standard errors by dyad and conflict (Appendix, Table 18). The numbers of observations in these models increase because the dataset gains an additional year (2010) and because there are fewer missing values in the measures of transnational non-state actors' military and transnational non-state actors' financial support. NSA provides information on type of state support (*rtypesup*) but does not

provide information on the type of transitional supporters (for details, see Appendix, Table 21 'Summary Descriptive for NSA Indicators). Table 18 (Appendix), however, provides further evidence that rebel groups that receive transnational non-state actors' military support are significantly correlated with the likelihood to kill more civilians than combatants. The findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that rebel groups with transnational non-state actors' financial support are significantly more likely to kill less civilians than combatants.

In summary, the effects of the covariates of interest do not change depending on control variables, model specification, alternative functional form and alternative measures. I find robust evidence that different types of transnational non-state actors support, i.e. financial and military support, affect rebel groups' incentives to refrain from using terrorism in civil war differently.

Conclusion

The study develops a series of propositions to explain rebel groups' relative allocation of terrorist violence against civilians and conventional armed violence against the military (rebel groups' portfolio of killings). This is viewed as a function of how rebel-group-biased transnational non-state actors' financial and military support modifies rebel groups' dependence on the local population. Unlike direct conventional strategies, which involve the use of forces trained and equipped to fight as organized units against other similarly trained and equipped forces, terrorist actions allow rebels to avoid direct retaliation and work with small, poorly trained units and light arms. However, under specific circumstances, the costs of alienating potential supporters and sympathizers with terrorist civilian victimization may offset the tactical advantages of terrorism in civil war.

Transnational non-state actors' financial support and military support alter rebel groups' dependency on local population, ultimately modifying their incentives to use or restrain the use of terrorist violence against civilians depending on the fungibility of these resources. Rebel groups have incentives to invest transnational non-state actors financial support domestically. This is because it is more efficient in the short term and secures less volatile future resources. In turn, domestic investments increase rebel groups' dependency on local populations and the cohesion of rebel organizations, generating incentives and capability to restrain the use of terrorism. On the contrary, rebel groups' that receive transnational non-state actors' military support do not develop the same incentives and capacity to restrain the use of terrorist violence. In fact, military support is efficiently used in warfare without the need to increase existing reliance on local populations and it is much harder to convert military resources into fungible assets that can be invested to secure less volatile future returns from the population.

Empirical studies on rebel groups' rationale for choosing terrorist tactics in civil war have considered only the simple total of terrorism-related deaths, without considering the relative frequency of terrorist and conventional deaths. This makes it difficult to distinguish whether more terrorist violence is a tactical choice or simply a function of greater rebel activity in general. This study models rebel groups' portfolio of killings as a proportion of terror-related deaths and battle-related deaths.

My empirical findings support the theoretical claims, providing evidence that rebel groups receiving transnational non-state actors' military support are significantly correlated with the likelihood of killing more civilians than combatants. The empirics also show robust evidence that rebel groups with transnational non-state

actors' financial support are significantly more likely to kill fewer civilians than combatants.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the effect of non-state actors' external support on rebels' choice of tactical killings and by disaggregating the effects of different types of rebel-biased support by transnational non-state actors on the portfolio of killings. The studies model rebel groups actual relative allocation of conventional and terrorist violence and present newly crafted data on rebel groups' portfolios of killings and violence and rebel-biased support, disaggregated by type of support and type of supporter, in 204 conflict-dyads from 1989 to 2009.

References

Asal V., Cousins, K., and Gleditsch, K. S. (2014). Making Ends Meet: Combining Organizational Data in Contentious Politics. *Journal of Peace Research 52*(1): 134–138.

Balch-Lindsay, D,, and Enterline, A. (2000). Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992. *International Studies Quarterly 44*(4): 615–642.Beardsley, K. Gleditsch, K. S. and Lo, N. (2015). Roving Bandits? Geographical Evolution of African Armed Conflicts. *International Studies Quarterly 59*: 503–516.

Beckett, I. F.W. (2001). *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1970*. London: Routledge.

Biddle, S., and Freidman, J. A. (2008). *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.

Bray, J., Lunde, L., and Murshed, M. S. (2003). Nepal: Economic Drivers of the Maoist Insurgency. In *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond Greed and Grievances*. Kare Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds). Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Buhaug, H., Gates, S., and Lujala, P. (2009). Geography, Rebel Capacity and the Duration of Civil Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 54*(4): 544–569

Burgoon, B. (2006). On Welfare and Terror. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 50*(2)176–203.

Carter, B. D., and Curtis, S. S.(2010). Back to the Future: Modelling Time Dependence in Binary Data. *Political Analysis 18*(3), 271–292.

Clauset, A. and Gleditsch, K. S. (2012). The Developmental Dynamics of Terrorist Organizations. *PLoS One 7*(11): e48633. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048633

Clauset, Aron and Gleditsch, K. S. Trends in Conflict: What Do We Know and What Can We Know? (forthcoming).

Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2004a). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers 56*(4) 563–95.

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., and Soderbom, M. (2004b). On the Duration of Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research 41*(3): 253–73.

Chenoweth, E. (2010). Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity. *Journal of Politics 72*(1): 16–30.

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics 13*(4): 379–399.

Croicu, M., and Sundberg, R. (2015). UCDP GED Codebook version 4.0. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

Cunningham, D. E., Gleditsch, K. S., and Salehyan, I. (2009). It Takes Two. A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 53*(4): 570–597.

Cunningham, D. E., and Gleditsch, K. S. (2012). Codebook for the Non-State Actor Data. Available at: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_codebook.pdf.

Cunningham D. E., Gleditcsh, K. S. and Salehyan, I. (2013). Non-State Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science 30*(5): 515–531.

De Mesquita, Bueno E. and Dickson, S. E. (2007). The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Mobilization. *American Journal of Political Science 51*(2): 364–381.

De Mesquita, Bueno E. (2013) Rebel Tactics. *Journal of Political Economy 21*(2): 323–357.

Dube, O., and Naidu, S. (2015). Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia. *Journal of Politics 77*(1): 249–267.

Eubank, L. W., and Weinberg L. (1994). Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism? *Terrorism and Political Violence 6*(4): 417–463.

Eubank, W., and Weinberg, L. (1998). Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose. *Terrorism and Political Violence 10*(1): 108–118.

Eubank, W., and Weinberg, L. (2001). Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims. *Terrorism and Political Violence 13*(1): 155–164.

Findley, Michael G. and Young, Joseph K. (2012) Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem. *Perspectives on Politics 10*(2): 285–305

Gates, S. (2002). Recruitment and Allegiance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 46* (1): 111–130.

Gleditsch, K. S. (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 46* (5), 712–724.

Gunaratna, R. (2001). Terrorism and Small Arms and Light Weapons. Symposium on Terrorism and Disarmament. Retrieved from: http://archive2.grip.org/bdg/pdf/g3062.pdf.

Hazen, J. M. (2013). *What Rebels Want. Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, NY and London, Cornell University Press.

Harbom, L., Melander, E., and Wallensteen, P. (2008). Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946–2007. *Journal of Peace Research 45*(5): 697–710.

Hovil, L. and Werker, E. (2005). Portrait of a Failed Rebellion. An Account of Rational Sub-optimal Violence in Western Uganda. *Rationality and Society 17*(1) 5–34.

Hultquist, P. (2013). Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War Settlement. *Journal of Peace Research 50*(5): 623–634.

Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J. M. (2006). Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science 100*(3): 429–447.

Kalyvas, S. N. (1999). Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria. *Rationality and Society 11*(3): 243–285.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2003). The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War. *Journal of Ethics*. Retrieved at http://stathis.research.yale.edu/files/Paradox.pdf.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge University Press. *Comparative Political Studies 40*(9): 1146–1151.

Kydd, H. A., and Walter, B. F. (2006). Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security 31*(1): 49–80.

Lake, D. A (2003). International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices. *International Studies Review 5*(4): 81–89.

Li, Q. (2005). Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution 49*(2): 278–297.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1995. The Rebel's Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Marshall, G. M., Gurr, T. R. and Jaggers, K., (2014). Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013. Version: p4v2014

McCarthy, John, and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. American Journal of Sociology 82 (6):1212–41.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2015). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *American Political Science Review 87*(3): 567–576.

Papke, L. E. and Wooldridge, J. M. (1996). Econometric Methods for Fractional Response Variables with an Application to 401(K) Plan Participation Rates. *Journal of Applied Econometrics 11*(6): 619–632.

Piazza, J. A. (2006). Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages. *Terrorism and Political Violence 18*(1): 159–77.

Piazza, J. A., and Walsh, J. I. (2010). Physical Integrity Rights and Terrorism. *Political Science and Politics 43*(3): 411–414.

Polo, S., and Gleditsch, K. S. (2016). Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research 53*(6): 815–829.

Record, J. (2007). *Beating Goliath. Why Insurgencies Win*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books.

Ree, J., and Nillensen, E. (2009). Aiding Violence Or Peace? The Impact of Foreign Aid on the Risk Of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Development Economics 88* (2) 301–313.

Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K. S., and Cunningham, D. E. (2011). Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. *International Organization 65*(4): 709–744.

Salehyan, I., Siroky, D., and Wood, R. M. (2014). External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of War Atrocities. *International Organizations 68* (Summer): 633–661.

Salehyan, I Gleditsch, K. S. and Cunningham D. E. (2015). Transitional Linkages and Civil War Interactions. Working paper, retrieved at: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/dscw2007/Gleditsch.pdf.

Sánchez-Cuenca, I., and de la Calle, L. (2009). Domestic Terrorism: the Hidden Side of Political Violence. *Annual Review of Political Science 12* (June): 31–49.

Savun, B., and Phillips, B. (2009). Democracy, Foreign Policy and Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(*6): 878–904.

Sawyer, K., Cunningham, K. G., and Reed, W. (2015) The Role of External Support in Civil War Termination. Working Paper, retrieved at: http://www.kathleengallaghercunningham.com/uploads/4/5/5/8/45589607/jcr_finalversion_wnames.pdf.

Schelling, C. T. (1966). *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Schmid, A. P (1992). Terrorism and Democracy. *Terrorism and Political Violence 4*(4): 14–25.

Stanton, J. A. (2013). Terrorism in the Context of Civil War. *Journal of Politics 75*(4): 1009–1002.

Sundberg, R., and Melander, E. (2013). Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research 50*(4): 523–532.

Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Weinstein, J. M. (2007). *Inside Rebellion. The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wood, R. M. (2010). Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians. *The Journal of Peace Research 47*(5): 601–614.

Wood, R. M. (2014). Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War. *Conflict Management and Peace Science 31*(5): 461–480.

Wood, E. J. (2003). *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Conclusion

Contribution, findings and policy implications

This dissertation began with a set of questions. First, it asked what motivates organizations participating in mass dissident campaigns to go underground and to start terrorist campaigns. Second it asked whether the occurrence of terrorist attacks perpetrated by radical groups have an effect on the outcomes of non-violent mass civil resistance movements and under what conditions the occurrence of terrorist attacks are more likely to help the movements goals. Lastly it aims at explaining how external non-state actors financial and military support affect rebel groups' strategic choice of killings in civil war. To address these questions, the use of terrorist tactics has been disaggregated beyond conventional country-level analyses: the data on terrorism was associated in various ways with dissident organizations participating in sustained mass contentious behaviours against the state and sharing the mass dissident campaign broad political goals.

The first paper has applied an actor-oriented approach and has investigated the strategic constraints on mass dissident tactics leading the onset of terrorist campaigns. Using newly coded data identifying terrorist attacks carried out in 189 mass dissident campaigns between 1948 and 2006, this study shows that repression against mass dissent is correlated with a higher likelihood of terrorism onset. Moreover, the longer mass dissident campaigns last, the higher the likelihood of terrorism. These findings are consistent with the idea that dissident groups more likely to resort to terrorism where legal expression of political opposition is blocked and more direct methods of contention are too risky to be pursued or perceived as ineffective. The first paper suggests that to avoid the emergence of terrorist campaigns, governments should

decrease the length of the mass resistance with means that are different from repression.

The second paper has focused on the political outcomes of mass civil resistance campaigns when violent groups sharing the political goals of the moderate organizations in the mass movement engage in terrorist activities. This paper aims at overcoming the theoretical and empirical shortcomings that might be at the base of these inconsistent findings in the existing literature on the effect of radical flanks. The empirical analysis show that terrorist tactics by violent segments are likely to favor the mainstream mass nonviolent resistance campaigns by encouraging the state to provide major political concessions to moderate groups when the civil resistance campaign has a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership. The second paper indicates that governments that wants to avoid the outbreak of civil wars, should provide spaces for mass civil resistance campaign to develop an effective organization with central leadership and a hierarchical structure.

The third paper explores the role of financial and military support to rebel groups by external non-state actors as determinants of rebel groups' portfolio of killings. The empirical findings provide evidences that rebel groups receiving military support from transnational non-state actors are significantly more likely to kill more civilians than combatants. Additionally, the empirics provide evidences that rebel groups with transnational non-state actors financial support are significantly more likely to kill less civilians than combatants. The findings of this paper suggest that in situations in which rebels receive extensive military support from external non-state actors the government involved in the conflict should invest particularly in the protection of civilians. On the contrary, in situations in which rebels receive financial support from external non-state actors the government involved in the conflict should

invest in its militaries and in winning the heart of the population in the contested areas.

What we learn and implication for future research

While the vast majority of existing studies on terrorism focus on structural factors as determinants of terrorist tactics this dissertation have focused on the effect that more dynamic relational factors characterizing organizations in conflict bear on the choice of terrorism. These factors are dynamic because they are inherently connected to the ever changing strategic environments in which dissident organizations operate. From this perspective to understand the logic terrorism in conflict it is necessary to compare terrorist attacks with other dissident tactics that are available to dissident organizations. Therefore, this dissertation has shown that organizational factors connected to conflict dynamics need to be taken into account when exploring tactical choices. This dissertation suggests a number of relevant extensions and topics for future investigations. The first paper in this dissertation have focused on the constraints on mass dissent that motivate dissident groups to initiate dissident campaigns. However, less time variant campaign characteristics might also bear an important overall effect on the likelihood that certain participant groups will recur to terrorist tactics over their struggle. For example, more research could be done to investigate the role that nature of the groups, and the ideology and goals of dissident campaigns play with respect to the likelihood of terrorism onset. Systematic work on the effect of ideology and goals on terrorist tactics has so far been limited to civil wars contexts and terrorism intensity. Future research may also focus on the emergence of more spontaneous and less organized types of dissident activities, such

as riots and mobs. Additionally, available data on participation in mass civil resistance and in civil wars are rather aggregated across dissident campaigns and less aggregated data at an event-level of analysis might capture enough variation to unpack the effect of participation the choice of terrorist tactics. The second paper have found that mass civil resistance campaigns with hierarchical structure and centralized leadership more likely achieve political progress towards their desired outcome when violent flanks with the same broad political goal perpetrate terrorist attacks. This is because the state hope to legitimize non-violent vs. violent methods and because mass civil resistance campaigns with hierarchical structure and centralized leadership are seen as capable to control the contentious behavior of their social base and stop massive the shift of participants towards more violent tactics. This paper introduces new data on the occurrence of terrorist attacks perpetrated by dissident organizations which share the mass civil resistance campaign broad political goal. To shed additional light on the validity of the theoretical argument future research efforts would benefit from new data that capture the actual relationship between the dissident groups that use terrorism and the mass dissident campaign. In fact, recent work on self-determination insurgents movements (Cunningham, 2011; 2013) have shown that dissident organizations within the same rebel movement are often internally divided and fragmented. In turn, the internal anatomy of rebel movements affects their ability to bargaining with the government and obtain concession. It is possible that the shape of the relationship between actors within the same mass civil resistance campaign bear an effect on their ability to reach their desired political goal. The third paper in this dissertation focuses on the effect of

external non state actors on the repertoire of tactics that rebel groups adopts in civil war. This paper provides the first attempt to model statistically rebel organizations' complementary use of violent tactics observed in civil wars. This allow to test the hypothesis on the full portfolio of killings and therefore help devising strategic choices rather than periods of highbred general violence. Future research may explore the likelihood of determinate peace agreement provision depending on rebel groups' different portfolio of violence. Additionally, an extension of this particular approach could interest the study of which combination of nonviolent tactics make dissident groups in civil resistance more likely to succeed. With more fine-grained and disaggregated data on organizations and tactics in nonviolent movements future studies could better investigate the role of conflict dynamics and international factors on the outcomes of these campaigns.

In general, this dissertation has disaggregated non only actors within the same conflict but also actions and it has shown that integrating different type of contentious political behaviors and considering the full portfolio of contentious activities across different organizations allows a more comprehensive understanding of how non-state actors choose from a vast set of strategies and tactics and how the combination of these tactical choices affects dissident political outcomes.

Going underground:

Resort to terrorism in mass mobilization dissident campaigns

Online appendix

This appendix provides additional evidence, analyses and robustness checks to complement the results presented.

Terrorist attacks identification strategy

When perpetrators are known, I engaged in in-depth case research using scholarly literature and news media reports from Lexis Nexis to verify that organizations that chose terrorism participated in mass dissent. Participation in mass civil resistance is established when (1) groups helped to coordinate the emergence of nonviolent mass movements and/or (2) took part in the broader coalition that waged mass civil unrest. When the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are unknown, I engaged in in-depth case-by-case research using the GTD advanced online research tool. I also used news media reports from Lexis Nexis to verify that attacks target the political opposition to civil resistance campaigns. In 2005, for example, nonviolent mass dissent was waged against Hezbollah's Syrian-friendly government (Cedar Revolution). Terrorist attacks that targeted Hezbollah officials, pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians, and Syrian citizens in Lebanon provide evidence that actors who share the broad political goals of the civil resistance engaged in terrorism, even if the name of the perpetrator's group is unknown. Table I below follows the panel data structure of NAVCO and presents the cases in which participants in mass nonviolent dissident campaigns engaged in terrorist attacks. Three terrorist attacks within a year in the absence of civil wars are

the threshold for inclusion because in the absence of civil war three terrorist attacks can be considered a relevant threat to domestic stability. The column 'Country' reports the state where the mass civil resistance took place. The column 'Campaign' presents evidence that the groups or actors involved in terrorist attacks participated in mass dissent and/or shared the civil resistance campaign broad political goal. The column 'Year' reports the year of nonviolent mass dissent when terrorism occurred. Finally, the column 'Terrorist Attacks' reports a summary for each terrorist attack by known and unknown perpetrators.

Table I. Extended list of nonviolent mass dissident campaigns (ONLY) - year and terrorism

Country	Campaign	Year	Terrorist attacks	
			GTD In parentheses GTD id code	Nexis and other sources
Algeria	Islamic salvation front (FIS). Campaign against military and government. Although the Islamist movement was clearly resurgent during the 1980s in Algeria, it was not associated with terrorism and political violence. In April 1991, the Algerian government passed an electoral law to counter the FIS, favouring the rural constituency where the government was stronger. FIS called for mass demonstrations and a general strike in May. After	1992	-Islamic Salvation Front bombed the Justice Ministry (199201310003) -Muslim Fundamentalist assassinated the Ministry of Justice (199203170002) - Islamic Salvation Front bombed University in Setif (199205050007)	

	being faced with harsh repression that caused 20 deaths on the 4th of June, the FIS leadership exhorted their supporters to refrain from violence and it did not break communications with the government (Hafez, 2003: 39-40). In January 1992, a military coup annulled the FIS parliamentary victory. The military began a wave of mass violence and job dismissal. A minority of activists who were disappointed with the failure of nonviolent mass dissident activities to produce the desired goal shifted from the civil resistance campaigns' mainstream collective actors towards small armed groups that were developing independently of the more moderate organizations (Dalacoura, 2011).			
Timor Leste / Indonesia	Campaign for the independence from Indonesia. In June 1998, as Suharto's successor -interim President Habibie- rejected the demand of the civil resistance to hold a referendum on independence, mass demonstrations intensified and with them disillusion on nonviolent contentious political activities (International Associated Press, 1998a). In November 1998, in a telephone interview the Timor Socialist Party, a pro-independence Timorese	1998	-The Ninjas Timorese resistance group (199802100003)	-Timor Socialist Party (International Associated Press, 1998 November 5; 1998 November 6) -Rebels shoot East Timor teacher dead in front of student (Agence France Presse, 1998 December 2)

	clandestine group, threatened the use of terrorist attacks: 'We have the right to find ways of pressuring Indonesia' (International Associated Press, 1998b; 1998c). In December 1998, terrorism is ultimately employed. The target, an East Timorese elementary school teacher, was shot dead by a flank of the pro-independence resistance while teaching his sixth grade students because of his 'frequent contact' with the local members of the Indonesian security forces (Press, 1998).			
Timor Leste/ Indonesia	Campaign for the independence from Indonesia.	1999	-Hilario Gustavo, a resident of Caiceli, Darulete, was kidnapped and then stabbed to death in Manufatia, East Timor, Indonesia. Police suspected that the attack was perpetrated by a pro-independence group because Gustavo was a member of Besi Merah Putih, a pro-Indonesia militia group (199906170004) -A public bus traveling from Banda Aceh to Medan was ambushed by unidentified assailants and set on fire in Dili, East Timor, Indonesia, after all the passengers were forced off the vehicle. There were no casualties, but the bus was badly damaged. (199907170005)	-Est Timor Rebels (International Associated Press, 1999)
Indonesia	Anti-Suharto. Against the Suharto regime. During the rise of the mass	1998		- Muslim youths group burned a church (Jatmiko, 1998) -Muslim youths

	nonviolent dissident campaign against Suharto in Indonesia, the military was deployed in the streets to suppress Muslim students' non-violent marches and demonstrations (Rousseau, 1998). As street violence escalated to riots and mobs, a series of more organized terrorist attacks emerged in the Central Java region. These were perpetrated by Muslim students against ethnically Chinese Indonesians, blamed for the economic situation, (Drogan, 1998; Ngo, 1999; Azzoni, 1999).			group hijack ethnic Chinese (Grant, 1998) -Muslim youth attack ethnic Chinese (Torchia, 1998)
Lebanon	Cedar revolution. Campaign Against Syrian forces and Hezbollah Syrian-friendly government. Violent fringe groups engaged in terrorist attacks during the Lebanese Cedar Revolution during the last phases of the nonviolent campaign. Particularly, just before the last round of presidential election (20 June 2005). The first anti-Syrian terrorist attack occurred (12 July 2005). A car bomb detonated in a failed assassination of the pro-Syrian Lebanese Defense Minister, Elias Murr (Washington Post, 2005 July 13)	2005	-Unknown perpetrator bombed the car of an Hezbollah official (200512090004) -Unknown perpetrator bombed the car of pro-Syrian Lebanese Defence Minister, Elias Murr (200507120006) -Unknown perpetrator through a stick of dynamite at a parked car belonging to Syrian citizen (200602110001)	
Madagascar	Active forces. Campaign against military regime In 1991 the principal Madagascan opposition parties united under the	1992	-Unknown perpetrators exploded bomb at the Residence, Political Bureau of Paul Rabemanjara which held several government posts with Ratsiraka- and its political Bureau, played an	-Alleged extremist faction of the opposition Forces Vives occupy a radio station (United Press

	Umbrella of 'Lifeblood Coalition' and coordinated nonviolent campaign activities against the Madagascan military regime. Initially, the mass dissident campaign involved mainly non-violent methods and neither side appeared to want an escalation of violence (Xinhua General News, 1991; Press, 1991a). However, in August 1991 the presidential guard fired on the demonstrators causing several deaths and injuries (Press, 1991b). Government violence gradually radicalised long-standing participants (Press, 1991c). The first organized terrorist attack against the government occurred on the 30th January 1992. A grenade was exploded against the Congress of Malagasy Independence in Antanarivo (the capital of Madagascar), in an attempt to target the residence and political Bureau of the Paul Rabemanjara.		influential role on the government political decision (199201300012) -Unknown Firemen shout at the high constitutional court (199208310007)	International 1992a)
Mexico	Anti-PRI. Campaign against Regime. The popular revolutionary army was the armed wing of the Party of the Poor also known as the Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union of the People Party. The latter was affiliated to the Popular Democratic Revolutionary Party. These supported the candidacy of Cárdenas against PRI (Chicago Tribune, 1996)	1990	-Revolutionary worker clandestine Union of People Party assassinated security guards of 'La Jornada' Newspaper. (199004020008) -Poor People Party bombed car. (199006180009) -Democratic Revolutionary Party kidnapped Mayor-elect Jorge Alberto Villegas from the PRI. (199001020003)	
Mexico	Anti-PRI.	1991	- Revolutionary Worker	

			Clandestine Union of People Party bombed Citibank. (199108110002) -Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union of People Party bombed retail store. (199108150012) -Movement for Triqui Unification and Struggle assassinated 4 members of the PRI. (19911180003)	
Mexico	Anti-PRI. The National Action Party was part of the Pri opposition movement (CRS Reports, 2012). The Authentic Mexican Revolution Party was part of the National Democratic Front (United Press International, 1992b)	1992	-Militant of the National Action Party attacked the Municipal Electoral Commission Office in Matamoros (199211110023) -Unknown perpetrators assassinate PRI government official in Rancho El Mirador (199201130006) -Unknown perpetrators attacked Mexican Government Customs Facilities (199211290006)	- Authentic Mexican Revolution members threw molotov cocktails, bottles and sticks, broke down doors and smashed windows (United Press International 1992b)
Mexico	Anti-PRI.	1993	Missing year in GTD	No evidence of terrorism found
Mexico	Anti-PRI.	1994	-Known gunman shut Presidential Candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta PRI (199403240001) -Democratic Revolutionary Party target PRI party member (199410300010) -Unaffiliated individuals assassinated PRI secretary general Francisco Ruiz	

			Massieu (199409280001)	
Mexico	Anti-PRI.	1995	-Democratic Revolutionary Party kidnapped workers in the National Indian Institute (199502070001) -Democratic Revolutionary Party members assaulted PRI political activist (199503240009) -Unknown perpetrator assaulted PRI government town hall (199504030004)	
Mexico	Anti-PRI.	1996	-Unknown gunmen assassinated Member of institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (199605200001) _Democratic Revolutionary Party members assaulted bus (199606250001) -Popular revolutionary army kidnapped private citizen (199608290002)	
Mexico	Anti-PRI.	1997	-Unknown perpetrator assaulted PRI Mayoral Candidate (199703130003) -Democratic Revolutionary Party members assaulted PRI Activists with guns (199710130001) -Unknown perpetrator kidnapped a member of the PRI (199712090005)	

Mexico	Anti-Calderon. Campaign against regime.	2006	-A group of civilians took four elections officials hostage demanding access to election material (200607020015) -Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb at a bank and headquarters of the ORI in Mexico City (200611060005) -Unidentified gunmen opened fire at a Mexican congressman (Horacio Garza Garza) in the city of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico(200702190004)	
Nepal	Nepalese anti government. The CPN-M/UPF campaign shared the broad political goal of the Nepalese anti Government Campaign. The group formed an alliance with mainstream political parties and participated in the organization and coordination of the civil resistance. (Gobyn, 2009; Bindra and Prithvi, 2006)	2006	-Anti-government guerrilla exploded a bomb in a marketplace in Pokhara city (200601020004) -Anti-government guerrillas asked employees to leave the (District) Survey Office in Butwal Municipality, western Nepal, before exploding a bomb (200601020005) -One woman was seriously injured when Maoist guerrillas detonated a bomb along the road in Lati Koili village (200601120004)	
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist movement. The IRA and other violent factions shared the broad political goal of the nonviolent separatist movement. Additionally, in 1967 IRA initially participated in the organization of the Northern	1968		Multiple bombings IRA (Background Information on Northern Ireland Society; Kane, 2015)

	Ireland Civil Rights Movement. The IRA split in rival groups after 1967 because factions disagreed over the failure of IRA to protect their social base from state violence (The Irish History, 2015).			
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist Movement.	1999	-Shots were fired at Woodburn Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) station in West Belfast, Northern Ireland. Police and politicians blamed the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) for the incident (199901140001) -Unknown perpetrators set fire at the Free Presbyterian Church in County Monaghan, Northern Ireland (199907030006) - Dublin, Ireland, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was suspected of shooting Alan Byrne, an outspoken witness of a killing three years ago (199903090001)	
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist.	2000	-Authorities blamed the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) for bombing a rural hotel in Irvines town, Northern Ireland (200002060001) -Members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army attacked Paul Macdonald (200005020004) -An explosive device was discovered in a park near Hillsborough Castle	

			outside of Belfast, in County Antrim, Northern Ireland. Authorities blame Republican dissidents for the attempted attack (200006190003)	
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist.	2001	-A bomb made of a coffee jar was thrown at a police car in Cooks town, Northern Ireland. No one was harmed, and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was believed to be responsible. (200101140003) - Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) members set off a car bomb in front of BBC television studios in London, England. No casualties resulted from the explosion because police had evacuated the area after having received a telephone warning. (200103040004) -A ten pounds bomb detonated outside a police station in Sion Mills, County Tyrone, Northern Ireland around 3am. Authorities suspected that the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) organization was behind the explosion. (200106010003)	
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist.	2002	-A bomb exploded at a British Army training camp in the Northern Ireland town of Magilligan, injuring a civilian defence worker. Police suspected a group named the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA). (200202080001) -A bomb partially	

			exploded outside of the Windsor House, a large office complex in Belfast, County Antrim, Northern Ireland. Media sources received a warning call from Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA). (200210250001) - The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was suspected responsible for placing a bomb in Belfast the incident. (200211250002)	
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist.	2003	-A 'substantial' bomb was left in a van by two masked men in Belfast, in front of the motor tax office few hours before the annual Belfast marathon. Police suspected that the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was responsible for the incident. (200305050002) - Members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) planted a bomb at the army base in Dungannon, Northern Ireland. Local police had received telephone warnings prior to the attack. (200311240005) -Members of the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) threw a coffee-jar bomb at a police car in Armagh, North Ireland. (200305070002)	
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist.	2004	-Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) gunmen fired up to thirty shots at workers in Londonderry, from an AK47 rifle.	

			Several cars and buildings were hit by bullets. (200409080001) - Two petrol bombs were thrown at the home of Pat Ramsey a SDLP assembly member from Londonderry. (200409140002) -A firebomb detonated at a Next shopping outlet in Northern Ireland. Authorities are blaming this attack and a spate of fire bombings in the area on dissident republicans (200503260006)	
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist.	2005	-Suspected Irish Republican Army members planted a pipe bomb at Gideon's Green. (200505020002) -Denis Bradley was attacked by a masked man with a baseball bat at a bar in Londonderry, Northern Ireland. Authorities suspect dissident republicans behind the attack since Bradley has been targeted previously. (200509200004) -Dissident republicans hijacked a taxicab at gunpoint, placed a bomb in the hijacked vehicle, and forced the driver to park outside Lurgan police station, where they intended the bomb to explode. (200508100014)	
Northern Ireland/England	Northern Ireland separatist.	2006	-Irish Republican Army suspected. Denis Donaldson, the former Sinn Féin member at the centre of the spy scandal	

			which brought down the Northern Ireland Assembly, was found shot dead and his body was discovered by Gardaí at 5 p.m. at his home in County Donegal with a gunshot wound to his chest. (200604040015) -IRA suspected. British army explosives experts dismantled a crude van bomb that failed to detonate after it was left overnight near the main police station after gunmen hijacked a van the previous night on the Catholic west side of Londonderry. (200604130013) - A 'viable' makeshift pipe bomb was thrown over a wall onto the grounds of a police station in Castlederg, County Tyrone, Northern Ireland. (200609230015)	
Peru	Anti-Fujimori. Campaign against regime. During the campaign against Fujimori's regime, some groups of protesters used violence and burned government buildings (Global Nonviolent Action Database Peruvians campaign to overthrow Dictator Alberto Fujimori, 2000). Additionally, a few weeks after the onset of mass dissent, rebellious military units staged a series of occupations and took hostages, to pressure Fujimori to resign. In turn,	2000	-Rebel Military Unit (200010290003) -Unknown perpetrators. A bomb exploded outside of the National Election Board offices in Lima, Lima region, Peru around 10am. The bomb had been left in a backpack outside of the offices, and had detonated after police had picked it up (200105160001)	-Rebel Military Unit took five hostages, including an army general. Their action came just as President Alberto Fujimori been trying to calm the political turmoil (Wn.com, 2015)

	the mass dissent participants staged demonstrations in support of the mutinous soldiers (Wn.com, 2015).			
Palestinian Territories	Palestinian liberation. The first Palestinian intifada started in 1987 with a spontaneous Palestinian popular uprising against Israeli occupation. The Intifada erupted in Gaza and quickly spread to the West Bank and Israel itself and involved primarily nonviolent disruptive actions (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011: 123). PLO factions founded the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU). The UNLU comprised one representative for each PLO organization (Fatah, Democratic Front of Liberation of Palestine, the popular front for the liberation of Palestine and the Palestine Communist Party) and had a coordinative function. Tens of thousands local voluntary committee, organizations and groups also made an independent decision on nonviolent actions (Stephan, 2009: 141). By the beginning of the mass-based mobilizations all PLO factions officially foreswore the use of violence (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011: 141). Despite the official ban on violence, PLO repeatedly called on local organizations and Palestinians to kill one Israeli for each Palestinian. Since the second year of the Intifada (1988), although no	1988	-Palestinian group bombed private home (198803060010) -Palestinian group assassinated Drilling/Contractor (198803170008) -Palestinian groups bombed grocery store (198810020001)	

	organization claimed responsibility for the attacks, there is evidence of increasing Palestinian systematic use of terrorist attacks against the Israeli government, transport, and private citizens and property.			
Palestinian Territories	Palestinian liberation.	1990	-Palestinian groups kidnapped Israeli collaborator (198810020001) -Palestinians assassinated Israeli bus driver (199001190007) -Palestinians assassinated Israeli collaborator (199001310003)	
Philippines	Second people power movement. Against Estrada regime. New People's Army has the same broad political goal and participated in the organization and coordination of the civil resistance called 'Second People Power Movement'. 'In 2001, the CPP-NPA demonstrated that it had learned from its mistakes during the 1986 "people power" revolution and joined efforts to remove Estrada from office and replace him with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In the elections that year, Bayan Muna – a legal political party separate from the NDF umbrella but linked to the communist movement – led the party list and won three congressional seats, the maximum under the party	2001	-Unidentified gunmen killed Rodolfo Aguinaldo, a member of the House of Representatives, when he was outside his home in Tuguegarao, Cagayan province, Philippines. One of Aguinaldo's bodyguards was killed in the attack as well. The New People's Army (NPA), a branch of the National Democratic Front (NDF), later said they were responsible for the attack, claiming that Aguinaldo's crimes against citizens in the area made him deserving of death (200106120001) -New People Army assassinated the deputy police chief of Mindoro Occidental Province, Winston Ebersole, was shot and killed by two members of the New People's Army (NPA) in San Jose, Philippines.	

	list system' (International Crisis Group, 2011: 8).		(200108290017) -Florencio Munoz, a mayoral candidate, was assassinated in Camalig, Philippines by three suspected communist rebels. (200104210001)	
Sri Lanka	Campaign for the independence of Ealam The Tamil Tigers (LTTE) used terrorism after having coordinated the emergence of mass nonviolent dissent for Tamil independence from Sri Lanka. According to Rinehart (2013: 109), the Tamils (including the youth group LTTE) 'fought peacefully for their rights. However, as time progressed radical elements [began to] (…) use unmitigated violence towards its own Tamil people and the greater Sri-Lankan population'. As of 1975, LTTE mounted large-scale conventional military tactics to gain independence, at times complementing them with terrorism.	1975	-Former Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah, was assassinated by Velupillai Prabhakaran, founder and leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), (197507270002) -Over following year LTTE escalated to full scale civil war (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013)	-
West Papua/ Indonesia	Campaign against Indonesia occupation The Free West Papua Movement formed in 1965 and from 1985 encompassed both military and political wings (Gault-Williams, 1987). In 2000, the activities of the Free Papua Movement (OP M), which aimed at establishing an independent state of Papua, were on the rise. In 2000, the unrest was not noticeable, but there	2001	-Rebels associated with the Free Papua Movement (OPM) kidnapped 16 people from the town of Merauke, Indonesia. The group asked for $1 million U.S., the removal of police forces from the Asiki region and a halt to all logging (200101160002) -Six people were wounded in an attack on a police post and market by the Free Papua Movement	

	were indications, from the activities of community members, that the Free Papua Movement was employing a political approach, and even intended to declare independence on 1st December 2003 (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2000). It appears that the Free Papua Movement participated in the coordination of the civil resistance campaign and stuck to nonviolent methods for the duration of 2000 (The Associated Press, 1999)		(200108270016) -The Free Papua Movement attacked a police post (200108270015).	
West Papua/ Indonesia	Campaign against Indonesia occupation	2003	-Suspected members of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) shot and killed one person and injured three others in the village of Ugimba, in Indonesia's Papua Province. (200311020002) -Indonesian police, investigating the shooting of two women including the wife of a known human rights campaigner, came under fire from unknown gunmen in the Papuan capital Jayapura. One military officer accompanying the policemen was wounded when three bullets hit his car (200301010015)	-A construction worker was shot dead in an attack some 1,000 kilometres west of Jayapura, the capital of Indonesia's Papua province. The attack was allegedly perpetrated by the members of the separatist Free Papua Movement (Xin hua Gneral Service, 2003 November 5)
West Papua/ Indonesia	Campaign against Indonesia occupation	2004	- Suspected members of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement) - OPM killed six workers traveling in a convoy heading from Ilu Sub-District to Mulia, Indonesia (200410120001) -At least six people were	- A policeman and an election official were killed in Indonesia's easternmost province of Papua before Monday's legislative

			killed when alleged Free Papua Movement (OPM) separatist rebels opened fire on a procession of cars belonging to the PT Modern contractor company in Puncak Jaya District, Papua Province, Indonesia. No group claimed responsibility for the attack (200410140010)	elections (Press, 2004)

Note: In text empirics account for only terrorism onsets, i.e. the first year that organizations or groups sharing mass dissident campaigns o broad political goals resort to terrorism as a tactic of political contention.

Case studies

Below, I provide two case studies as examples of mass civil resistance campaigns in which participants decided to initiate terrorism.

The case of the Madagascan Active Forces mass civil resistance (1991–1993)

In 1975, Commander Didier Ratsiraka seized power in Madagascar. From his first term onward, Ratsiraka's socialist economic and political reforms were coupled by censorship and repression against political opponents (Global Nonviolent Action Database. Madagascar citizens force free elections, 1990-1992). In 1989, Ratsiraka' s re-election was regarded as fraudulent and motivated widespread anger.

By May 1998, 16 political opposition parties and social professional groups had organized a first mass general strike under the banner of 'Active Forces'. By the 10th of July 1991, mass civil resistance tactics in the form of general strikes and mass demonstrations which demanded the president's resignation, a new constitution, and free elections were carried out daily (Smith, 1991). Initially the mass dissident campaign involved exclusively non-violent methods. Neither the state nor the dissidents engaged in violence or appeared to want an escalation of violence (Ahlstorm, 1991; Champagne, 1991a). However, after one month the government started to heavily repress dissidents in mass strikes and demonstrations. In August 1991 the presidential guard fired guns and grenades indiscriminately into the demonstrators, leading to several deaths and injuries (Rousseau, 1991). During the following months, government violence gradually radicalized long-standing participants in mass civil resistance (Jacob, 1991). For example, a long-term activist claimed that if the opposition had abandoned its policy of non-violence, she would have been ready to march on Ratsiraka's residence (Champagne, 1991b).Despite

agreeing to scheduled multiparty elections in 1991, Ratsiraka held on to the presidency and power until November 1992, during which period he met opposition activists and demonstrating crowds with severe repression (USDOS). The first organized terrorist attack against a government figure occurred the 30th January 1992. Seven months form the outbreak of the mass nonviolent civil resistance campaign, a grenade exploded in the political Bureau of Paul Rabemanjara, Ratsiraka's long standing official (GTD-199201300012). In July, an opposition group seized a state run radio, staging a coup and claiming that they were heavily armed and prepared to blow up hydroelectric dams (Reuters, 1992a; Reuters, 1992b). In August 1992 there was an armed assault against the Malagasy High Constitutional Court under the control of Ratsiraka's dictatorship in the capital Antanarivo (GTD-199208310007).

The case of the Islamic Salvation Front mass civil resistance (1992)

The Algerian Islamist movement was resurgent in the 80s and was not associated with the use of terrorist tactics or other forms of political violence (Dalacoura, 2011: 101). In March 1989, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was an established as political party that aimed to run for the municipal elections of 1990.

Overall, FIS bi-cephalous leadership (Ali Benhadj and Abassi Madani) sought to consistently represent those who, since independence, had not been offered a voice in the Algerian system. In the 1990 local government elections, the FIS received more than half of the total valid votes. In April 1991, however, the Algerian government passed an electoral law to counter the FIS by favoring the rural constituency where FLN was stronger.

FIS called mass demonstrations and a general unlimited strike in May. After being faced with repression, resulting in 20 deaths on the 4th of June, the FIS

leadership exhorted their supporters to refrain from violence and did not break communications with the government. By the end of June, the regime took both FIS leaders into custody and suppressed FIS mass dissident activities by arresting a very large number of activists (Dalacoura, 2011).

The arrests led to the emergence of a radical group headed by Said Mekhloufi and Qameredin Kharban. This flank wanted to block the forthcoming parliamentary elections and mobilize masses to use violence against the regime (ibidem). In January 1992, a military coup annulled FIS's general election victory. The government started a wave of mass violence. A minority of activists disappointed with the failure of mass dissident activities shifted towards small-armed groups. 'Former FIS activists argued that they were driven to a clandestine existence by fear of arrest and the terrible conditions of their imprisonments' (ibidem, 2011: 107).For these radical entities, the repression and the coup confirmed the futility of mass nonviolent tactics and the institutional strategy: 'in their eyes the FIS was finished and only rebellion would achieve an Islamic state' (ibidem, 2011: 108). By late October, radical groups consistently and tactically targeted non-combatants and eventually hitherto radical flanks grew in size and gained the initiative in a ferocious confrontation, which gradually engulfed large parts of the country (Dalacoura, 2011: 107).

Repression measure

The four-point scale that measures levels of *repression on mass dissent* is coded as follows: 0 (none): few or no action taken on the part of the state, appeasing or surrendering to campaign, making full concessions according to opponents' demands, making material concessions, taking actions that signal intention to cooperate or negotiate with opponents, expressing intention to cooperate or showing support;

1(mild repression): verbal or threatening action short of physical action, expressing intent to engage in conflict or threaten, use of economic fees and levies to increase costs on oppositions, decline to cease on-going conflict, maintain the status quo during conflict; 2 (moderate repression): physical or violent action aimed at coercing opponent, harassment or imprisonment of campaigns' members, no apparent intention to kill; 3 (extreme repression): physical action exhibiting intent to kill and violently silence opponents, torture or severe violence (such as severe beatings), which could easily kill someone, mass violence.

NAVCO's double counts

In NAVCO 2.0 the campaign named 'CPN-M/UPF' and the campaign named 'Democratic Movement' take place in Nepal in 2006 with the same political goal. In depth research reveals that 'CPN-M/UPF' is, in fact, a faction that contributed to the coordination, sustainment and participation of the 'Democratic Movement' against the autocratic regime in Nepal (Gobyn, 2009). Therefore, I dropped the campaign named after the 'CPN-M/UPF'. Similarly, I dropped the campaign named after the 'New People's Army' against the Filipino government in 2001. In fact, in depth research shows that the 'New People's Army' joined efforts to remove Estrada from office and replace him with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and was part of the coalition of the Second People Power Movement (International Crisis Group, 2011: 8).

Table II: Descriptive statistics

VARIABLE	Obs.	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Terrorism	1485	.185	.388	0	1
Size of mass dissent participation	1341	1.592	1.033	0	5
Repression on mass dissent	1462	2.699	.787	0	3
Mass dissent duration	1485	10.549	10.350	1	59
Primary method of mass dissent	1485	.189	.391	0	1
Population (log)	1377	10.099	1.448	5.658	13.961
Real GDP per capita (log)	1377	10.894	1.762	5.679	14.949
Democracy (lag)	1485	.314	.464	0	1

Table III: Collinearity diagnostics

Variable	VIF
Terrorism occurrence	1.11
Size of mass dissent participation	1.17
Repression on mass dissent	1.18
Mass dissent duration	1.13
Primary mass dissident method	1.36

Models with standard errors clustered by campaigns

I re-estimate all Models in Table II (main article) clustering standard errors by campaign, since the variance may also differ systematically across mass dissident campaigns and accounting for this might invalidate the main findings of the article.

Table IV: Determinants of terrorist campaigns onset with standard errors clustered on campaign

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation	-0.111 (0.162)	-0.111 (0.165)	0.107 (0.151)
Repression on mass dissent	0.883** (0.273)	0.882** (0.267)	1.043** (0.353)
Mass dissent duration	0.084** (0.013)	0.084** (0.013)	0.051** (0.014)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.004 (0.359)	-0.099 (0.429)
Population (log)			-0.388** (0.148)
Real GDP per capita (log)			0.370* (0.174)
Democracy (lag)			1.060** (0.369)
Constant	-4.404** (1.033)	-4.401** (1.036)	-5.791** (1.452)
Observations	952	952	885

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Core models for individual independent variables

Table V: Repression on mass dissent as determinant of terrorist campaigns onset

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset
Repression on mass dissent	0.545† (0.289)	0.644† (0.337)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.043 (0.425)
Population (log)		-0.429** (0.137)
Real GDP per capita (log)		0.448** (0.172)
Democracy (lag)		1.221** (0.332)
Constant	-2.675** (1.013)	-4.235** (1.559)
Observations	1,034	961

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included.

Table VI: Mass dissent duration as determinant of terrorist campaigns

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset
Mass dissent duration	0.085** (0.014)	0.053** (0.015)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.356 (0.406)
Population (log)		-0.343* (0.138)
Real GDP per capita (log)		0.281† (0.158)
Democracy (lag)		1.051** (0.350)
Constant	-2.011** (0.416)	-1.877**(0.954)
Observations	1,052	979

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table VII: Size of mass dissent participation as determinant of terrorist campaigns onset

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation	-0.173 (0.137)	0.150 (0.131)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.427 (0.471)
Population (log)		-0.423** (0.161)
Real GDP per capita (log)		0.444* (0.181)
Democracy (lag)		1.273** (0.343)
Constant	-1.127* (0.527)	-2.903** (0.958)
Observations	953	886

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Alternative mass dissent participation measures

The effect of *size of mass dissent participation* is not significant in any of the Models reported in Table II (main article). As Table VII shows, there is reason to believe that this may be due to the distribution of the scale of *camp_size* from NAVCO2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). In fact, around 88 % of the observations in the data have participation levels with the 0-2 range of the scale, while very few observations (N=160; about 12%) have dissident campaign participation in the very high range of the scale. To verify that the values of *size of mass dissent participation* do not

influence my results, I consider alternative participation measures. I grouped together the three and two higher values on the *size of mass dissent participation* generating *size of mass dissent participation 2* and *size of mass dissent participation 3* respectively. I also run the analysis using simpler ordinal variable from NAVCO2.0: *estimated campaign size*.*Estimated campaign size* ranges from 0 (small, hundreds to thousands) to 3 (extremely large, above one million) (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013: 6). Lastly, I extracted from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcome (NAVCO 1.1) (Chenoweth, 2011) a continuous variable measuring the peak participation in a given campaign. Note this variable does not exist in NAVCO 2.0 and NAVCO 1.1 is time-invariant. I then normalized this continuous item by total population. Tables VIII-XII present the results of these alternative measures. They remain virtually identical to those of the core Models in Table II (main article). The results for the core variables on *repression on mass dissent* and mass *dissent duration* remain unchanged in terms of the substantive implications and significance, while the effect of the alternative participation measures do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the Models in Tables IX-XII (below).

Table VIII: Tabulation of dissident campaign participation

Size of mass dissent participation	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	148	11.04	11.04
1	515	38.40	49.44
2	518	38.36	88.07
3	94	7.01	95.08
4	28	2.09	97.17
5	38	2.83	100.00
Total	1,341	100.00	

Table IX. The determinants of terrorist campaigns onset with dissident campaign participation variable grouping together the three highest values

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation 2	-0.073 (0.205)	-0.068 (0.205)	0.203 (0.194)
Repression on mass dissent	0.884** (0.270)	0.873** (0.264)	0.991** (0.330)
Mass dissent duration	0.084** (0.014)	0.084** (0.013)	0.050** (0.014)
Primary method of mass dissent		-0.062 (0.359)	-0.129 (0.432)
Population (log)			-0.397** (0.150)
Real GDP per capita (log)			0.382* (0.185)
Democracy (lag)			1.097** (0.357)
Constant	-4.478** (1.091)	-4.437** (1.110)	-5.833** (1.491)
Observations	952	952	885

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table X: Determinants of terrorist campaigns onset with dissident campaign participation variable grouping together the two highest values

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation3	-0.111 (0.171)	-0.111 (0.172)	0.107 (0.158)
Repression on mass dissent	0.883** (0.273)	0.882** (0.266)	1.043** (0.342)
Mass dissent duration	0.0845** (0.0139)	0.0845** (0.013)	0.051** (0.014)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.004 (0.359)	-0.099 (0.436)
Population (log)			-0.388* (0.153)
Real GDP per capita (log)			0.370* (0.185)
Democracy (lag)			1.060** (0.349)
Constant	-4.404** (1.104)	-4.401** (1.117)	-5.791** (1.536)
Observations	952	952	885

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included.

Table XI: Determinants of terrorist campaigns onset using estimated campaign size

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset
Estimation of size of mass dissent participation	-0.110 (0.247)	-0.079 (0.247)	0.192 (0.231)
Repression on mass dissent	0.850** (0.265)	0.813** (0.255)	1.044** (0.358)
Mass dissent duration	0.086** (0.014)	0.086** (0.013)	0.053** (0.014)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.257 (0.358)	-0.324 (0.426)
Population (log)			-0.384* (0.154)
Real GDP per capita (log)			0.374* (0.186)
Democracy (lag)			1.065** (0.362)
Constant	-4.394** (1.092)	-4.243** (1.074)	-5.751** (1.626)
Observations	954	954	887

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XII: Determinants of terrorist campaigns onset using number participants normalized by population

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset
Peak participation/total population	-0.044 (0.051)	-0.024 (0.024)
Repression on mass dissent	0.453* (0.216)	0.585* (0.236)
Mass dissent duration	0.076** (0.015)	0.055** (0.015)
Primary mass dissident method		0.365 (0.430)
Real GDP per capita (log)		0.068 (0.100)
Democracy (lag)		1.092** (0.345)
Constant	-2.874** (0.824)	-4.504** (1.220)
Observations	920	920

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Test for curvilinear relationship duration/repression-terrorism onset and repression omission

I re-estimate Model 3 in Table II (main article) to examine whether *duration of mass dissent* has a curvilinear relationship with the likelihood of *terrorism onset*.

Additionally, I re-estimate Model 3 in Table II (main article), omitting *repression on mass dissent* to verify whether this item affects my core variables. Model 1 Table XIII shows that duration and its square term are not statistically significant. Model 2 Table XIII omits *repression on mass dissent* from the estimation and shows that the effect of *duration of mass dissent* is positive and highly significant when *repression on mass dissent* and *duration of mass dissent* squared are omitted. Again, *duration of mass dissent* and its squared term are not statistically significant. Finally, Model 3 Table XIII excludes *duration of mass dissent* squared and *repression on mass dissent* from the analysis. Model 3 validates a positive linear relationship between duration of mass dissent and terrorism campaigns onset: the coefficient for duration is positive and highly statistically significant. Additionally, I run all Models of Table II (main article) substituting dummy variables for repression levels with 'no repression' as baseline to verify an erroneous linear assumption (Table XIV). The effects of medium and high repression are positive and significantly correlated with the likelihood of terrorist campaign onset in all Models, while low repression drops out because of collinearity. Again, there is no support to a non-linear impact of repression on terrorism campaign onset.

Table XIII: Robustness checks for curvilinear duration-terrorism onset relation and on whether repression is driving the findings

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation	0.113 (0.156)	0.149 (0.137)	0.145 (0.139)
Repression on mass dissent	1.046** (0.341)		
Mass dissent duration	0.034 (0.053)	0.044 (0.051)	0.055** (0.014)
Mass dissent duration squared	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	
Primary mass dissident method	-0.125 (0.433)	-0.407 (0.458)	-0.386 (0.456)
Population (log)	-0.398* (0.173)	-0.363* (0.173)	-0.355* (0.157)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.379† (0.204)	0.314† (0.191)	0.308† (0.147)
Democracy (lag)	1.098** (0.369)	1.104** (0.361)	1.079** (0.346)
Constant	-5.756** (1.523)	-2.451* (0.977)	-2.483* (0.998)
Observations	885	886	886

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XIV. Robustness checks for curvilinear repression-terrorism onset relation

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation	-0.090 (0.168)	-0.088 (0.171)	0.120 (0.162)
Low repression (1)	-	-	-
Medium repression (2)	13.57** (0.577)	12.93** (0.596)	13.35** (0.749)
High repression (3)	14.11** (0.292)	13.46** (0.329)	14.18** (0.465)
Mass dissent duration	0.083** (0.013)	0.083** (0.013)	0.051** (0.014)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.028 (0.364)	-0.111 (0.438)
Population (log)			-0.379* (0.158)
Real GDP per capita (log)			0.361† (0.188)
Democracy (lag)			1.066** (0.351)
Constant	-15.90** (0.690)	-15.25*** (0.735)	-16.84** (1.289)
Observations	938	938	874

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included.

Checking for severe endogeneity issues between repression on mass dissent and terrorism onset

Repression against mass dissident campaigns may be the consequence of particularly threatening dissident activities or mass dissident activities in the initial phase of the campaign. Alternatively, governments that use repression against mass dissident campaigns may have a low threshold for perceiving political behaviours as threatening, and thus engage in pre-emptive repression anticipating mass dissent. To rule out severe endogeneity problems between *repression on mass dissent* and *occurred mass dissident* I examine a Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing with phases of mass dissident campaign as regressor and levels of state repression against political opponents at t-1 as response. Campaigns' phases are coded as follow. 0: Campaigns' on-set year; 1: Campaigns' on-going years; 2: Campaigns' end year; 3: One year after campaigns' end. Levels of state repression against political opponents t-1 is used as a response variable. I use the *amnesty* from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al. 2013) as a measure of state repression against political opponents. *Amnesty* codes the repressive practices of states against political opponents, not specific repressive responses to mass dissident activities. Amnesty is coded as follows. 1: countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional; 2: there is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected and torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare; 3: there is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. Political murders are extremely rare; 4: civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population.

Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas; 5: terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which. The results Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 show that the expected values of *repression against political opponents* (t-1) remain largely stable showing no evidence of a general increase in state repression against opposition after mass dissent onsets indicating no severe endogeneity of repression to mass dissident's campaigns.

Figure 1: Expected value of levels of repression against political opponents t-1 given current phase of mass dissident campaigns



Note: This figure displays a graph of the smoothed values from a kernel-weighted polynomial of state repression against political opponents (y axis) on phases of (violent and nonviolent mass dissident campaigns) (x axis).

Figure 2: Expected value of levels of repression against political opponents t-1 given current phase of nonviolent mass dissident campaigns



Note: This figure displays a graph of the smoothed values from a kernel-weighted polynomial of state repression against political opponents (y axis) on phases of nonviolent mass dissident campaigns (x axis)

Figure 3: Expected value of levels of repression against political opponents t-1 given current phase of violent mass dissident campaigns



Note: This figure displays a graph of the smoothed values from a kernel-weighted polynomial of state repression against political opponents (y axis) on phases of violent mass dissident campaigns (x axis).

Alternative regime measures and nested models with alternative regime measure

I consider an alternative regime type measure by substituting the dichotomous item accounting for democratic regimes (t-1) with the lagged regular *polity2* score (t-1) from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2014). Model 1 Table XV shows that the findings remain consistent with Table II (main article). Model 2, Model 3 Table XV and Test 1 and 2 show that the effects of *repression on mass dissent* and mass *dissent duration* on the likelihood of *terrorism onset* does not significantly differ in a across violent and nonviolent methods of mass dissent activities when using *regime type* (t-1) as an alternative measure for democracy.

Table XV: Determinants of terrorist campaigns onset using *polity2 score* lagged one year.

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset
ize of mass dissent participation	0.136 (0.155)	0.131 (0.155)	0.129 (0.156)
epression on mass dissent	1.065** (0.358)	1.082** (0.362)	1.140** (0.386)
lass dissent duration	0.050** (0.015)	0.052** (0.018)	0.051** (0.015)
rimary mass dissident method	-0.056 (0.443)	0.050 (0.693)	0.675 (2.283)
rimary mass dissident method* Mass dissent duration		-0.007 (0.028)	
opulation (log)	-0.367* (0.152)	-0.364* (0.156)	-0.368* (0.153)
eal GDP per capita (log)	0.361† (0.190)	0.357† (0.193)	0.361† (0.190)
egime type (lag)	0.081** (0.023)	0.081** (0.023)	0.081** (0.023)
rimary mass dissident method* Repression on mass dissent			-0.252 (0.763)
onstant	-5.611** (1.592)	-5.650** (1.597)	-5.814** (1.749
bservations	844	844	844

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included. Model 1: Full Model. Models 2 - 3: nested models with interaction terms between terrorist campaigns on-sets and main explanatory variables for group comparison.

Test 1. Nested Model 2: difference of the effect of duration across methods of mass dissent: not statistically different

chi2 (2) = 0.01

Prob > chi2 = 0.935

Test 2. Nested Model 3: difference of the effect of repression across methods of mass dissent: not statistically different

chi2 (2) = 0.09

Prob > chi2 = 0.760

Do the effects of the core explanatory variables differ across different primary tactics of mass dissent?

To test whether the effect of the core explanatory variables differs across different primary tactics of mass dissent, I run nested models for Models 2 and 3 in Table II (main article) with interaction terms between *primary mass dissident methods* and significant core explanatory variables. In Table XVI, the coefficients of each parameter indicates the effect for conventional civil wars, while the coefficient of the interaction terms between *primary mass dissident methods* and the other significant parameter is the effect of the parameter tested on mass civil resistance. I then test whether the effect of each parameter for mass civil resistance differs from the effect of the same parameter for conventional civil wars (Test 3-6, and Figure 4-7). Figures 4-5 show that the effect of *mass dissent duration* on the likelihood of *terrorism onset* is virtually identical across violent and nonviolent methods of mass dissent activities. The 95% confidence intervals grow larger as the duration of mass dissident campaigns increases and the number of observations for on-going mass dissident campaigns decreases. Figures 6 and 7 also show that the effect of *repression on mass*

dissent on the likelihood of *terrorism onset* is virtually identical across mass civil resistance and large-scale conventional civil war.

Table XVI: Nested models with interaction terms between terrorist campaigns onsets and main explanatory variables for group comparison

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset	Model 4) Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation	-0.113 (0.172)	0.106 (0.159)	-0.106 (0.170)	0.105 (0.158)
Repression on mass dissent	0.893** (0.267)	1.049** (0.346)	0.805** (0.252)	1.067** (0.369)
Mass dissent duration	0.085** (0.015)	0.052** (0.018)	0.084** (0.014)	0.051** (0.014)
Primary mass dissident method	0.055 (0.542)	-0.064 (0.692)	-0.666 (1.963)	0.121 (2.315)
Primary mass dissident method* Mass dissent duration	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.028)		
Population (log)		-0.387* (0.156)		-0.388* (0.154)
Real GDP per capita (log)		0.369† (0.188)		0.370* (0.185)
Democracy (lag)		1.062** (0.350)		1.061** (0.348)
Primary mass dissident method* Repression on mass dissent			0.230 (0.654)	-0.076 (0.781)
Constant	-4.436** (1.120)	-5.806** (1.540)	-4.179** (1.103)	-5.857** (1.696)
Observations	952	885	952	885

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included.

Test 3: Nested Model 1: difference of the effect of duration across methods of mass dissent: not statistically different

chi2 (2) = 0.01

Prob > chi2 = 0.913

Test 4: Nested Model 2: difference of the effect of duration across methods of mass dissent: not statistically different

chi2 = 0.01

Prob > chi2 = 0.931

Test 5. Nested Model 3: difference of the effect of repression against dissidents across methods of mass dissent: not statistically different

chi2 = 0.12

Prob > chi2 = 0.731

Test 6. Nested Model 4: difference of the effect of repression against dissidents across methods of mass dissent: not statistically different

chi2 = 0.00

Prob > chi2 = 0.949

Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of terrorist campaigns onsets by mass dissident campaigns' duration for different primary method of mass dissent (Appendix, Table XVI, Model 1)



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value of mass dissident campaign duration (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.

Figure 5: Predicted probabilities of terrorist campaigns onsets by mass dissident campaigns' duration for different primary method of mass dissent (Appendix, Table XVI, Model 2)



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value of mass dissident campaign duration (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.

Figure 6: Predicted probabilities of terrorist campaigns onsets by repression on mass dissident activities for different primary method of mass dissent (Appendix, Table XVI, Model 3)



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value of state repression on mass dissent (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.

Figure 7: Predicted probabilities of terrorist campaigns onsets by repression on mass dissident activities for different primary method of mass dissent (Appendix, Table XVI, Model 4)



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value of state repression on mass dissent (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.

Montecarlo simulation: **Do the effects of the core explanatory variables differ across different primary tactics of mass dissent?**

I perform a Montecarlo simulation with 10,000 draws based on the estimates of the nested Models in Table XVI above, since these estimates are uncertain due to variation in the data and mode uncertainty. Figures 8-11 show that the distribution of the effects of mass dissent duration and repression against mass dissent across large-scale conventional civil wars and mass civil resistance is virtually identical**.**

Figure 8: Montecarlo simulation, 10,000 draws based on Table XVI, Model 1



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value mass dissident campaign duration (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities. Simulated values are based on Table XVI, Model 1 and were generated via Montecarlo simulation with all other covariates set at their means.

Figure 9: Montecarlo simulation, 10,000 draws based on Table XVI, Model 2



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value mass dissident campaign duration (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities. Simulated values are based on Table XVI, Model 2and were generated via Montecarlo simulation with all other covariates set at their means.

Figure 10: Montecarlo Simulation, 10,000 draws based on Table XVI, Model 3



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value state repression on mass dissent (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities. Simulated values are based on Table XVI, Model 3 and were generated via Montecarlo simulation with all other covariates set at their means.

Figure 11: Montecarlo simulation, 10,000 draws based on Table XVI, Model 4



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value state repression on mass dissent (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities. Simulated values are based on Table XVI, Model 4and were generated via Montecarlo simulation with all other covariates set at their means.

Tests for non-difference of the effects of main explanatory variables splitting samples

I test whether the effects of the main significant explanatory variables do not differ when allowing the slopes of all other covariates to differ across groups, i.e. violent and nonviolent campaigns. Again, Tests 7-8 show that no significant statistical difference exists for the slopes of *mass dissent duration* and the *repression on mass dissent* across mass civil resistance and civil war.

Test 7: Difference of the effect of repression across methods of mass dissent: not statistically different

chi2 = 0.11

Prob > chi2 = 0.744

Test 8: Difference of the effect of duration across methods of mass dissent: not statistically different

chi2 = 0.12

Prob > chi2 = 0.727

Self-coded data excluded

The findings for mass dissent duration and repression on mass dissent remain consistent when excluding the year of self-coded terrorist attacks to check that the self-coding data are not driving the findings (Table XVII).

Table XVII: The determinants of terrorist campaigns onset excluding self-coded terrorist data

	Model 1) Terrorism onset	Model 2) Terrorism onset	Model 3) Terrorism onset
Size of mass dissent participation	-0.037 (0.191)	-0.001 (0.195)	0.117 (0.184)
Repression on mass dissent	1.004* (0.427)	0.932* (0.411)	0.814† (0.418)
Mass dissent duration	0.121** (0.017)	0.120** (0.018)	0.069* (0.029)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.309 (0.452)	-0.459 (0.572)
Population (log)			-0.333* (0.159)
Real GDP per capita (log)			0.169 (0.153)
Democracy (lag)			1.061* (0.505)
Constant	-5.830** (2.039)	-5.599** (2.027)	-4.016* (2.046)
Observations	560	560	529

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Figure 11 (below) displays how the predicted probabilities of *terrorism onset* increase for every additional year of mass dissident activities, holding all other covariates at their mean. Figure 12 (below) displays how the predicted probability of *terrorism onset* increases with higher repression against mass dissents, holding all other covariates at their mean.

Figure 11: Predicted probability of terrorist campaigns onsets by duration (Table XVII, Model 3)



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value of mass dissident campaign duration (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.

Figure 12: Predicted probability of terrorist campaigns onsets by repression levels (Table XVII, Model 3)



Note: This figure plots the predicted probability of terrorism campaigns onset (y axis) at different value of state repression on mass dissent (x axis) keeping all the other covariates at their mean. The black line corresponds to cases of large-scale conventional civil war. The gray line represents cases of mass civil resistance campaigns. The dashed lines indicate the bounds of 95 % confidence interval for these predicted probabilities.

Joint significance Model 3, Table II (main article)

I run a joint significance test for the full Model that includes the polynomial to control for time dependency. The joint significance level of the test is close to 0 so we can strongly reject the hypothesis of no difference between the effects of different independent variables.

Test 9. Joint significance test for main explanatory variables

chi2 = 20.08

Prob > chi2 = 0.000

Are certain political goals more likely to lead dissident to start terrorist activities?

There exists some work on ideology and terrorism intensity in civil war. Polo and Gleditsch (2016) and Stanton (2013) find that rebel groups with political goals that

address greater constituencies use less terrorism and are more likely to select lower-casualty civilian targets, because of the risk of alienating potential followers and to minimize public backlash. However, less is known on the effect of ideology and goals on terrorist campaigns onset in mass dissident campaigns. This is an interesting question because terrorism serves a variety of goals. I ran some preliminary tests including campaigns' political goals extracted from NAVCO2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013) in the analysis. It emerges that mass dissident campaigns that have *significant institutional reform* as a political goal are more likely to experience the onset of terrorist campaigns at a significance level of .01. In contrast, the findings show that mass dissident campaigns that have *policy change* as a political goal are less likely to experience emergence of terrorist campaigns at a significance level of 0.5. The coefficients of all others mass dissent political goals do not reach significant levels (*regime change* is used as baseline here). Importantly, the main findings of the article remain consistent with the main analysis.

Table XX: Do the ends justify the means?

	(1) Terrorism onset	(2) Terrorism onset	(3) Terrorism onset
Significant institutional reform	1.783† (0.975)	1.837† (0.983)	2.272* (1.153)
Policy change	-0.672* (0.328)	-0.669* (0.322)	-1.085* (0.445)
Territorial secession	-0.233 (0.382)	-0.238 (0.385)	-0.533 (0.546)
Greater autonomy	-0.797 (0.581)	-0.800 (0.578)	-1.096† (0.601)
Anti-occupation	0.323 (0.516)	0.331 (0.524)	-0.071 (0.499)
Size of mass dissent participation	-0.212 (0.189)	-0.201 (0.189)	0.063 (0.167)
Repression on mass dissent	0.788** (0.231)	0.763** (0.222)	0.907** (0.275)
Mass dissent duration	0.084** (0.016)	0.084** (0.016)	0.052** (0.013)
Primary mass dissident method		-0.150 (0.412)	-0.256 (0.478)
Population (log)			-0.322† (0.171)
Real GDP per capita (log)			0.376† (0.210)
Democracy (lag)			1.175** (0.399)
Constant	-4.063** (1.007)	-3.977** (1.013)	-6.035** (1.280)
Observations	952	952	885

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

References

Ahlstorm, Dick (1991) Protests Continue in Madagascar. *Irish Times* 25 July.

Azzoni, T (1999) Indonesian President leaves for China visit. *Associated Press International* 30 November.

Background Information on Northern Ireland Society (http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#05).

BBC Monitoring International Reports (2000) Free Papua Movement activities for independent state on rise February 24.

Bindra, Satinder and Banerjii Prithvi (2006) Police douse Nepal protest. *CNN*. 24 April.

Champagne, J (1999a) Ratsiraka given ultimatum, but opposition will talk. *Agence France Presse* 3 August.

Champagne, J (1999B) Hundreds of thousands protests at new government. *Agence France Presse* 27 August.

Chenoweth, Erica (2011) Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset, v. 1.1. University of Denver (http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html).

Chenoweth, Erica and Orion Lewis (2013) Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data Project. Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver (http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html).

Chenoweth, Erica and Maria, J Stephan (2011) *Why civil resistance works: the Strategic Logic of Non-violent Conflicts*. Columbia University Press (http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html).

Chicago Tribune (1996) *Mexico Newest Rebels Display Elan*. 3 September (http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-09-01/news/9609010125_1_popular-revolutionary-army-rebel-commander-epr).

CRS Reports (2012) Mexico's 2012 Elections (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42548.pdf).

Dalacoura, Katerina (2011) *Islamist terrorism and democracy in the Middle East*. Cambridge University Press.

Drogan, M (1998) THERE ARE NO LEADERS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES IN SHARDS, A NEW YEAR OF UPHEAVAL BECKONS. *San Jose Mercury News* 23 December.

Gibney, Mark; Linda Cornett, Reed Wood and Peter Haschke (2015) Political Terror Scale, 1976–2012 (http://www.poli ticalterrorscale.org).

Gault-Williams, Malcom (1987) Organisasi Papua Merdeka: The Free Papua Movement lives. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 19(4): 32-43.

Global Nonviolent Action Database. Madagascar citizens force free elections, 1990-1992 (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/madagascar-citizens-force-free-elections-1990-1992).

Global Nonviolent Action Database. Peruvians campaign to overthrow Dictator Alberto Fujimori (The March of the Four Directions), 2000 (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/peruvians-campaign-overthrow-dictator-alberto-fujimori-march-four-directions-2000).

Gobyn, Winne (2009) From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists' Strategic and Ideological Thinking. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32(5): 420-438.

Grant, J (1998) The death of Tahan-rough justice in Jakarta. *Sydney Morning Herald* 28 November.

GTDid: 199201310003 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199201310003).

GTDid: 199203170002 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199203170002).

GTDid: 199205050007 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199205050007).

GTDid: 199802100003 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199802100003).

GTDid: 199906170004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199906170004).

GTDid: 199907170005 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199907170005).

GTDid: 200512090004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200512090004).

GTDid: 200507120006 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200507120006).

GTDid: 200602110001
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200602110001).

GTDid: 199201300012
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199201300012).

GTDid: 199208310007
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199208310007).

GTDid: 199004020008
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199004020008).

GTDid: 199006180009
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199006180009).

GTDid: 199001020003
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199001020003).

GTDid: 199108110002
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199108110002)

GTDid: 199108150012
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199108150012).

GTDid: 199111180003
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199111180003).

GTDid: 199211110023
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199211110023).

GTDid: 199201130006
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199201130006).

GTDid: 199211290006
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199211290006).

GTDid: 199403240001
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199403240001).

GTDid: 199410300010 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199410300010).

GTDid: 199409280001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199409280001).

GTDid: 199502070001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199502070001).

GTDid: 199503240009 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199503240009).

GTDid: 199504030004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199504030004).

GTDid: 199605200001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199605200001).

GTDid: 199606250001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199606250001).

GTDid: 199608290002 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199608290002).

GTDid: 199703130003 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199703130003).

GTDid: 199710130001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199710130001).

GTDid: 199712090005 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199712090005).

GTDid: 200607020015 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200607020015).

GTDid: 200611060005 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200611060005).

GTDid: 200702190004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200702190004).

GTDid: 200601020004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200601020004).

GTDid: 200601020005 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200601020005).

GTDid: 200601120004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200601120004).

GTDid: 199901140001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199901140001).

GTDid: 199907030006 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199907030006).

GTDid: 199903090001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199903090001).

GTDid: 200002060001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200002060001).

GTDid: 200005020004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200005020004).

GTDid: 200006190003 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200006190003).

GTDid: 200101140003 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200101140003).

GTDid: 200103040004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200103040004).

GTDid: 200106010003 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200106010003).

GTDid: 200202080001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200202080001).

GTDid: 200210250001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200210250001).

GTDid: 200211250002 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200211250002).

GTDid: 200305050002 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200305050002).

GTDid: 200311240005 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200311240005).

GTDid: 200305070002 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200305070002).

GTDid: 200409080001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200409080001).

GTDid: 200409140002 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200409140002).

GTDid: 200503260006 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200503260006).

GTDid: 200505020002 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200505020002).

GTDid: 200509200004 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200509200004).

GTDid: 200508100014 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200508100014).

GTDid: 200604040015 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200604040015).

GTDid: 200604130013
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200604130013).

GTDid: 200609230015
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200609230015).

GTDid: 200010290003
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200010290003).

GTDid: 200105160001
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200105160001).

GTDid: 198803060010
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198803060010).

GTDid: 198803170008
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198803170008).

GTDid: 198810020001
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198810020001).

GTDid: 198810020001
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198810020001).

GTDid: 199001190007
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199001190007

GTDid: 199001310003
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199001310003).

GTDid: 200101160002
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200101160002).

GTDid: 200108270016
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108270016).

GTDid: 200108270015
(https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108270015).

GTDid: 200410120001 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200410120001).

GTDid: 200410140010 (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200410140010).

Hafez, M Mohammed (2003) *Why Muslim Rebel*. Lynne Rienner Publisher.

International Associated Press, (1998a). *East Timor's governor calls for calm as thousands flee* July 13

International Associated Press, (1998b). *E. Timoreses exiles threaten terrorist attacks against Indonesia*. November 5

International Associated Press, (1998c). *Indonesian army slams East Timor terrorist attacks threat*. November 6.

International Associated Press, (1999) *Rebels attack prison in East Timor; three policemen injured*. 13April.

International Crisis Group (2011) The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines Tactics and Talks. Asia Report N 202. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/202 The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines Tactics and Talks.pdf

Jatmiko, A (1998). Indonesian police scuffle with students, Muslims burn church. The Associated Press.

Jacob, S (1991) Opposition rallies in capital, deaths reported in clash with troops. *Agence France Press*, 24 October.

Kane, A (2015) *Shore up the dam of the past or it may fracture again; Learn how to tackle our legacy issues, or prepare for the next round of terrorism and an ugly polarisation of society here, warn Alex Kane*. Belfast Telegraph, 11 June.

Marshall, G Monty; Robert T Gurr and Keith Jaggers (2014) Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013. Version: p4v2014 (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).

Ngo, J (1999) The Terror lives on. *South China Morning Post*, 20 May.

Polo, Sara and Kristain S Gleditsh (2016) Twisting Arms and Sending Messages: Terrorist Tactics in Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 53(6): 815-829.

Press, A F (1998). Rebels shoot East Timor teacher dead in front of students. 2 December

Press, A F (1991a). Ratsiraka given ultimatum, but opposition will talk. 3 August.

Press, A F (1991b). Fresh protests as 12 said shot dead, 200 injured. 11 August

Press, A F (1991c) Hundreds of thousands protest at new government. 27 August

Press, A F (2004) Two killed in violence ahead of elections in Indonesia's Papua. April 5.

Reuters (1992a) Coup Attempt in Madagascar Put Down, Government Says. The New York Times, 30 July. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/30/world/coup-attempt-in-madagascar-put-down-government-says.html

Reuters (1992b) Madagascar soldiers suppress coup bid. *The Toronto Star*, 29 July 29.

Rinehart, S Christine (2013) *Volatile Social Movements and the Origins of Terrorism: The Radicalization of Change*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Rousseau, D (1998) Two killed, 10 wounded as police open fire in Jakarta. *Agence France Press*, 12 May.

Rousseau D (1991) Fresh protests as 12 said shot dead, 200 injured. *Agence France Press*, 11 August.

Stanton, A Jessica (2013) Terrorism in the Context of Civil War. *The Journal of Politics* 75(4): 1009-1002.

Stephan, J Maria (2009) *Civilian Jihad. Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN.

The Associated Press (1999, November 29) *Protesters demand independence votes for Indonesian provinces*.

The Irish History (2015) *Northern Ireland Conflict*. Available at: http://www.theirishstory.com/2015/02/09/the-northern-ireland-conflict-1968-1998-an-overview/#.WCMJTC2LSUl.

The Washington Post (2005, July 13). Car Bomb Target Pro-Syrian Lebanese Prime Minister.at:https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1915&dat=20050711&id=GxEiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=5XIFAAAAIBAJ&pg=5105,2619099&hl=en.

Torchia, C (1998). Despite fear of violence, Indonesia stays mostly calm- for now. AM cycle.

United Press International (1992a) Eight arrested after attempted coup in Madagascar. BC cycle. 29 July.

United Press International (1992b) Police search for more suspects in election violence. 13 November.

Wn.com (2015) *Peru Group of Soldiers Stage a Revolt*. Available at: https://wn.com/peru_group_of_soldiers_stage_a_revolt.

Xinhua General News Service (1991) Protests continue in Madagascar. 25 July.

Better the devil you know?

Nonviolent movement success and terrorism

Online Appendix

Table 1: List of civil resistance campaigns – year experiencing terrorism

ivil resistance campaign ame	Country	Year	Hierarchy	Progress	Attacks
ctive Forces overnment violence radually radicalised long- anding participants. The rganizations perpetrating rrorist attacks emerged from ne civil resistance movement nd can be considered as inges. The Lifeblood ommittee adopted an explicit olicy of nonviolence and here is not evidence that it ontrolled and orchestrated the ctions of these fringes (Press, 991; Madagascar citizens orce free elections, 1990- 992).	Madagascar	1992	0	1	-Unknown perpetrators exploded bomb at the Residence, Political Bureau of Paul Rabemanjara which held several government posts with Ratsiraka- and its political Bureau, played an influential role on the government political decision (GDT ID199201300012) -Unknown Firemen shout at the high constitutional court (GTD ID 199208310007) -Alleged extremist faction of the opposition Forces Vives occupy a radio station (United Press International 1992)
lbania Anti-Communist fter several months of emonstrations in 1990 the ommunist party legalized pposition parties. In 1991 a oalition of opposition parties ere leading the protests gainst Albanian communist egime. The communist party oined the opposition parties in coalition of government to ecure political stability. This ower-sharing pact was forced y a general strike by 350,000 isgruntled state workers that egan May 16 and was called ff Sunday. The walkout was narked by massive anti- ommunist protests and	Albania	1990	0	1	-Unknown perpetrator explode a bomb in the Cuban Embassy (GTD ID 199007030003) -Albanians anti-Communist protesters lynched a police man (Binder 1990) - At least three people suffered stab wounds or were beaten with iron bars, including the local police chie by anti-communist dissidents in the northern Albanian town of Shkoder (Traynor 1990a) -Anti communist dissidents destroyed buildings with dynamite (Traynor 1990b)

poradic violence that fueled ears of worse unrest unless ramatic steps were taken to evive the economy (ABC IEWS, 1991). The actors erpetrating terrorist attacks merged from the anti-ommunist movement but here is no evidence that the pposition parties controlled nd orchestrated the actions of hese actors.					
lbania Anti-Communist	Albania	1991	1	1	-Unknown perpetrator explode a bomb in the Socialist Party headquarter in Bajram Curri (GTD ID 199109080001) -Anti-communist dissidents attacke bookshops containing the late Enve Hoxha's works (Traynor 1991) -Unknown perpetrators set fire to the House of the Party, a museum house where the Communist Party of Albania was founded (McDowal 1991)
nti-Arap Moi he Forum for the Restoration f Democracy (FORD) was he broad-based pressure roup that led the fight to hange Kenya to a multi-party ystem. The leaders of FORD re not committed to onviolence. Actors using errorist actions emerged from he civil resistance movement. lowever these actors and their ctions were not controlled or rchestrated by the FORD entral committee. Terrorism used by sub-actors such as tudents and sub-groups such s the Shikuku's faction Agence France Presse, 1991a, 991b). Interestingly, after uccess the FORD fragments nd different factions enter in pen competition among each ther (Richburg, 1991). It is ypnotized that Moi conceded he multiparty elections	Kenya	1991	1	1	-Unknown perpetrators attacked offices belonging to the ruling party: the Kenya African National Union (GTD ID 199109280005) - Unknown perpetrators attacked offices belonging to the ruling party: the Kenya African National Union (GTD ID 199109280004) -The Kenya Union of Journalists said Tuesday that one of the leaders of the FORD Shikuku attempted to "instill fear in journalists, including editors, with the hope that this will make them take sides in politics". (Chazan, 1991) - Angry youths demanding an end t one-party rule set fire to two offices of Kenya's ruling party amid growing fears of political violence sparked by a crackdown on dissent (Agence France Presse, 1991b)

epresenting campaign uccess) knowing that the ampaign would have agmented.					
nti-Banda Malawi's 8 Catholic bishops egan the campaign, though nany diverse groups ollaborated in causing the nultiparty referendum. In October, the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) was reated specifically to ampaign nonviolently to end anda's regime. Actors erpetrating terrorist activities merged from the civil esistance movement. There is o evidence that these actors ere orchestrated and ontrolled by the main oalition. Terrorism and iolence is typically associated ith actors such as students nd workers (Malawians bring own 30-year dictator, 1992-993)	Malawi	1992	0	1	-Anti-government dissidents assaulted with arms a commercial center in Liongwe killing 30 people (GTD ID 199205060019) -Unknown perpetrators attacked the government owned 'People's Trading Center' in Blantyre (GTD ID 199205060020) -A store owned by Dr. Banda was attached by anti-government dissidents (Hunter, 1992)
nti-Banda	Malawi	1993	0	1	-Violent attacks by, mainly junior, soldiers on Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP: the paramilitary wing of the Malawi Congress Party) bases spread throughout the country. -The main MYP headquarters in Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu and Zomba were destroyed, often with the active participation of civilians, and within the week the power of the MYP had been broken: many were killed and most of the rest flec into exile in Mozambique (Wiseman, 1999).
nti-Burnham / Hoyte he terrorist attacks that merged from this civil esistance campaigns targets ainly facilities. Specific erpetrators' actors or groups ame are impossible to find ut the violence is associated o opposition parties. There is	Guyana	1990		0	-Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb in a government building GTD ID (199002030009) -Two bombings damaged a substation of state-owned Guyana Telecoms and water pumping station The government of this financially strapped South American country is concluding the

o evidence that the use of errorism constitute a coherent trategy orchestrated by the ivil resistance campaign as a hole (International News 990).					sale of 80 percent of Guyana Telecoms to Atlantic Tele-Network based in the Virgin Islands. Opposition parties and several Telecoms executives have criticized the sale (International News 1990) -Police found two unexploded bombs after two other explosions injured three people outside a telephone relay facility and a water authority pumping station (International News 1990).
nti-Calderon he July 2006 general election nat brought Calderón ecoming to power was seen s fraudulent. The opposition eader López Obrador rganized mass protests, narches, and civil isobedience, vowing not to top until the authorities greed to a ballot-by-ballot ecount. The beginning of 007. There is no evidence nat the terrorist attacks were a trategy orchestrated by the nain mass non-violent ampaign. Additionally, the erpetrators are never ssociated with the name of a articular organization Mexican citizens massively rotest presidential election esults, 2006)	Mexico	2006	1	0	-A group of civilians took four elections officials hostage demanding access to election material (GTD ID200607020015) -Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb at a bank and headquarters of the ORI in Mexico City (GTD ID 200611060005) -Unidentified gunmen opened fire a a Mexican congressman (Horacio Garza Garza) in the city of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico (GTD ID 200702190004)
nti-Diouf Diouf's main political pponent, Wade organized nass protest to sustain his lectoral campaign. There is o evidence that terrorist ttacks were planned centrally y Wade's organization Chenoweth, 2011)	Senegal	2000	1	1	-Wade, leader of the Democratic Party of Senegal, one of President Abdou Diouf's main challengers threatened violence (Mulero 2000) - Two houses of Rufisque Mayor Mbaye Jacques Diop, a senior rulin party member were destroyed by dissidents against the Diouf government (McKenzie 2000) - Democratic Party of Senegal dissidents set fire to the headquarters of the ruling Socialist Party as well as the Senegalese Liberal party –a rival opposition party- (BBC NEWS 2000)

ıntı-Fujimori)uring the campaign against ujimori's regime, some roups of protesters used iolence and burned overnment buildings Peruvians campaign to verthrow Dictator Alberto ujimori). Additionally, a few /eeks after the onset of mass issent, rebellious military nits staged a series of ccupations and took ostages, to pressure Fujimori › resign. Despite the fact that ıere is no evidence that the road campaign coalition rchestrated the terrorist ttacks, demonstrations were :aged in support of the ıutinous soldiers (Wn.com, 015).	Peru	2000	1	1	-Rebel Military Unit (GDT ID 200010290003) -Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb outside of the National Election Board offices in Lima around 10am. (GTD ID 200105160001) -Rebel Military Unit took five hostages, including an army genera Their action came just as President Alberto Fujimori been trying to calm the political turmoil (Wn.com 2015)
ıntı-PRI 'he popular revolutionary rmy was the armed wing of ıe Party of the Poor also nown as the Revolutionary Vorker Clandestine Union of ıe People Party. The group as been around in one form r another for more than three ecades. In the 1970s, it was nked to a guerrilla movement ıat the army put down rutally but effectively in the acific Coast state of Guerrero. The group, which ays it is affiliated with the opular Democratic .evolutionary Party (PDR) alls for a new constitution, hanges in economic policy Chicago Tribune, 1996). It ppears that the PDR enounced the supposed uerrilla. An unclassified ocuments of the American mbassy in Mexico reports ıat preoccupations that ttacks are probably a	Mexico	1998	0	0	- Rebels from the popular revolutionary army used automatic weapons to ambush an infantry detachment (GTD ID 199806220002) -Popular Revolutionary Army is blamed for the killing of police officers (International News 1998a) -Two local officials were killed Monday in an ambush authorities said was carried out by members of the ultra-leftist Popular Revolutionary Army (International Enws 1998b)

ublicity stunt by radicals and ut it also reports reoccupations that the “PDR ıay be headed for ıdicalization” UNCLASSIFIED ELEASED, NON ESPONSIVE DELEATED)					
ıntı-PRI	Mexico	2000	0	1	-Three people were injured after a police station was attacked by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (GTD ID 200007240003). -Villagers kidnapped two PRI officials (GTD ID 200008250003) - A group of about 20 masked rebel showed up Friday night and vowed to continue fighting Mexico's elites (International news 2000)
ıntı-Pinochet Movement ı 1983 Pinochet called lebiscites to bolster the ppearance of popular support. ı mid-1983 union leaders met ɔ establish a list of demands ɔr the government. The onfederation of Copper Vorkers (CTC) led by odolfo Seguel, organized the rowing popular dissent into rotest against the regime. On May 11, 1983, the CTC called ɔr the first major protest, hich had the support of the lational Workers’ Command ıd several opposition party aders (from the Communist arty and the Christian emocratic Party). The initial ay of protest spread ationally. After the success of ıis initial protest, the rganizing groups began to ıdependently call monthly rotests. After in 1987 inochet announced that the ational plebiscite would be eld to either approve or reject is continuation as president ıe opposition groups quickly rganized a unified campaign	Chile	1983	0	0	-Movement of the Revolutionary Left bombed a supermarket (GTD ID 198303240007) - Movement of the Revolutionary Left bombed a bank (GTD ID 198303240008) -Movement of the Revolutionary Left assaulted police unit (GTD ID 198304190002)

) defeat the plebiscite. There ; no evidence that the terrorist ttacks were part of the :rategy of the main onviolent campaign Chileans overthrow Pinochet egime, 1983-1988)					
nti-Pinochet Movement	Chile	1985	0	0	-Movement of the Revolutionary Left exploded a bomb in a State office building (GTD ID 198503260009) -Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front exploded a bomb in the Provencia Area of Santiago city (GTD ID 198504090003) -Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front exploded a bomb in the municipal building (GTD ID 198505140005)
nti-Pinochet Movement	Chile	1986	0	0	-Movement of the Revolutionary Left assaulted a public transport bu (GTD ID198602060004) -Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front exploded a bomb in the rood of Concepcion (GTD ID 198603180001) -Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front exploded a bomb in several busines building (GTD ID 198603260007)
nti-Pinochet Movement	Chile	1987	0	0	-Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front exploded a bomb in the Municipal building (GTD ID 198704300001) - Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front exploded a bomb in the San Ramon City Hall (GTD ID 198706210002) - Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front exploded a bomb in the Municipal Government Building (GTD ID198707300005)
nti-Pinochet Movement	Chile	1988	0	1	-Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front bombed a clinic for retired military personnel (GTD ID 198801210001 - Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front bombed an Hotel to kill Government Prosecutor (GTD ID 198801270002) -Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front bombed a government town hall (GTD ID 198801060001)
nti-Pinochet Movement	Chile	1989	0	1	-Movement of the Revolutionary Left assassinated owner of Liovor

					store (GTD ID 198901240004) - Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front bombed government building (GTI ID 198902210025) - Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front bombed civil registration Office (GTD ID 198903120003)
ıntı-Suharto)uring the campaign against uharto terrorist attacks were erpetrated by Muslim :udents against ethnically 'hinese Indonesians, blamed or the economic situation, Drogan, 1998; Ngo, 1999; ızzoni, 1999). Muslim :udents appear to be one of ıe many student groups articipating in the mass ıobilization alongside the eople's Democratic Union. lowever, there is no evidence ıat these attacks were rchestrated by a broader oalition (Indonesia overthrow resident Suharto, 1998)	Indonesia	1998	0	1	- Muslim youths group burned a church (Jatmiko, 1998) -Muslim youths group hijack ethnic Chinese (Grant, 1998) -Muslim youth attack ethnic Chinese (Torchia, 1998)
ıntı-Thaksin ormer supporter of Thaksin ondhi Limthongku frequently ccused Taksin of political orruption and successfully ıunched a massive 4-months rotest campaign using his ıedia empire of cable TV, ewspapers, magazines, ooks, CDs, and websites in rder to build political ıomentum. In 2006 a broader oalition composed by pposition groups and NGOs ıounted systematic protests nd rallies. There is no vidence that the terrorist ttacks are a strategy devised rganically by the broader esistance campaign (Urban 'hais overthrow Prime Minister Thaksin, Thailand, 005-2006).	Thailand	2005	1	0	- Thailand insurgents coordinately attacked governmental buildings (GTD ID 200504020009) -Unknown perpetrator killed a government official (GTD ID 200503260003) -Unidentified perpetrators shot and killed the Deputy Chief of Banang Star, Thailand. No group claimed responsibility for the assassination (GTD ID 200502240008).
ıntı-Thaksin	Thailand	2006	1	1	-A small bomb exploded near

					Thailand's Justice Ministry in Nonthaburi Province on the outskirts of Bangkok (GTD ID 200601270001) - Six bombs went off in downtown Bangkok, Thailand, on the Sukhumvit Road (GTD ID 200612310001) - An unidentified insurgent group set nine mobile phone towers in seven districts in Thailand on fire. There was no immediate claim of responsibility (GTD ID 200603030010)
ırgentina coup plot	Argentina	1987	1	1	-Unknown perpetrators bombed the Intransigent Party office (GTD ID 198701210002) - Unknown perpetrators bombed governmental regional office (GTD ID 198703300001) - Unknown perpetrators bombed th offices ministry of economy (GTD ID 198704030002)
ırgentina pro-democracy ıovement 'he military Junta headed by ieneral Jorge Vileda nplemented a program to rid ırgentinian society perceived overnment subversives. As ıany as 30,00 Argentinians isappeared. In spring 1977 ɔurteen mothers of that lost ıeir children started a ampaign to make isappearances public and ıount a civil resistance gainst the military junta. The Montoneros formed in the 60 nd thus is precedent to the nset of the nonviolent ıovement. Vileda anti-ubversives program included ıe destruction of the Montoneros and the guerrilla sed extensively terrorist iolence against the military ınta (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo campaign for emocracy and the return of	Argentina	1977	0	0	-Montoneros attempted to assassinate the President of Argentina Vileda (GTD ID 197702180001) -Unknown perpetrators kidnapped Argentinian ambassador in Venezuela (GTD ID 197707180002) -Montoneros assassinated an executive of governmental oil agency (GTD ID 197710210001)

ıeir 'disappeared' family ıembers, 1977-1983)					
ırgentina pro-democracy ıovement	Argentina	1978	0	0	-Montoneros assaulted a police unit (GTD ID 197803110003) -Montoneros assassinated Argentinian ministry of Economy (GTD ID 197804110001) -Montoneros assaulted a radio station (GTD ID 197807290001) Montoneros exploded a bomb in the apartment od a sales manager (GTD ID 197808130001)
ırgentina pro-democracy ıovement	Argentina	1979	0	0	-Montoneros assaulted the residenc of economic programming secretary (GTD ID 197909270006) - Montoneros attempted to assassinate the secretary of Treasur (GTD ID 197911070003) -Montoneros exploded a bomb in a official car (GTD ID 197911130005)
ırgentina pro-democracy ıovement	Argentina	1980	0	0	-Unknown perpetrator attempted to assassinate the director of the Taxi Drivers Union (GTD ID 198011110001) -Unknown perpetrator bombed the US embassy in Buenos Aires (GTD ID 198009260001) - Leftist terrorist group threats international newspaper in the capital (International News 1980)
ırgentina pro-democracy ıovement	Argentina	1982	0	1	-Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb in an international English School (GTD ID 198204000001) - Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb against a USA bank branch in Buenos Aires (GTD ID 198204010001) -Grupo Armado de Liberacion Argentina bombed yje Justicialist Party Cultural Center (GTD ID 198302030001)
ırgentina pro-democracy ıovement	Argentina	1983	0	1	-Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb in the home of the former provincial secretary General Emilio Castellanos (GTD ID198309130003) -2 April group exploded a bomb in International English School (GTD ID 198303240005)

					-2 April group exploded a bomb in International English School (GTD ID 198304060001)
angladesh Anti-Ershad n 1982, General Hussain Muhammed Ershad seized ower in Bangladesh. In 1986 residential elections were eld and Ershad won. lowever, the opposition arties contested the electoral esults for fraud. Mass obilization intensified after rshad attempt to pass a bill in arliament that would allow ilitary officers to serve on ocal district councils. In 1990 pposition groups were losely unified in their efforts o achieve the common goal of ringing the Ershad regime own. The opposition leaders mphasized the use of non- iolence the terrorist attacks ere perpetrated by violent roups acting independently om the organizations in the ass civil resistance campaign Bangladeshis bring down rshad regime, 1987,1990)	Bangladesh	1987	0	0	-Unknown perpetrators assassinated the textile ministry (GTD ID 198712090002) -Unknown perpetrators bomber a Ershad's Jatiya Party building (GTI ID 198710300001) -Two suspected opposition activists were killed in southern Khulna City when a bomb they were making exploded (REUT 1987)
angladesh Anti-Ershad	Bangladesh	1988	0	0	-Unknown perpetrators bomber a government building (GTD ID 198802290001) -Dozen of home-made bombs rocked the capital as parliamentary election voting began amid tight security following opposition threats to disrupt the poll (REUTEI 1988) -Unknown perpetrators bombed a government fair (GTD ID 198803250001)
angladesh Anti-Ershad	Bangladesh	1989	0	0	-Bangladesh Sarbahara Party assassinated Jatiya's party members (GTD ID 198906040002) -Two polling stations were burned down (International 1989) -Hundreds of bombs exploded across Bangladesh yesterday, the

					final day of a two-day national strike (GAM 1989)
angladesh Anti-Ershad	Bangladesh	1990	0	1	-Two women and three men have been shot dead in southern Chittagong and southwest Jessore districts in the past two days (REUT 1990) -Two people died in bomb attacks near central Manikganj town, officials said (REUT 1990) -Youth opposing Ershad attempt to set fire to a train and assaulted the police with homemade bombs (International 1990)
olivian Anti-Junta he military took control over ıe country in 1972 as political ıstability and economic ownturns were pervading olivia. The organizations at ıe lead of the civil resistance ıovement were The Bolivian Vorkers' Union (Central)brera Boliviana, COB) and ıe Confederation of Bolivian rivate Entrepreneurs Confederación de ımpresarios Privados de olivia, CEPB). These rganizations and their leaders dvocated nonviolent means f protest and did not support iolent acts (Bolivians ıccessfully oust military egime, 1982). Indigenous ıilitant groups, labor unions nd socialist groups started merging since 1940s (Becker, 016).	Bolivia	1979	0	1	-Revolutionary Left Movement assassinated former ministers in a military officers car (GTD ID 197910200001) -Unknown perpetrators bombed the tomb of former conservative president (GTD ID 197910110001) -Unknown perpetrators bombed Folk Club crowded with officials and journalists (GTD ID 197910270001)
olivian Anti-Junta	Bolivia	1980	0	1	-Revolutionary Worker party bombed a radio station (GTD ID 198002150006) -Unknown perpetrators bombed Comptroller General's House Residence (GTD ID 198005140001 -Bolivian Socialist Falange kidnapped Office of Santa Cruz Governor Walter Pereira (GTD ID 198006170004)

olivian Anti-Junta	Bolivia	1981	0	0	-Extreme Left assassinated Brig. Gen. Jorge Aguila Teran (GTD ID 198111190001) -Unknown perpetrators bombed high pressure pipeline (feeds La Paz's most important hydroelectric plant) (GTD ID 198110090002) -Unknown perpetrators bombed Santa Cruz- La Paz oil pipeline (GTD ID 198105190004)
olivian Anti-Junta	Bolivia	1982	0	1	-Unknown perpetrators assassinated General Lucio Anez Rivera (GTD ID 198201270003) -Unknown perpetrators bombed Armed Forces NCO Club (GTD ID 198209000001) -Unknown perpetrators bombed Home of Vice Admiral Oscar Pammo (GTD ID 198209170001)
edar Revolution iolent fringe groups acted ndependently from the rganizations in the civil esistance movement and ngaged in terrorist attacks uring the last phases of the ass civil resistance campaign 20 June 2005). There is no vidence these factions were ontrolled or orchestrated by ne broader united civil esistance coalition (Lebanese ampaign for democracy).	Lebanon	2005	0	1	-Unknown perpetrator bombed the car of an Hezbollah official (GTD ID 200512090004) -Unknown perpetrator bombed the car of pro-Syrian Lebanese Defence Minister, Elias Murr (GTD ID 200507120006) -Unknown perpetrator through a stick of dynamite at a parked car belonging to Syrian citizen (GTD ID 200602110001)
hechen separatists ince 1994, rebel groups have ttempted to separate hechnya from Russia. In 996 Russia's chief General lexander Lebed and Chechen ebel chief of staff Aslan askhadov sign a ceasefire nd in 1997 a peace treaty BBC). Maskhadov become hechen president but uffered increasing pressure om extremist opposition. He ondemned several times the errorist attacks carried out by xtremist Chechen separatist rganizations (Minorities at	Russia	1997	0	0	-Chechen rebels kidnapped a Russian journalist (GTD ID 199705100002) -Chechen rebels kidnapped Soldier Sergey Dyakun (GTD ID 199706260009) -People's Militia of Dagestan kidnapped a Russian journalist - (GTD ID 199712220004)

isk Project 2004)					
reece Anti-Military he democratic elements of ıe Greek society were pposed to the military junta om its installment via coup- 'état. In 1968 many militant roups promoting democratic ıle were formed, both in exile nd in Greece and the first rmed action against the junta as the failed assassination ttempt against the Regime as an attempted assassination f the colonel George apadopulus on 13 August 968. The mass nonviolent ampaign was initiated by the udents of the Athens olythecnic and spontaneously rew. There is no evidence ıat terrorist attacks were a ıctics embraced by the ampaign ıttp://www.bbc.co.uk/progra ımes/p00btwtl)	Greece	1973	0	0	-Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth bombed the private vehicle of a USA government employee (GTD ID 197303220001) -National Youth Resistance Organization exploded the car of ar European Exchange Service Employee (GTD ID 197304210001 -Unknown perpetrators assaulted a USA vehicle (GTD ID 197301070002)
reece Anti-Military	Greece	1974	0	1	-Popular resistance Sabotage Group bombed a senior naval officer privately owned vehicle (GTD ID 197406120002) - Popular resistance Sabotage Grou bombed a USA servicemen's vehicle (GTD ID 197406020002) -People's Resistance Organized Army bombed the Dow Chemical Plant (GTD ID 197402230002)
RA he IRA and other violent ıctions shared the broad olitical goal of the nonviolent eparatist movement. In 1967 RA initially participated in ıe organization of the lorthern Ireland Civil Rights lovement, but split in a rival roups after 1967 because isagreed over the failure of RA to protect their social ase from state violence (The	Northern Ireland	1968	0	0	-Multiple bombings by IRA (Background Information on Northern Ireland Society; Kane, 2015)

·ish History, 2015).					
RA :etween 1968 and 1999 the RA was the main dissident roup organizing and articipating in the civil war. 'his group and its subgroups arried out terrorist attacks uring the 1999-2006 onviolent campaign for ıdependence.	Northern Ireland	1999	0	1	Shots were fired at Woodburn Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) station in West Belfast, Northern Ireland. Police and politicians blamed the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) for the incident (GTD ID 199901140001) -Unknown perpetrators set fire at the Free Presbyterian Church in County Monaghan, Northern Irelan (GTD ID 199907030006) - Dublin, Ireland, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was suspected of shooting Alan Byrne, an outspoken witness of a killing three years ago (GTD ID 199903090001)
RA	Northern Ireland	2000	0	1	-Authorities blamed the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) for bombing a rural hotel in Irvines town, Northern Ireland (GTD ID 200002060001) -Members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army attacked Paul Macdonald (GTD ID 200005020004) -An explosive device was discovered in a park near Hillsborough Castle outside of Belfast, in County Antrim, Northerı Ireland. Authorities blame Republican dissidents for the attempted attack (GTD ID 200006190003)
RA	Northern Ireland	2001	0	1	-A bomb made of a coffee jar was thrown at a police car in Cooks town, Northern Ireland. No one wa harmed, and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was believed to be responsible. (GTD II 200101140003) - Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) members set off a car bomb in front of BBC television studios i London, England. No casualties resulted from the explosion becaus police had evacuated the area after having received a telephone

					warning. (GTD ID 200103040004) -A ten pounds bomb detonated outside a police station in Sion Mills, County Tyrone, Northern Ireland around 3am. Authorities suspected that the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) organization was behind the explosion. (GTD ID 200106010003
RA	Northern Ireland	2002	0	0	-A bomb exploded at a British Army training camp in the Northern Ireland town of Magilligan, injuring a civilian defence worker. Police suspected a group named the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA). (GTD ID 200202080001) -A bomb partially exploded outside of the Windsor House, a large offic complex in Belfast, County Antrim Northern Ireland. Media sources received a warning call from Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA). (GTD ID 200210250001) - The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was suspected responsible for placing a bomb in Belfast the incident. (GTD ID 200211250002)
RA	Northern Ireland	2003	0	0	- Two masked men in Belfast left a bomb in a van by, in front of the motor tax office few hours before the annual Belfast marathon. Police suspected that the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA). (GTD II 200305050002) - Members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) planted a bomb at the army base in Dungannon, Northern Ireland. Local police had received telephone warnings prior to the attack. (GTD ID 200311240005) -Members of the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) threw a coffee-jar bomb at a police car in Armagh, North Ireland. (GTD ID 200305070002)
RA	Northern Ireland	2004	0	0	-Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) gunmen fired up to thirty shots at workers in Londonderry, from an AK47 rifle. Bullets hit several cars and buildings. (GTD II

					200409080001) - Two petrol bombs were thrown at the home of Pat Ramsey a SDLP assembly member from Londonderry. (GTD ID 200409140002) -A firebomb detonated at a Next shopping outlet in Northern Ireland Authorities are blaming this attack and a spate of fire bombings in the area on dissident republicans (GTD ID 200503260006)
RA	Northern Ireland	2005	0	0	-Suspected Irish Republican Army members planted a pipe bomb at Gideon's Green. (GTD ID 200505020002) -Denis Bradley was attacked by a masked man with a baseball bat at a bar in Londonderry, Northern Ireland. Authorities suspect dissident republicans behind the attack since Bradley has been targeted previously. (GTD ID 200509200004) - Dissident republicans hijacked a taxi-cab at gunpoint, placed a bomb in the hijacked vehicle, and forced the driver to park outside Lurgan police station, where they intended the bomb to explode. (GTD ID 200508100014)
RA	Northern Ireland	2006	0	0	-Irish Republican Army suspected. Denis Donaldson, the former Sinn Féin member at the centre of the spy scandal which brought down the Northern Ireland Assembly, was found shot dead and his body was discovered by Gardaí at 5 p.m. at his home in County Donegal with a gunshot wound to his chest. (GTD ID 200604040015) -IRA suspected. British army explosives experts dismantled a crude van bomb that failed to detonate after it was left overnight near the main police station after gunmen hijacked a van the previous night on the Catholic west side of Londonderry. (GTD ID 200604130013)

					- A "viable" makeshift pipe bomb was thrown over a wall onto the grounds of a police station in Castlederg, County Tyrone, Northern Ireland. (GTD ID 200609230015)
slamic Salvation Front)uring the 1980s, the Islamist ıovement was not associated /ith terrorism and political iolence. FIS leadership was ommitted to refrain its ctivists from violence and it ever broke communications /ith the government. lowever a minority of ctivists were disappointed /ith the failure of nonviolent ıass dissident activities to roduce the desired goal and rmed independently of the ıore moderate organizations ventually engaging in :rrorism and sucesfully scalating the conflict (Hafez, 003; Dalacoura, 2011).	Algeria	1992	0	0	-Islamic Salvation Front bombed th Justice Ministry (GTD ID 199201310003) -Muslim Fundamentalist assassinated the Ministry of Justice (GTD ID 199203170002) - Islamic Salvation Front bombed University in Setif (GTD ID 199205050007)
.osovo Albanian 'he mass dissident campaign ıw the eruption of ontaneous forms of violence ince its veryonset ttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/spe ial_report/1998/kosovo/9974 .stm). There is no evidence ıat the nonviolent rganizations in the civil :sistance orchestrated the :rrorist attacks coordinating /ith violent flanks ıttp://www.refworld.org/doci /469f38f51e.html)	Yugoslavia	1990	0	0	-Albanian Separatists assaulted police unit (GTD ID 199002220010) -Albanian ethnic youth assaulted Serbian bus drivers (Fisher 1990) -Albanian villagers plan to attack Serbian neighborhood (Tanner 1990)
.osovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	1991	0	0	-Front of Resistance and National Liberation of Albanians assaulted police unit (GTD ID 199112300015) -Kosovo Albanian opened fire against a police patrol (Agence France Presse 1991) -Kosovo Albanian attacked a police

					patrol (Agence France Presse 1991)
TTE rom 1956 the Tamil Federal arty (FP) started mobilize onviolent demonstration and arches as a complement to stitutional political activities. adicalized claims emerged in 961, when 20 persons ssociated with the FP decided o form a separate nderground group -the Pupil adai- to fight for Tamil ndependence from Sri Lanka. rom 1972, Tamil political roups and organizations, ncluding PF and the more adical Tamil Student ederation, Tamil New Tiger TNT) unified under the mbrella of the Tamil United iberation Front (TULF) Rinehart 2013, Swami 1994). he formation of the TUF ncouraged to the creation of ne Tamil Youth League TYL,) in January 1973. Although strictly not a TULF ffiliate, it functioned as one nd brought numerous young amils under one banner" Swami 1994, 26). n 1975 the TYL spitted as art of the organization anted to function as the outh wing of the TULF, hile another part "were eginning to see the ainstream Tamil leadership s half-hearted tea-cup evolutionaries" (Swami 1994, 0). The split produced the LO a youth underground rganization that advocated rmed struggle (ibid). The 27th uly 1975 Tamil radicals erformed their first political ssassination killing Alfred hangarajah Duraiappah, Sri	Sri Lanka	1975	1	0	-Former Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah, was assassinated by Velupillai Prabhakaran, founder an leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), (GTD ID 197507270002) -Over following year LTTE escalated to full scale civil war (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013)

ankan Tamil, member of the arliament, and accused of upport for a Sinhalese party Rinehart 2013, 119; Swami 994, 30). LTTE was founded y a survivor of the ELO that ot decimated as a onsequence of police epression and eventually ained the leadership of the ntire campaign escalating the onflict to a large-scale onventional civil war Rinehart 2013). "The TULF oss (…) was not adverse to a it of violence, and thought it as the only way to send a essage or two to Colombo. vertly he would never admit is links with the "boys", and erely chose to heap lavish raises for their more daring xploits. He even told Uma at the LTTE should operate om the underground parallel the TULF mainstream olitics, but that arrangements hould remain a secret. But as iolence by the militants ontinued even after general lections, the TULF got orried.					
Madagascar pro-democracy ovement n 1996, the former military ictators: Didier Ratsiraka, hich had been forced from ower in 1993, was re-elected nto the government. By 2001 pposition under Marc avalomanana built into a ubstantial campaign seeking o oust the Radsiraka overnment. Ravalomanana's arty was aided by wide-scale rotests that were similar in haracter to those that first usted Ratsiraka in 1993 Randrianja, 2003). There is	Madagascar	2002	1	1	-Unidentified assailants launched hand grenades into the home of a Madagascar presidential spokesperson. The attack was thought to be retribution for suppor of pro-government demonstrations months prior. (GTD ID 200206150004) - Unidentified assailants launched hand grenades into the home of a Madagascar government official. The attack was thought to be retribution for support of pro-government demonstrations months prior (GTD ID 200206140004) - 100 young men armed with batons smashed their way into factories in

o evidence that the terrorist iolence was the product of ıe strategic decision of the ampaign. Additionally, the erpetrators of terrorist attacks re never associated with the ame of a particular rganization.					Madagascar's capital on Wednesda and coerced workers to join a rally for opposition presidential candidat Marc Ravalomanana, an employers leader told AFP (International New 2002)
Marxist rebels (URNG) our principal left-wing uerrilla groups--the Guerrilla ırmy of the Poor (EGP), the evolutionary Organization of ırmed People (ORPA), the ebel Armed Forces (FAR), nd the Guatemalan Labor arty (PGT)--conducted conomic sabotage and ırgeted government ıstallations and members of overnment security forces in rmed attacks. These rganizations combined to ɔrm the Guatemalan National evolutionary Unity (URNG) ı1982 ıttp://www.globalsecurity.org nilitary/world/war/guatemala ıtm)	Guatemala	1963	1	0	-In these early years (after 1960) th Guatemala insurgency focused on small-scale attacks and ambushes o police stations, military outposts and patrols. In urban areas they staged bombing kidnapping and assassinations of high-racked officials (Valentino 2013, 207)
Marxist rebels (URNG)	Guatemala	1964	1	0	-In these early years (after 1960) th Guatemala insurgency focused on small-scale attacks and ambushes o police stations, military outposts and patrols. In urban areas they staged bombing kidnapping and assassinations of high-racked officials (Valentino 2013, 207)
Marxist rebels (URNG)	Guatemala	1996	1	1	- Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity kidnapped the owner of Progreso Cement Co (GTD ID 199608250012) - Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity assaulted government building (GTD ID 199608120009) -Unknown perpetrators kidnapped postal worker (GTD ID 199602280056)

Moro National Liberation Front	Philippines	1976	0	1	-The Moro National Liberation Front kidnapped Chinese businessman (GTD ID 197607310001) - The Moro National Liberation Front assaulted a bus (GTD ID 197606170002) - The Moro National Liberation Front assaulted a bus (GTD ID 197605240001)
Nepalese Anti-government The CPN-M/UPF was for decades in war with the government. However, after the coup perpetrated by the King at the expenses of the institutional parties the CPN-M/UPF changed officially strategy. The group formed an alliance with mainstream political parties and participated in the organization and coordination of the civil resistance. While the CPN-M/UPF was officially committed to nonviolence in line with the official campaign, some of its sub-fuctions perpetrated terrorist attacks (Gobyn, 2009; Sindra and Prithvi, 2006).	Nepal	2006	0	1	-Anti-government guerrilla exploded a bomb in a marketplace in Pokhara city (GTD ID 200601020004) -Anti-government guerrillas asked employees to leave the (District) Survey Office in Butwal Municipality, western Nepal, before exploding a bomb (GTD ID 200601020005) -One woman was seriously injured when Maoist guerrillas detonated a bomb along the road in Lati Koili village (GTD ID 200601120004)
Nigeria Anti-Military In 1993 the military government nullified the results of presidential election. Pro-democracy mass protest escalated across all country and particularly in the southwest. “Even before […] June 1993, the Nigerian democracy movement had strong presence in the southwest” (Brennan 2004, 3). In 1994 there was a first attempt to unify various dissident groups under the umbrella of National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). However, the	Nigeria	1993			-Unknown troops stormed a Nigerian Airways jetliner held by hijackers at midnight tonight and freed two-dozen hostages. A flight attendant was reported killed in the crossfire (The Herald 1993) -The group, founded by a former weekly newspaper editor, called the hijackers a "suicide squad" and threatened to carry out more suicide attacks dedicated to ousting Nigeria's military-backed government (Mamane 1993) - Former head of the commission, Humphrey Nwosu, had not been seen since he signed a statement suspending as he was ospitalized after an attack on him (Agence

arious local dissident group emained utterly independent orm each other and many of nem were primarily focused n the achievement of their nort-term goals -- such as the irect administration of their erritory -- (Brennan 2004). 'here is no evidence that any entral organizational attempt vas made to orchestrate errorist violence or that inges using terrorist violence vere not doing so ndependently from other rganizations in the civil esistance movement.					France Presse 1993b)
Nigeria Anti-Military	Nigeria	1994			-Council of Popular Justice exploded a bomb in the home the the minister of transport and aviation (GTD ID 199408130002) - Council of Popular Justice exploded a bomb in the home the the minister of home and housing (GTD ID 199408130003) -Unknown perpetrator exploded a bomb in the home of the delegate o the National Consortium Confederation (GTD ID 199409020001)
Nigeria Anti-Military	Nigeria	1995			-Unknown perpetrators assassinate a politician (GTD ID 199510060010) -Youths assaulted soldiers (Gazy 1995)
Nigeria Anti-Military	Nigeria	1996	0	0	-United Front for Nigeria Liberatio bomber presidential aircraft (GTD ID 199601170002) -Unknown perpetrators assassinate the administrative director of Nigerian Central Bank (GTD ID 199605230001) -Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb in the weapons plant (GTD ID 199605310003)
Nigeria Anti-Military	Nigeria	1997	0	0	-Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb against the residence of a government official (GTD ID 199709250003) -Unknown perpetrators exploded a

					bomb in a market (GTD ID 199708150008) -Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb in a parking lot (GTD ID 199705160002)
Ilgeria Anti-Military	Nigeria	1998	0	1	-Villagers sabotaged oil pipeline (Ejime 1998) -Unknown perpetrators hijack the helicopter belonging to Diamond Offshore, a contractual firm to Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company Unlimited (Africa News 1998) -Village youths disrupted Shell's production in the Niger delta for several weeks in August during a campaign to protest lack of essentia services provided by the military government, which receives oil revenue from multinational companies (International News 1998c)
)goni movement tarting from the 90s the)goni people in the southwest ttempt to escalate a large- :ale protest against the overnment accused articularly of damaging the nvironment Nigeria's)uthern regions with xtensive oil production Chenoweth 2011). Despite ıe violent flanks appears to :t with terrorist violence elatively early after the mergence of the mass ıovement, there is no vidence that these were rchestrated by the leadership f the nonviolent campaign. 'here is also no evidence that ·inges using terrorist violence 'ere not doing so ıdependently from other rganizations in the civil :sistance (Factsheet on the)goni Struggle)	Nigeria	1993	0	1	-Plotters planned to carry out bomb attacks in the federal capital of Abuja, Lagos and Kaduna and blow up a key pipeline in northern Nigeria (Agence France Presse 1993a) -Villagers vandalized offshore oil rigs and conspired with disgruntled oil workers to cut pipelines (Faul 1993) -Shell alleges Ogoni movement included sabotage and attacks on its staff (McGreal 1993)
)range Revolution	Ukraine	2002	0	0	-Unknown perpetrators placed

he mass movement emerge ı 2004. Millions of emonstrators and protesters emanded a fair and free lection, after evidence of oting fraud perpetuated by ıe government in power came › light. The leadership of the ampaign were determinedly onviolent, with organizers aving been influenced by the ritings of Gene Sharp and ıe previous nonviolent olour Revolutions in Serbia Ukrainians overthrow ictatorship (Orange evolution), 2004). There is o evidence that the terrorist ttacks were orchestrate by the ivil resistance leadership.					targeted Odessa city persecutor wit a car-bomb (GTD ID 200201230001) -Unknown perpetrators assassinate a parliamentary candidate for the Social Democratic Party (GTD ID 200203300003) -An unknown perpetrator threw tw gasoline bombs at the house of a Ukrainian journalist who worked fo Fest and for Staryy Zamok regional newspapers in Berehove, Ukraine (GTD ID 200205110006)
akistan pro-democracy ıovement ı late 1983, in response of a loodless coup d'état by akistani military chief of taff, Muhammad Zia along ith outrage over failed romises to conduct national lections, a wave of mass emonstrations emerged in akistan. A coalition of eleven akistani political parties nown as the Movement for ıe Restoration of Democracy MRD) formed in 1983 to ressure the dictatorial regime f Muhammad Zia-ul Haq to old elections and suspend ıartial law (Zunes 2006). here is no evidence that the iolent flanks using terrorist ttacks to oppose the Zia egime where not acting ıdependently.	Pakistan	1983	1	0	-Unknown perpetrator bombed the office of the support Zia Movement (GTD ID 198308140001) -Pro Pakistan People Party youths assaulted with arms a police station (REUT 1983) -There have been numerous arson attacks, with offices of the "Suppor Zia Campaign" a favorite target. Reliable independent reports say over 20 people have been killed (Hoare 1983)
alestinian Liberation he first Palestinian Intifada tarted in 1987 with a pontaneous Palestinians	Palestinian Territories	1987	0	0	-Unknown perpetrators exploded a bomb against a group of Israeli teenagers (GTD ID 198607240013) -Palestinians assaulted the residenc

opular uprising against Israeli ccupation. In 1969 the alestine Communist Party roke Israeli ban for alestinian political activity in ıe occupied territories and penly advocated political ather then military methods. ince then small locally- overned institutions and rganizations flourished. 'landestine PLO affiliated ıilitary factions adopted the ame strategy to avoid loosing rip on local communities and arted playing a role in the uilding up of the ıfrastructure that would have ıade the first intifada ossible. By one month from ıe beginning of the intifada, LO factions founded the Inited National Leadership of ıe Uprising (UNLU). The INLU comprised one epresentative for each secular LO organization (Fatah,)emocratic Front of iberation of Palestine, the opular front for the liberation f Palestine and the Palestine 'ommunist Party) and had a oordinative function. lowever, each faction was esponsible of writing and istributing their own ommuniqués to Palestinians Stephan, 2009). "Factional ifferences led to tactical ifferences and the occasional suing of altogether different aflets" (Chenoweth and tephan 2011, 126). Among ıe UNLU factions the alestine Communist Party as the only committed to xclusively moderate means Chenoweth and Stephan 011, 126) as well as local articipants organizations and					of Israeli police (GTD ID 198708300004) -Palestinians assassinated an Israeli citizen (GTD ID 198712290001)

roups. On the contrary, the ther exiled PLO factions ere less prone to negotiation nd indeed more radical for esistance methods and goals. y the beginning of the mass-ased mobilizations, however, ll PLO factions officially oreswore the use of violence. espite the official ban of iolence PLO repeatedly alled local organizations and alestinians to kill one Israeli r each Palestinian. henoweth and Stephan, 011).					
alestinian Liberation	Palestinian Territories	1988	0	0	-Palestinian group bombed private home (GTD ID 198803060010) -Palestinian group assassinated Drilling/Contractor (GTD ID 198803170008) -Palestinian groups bombed grocery store (GTD ID 198810020001)
alestinian Liberation	Palestinian Territories	1989	0	0	-Palestinians killed Israeli collaborator in West Bank (GTD ID 198904250004) -Palestinians killed Israeli collaborator (GTD ID 198904180002) - The leader of a faction of PLO - Yasser Arafat- ordered 12 attacks on Israeli civilians since the beginning of 1989 (Tatro 1989)
alestinian Liberation	Palestinian Territories	1990	0	0	-Palestinian groups kidnapped Israeli collaborator (GTD ID 198810020001) -Palestinians assassinated Israeli bu driver (GTD ID 199001190007) -Palestinians assassinated Israeli collaborator (GTD ID 199001310003)
alestinian Liberation	Palestinian Territories	1991	0	0	-Palestinians killed Israeli collaborator (GTD ID 199102070011) -Palestinians killed Israeli collaborator (GTD ID 199102070012) Palestinians attempt to assassinate Israeli collaborator (GTD ID

					199103150009)
alestinian Liberation	Palestinian Territories	1992	0	0	-The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine killed an Israeli collaborator (GTD ID 199211070021) -Revolutionary Security Apparatus killed an Israeli collaborator (GTD ID 199206060002) -Hezbollah Palestine assaulted a bu carrying Israeli Settlers (GTD ID 199201140014)
eople Power 'he emergence of a civil esistance campaign came uch later than the evelopment of armed pposition to Marcos. Up to ıe early 1980s while most of ıe non-violent political forces ere quiescent fringe lements in the Christian hurches, the intelligentsia, nd a few opposition oliticians allied themselves ith the communists armed pposition. "This alliance etween anti-Marcos oliticians and the ommunists, however, was ssentially tactical and was ıarked by a high degree of istrust and opportunism on oth sides" (186) 'The use of violence was ejected by the Catholic 'hurch as well as other ıaller religious groups, the ulk of big business, the ıiddle class, and members of ıe under-classes newly ıobilized by the Aquino ssassination Butthis must be ualified. Certain key ıembers of the Catholic ierarchy clearly condoned iolent methods. Some Jesuit riests had links with guerrilla rmies" (185)	Philippine	1983	0	0	-New People's Army assaulted two Army vehicles (GTD ID 198303190005) -New People's Army assaulted Zambo Wood Corporation (GTD II 198304250010) -New People's Army assassinated a mayor (GTD ID 198311010005)

eople Power	Philippine	1984	0	0	-New People's Army attacked villagers (GTD ID 198402090006) -Unknown perpetrators assassinated the Mayor Recaredo Castillo (GTD ID 198404000005) - New People's Army attacked a truck of a construction firm (GTD ID 198405030004)
eople Power	Philippine	1985	0	1	-New People's Army kidnapped vice president of Mindanao Steel Corp. (GTD ID 198505050005) - New People's Army assaulted a power station (GTD ID 198505100028) - New People's Army attacked government installations (GTD ID 198505300008)
eople Power	Philippine	1986	0	1	- New People's Army kidnapped th mayor of Villaverde Town (GTD II 198601030005) - New People's Army kidnapped th mayor of Barabgay (GTD ID 198602070006) - New People's Army assaulted Barngay Naga (GTD ID 198602170004)
alvadoran Civil Conflict 'he civil resistance campaign ı Salvador was stimulated by ıe action of religious groups ıat in 1974 called for a first ational meeting of ampesinos' organizations, niversity groups and trade nions (Wood 2003). It ppears that the early leaders f the People's Liberation orces routinely using terrorist ctivities were also part of the ırgest civil resistance rganizations capable of ıobilizing tens of thousands f Salvadorans: the Popular .evolutionary Block (Wood 002, 92-93). This rganizations operated as an ffective armed wing of the issident movement.	El Salvador	1977	0	0	-People's Revolutionary Army kidnapped a Salvadorian industrialist (GTD ID 197701270001) -People's Liberation Forces kidnapped Salvadorian foreign ministry (GTD ID 197704190001) -People's Liberation Forces assaulted radio station (GTD ID 197706240003)

alvadoran Civil Conflict	El Salvador	1978	0	0	-People's Liberation Forces is responsible for an explosion in the Headquarters of the National Conciliation Party (GTD ID 197802280001) -People's Liberation Forces is responsible for an explosion at the Jose Simon Canas Central America University (GTD ID 197803300001) -People's Liberation Forces assaulted the Supreme Court of Justice (GTD ID 197805150004)
alvadoran Civil Conflict	El Salvador	1979	1	0	-People's Revolutionary Army attempted to detonate a bomb in the ministry of Labor (GTD ID 197902020001) -People's Revolutionary Army exploded a bomb at the Municipal building of Cuscatancingo (GTD II 197903240006) -Pleople' s Liberation Forces kidnapped employees of Radio Internatcional YSC (GTD ID 197905100008)
econd People Power Iovement 'he second people power ıovement involved hundred f thousands individual ilipinos and a wide range of rganizations among whom ıe CCP. The early months of 000 had witness a series of emonstrations elsewhere in ıe metropolis by labor, easant, poor, and other rganizations associated with ıction of the CCP, whose :aders had been drawn into lectoral alliances of onvenience with mainstream ıachine politicians since the ıte 1980s (Hedman 2006, 74-175). In January 2001 longside with contingents of ankers, corporate executives, nd stockbrokers from Makati 'ere jeepney drivers and	Philippine	2001	0	1	-Unidentified gunmen killed Rodolfo Aguinaldo, a member of the House of Representatives, wher he was outside his home in Tuguegarao, Cagayan province, Philippines. One of Aguinaldo's bodyguards was killed in the attack as well. The New People's Army (NPA), a branch of the National Democratic Front (NDF), later said they were responsible for the attack claiming that Aguinaldo's crimes against citizens in the area made him deserving of death (GTD ID 200106120001) -New People Army assassinated the deputy police chief of Mindoro Occidental Province, Winston Ebersole, was shot and killed by two members of the New People's Army (NPA) in San Jose, Philippines. (GTD 200108290017) -Florencio Munoz, a mayoral candidate, was assassinated in Camalig, Philippines by three

actory workers affiliated with ne Kilusag Mayo CCUno KMU; May First Movement), easants from the Kilusang Magsasaka ng Pilipinas Philipine Paesant Movement), nd veterans from established eft organizations like Bayan New Nationalist Alliance) nd Akbayan (Citizens'Action arty) who had been leading nti-Estrada demonstration in stablished sites of Left rotest elsewhere in Metro Manila for many months Hedman, 2006: 174-175). Most notably, in 2001, the PP-NPA (…) joined efforts o remove Estrada from office nd replace him with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo International Crisis Group, 011: 8). Despite CPP-NPA articipation in nonviolent ctivities in the context of the econd people power ovement there is evidence at sections of the rganization engaged in errorist acttacks as method of ontentious political activity gainst the Estrada regime. artlcularly targeting overnment figures of Estrada oalition. There is no evidence at the engagement in errorist attacks of CPP-NPA's ub-factions was an organic ecision of the broader mbrella organization.					suspected communist rebels. (200104210001)
outh Africa Second Defiance ampaign he second defiance ampaigns emerged ffectively from 1983 "after ne rejection of political eforms and the creation of ne United Democratic ront (UDF), which acted as	South Africa	1990	1	1	-African National Congress (South Africa) bombed electrical power plants (GTD ID 199002180001) - African National Congress (South Africa) bombed local Government offices (GTD ID 199003250003) - African National Congress bombed Newlands Ckriket Grounds (GTD ID 199002120007)

n umbrella organization oordinating hundreds of rganizations and diverse ɔcal struggles into an ffective national ntiapartheid struggle" Chenoweth and Shock 2015 44). Many violent groups erpetrating terrorist attacks to ɔ obtain political reforms (for xample African National 'ongress) had emerged during ıe first wave of civil ɛsistance. While the UDF ıcorporated a range of onviolent actions there is no vidence that the fringes using ɛrrorist violence were not oing so independently from ther organizations in the civil ɛsistance or that the main mbrella organization rchestrated the attacks.					
outh Africa Second Defiance 'ampaign	South Africa	1991	1	1	-The African National Congress assaulted a meeting of the Inkatha Movement (GTD ID 199108100019) - The African National Congress assaulted the Inkatha Groups (GTD ID 199103090004) -African National Congress assaulted the Inkatha freedom Party (GTD ID 199102100004)
outh Africa Second Defiance 'ampaign	South Africa	1992	1	1	-Alpha claimed responsibility for the killings of whites in November 1992 (Xinhua General News Service 1993) -Alpha claimed responsibility for the killings of whites in December 1992 (Xinhua General News Service 1993) -Alpha claimed responsibility for the killings for an ambush of a school bus south of johannesburs in March1992 (Xinhua General News Service 1993)
outh Africa Second Defiance 'ampaign	South Africa	1993	1	1	-Six children of Inkatha supporters were killed by unknown perpetrators (International 1993)

					-The Pan African Congress is allegedly responsible for an armed attacks to an Hotel in which five whites were killed (AP 1993) -The Azanian National Liberation Army killed 5 whites in a bar attack (Hamilton Spectator 1993)
outh Africa Second Defiance Campaign	South Africa	1994	1	1	- African National Congress (South Africa) assaulted members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (GTD ID 199411200006) - African National Congress (South Africa) assaulted members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (GTD ID 199407090002) - African National Congress (South Africa) assaulted members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (GTD ID 199407090002)
Timorese resistance following the initial invasion of East Timor by the ndonesian military, and the ubsequent violent oppression of the Timorese independence novement, the Indonesian nilitary continued to occupy ne country, violently ppressing the inhabitants of ne region. During the late 980s, remnants of the Fretilin esistance movement and thers started another period of resistance against the ndonesian military Brunnstrom, 2003). Mattiew ardine an international ournalist reports that in late 0s, the East Timorese esistance group FALINTIL vas far from marginalized and olated and had a highly rganized network of nderground activists in Dili nd in other towns (Retbol 98184-188). These ndergrounds were the groups esponsible for the emergence nd coordination of the onviolent dissident campaign	East Timor	1998	1	1	-The Ninjas Timorese resistance group (199802100003) -Timor Socialist Party (Internationa Associated Press, 1998 November 5; 1998 November 6) -Rebels shoot East Timor teacher dead in front of student (Agence France Presse, 1998 December 2)

gainst Suharto in 1988-1999. ven though the "East imorese leadership explicitly rohibited targeting ıdonesian civilians with iolence, and the leader of the imorese resistance, Xanana usmao, openly declared his version to (…) violence uring the popular struggle" Stephan 2006, p.76) some roups had no intention of nilaterally refuse the use of iolence. It appears, in fact, ıat radical flanks enacted errorist actions independently om the leadership of the ıovement as the nonviolent ampaign grew in a well-stablished mass-based ıovement.					
imorese resistance	East Timor	1999	1	1	-Hilario Gustavo, a resident of Caiceli, Darulete, was kidnapped and then stabbed to death in Manufatia, East Timor, Indonesia. Police suspected that the attack was perpetrated by a pro-independence group because Gustavo was a member of Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron), a pro-Indonesia militia group (199906170004) -A public bus traveling from Banda Aceh to Medan was ambushed by unidentified assailants and set on fire in Dili, East Timor, Indonesia, after all the passengers were forced off the vehicle. There were no casualties, but the bus was badly damaged (199907170005) -Est Timor Rebels (International Associated Press, 1999 April 13)

Vest Papua Anti-Occupation lard-line actors and groups uch as the Free West Papua lovement emerged as early s 1965 in the conflict for ndependence of Papua from ndonesia. From 1985 the Free apua Movement ncompassed both military nd political wings (Gault-Villiams, 1987). In 2000, here were indications, from he activities of community nembers, that the Free Papua lovement was employing a olitical approach (BBC lonitoring International eports, 2000). It appears that he Free Papua Movement articipated in the broader oalition coordinating civil esistance campaign and stuck o nonviolent methods for the uration of 2000 (The ssociated Press, 1999 lovember 29). However in 001 resumed the use of iolence. There is no evidence hat the decision to start errorist attacks was taken by he broader coalition.	West Papua	2000	0	0	-Hard-line separatists in Irian Jaya - known locally as West Papua - hav stepped up attacks against Indonesian security forces and migrant settlers this month following the anniversaries of two unsuccessful independence declarations (Curran 2000) -Four non-native settlers were kille by rebels (The Advertiser 2000) -Four non-native settlers were kille by rebels (The Advertiser 2000)
Vest Papua Anti-Occupation	West Papua	2001	0	0	-Rebels associated with the Free Papua Movement (OPM) kidnappe 16 people from the town of Merauke, Indonesia. The group asked for $1 million U.S., the removal of police forces from the Asiki region and a halt to all logging (200101160002) -Six people were wounded in an attack on a police post and market

					by the Free Papua Movement (200108270016) -The Free Papua Movement attacked a police post (200108270015).
Vest Papua Anti-Occupation	West Papua	2003	0	0	-Suspected members of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) shot and killed one person and injured three others in the village of Ugimba, in Indonesia's Papua Province. (200311020002) -Indonesian police, investigating th shooting of two women including the wife of a known human rights campaigner, came under fire from unknown gunmen in the Papuan capital Jayapura. One military officer accompanying the policeme was wounded when three bullets hi his car (200301010015) -A construction worker was shot dead in an attack some 1,000 kilometres west of Jayapura, the capital of Indonesia's Papua province. The attack was allegedly perpetrated by the members of the separatist Free Papua Movement (Xinhua General Service, 2003 November 5)
Vest Papua Anti-Occupation	West Papua	2004	0	0	-Suspected members of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement) - OPM killed six workers traveling in a convoy heading from Ilu Sub-District to Mulia, Indonesia (200410120001) -At least six people were killed when alleged Free Papua Movemer (OPM) separatist rebels opened fire on a procession of cars belonging t the PT Modern contractor company in Puncak Jaya District, Papua Province, Indonesia. No group claimed responsibility for the attack (200410140010) - A policeman and an election official were killed in Indonesia's easternmost province of Papua before Monday's legislative elections (Agence France Presse

					2004 April 5)

Table 2) One-way tabulations decomposing terrorism occurrence into between (civil resistance campaigns) and within (years) components in panel data

Terrorism occurrence	Overall		Between		Within percent
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	
No	211	69.41	86	80.37	90.68
Yes	93	30.59	38	35.51	76.35
Total	304	100.00	124	115.89	86.29
N=107					

Table 3: Transition probabilities of terrorism occurrence

Terrorism occurrence	Terrorism occurrence in the following year		Total
	No	Yes	
No	134	17	151
No percentage	88.74	11.26	100.00
Yes	12	53	65
Yes percentage	18.46	81.54	100.00

Table 4: One-way tabulations decomposing civil resistance campaigns' hierarchy occurrence into between (civil resistance campaigns) and within (years) components in panel data

Hierarchy	Overall		Between		Within percent
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	
No	206	68.67	79	70.83	93.97
Yes	94	31.33	39	36.45	84.02
Total	300	100.00	118	110.26	90.68
N=107					

Table 5: Transition probabilities of civil resistance campaigns' hierarchy occurrence

Hierarchy	Hierarchy in the following year		Total
	No	Yes	

No	127	8	135
No percentage	94.07	5.93	100.00
Yes	4	55	58
Yes percentage	5.48	94.83	100.00

Table 6: Descriptive statistics

VARIABLE	Obs.	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Campaign substantial political gains	307	.394	.489	0	1
Campaign success	302	.218	.413	0	1
Terrorism occurrence	304	.305	. 461	0	1
Riots	299	.538	.499	0	1
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)	393	.430	.495	0	1
Hierarchy	300	.313	.464	0	1
Democracy (lag)	307	.247	.423	0	1
Duration (log)	307	1.208	.514	.693	2.708
Campaign Size	242	2.537	1.477	0	5
Repression	298	1.993	1.208	0	3
Cold War	307	.641	.480	0	1
GDP per capita (log)	305	7.799	1.177	5.153	10.402

Table 7: Collinearity diagnostics

Variable	VIF
Terrorism occurrence	1.24
Riots	1.28
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)	1.32
Hierarchy	1.21
Democracy (lag)	1.19
Duration (log)	1.25
Campaign Size	1.14
Repression	1.47
Cold War	1.37
GDP per capita	1.26

Test 1) Likelihood ratio test Models 1 and 2, Table 2

chi2(2) = 9.33

Prob > chi2 = .00

Table 8: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains (SD clustered by country)

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.478**	0.087				
	(0.221)	(0.217)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.706***				
		(0.564)				
Hierarchy	-0.036	-0.450	-0.144	-0.316	-0.054	0.340
	(0.212)	(0.294)	(0.206)	(0.365)	(0.212)	(0.343)
Democracy (lag)	-0.406	-0.542**	-0.335	-0.341	-0.306	-0.331
	(0.249)	(0.257)	(0.236)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.242)
Campaign size	0.360***	0.405***	0.364***	0.380***	0.353***	0.347***
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.083)
Duration (log)	0.900**	0.912**	0.930***	0.951***	0.739**	0.831**
	(0.351)	(0.365)	(0.338)	(0.334)	(0.335)	(0.351)
Repression	-0.188**	-0.195**	-0.183*	-0.200**	-0.189**	-0.186**
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Cold War	-0.412**	-0.375*	-0.478**	-0.467**	-0.606***	-0.602***
	(0.200)	(0.198)	(0.206)	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.209)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0827	-0.138	-0.0888	-0.105	-0.133	-0.132
	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Years without progress (log)	-1.142***	-1.067***	-1.156***	-1.160***	-1.053***	-1.120***
	(0.252)	(0.260)	(0.248)	(0.245)	(0.241)	(0.258)
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.126	0.005		
			(0.224)	(0.262)		
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.396		
				(0.517)		
Riots					0.0870	0.281
					(0.186)	(0.241)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.611
						(0.396)
Constant	-0.376	0.028	-0.228	-0.082	0.343	0.162
	(0.985)	(0.906)	(1.032)	(1.008)	(0.908)	(0.905)
Observations	236	236	234	234	231	231

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains with alternative measure for control variables (SD clustered by campaign)

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.427**	0.079				
	(0.218)	(0.229)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.320***				
		(0.476)				
Hierarchy	-0.0797	-0.452	-0.170	-0.375	-0.0867	0.253
	(0.226)	(0.293)	(0.226)	(0.345)	(0.226)	(0.312)
Regime type (lag)	-0.022	-0.029*	-0.019	-0.020	-0.016	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Estimated campaign size	0.590***	0.644***	0.590***	0.616***	0.574***	0.564***
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.122)
Duration (log)	1.029***	1.077***	1.046***	1.080***	0.868**	0.943***
	(0.362)	(0.385)	(0.357)	(0.360)	(0.346)	(0.357)
Repression	-0.177**	-0.188**	-0.174*	-0.192**	-0.172*	-0.169*
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Post Cold War	0.448**	0.422*	0.504**	0.495**	0.601***	0.603***
	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.217)	(0.223)	(0.230)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.103	-0.149*	-0.101	-0.118	-0.142*	-0.137
	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Years without progress (log)	-1.190***	-1.140***	-1.197***	-1.210***	-1.102***	-1.159***
	(0.239)	(0.253)	(0.238)	(0.241)	(0.230)	(0.245)
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.152	-0.006		
			(0.227)	(0.249)		
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.512		
				(0.458)		
Riots					0.0295	0.203
					(0.199)	(0.249)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.526
						(0.401)
Constant	-0.604	-0.216	-0.590	-0.410	-0.156	-0.335
	(0.818)	(0.828)	(0.882)	(0.862)	(0.806)	(0.823)
Observations	238	238	236	236	233	233

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains with alternative measure for control variables (SD clustered by country)

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.427**	0.079				
	(0.214)	(0.210)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.320***				
		(0.503)				
Hierarchy	-0.079	-0.452	-0.170	-0.375	-0.086	0.253
	(0.206)	(0.301)	(0.201)	(0.348)	(0.204)	(0.306)
Regime type (lag)	-0.022	-0.029*	-0.019	-0.020	-0.016	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Estimated campaign size	0.590***	0.644***	0.590***	0.616***	0.574***	0.564***
	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.124)	(0.121)	(0.124)
Duration (log)	1.029***	1.077***	1.046***	1.080***	0.868**	0.943**
	(0.370)	(0.387)	(0.360)	(0.359)	(0.355)	(0.367)
Repression	-0.177**	-0.188**	-0.174*	-0.192**	-0.172*	-0.169*
	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.088)
Post Cold War	0.448**	0.422*	0.504**	0.495**	0.601***	0.603***
	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.220)	(0.215)	(0.212)	(0.220)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.103	-0.149	-0.101	-0.118	-0.142	-0.137
	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Years without progress (log)	-1.190***	-1.140***	-1.197***	-1.210***	-1.102***	-1.159***
	(0.248)	(0.255)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.241)	(0.257)
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.152	-0.006		
			(0.218)	(0.254)		
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.512		
				(0.504)		
Riots					0.029	0.203
					(0.185)	(0.246)
Riot*Hierarchy						-0.526
						(0.379)
Constant	-0.604	-0.216	-0.590	-0.410	-0.156	-0.335
	(0.897)	(0.852)	(0.967)	(0.930)	(0.854)	(0.853)
Observations	238	238	236	236	233	233

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11 The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns full success

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign full success	(2) Campaign full success	(3) Campaign full success	(4) Campaign full success
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)	0.035	0.065		
	(0.231)	(0.263)		
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy		-0.092		
		(0.452)		
Hierarchy	-0.047	-0.006	0.041	0.149
	(0.233)	(0.342)	(0.229)	(0.320)
Democracy (lag)	-0.089	-0.086	-0.043	-0.047
	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.258)	(0.256)
Campaign size	0.288***	0.285***	0.315***	0.314***
	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Duration (log)	-0.143	-0.146	-0.232	-0.226
	(0.212)	(0.213)	(0.227)	(0.230)
Repression	-0.124	-0.121	-0.108	-0.105
	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Cold War	-0.387*	-0.392*	-0.484**	-0.487**
	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.233)	(0.234)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.162*	-0.158	-0.255***	-0.253***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Riots			-0.265	-0.205
			(0.215)	(0.258)
Riots*Hierarchy				-0.176
				(0.388)
Constant	0.460	0.425	1.265	1.215
	(0.855)	(0.857)	(0.779)	(0.779)
Observations	234	234	231	231

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns full success with alternative control variables

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign full success	(2) Campaign full success	(3) Campaign full success	(4) Campaign full success	(5) Campaign full success	(6) Campaign full success
Terrorism	0.167	-0.065				
	(0.227)	(0.250)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		0.743				
		(0.519)				
Hierarchy	-0.025	-0.253	-0.071	-0.056	0.003	0.055
	(0.230)	(0.293)	(0.229)	(0.327)	(0.226)	(0.305)
Regime type (lag)	0.004	-0.000	0.006	0.006	0.011	0.011
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Estimated campaign size	0.484***	0.500***	0.466***	0.465***	0.496***	0.494***
	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Duration (log)	-0.001	0.045	-0.037	-0.037	-0.117	-0.115
	(0.230)	(0.224)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.242)	(0.244)
Repression	-0.129	-0.135	-0.130	-0.129	-0.115	-0.113
	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.092)
Post Cold War	0.316	0.295	0.343	0.344	0.425*	0.427*
	(0.238)	(0.234)	(0.231)	(0.230)	(0.237)	(0.238)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.184**	-0.206**	-0.171*	-0.170*	-0.259***	-0.258***
	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.059	0.071		
			(0.228)	(0.261)		
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0) *Hierarchy				-0.035		
				(0.446)		
Riots					-0.273	-0.242
					(0.226)	(0.269)
Riots* Hierarchy						-0.086
						(0.386)
Constant	0.053	0.273	0.064	0.051	0.765	0.734
	(0.744)	(0.738)	(0.803)	(0.810)	(0.681)	(0.677)
Observations	238	238	236	236	233	233

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns political gains with Multinomial Logit Models (SD clustered by campaign, base 0)

VARIABLES	(1) Progress	(2) Progress
Terrorism	0.781**	0.143
	(0.352)	(0.387)
Terrorism*Hierarchy	-0.137	-0.732*
	(0.329)	(0.425)
Hierarchy		2.211***
		(0.732)
Democracy (lag)	-0.553*	-0.656*
	(0.326)	(0.338)
Duration (log)	-0.141	-0.0110
	(0.298)	(0.286)
Campaign size	0.646***	0.709***
	(0.123)	(0.126)
Repression	-0.232*	-0.244*
	(0.140)	(0.143)
Cold War	-0.913***	-0.845***
	(0.323)	(0.309)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0514	-0.102
	(0.160)	(0.153)
Years without progress (log)	-0.658**	-0.604**
	(0.301)	(0.298)
Constant cut1	-1.068	-1.329
	(1.334)	(1.250)
Constant cut2	0.110	-0.115
	(1.295)	(1.224)
Observations	251	251

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains with alternative temporal control variables

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.410*	0.044				
	(0.221)	(0.236)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.602***				
		(0.538)				
Hierarchy	-0.0788	-0.446	-0.197	-0.320	-0.098	0.354
	(0.252)	(0.289)	(0.253)	(0.368)	(0.251)	(0.359)
Democracy (lag)	-0.352	-0.485*	-0.274	-0.281	-0.279	-0.308
	(0.248)	(0.253)	(0.234)	(0.239)	(0.238)	(0.238)
Campaign size	0.360***	0.397***	0.368***	0.379***	0.360***	0.357***
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Duration (log)	0.927***	0.963***	0.976***	0.991***	0.742**	0.848***
	(0.338)	(0.371)	(0.328)	(0.327)	(0.320)	(0.328)
Repression	-0.200**	-0.203**	-0.193**	-0.206**	-0.196**	-0.196**
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.094)
Cold War	-0.420*	-0.396*	-0.474**	-0.470**	-0.583***	-0.575**
	(0.219)	(0.216)	(0.219)	(0.217)	(0.224)	(0.229)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0886	-0.141	-0.105	-0.116	-0.135	-0.134
	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.091)
Years without progress	-0.529*	-0.454	-0.502*	-0.505*	-0.457	-0.510
	(0.307)	(0.329)	(0.299)	(0.299)	(0.297)	(0.311)
Years without progress square	-0.060	-0.064	-0.078	-0.076	-0.075	-0.074
	(0.119)	(0.128)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.124)
Years without progress cube	0.012	0.011	0.014	0.014	0.013	0.014
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.033	-0.054		
			(0.237)	(0.257)		
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.294		
				(0.487)		
Riots					0.008	0.223
					(0.199)	(0.251)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.704
						(0.433)
Constant	-0.334	0.022	-0.135	-0.030	0.359	0.159
	(0.903)	(0.889)	(0.976)	(0.966)	(0.909)	(0.909)
Observations	236	236	234	234	231	231

Table 15: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains including anti-colonial campaigns (SE clustered by campaigns)

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.587***	0.170				
	(0.212)	(0.224)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.373***				
		(0.473)				
Hierarchy	-0.055	-0.472*	-0.075	-0.219	-0.013	0.316
	(0.211)	(0.282)	(0.211)	(0.329)	(0.218)	(0.337)
Democracy (lag)	-0.547**	-0.683***	-0.552**	-0.549**	-0.438*	-0.467**
	(0.242)	(0.250)	(0.228)	(0.229)	(0.233)	(0.233)
Campaign size	0.401***	0.443***	0.368***	0.385***	0.352***	0.345***
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.089)
Duration (log)	0.000	0.082	0.153	0.151	0.145	0.169
	(0.216)	(0.209)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.230)	(0.235)
Repression	-0.182**	-0.200**	-0.224**	-0.232**	-0.264***	-0.262***
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Cold War	-0.532***	-0.511***	-0.561***	-0.554***	-0.685***	-0.692***
	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.189)	(0.203)	(0.209)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0725	-0.119	-0.102	-0.115	-0.188**	-0.189**
	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Years without progress (log)	-0.579***	-0.548***	-0.725***	-0.714***	-0.680***	-0.711***
	(0.188)	(0.192)	(0.201)	(0.193)	(0.204)	(0.216)
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.215	0.099		
			(0.220)	(0.244)		
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.323		
				(0.447)		
Riots					0.119	0.277
					(0.192)	(0.252)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.485
						(0.410)
Constant	0.245	0.565	0.668	0.779	1.451*	1.375*
	(0.831)	(0.788)	(0.861)	(0.856)	(0.798)	(0.806)
Observations	251	251	253	253	248	248

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Test 2: Likelihood ratio test Models 1 and 2, Table 13

chi2(2) = 8.28

Prob > chi2 = .015

Table 16: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains including anti-colonial campaigns (SD clustered by country)

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.587***	0.170				
	(0.208)	(0.205)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.373***				
		(0.494)				
Hierarchy	-0.055	-0.472	-0.075	-0.219	-0.013	0.316
	(0.189)	(0.288)	(0.187)	(0.324)	(0.192)	(0.329)
Democracy ()lag	-0.547**	-0.683***	-0.552**	-0.549**	-0.438**	-0.467**
	(0.238)	(0.250)	(0.222)	(0.224)	(0.222)	(0.222)
Campaign Size	0.401***	0.443***	0.368***	0.385***	0.352***	0.345***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.092)
Duration (log)	0.000	0.082	0.153	0.151	0.145	0.169
	(0.214)	(0.205)	(0.226)	(0.222)	(0.235)	(0.241)
Repression	-0.182**	-0.200**	-0.224**	-0.232**	-0.264***	-0.262***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Cold War	-0.532***	-0.511***	-0.561***	-0.554***	-0.685***	-0.692***
	(0.189)	(0.187)	(0.191)	(0.186)	(0.190)	(0.197)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0725	-0.119	-0.102	-0.115	-0.188**	-0.189**
	(0.102)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Years without progress (log)	-0.579***	-0.548***	-0.725***	-0.714***	-0.680***	-0.711***
	(0.185)	(0.183)	(0.200)	(0.189)	(0.219)	(0.231)
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.215	0.099		
			(0.210)	(0.241)		
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.323		
				(0.479)		
Riots					0.119	0.277
					(0.182)	(0.246)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.485
						(0.372)
Constant	0.245	0.565	0.668	0.779	1.451*	1.375
	(0.924)	(0.857)	(0.935)	(0.908)	(0.844)	(0.842)
Observations	251	251	253	253	248	248

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 17: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains including anti-colonial campaigns (SD clustered by campaign)

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.587***	0.170				
	(0.212)	(0.224)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.373***				
		(0.473)				
Hierarchy	-0.055	-0.472*	-0.075	-0.219	-0.013	0.316
	(0.211)	(0.282)	(0.211)	(0.329)	(0.218)	(0.337)
Democracy (lag)	-0.547**	-0.683***	-0.552**	-0.549**	-0.438*	-0.467**
	(0.242)	(0.250)	(0.228)	(0.229)	(0.233)	(0.233)
Campaign size	0.401***	0.443***	0.368***	0.385***	0.352***	0.345***
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.089)
Duration (log)	0.000	0.082	0.153	0.151	0.145	0.169
	(0.216)	(0.209)	(0.230)	(0.226)	(0.230)	(0.235)
Repression	-0.182**	-0.200**	-0.224**	-0.232**	-0.264***	-0.262***
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Cold War	-0.532***	-0.511***	-0.561***	-0.554***	-0.685***	-0.692***
	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.189)	(0.203)	(0.209)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0725	-0.119	-0.102	-0.115	-0.188**	-0.189**
	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Years without progress (log)	-0.579***	-0.548***	-0.725***	-0.714***	-0.680***	-0.711***
	(0.188)	(0.192)	(0.201)	(0.193)	(0.204)	(0.216)
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.215	0.099		
			(0.220)	(0.244)		
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.323		
				(0.447)		
Riots					0.119	0.277
					(0.192)	(0.252)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.485
						(0.410)
Constant	0.245	0.565	0.668	0.779	1.451*	1.375*
	(0.831)	(0.788)	(0.861)	(0.856)	(0.798)	(0.806)
Observations	251	251	253	253	248	248

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 18: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains including anti-colonial campaigns and alternative control variables (SE clustered by campaign)

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.522***	0.148				
	(0.202)	(0.197)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.130**				
		(0.468)				
Hierarchy	-0.0732	-0.442	-0.065	-0.249	-0.002	0.272
	(0.187)	(0.293)	(0.187)	(0.312)	(0.190)	(0.299)
Regime type (lag)	-0.038***	-0.045***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.032**	-0.034**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Estimated campaign size	0.636***	0.687***	0.577***	0.607***	0.548***	0.539***
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.133)
Duration (log)	0.0304	0.106	0.163	0.158	0.167	0.184
	(0.231)	(0.226)	(0.238)	(0.234)	(0.249)	(0.255)
Repression	-0.161*	-0.177*	-0.205**	-0.213**	-0.239**	-0.238**
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Post Col War	0.607***	0.593***	0.630***	0.628***	0.719***	0.730***
	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.199)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0879	-0.127	-0.107	-0.122	-0.188**	-0.187**
	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Years without progress (log)	-0.594***	-0.567***	-0.741***	-0.727***	-0.702***	-0.726***
	(0.202)	(0.199)	(0.215)	(0.201)	(0.236)	(0.248)
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.248	0.088		
			(0.207)	(0.239)		
Radical flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				0.442		
				(0.471)		
Riots					0.058	0.198
					(0.182)	(0.254)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.407
						(0.355)
Constant	0.0202	0.347	0.348	0.503	0.981	0.896
	(0.859)	(0.818)	(0.884)	(0.847)	(0.826)	(0.827)
Observations	253	253	255	255	250	250

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial gains including anti-colonial campaigns and alternative control variables (SE clustered by country)

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign substantial gains	(2) Campaign substantial gains	(3) Campaign substantial gains	(4) Campaign substantial gains	(5) Campaign substantial gains	(6) Campaign substantial gains
Terrorism	0.522**	0.148				
	(0.207)	(0.218)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		1.130**				
		(0.445)				
Hierarchy	-0.073	-0.442	-0.065	-0.249	-0.002	0.272
	(0.210)	(0.288)	(0.210)	(0.315)	(0.215)	(0.307)
Regime type (lag)	-0.038***	-0.045***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.032**	-0.034**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Estimated campaign size	0.636***	0.687***	0.577***	0.607***	0.548***	0.539***
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.126)	(0.130)
Duration (log)	0.0304	0.106	0.163	0.158	0.167	0.184
	(0.230)	(0.225)	(0.241)	(0.236)	(0.242)	(0.248)
Repression	-0.161*	-0.177**	-0.205**	-0.213**	-0.239**	-0.238**
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Post Cold War	0.607***	0.593***	0.630***	0.628***	0.719***	0.730***
	(0.201)	(0.196)	(0.198)	(0.192)	(0.205)	(0.211)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.087	-0.127	-0.107	-0.122	-0.188**	-0.187**
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Years without progress	-0.594***	-0.567***	-0.741***	-0.727***	-0.702***	-0.726***
(log)	(0.199)	(0.202)	(0.211)	(0.203)	(0.217)	(0.229)
Radical flanks			0.248	0.088		
(NAVCO2.0)			(0.216)	(0.241)		
Radical flanks				0.442		
(NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				(0.440)		
Riots					0.058	0.198
					(0.191)	(0.258)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.407
						(0.388)
Constant	0.020	0.347	0.348	0.503	0.981	0.896
	(0.756)	(0.751)	(0.793)	(0.788)	(0.741)	(0.751)
Observations	253	253	255	255	250	250

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 20: The role of credible threat and commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns full success including anti-colonial campaigns

VARIABLES	(1) Campaign full success	(2) Campaign full success	(3) Campaign full success	(4) Campaign full success	(5) Campaign full success	(6) Campaign full success
Terrorism	0.404*	0.094				
	(0.215)	(0.257)				
Terrorism*Hierarchy		0.874*				
		(0.452)				
Hierarchy	0.052	-0.228	0.025	0.107	0.058	0.096
	(0.202)	(0.271)	(0.206)	(0.303)	(0.213)	(0.302)
Democracy (lag)	-0.154	-0.265	-0.104	-0.098	0.004	0.003
	(0.236)	(0.242)	(0.221)	(0.220)	(0.235)	(0.233)
Campaign size	0.293***	0.312***	0.276***	0.268***	0.291***	0.290***
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.077)
Duration (log)	-0.328**	-0.287*	-0.298**	-0.297**	-0.320**	-0.318**
	(0.147)	(0.157)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Repression	-0.118	-0.131	-0.115	-0.111	-0.156*	-0.155*
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Cold War	-0.361*	-0.358*	-0.427**	-0.432**	-0.519**	-0.519**
	(0.207)	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.224)	(0.225)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.118	-0.146	-0.158	-0.151	-0.290***	-0.289***
	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)			0.0452	0.117		
			(0.219)	(0.265)		
Radical Flanks (NAVCO2.0)*Hierarchy				-0.189		
				(0.407)		
Riots					-0.156	-0.136
					(0.207)	(0.259)
Riots*Hierarchy						-0.057
						(0.369)
Constant	0.190	0.450	0.682	0.612	1.799**	1.786**
	(0.821)	(0.808)	(0.824)	(0.832)	(0.767)	(0.766)
Observations	251	251	253	253	248	248

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 21: the role of credible commitment to nonviolent tactics as determinants of civil resistance campaigns substantial including anti-colonial campaigns with multinomial logit

	(1)	(2)
VARIABLES	Progress	Progress
Terrorism	0.781**	0.143
	(0.352)	(0.387)
Hierarchy	-0.137	-0.732*
	(0.329)	(0.425)
Terrorism*Hierarchy		2.211***
		(0.732)
Democracy (lag)	-0.553*	-0.656*
	(0.326)	(0.338)
Duration (log)	-0.141	-0.0110
	(0.298)	(0.286)
Campaign size	0.646***	0.709***
	(0.123)	(0.126)
Repression	-0.232*	-0.244*
	(0.140)	(0.143)
Cold War	-0.913***	-0.845***
	(0.323)	(0.309)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0514	-0.102
	(0.160)	(0.153)
Years without progress (log)	-0.658**	-0.604**
	(0.301)	(0.298)
Constant cut1	-1.068	-1.329
	(1.334)	(1.250)
Constant cut2	0.110	-0.115
	(1.295)	(1.224)
Observations	251	251

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Attacks references

ABC NEWS (1991) New coalition government approved, Communist Party congress continues.

Agence France Presse (1991, May 18) Kosovo Albanian killed in attack, agency says.

Agence France Presse (1991) Kenyan opposition calls off demo, but Nairobi under tight security.

Agence France Presse (1991) Political Violence Feared in Kenya after Attacks on party offices.

Agence France Presse (2004, April 5). Two killed in violence ahead of elections in Indonesia's Papua.

Agence France Presse (1998, December 02). Rebels shoot East Timor teacher dead in front of students.

Agence France Presse (1993a, August 14) Anti-government protest winds down.

Agence France Presse (1993b, June 28) Babangida calls in civilian governors to discuss security.

Africa News (1998, December 30) Nigeria, The War Within. AllAfrica Inc.

AP (1993, May 2) Attack at a South Africa Hotel Kills 5 Whites. The New York Times

Background Information on Northern Ireland Society. Available at: http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#05

Bangladeshis bring down Ershad regime, 1987,1990 http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bangladeshis-bring-down-ershad-regime-1987-1990

BBC News (2000, February 16) Violence prompts fears for Senegal pool.

BBC. Timeline: Chechnya http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/2357267.stm

Becker, Marc (2016) SocialMovement in Late 20th-Century Ecuador and Bolivia. Latin American History http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-65

Binder, David (1990, November 5) Evolution in Europe; In Albania, Communist Stronghold, The Grip Appears to Be Loosening. The New York Times

Bindra, Satinder and Banerjii Prithvi (2006) Police douse Nepal protest. *CNN*. 24 April

Bolivians successfully oust military regime, 1982 http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivians-successfully-oust-military-regime-1982

Brunnstrom, Cecilia (2003) Another Invasion: Lessons from International Support to East Timorese NGOs. *Development in Practice* 13: 310-321.

Ejime, Paul (1998, December 30) Nigerians Brace For Hard Times Ahead. Africa News

Chazan, David (1991, December 17) Kenyan opposition leader threatens foreign newsman with expulsion. Agence France Presse

Chenoweth, Erica and Lawrence, Adria ed. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Chenoweth, Erica and Maria, J Stephan (2011) *Why civil resistance works: the Strategic Logic of Non-violent Conflicts*. Columbia University Press (http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html).

Chenoweth Erica and Schock Kurt (2015). Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns? Mobilization, 20(4)427-451

Chicago Tribune (1996) *Mexico Newest Rebels Display Elan*. 3 September (http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-09-01/news/9609010125_1_popular-revolutionary-army-rebel-commander-epr).

Chileans overthrow Pinochet regime, 1983-1988. http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chileans-overthrow-pinochet-regime-1983-1988

Curran, Bronwyn (2000, December 18) Indonesian police summon second rights worker on killing claims. Agence France Presse

Cyprus Emergency 1955-1960 http://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/cyprusemergency.htm

Debusmann, Bernd (1987, July 7) Unrest threatens Panama's role in banking. The Globe Mail

Dalacoura, Katerina (2011) *Islamist terrorism and democracy in the Middle East*. Cambridge University Press.

Fisher, Matthew (1990, January 29) EUROPE IN TRANSITION Albanians in Yugoslavia urged to end protest against Serbian rule. The Globe and Mail (Cananda)

GAM (1989, December 1) Bombs explode in Bangladesh. The globe and Mail (Canada)

Gazy, Polly (1995, December 17) SHELL LETTERS SHOW **NIGERIA** ARMY LINKS. The Observer

Grant J (1998). *The death of Tahan-rough justice in Jakarta*. Sydney Morning Herald. GTD ID 200201230001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200201230001

GTD ID 200203300003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200203300003

GTD ID 200205110006

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200205110006

GTD ID 199408130002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199408130002

GTD ID 199408130003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199408130003

GTD ID 199409020001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199409020001

GTD ID 199510060010

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199510060010

GTD ID 199007030003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199007030003

GTD ID 199906170004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199906170004

GTD ID 199907170005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199907170005

GTD ID 199802100003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199802100003

GTD ID 197607310001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197607310001

GTD ID 200108270016

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108270016

GTD ID 200108270015

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108270015

GTD ID 200206140004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200206140004

GTD ID 200101160002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200101160002

GTD ID 197606170002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197606170002

GTD ID 200206150004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200206150004

GTD ID 198308140001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198308140001

GTD ID 199002220010

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199002220010

GTD ID 197605240001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197605240001

GTD ID 199109080001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199109080001

GTD ID 200607020015

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200607020015

GTD ID 199112300015

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199112300015

GTD ID 199201300012

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199201300012

GTD ID 199208310007

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199208310007

GTD ID 200611060005
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200611060005

GTD ID 200702190004
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200702190004

GTD ID 199709250003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199709250003

GTD ID 199608250012

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199608250012

GTD ID 199708150008

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199708150008

GTD ID 199705160002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199705160002

GTD ID 199601170002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199601170002

GTD ID 200010290003
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200010290003

GTD ID 199605310003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199605310003

GTD ID 199602280056

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199602280056

GTD ID 199605230001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199605230001

GTD ID 200105160001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200105160001

GTD ID 199608120009

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199608120009

GTD ID 200512090004
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200512090004

GTD ID 200507120006
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200507120006

GTD ID 200602110001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200602110001

GTD ID 199201310003
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199201310003

GTD ID 199203170002
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199203170002

GTD ID 199205050007
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199205050007

GTD ID 199901140001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199901140001

GTD ID 199907030006
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199907030006

GTD ID 199903090001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199903090001

GTD ID 200002060001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200002060001

GTD ID 200005020004
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200005020004

GTD ID 200006190003
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200006190003

GTD ID 200101140003
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200101140003

GTD ID 200103040004
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200103040004

GTD ID 200106010003
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200106010003

GTD ID 200202080001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200202080001

GTD ID 200210250001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200210250001

GTD ID 200211250002
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200211250002

GTD ID 200305050002
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200305050002

GTD ID 200311240005
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200311240005

GTD ID 200305070002
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200305070002

GTD ID 200409080001
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200409080001

GTD ID 200409140002
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200409140002

GTD ID 200503260006
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200503260006

GTD ID 200505020002
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200505020002

GTD ID 200509200004
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200509200004

GTD ID 200508100014
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200508100014

GTD ID 200604040015
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200604040015

GTD ID 200604130013

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200604130013

GTD ID 200609230015

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200609230015

GTD ID 200106120001
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200106120001

GTD ID 200108290017

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108290017

GTD ID 197910110001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197910110001

GTD ID 197910200001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197910200001

GTD ID198002150006

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198002150006

GTD ID 197910270001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197910270001

GTD ID 197507270002

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197507270002

GTD ID 198005140001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198005140001

GTD ID 200601020004
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200601020004

GTD ID 200601020005
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200601020005

GTD ID 200601120004
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200601120004

GTD ID 199109280005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199109280005

GTD ID 199109280005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199109280004

GTD ID 199205060019

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199205060019

GTD ID 199205060020

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199205060020

GTD ID 199002030009

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199002030009

GTD ID 199001310003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199001310003

GTD ID 199001190007

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199001190007

GTD ID 198810020001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198810020001

GTD ID 198810020001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198810020001

GTD ID 198803170008

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198803170008

GTD ID 198803060010

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198803060010

GTD ID 198904250004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198904250004

GTD ID 198904180002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198904180002

GTD ID 199102070011

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199102070011

GTD ID 199102070012

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199102070012

GTD ID 199103150009

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199103150009

GTD ID 199211070021

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199211070021

GTD ID 199206060002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199206060002

GTD ID 199201140014

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199201140014

GTD ID 199002180001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199002180001

GTD ID 199003250003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199003250003

GTD ID 199002120007

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199002120007

GTD ID 199411200006

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199411200006

GTD ID 199407090002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199407090002

GTD ID 199407090002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199407090002

GTD ID 199108100019

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199108100019

GTD ID 199102100004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199102100004

GTD ID 198710220008

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198710220008

GTD ID 200007240003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200007240003

GTD ID 200008250003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200008250003

GTD ID 199806220002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199806220002

GTD ID 198807260004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198807260004

GTD ID 198303240007

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198303240007

GTD ID 198303240008

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198303240008

GTD ID 198304190002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198304190002

GTD ID 198503260009

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198503260009

GTD ID 198504090003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198504090003

GTD ID 198505140005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198505140005

GTD ID 198602060004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198602060004

GTD ID 198603180001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198603180001

GTD ID 198603260007

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198603260007

GTD ID 198704300001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198704300001

GTD ID 198706210002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198706210002

GTD ID 198707300005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198707300005

GTD ID 198801210001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198801210001

GTD ID 198801270002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198801270002

GTD ID 198712120007

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198712120007

GTD ID 198801060001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198801060001

GTD ID 198901240004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198901240004

GTD ID 198902210025

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198902210025

GTD ID 198903120003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198903120003

GTD ID 200504020009

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200504020009

GTD ID 200503260003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200503260003

GTD ID 200502240008

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200502240008

GTD ID 200601270001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200601270001

GTD ID 200612310001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200612310001

GTD ID 200603030010

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200603030010

GTD ID 197406120002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197406120002

GTD ID 197303220001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197303220001

GTD ID 197406020002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197406020002

GTD ID 197402230002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197402230002

GTD ID 197304210001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197304210001

GTD ID 197301070002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197301070002

GTD ID 199705100002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199705100002

GTD ID 199706260009

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199706260009

GTD ID 199712220004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199712220004

GTD ID 197701270001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197701270001

GTD ID 197704190001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197704190001

GTD ID 197706240003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197706240003

GTD ID 197802280001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197802280001

GTD ID 197803300001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197803300001

GTD ID 197805150004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197805150004

GTD ID 197902020001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197902020001

GTD ID 197903240006

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197903240006

GTD ID 197905100008

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197905100008

GTD ID 197702180001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197702180001

GTD ID 197707180002

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197707180002

GTD ID 197710210001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197710210001

GTD ID 197803110003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197803110003

GTD ID 197804110001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197804110001

GTD ID 197807290001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197807290001

GTD ID 197808130001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197808130001

GTD ID 197909270006

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197909270006

GTD ID 197911070003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197911070003

GTD ID 197911130005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197911130005

GTD ID 198011110001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198011110001

GTD ID 198009260001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198009260001

GTD ID 198204000001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198204000001

GTD ID 198204010001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198204010001

GTD ID 198302030001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198302030001

GTD ID 198309130003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198309130003

GTD ID 198303240005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198303240005

GTD ID 198304060001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198304060001

GTD ID 198701210002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198701210002

GTD ID 198703300001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198703300001

GTD ID 198704030002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198704030002

GTD ID 198303190005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198303190005

GTD ID 198304250010

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198304250010

GTD ID 198311010005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198311010005

GTD ID 198402090006

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198402090006

GTD ID 198404000005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198404000005

GTD ID 198405030004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198405030004

GTD ID 198505050005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198505050005

GTD ID 198505100028

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198505100028

GTD ID 198505300008

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198505300008

GTD ID 198601030005

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198601030005

GTD ID 198602070006

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198602070006

GTD ID 198602170004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198602170004

GTD ID 198607240013

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198607240013

GTD ID 198708300004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198708300004

GTD ID 198712290001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198712290001

GTD ID 198712090002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198712090002

GTD ID 198710300001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198710300001

GTD ID 198802290001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198802290001

GTD ID 198803250001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198803250001

GTD ID 198906040002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198906040002

GTD ID 198006170004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198006170004

GTD ID 198111190001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198111190001

GTD ID 198110090002

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198110090002

GTD ID 198105190004

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198105190004

GTD ID 198201270003

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198201270003

GTD ID 198209000001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198209000001

GTD ID 198209170001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198209170001

GTD ID 200410120001

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200410120001

GTD ID 200410140010

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200410140010

Factsheet on the Ogoni Struggle https://ratical.org/corporations/OgoniFactS.html

Faul, Michelle (1993) Crude Crusade: Blood and Oil Fuel Secessionist Ire. International News

French, David (2015). Fighting EOKA. *The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus 1955-1959*. Oxford University Press

Fraizer (1989, May 11) Government Nullifies Election After Day of **Violence,** Blames U.S. The Associated Press

Hafez, M Mohammed (2003) *Why Muslim Rebel*. Lynne Rienner Publisher.

Hamilton Spectator (1993, May 3). 5 white dead in bar attack. Metroland Media Group Ldt.

Hedman E. E. (2006). *In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to People Power in the Philippines*. University of Hawaii Press.

Henriksen, Thomas H. (1983) Revolution and Counterrevolution. London:

Greenwood Press.

Hunter, Alan (1992, March 24) Kirk fears over bishop in Malawi. The Herald (Glasgow)

Hoare, Ian (1983, September 4) Agitation in Pakistan increases despite arrests. Guardian Weekly

Ibikunle, Tijani Hakeem (2006) Britain and the development of leftist ideology and organisations in West Africa: the Nigerian experience, 1945-1965. Thesis. Retrieved at: http://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/2025 . See also: http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/2025/02chapter2.pdf?sequence=2

International Associated Press, (1998, November 5). *E. Timoreses exiles threaten terrorist attacks against Indonesia*

International Crisis Groups *(2011). The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines Tactics and Talks https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/communist-insurgency-philippines-tactics-and-talks*

Indonesians overthrow President Suharto, 1998. Global Nonviolent Action Database http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/indonesians-overthrow-president-suharto-1998

International Associated Press, (1998, November 6). *Indonesian army slams East Timor terrorist attacks threat.*

International Associated Press, (1999, April 13) Rebels attack prison in East Timor; three policemen injured.

International News (1980, September 5) Paper Reports Threats Against Editor. The Associated Press

International News (1998a, December 02) Mexican governor makes first offer of talks with EPR rebels. Associated Press International

International News (1998b, October 27) Murders of local officials in Mexico attributed to rebels. Agence France Presse

International News (1998c, December 01) Shell blames sabotage, attacks for oil pipeline shutdown. Associated Press

International News (1990, February 7) Unexploded Pipe Bombs Found Day After Two Explosions. The Associated Press

International News (2000, July 25) Mexican guerrilla group claims attack on police, rejects election. Associated Press International

International News (2002, January 9) Madagascar opposition supporters accused of intimidation

International (1993, March 6) police say killing of 10 may be a revenge attack. BC cycle

International (1989, January 28) Election violence kills six, wounds hundreds. United Press International

International (1990, October 16) Anti-government violence plagues Bangladesh. United Press International

Kraxberger, Brennan. "The Geography of Regime Survival: Abacha's Nigeria." *African Affairs* 103 (2004): 413-430.

Lawrence, Adria (2010) Driven to Arms? The Escalation to Violence in Nationalist Conflicts. 143-173 in Rethinking Violence State and Non-state Actors in Conflict..

Lebanese Campaigns for democracy (Independence intifada or cedar revolution), 2005 http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/lebanese-campaign-democracy-independence-intifada-or-cedar-revolution-2005

Lordan, Besty (1989, August 15) Panama's opposition refuses to join ant-US protest. United Press International

Madagascar citizens force free elections, 1990-1992. Global Nonviolent Action Database. (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/madagascar-citizens-force-free-elections-1990-1992)

Malawians bring down 30-year dictator, 1992-1993. Global Nonviolent Action Database http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/malawians-bring-down-30-year-dictator-1992-1993

Mamane, Dalatou (1993, October 27) Group Claims Responsibility for Hijacking. The Associated Press

McDowall, Liam (1991, February 22) Gunfire as Tirana revolt continues. The Independent

McGreal, Chris (1993, August 11) SPILT OIL BREWS UP A POLITICAL STORM;

Chris McGreal reports from the Niger Delta on the Ogoni people's response to Shell's pollution record. The Guardian

McKenzie, Glenn (2000, February 24) Police, Army try to head off election violence in Senegal. The associated Press

Mexican citizens massively protest presidential election results, 2006. http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mexican-citizens-massively-protest-presidential-election-results-2006

Miller, Reid G. (1987, July 3) Business Close After Calls for Strike to Protest Government Measures. International News

Minorities at Risk Project (2004) *Chronology for Chechens in Russia* http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38d12.html

Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo campaign for democracy and the return of their 'disappeared' family members, 1977-1983 http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mothers-plaza-de-mayo-campaign-democracy-and-return-their-disappeared-family-members-1977-19

Mulero, Seidi (2000, February 7) Senegal; Senegal to go to the polls amidst threats of coup d'Etat and riots. Africa News

Jatmiko, A (1998). Indonesian police scuffle with students, Muslims burn church. The Associated Press.

Peruvians campaign to overthrow Dictator Alberto Fujimori, 2000. Global Nonviolence Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/peruvians-campaign-overthrow-dictator-alberto-fujimori-march-four-directions-2000)

Press, A F (1991) Hundreds of thousands protest at new government. 27 August

Power, Robert Willim Leonard (2015) Federation to New Nationhood The Development of Nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1950-64. King's College London. Available at: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/federation-to-new-nationhood(62ee8864-9297-4fd6-a139-a0a34955a665).html

Randrianja, Solofo (2003) 'Be not afraid, Only Believe': Madagascar 2002. *African Affairs* 102 (407): 309-329.

Retbol T. and International Work Group of Indigenous Affairs, (1998). *East Timor: Occupation and Resistance*. DANIDA

REUT (1983, August 23). Riot leaves three dead in Pakistan. The Globe an Mail (Canada)

REUT (1987, December 23) Dhaka shaken by bomb blasts as general strike takes effect. The Globe and Mail (Canada)

REUT (1990, March 26) 26 killed, 1,500 injured in Bangladesh violence. The Globe an Mail (Canada)

REUTER (1988, March 23) Political rivals bomb capital as Bangladesh elections begin. The Toronto Star

Richburg, Keith B (1991) Democracy Movement Breaks Up in Kenya; Rival Goups Claim Opposition Party's Name. The Washington Post.

Rinehart, C. S. (2013). *Volatile Social Movement and the Origins of Terrorism. The Radicalization of Change*. Lexington Books.

Stephan, J. Maria (2006). Fighting for Statehood: the Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination Movements. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, *30*(2), 57–79

Swami, N. S. (1994). Tiger of Lanka. From Boys to Guerrilla. Konark Publisher

Tanner, Marcus (1990, January 31) Deaths rise as Yugoslav leaders meet. The Independent

Tarto, Nicholas B. (1989, October 26) Israel: Arafat Still Involved in Terror Attacks. The Associated Press

The Advertiser (2000, December 3) 18 killed as talks give way to violence. Nationwide News Pty Limited

The Associated Press (1999, November 29) *Protesters demand independence votes for Indonesian provinces*.

The Herald (1993, October 28) Troops storm hijacked jet at airport. Caledonian Newpapers

The Irish History (2015) *Northern Ireland Conflict*. Available at: http://www.theirishstory.com/2015/02/09/the-northern-ireland-conflict-1968-1998-an-overview/#.WCMJTC2LSUl.

The Toronto Star (1988, January 5) United States FIRE FORCES EVACUATION, Metro Edition

Traynor, Ian (1990a, December 14) Albanian troops fight protesters. The Guardian

Traynor, Ian (1990b, December 15) Albanian sends in tanks to quell violence and looting. The Guardian

Traynor, Ian (1991, February 22) Albanian tanks on streets as the protests continue: Demonstrators attack 'Hoxha' bookshops as police fire warning shots

Torchia, C (1998). Despite fear of violence, Indonesia stays mostly calm- for now. AM cycle.

Treaster, Joseph B. (1989, October 6) **Panama** Opposition Figures Seized in Crackdown. The New York Times

Ukrainians overthrow dictatorship (Orange Revolution), 2004 http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ukrainians-overthrow-dictatorship-orange-revolution-2004

UNCLASSIFIED RELEASED, NON RESPONSIVE DELEATED http://www.cod.edu/people/faculty/yearman/guerrero/Mexico_009133_16July1996.pdf

United Press International (1992 November, 13) Police search for more suspects in election violence

Urban Thais overthrow Prime Minister Thaksin, Thailand, 2005-2006 http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/urban-thais-overthrow-prime-minister-thaksin-thailand-2005-2006

Wiseman, Johan A. (1999) Assessing the outcome of democratic transition in Malawi. aper presented to the workshop 'Democracy in the Third World: What Should be Done?' ECPR, Mannheim, March 1999. Available at: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/6f8edc09-6370-49c4-8929-47b0891985d7.pdf

Wn.com (2015) *Peru Group of Soldiers Stage a Revolt*. Available at: https://wn.com/peru_group_of_soldiers_stage_a_revolt.

Wood Elisabeth Jean (2003). Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Gault-Williams, Malcom (1987) Organisasi Papua Merdeka: The Free Papua Movement lives. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 19(4): 32-43.

Gobyn, Winne (2009) From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists' Strategic and Ideological Thinking. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32(5): 420-438

Kane, A (2015) *Shore up the dam of the past or it may fracture again; Learn how to tackle our legacy issues, or prepare for the next round of terrorism and an ugly polarisation of society here, warn Alex Kane*. Belfast Telegraph, 11 June.

Wn.com (2015) *Peru Group of Soldiers Stage a Revolt*. Available at: https://wn.com/peru_group_of_soldiers_stage_a_revolt.

Xinhua General News Service (1993, March 24) 18 alpa members arrested in s. Africa

Xinuha General News Service (2003, November 5). One dead after rebel attack in Indonesia' Papua.

Zunes Stephen (2006). Pakistan's Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (1981-1984). International Center of Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC). https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/pakistans-movement-for-the-restoration-of-democracy-1981-1984/

Biting the hand that feeds?

External support, population dependence and rebel groups' portfolio of killings

Online Appendix

Variability main explanatory variables

The first two columns of Table I (below) summarize the distribution of transnational non-state actors' military support across dyad-years. The dataset contains 565 dyad-year observations of which 80% have not seen transnational non-state actor military support; conversely, in about 20% of the data, rebel groups received such military support. Columns 3-4 show that at some point in the conflict 122 rebel groups did not receive transnational non-state actor military support, while 43 rebel groups received transnational non-state actor military support. The total number of rebel groups in the 'Between' column (165) is larger than the total number of rebel groups in the dataset (143), which reflect that some rebel groups transition from receiving to not receiving transnational non-state actor military support (or vice versa) over the civil war.

The last column reports the fraction of the years a rebel group did not receive (0) or receive (1) transnational non-state actors military support. These two numbers are a measure of the stability of the absence and existence of transnational non-state actors military support for rebel groups during the war. The total 'Within' of 86.06% is the normalized between weighted average of the within percentages, in this case: $(123 \times 91.23 + 42 \times 70.92)/165$. As such, the total of this column is a measure of the overall stability of the variable 'Transnational Military Support' and indicates that transnational non-state actor military support varies over time for almost the 15% of rebel groups.

Table I. one-way tabulations decomposing count of transnational non-state actors' military support into between and within components in panel data

Transnational Non-state Actor Military Support	Overall		Between		Within Percent
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	
No	415	73.45	122	85.31	91.77
Yes	150	26.55	43	20.07	72.18
Total	565	100.00	165	115.38	86.67
N=143					

Table II (below) shows the transition probabilities that rebel groups stop or start receiving transnational non-state actors' military support. The rows reflect the initial status and the columns reflect the status in the following year. Each year, 94% of rebel groups not receiving transnational non-state actor military support keep not receiving the support in the following year. The remaining 6% of rebel groups that in a given year do not receive transnational non-state actors' military support start receiving it in the next year. Table II also shows that each year, the 87% of rebel groups that receive transnational non-state actors' military support keep receiving such military support it the following year. In turn, almost 13% of the rebel groups that receive transnational non-state actors' military support in a given year stop receiving it in the next year.

Table II. Transition probabilities transnational non-state actors' military support

Current Transnational Non-state Actor Military Support	Transnational Non-state Actor Military Support In the following year		Total
No	266	15	281
No percentage	94.66	5.34	100.00
Yes	15	101	116
Yes percentage	12.93	87.07	100.00

The 'Overall' part of Table III (below) summarizes the distribution of transnational non-state actors' financial support in terms of dyad-years. The dataset contains 565 dyad-year observations of which almost the 81% have not seen transnational non-state actors financial support, while the 19% of the data, rebel groups receive transnational non-state actors financial support. Columns 3-4 show that 132 rebel groups at some point did not receive transnational non-state actors financial support, while 25 rebel groups at some point received transnational non-state actors financial support.

Again, the total number of the 'Between' column (157) is bigger than the total number of rebel groups (143) indicating that there are rebel groups that transitioned from receiving to not receiving transnational non-state actor financial support (or vice versa) over the civil war. The overall stability of the variable 'Transnational Financial Support' is reported in the 'Total' and indicates that transnational non-state actors' financial support varies over time for almost the 10% of the rebel groups.

Table III. one-way tabulations decomposing count of transnational non-state actors' financial support into between and within components in panel data

Transnational Non-state Actor Financial Support	**Overall**		**Between**		**Within Percent**
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**	
No	456	80.71	132	92.31	96.03
Yes	109	19.29	25	17.48	64.94
Total	565	100.00	157	109.79	91.08
N=143					

Table IV (below) shows the transition probabilities that rebel groups stop or start receiving transnational non-state actors' financial support. Each year, the 97% of the rebel groups not receiving transnational non-state actors' financial support in the data keep not receiving it the following year; the remaining 3% of rebel groups not

receiving transnational non-state actors financial support start receiving such financial support the next year.

In turn, each year, the 86% of the rebel groups that receive transnational non-state actors' financial support keep receiving such financial support the following year, while the 14% of rebel groups that receive transnational non-state actors financial support stop receiving it in the next year.

Table IV. Transition probabilities transnational non-state actors' financial support

Current Transnational Non-state Actor Financial Support	**Transnational Non-state Actor Financial Support In the following year**		**Total**
No	295	8	303
No percentage	97.36	2.64	100.00
Yes	13	81	94
Yes percentage	13.83	86.17	100.00

Variability NSA measures for rebel-biased transnational non-state actors financial and military support

I extract information on transnational non-state military support from "*rebextpart*" in the NSA. This item measures weather transnational non-state actors support rebel groups militarily and codes whether there exists no military support by transnational non-state actor ('no'); transnational non-state actor military support is exclusively alleged ('alleged') and weather there is evidence of major or minor transnational non-state actor military support ('major' and 'minor' respectively). I create a dichotomous variable ('Transnational non-state military support') equal to 1 when there exists evidence of a major or minor military support by transnational non-state actors to a rebel group and 0 otherwise.

I extract information on transnational non-state financial support from "*transconstsupp*" in the NSA. This item indicates whether transnational non-state

actors support rebel groups in a financial way and it allows differentiating when there exist evidence of transnational non-state actor financial support ('yes'), when this is explicit financial support ('explicit') and when otherwise there is not evidence or the existence transnational non-state actor financial support to rebel groups is only inferred ('no' and 'tacit' respectively). I generate a dummy variable 'transnational non-state actors, financial support' equal to 1 if there exist evidence of explicit transnational non-state actors financial support to rebel groups and equal to 0 otherwise.

The 'Total' line' of the 'Within Percent' column in Table V (below) indicates that transnational non-state actors' military support varies over time for only the 1.46% of the rebel groups. Table VI (below) shows that the 0% of rebel groups shift from not receiving transnational non-state actors' military support to start receiving such a support in the following year, while 1% of the rebel groups that receive transnational non-state actors' military support in a given year stop receiving such a military support in the following. Similarly, the overall stability of the variable 'Transnational Financial Support' in the NSA data (reported in 'Total' line, 'Within Percent' column in Table VII below) indicates that transnational non-state actors' financial support varies over time for only the 1.01% of the rebel groups. Accordingly, Table VIII (below) shows that the 0% of the rebel groups that not receiving transnational non-state actors' financial support in a given year to start receiving such a financial support it in the following year, while 0.5% of the rebel groups that receive transnational non-state actors' financial support in a given year stop receiving it in the next year.

Table V. One-way tabulations decomposing count of non-state transnational military support into between and within components in panel data (NSA)

Transnational Non-state Actor Military Support	Overall		Between		Within Percent
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	
No	615	72.10	167	82.67	98.95
Yes	238	27.90	38	18.81	96.71
Total	853	100.00	205	101.49	98.54
N=202					

Table VI. Transition probabilities transnational non-state actors' military support (NSA)

Current Transnational Non-state Actor Military Support	Transnational Non-state Actor Military Support In the following year		Total
No	445	0	445
No percentage	100.00	0.00	100.00
Yes	2	199	201
Yes percentage	1.00	99.00	100.00

Table VII. one-way tabulations decomposing count of non-state transnational financial support into between and within components in panel data (NSA)

Transnational Non-state Actor Financial Support	Overall		Between		Within Percent
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	
No	619	73.95	167	83.16	99.29
Yes	218	26.05	37	17.86	97.52
Total	837	100.00	198	101.02	98.99
N=196					

Table VIII. Transition probabilities transnational non-state actors financial support (NSA)

Current Transnational Non-state Actor Financial Support	Transnational Non-state Actor Financial Support In the following year		Total
No	453	0	453
No percentage	100.00	0.00	100.00
Yes	1	182	183
Yes percentage	0.55	99.45	100.00

Table IX. Summary Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Transnational Non-state actors' Military Support (lag)	406	.2783251	.4487273	0	1
Transnational Non-State Financial Support (lag)	406	.226601	.4191488	0	1
Territorial Control	843	.3653618	.4818173	0	1
Militarily Weak Rebels	845	.9159763	.2775876	0	1
Conflict duration (log)	855	1.565002	1.054929	0	3.637586
Real GDP per capita (log)	855	11.22871	2.048845	6.285439	16.39188
Total population (log)	855	10.49463	1.690802	6.057697	14.00426
Regime Type (lag)	855	8.436257	7.551097	0	20
Diaspora financial support	545	.1192661	.3243991	0	1
Diaspora military support	544	.0091912	.0955169	0	1
Rebel group military support	545	.2348624	.4243022	0	1
Rebel group financial support	544	.0588235	.2355107	0	1
State military support	544	.5919118	.491932	0	1
State financial support	538	.169145	.3752288	0	1

Table IXa. Collinearity tests

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Variable	VIF	VIF	VIF
External Non-state actor' Military Support	1.15	1.49	5.51
External Non-State Financial Support	1.10	1.23	4.89
Territorial Control	1.20	1.20	1.22
Militarily Weak Rebels	1.17	1.17	1.17
Conflict duration (log)	1.18	1.20	1.27
Real GDP per capita (log)	4.14	4.28	4.43
Total population (log)	3.83	4.28	4.23
Regime Type (lag)	1.07	1.09	1.10
Diaspora financial support	-	-	3.72
Diaspora military support	-	-	1.38
Rebel group military support	-	-	5.00
Rebel group financial support	-	-	2.53
State military support	-	1.54	1.58
State financial support	-	1.26	1.30

Table IXa above shows that collinearity is very low for Model 1and Model 2 Table I (main text). The variance inflation increases in Model 3 because dummies indicating 4 subcategories contained in the main explanatory variables are included in the model. This inclusion however does not increase the VIF to more than 6, indicating only moderate correlation.

Table IXb. Overlap external non-state actors financial and military support

External non-state military support	**External non-state financial support**		
	No	**Yes**	**Total**
No	348	67	415
Yes	108	42	150
Total	456	109	565

Table X. Full Models for the effect of transnational non-state actors' military and financial support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings and the portfolio of violence (standard errors clustered by conflict)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings	(3) Portfolio of killings
Transnational non-state military support (lag)	0.481† (0.250)	0.573* (0.231)	0.863* (0.438)
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)	-0.767** (0.297)	-0.709* (0.310)	-1.063* (0.522)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-0.120 (0.520)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-1.257† (0.695)
Rebel group military support (lag)			-0.568 (0.396)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			1.181* (0.565)
State military support (lag)		0.043 (0.260)	0.038 (0.274)
State financial support (lag)		0.309 (0.372)	0.202 (0.381)
Territorial Control	-0.102 (0.306)	-0.096 (0.314)	-0.148 (0.336)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.0338(0.581)	-0.155	-0.185 (0.597)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.105 (0.199)	-0.096 (0.198)	-0.012 (0.199)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.272* (0.127)	0.239† (0.122)	0.251* (0.118)
log_pop	-0.133 (0.140)	-0.0991(0.147)	-0.092 (0.147)
lagpolity22	0.000 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.017)
Constant	-2.590** (0.998)	-2.667* (1.110)	-2.805* (1.153)
Observations	376	360	360

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Including main explanatory variables independently

Tables XI and XII tests if the correlation of transnational non-state actors' military and the effect of transnational non-state actor financial support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings remain robust when excluding one of the main explanatory variable from the analysis. Again, the findings for both indicators remain virtually unchanged. In fact, the full model in Tables XI show that rebel groups with transnational non-state actors' military support are significantly correlated with higher likelihood to kill more civilians than combatants at significance levels of 0.01. The full model in Table XII shows that rebel groups with transnational non-state actors financial support are significantly more likely to kill less civilians than combatants at a significance levels of 0.05.

Table XII. GLM models with logit link function for the effect of transnational non-state actors' military support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings (standard errors clustered by dyad)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings	(3) Portfolio of killings
Transnational non-state military support (lag)	0.385† (0.226)	0.563* (0.245)	0.864† (0.456)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-1.057** (0.380)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-1.351† (0.784)
Rebel group military support (lag)			-0.528 (0.414)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			0.200 (0.388)
State military support (lag)		0.171 (0.225)	0.138 (0.243)
State financial support (lag)		0.488(0.364)	0.228(0.362)
Territorial Control	-0.108 (0.277)	-0.111 (0.284)	-0.147 (0.300)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.082 (0.538)	-0.205 (0.523)	-0.217 (0.513)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.207 (0.203)	-0.191 (0.192)	-0.032 (0.186)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.240† (0.124)	0.201† (0.113)	0.244* (0.106)
Total population (log)	-0.099 (0.161)	-0.044 (0.159)	-0.080 (0.155)
Regime Type (lag)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)
Constant	-2.571* (1.076)	-2.914* (1.138)	-2.911* (1.177)
Observations	376	360	360

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XII. GLM models with logit link function for the effect of transnational non-state actors financial support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings (standard errors clustered by dyad)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings	(3) Portfolio of killings
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)	-0.700* (0.333)	-0.716* (0.361)	-1.085* (0.551)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-0.269 (0.481)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-1.316 (0.563)
Rebel group military support (lag)			0.069 (0.307)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			1.220* (0.543)
State military support (lag)		0.206 (0.229)	0.084 (0.265)
State financial support (lag)		0.257(0.359)	0.153 (0.362)
Territorial Control	-0.112 (0.275)	-0.088 (0.280)	-0.073 (0.285)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.050 (0.531)	-0.051 (0.528)	-0.108 (0.514)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.146 (0.180)	-0.129 (0.182)	-0.008 (0.197)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.248* (0.109)	0.230* (0.107)	0.257* (0.106)
Total population (log)	-0.061(0.140)	-0.052 (0.150)	-0.064 (0.150)
Regime Type (lag)	0.001(0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)
Constant	-2.857* (1.017)	-2.693* (1.117)	-3.102* (1.126)
Observations	376	360	360

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XIIa. GLM models with logit link function for the effect of transnational non-state actors support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings

VARIABLES	Model 1)	Model 2)
Transnational non-state actors' support (lag)	0.162 (0.462)	-0.283 (0.595)
Transnational non-state military support (lag)		1.110† (0.632)
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)		-0.914† (0.520)
Diaspora financial support (lag)	-1.325** (0.444)	-0.0384 (0.530)
Diaspora military support (lag)	-0.452 (0.585)	-1.465† (0.820)
Rebel group military support (lag)	0.010 (0.463)	-0.572 (0.413)
Rebel group financial support (lag)	0.211(0.386)	1.061* (0.519)
State military support (lag)	0.054(0.249)	0.028(0.259)
State financial support (lag)	0.192(0.364)	0.200(0.362)
Territorial Control	-0.066 (0.299)	-0.154 (0.290)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.158(0.516)	-0.182(0.517)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.020 (0.186)	-0.014 (0.183)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.250* (0.110)	0.247* (0.104)
Total population (log)	-0.057 (0.156)	-0.086 (0.155)
Regime Type (lag)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)
Constant	-3.162** (1.145)	-2.809* (1.190)
Observations	360	360

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XIII. OLS models for the effect of transnational non-state actors' military and financial support on rebel groups portfolio of killing (standard errors clustered by dyads)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings	(3) Portfolio of killings
Transnational non-state military support (lag)	0.078* (0.038)	0.0865* (0.039)	0.155* (0.076)
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)	-0.115 ** (0.040)	-0.106* (0.045)	-0.129* (0.055)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-0.021 (0.059)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-0.190† (0.108)
Rebel group military support (lag)			-0.109 (0.076)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			0.145* (0.070)
State military support (lag)		0.002 (0.033)	0.003 (0.035)
State financial support (lag)		0.040 (0.055)	0.027 (0.055)
Territorial Control	-0.014 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.037)	-0.019 (0.038)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.022 (0.056)	-0.034 (0.061)	-0.038 (0.063)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.012 (0.025)	-0.011 (0.026)	-0.001 (0.028)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.040* (0.023)	0.036* (0.015)	0.037* (0.014)
Total population (log)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.025)
Regime Type (lag)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Constant	0.014 (0.162)	0.0054 (0.173)	-9.43e- (0.184)
Observations	376	360	360
R-squared	0.250	0.108	0.127

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XIV. OLS models for the effect of transnational non-state actors military and financial support on rebel groups portfolio of killing (standard errors clustered by conflict)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings	(3) Portfolio of killings
Transnational non-state military support (lag)	0.078† (0.039)	0.086* (0.036)	0.155* (0.074)
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)	-0.115** (0.041)	-0.106* (0.043)	-0.129* (0.058)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-0.021 (0.062)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-0.190† (0.107)
Rebel group military support (lag)			-0.109 (0.072)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			0.145† (0.077)
State military support (lag)		0.002 (0.036)	0.003 (0.037)
State financial support (lag)		0.040 (0.058)	0.027 (0.058)
Territorial Control	-0.014 (0.041)	-0.012 (0.043)	-0.019 (0.045)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.022 (0.063)	-0.034 (0.072)	-0.038 (0.074)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.012 (0.028)	-0.011 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.030)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.040* (0.017)	0.036* (0.016)	0.037* (0.015)
Total population (log)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)
Regime Type (lag)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Constant	0.014 (0.148)	0.005 (0.165)	-9.43e- (0.170)
Observations	376	360	360
R-squared	0.119	0.108	0.127

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XV. OLS full models for the effect of transnational non-state actors' military on rebel groups' portfolio of killings (standard errors clustered by dyad)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings	(3) Portfolio of killings
Transnational non-state military support (lag)	0.064† (0.036)	0.086* (0.038)	0.161* (0.080)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-0.134* (0.053)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-0.207† (0.110)
Rebel group military support (lag)			-0.108 (0.079)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			0.028 (0.072)
State military support (lag)		0.023 (0.031)	0.017 (0.033)
State financial support (lag)		0.068 (0.056)	0.030 (0.055)
Territorial Control	-0.016 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.039)	-0.017 (0.039)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.024 (0.057)	-0.035 (0.062)	-0.042 (0.062)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.030 (0.028)	-0.029 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.029)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.035* (0.017)	0.030† (0.016)	0.037* (0.015)
Total population (log)	-0.013 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.012 (0.025)
Regime Type (lag)	0.000 (0.002)	-5.46e- (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Constant	0.030 (0.172)	-0.019 (0.183)	-0.010 (0.184)
Observations	376	360	360
R-squared	0.092	0.088	0.118

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XVI. OLS Models with logit link function the effect of transnational non-state actors financial support on the portfolio of killings (standard errors clustered by dyads)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings	(3) Portfolio of killings
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)	-0.104* (0.045)	-0.105* (0.048)	-0.135* (0.057)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-0.041 (0.051)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-0.021 (0.059)
Rebel group military support (lag)			0.015 (0.047)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			0.153* (0.074)
State military support (lag)		-0.031 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.036)
State financial support (lag)		0.036 (0.055)	0.020 (0.056)
Territorial Control	-0.016 (0.038)	-0.011 (0.039)	-0.011 (0.040)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.007 (0.057)	-0.018 (0.064)	-0.028 (0.063)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.021 (0.025)	-0.019 (0.026)	0.002 (0.027)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.037* (0.015)	0.034* (0.015)	0.038* (0.015)
Total population (log)	-0.007 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.024)
Regime Type (lag)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Constant	-0.018 (0.168)	0.005 (0.182)	-0.046 (0.180)
Observations	376	360	360
R-squared	0.105	0.094	0.115

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XVII. GLM models with logit link function for the effect of transnational non-state actors financial and military support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings. With lag of outcome as time control (standard errors clustered by dyad)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings	(3) Portfolio of killings
# terrorist-related deaths (lag)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Transnational non-state military support (lag)	0.534** (0.265)	0.638* (0.285)	0.953† (0.504)
Transnational non-state financial support (lag)	-0.718* (0.321)	-6.674† (0.347)	-1.051* (0.528)
Diaspora financial support (lag)			-0.046 (0.507)
Diaspora military support (lag)			-1.090 (0.846)
Rebel group military support (lag)			-0.595 (0.422)
Rebel group financial support (lag)			1.207* (0.534)
State military support (lag)		-0.056 (0.238)	0.047 (0.261)
State financial support (lag)		0.294 (0.350)	0.210 (0.358)
Territorial Control	-0.072 (0.269)	-0.068 (0.277)	-0.127 (0.288)
Militarily Weak Rebels	0.028 (0.532)	-0.113 (0.520)	-0.161 (0.521)
Conflict duration (log)	0.003 (0.197)	-0.004 (0.195)	0.040 (0.205)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.289* (0.127)	0.250† (0.120)	0.274* (0.110)
Total population (log)	-0.147 (0.154)	-0.105 (0.158)	-0.127 (0.156)
Regime Type (lag)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.0144)
Constant	-3.301** (0.967)	-3.286** (0.040)	-3.237** (1.128)
Observations	376	360	360

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XVIII. The effects of types of external non-state actors' support on rebel groups' portfolio of killings (NSA data Model 1. standard errors clustered by dyad, Model 2. standard errors clustered by conflict)

VARIABLES	(1) Portfolio of killings	(2) Portfolio of killings
External non-state military support (lag)	0.501* (0.291)	0.501** (0.209)
External non-state financial support (lag)	-1.165*** (0.410)	-1.165*** (0.370)
State military support (lag)	0.009 (0.319)	0.009 (0.352)
Territorial Control	-0.332 (0.275)	-0.332 (0.285)
Militarily Weak Rebels	-0.506 (0.469)	-0.506 (0.489)
Conflict duration (log)	-0.026 (0.171)	-0.026 (0.186)
Real GDP per capita (log)	0.324** (0.160)	0.324** (0.160)
Total population (log)	-0.218 (0.191)	-0.218 (0.181)
Regime Type (lag)	0.010 (0.014)	0.010 (0.016)
Observations	518	518

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered on conflict dyad in parentheses. Time dependency controls included

Table XXI. Summary Descriptives for NSA Indicators

Variable	Obs	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Transnational Non-state Military Support (lag) NSA	891	.2790152	.4487782	0	1
Transnational Non-State Financial Support (lag) NSA	837	.260454	.4391448	0	1
State military support	888	.4864865	.500099	0	1
Territorial Control	886	.3611738	.4806121	0	1
Militarily Weak Rebels	888	.9166667	.2765412	0	1
Conflict duration (log)	949	1.552743	1.067291	0	3.663562
Real GDP per capita (log)	949	11.27712	2.065538	6.285439	16.39188
Total population (log)	949	10.53915	1.70161	6.057697	14.0819
Regime Type (lag)	949	8.185458	7.612542	0	20

I extract *state military support* from NSA using *rtypesup*. *Rtypesup* codes whether states support militarily, with troops or non-militarily rebel groups. These categories are mutually exclusive therefore *state military support* takes values equal to 1 with the value military and troop and equal to 0 otherwise.