From Affect to Value: towards a Deleuzian approach to creative production and control in late capitalism

Tyler Hinson

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Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt to map out the production process of graphic design within contemporary circuits of capitalist production. I will argue that understanding the production process of design today is assisted by Deleuze and Guattari's understandings of capitalism as both a *deterritorializing* and *reterritorializing* force. I will argue that the generative power for graphic design is drawn from a level that Deleuze and Guattari describe as the *body without organs*, which is *affective* in composition. As affect, this raw material for design is a generative, non-conscious, non-representative, and unstructured milieu associated with what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the *virtual*. On the other hand, I will argue that design labor also mobilizes a more structured and hierarchical level of discipline and control against these novel proliferations. This second level is associated with what Deleuze and Guattari call the *plane of organization* or *actual* plane of existence. I will ultimately locate this latter controlling side of capital within what Marx (1976) associated with the *labor process* of design labor. I will argue that the labor process of design is a technique that reterritorializes, manipulates, channels and ultimately de-radicalizes the creative affective energy that designers drawn from the *body without organs.* Once design work is understood in this way, I argue that we can then recognize the occupation as a strategic point through which capital both expropriates value from affective flows, while simultaneously serving as disciplinary mechanism to control the possibilities for subjective becomings.

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Abbreviations

Texts by Deleuze and Guattari: **AO**: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Vol. 1 (1983) **ATP**: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Vol. 2 (1987/2004) **K**: Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1986)

Texts by Deleuze:

TRM: Two regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995 (2007)

Texts by Foucault: **WK**: History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will To Knowledge (1978/1998) **DP**: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977/1995)

Texts by Guattari: **C**: Chaosophy: texts and interviews 1972-1977 (2009a) **SS**: Soft Subversions: Texts and Interviews 1977-1985 (2009b)

Introduction: Strange Resonances

In this dissertation, I wish to provide a novel way in which one can both understand the work done within what has been recently referred to as the "cultural" or "creative" industries, while simultaneously situating these occupations within the wider circuits of capitalist accumualtion and control.   This work seeks to offer a way to view contemporary capitalism as encompassing two types of production according to the theory of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. The first is what I will call the production of affect, which, drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari occurs outside of, and in many ways unincorporated within tradition notions of the labor process as outlined by Karl Marx in *Capital.* As an affective form of production, this process is largely unstructured, non-signifying, intensive, and forms the basis for any novel creation.

I will argue that this generative power is what propels forms of cultural labor; it is the generative power which furnishes the creative industries with the ability to create new commodities. As such, these forms of affective production, which circulate throughout the general social body, are fundamental to the work that creative workers like designers must seek out.

In addition to this first layer of production, I wish to identify a second layer of production that seeks to delimit, direct, and manipulate this first form of affective production. Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari, I refer to this second layer as a sort of "plane of organization", related to the labor process of creative workers. Within the labor process of cultural labor, affects are translated into intelligable, and signifying forms of culture directed by managers and clients.

Through identifying these two layers, I will argue that production has both increasingly seeped out of the traditional boundaries of work, invoking theories of the "social factory" put forth by autonomist authors, while simultaneously calling for an analytic disticition between two forms of production and the specificity of the labor process as a form of translation and control. In doing so, I will replace both the narrow assumptions of labor bound up with orthodox Marxism, and the very broad and undiferentiated theories of labor introduced by autonomist Marxism with an argument that theories of cultural labor should instead re-engage with Deleuze and Guattari's understandings of capitalism and its relationship to affect.

Introducing the Cultural and Creative Industries

Over the last several years we have witnessed an explosion of

concern in what have come to be defined as the 'cultural' or 'creative industries' and those who work within them. Entrepreneurs resound with the defining trope of the moment: create, creativity, be creative! Marketing and advertising employees have—sometimes reluctantly, sometimes not—traded in their tired titles of 'worker' for the more appealing noun of 'creative', and Richard Florida has anointed them as members of a 'creative class'. Government policy has promoted occupations associated with these so-called 'creative industries' as central to urban and national economic growth. Creativity with respect to the current economy has become a cliché, but like most clichés it is demonstrative of something very real, though often misunderstood. Social theorists, too, have speculated on this increasing centrality of creativity in the capitalist circuits of production. While vehemently opposing the overly optimistic business and policy accounts of the creative industries, theorists on the Left like Franco Berardi agree on the premise that 'creativity' makes up one of the 'primary tools for the production of value' (Berardi, 2009: 21). Moulier Boutang (2011) echoes this sentiment, writing, 'we can say that most of the exchange value or market value derives from the value of the brand, and thus from a factor which is immaterial or intangible' (2011: 32). Within the

emergence of such concepts as 'immaterial labour' (Lazzarato, 1996; Hardt and Negri, 2000), 'cognitive capitalism' (Berardi, 2012; Moulier Boutang, 2011), and 'semio- capitalism' (Berardi, 2009) that try to make sense of these new productive relations, creativity and workers' subjectivity have come to the fore as means of production that are instrumental for value extraction.

The so-called creative industries that are associated with this shift in production have moved to the centre of policy debates surrounding global economic growth, especially since the mid-1990s. Illustrative of this is the preoccupation with the creative industries in the policies of New Labour under Tony Blair, which championed such efforts as the Creative Industries Task Force in an effort to promote growth in many of those artistically oriented occupations (DCMS, 1998/2001; Ross, 2007: 19). By the late 1990s, fascination over the creative industries had reached its peak with governments around the world promoting creative occupations as the key for postmodernizing domestic economies (Ross, 2007: 20). The creative industries have since become synonymous with urban economic prosperity as journalist and business gurus alike argue that cities must vie to attract a young, hip, demographic

that is commonly associated with them or else risk '[going] the way of Detroit' (Dreher,2002:1). Perhaps the most famous promoter of this rhetoric is Richard Florida (2002), who suggests that the emerging 'creative class' is primary for urban regeneration and building a strong municipal economy. The infatuation with creative industries and those who work within them is eloquently summarised by the Sociologist Andrew Ross, who writes:

> "As paradigms of entrepreneurial selfhood, 'creatives', as they are now labelled, are the apple of the policymaker's eye, and are recipients of the kind of lip service usually bestowed by national managers on high-tech engineers as generators of value. Art products are the object of intense financial speculation; cultural productions are top hit-makers in the jackpot end of the economy; 'cultural districts' are posited as the key to urban New Prosperity; and creative industries policy is embraced as the anchor of regional development by governments around the world on the lookout for a catch-up industrial plan. In the business world, creativity is viewed as a wonderstuff for transforming workplaces into powerhouses of value, while intellectual property – the lucrative prize of

creative endeavour – is increasingly regarded as the 'oil of the 21st century'" (Ross, 2007:32).

Meanwhile, social scientists have focused their attention on the workers within those blossoming occupations most characteristic of the creative economy. Empirical accounts have highlighted some of the positive and negative realities of workers who find themselves in the industries most closely associated with the drive for creative input. Studies have noted that many workers in these industries gain a strong sense of pleasure from their work (Banks and Milestone, 2011; Gill, 2002; 2007; McRobbie, 2002; Neff, et al., 2005; Ursell, 2000); that the ability for self expression in these occupations leads to strong attachment to the work and the ability for self realization through work (McRobbie, 2002; Gill, 2002; Ross, 2003; Ursell, 2000); that many organizations have open and flat organizational structure, with workers being able to self-govern, or work without rigid regulations (de Peuter and Dyer-Witheford, 2005; Gill, 2007; Leadbetter and Oakley, 1999; Neff, et al., 2005). On the other hand, a number of more negative traits have also been uncovered, including workers having to work long hours that leak out of the traditional nine-to-five schedule (Gill, 2007; Jaarvis and Pratt, 2006; Perrons, 2003;

Dyer-Witheford, 2005); sporadic hours, with extreme ups and downs in workloads (de Peuter and Dyer- Witheford, 2005; Ursell, 2000); constantly being required to spend time and money updating skills or creating self-promotional material (Christopherson, et al, 1999; Batt et al. 2001; Kotamaraju, 2002; Neff, et al., 2005; Sennet, 2006); and low pay (de Peuter and Dyer- Witheford, 2005; Gill, 2000).

The Culture Industry and the Frankfurt School of Social Theory

Discussions of the 'creative industries' are nested within a much larger historical trajectory that begins with the shifting modes of production from feudalism to capitalism. It is at this point, in the nineteenth century, that cultural products began to be commercialized and enter into capitalist production (Hesmondalgh and Pratt, 2005). It isn't until the early to mid-twentieth century, however, that this process begins to happen on a much larger scale and becomes much more significant in the discourses surrounding the economy. At this time the analyses of what would be later be considered 'creative industries' focused on the mass production of art from a critical perspective, largely associated with the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School.

It is in Adorno and Horkheimer's (1944/1989) text, The

Dialectic of Enlightenment, that the 'culture industry' emerged as a critique to what was seen as the increasing commodification of art and culture in monopoly capitalism. Here Adorno and Horkheimer argue that art and culture had been commodified by capital to the point that any sense of authenticity that they once carried had been supplanted by a system whereby art and culture emerge as a homogenized and meaningless. They further argue that the process is one by which the forms of art and culture--whether it be television, film, radio--were now the means through which capital subjugated dissent and produced a new, passive subject. Emerging around the same time, and also tied with the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin's (1955/1978) 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' touches on similar themes. Benjamin argues that through reproducing art, the original work of art's qualities of 'time and space', or the 'aura' that are marks of authenticity, are lost. Ultimately, these early analyses affirm a sort of dichotomy in artistic production that associates the emergent forms of mass-produced art as inferior to those pieces of 'authentic' art that predated the shift.

These emerging understandings of the culture industry were integrally tied to the hegemonic capitalist mode of of mass

reproduction and large scale consumption at the time. This form of monopoly capitalism operated by a logic in which initial investments in labour and materials could yield high profits if commodities could be produced in a large volume. While the reproduction of art has long been a possibility throughout history, the age of mechanical reproduction, brought along by shifts in capitalism, 'represents something new' (Benjamin, 1978: 218). This sheer scale through which art could be detached from it's original 'tradition', or authentic space and time was unseen (ibid). The scale of this process is, for Adorno and Benjamin, tied to the emerging technologies that allow for mass reproduction. The detriment to 'authentic' art arrives in a climate in which mechanized technologies come to dominate the labour process.The new technologies insinuated in this shift (the printing press, photography, wax discs) were seen as integral to the mass reproduction model and the lack of authenticity that it promoted.

While Adorno and Benjamin affirmed a problematic dichotomy between high and low culture (particularly evident in Adorno's analysis of jazz and pop music (1932, 1936, 1938)) , they simultaneously critiqued what they saw as an increasingly diminishing dichotomy between art and capitalism. If nothing

else, their analysis points to a process in which the previously assumed autonomous domains of art and capitalism become enmeshed in one another, 'as the independent artist gave way to the culture factory' (O'Connor, 2010: 14). We should be careful, however, to assume that before this shift that the artist was completely independant of commerce. If we look deeper into the history of art it becomes clear that the artist has always been implicated in commercial relations, and art and the artist have never really stood completely autonomous from production. As Bayly (2004 O) argues, even in the era of mercantilism, the artist was dependant on markets for subsistence. What was particular for Adorno and Benjamin, however, was the degree to which art had entered into the domain of capitalist relations of mass production.

Beyond the Frankfurt School: New Appraisals of The Culture Industry in British Cultural Studies

In the decades after Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of the 'culture industry', the adequacy and validity of their account of the culture industry became questioned by a number of academics, particularly those associated with the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). This current tended to reject the Frankfurt School's thesis that popular

forms of culture lacked any potential to be critical of capitalist relations. We might attribute this first critique as initially originating from Raymond Williams' text, Culture and Society (1958/1960). It is here that Williams offers a historical account of culture as coming to mean something quite different in the period starting in the late 18th century. Before this shift, culture, Williams writes, 'had meant, primarily, the "tending of natural growth"' (Williams, 1960: xiv). After this time, it begins to signify 'the whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual' (ibid). This shift was a response to both capitalist industrialization and the emerging discourse on democracy. Within this emerging material and social milieu, art and culture begins to offer a separate domain of reflection and means of challenging Industrial capitalist relations; it becomes a

> 'recognition of a separate body of moral and intellectual activities, and the offering of a court of human appeal, which comprise the early meanings of the word, are joined, and in themselves changed, by the growing assertion of a whole way of life, not only as a scale of integrity, but as a mode of interpreting all our common experience, and, in this new interpretation, changing it' (1960: xvi).

Thus, culture, in emerging within Industrial capitalism, was not simply conceptualized as meaningless consumption through which capitalism produced uncritical subjects, as Adorno had suggested; but is understood as the primary field in which interrogation and praxis unfolds. In other words, culture had not completely merged with capitalism, but still offered a space of autonomous reflection and scrutiny contra to capitalism. In the following decades, those associated with the CCCS, such as Stuart Hall, developed this understanding further. They argued that resistance and critique to the hegemonic order was visible in youth and popular cultures, manifested in cultural commodities like music and clothing styles (Hall and Jefferson, 1975; Hebdige, 2005 O).

But the leading intellectuals emerging out of this school did not deny that forms of cultural production were imbued with capitalist relations. By focusing on a more textual reading of consumer goods--tying (post)structualist analysis with the work of neo-Marxists like Althusser--they simultaneously argued that cultural mediums like television were mechanisms to disseminate capitalist ideology, but gave more merit to the consumer, or 'decoder' in constructing meaning in this process (Hall, 1973). Viewed this way, their work can be seen not only

a critique of figures like Adorno, but also as an extension.

The Political Economy of Culture

Alongside these analyses of culture, the 'political economy of culture' (PEC) school developed in Britain, critiquing the CCCS's emphasis on the production of culture read primarily as texts. Leading figures of this movement, such as Garnham (1990), were critical of the the structuralist underpinnings of the CCCS, which focused their analysis on the ideological/Althusserian reading of culture (Milner, 2002: 130). Instead, they focused on 'how this culture got produced, by whom, and under what conditions', built around the scholarly work on Marx in the 1960s and 1970s (O'Connor, 2010: 23). The PEC school, according Garnham (2005: 18), was 'influenced by information economics, the special features of the economic structure and dynamics of symbolic production, distribution and consumption.' Like CCCS, however, they were critical of Adorno's approach to culture. O'Connor (2010) underlines four ways in which Adorno's account was critiqued by the political economy school:

1. Adorno's analysis focused on how culture had become homogenized through mass reproduction to the point that it becomes meaningless. Against this, those associated with PEC

argue that the desire for new commodities is a fundamental human quality. Ultimately, they make a distinction between the fundamentally human necessity for new use-values manifest in commodities on the one hand, and the exchange-value of commodities that is governed capitalist reproduction on the other. As humans yearn for new use-values and new commodities, it limits the degree to which commodities can be reproduced on a mass scale. Capital must not only allow for, but seek new commodities in order to keep up with this fundamental desire for new products (Garnham, 1983).

2. It is impossible to know the degree to which the audience as consumers will respond to the mass production of a specific commodity. Adorno's emphasis on the culture commodity as a means of subjugating critical reflection is questioned when one acknowledges that certain consumers do not respond well to commodities. The consumer product may or may not be a hit. The unpredictability of demand and the inherent need for new use-values complicates an ideological programme that works through the production of commodities.

3. Adorno's historical argument that the individual artist has for the most part, and will be completely, absorbed into the mode of mass production, whereby any sense of individuality

will be exterminated, is brought into question (Garnham, 1983). The political economy school argued that this process had not been completely realised, and that the artisanal quality of autonomy continues to persist in the sectors concerned with cultural production.

4. The idea that there is one 'culture industry' is problematised when looking at the particularities in different types of industry distributing culture. In this regard, Miege (1979; 1987; 1989) provides a basis for reflecting on some of these differences in the realisation of cultural exchange value (Garnham, 1983). As O' Connor (2010: 24) summarises, there are four different ways in which exchange value is extracted:

> 'First, physical objects carrying cultural content were sold as commodities to individuals – books, records, videos etc. Second, television and radio broadcasting were (apart from what was then a limited subscription audience) available free to consumers and made money out of advertising and sponsorship. Here there were strong interventions by the State, often taking broadcasting completely out of private ownership and providing it as a public service financed by taxation. In most States some mix of public service and commercial stations was in

place. Newspapers and magazines occupied an intermediary position, where individual copies were paid for but advertising brought in the bulk of the revenue. Thirdly, those forms associated with public performance – music, theatre, and especially cinema - depended on restricted viewing and charging an admission fee.'

The importance here is that there are variations and differences in how and by whom culture gets produced, commodified, and managed depending on the specific cultural commodity. For this reason, many later theorists prefer the the plural signifier of the cultural industries, rather than the singular 'culture industry', in order to reflect those differences.

From Culture to Creativity: Culture and Economic Policy

By the 1980s, interest in the cultural industries had escaped the confines of academia and was picked up by politicians and economists. One of the earliest examples of this on an international scale is reflected in a publication by UNESCO, addressing concerns over public access to culture and the arts. In the UNESCO published document of 1982, Girard argues that access to cultural goods is better advanced by moving 'away from the antithesis of business and culture, or art and industry, which is as false as it is facile' (1982: 25). Policy, according to

Girard, should concern itself with marketized ways of promoting the cultural industries, instead of public spending on culture and the arts. He argues that while public spending had increased over the previous years, access had still been relatively restricted to the higher classes. In an ironic twist of argument, marketizing culture through the emerging cultural industries and informational technologies like television was seen as a way to democratize and open up culture.

Around the same time, the cultural industries emerged as a key concern in the local economic strategy of the Greater London Council (GLC) under the control of the Labour Party in Britain. With the appointment of Ken Livingstone as its leader, the GLC attempted to build an alternative to a centralised economic model focusing on national politics (Bianchini, 1987). In the political climate of Thatcherism on a national scale and the tarnished credibility of the top-down economic programmes in Soviet communism, Labour looked for more decentralised and localised means in which they could achieve their economic agenda. Moreover, with an increasing amount of manufacturing jobs being lost to overseas competition, the GLC saw the emerging cultural sectors of advertising, television, film, music, and newspapers as areas that could

potentially alleviate the growing unemployment problem (Hartley, cited in Garnham, 1983). While most of the cultural sectors were centred in London, and thus could be affected on a local scale, their scope and significance included the whole of the country (Hartley, cited in Garnham, 1983). This put them in a critical position for mounting a large policy initiative that could be done within the confines of the Labour controlled London County Hall.

The GLC's growing concern with the cultural industries was in a large part influenced by two main figures. First was Tony Banks, acting as the chair of the GLC's Arts and Recreation Committee (Bianchini, 1987). Banks was integral in shifting discourse and conceptualization of culture away from its a relatively traditional understanding, restricted to the individual as artist, 'towards a redefinition which focused on popular culture and media' (Hartely, 2007). Second, and perhaps most importantly, was the influence of Nicholas Garnham. Garnham had been an acting consultant to the GLC, authoring an influential document that would later be published as a pamphlet by the GLC, Concepts of Culture (1983) (see Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). Similar to Girard's (1982) published article by UNESCO, Garnham saw the

market as an efficient and useful way to instigate a more democratic view of culture that would reflect consumer choice (O'Connor, 2010: 27).

Cultural Industries and Urban Economic Development

In 1986 the GLC was abolished by the Conservative government of Thatcher, preventing many of the cultural industries policies to ever become realised (Biachini, 1987). In a related way, however, one can see a continuation of some of the GLC's concerns in the municipal policies outside of London in the late 1980s (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005; O'Connor, 2010). It is at this time that the cultural industries become tethered to the concerns of urban regeneration, with local authorities focusing development on 'cultural quarters', a process that would continue to the present time (see Bell and Jayne 2004 in Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). In the UK this trend has been associated with the weakening of local authorities' power over taxation and planning under the Thatcher leadership of the late 1980s, apparent with the dissolution of the GLC (O'Connor, 2010). The central government, while restricting power, simultaneously demanded local economic planning initiatives that would focus economic policy away from industrial manufacturing. With a

limited amount of resources and power, local authorities looked towards arts and culture as a vehicle for urban economic regeneration. In this context, the city policy of Sheffield, through the Department of Employment Economic Development (DEED), is one of the earliest examples of ways in which the arts and culture played an integral part in post-industrial city development (see Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). While DEED was not specifically a cultural programme, but rather an economic development programme, strengthening cultural institutions and the cultural industries was seen as a viable component to reversing unemployment and building an economic alternative to an industrial economy (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005).

Soon, culture-led initiatives to economic development spread throughout the UK and western Europe. Local governments started to funnel money into projects that 'sometimes centred on museums and other building projects, but sometimes around cultural industries- related initiatives' (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005: 5). A number of these policy initiatives are evaluated through case-studies in Biachini and Parkinson's edited volume (1993 in Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). Local municipalities were keen to demonstrate how their public

spending on the arts had a much more robust effect on the broader economy. At this time Myerscough (1988) developed a framework for measuring not only the amount of money generated by the arts themselves, but also the indirect impact of these projects in generating capital and employment in the surrounding cafes, restaurants, and other tourist amenities within the city. The idea was that the municipally funded arts and culture projects produced a 'multiplier effect', whereby arts and cultural investment would impact the wider economic vitality of the city as well. It is in this context that art and culture began to emerge as the object of city development, and a whole slew of local policy initiatives began to focus on creating cultural quarters, and promoting cultural tourism.

The Postmodernization of Capital

From the late 1980s through the mid1990s, more cities around the world began to adopt policies that centred on fostering culture and the cultural industries. The sought image of the city became tied to a process of building small and medium sized enterprise (SME) 'clusters' seen as a means to transform de-industrialised urban cores. Around this time, economists and cultural geographers began to associate this process with a broader shift in capitalism towards a 'postmodernization' of

the economy, giving rise to an era of 'post-fordism' (Lash and Urry, 1987; Scott, 1988; Harvey, O). These figures argued that the era of mass production and consumption that the Frankfurt school spoke of had largely been replaced by a configuration of smaller markets where niche production and consumption proliferated. In this new terrain, the consumption of symbolic goods and services became aligned with identity formation, tending to shift away from the mass culture of Fordism (Lash and Urry, 1994). In responding to these new, unpredictable markets, these figures argued that production had to become more flexible to change, and quicker in reading the shifts in consumption. Ultimately, this meant that information flows between consumer markets and producers had to be sped up; production had to be more closely synced to changes in the market.

Academics thus became interested in the way that these new shifts in capitalist accumulation were redefining the city, labour, and society. In particular, Marxist geographer David Harvey (1989) spoke of the postmodernization of society, related to the increasingly mobile nature of capital and labour and 'flexible specialisation'. For Harvey, the contemporary moment of capitalism was defined by its emphasis on the

production and consumption of symbolic and cultural goods in what he termed a 'cultural fix'. In the emerging mode he spoke of, he argued that the city was transforming based upon the logic of cultural consumption, planned around the creation of spectacles, shopping districts, and cultural quarters, replacing the old crumbling urban cores that were associated with industrial flight. Here, Harvey tied many of the changes being implemented through urban economic policy spoke about above to a larger shift in capitalist development.

From Culture to Creativity

Beginning in the 1990's occupations that had been previously discussed in relation to the cultural industry or cultural industries was recast under the umbrella of the creative industries. This definition coincides with a renewed interest in how culture is increasingly central to municipal and national economic development under New Labor. Following the elections of 1997 that put Labour into power, the Creative Industries Task Force (CITF) was set up in an effort to map and evaluate the cultural industries. It was at this point that the cultural industries were rebranded by Labour as the 'creative industries' (see Garnham, 2005). In 1998, the CITF, as a body of the broader Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS),

published the *Creative Industries Mapping Document* wherein those industries associated with the cultural industry became know as the "creative industry"(1998). Pratt (2005) speculates this renaming was for two reasons. First, in attempt to distance itself from traditional leftists ideology associated with the history outlined above, and second as a way to heighten the focus on intellectual property. The second reason relates to New Labour recasting the creative industries as 'Those activities that have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the general exploitation of intellectual property'(DCMS 1998).

There are a number of problems that have been pointed out with this definition put forth by the DCMS (see Pratt and Jeffcut, 2009), including the tendency to blur "the destinction between the cultural economy and 'the rest' of the economy" (n:p). In other words, as Pratt describes, under the definition it is "difficult to identify a non-creative industry or activity (Pratt, 2005: 6). Because of some of these difficulties, following Pratt, when I refer to the "creative" or "cultural" industries, I refer to the United Nations' definition (UNCTAD, 2008) of "any economic activityproducing symbolic products with a heavy

reliance on intellectual property and for as wide a market as possible". In order to outline exactly what occupations are covered under the creative industries banner, I refer to their classification of four groups (UNCTAD, 2008:13):

1. Heritage. Cultural heritage is identified as the origin of all forms of arts and the soul of cultural and creative industries. It is the starting point of this classification. It is heritage that brings together cultural aspects from the historical, anthropological, ethnic, aesthetic and societal viewpoints, influences creativity and is the origin of a number of heritage goods and services as well as cultural activities. Associated with heritage is the concept of "traditional knowledge and cultural expressions" embedded in the creation of arts and crafts as well as in folklore and traditional cultural festivities.

2. Arts. This group includes creative industries based purely on art and culture. Artwork is inspired by heritage, identity values and symbolic meaning. This group is divided into two large subgroups: Visual arts: painting, sculpture, photography and antiques; and

Performing arts: live music, theatre, dance, opera, circus, puppetry, etc.

3. Media. This group covers two subgroups of media that produce creative content with the purpose of communicating with large audiences ("new media" is classified separately): Publishing and printed media: books, press and other publications; and Audiovisuals: film, television, radio and other broadcasting.

4. Functional creations. This group comprises more demand-driven and services-oriented industries creating goods and services with functional purposes. It is divided into the following subgroups: Design: interior, graphic, fashion, jewellery, toys; New media: software, video games, and digitalized creative content; and Creative services: architectural, advertising, cultural and recreational, creative research and development (R&D), digital and other related creative services.

Within this dissertation, I will focus primarily on the 4th dimension under this defintion—functional creactions.

Towards a Deleuzoguattarian approach to cultural labor

Without a doubt, many of these existing theoretical and empirical appraisals are very useful for understanding the creative industries, their organizational structure and those who work within them. And to be clear from the outset, I do not in any way mean to color existing approaches inept, nor do I wish to claim that what I will presenting is the approach to creative production while theirs is not. The following is not a dialectic negation of current critiques of cultural production in order to arrive at something new. What I seek to do, instead, is to resonate existing literature attending to cultural production with the somewhat separate—though not always—discussions on affect, and Deleuze and Guattari's concepts relating to the schizophrenic productions of capitalism in order to open up novel ways of understanding contemporary capitalist production and the forms of discipline within it.

The idea of resonance as a method of inquiry is one I take from the late Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari who, most notably—though not exclusively—employ it throughout their joint works falling under the project *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, a project that serves as a great inspiration for what follows. Here

they introduce and actively demonstrate the notion that certain discourses can be made to interfere with one another in a way that produces something novel. It is a process by which, to take the example of A Thousand Plateaus, various productions such as art, literature, geology, geography, and linguistics come together to create new philosophical concepts. In connecting these somewhat desperate literatures, the sum of what is created in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical concepts are not reducible to the parts that make them up. Discourse is deterritorialized, made to become, opening up new existential territiories. There is, as Ian Buchanin explains in regards to Deleuze's relationship to his literary inspirations, something gained through his conversion of this material into his thought. In a similar fashion, by resonating the different influences of this project that I will introduce more fully below, I hope to open up new ways of perceiving current configurations of post-Fordist capitalism.

As I compile this thesis, putting different literature together, making them, as I refer to it, resonate, I want to underline that this method is not to be misunderstood as a simple re-presentation of ideas. In the process of translating various inspirations, there is an accompanied layer of distortion or

bastardization, and it is this activity that differentiates this method from replication; it is what makes the thoughts irreducible their inspirations. These gestures, then, are more consistent with how Deleuze describes his own modus operandi, of engaging in a 'sort of buggery' with different figures, creating an offspring that is composed of the original's ideas, but whose ideas become strange, new, or 'monstrous' in the production of new concepts. In buggery there is a certain misalignment with the object of inspiration; through buggery something is added, but also, in parallel, taken away. Ian Buchanan highlights this process within the work of Deleuze, insisting that if one refers to many of his cited influences, there are important inconsistencies and omissions that prevent a reader from tracing any straightforward relationship with his work. This is because Deleuze is often selective in which fragments of work he chooses to develop and which ones he ignores. With regards to one of Deleuze's literary inspirations, D.H. Lawerence, Buchanin notes: 'Deleuze is simultaneously a close, careful, and obviously knowledgeable reader of Lawrence as well as highly selective, subtly distorting and even a negligent reader' (Buchanan, 2009: 6.01). Indeed, in the introduction to what is widely considered Deleuze and Guattari's magnum opus, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Brian Massumi

encourages readers to approach it in the same way, focusing on parts that strike the reader while ignoring the parts that don't. Not only should the reading of the text be open to this sort of distortion, but also the application:

> "Most of all, the reader is invited to lift a dynamism out of the book entirely, and incarnate it in a foreign medium, whether it be painting or politics. The authors steal from other disciplines with glee, but they are more than happy to return the favor. Deleuze's own image for a concept is not a brick, but a 'tool box'" (Massumi in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: xv-xvi).

If Deleuze and Guattari's method of philosophical production is not one of copy it is because they prefer to map instead of trace (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 13). Maps and traces are distinguished in that the later seek to replicate the same over and over, to find the hidden meaning in art, language, or sociality, while the former seek to open up, to create new and novel configurations that produce new ways of seeing. Maps are experimental and constantly susceptible to revisions; they produce new understandings instead of trying to overcode everything with a predetermined transcendental signifier. Instead of asking what things mean or say, maps suggest we

seek out what things do, what gets produced—what does this do when it is put in this assemblage? What does it do when it is inverted or skewed in this way? What if it is combined with this instead of that?

In this thesis I take these ideas to heart. In presenting an assemblage of different ideas, thoughts, and concepts I am not worried with properly or fully representing the original author's intentions or meanings. At best I am an amateur in all the scholarly fields that I will present, at worst I am a fraud. This is not to say that there have not been countless hours of work put into this project, wrestling with trying to grasp at something. Nor does it mean that this is necessarily a bad place from which to create something new. For many worthwhile ideas are never fully grasped but nonetheless leave a certain impression on you that you can then mobilize in the production of something new. Furthermore, I am less interested in fully representing the works of certain authors because I find more importance in plugging in different fragments of their work into an assemblage with other fragments in order to see what new understandings might arise. As such, this project is better described as an experiment with arranging and mal-aligning parts rather than identifying

the 'gaps' in research that need to be filled, as if finding the gap will fulfill the complete image of what there is to know. Deleuze teaches us that the need to produce or generate knowledge does not come from lack, nor does it come from a full survey and understanding of the world. We produce at the edges of our knowledge while at the same time in a 'cramped space' of overabundance (Deleuze, 1994: xxi; Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 16). Ignorance is a precursor to novel ideas, but so is impasse and suffocation. Production of novelty takes place in flows, not gaps. The water that wets you and leaves impressions cannot be turned off, but it can be siphoned, diverted and cut into. There is no space of solitude to build up an idea, only an endless torrent that will force one to develop tools in order to float.

Lines of Resonation

The primary lines that will be resonated, bastardized, and fragmented throughout the following chapters in order produce this doctoral assemblage are: (1) theories of 'affect' and 'affectivity' within contemporary social theory; (2) the theoretical legacy of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly their work falling under the umbrella of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, but also their writings related to the first and

third points; (3) theoretical configurations of labor, organization and capitalism within the era of 'post-Fordism', such as those related to the Italian Marxists tradition of operaismo and post-operaismo, but also those related to the wider fields of organizational studies, sociology of work, and critical management studies; and (4) empirical data focusing on the work of graphic designers.

Neither one of these layers forms a basis or primary problematic from which the others are built upon. At times different layers might be more in focus than others, but that does not mean that they presuppose or are ultimate to any other layer. The architecture of this project did not develop like the building of a house, starting with the foundation working upwards, but like a rhizome of circulating ideas that had to be puzzled together, siphoned, attached, detached, and broken. As a rhizome, there are multiple entrances and each point of the rhizome connects with every other point (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 3; 1987: 7). It isn't that I am seeking to find the answer to a question around creative labor within the field of affect, for instance, but that I begin in a jumble of all sorts of literature and the specific lines that become primary were the ones that resonated best with one another to create a new

'topography' or 'mapping' of capitalist production and discipline. These lines are co-constitutive in the process of producing this text, in line with the way Deleuze and Guattari describe different milieus coming together in a refrain (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 344-45).

It is important to note that the intellectual milieus or lines that I present are not exclusive from one another and that there are many shared overlaps, which is precisely the points of resonation that I will be exploring. Following Deleuze and Guattari, these millieus are 'not unitary...but they pass into one another; they are essentially communicating' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 345). That said, in order to analytically lay out my ideas in a more linear fashion required by a thesis introduction, I have made my best attempts to parcel them out. Furthermore, the list I present isn't exhaustive. I have left out many of the more minor theoretical figures that do crop up within the following chapters and plug into the assemblages that I produce here.

The General Topography

The specific lines I will forward in this thesis make up what I will refer to as a topography of capitalist production and discipline that centers on the need to both promote and

contain creative energies. This topography is bound by the premise that creativity is both fundamental to the ongoing capitalist production of novelty tethered to the need to produce ever more commodities, but also that it poses serious risks for capitalism in that it is the also basis for new forms of life that can and do become contentious to its demands and, therefore, must be disciplined.

Capitalism is schizophrenic, decoding and deterritorializing flows, precisely because it is these flows of creative displacement that are 'both its primary determinant and its fundamental raw material' and, because of this, it 'deliberately perpetuates it' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 33). But there is always a limit to this, a fine line that capital must walk in the process of unleashing these creative capacities, for it risks, as Deleuze and Guattari comment, '[unleashing] itself to the moon' (1983: 34). This is where the paranoia of capitalism is deployed, as a second pole to limit the schizophrenic dimension from which it's value production is perpetuated. It is where the disciplining mechanisms of capitalism temper its capacity to spin off out of its reach. Capital must allow for a certain level of creativity to flourish, a certain amount of deterritorialization from its grasp; it doesn't completely

control, for that would induce a sort of entropy, but it must also discipline that creativity to ensure it 'falls back on' or becomes consistent with capitalism's laws of value:

"Capitalism, throught its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all of its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as capitalism's limit. For capitalism constant counteracts, constantly inhibits this inherent tendency while at the same time allowing it free reign; it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 34).

Thus, there is a 'two-fold movement' (1983: 34) of deterritorialization and reterritorialization that make up the basic topos of capitalist development, and it is this relationship that will be considered when approaching creativity in relation to capitalism.

What I wish to make clear in the following parts is that in this process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, it is not capital that produces creativity. The deterritorializing creative forces on which capital is built are produced somewhat outside of its immediate and direct control. Capital is a 'recording body'

with respect to the production of subjectivity, a 'body without organs' that 'attracts [production], and appropriates it for its own', falling back on it ('su rabat sur') in such a way that it appears as though it emanates from it (1983: 11). Capitalism in this way is a 'production of production' that does not produce its initial creative raw material but produces recordings, coordinates and grids (1983: 12).

This does not mean that in allowing for this creativity to flourish somewhat outside if it's immediate reach that it does not constantly re-fold it into its structures of discipline and command and keep it within an arm's distance. It must, both in order to extract value from these novel productions, to reterritorialize them into value, but also in order to guarantee, as I said before, that they do not spin off and find a different body and produce subjectivities that might be contentious to it. This is why the capitalist body also includes a 'strata' involved with 'accumulation, coagulation and sedimentation, that, in order to extract useful labor...imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations...' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 176). It is forever creating new techniques of discipline and organization in order to direct the flows of creativity it unleashes and requires back into itself in a

constant, infinite manner. It develops endless 'axioms' that stack on top of one another so that capitalism never reaches a terminal state. Capital has an "infinite ability to push past and reset its limits; it can just add a new axiom" (Beck, 2009). Indeed, part of this project is to understand some of the current axioms that capital deploys in order to reign in the productive powers it depends on.

At this point one could say that capitalism is in many ways reactive in its confrontations with deterritorialized flows of creativity. As I tried to dispel earlier, it doesn't create the power that propels it forward but attaches or territorializes that power into itself. Its power is, as Michel Foucault might describe it, 'an action over the action of people'. Like Foucault's analysis of biopower, deterritorialization is allowed a little bit of play: "[it] is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them' (Foucault, 1978/1998: 143). As in the descriptions of biopower, on one level capital must say 'yes'—it intensifies knowledge, requires it, even demands it— but at the same time it distributes productions around certain apparatuses of power, around a specific norm. But capital's disciplinary mechanisms, it's reterritorializing powers come after the

deterritorializing energy that it harnesses and reclaims. As Judith Revel comments, "power is an action over an action: thus it always comes second—logically, ontologically and chronologically" (Revel, 2013: 105). This reactive logic is operative elsewhere, most notably in the autonomist Marxist theories of class composition. Developing in Italy between the 1850s and 1970s, composition analysis, among other things, seeks to overturn predominant logics of capitalism as being the primary motor of history, where labor merely '[reacts] to the effects of a continuing pattern of development with little hope of exerting any real influence' (Shukaitis, 2009: 21). Composition analysis argues, instead, that the development of capitalist organization and discipline follows labor's productive energies. As de Molina (2004) argues, 'the hierarchical organization of business is in fact just a response to workers' struggles', highlighting the reactionary power at its core. Capitalism 'recomposes' itself based upon the struggles and creative interventions of labor, not vice versa.

The Two Poles of Production

Building on the general description of capitalism described above, I will argue in this thesis that there are at least two levels of production that make up the topography of creative or

cultural capitalism. The first level of production is what I will associate with deterritorialization, or the novel slippages that escape its modes of discipline and recordings, however briefly, and are fundamental to its creation of new cultural commodities. This level of production is dominated by the circulations of affects that escape consciousness and language, propagating and circulating in a state of 'virtuality' that comes prior to the any actualization in settled forms of subjectivity and meaning. To fully understand this level of production, one must come to terms with the concept of affect and understand its relationship in the production of subjectivity. In the first section of this thesis I unpack the concept of affect and demonstrate how it is connected to the construction of new subjectivities, which privileges it as an object that is both integral to capitalist value production, but also, in the same manner, a power that has the potential to produce revolutionary subjectivities outside of its grasp. Because of this power, I argue that capitalism has a great interest in both harvesting affects for value production but also delimiting its virtuality and disciplining it in order to prevent germinations that would harm its own proliferation. After this, I connect this level of production to what Nancy Fraser calls 'the even more hidden abode of production' and what autonomist Marxists

refer to as 'the social factory'. I situate affective production within the commons that forms the raw material for the later form of production.

The second form of production I will describe is the production of recording and is related to reterritorialization. This level is instrumental in actualizing affects, which is both necessary for them to be converted into value, but also integral in subjecting them to the rules of capital. In the second section of this thesis I describe this process at length, tracing out the way in which affects move from the commons where they originate into more bounded nodes of power, which codify and organize affect into permissible forms of culture, delimiting them of their potentiality and milking them of value. This is where I will discuss disciplinary apparatuses that assist in the process of actualizing affects in relation to Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of apparatuses of capture and Foucualt's technologies of power in biopolitics.

These two examples of production will be elaborated upon in a third section that brings the theoretical concerns of the first two sections in conversation with empirical examples that highlight and illuminate how these processes work within the cultural economy. In this section I argue that graphic design

labor and gentrification within the modern city are particular manifestations of capitalism's two primary productions of recording: labor and rent. In these sections I argue that design and gentrification are predicated upon the affective value that is produced throughout the commons but which becomes valorized and coded within these two domains of capture.

Section Layout

In Part One of this thesis I will introduce some material that problematizes traditional Marxist assumptions about production through an engagement with design labor. Section One of Part One will layout the basic tenents of Marx's "labor process theory" as well as more contemporary incarnations of that theory by organizational scholars associated with what has become known as Labor Process Theory (LPT). Ultimately, through this process I will argue that these theories are inedequite for understanding the production process of cultural labor. As such, this first part acts somewhat as an illustration of the problematic that will require subsequent analyses. In Section Two of Part One, I will introduce a body of theory associated with *autonomist Marxism* which confronts some of the problematics that were uncovered in Section One of Part One. I will argue that autonomist theories such as "the

social factory" do go further in understanding what I will underline as the dilision of boundaries in capitalist production for design labor. But while autonomists do go further, I will further assert that a more focused approach on what I will describe as "affect" is a useful addition to these discussions.

In Part Two of this thesis, I will fold in a more pointed discussion on affect. Section One of Part Two will provide an overview of material that speaks about "affective labor". Here I will accomplish a couple of things. First, I will argue that "affective labor" is distinct from discussions of emotional labor, though the two are certainly connected and even share a theoretical basis. In doing so, I seek to provide an understanding of the more novel insights that discussions of affective labor bring to an anaylsis of work and production. This includes, among other things, a different way in which we can begin to approach ideas of aesthetics in relation to affect and labor. Amongst other things, I set out to, as Shouse (2005) does, mark out a analytical difference between emotion, which is "the projection/display of feeling" in an almost signifying way, versus affect, which is an unstructured intensity that is potentiality (Shouse, 2005:n.p.). Ultimately, I will argue that affective labor provides a nice addendum to the previous

analyses of the "social factory" in Part One in understanding the mileu or productive power of the social factory that create laborors draw upon as affective.

In Section Two of Part Two, I will focus more particularly on the ontology of affect. Here I will lay out Deleuze and Guattari's theories of unconscious and non-representative production, tracing a trajectory from their discussions of desire in *Anti-Odipus* through their more contemporary concerns in *A Thousand Plateus.* I will also fold in a number of contemporary theorists that build off of or inform Deleuze and Guattari's work in order to better anchor and explain their concepts. The primary point of this section will be to provide an operational definiton of affect which will be built upon in latter sections.

Part Three of this dissertaion will act to bring the lessons I have outlined in previous chapters into an alternative view of production that I have already discussed in this introduction. I begin with yet another problematic I associate with the autonomist notion of production as way to frame this Part. I argue that autonomist discussions of the social factory wrongly assume that the direction and control of the labor process is no longer apparent or needed in contemporary forms of labor.

After setting up this argument, I will then begin to introduce

what I believe is a better alternative to understanding the production process of creative labor. This alternative, as already discussed, is one taken from Deleuze and Guattari which appreciates a dual notion of productivity. In Section One of Part Three, I will focus on the first pole of this production process that I will associate with what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as "the body without organs" and "deterritorialization".

Section Two of Part Three will alternatively lay out the second pole of production. This pole, I will argue, is necessary in order to both extract value from the previous level of affectual production, but also to ensure that that productive power does not lead to subjective formations outside of capitalism. I will argue that this second pole, what Deleuze associates with the "plane of organization" is synonomous with the labor process of graphic design. I will argue that the labor process, under the management and direction of different techniques, is used to qualify, code, and signify affect into capitalist meanings.

The final part of this thesis acts as a vignette to illustrate the theory I have laid out in conjunction with empirical data. I focus on the work of graphic designers as a way to illustrate how creative labor depends on the productions of affect, circulating throughout what Lazzaratto (1995) calls the "basin

of immaterial labor". Using descriptions from designers, I will show how designers draw upon a certain aural power that is neither representative, nor conscious. I will further demonstrate that while affect is an important form that designers siphon off, their work within the production process consists of routinizing, representing, and translating affect into the needs and desires of both management, the brand, and clients.

Part 1: Raw Material, The Social Factory and the General Affect

One could say this project started years ago, when, as a Masters student, I started interviewing workers occupying various positions related to the graphic design industry in order to gather a broad profile of the industry and day-to-day processes of those within the field. I initially sought out basic questions related to things like pay, hours, and the most frustrating aspects of working within the industry. Using these interviews I was able to tie the contributions that I observed to some of the insights in related fields of work. Similar to related "creative" or "cultural" occupations that have been studied, designers spoke, for instance, of what Gill and Pratt (2008) call "bulimic" working hours, sometimes cramming in all night shifts to meet a deadline, while at other points having very little work to do.

It wasn't until after my Master's degree, however, while re-discovering Marx's *Capital Vol.1* in a postgraduate reading group at the University of Essex that I began to ask myself how Marx himself may have approached contemporary design labor within his wider matrix of capital accumulation. More

specifically, I began to ask how I might attempt to map out what Marx introduces in chapter 7 of the volume as "the labor process" onto the occupation of graphic design I had begun to study years earlier. I asked myself things like 'What are the "means of production" for design labor', or "what forms the raw material for graphic design". Over the years since I first began to mull over this problem, what I initially thought would be a fairly straightforward thought experiment became a much larger and more complex analysis. The more I revisited these questions in my head and began to review the data that I had collected as a Masters student, I started to see certain divergences develop. Most glaring was the contrast between Marx's very industrially anchored descriptions and the ones that various design professionals gave me. The people I spoke with weren't manipulating material, as was the case in *Capital*, but were seeking out and transforming something much more aesthetic and artistic in quantity. Their descriptions of the labor process further highlighted the contrasts--Marx's description was solidly bounded by particular times and spaces while the designer's seemed to complicate the barriers Marx set up between production and reproduction.

What I began to realize is that the realities uncovered by the empirical data I had accumulated from my previous research with graphic designers, and my observations of the cultural industry more broadly, complicated Marx's analysis. For instance, the object of labor that they sought out and transformed often existed outside of what could be defined as the labor process. They often borrowed material from outside their remunerated working lives; in spaces and times Marx would align with reproduction. Moreover, this material was extremely difficult to describe, often not qualifiable by the language they had at their expense. It was a quality that was much more fickle and intensive, fleeting and unfixable than what Marx describes in *Capital*. What the designers I spoke with depended on was not so much an object or material at all, but an immaterial aura akin to that which Walter Benjamin once described as an "aura" (2008).

As I continued to mull over these problems, I was increasingly exposed to different theories that began to resonate much more fruitfully than Marx's *Capital* with the realities that designers described to me, and the observations of cultural labor. One such theoretical thread was autonomist Marxism, which went much further to describe the cultural laborer's

process and the particular cultural and aesthetic dimensions that they drew upon. Autonomist Marxism also provided a framework for understanding what I saw within cultural labor as the blurring of boundaries between work and life. It spoke, for instance, to the necessity for workers to mine out different aesthetic kernels for their production process outside of work. Beyond this, the autonomists also provided a framework that provided a number of answers for how the design and cultural labor might fit into the larger shifts within the capitalist economy. In other words, while they offered a critique that in some ways broke with the Marx of *Capital* before them, they still provided a critical appraisal that tethered some of the phenomena I was finding in design work with the wider system of capitalist transformation.

But while the autonomist descriptions of labor are in part appropriate to cultural labor today, I wish to put forth an alternative appraisal of labor that both builds off of their work, but also diverges in some important ways. The first autonomist notion that I wish to contend is the insistence by some contemporary theorists, particularly Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, borrowing from Marx's *Grundrisse*, that the "general intellect" had become directly productive to

capitalism. The general intellect is approached in many different ways between autonomist Marxist literature, but most accounts understand it as general intellectual developments in technology and science that directly contribute to capitalist production. What I wish to begin to lay out in this section is that while the work of cultural laborers seems to corroborate the notion that there is something general and socially produced that directly contributes to design labor, that "something" is not necessarily concrete societal developments of thought or technology, but is rather much more vague, non-conscious, and hard to describe; it was not a fully formed idea gathered from the social body that became productive, but an aesthetic intensity that acted as the raw material for what they transformed into an image commodity.

The second divergence I wish to begin to outline, related to the first, revolves around Hardt and Negri's thesis that the boundaries between capitalist production and social production have diminished to such an extent that the two are now indistinguishable; that it had now become impossible to analytically separate the labor process from every other cultural aspect of life. In this shift, they argue that capital

becomes somewhat parasitic and organizationally removed from the labor process; capital no longer attempted to direct the labor process, but allowed for the process to unfold and proliferate itself autonomously. In this respect, I wish to begin to argue that, while cultural labor depends on different laborious activities outside of the traditional confines of work, those processes differ from the labor that is done within the traditional confines of the labor process. I wish to set up an argument that cultural laborers spend a lot of time outside work cultivating various aesthetics, or what I will later call "affects" in the next section, but within the labor process they are required, in a very structured and formal way, to mobilize those aesthetic kernels and transform them into a very specific form, guided by the overriding company and client interests. As such, I wish to begin to layout the argument that the labor process of graphic design is very much still a specific and somewhat autonomous link in the production of value, different than the labor done outside work that is crucial for translating the very non-conscious and aesthetic qualities they take from the wider socius into something that is ultimately tied to a specific, individualized understanding. The labor process of graphic design achieves this by disciplining labor in

a number of ways, though the techniques differed from many of the ways that Marx would have described.

I wish to ultimately argue that a better analysis of cultural production can developed by returning to the work of two theorists that have heavily influenced Hardt, Negri, and many other Autonomists: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari; It is Deleuze and Guattari offer a more appropriate matrix for understanding cultural labor and its relationship with the wider circuits of capitalist production. Deleuze and Guattari's work, particularly *A Thousand Plateaus*, works quite well alongside autonomist theories, while overcoming the parts that I find at odds with the empirical realities of cultural labor. Specifically, I find Deleuze and Guattari's work offers two major advantages in relation to the autonomist theories of the general intellect and Marx's descriptions of the labor process in *Capital*. First is their notion of 'affect' and the 'virtual', which help to frame the aesthetic and intensive raw material within a particular ontology of production. Affect helps to describe a form of production that is collective but which is non-conscious and non-signifying. Here Deleuze and Guattari locate affective proliferation as an ontological wellspring for all forms of cultural and artistic creativity that flows from it.

Secondly, and related to this point, Deleuze and Guattari provide a framework for understanding production that accounts for the sort of graduating and multilayered productive process found within cultural labor (more on this in later sections). For Deleuze and Guattari there are at least two forms of production that capitalism depends on--the production of affect, and the production of code, and ultimately value. These different styles of production, I find, resonate much better with the forms of production necessary in cultural industries. Cultural laborers require and seek out various affective productions produced within the wider socius outside of the confines of the labor process, but also perform a different kind of production that in many ways codes these affects and ascribes them with certain meanings. In other words, while they required the production of affect for their work, their own labor process involves a sort of signifying and coding process that is guided by various emerging technologies of discipline. Thus what Deleuze and Guattari allow us to recognize is two types of production, both necessary for capital, but analytically different in character. These differences are important for understanding the political implications of cultural labor, as I will show.

In order to arrive at the conclusions that I will argue in this thesis, I thus believe the three intonations of cultural and political thought I have introduced here are necessary to examine, and, in many ways, resonate. First, Marx's *Capital* is necessary in order to frame the problem, or the certain impasse that led me to these conclusions: 'what is the means of production for cultural work?' While in the end it has become less useful for understanding the occupation of design labor, cultural labor, and the labor process it involves, it necessarily defines some of the key terms that I have worked on throughout my PhD. The second stream, autonomist Marxism, in many ways helps to define some of the shortcomings of Marx's analysis for understanding contemporary labor like graphic design. The autonomists allow one to understand how labor has become more diffuse than what labor process theory allows, and gestures towards a broader understanding where the means of production includes wider productions occurring throughout what they refer to as "the social factory". And lastly, in attending to some of the issues that Marx's *Capital* has when considering contemporary labor, autonomist Marxism, too, has its own deficiencies. Autonomism does not do enough to clarify what the raw material that cultural laborers depend

on, a quality that is intensive and unattributable. Here is where I find Deleuze and Guattari's work a necessary addendum to the two, as a way to overcome the impasses that both previously mentioned threads pose. Deleuze and Guattari offer a way to not only make sense of the raw material for graphic design, but also help to understand how these "affects" are translated in the labor process, which remains somewhat separate.

Understanding all of these threads allows me to paint a picture of design labor that broadly follows the table below. This table, it is my hope, will become more clear throughout the sections of this dissertation. It allows us to see how Deleuze and Guattari offer a nuanced look at both the labor process and the "raw material" component of that process. In the first part of this section, I will consider Marx's original contribution to understanding the labor process in *Capital.* This first section, then, will explain the content in the first row of the table below. After this first part, I will introduce some of the empirical material from graphic designers that question many of Marx's concepts and the assumptions bound up with them. In the second part of this section I will explain the autonomist contributions to political economy that challenge what is laid

out in table one. This section will cover the autonomist reply to Marx's *Capital*, laying out their own interpretation that can be found in the second row of the table below. In this second section I will also be weaving in some empirical data that both resonates with what some autonomists outline, but also begins to take their discussions elsewhere. It will include interview data from designers that insist on an continued analytical specificity to what Marx described as the labor process, though it also highlights how labor is much more diffuse than what *Capital* outlines. In the final section I introduce Deleuze and Guattari's take on capitalist production that places affect in a foundational role. This final section relates to what is the third row in the table, and argues that the raw material for design work is similar to a type of virtual affective production. This final section draws out the main contribution to this thesis: that contemporary capitalism relies on two types of production--the production of affect that is produced in the wider social factory, and the production of meaning and value that occurs within the confines of a more traditional labor process akin to what Marx originally described. This latter process arises as a necessity for capital to both commodify and expropriate value from affective contributions, but also as a form of discipline to ensure that affective productions do not

lead to subjective formations outside or antithetical to capitalist values.

	Raw Material	**Labor Process**
Marx's *Capital*	Material "objects"	Too limited. Work is restricted to a confined and specific time and space; everything outside of that time and space is 'unproductive"
Autonomist Marxism	General intellect. General advances in science and technology become directly productive in the same way that factory labor was once productive.	Too broad and unspecific--everything is productive and productive in the same way.
Deleuze and Guattari	Affective. Raw material, like the autonomist interpretation, is productive, but not productive in the same way that work done in the labor process is.	Multilayered and Exhaustive. There are two types of production, both of which are necessary but carry important differences. One layer is

	This raw material requires a second form of production to make it valuable.	the production of affect, while the other is the production of code and meaning.

Part 1, Section 1: Marx, Capital and the Labor Process

In this section I will briefly outline some of the main Marxist concepts necessary in order to understand the argumentation that will follow in later sections. This section is a way to frame the logical progressions from my early attempts to make reconcile the empirical world of cultural labor today with the work of Marx's *Capital, Vol. 1* (1976/1990). While many of the concepts introduced here will ultimately fail to properly account for the labor process of graphic design, these failures are productive and necessary.

Following an introduction to Marx's labor process and some of the primary concepts related to it laid out in Chapter 7 of *Capital, Vol. 1*, I will briefly touch on a body of work that builds off of Marx's labor process concepts, namely the organizational literature associated with what has become known as "labor process theory" (LPT). These more contemporary considerations help to better understand Marx's original contribution while teasing out and clarifying particular assumptions bound up with his ideas.

Marx, the labor process, and associated concepts

In Karl Marx's *Capital, Vol. 1* (1976/1990), one of the central concepts we are introduced to is the notion of 'the labor process', broadly understood as the operation in capitalism through which labor is mixed with a material and transformed into a commodity. For Marx, there are three different components of this process: "(1) purposeful activity, that is work itself, (2) the object on which that work is performed, and (3) the instruments of that work" (284). Below I will focus specifically on the final two components of the labor process, which together make up what Marx refers to as "the means of production". I will also refer to other concepts, which are closely related to his discussions of the labor process

beginning in Chapter 7 of *Capital, Vol. 1* which will later become relevant. After this, I will revisit the first component of the labor process, work itself, and provide a brief discussion on LPT that elaborates on this facet of the labor process.

Objects of Labor

The object(s) of labor for Marx consists of the material(s) on which a particular form of labor is performed. Marx identifies two types of objects in the labor process. The first is what he defines as "nature" which is a material that has had no prior labor mixed with it. In other words, nature has not been transformed at all by any human interaction with that material. Examples of nature acting as a raw material would be certain agricultural goods, such as if a forager went out into uncultivated woods and picked berries. Certain extractive industries also have nature as their raw material, when, for instance, they mine out copper from a mountain.

A second type material that forms the "object of labor" is what Marx refers to as "raw material". Raw material is also an object on which labor is performed, but is distinguished from nature in that "has already undergone some alteration by means of labor" (285). It is more frequently the case, "with the exception

of the extractive industries, such as mining, hunting fishing (and agriculture, but only in so far as it starts by breaking up virgin soil)" (1976/1990: 287), that raw material forms the objects of labor. To put it differently, raw material means that the material that is currently the primary object on which labor is done is a result of a previous laboring process. Harvested and cultivated grapes form a raw material for wine production, for instance. Thus, it is often the case that a product that can be sold as a final commodity, such as grapes, can also be used as a raw material for other forms of production. However, "whenever [such] products enter as a means of production into new labor processes", such as when grapes become a raw material for a new production process of wine, Marx tells us that "they lose their character of being products and function only as objective factors contributing to living labor" (1976/1990: 289).

One more example is helpful in order to understand the difference between nature and raw material. Let's take the occupation of commercial fishing as an example. When a fisherman catches a completely wild fish in the ocean, the object of their labor (the fish) is what would be understood as "nature" according to Marx. However, that same fish, once it

has been transported back to port, cleaned, and frozen it becomes a raw material since there has been all sorts of human labor expended in catching the fish, transporting it and processing it. Thus, when a chef in a restaurant cooks that fish, their object of labor is not nature, but a "raw material" because previous labor has already been mixed with the object. In this sense, Marx declares that "all raw material is an object of labor [*ArbeitsgegenstandI*] but not every object of labor is raw material; the object of labor counts as raw material only when it has already undergone some alteration by means of labor" (1976/1990: 284-85).

Instruments of work

Instruments of work are objects that the worker uses in order to perform his or her labor on the objects of labor. These come between the worker and the object of labor, and can include, tools, machines, chemicals, etc. In a more broader view, Marx also includes 'all the objective conditions necessary for carrying on the labor process' to the category of labor instruments. Consider the example of winemaking once more. In wine production, the instruments of labor would include all the barrels involved in aging the wine, the vats used in fermenting the grapes, bottles, siphons, and they yeast used to

convert the grape sugars into alcohol. In a factory setting, we would say that things like machines, hammers and other tools are instruments of labor. We could also say that even the roads and canals used to transport the goods and the buildings where the workers perform their labor are also instruments of that process.

Productive consumption

Marx states that productive consumption happens when, "labor uses up its material elements, its objects and its instruments" (1976/1990: 290). To return to the wine production example, productive consumption is the consumption of raw grapes (the object of labor) in the production of wine, but also the slow consumption of tools that are used in the process of wine production. Things like the electricity that is used to run the machinery is consumed in the production process is a form of labor, but also the wine barrels that eventually break down and have to be replaced. The importance of laying out what Marx calls "productive consumption" is important because it marks out these processes of consumption as very different than what he calls "individual consumption". When consumption happens outside of the production process, in the space Marx defines as

"reproduction" it is individual; it is consumption that "uses up products as a means of subsistence for the living individual" rather than for the production of further products within the labor process (1976/1990: 290). An example of individual production would be when a worker takes their wage that they earn from a capitalist and buy anything for subsistence or entertainment. The distinction between productive consumption and individual consumption will later be become important.

Labor or Work Itself

Above the "means of production" of the labor process that Marx names, it is the distinct and primary role that labor and the organization of labor holds for Marx and his labor theory of value that is perhaps most important. This is the crux on which his development of a labor theory of value rests, for human labor is the base component that takes an object of labor and adds value to it. It is the labor process that not only reproduces the workers means of subsistence, but also produces the surplus value over an above the workers subsistence which is accumulated and taken from the worker by the capitalist as profit. It is for this reason that Marx specifies that the control of the labor process is integral, and

the greater expropriation of surplus labor is only done through either extending the labor process or intensifying the time of work.

In the decades since Marx's original explication of the labor process, the components of that process and the centrality of it for understanding work and organizations has continued to be central to organizational theory. Many decades later, the centrality of the labor process for producing value is a theme that would be picked up again in the 1970's, particularly in Harry Braverman's highly influential *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, where he elaborates on how Taylorist regimes of labor are continually disciplined and deskilled. Key in these discussion is how Braverman focuses his critique on how "labor power", an indeterminate *capacity* for work, is transformed into concrete labor for the creation of value in a capitalist society in and through the labor process. For him, following Marx, this transformation is a result of "the complex interaction between tools and social relations, technology and society" (Braverman, 1998: 35) and requires three processes in capitalist society:

"First, workers are separated from the means with which production is carried on, and can gain access to them only by selling their labor power to others [what Marx refers to as 'primitive accumulation']. Second, workers are freed of legal constraints, such as serfdom or slavery, that prevent them from disposing of their own labor power [they require a nominal amount of freedom to sell their labor power]. Third, the purpose of the employment of the worker becomes the expansion of a unit of capital belonging to the employer, who is thus functioning as a capitalist [their labor does not belong to them, but to someone else]. The labor process therefore begins with a contract or agreement governing the conditions of the sale of labor power by the worker and its purchase by the employer" (1998: 35-36).

In the capitalist arrangement presented above, the worker becomes devoid of any other means through which they might earn a living and survive other than capitalism, and as such is forced to sell their 'labor power' to the capitalist through a contractual agreement for a determined period of time (36). At this point of selling labor power, however, labor remains *a potential for work*. As Marx before Braverman underlined,

labor power is a hypothetical, distinguished from the act of working, which is 'labor' proper or labor power actualized. When a laborer sells their labor power they remain in possession of that potential, as Braverman highlights: "Muscle and brain cannot be separated from persons possessing them; one cannot endow another with one's own capacity for work, no matter at what price, any more than one can eat, sleep, or perform sex acts for another. Thus, in the exchange, the worker does not surrender to the capitalist his or her capacity for work" (Braverman, 1998: 37). It is only at the point that the worker is put to work, or when the workers labor potential is turned into actualized labor that the control over one's capacity is relinquished to the capitalist who now owns the products of their work and controls the process of work. For this reason, Marx explains in *Capital* that it is only through "working, the [labor power] becomes in actuality what previously he only was potentially, namely labor-power in action, a worker" (1976/1990: 283). Braverman builds on this notion, writing "the capitalist can take advantage of the bargain [of buying of labor power] only by setting the worker to work" (1998: 37). He continues:

"If the capitalist builds upon this distinctive quality and potential of human labor power, it is also this quality, by its very indeterminacy, which places before him his greatest challenge and problem. The coin of labor has its obverse side: in purchasing labor power that can do much, he is at the same time purchasing an undefined quality and quantity. What he buys is infinite in potential, but in its realization it is limited..." (1998: 39).

For Braverman, following Marx, when the capitalist buys the means of production, such as the objects on which labor is performed, and the instruments used in the labor process, that investment's quantity and quality is already known. These "means of production", as Marx refers to them, are 'constant capital' because they do not produce, do not add value, and the cost does not change (see Marx, 1976/1990: Chapter 8). Labor power, on the other hand, is indeterminate, and as such, the quality of work and amount of value it produces is "variable" and dependent on the production process and the degree to which that labor power can be converted into real work:

"[W]hen the capitalist buys buildings, materials, tools, machinery, etc., he can evaluate with precision their place

in the labor process. He knows that a certain portion of his outlay will be transferred to each unit of production and his accounting practices allocate these in the form of costs or depreciation. But when he buys labor time, the outcome is far from being either so certain or so definite that it can be reckoned in this way, with precision and in advance. This is merely an expression of the fact that the portion of his capital expended on labor power is the 'variable' portion, which undergoes an increase in the process of production; for him, the question is how great that increase will be" (Braverman, 1998: 39).

It is here that the notion of the 'labor process" becomes such a central feature for Braverman, for without the capitalist control over that process, the potential for work could not be actualized into a specifically capitalist form of value. Put differently, the labor process forms the link that is necessary for this transition from labor power to labor, and ultimately, value. While the capitalist cannot know in advance the quality and quantity of the labor power they are purchasing, they can, and indeed do, control how that potential is mobilized to ensure that they can maximize the amount of labor, and thus value, that is realized. Ultimately it is the labor process and its

control, which must be wrested from the worker and brought into the exclusive domain of the capitalist and their management. The insistence on the labor process as an integral and almost exclusive domain of surplus value extraction is quite consistent with Marx's analysis of surplus value, at least in *Capital.* What Braverman adds to Marx's analysis, however, is the notion that the management over that process is constantly evolving in order to expropriate ever more amount of labor and thus value out of labor power.

The vitality of the labor process found in Braverman's work has become quite influential in the fields of organizational studies and the sociology of work since *Labor and Monopoly Capitalism*, eventually informing what would become loosely known as "labor process theory" (LPT hereafter). Even today, the labor process and LPT specifically is an influential component to many in contemporary workplace analyses, where figures like Thomson and Smith still insist on the labor theory mantra that "management must, under competitive, standardizing, and differentiating conditions, seek to release and realize productive labor from living labor power" (2001: 61 cited in Bohm and Land, 2009).

The ongoing relevance of LPT for contemporary understandings of capitalist accumulation have not continued without a number of implicit or explicit confrontations with what one could refer to as post-structuralst and post-fordist appraisals of work, however. There has been an ongoing LPT debate within organizational studies, particularly in the British context, which critiques the lack of attention to subjectivity within the theory, for instance (O'Doherty and Willmott, 2001). One also sees a number of claims from Foucauldian perspectives on capitalist production, such as those from Knights and Willmott (1989; see also Knights, 2001; Wilmott, 1994, 1997), who claim that LPT doesn't appreciate the reality the role of micro-relations within capitalist organization (see Knights and Wilmott, 1989: 533). More recently, and more specific to the analysis here, the contemporary charge that LPT doesn't adequately account for the shifts towards a more service based economy have become more prevalent (see Bohm and Land, 2009: n.p.). It is this final objection that will be further unpacked in the following section with respect to my own empirical data with graphic designers, which both challenges but also re-affirms certain aspects of LPT.

The contemporary components of the labor process

When both Marx and Braverman wrote their analyses of the labor process, they did so with the consideration of specifically industrial forms of capitalist production. Despite this particularity, some LPT theorist insist that the merits of LPT still stand when considering more contemporary service-dominated economies. While they may in some cases acknowledge the changing role of labor process theory in the emergent service-led economy, they refute the notion that there is a new economy that breaks with industrial forms of production and deserves a rethinking of the specificity of labor or the labor process in capitalist value accumulation. As Warhurst et al (2008) argue, "there has been a continual tendency to present service work as somehow involving a break with one or more of the feature of the capitalist labor process. Yet, for LPT in principle, these features apply equally to manufacturing or services, though they may be manifested in different ways" (98-99 cited in Bohm and Land). In this way, LPT at once insists that the labor power and concrete labor itself is still crucial for the accumulation of wealth in contemporary arrangements of capitalism, while at the same time accepting, as Bohm and Land (2009: n.p.) put it, "the labor process and its control mechanisms are continuously reformed and adjusted". In other words, the labor process is still the

exclusive mode through which value is produced, though the labor process constantly develops new means to convert labor power into concrete labor, and those modes change depending on the type of work one does. As Bohm and Land put it, it is the "labor that is going on in the capitalist workplace occupies a central position for generating surplus value in capitalism" (2009: n.p).

But while LPT continues to insist the fairly orthodox understanding of the labor process, still applicable to contemporary forms of labor, recent arguments have claimed the traditional Marxist understanding of the labor process is too narrow. In particular, contemporary theorists associated with autonomist Marxism, such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, have claimed that the production process, associated with a shift towards more service-led and cultural occupations, has rendered the division between the labor process and life at large indefinable.

Interlude: Creativity, Context, and the Labor Process of Cultural Labor

All creative work is the result of shared knowledge and labor; originality springs forth not from the forehead of geniuses but

from ideas pooled by communities of peers and fellow travelers.

-Andrew Ross, Nice Work if You Can Get It, pp. 47

As an increasing amount of academic and empirical analyses on the cultural and creative industries emerge, there is still a lack of insight and research into the dynamics of just where creativity comes from. In the words of Pratt and Jeffcut (2009: 2), we still need research which seeks "to understand where creativity and innovation is 'located'". The classical view of creativity, which largely subsists to this day, tends to locate creativity within individual genius and ingenuity. A predominant view would start with the individual, as they, of course, are the ones rendering a creative idea useful. But just because an individual subject renders an idea useful, it would be misleading to look to the subject as the sole factor in the process of creativity, as if it were somehow an innate quality. For this reason, an understanding of creativity and creative labor must move beyond the individual and take into consideration the context. This is not to say that the subject is of no importance in the process of creative production; it is, rather, to emphasize, as Pratt and Jeffcut do, that '[new] ideas certainly require a context in which they may be nurtured, developed and passed on, or made into something

more generally useful' (Pratt and Jeffcut, 2009: 2). This is the argument that this research follows as I begin to map out a fuller understanding of what this context entails. Of course, this issue is not a completely new one, and the tension between the individual and context in relation to creativity can be noted in varying degrees within the works of those reflecting on art and literature over the last several decades. For instance, In Roland Barthes seminal 1977 essay, 'The Death of the Author', he seeks to undermine the prevailing image of writing that privileges the author as the sole constituent of texts. The view he contends is one in which 'the explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end...the voice of a single person, the author...' (1977: 143). In this quintessentially post-structuralist example, what interests me is the obvious conflict between the individual producer as the originator of creativity and the common or social constitution of ideas that they rely on; between the singularity of the author and the commonly rooted sociality that underpins creativity. Though he focuses specifically on the process of writing, and he does not explicitly arrive more generally to the question of creativity, his argument can easily be informative for understanding artistic creation.

Written some years after Barthes' essay, in Janet Woff's The Social Production of Art (1981) we see the beginnings of sociology of art arguing for a redefinition of art and creativity as anchored in sociality. She argues that 'an overemphasis of the artist as unique creator of work is misleading, because it writes out of the account the numerous other people involved in the production of any work, and also draws attention away from the various social constituting and determining processes involved' (Wolff, 1993: 137)

In a similar inflection, Howard Becker's Art Worlds (1982) is another early text that critiqued the dominant discourse focusing on the artist and artwork as the main site of intellectual infatuation. He problematizes '[t]he dominant tradition' that 'takes the artist and art work, rather than the network of cooperation, as central to the analysis of art as a social phenomenon' (1982:xi). Instead, he opts to treat artistic endeavors using the same types of analyses used in any other occupation through a so-called 'sociology of occupations applied to artistic work' (xi). His text is an interesting turn in that it looks at artistic creation not through the lens of aesthetic judgments applied to individual actors and individual works, but

as a form of social organization whereby artistic invention is reliant upon cooperative collaboration. What Becker and Wolff add to Barthes' understanding is a more fully developed analysis of the importance of sociality and the 'art worlds' at large in the constitution of creativity.

Still, this notion of context in respect to creativity remains largely underexplored in organizational studies on the creative industries. As Pratt and Jeffcut observe, '[there] is a lack of strategic knowledge about the relationships and networks that enable and sustain creativity and innovation in the cultural economy' (2009:3). In this sense, the research that follows serves as a critical interjection into this gulf of knowledge. In the sections that follow, I seek to foreground the certain context that underpins and makes the production of creative commodities possible. In particular, I wish to identify the context of graphic design labor, what I have up to this point associated with raw material, with what some have called the 'social factory' and the 'general intellect'. I will also seek to tie this context with what I will refer as affective, an intensity collectively produced but non-cognitive and non-representative.

Part 1, Section 2: From the General Intellect to the Social Factory

Perhaps the most insidious occupational hazard of no-collar work is that it can enlist employee's freest thoughts and impulses in the service of salaried time. In knowledge companies that trade in creative ideas, services and solutions, everything that employees do, think, or say in their waking moments is potential grist for the industrial mill.

--Andrew Ross, *No Collar,* pp. 19

The Contested Terrain of Production

In the previous epoch of Fordist capitalism, production and reproduction existed relatively distinct from one another. Though production had always relied on the reproduction of capitalist subjectivity, it had been comparatively uncomplicated to draw a line between what was understood as work itself and the forms of social production that existed outside this realm. Capitalist production was temporally and spatially associated with the factory; social reproduction with the home, school, and other socializing institutions. If we

imagine a typical working class life in North America or Europe during the 1950s, it would involve a basic story of a day of work that starts at the moment they 'clock in' and ends the moment that they 'clock out'. Once 'clocked out', the worker would enter into a separate domain in which 'life' and its unfolding took place. Though this example is admittedly superficial, it nonetheless highlights relative autonomy of these domains; an autonomy that Deleuze (1992: 3) associates with Foucault's *disciplinary societies*, in which '[t]he individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each with its own laws'. In other words, the domains exist somewhat separate, even though they might all reinforce capitalist *relations*.

In the second part of the 20th century, however, the ability to define the boundaries of these domains becomes a more dubious task. As Nancy Fraser (2014: 62) notes, neoliberal capitalism has had a tendency to commodify 'aspects of social reproduction for the first time', thus seemingly converting activities limited to the production of use values, into activities that produce exchange value. Thus, it seems that the defining categories of production on the one hand and reproduction on the other begin to slip into one another. But this analysis that

Fraser forwards and her call for an 'expanded conception of capitalism' in response to this phenomena is not wholly new, but is already apparent to a certain extent in autonomist Marxist literature focusing on labor from the 1970s. Here it is useful to acknowledge the work of figures like Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, who, in a way very similar to Fraser, note: 'We have to make it clear that, within the wage, domestic work produces not merely use values, but is essential to the production of surplus value' (1973: 33, cited in Shukaitis, 2009: 146). Thus, conceptualizing activities that would have been previously confined to social production and reproduction as integral to the realm of production seems to have a much longer history.

In the following sections I seek to engage with the history of ideas that Maria Dalla Costa and Selma James draw upon, sketching out what I believe to be a very similar, but more nuanced way to understand this terrain 'behind the hidden abode', as Fraser refers to it (2014: 61). Here I focus on the Marxist concept of 'the general intellect' and the autonomist Marxist concept of 'the social factory' as useful foundations for going beyond Marx's understanding of the labor process in *Capital*, towards a definition of production that is more in-line

with the forms of cultural and creative labor that exist today. I will argue that autonomist concepts with foundations in Marx's *Grundrisse* are helpful to understand what I observed in the previous section as both the aesthetic composition of labor, but also the reality that labor for graphic designers seems to go beyond the confines of the strict labor process.

Marx's Fragment on Machines and the General Intellect

Autonomist Marxism has received a growing amount of academic attention recently, thanks in large part to the *Empire* (2000) trilogy of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Behind these popularized engagements, however, lays a much larger theoretical trajectory with roots in 1960s Italy. It was at this time the political movement of *operaismo* (workerism), which set the groundwork for the later movements of *autonomia* and *post-autonomia*, began to formulate a critique to the orthodox view of Marxism dominant in the mainstream political left. In particular, the work of predominant early figures like Raniero Panzieri, Mario Tronti, Romano Alquati, through journals like *Classe Operaia* and *Potere Operaio*, offered an alternative to the dominating thread of neo-Gramscian theory that had become ubiquitous with Italian socialism. In an important way, their critique opposed the Gramscian insistence on 'the relative

autonomy of the social' in relation to capital, which informed much of the political strategy of the PCI (Italian Communist Party) and the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) at the time (see Thoburn, 2003: 76). Through a re-engagement with Marx, particularly the 'Fragment on Machines' in Marx's *Grundrisse*, *operaismo* argued that the social had become intertwined with production, leading to a phenomena they refer to as the 'social factory'. Here I would like to expand upon the autonomist concept of the social factory, which I believe underlines the importance of researching the contexts of production in creative labor. I will offer a brief genealogy of the concept as it developed from the formative years of *operaismo* to its usage in contemporary *post-autonomia* literature.

From the Fordist Factory to the Social Factory

The concept of the 'social factory' initially developed as *operaistis* began to question the orthodox Marxist view of the relationship between technology and capital. The orthodox view at the time was an 'objectivist' one that saw technology and science as developing neutrally and distinct from capitalist relations (see Thoburn, 2001; 2003; Bologna, 1987). Against this view, figures like Panzieri and Tronti argued that capitalism had become immanent to technological and

scientific innovation; that 'labor power was condemned to perpetual subordination to machinery' (Bologna, 1987: n.p.). In many ways, this autonomist argument was based upon an incessant re-reading of Marx's 'Fragment on Machines' in his *Grundrisse* that was integral to the development of *operaismo*, its extension in *autonomia,* and the current inflections of both that exist today. It is within the 'fragment' that autonomists would resurrect a sort of 'Marx beyond Marx' that could speak to the current context of capital that had seen widespread transformations since Marx's death.

In Marx's twenty page 'Fragment on Machines' we see quite a different conceptualisation of capital than in Marx's other major works. In many ways it almost seems out of place within the rest of his oeuvre to the point that Virno (1996: 265 cited in Thoburn, 2003: 81) suggests that it's 'not at all very Marxist'. In this dense passage, Marx suggests that with the integration of more advanced technology into the production process, workers and labor cease to its driving force, and instead become mere points that link together the overarching machinery that subsumes them:

"The production process has ceased to be a labor *process in the sense of a process dominated by* labor *as its governing unity. Labour appears, rather, merely as a conscious organ, scattered among the individual living workers at numerous points in the mechanical system; subsumed under the total process of the machinery itself, as itself only a link of the system, whose unity exists not in the living workers, but rather in the living (active) machinery, which confronts his individual, insignificant doings as a mighty organism"* (Marx, 1973: 693).

Thus, Marx casts the worker, and what I have called 'work itself', as secondary to the subsuming 'mechanical system' in the process of production. Machinery does not exist outside of capitalist relations, but is one of its governing forces such that the worker 'steps to the side of the production process rather than being its chief actor' (Marx, 1973: 705); workers are relinquished of their autonomy and particularity within the production process, as was familiar in craft-style production. Marx moves from an understanding of the *formal subsumption* of labor, whereby capital confronts and subsumes labor as it already exists, into a conceptualization of *real subsumption*, whereby labor is governed by capital which manipulates the

former towards its own ends. It is here that we can see why the Fragment was an integral part of early *operaismo* contentions to the idea technology developed as a separate, 'objective' domain outside of capitalist relations.

At the time Marx was writing the fragment, mechanisation, technology and science had begun to very visibly take centre stage within production. It is no wonder, then, why science and technology was referenced several times as central to his articulation of capital here. The repetition and deskilling of labor that is only possible through the instigation of technologies of mass production is an obvious concern within this piece, and it is not at all hard to imagine a factory where the worker is assembled within a conglomeration of technology that dictates their working pace, skills and affordances. However, it is important to highlight that science and technology are merely the most historically visible articulations of broader social and intellectual advances. So while Marx in parts directs our attention specifically to advancements in technology as a mechanism that increasingly controls production: 'the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labor time and on the amount of labor employed than...on the general state of science and on the

progress of technology, or the application of this science to production' (1973: 704-5); at other times he frames this process terms of a particular type of sociality. He writes, for instance, that in the process of real subsumption,

> *"[the worker] steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is neither the direct human* labor *[the worker] performs, nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery of it by virtue of his presence as a social body – it is, in a word, the development of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth"* (Marx 1973a: 705 cited in Thoburn, 2003: 82).

It is through reading Marx's references to the 'social individual', 'social brain' and, most notably, the 'general intellect' that he uses somewhat interchangeably in the piece, that one can begin to recognize a different understanding of the fragment that doesn't confine the process of 'real subsumption' to technology and science. It becomes an understanding of 'direct human labor' as secondary to the

'social body' as a whole as the primary producer of value. The individual worker becomes important to the production of value only in so much as they enunciate a broader social context that underpins their work.

This latter understanding of the fragment focusing on the 'social individual' is what is reflected in *operaismo* thought as it moves out of it's particular focus on technology into Tronti's conceptualisation of 'the social factory'. Tronti goes beyond the technological critique, aimed towards the neo-Gramscian thesis that technology and capital are separate, to the very heart of the separation of the social and capital that underpins the basis of 'hegemony', extracting from the fragment an argument that as capitalism progresses, social production and capitalist production coincide:

> "The more capitalist development advances, that is to say the more the production of relative surplus value penetrates everywhere…the relationship between capitalist production and bourgeois society, between the factory and society, between society and the state, become more and more organic. At the highest level of capitalist development social relations become moments

of the relations of production, and the whole society becomes an articulation of production. In short, all of society lives as a function of the factory and the factory extends its exclusive domination over all of society" (Tronti, in Quaderni Rossi no. 2, cited in Thoburn, 2003: 137).

As the 'social factory' thesis above suggests, social relations become constitutive to process of capitalist production instead operating merely as a production use values within a separate field of reproduction. As Thoburn (2003) remarks in reference to the 'social factory' thesis,

> "The maintenance of circulation [of capital] on a broad scale (total annual commodity-product) necessitates not the operability of individual capital, or of 'production', 'reproduction', and 'consumption' as distinct spheres, but the maintenance of capitalist relations as a whole across society" (78).

Reflecting upon Fraser's argument earlier, the resonances now become clear. The individual capital of reproduction becomes mobilized towards the overall ends of capitalist value

extraction, which is precisely what she spoke of when she highlighted the background conditions that are integral to value production.

Immaterial Labor and the Basin of Immaterial Labor

In more contemporary debates surrounding work, the 'general intellect' and the 'social factory' thesis have emerged as central to understanding forms of informational and cultural labor. The real subsumption thesis is very much visible in the most recent inflections of autonomist Marxist thought through figures like Maurizio Lazzarato, Franco Berardi, and Paulo Virno. At this point I would like to take some time to speak a little bit about how the theory of the general intellect has been mobilized in order to make sense of what has been referred to as 'immaterial labor'. In Lazzarato's (1996) formulation of the term, 'immaterial labor' defines a growing amount of positions within the capitalist economy that either deal with the manipulation of data and information, or which are defined as producing cultural content. In regards to cultural aspect of immaterial labor, which aligns with the object of this study, Lazzarato writes:

"...immaterial labor *involves a series of activities that are not normally recognized as 'work'--in other words, the kinds of activities involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and more strategically, public opinion"* (1996: 132).

In this cultural dimension of immaterial labor, or what would be qualified as "creative labor" under current definitions--which, according to Lazzarato, become more hegemonic in the years following the early 1970s--what is required is the intellect of the worker, or 'subjectivities that are rich in knowledge' (1996: 133). As such, organizational command shifts from the previous epoch of Fordist capitalism, which revolved around the demand to fulfill a number of preconceived tasks, towards a demand to 'become subjects' in which 'one *has to* express oneself, one *has to* speak, communicate, cooperate, and so forth' (1996: 134). Thus once capital shifts to not only incorporate but demand the subjectivity of the worker, behaviours such as communication and cooperation become key.

For Lazzarato, this shift means that the control and organization of the labor process changes. Workers are given

much more autonomy in this arrangement. As Lazzarato would argue, workers now have 'an ability to choose among different alternatives and thus a degree of responsibility regarding their decision making' (1996: 133). But within this autonomy, subjectivity must be 'put to work', so to speak; 'creativity must be made compatible with the conditions of "production for production's sake" (1996: 134). The mantra of capital thus allows autonomy and forces one to communicate because it is necessary for creative subjectivities. It only becomes key to the extent that they are the fundamental to producing value.

So, when labor becomes immaterial and cultural, it necessarily involves a subjective element and capitalist demands change from a prescription of tasks to a prescription of subjectivity. But this subjective quality necessitates a form of collectivity and communication, which Lazzarato defines in terms of 'networks and flows'. The subjective is in this sense immediately collective. Subjective labor of creativity, for instance, is but an enunciation of the social flows that underpin that activity. In a terrain of immaterial labor, then, or what Franco Berardi (2012: 97) defines as 'semiocapitalism', what is crucial is being assembled in a sort of 'infosphere', or an 'environment where information races toward the brain'.

And crucially, flows of communication and subjectivity that underpin immaterial production are not confined to the domain of work itself, or 'the four walls of the factory' (1996: 136). The flows that constitute labor are at least partially located outside of production 'in society at large, at a territorial level we would call "the basin of immaterial labor"' (1996: 136). It is through the subjectivization labor, in this sense, that the boundaries between production and reproduction, work and life, become more fluid and production comes to increasingly involve an enunciation of a form of sociality or public intellect. As Virno argues, '[t]hought...becomes something exterior, "public", as it breaks into the productive process', which results in 'the hybridization of different spheres (pure thought, political life and labor)' (2004: 64). In parallel to the real subsumption thesis of Marx and the concept of the social factory of Tronti, what becomes valorised in immaterial cultural production is the general intellect, 'the general intellect of society' (2004: 63), that is located throughout the social.

It is within this conception of immaterial labor that autonomist Marxism offers a way to reconsider the Marx's conceptualisation of the labor process found in *Capital*. Using

the logic provided here, it would like to suggest that the means of production have come to encompass more than primarily material components existing separate from labor and man in the classical Marxist sense ('man and his labor on one side, nature and its materials on the other' (Marx, 1976: 290)). For Lazzarato, 'the "raw material" of immaterial labor is subjectivity and the "ideological" environment in which this subjectivity lives and reproduces' (1996: 142). Similarly, Virno argues that in the transformations of capitalism towards subjectivisation, 'the means of production are not reducible to machines but consist of linguistic-cognitive competencies inseparable from living labor...' (2004: 61). Thus, it seems necessary for this research to widen the potential site of inquiry beyond the traditional boundaries of production in aiming to understand context in relation to creative production.

Conclusion

In this first part, I have attempted to clarify an issue that current forms of creative labor pose for traditional conceptions of labor, particularly in Marx's *Capital.* I do not wish to argue that Marx was wrong, however, he could not forsee the terrain

of labor today. In this respect, returning to his work in the *Grundrisse,* and the subsequent work done by autonomists helpt to offer a different way to understand cultural labor in this context.

In the next part, I wish to build off of many of the conceptions of labor offered in this section. I will introduce the notion of "affect" and "affective labor" into these debates. Folding in the notion of affect, I will argue, will help us to better analyze and understand what this "basin of immaterial labor" consists of, and how it fits within contemporary forms of capitalist production and control.

Section 2: Towards an Understanding of Affect

In recent years, the notion of 'affective labor' has gained significant traction within debates around the shifts in capitalist production towards post-Fordism. Within the sociology of work (Gill and Pratt, 2008), and contemporary Marxist analyses of labor (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2004, 2009), affective labor has been seen as a central object of capitalist value and control, as well as a domain that offers a potential to escape capitalist modes of subjectivity. Affective labor has

become what some even refer to as "at the very pinnacle of the hierarchy of laboring forms".

This chapter presents three different ways in which affect and contemporary capitalism have been understood. First is feminist discussions of bodily work and 'emotional labor' which cleared the way for understanding certain affective dimensions of labor, particularly in reference to women's housework and forms of service work dominated by women. Second is analyses that situate affective labor alongside what is referred to as 'biopolitical production', namely those understandings of affective labor brought about by people such as Hardt, Negri, and Patricia Clough. Lastly, I identify a strand of thinking that meditates on affect within contemporary work that offers a much more developed ontology of affect as pre-cognitive and pre-linguistic. This last understanding of affect is integral in opening up affective labor analysis to forms of labor that are aesthetic in character. As such, I will argue that it helps to situate some of the empirical work that has been introduced within the previous sections, allowing us to begin to understand the social factory and general intellect as domain that produces affectual relations that forms the raw material of cultural labor.

To begin this chapter I will introduce a rather reductive definition of affective labor offered by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri to underline its similarities to socialist-feminist understandings of caring labor and the concept of emotional labor. I will highlight the way in which both affective labor and emotional labor seem, at least on the surface, to describe the similar qualities. Here, I will also introduce empirical material that can be seen to substantiate the idea that affective labor and emotional labor are closely related concepts. Afterwards, this connection will be complicated as I introduce other facets of the affective labor thesis that distances it from these previous conceptualizations and contribute to its novelty and usefulness as a concept to speak about a wider range of occupations. These examples will provide a basis for thinking of affect that marks out its ontology as unique in respect to earlier feminist theories of work and discussions of emotional labor. Through this exercise I hope to demonstrate how affective labor holds a particular analytic and theoretical role that attunes our attention to facets of work that are missed by other theories. Beyond this, the notion of affective labor that I arrive at will serve to better contextualize the discussions of design labor that were previously introduced. The final section

will serve as a way to reimagine design labor, as subsisting on and transforming not simply culture, but forms of affective production.

Part 2, Section 1: Affective Labor

The theoretical roots of the concept "affective labor" are indeed quite deep, as I will argue throughout this chapter, but the terminology itself is quite contemporary. Its usage first appears within the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who introduce the concepts in both their individual (Hardt, 1999; Negri, 1999) and highly popularized co-authored works belonging to the *Empire* trilogy (2000; 2004; 2009). Within this literature, affective labor acts as somewhat of a nexus of differing ideas and theories, which I will unpack in the following pages, but in a more general reading it can be understood as work that produces "a feeling of ease, well-being, excitement, or passion" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 293) and is very closely tied to 'caring labor' and 'women's work', traditionally found in the reproductive sphere of the household, but increasingly pertinent to the types of labor found in the service industries. In Hardt and Negri's conceptualization, affective labor is identifiable in occupations such as nursing and other healthcare work that produce

feelings of security or happiness; in the fast-food industry that requires workers to greet customers with a smile; or within entertainment industries who are "focused on the creation and manipulation of affect" (2000: 292). It is commonly attributable to labor that is bodily, or that involves some sort of bodily human contact, though it can also be found in occupations that involve virtual contact (2000: 293).

The concept of affective labor within Hardt and Negri's conceptualization is inextricably tied to the broader notion of 'immaterial labor' that has been worked through by Hardt and Negri, and a number of other Italian autonomist writers since the early 1990s, including Maurizio Lazzarato and Paolo Virno (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2008). Immaterial labor, which has become even more popular than affective labor in organizational behavior literature, is most fully attended to and defined during these earlier years in Lazzarato's (1996) essay by the same name. The essay is a touchstone text in the more contemporary inflections of autonomist Marxism, and has become widely cited within literature on organizational behavior and sociology of work (see Gill and Pratt, 2008). Here Lazzarato defines immaterial labor as that which produces 'the informational and cultural content of the commodity'

(Lazzarato, 1996: 132). Thus, immaterial labor, in his understanding, is made up of two sides, one informational in character and the other cultural. The labor that produces the 'informational content' relates to sectors of the economy involved in industrial manufacturing, or 'direct labor'. The idea here is that industrial manufacturing comes to rely more heavily on computing and cybernetic communication. On the other hand, the cultural aspect of immaterial labor 'involves a series of activities that are not normally recognized as work--…the kinds of activities involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes… '(1996: 132). In the transformation from Fordism to the current manifestation of work that immaterial labor seeks to attend to, there is a change in capital in that work is no longer qualitatively or quantitatively different than 'life'; that the production of subjectivity is at once the production of labor.

By the time we see the immaterial labor thesis defined in Hardt and Negri's later works of *Empire* (2000)*, Multitude* (2004)*,* and *Commonwealth* (2009), affective labor is included in the conceptualization of immaterial labor as third important, if not primary, component of work. Their definition includes the

previous 'informational' and 'cultural' poles of immaterial labor outlined by Lazzarato, but they also add to it:

> "In short, we can distinguish three types of immaterial labor that drive the services sector at the top of the informational economy. The first is involved in an industrial production that has been informationized and has incorporated communication technologies in a way that transforms the production process itself [...]. Second is the immaterial labor of analytical and symbolic tasks, which itself breaks down into creative and intelligent manipulation on the one hand and routine symbolic tasks on the other [what could be understood as the 'cultural aspect' in Lazzarato's description]. Finally, a third type of immaterial labor involves the production and manipulation of affect and requires (virtual or actual) human contact, labor of the bodily mode" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 293).

Thus, immaterial labor involves an informational aspect, a symbolic or creative aspect, and an affective aspect.

It's hard to say exactly why immaterial labor begins to include an affective dimension in Hardt and Negri's writings on immaterial labor, but Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2008: 98) suggest that it might be in part due to the issues raised by other autonomist writers about the "lack of attention to gender" in its earlier incarnations. This would make sense considering that the concept of affective labor, as Hardt and Negri describe it, shares a lot in common with the socialist-feminist tendencies of the 1970s and 1980s, and thus, through including a discussion of affective labor, perhaps Hardt and Negri wish to overcome this apparent critique. Hardt and Negri even explicitly state that "affective labor is better understood by beginning from what feminist analyses of 'women's work' have called 'labor of the bodily mode'", referencing feminist scholar Dorthy Smith's *The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology* (1987). Silvia Federici further comments that the addition of affective labor to the notion of immaterial labor is "a faint echo of the feminist analysis –a lip service paid to it" (2006: n.p.). If we turn now to this feminist literature, the connection between it and affective labor becomes more apparent, which seems to beg the question, at least when viewing Hardt and Negri's cursory overview of affective labor

so far, what separates the concept of affective labor from previous discussions of labor by feminists at all?

Affective Labor and Feminist Thought

I use the term 'affective labor' as a way to build on [...] rather disparate streams of research. The first stream is composed of work developed by U.S. feminists about gendered forms of labor that involves the affects in a central way--such as emotional labor, care, kin work, or maternal work..." (Hardt, 2007)

In her recent article that connects discussions of affective labor to earlier socialist-feminist analyses of labor, Kathi Weeks writes that "[f]eminist theorists have long been interested in immaterial and affective labor, even if the terms themselves are a more recent invention" (2007: 233). One of these prefigurative examples, no doubt, can be found in the writings of Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, who integrate the same autonomist Marxist theoretical basis of which Hardt and Negri are aligned into an analysis of women's domestic labor. In *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Economy* (1972), Dalla Costa and James distinguish their project from the dominant Marxist analyses on labor through highlighting

housework as a central sphere for both capitalist production as well as the struggle against capitalism. Whereas orthodox Marxist interests concentrated on the factory as the site of production and struggle at the time of their writing, Dalla Costa and James opened up critique to the forms of work that produced *labor power*. As James comments in the forward to a later version of the text, reflecting on its originality, "this book broke with all those previous analyses of capitalist society which began and ended in the factory, which began and ended with men" (Dalla Costa and James, 1972: 3).

One of the truly novel steps that James and Dalla Costa make is to understand women's work not only as a form of reproduction, but as a form of production proper. They challenge the dominant Marxist line by arguing that women in fact do produce value for capitalism, albeit in a more indirect manner. For them, housework is a form of labor that produces not simply use-values, but is labor that "is essential to the production of surplus-value" (Dalla Costa and James, 1972: 33). This recognition of women's work as productive calls into question the dominant Marxist assumption of the separation between the domains of production and reproduction, production and consumption, life and work, community and

capitalism. Invoking the autonomist idea of the 'social factory', they focus on the ways in which capitalism fundamentally depends on the labor done to produce ways of life--child rearing, cooking and cleaning, for example--that is unwaged and occurs outside what are considered to be the traditional boundaries of work. It directs our attention to the ways in which sociality, or 'community' in their lexicon, is one of the bases for capitalist exploitation and should be understood as a form of labor:

> "The community therefore is not an area of freedom and leisure auxiliary to the factory where by chance there happen to be women who are degraded as the personal servants of men. The community is the other half of capitalist organization, the other area of hidden capitalist exploitation, the other, hidden source of surplus labor" (1972: 11).

In their analysis, the commodity that is produced by women's work is of a different character than material products, but is none the less the result of labor. While male-dominated industries, confined to the factory or workplace produces goods, women's work, done within the household, produces a

form of sociality that is also integral to capitalist production. As Selma James writes in reference to Dalla Costa's work:

> "[T]he family under capitalism is a center of conditioning, of consumption and of reserve labor, but a center essentially of social production. When previous so-called Marxists said that the capitalist family did not produce for capitalism, was not part of social production, it followed that they repudiated women's potential social power" (Dalla Costa and James, 1972: 10).

Instead of only seeing labor as that which produces material commodities, confined to the space of the factory, we begin to see how housework, too, is a form of *unwaged* labor, producing sociality, life, and labor power. "The commodity they produce, unlike all other commodities," James continues, is "the living human being-'the laborer himself'" (1972: 10).

These ideas in many ways anticipate what would later develop into the concepts of immaterial and affective labor. Like the notion of immaterial labor, they are highlighting the production of a commodity that is very different than the production of material goods. James writes, in reference to

what women produce within the home, "[t]his is a strange commodity for it is not a thing" (1972: 11). The product of women's work within the domestic sphere is the production of people, of ways of life, similar to Hardt and Negri's analysis of immaterial production. What is produced by domestic labor, above all, are "relationships". What is gained in their analysis is a more textural understanding of labor that begins to acknowledge the forms of subjectivity demanded and produced by labor more broadly, but women's work more specifically.

Emotional Labor

While offering a novel conception of women's work in relation to the wider circuits of capitalist value production, Dalla Costa and James restricted their analysis primarily to domestic labor within the household. As they acknowledge, their discussions were rooted in a particularly Italian context in which most women tended to work in the home while relying on a male wage to support themselves and their family--a restricting and oppressive reality that they wished to overcome through political movements like the Wages for Housework campaign that they started at the time. As one begins to look beyond the geographical and historical context of their writing, however,

the reality that women find themselves change, as does the feminist appraisals of work.

By the late 1970's in places like the United States and Britain, women were entering the waged workforce in larger numbers, particularly in sectors of the service industry that was increasing in economic and political importance. Feminist scholarship in this context begins to address women's labor from the point of view of production proper, as a waged labor. Many of the central concerns of earlier feminist discussions are transposed into this new terrain, as the emotional side of labor uncovered in the domain of the household becomes a central preoccupation in certain studies on women's work within the growing service industries. This brings along a new set of concerns, but also invokes many of the same themes from earlier feminism.

One of the most notable examples of feminist scholarship on work coming from this latter period is Arlie Hochschild's *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (1983). On one level, Hochschild's work can be viewed as a continuation of Dalla Costa and James' concern for the more feminized and subjective bases for capitalist value production.

On the other hand, it directs our attention away from how the subjective social productions produce labor power and uncovers how these feminine subjectivities are increasingly commodified within the service industry more directly as labor itself (that is, work that directly produces value for capital). Hochschild shows how emotion is the commodity of paramount importance to the types of highly gendered labor, such as flight attending, and these types of labor can thusly be described as 'emotional labor'.

One of the theoretical interlocutors that inform Hochschild's *Managed Heart,* as noted in the preface to the text, is the work of C. Wright Mills, particularly the chapter "The Great Salesroom" in his seminal work, *White Collar* (Hochschild, 1983: ix). Whereas some of the socialist-feminist literature at the time was still working within a Fordist paradigm of labor, one that restrictively focused on material production within factories and the differences this work had in comparison to women's caring labor, Mills identifies how workers' subjectivity was increasingly seeping out of the realm of reproduction and into the space of production proper. As Mills comments, the "personal or even intimate traits of the employee are drawn into the sphere of exchange" (1951: 182

cited in Weeks, 2007), underlining the increasingly muddled relationship between the personal and privatized, reproductive and productive, within the contemporary capitalist moment. Like the socialist-feminist tendencies described previously, however, the point is that it is not just the production of material goods that was crucial for the capitalism, but also the very subjective products like personality that were central.

Using Mills, Hochschild builds upon the former's identification that what is sold in certain occupations "is our personality" (Hochschild, 1983: ix). Interested in this notion, Hochschild develops the central question to *The Managed Heart* that was left unanswered in many of the analyses of labor up to that point: "what is it that 'people jobs' *actually require* of workers" (1983: 10). This interest in "people jobs" begins to take us away from the dominant assumptions and concerns of labor analyses at the time that privileged the overwhelmingly male, Fordist factory worker as the primary subject. Problematizing these assumptions, Hochschild comments, "..the modern assembly worker has for some time been an outmoded symbol of modern industrial labor.." (1983: 8). She identifies a shift in production away from the forms of assembly-line factory work

within places like the United States towards a post-industrial economy increasingly based upon service work--"the voice to voice or face to face delivery of service"--and sought to understand what the labor process of such work consists of (1983: 8).

Starting with this basic question and understanding, Hochschild's work focuses particularly on the working realities of flight attendants, providing rich empirical data that underscores the more subjective dimensions produced by such labor. She comes to define the work of flight attending as a form of 'emotional labor', or 'labor that requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others…" (1983: 7). In emotional labor, what is produced is a feeling; "the product is a state of mind" (1983: 6). In the case of flight attending, the workers (overwhelmingly women) are required to engage their emotions and to disguise negative feelings such as "fatigue or irritation" in order to induce a desired emotional response in the customer (1983: 8). This process of acting out and managing emotions is where Hochschild delineates from Mills' analysis. Whereas Mills saw emotion as simply what workers 'have', Hochschild provides

an understanding of how emotions are cultivated, suppressed, and ultimately managed at work (1983: ix). Emotional labor for Hochschild is active, worked on within the labor process, not merely a trait that is brought into work from the outside.

While Hochschild concentrates primarily on flight attendants in her empirical descriptions of what she defines as 'emotional labor', she insists that there are many occupations that are more or less in accordance with this concept. She argues that "roughly one-third of American workers today have jobs that subject them to substantial demands for emotional labor", and that that share, according to her estimates, increases to one-half for women (1983: 11). She claims that secretaries, hotel receptionists, and social workers can be defined as emotional laborers to some degree. Waitresses, too, she argues, are emotional laborers to the extent that they create "an atmosphere of pleasant dining" (1983: 11). Indeed, in the years after *The Managed Heart*, many have found her work and the concept of emotional labor in particular useful in describing a wide range of occupations. Recent examples draw upon the emotional labor thesis in discussions of childcare workers (Vincent and Braun, 2013), retail workers (Rutherford and Park, 2013), school psychologists (Truta, 2012), teachers

(Isenbarger and Zembylas, 2006) and lecturers (Constanti and Gibbs, 2004), call center workers (Mulholland, 2002), hotel workers (Kim, 2008), and nurses (Lopez, 2006).

Emotional and Affective Labor

Concentrating on the concept of emotional labor in Hochschild's work allows one to recognize a number of shared features to the definition of affective labor offered by Hardt and Negri. For Hochschild, emotional labor "require[s] face-to-face or voice to voice contact with the public" (1983: 147). Similarly, affective labor, in Hardt and Negri's words, is "generally associated with human contact, but that contact can either be actual or virtual (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 293). The second feature of emotional labor, alluded to above, is that it "produce[s] an emotional state in another person" (1983: 147). This definition would thus fit quite well into Hardt and Negri's rubric of immaterial labor, of which affective labor is a part, as a form of work that produces an immaterial good. In addition, Hochschild uses emotional labor to characterize highly feminized forms of employment. While she concentrates most intently on flight attendants, she argues that the category could be applied to nurses, for example, which seems to mesh quite well with Hardt and Negri's identification of the work

with types of labor that would traditionally be viewed as 'women's work'.

If we turn to a growing number of empirical analyses that invoke the terminology of affective labor, the similarities between what the concept means within this literature and what emotional labor as outlined by Hochschild denotes become further apparent. One example can be drawn from Emma Dowling's (2007; 2012) analyses of her own experience working as a waitress at a high-end restaurant in which she identifies the organizational context of the restaurant she worked in as affective in a number of ways. First, she underlines the affective dimensions of management discourse and strategy, and how these reinforced management's acknowledgement and preoccupation with fostering and controlling the affective dimensions of the restaurant experience, both between workers and in the employee customer relationship. Secondly, within her own work as a waitress, she identifies one of the primary pillars as the ability to "make the customer feel happy, contented and entertained, in a way that they experienced the restaurant as theatre" (2007: 120). Aside from simply acting as a surrogate for food and beverage orders going to and from the kitchen, what she

and the other wait-staff produced was a feeling, an emotion, and ultimately a "dining *experience*" (2007: 120).

Finding the concept of affective labor useful in her study of sex-workers in Calcutta, Melissa Ditmore (2007) further adds to the definition. Ditmore describes affective labor as "work that aims to evoke specific behaviors or sentiments in others as well as oneself" (2007: 171), which bears a remarkable resemblance to the definition of emotional labor laid out by Hochschild. Specific to sex-work, Ditmore underlines the women's self-image projection as instances of affective production, such as putting off an air of "the girl next door" or a "hypersexual persona" (2007: 172), which works in tandem to the sexual intercourse the women sell. The cultivation of these specific personas, similar to Dowling's description of restaurant workers, is a kind of performance or theatre played out by the workers (2007: 172). In addition to these aesthetic projections, they are required in many ways to put in the work of cultivating and sustaining client relationships as a further affective dimension which takes place both before and after sexual intercourse. The sex-worker must be able to spark a rapport with their clients, requiring conversational skills and identifying things like "shared interests" (2007: 172).

In another example, Ariel Ducey (2007) looks at the work of healthcare professionals in New York City, sustaining Hardt and Negri's earlier, yet underdeveloped, claim that health care work is one of the more obvious forms of affective labor. Ducey, like Hardt and Negri, also seems to align affective labor with that of the rise of service work more broadly, writing that the "affect economy", is "an economy increasingly central to the production of value in a services-based, capitalist society" (Ducey, 2007: 190). In her study she concentrates in particular on the training programs implemented in the health field as a means of trying to control the affective productions of the workers, highlighting not only the ways affect is produced, but the attempts to organize it within the service dominated occupations in the capitalist economy. In this way she, like Dowling, looks at both the production and manipulation of affect within contemporary forms of work.

Affective labor has also been used to characterize the work of modeling by Elizabeth Wissinger (2007; 2015). Keeping with the general connection of affective labor with a sort of performance or theatre developed by the previous examples, Wissinger draws the reader's attention to the ways in which

models have to produce feelings, engaging with technologies such as cameras, and with other bodies, such as managers, fashion show spectators, and designers. Like the other empirical examples, she connects affective labor in a field of work that is largely dominated by women whose femininity is, in part, what is manipulated and sold by the industry.

Finally, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2011) uses the term to describe and account for the work done by undocumented domestic workers, a further occupation that is dominated by women and, which propagates through the subjective markers of femininity *and* coloniality. In her analysis, the domestic worker produces a feelings, and reciprocally, absorbs them within the house that she does her job. The domestic worker's product is not simply cleanliness, but a less material product of feelings.

All these examples of affective labor find a certain affinity with what is defined by emotional labor in that they, on the surface at least, seem to involve the production and capitalization of feelings; the manipulation of feelings in the workers as well as the production of feelings in others. The examples show how a certain type of femininity is put to work, a further connection

to Hochschild's emotional labor. Describing Hochschild's work, Weeks comments that emotional labor "recognizes the strategic management of emotions for social effect as an everyday practice which, since it is traditionally privatized and feminized, is not generally recognized or valued as labor" (2007: 240). Indeed, both the empirical examples of affective labor above and Hochschild's definition of emotional labor both address the increasing commodification and manipulation of feminine subjectivities that were previously tied to the field of reproduction, but that are increasingly becoming implemented in the direct production of capitalist value. This reality seems to bond both emotional labor and affective labor to occupations that are dominated by women and that heavily involve women subjectivities: flight attendants in the case of emotional labor and occupations such as sex workers, domestic workers and models in respect to affective labor. Furthermore, all examples of affective labor and emotional labor are identified in the domain of what we would call 'service work' that involves either face-to-face interaction or communication via some other medium. Lastly, the examples of affective labor also demonstrate a performative quality to the work they concentrate on, which Hochschild also touches on in her matrix of self-emotional management. Emotional

management for Hochschild entails a sort of acting and playing out the emotions that are socially expected within a particular social setting, such as work. This acting, through bodily gestures and cues seems to be central to both emotional labor and affective labor.

Given the similarities, the implicit and explicit ties to feminist understandings of labor and the concept of emotional labor, why is it that Hardt, Negri, and a growing number of others in in organizational studies and the sociology of work, find it necessary to speak of affective labor? Isn't what Hardt, Negri and the multitude of others discussing with concept of affective labor already covered under the term of emotional labor and the prior analyses brought about in socialist-feminist literature? What analytic and theoretical specificity, if any, does the concept of affective labor offer? In the following section I seek to answer some of these questions and flesh out some of the specificities of the concept of affective labor that identify the concept as unique in relation to emotional labor. Whereas I have until now been demonstrating some of the resonations between affective labor and other theories of work so far, now I will focus on the differences.

Towards an analytical and political specificity of affective labor

In an issue of *Theory Culture and Society* dedicated to discussing autonomist concepts in the context of sociological and organizational analyses of work, Hesmondhalgh and Baker offer a scathing critique of Hardt and Negri's theories of immaterial and affective labor. In their study on the television industry in Britain, the two find emotional labor as a much better theoretical model than affective labor in describing the work they studied, concluding, "autonomist concepts of 'immaterial labor' [and] 'affective labor' [...] are at best evocative metaphors rather than theoretical-political constructs with any analytical force." (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2008: 115). Much of this critique, it seems, tends to center on the apparent underdevelopment of the concepts as drawn out by Hardt and Negri. As the two further comment, autonomist concepts such as affective labor are "notoriously vague categories [that] are hardly specified at all" (2008: 99). Emma Dowling (2007: 118), in her own discussion of affective labor previously touched on, agrees, writing "[not] much analysis beyond a definition of what affective labor is coupled with a mere mention of affective labor as 'service with a smile',

'care labor', 'women's (reproductive) work', 'kin work', or the 'entertainment industry'".

While I concur that the concept of affective labor is indeed very underdeveloped and vague, which is part of the reason this thesis is a necessary addition to the affective labor debates, I do not think that it is worth abandoning the terms in preference for other theoretical concepts like emotional labor, as Hesmondhalgh and Baker do. The fact that a concept is lacking does not necessarily mean we should throw it out as useless. Indeed, many theories can and do begin by mere fragments of ideas, or in the process of grasping at something that is not quite clear. And if we are to return to the concept of affective labor within Hardt and Negri's work and other theoretical and organizational literature that invokes the terminology, we can begin to understand where affective labor comes to represent something quite different than emotional labor and sews the germinal beginnings of a novel analytic and political paradigm for understanding work. We begin to see that the question is not which model is more developed, exhaustive, and therefore appropriate to speaking about labor in the current capitalist mode, but how each respective theory

does something different and aligns our attention to different textures within work and the mechanisms of capitalism today.

Affect and Biopolitical Production

As I have thusly demonstrated, many of the examples of affective labor given by both Hardt, Negri, and the numerous other empirical studies do either explicitly or implicitly, intentionally or unintentionally, share some sympathy with socialist-feminist ideas of work, and Hochschild's analysis of emotional labor in particular. That said, many prefer the concept of affective labor over emotional labor because it in some way goes beyond these frameworks. As Melissa Ditmore in her study of sex workers in Calcutta, writes:

> "Arlie Hochschild's term "emotional labor" describes a form of affective labor, one certainly characteristic of sex work. And indeed the term emotional labor has been usefully applied to sex work by Wendy Chapkis. However, these analyses of the work in service industries including the sex industry have not delved deeply into the components of labor..." (2007: 171).

But how exactly does affect offer a deeper understanding of the components of labor? Answering this questions requires one to understand two of the primary theoretical bases for the concept of affective labor not yet covered so far that marks out its specificity in relation to feminist discussions on labor and the concept of emotional labor.

Biopower and Affective Labor: a Politics of Life

One way to begin to define affective labor's particularity in respect to terms like emotional labor is to understand how the concept fits within Hardt and Negri's wider critique of post-Fordist capitalism. Affective labor in Hardt and Negri's version is indispensable of further theoretical foundations of their thought, particularly the notions of 'biopolitical production'. Here I would like to briefly discuss affective labor's relationship to this concept in order to render affective labor's political specificity visible. While biopolitical production holds relevance beyond the scope of this discussion, I will try not to meander too far away from the topic at hand, and focus on the connections the concept has with affective labor specifically.

For Hardt and Negri, the current capitalist moment is characterized primarily by what they refer to as "biopolitical

production". In a rather simplistic way, Hardt and Negri use this term to denote a turn in post-Fordism whereby "the production of forms of life is becoming the basis of added value" (2009: 132). In other words,'life itself', the very inclusive notion of all human activity, becomes directly productive to capitalism. This concept of biopolitical production comes from the much earlier concept of 'biopower', which first arises in Foucault's *History of Sexuality Vol. I: The Will to Knowledge* (1976/1998). Foucault uses the term biopower to designate a shift away from techniques of juridical power based upon reduction and repression towards an emergent form of power that was concerned with the body, populations, life, and the proliferation of life. While previous juridical formations of power were typically exercised by the subtraction of life, as Foucault argues, in biopower the concern of power lies in fostering and organizing life. It is "a power bent on generating forces, making them grow and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit or destroying them" (1976/1998: 136). Whereas older techniques of power were based upon the "right to *take* life or *let* live", in biopower the objective is to "*foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death" (1976/1998: 138).

For Foucault, the rise of biopower in many ways parallels the rise of capitalism as a mode of production that prevailed over feudalistic forms of economic organization. Indeed, one might even say that the development of biopower and capitalism were co-constitutive to a certain degree. As Foucault states, in the 18th century, techniques of biopower were "present at every level of the social body", but crucially, were "an indispensable element in the development of capitalism" (1976/1998: 140-141). The ability for capitalism to become the dominant economic paradigm relied on "[the] investment in the body, its valorization, and the distributive management of its forces..." (1976/1998: 141). Biopower was integral in shaping capitalism in a way in which life and the body become primary basis for its proliferation and the primary object of its management and control.

While Foucault's brief description of the connection between biopower and capitalism focuses on the development of capitalism in the 18th century, Hardt and Negri invoke biopower in a much more contemporary context. The integration of life more wholly with capitalist production-- biopolitical production--reaches its apogee in the turn towards immaterial labor. Biopolitical production here might be

considered another way of describing the rise of immaterial labor; it is what the three different kinds of immaterial labor all have in common: they all produce forms of life (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 132). Within this understanding of biopolitical production, however, affective labor plays a more pivotal role than the other two forms of immaterial labor discussed earlier. As Hardt and Negri insist, "[t]he productivity of bodies and the value of affect, however, are absolutely central [to biopolitical production]" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 30). As they further elaborate, "the production and manipulation of affects [...] with its focus on the productivity of the corporeal, the somatic, is an extremely important element in the contemporary networks of biopolitical production" (2000: 30).

Affective labor's privileged role within the circuits of biopolitical production becomes somewhat clearer if we understand what it is that affective labor creates for Hardt and Negri. Earlier, we spoke of affective labor along similar lines of emotional labor in that it created, for example, "feelings of well being". Once Hardt and Negri explain the term in relation to biopolitical production, however, the definition becomes more diffuse. In his essay, "Affective Labor" (1999), Michael Hardt, in explaining affective labor within the context of biopower,

writes: "[w]hat is created in networks of affective labor is a form-of-life", or, "collective subjectivities, sociality, and society itself" (1999: 98). Though this declaration remains quite vague, it is nonetheless quite important. For what this understanding of affective labor underlines is the notion that affect is creative--that is, it produces something novel--and what it creates is subjectivity, life. Thus, it is affective labor, and more importantly affect, which produces forms of life that are increasingly central to this biopolitical turn of capitalism; affective labor, and affect more particularly, is a sort of substrate out of which forms of life emerge.

Because affect is imbued with this status of producing new forms of life, affective labor has a somewhat complex relationship to capitalist control in Hardt and Negri's definition of biopolitical production. Of course, in this "biopolitical turn of the economy", the need to produce new commodities depends on novel subjectivities, new information, different outlooks, ways of life, and thus affective labor is absolutely integral. This is, perhaps, why Michael Hardt argues that affective labor "is not only directly productive to capital, but [is] at the very pinnacle of the hierarchy of laboring forms" (Hardt, 1999: 90). In this way, affective labor is a necessary, welcomed, and even

fostered element to capitalist value production because it is constitutive of these forms of life on which capitalism in the biopolitical realm depends.

This increasingly central position that affective labor has in contemporary arrangements of biopolitical production results in a very different relationship between labor on the one hand, and biopolitical governance on the other. When increasingly the commodity that is valued by capital is a form of life, a subjectivity, capitalism's power becomes less prescriptive and more external to the production process itself. This idea is already at work in the earlier incarnations of the 'immaterial labor' thesis in which Lazzarato (1996) argues that as subjectivity becomes the dominant object of labor, Capitalism no longer defines "tasks of execution", but instead demands that workers "become subjects" (134), a process that depends on open communication and cooperation:

> "...workers are expected to become "active subjects in the coordination of the various functions of production, instead of being subjected to it as simple command. We arrive at a point where a collective learning process becomes the heart of productivity, because it is no longer

a matter of finding different ways of composing or organizing already existing job junctions, but of looking for new ones" (Lazzarato, 1996: 134).

Like Lazzarato, for Hardt and Negri capitalism's control is somewhat removed from this relationship of affective labor, external to it. As Hard and Negri argue, "affective labor generally produce[s] cooperation autonomously from capitalist command, even in some of the most constrained and exploited circumstances" (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 140). Here we can see how the notion of biopolitical production is related to Foucault's analysis of biopower. As is the case of Foucault's understanding, power is not marked by restriction and prescription, but rather by its ability to foster forms of life and to make them commensurable with capitalist value production. For Hardt and Negri, the ability to foster life depends on open, unimpeded cooperation that happens primarily outside of the direct employment relation "at the level of social production and social practice" (2009: 141). In other words, it is what Hardt and Negri describe as 'the commons' that is the site of affective and biopolitical production, a commons that is relatively autonomous from capitalist command.

Within this understanding of biopolitical production, capitalist exploitation is more akin to a sort of "capture" or "expropriation" of labor power, which is different than previous arrangements of capital, like Fordism, which worked through the direct exploitation and organization of labor. In biopolitical production, "the extraction of value from the common is increasingly accomplished without the capitalist intervening in its production" (2009: 141). Instead, they identify "*capitalist rent*" as the primary mechanism through which capitalist accumulation and control operates (2009: 141). The two describe this difference in capitalist organization, writing that "[w]hereas profit is generated through internal engagement in the production process, rent is generally conceived as an external mode of extraction" (2009: 141). In this way, capital's role in relation to production is removed, "simply hovering over it parasitically" (2009: 142).

Affective Production and 'Biopower From Below'

Foucault makes a very brief but interesting comment in *The Will to Knowledge* when describing how biopower works. He writes, "[i]t is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them" (1976/1998: 143). In other words, despite the constant

attempts of biopower to order life, the productions of life constantly fall outside of the grasp of the formers control. Later, he would write that while biopolitical capitalism produces a sort of "generalized control, it is nevertheless forced to preserve a minimum of degrees of freedom, creativity and inventiveness in the domain of sciences, technology and the arts, without which the system would collapse in a kind of entropic inertia" (Foucault, Le Peinture de Manet, Seuil, Paris 2004 cited in Lazzarato, 2013). This ambiguous relationship that the production of life has with biopower, one of constant escape and ordering, is what Hardt and Negri outline within their analysis of affective labor and biopolitics. Like Foucault, for Hardt and Negri, biopolitics is built off of what escapes it (2009: 31), and what escapes it is affect. The removed relationship of capitalism to affective production and the fact that biopolitics constantly escapes control underlines the political status of affect within capitalism.

While in *The Will to Knowledge* Foucault somewhat prioritizes the way in which biopower is exercised as a power over populations as a form of control, Hardt and Negri concentrate on this notion of escape in relation biopower. They acknowledge how biopower is deployed by sovereign power in

control of life (biopower), but also underline a potentially useful way in which it can be deployed against capitalist power arrangements ("biopower from below" or "biopolitics"). In this way, they diagnose affective labor as simultaneously one of the central bases for biopolitcal production and capitalist value, but also as the potential site for creating new forms of life that go outside of its control (Hardt, 1999: 98; Hardt and Negri, 2009: 59):

> "On the one hand, affective labor, the production and reproduction of life, has become firmly embedded as a necessary foundation for capitalist accumulation and patriarchal order. On the other hand, however, the production of affects, subjectivities, and forms of life present an enormous potential for autonomous circuits of valorization, and perhaps for liberation" (Hardt, 1999: 100).

Whereas in the earlier writings by Hardt and Negri on affective labor, the radical potentiality of affect is understood in relation to the idea of a "biopower from below" against the pernicious capitalist use of "biopower from above", in later writings this relationship is recast as an antagonism between biopolitics and

biopower. *Biopower* is used to describe the ways in which life is cultivated and controlled, whereas *biopolitics* takes on an ontological status as the creative and generative productions of life and subjectivity that are fundamentally resistant to biopower. In this way, biopower comes ontologically and chronologically second to a biopolitics identified "with the localized politics of life--that is, the production of affects and languages...the invention of new forms of relation to the self and others" leading to forms of "resistance and de-subjectivication" (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 58-59).

This notion of biopolitics as a form of resistance and de-subjectification comes from its status as a type of event. Here it is useful to quote Hardt and Negri at length in order to understand their conceptualization of the event as it relates to biopolitics:

> "Biopolitics, in contrast to biopower, has the character of an event first of all in the sense that the 'intransigence of freedom' disrupts the normative system...it ruptures the continuity of history and the existing order, but it should be understood not only negatively, as rupture, but also as innovation..." (2009: 59).

It is here where affective labor, tied to biopolitics, becomes central to Hardt and Negri's politics of capitalist subversion in addition to how it works for capitalist production. For it is affective labor that has the potentiality to create a rupture that both breaks from normative subjective arrangements of capitalism and to create subjectivities that might be outside of it's control.

Thus we have the politics of affective labor according to Hardt and Negri: affective labor is both the most important base for capitalist production in the biopolitical economy, but is also one of the primary sites of production that offers a way out of capitalist control. Both these realities center around affective labor's status as that which creates new forms of life--forms of life that are integral for creating ever more commodities on the one hand, and forms of life that might rupture from capitalist subjectivity on the other. To put this in Hardt and Negri's terms, affective labor is both one of the central objects of control under biopower, but is also one of the central spheres of intervention for biopolitics. This tension is very nicely summarized by Ben Anderson, who writes:

"On the one hand, life is that which exceeds attempts to order and control it. On the other hand, life is that which is made productive through techniques of intervention. It is in the tension between these two versions of how power and life relate that a politics of affect resides..." (Anderson, 2010: 1).

For Anderson, it is not surprising how affective labor on the one hand and biopower on the other would both be useful interlocutors. This is because "an encounter between 'affect' and 'biopower' is to bring together two ways of thinking about the relation between power and life" (2010: 1). In other words, affect and biopower both speak to the way in which power and life go together, albeit from slightly different angles. This connection is further commented on by Patricia Clough, another prominent figure to comment on the connection between affect and capitalism in recent years. Like Hardt and Negri, she finds concepts like biopower and affect useful in order to understand how life becomes the primary object of capitalist proliferation. Affect, for Clough, becomes a central concern within a "changing global process of accumulating capital', whereby value extraction becomes concerned with 'the structure and organization of the human body, or what is

called 'life itself'' (Clough, 2007: 3). On the other hand, like Hardt and Negri, affect can also pave the way for "new possibilities inside capital for making an outside for capital, and the potential for change" (2007: 25). Thus affect within her diagnoses of capital, similar to Hardt and Negri's, is both one of the increasingly central objects of extraction in capital, but is also a dimension of life that opens up ways out of capitalist subjectivity.

Beyond Hardt and Negri's Affective Labor: Towards an understanding of affect itself

Hardt and Negri's definition of affective labor, while useful in its identification of how affect is an integral political component in modern capitalism, is still quite vague when describing what affect is. Beyond the fact that it is mostly described as a sort of substrate that produces forms of life, or life itself, they only passingly denote that their understanding of affect is taken from Spinoza. Moreover, while they go beyond some of the preceding feminist literature and emotional labor theory in tying affect to forms of biopolitics, their definition doesn't do enough to distinguish their concept of affective labor from that of emotional labor. Why not simply build upon emotional labor rather than developing a new term, for

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instance? The closeness of the terms' meanings is part the reason, I believe, why individuals such as Hesmondhalgh and Baker find it difficult to see the value in affective labor. More recently, however, a growing amount of research taking up the relationship between affect and capitalism has provided a more robust definition that goes beyond Hardt and Negri's initial formulations. These descriptions are an important advancement in discussions on affective labor for they begin to lay out more concretely the distinctions between operative words of emotion and affect particular to each definition. In laying out these distinctions, affective labor becomes a useful concept for exploring not only those occupations associated with service work or feminized labor of the bodily mode, but also for the fields of advertising and cultural production.

Part of laying out a distinction between emotional labor and affective labor requires one to understand the ontology of the operative words within both descriptions--affect and emotion-- and how each term works within their respective theoretical frameworks. Returning to Arlie Hochschild's *Managed Heart*, we find that her definition of emotion draws it out as a type of "biologically given sense", like smell or taste, that provides us with "a means by which we know about or relation with the

world" (1983: 219). Unlike other senses, however, emotions are *cognitive* to the extent they " 'signal' messages to the individual" (1983: 220). Thus, in borrowing from Freud and Darwin, Hochschild understands emotions as a sort of communication that tells individuals information about themselves and their surroundings, a sort of shortcut to linguistic signification. Hochschild continues: "emotional states--such as joy, sadness, and jealousy--can be seen as the senders of signals about our way of apprehending the inner and outer environment" (1983: 220-221).

In Hochschild's analysis of service work, it is this signal function that is manipulated and managed within occupations such as flight attending. Workers have to act out specific emotions with the hope of signaling a desired message to the customers whom they serve. Hochschild's conceptual mix of Freudian psychology and evolutionary biology in her understanding of emotions generally produces what might be understood as a 'functional' understanding of emotion. In other words, emotions relay information crucial for our survival. Anxiety or fear tell us that something might be potentially harmful, disgust tells us we should refrain from a certain activity. They are thus personal experiences of states, tied to

cognition, that are reflected upon by the individuals that undergo them with the aim towards an action.

In comparison to the term emotion in Hochschild's work, the term affect within much of the contemporary affective labor literature denotes a much less stable and cognitive phenomena. Instead, affect is largely conceptualized as a sort of transference from body to body that occurs prior to our conscious reflection, subsisting below its threshold. Patricia Clough, for instance, explains that affect can be understood as "a substrate of potential bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in excess of consciousness" (Clough, 2007: 1-2). Indeed, this notion of affect as potentiality that is outside of consciousness is one the defining features that many commentators insist on when situating the concept affective labor in opposition to emotional labor. This difference is laid out quite clearly in Ariel Ducey's work on healthcare workers in New York, for example, where she explicitly distinguishes between affect and emotion. For her, "the concept of affect...refers to a different register of phenomena than the concept of emotions" with the former being "a process that can become, but does not necessarily become, conscious" (Ducey, 2007: 190). Emotions, on the other hand, are more akin to

feelings, which are the cognitive response to objects or phenomena (2007: 191). In this way, emotions are situated on a level of conscious sense making that comes after a non-conscious affectual process has taken place; emotions are tied to self-reflection that happens in response to an affective event.

These ontological differences between affects and emotions are at the center of why many have chosen to speak of affective labor instead of emotional labor. In Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2011: n.p.) work that analyzes domestic labor in light of affect theory, she, like those above, distances affective labor from emotional labor. While she recognizes the significance and usefulness of prior socialist-feminist writings and terms such as emotional labor for understanding work, she insists affective labor works on a different level:

> "The analysis of "emotional labor" in domestic work has uncovered the role of personal care and the investment of subjective faculties by stressing the significance of love in women's labor. Frequently, the assumption is made that when we speak of emotions we mean affects. But the perspective on affects, while it might embrace an analysis

of the dynamics of emotions, goes beyond the cognitive framework of emotions".

Elizabeth Wissenger (2007; 2015) provides an even more specific understanding of affective labor in her empirical work on the modeling industry that further clarifies its distinction with emotional labor. For her, to speak of affect is to underline a different understanding of the body and interactions between bodies where bodies are understood as "uncontained and fluid" and ultimately open to investments that "control, amplify, or channel bodily forces" (2007: 231). Affects are "bodily forces" that subsist below the threshold of consciousness, analogous to a type of energy flow that passes between bodies (2007: 231). These affective forces are "pre-individual", not contained within the particular subject, but diffuse and gaseous, freely flowing between people. In Wissenger's more recent work, a truly detailed and coherent empirical monograph, *This Years Model: Fashion, Media and The Making of Glamour* (2015), the definition of affective labor is further expanded upon. In this work affect becomes understood as "the unsaid, unseen, emergent potentials efflorescing in the confluences of the model-image-body-product" (Wissinger, 2015: 26). She interrogates modeling as a form of affective labor in which affect, understood as this

bodily energy full of potentials, gets shaped and manipulated into a specific 'looks', captured by cameras and distributed throughout different medias. She offers a very concrete analysis of how "our life energy and potential" are "circulated by imaging technologies, and how that circulation is turning a profit" (Wissenger, 2015: 27).

The distinction between affect and emotion is thus a very real and important one to those who invoke the prior. Affect tends to speak about a relationship that is involved with the production of subjectivity in a very elusive energetic realm that unfolds outside of or below consciousness and cognition. In the next chapter I will focus and elaborate more fully on the ontology of affect, but for now it is important to acknowledge that many of the understandings of affective labor largely borrow from social theorist Brian Massumi's conceptualization of the term. As Ducey states, "I am engaging in a concept of affect along the lines Brian Massumi has suggested" (Ducey, 2007: 191). Accordingly, Ducey associates affect with a type of intensity that is not only non-conscious, but also with a different level of experience than that of "semantics and semiotics, of language, narrative..." on which emotion belongs (2007: 192). When affect becomes one of the primary objects

of capitalist control, this "affect economy cultivates engagement and generates energy, which are both before and other than meaning" (Ducey, 2007: 198). Clough also cites Massumi's definition of the term in her work, writing that "affect is in excess of conscious states of perception, pointing to a pre-conscious 'visceral perception' that is the condition of possibility of conscious perception" arriving before the emotional "narration" of this process (Clough, 2009: 48). Understanding this side of affect is integral for situating it in relation to emotion in Hochschild's analysis: affect is not a phenomenon that denotes cognition, meaning, or a signal that relays information, but is, rather, a "contagious energy, an energy that can be whipped up or dampened in the course of interaction", as Wissinger argues (Wissenger, 2007: 232).

Situating affective labor in this way also highlights the similarities of affective labor discussions with what has become known as 'non-representational theory' (NRT) within the field of geography. Nigel Thrift has been at the center of discussions around NRT, outlining it as a break from representational forms of thinking about the world that trade specifically on discourse, language, and to certain Humean empiricism. NRT, for Thrift, seeks to underline the importance

of the pre-cognitive experiences that shape our subjectivity as "something more than an addendum to the cognitive" (Thrift, 2008:6). Attention to the pre-conscious experiences that animate our lives provides a much more rich and exhaustive understanding of our day-to-day experience:

> "What is called consciousness is such a narrow window of perception that it could be argued that it could not be otherwise. As Donald (2001) makes clear, defined in a narrow way, consciousness seems to be a very poor thing indeed, a window of time – fifteen seconds at most – in which just a few things (normally no more than six or seven) can be addressed, which is opaque to introspection and which is easily distracted. Indeed, consciousness can be depicted as though it hardly existed, as an emergent derivative of an unconscious" (Thrift, 2008:6).

Similar to discussions around affect, taken in large part from people like Brian Massumi, NRT attends to the "onflow" of human experience that happens prior to cognition and representation, described as a "rollng mass of nerve volleys [that] prepare the body for action in such a way that intentions

and decisions are made before the conscious self is even aware of them" (Thrift, 2008:7).

Like those discussing affective labor, Thrift highlights the centrality of politics in his analysis of NRT. His task, amongst others, is to address how the pre-cognitive is involved in adding new political subjectivities to the world, producing new forms of being that break with normative politics (Thrift, 2008:22). On the other hand, he understands that this level of experience is simultaneously employed within contemporary configurations of power (2008: 22). This is particularly relevant in his discussions on the shifts in capitalism towards an "age intent on producing various new kinds of captivation through the cultivation of atmosphere or presence or touch" (2008: 23). Here, in particular, Thrifts analysis of NRT strikes a very similar chord with the figures working through affective labor.

Aesthetic Production as Affective Labor

Understanding affective labor and NRT helps to distinguish not only its politics and ontology from that of emotional labor, but also allows one to view a number of different forms of labor as affective. Whereas emotional labor is largely associated with

forms of caring labor or service work (even Hardt and Negri tend to use affective labor restrictively in relation to service work) this understanding of affect has been employed to look at forms of cultural and aesthetic production. In Thrift's analysis, for example, he speaks of how this affective level is mobilized in what he refers to as 'vitalist capitalism' (Thrift, 2008). For him, the non-cognitive, affective layer of life is involved in much of our daily thinking, where thought is understood as something quite different than cognitive or conscious sense-making. And Within the 'vitalist' turn of the economy, "capitalism is attempting to use the huge reservoir of non-cognitive processes, of forethought, for its own industrial ends" (2008 :36). The body and its pre-cognitive relations are now becoming harnessed by capitalism to produce novel commodities. In Thrifts words, "persons are to be trained to 'unthinkingly' conjure up more and better things, both at work and as consumers, by drawing on a certain kind of neuro-aesthetic which works on the myriad small periods of time that are relevant to the structure of forethought and the ways that human bodies routinely mobilize them to obtain results" (2008:37). Workers and managers alike are encouraged "to pay much more attention to affect" as an integral process to creativity and innovation within the market (2008:37).

It is these latter interjections into affect that help to situate cultural labor as occupations that depend on the circulation and production of affects within the broader social factory. Like Thrift's discussions, we can see how cultural labor depends upon the non-cognitive or pre-cognitive aesthetic dimensions that animate our lives. Cultural labor can be seen as a part of a larger movement in capital bent on commodifying the affectual dimensions of the broader urban environment. Secondly, Thrift and other affective scholars help to situate affect as the substrate out of which creativity takes place. This generally correlates with what we witness with design workers. The affectual is integral in the ability of affects to spawn novel ideas that are critical for the ongoing production of new commodities. As designers told me, it was the ineffable quality of objects, art, and environments that sustained their work. Without affective productions, the work of design would fall into creative entropy.

Not only is the affective level of experience a valuable resource for producing commodities and ideas in Thrift's analysis, but the affective characteristics of the commodity itself have become integral; affect *is* what is produced. Consumption is an

affective experience and as such commodities are increasingly designed in ways to heighten the pre/nonconscious draw and experience of the commodity. Designers, for instance, are more likely to be involved in understanding how to create and market commodities that work on the affective level where "commodities are thought of as interfaces that can be actively engineered across a series of sensory registers in order to produce positive affective responses in consumers" (Thrift, 2008:39). Elsewhere, Thrift writes that "[economies] must generate or scoop up affects and then aggregate and amplify them in order to produce value, and that must involve producing various mechanisms of fascination" (Thrift, 2010: 290). Thus, for thrift, the current economy is one in which this new "intangible value" comes to the fore as an integral part of turning a profit (Thrift, 2010: 290).

It is no surprise, then, that for Thrift one of the examples in which we are able to witness this affective economy most abruptly is within the field of aesthetic production. In his conceptualization, aesthetics is not to be confused with a sort of secondary facet of experience, a luxury that is an added bonus to our lives, but as a key component of life. And whereas some forms of entertainment "require cognitive engagement

with narrative, word play, or complex, intellectual allusion" (Postrel, 2003:6 cited in Thrift, 2010), aesthetics for him is fundamentally an "*afffecctive* force that is active, intelligible and has a genuine efficacy: it is both moved and moving" (Thrift, 2010: 292). The 'allure' or magical quality that aesthetic objects or people have over us is another way to describe this quality, a quality that is only partially perceived (Thrift, 2010: 293). Better yet, Thrift claims this can be understood in terms of "style" and even more particularly in the type of style that is "glamour" (Thrift, 2010: 297). It is on this level that capitalism increasingly works to entice consumers and enchant them with this spell like quality.

Building on discussions of affective labor, Wissenger (2015), whose work has already discussed, similarly finds affect useful for understanding the 'the making of glamour' in modeling. Where Thrift prefers to discuss glamour in relation to "style", Wissenger relates the affective level of production with "the look" cultivated by models, where "the look" is understood as "an ineffable quality", or "a magical quality that the old fashioned notion of 'charisma or 'charm' goes some way to capturing" (Wissenger, 2015: 11). The look, of course, is produced in the capitalist market within modeling, as a means

to capture the attention of would be consumers of any number of commodities they are charged with selling.

It is only when one understands this broader concern of affect with the non-cognitive, pre-conscious energetic level of experience that we are able to see how the notion of affective labor has the potential to speak about certain forms of aesthetic or cultural production that are largely absent from earlier feminist concerns for women's domestic work, emotional labor theory, and even earlier inflections of affective labor by Hardt and Negri. Affect takes on a particularly aesthetic context that helps to position the design work I sopke about earlier as affective, as drawing upon affects that are integral to producing new creative aesthetics.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to bring out some of the fundamentals of what has become understood as affective labor. I started by charting some of the theoretical foundations of the term, looking at the some of the early descriptions of it by Hardt and Negri, and situating their analysis alongside earlier discussions of housework by socialist feminists and Arlie Hochschild's emotional labor theory. I have uncovered

some of the similarities of affective labor with this earlier literature and highlighted many resonances that question its relative specificity to these theoretical bodies. After this, I have sought to address where and why affective labor goes beyond earlier tendencies to mark out the term as divergent and specific from these earlier critiques of labor. Here, I returned to the work of Hardt and Negri specifically to show how the term interfaces with their notion of 'biopolitical production', emphasizing the political stature of affect within their work. Moving beyond Hardt and Negri's analysis of the term, I then reviewed some contemporary literature on affective labor and 'the affective economy' that offers a much more detailed and robust ontology of affect that further clarifies affective labors relationship to emotional labor, but also moves the concept of affective labor beyond Hardt and Negri's conceptualization. Here I have sought to demonstrate how the concept of affective labor has become useful for understanding forms of aesthetic production, particularly graphic design labor introduced before.

Through charting the concept of affective labor, I hope to begin to illustrate how the term interfaces with previous discussions on the social factory by autonomist writers. Throughout following sections, I will seek to make this connection stronger,

showing how it is an affective milieu that forms the basin of immaterial labor, which is in many ways non-representative and more intensive than signifying. The basic understanding of affective labor offered in this chapter, then, will form a basis for the discussions that will unfold in the following chapters. Certain parts of this discussion will be expanded upon, some will be found useful, and others will be problematized. In the next chapter I wish to concentrate more specifically on affect itself and how the term has developed in cultural theory beyond the discussions of affective labor. Specifically, I will offer an understanding of affect according to Deleuze and Guattari and many of their contemporaries who build upon and transform their understanding of the term. This will be necessary for providing my own interpretation of the concept, which will be integral to understand in section three.

Part 2, Section 2: Towards a Deleuzoguattarian Understanding of Affect

In the previous section I laid out a general overview of literature that ties labor and capital on one hand to discussions of affect and affectivity on the other. The purpose of that section was to identify what 'affective labor' has come to mean, and to understand the convergences and divergences it has

with other fields of thought, such as socialist feminist understandings of housework, the concept of emotional labor, and Foucauldian understandings of biopolitics. Through this exercise, I tried to arrive at the particularity of affective labor; some of the novelties this concept holds for discussing work within the contemporary moment, but also, more than this, an understanding of affective labor that opens the term up to a use within the more aesthetic fields of work, such as graphic design.

In this section I want to bracket out the discussion of labor for a moment and hone in on the concept of *affect* from the perspective of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. While there are obvious influences of Deleuze and Guattari's theory--and indeed even their interpretation of affect--in many of the discussions of affective labor discussed thus far, it is useful to interrogate their conceptualization of affect more directly in order to tease out some of the nuances that the term holds beyond the discussions of affective labor. This process will help to clarify and expand many of the insights initially introduced in the previous chapter, providing a more thorough ontology of affect, and will also lay the groundwork for later chapters when I will reconnect Deleuze and Guattari's notion of affect with

their broader critique of power, politics, and capitalism. For what seems to me to be a crucial absence in the literature on affective labor is a thorough understanding of how Deleuze and Guattari themselves offer a way to understand the connection of affect to capitalist production. And in order for to map out my contribution to the affective labor debate, a Deleuzoguatarian perspective, I will first need to provide a certain operationalization of the term according to Deleuze and Guattari.

This section will first attempt to briefly lay out the development of the term in their thought from the years prior to Deleuze and Guattari's acquaintance, up through their later joint publications, such as *Anti-Oedipus* (AO), and *A Thousand Plateaus* (ATP). I will begin by situating Deleuze and Guattari's theory in relation to certain figures in psychoanalytic and philisophical theory, particularly Lacan, Spinoza and Simondon. This is crucially useful in this context for a couple of reasons. First, as I will demonstrate, Deleuze and Guattari's thinking, particularly in works like *Anti-Oedipus*, are a direct confrontation with some of the predominant philosophical views that form the foundation of, and continue to animate, psychoanalytic discourse. In this regard, it helps to understand

how affect is in some ways developed as a way to overcome some of the critiques waged against specific assumptions bound up in certain branches of psychoanalytic thought. On the other hand, the foundations of affect for them is heavily indebted to figures like Spinoza and Simondon, who prove very useful to Deleuze and Guattari in offering an alternative to some of the ideas they find problematic in the work of Freud and Lacan, for instance.

Before going further, a preliminary note on Deleuze and Guattari's method is useful in order to better approach their concept of affect in relation to some of the figures mentioned above. One should understand that Deleuze and Guattari's concepts are not born out of some sort of dialectical negativity. While what they arrive at in their philosophy is in many ways opposed to certain threads of thought, such as some psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious and desire, opposition is not what propels them. Deleuze and Guattari's method, instead, is one of what Deleuze refers to as 'buggery': "taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous" (N: 6). Affect for Deleuze and Guattari, to be sure, is born out of a certain buggery of Spinoza, but also to more minor figures, like

Bergson and Simondon. Here I will present some of those lines that connect Deleuze and Guattari's concept of affect its proverbial forefathers. It must be said, however, that as important as it is to identify those who Deleuze and Guattari buggered in order to understand affect, it is equally important to note that what they create in the concept of affect is somewhat monstrous. In other words, while there are definite similarities between Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of affect and the foundational figures they use to develop the term, there is some 'slippage' and shifts in meaning when comparing their usage of the term to those who initially inspired it. As Deleuze comments, in regard to their method of buggering influences in his work, "It was really important for the child to be his own child, because the author had to actually say all that I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions…" (N: 6). Viewed in this light, affect for Deleuze and Guattari is not simply an outright adoption of the ways in which Spinoza discussed the term, for example. Through Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical gestation, the term takes on different meanings, particularly as it is used in conjunction with their other concepts, and with the different subjects that inform their thinking. Furthermore, as

Massumi explains, while " [i]t is Gilles Deleuze who reopened the path to these authors [figures like Spinoza and Bergson]", "nowhere does he patch them directly into each other" (Massumi, 2002: 32). It is for this reason that much of this chapter will be laying out the connections between Deleuze and Guattari's definition of affect and these influential figures that is not explicit their own work. This will involve a return to some of the foundational figures for Deleuze and Guattari's theory of affect in order to provide a more complete picture of its ontology.

Finally, a further component of this section will be to layer in a number of resonances that Deleuze and Guattari's concept of affect has with some of the more contemporary literature associated with what has been dubbed "the affective turn" (Clough and Halley, 2007). This is literature that has been generally conceived as a move towards more a more non-representational and non-conscious understanding of cultural and subjective production. What certain the authors associated with this shift do, namely Brian Massumi, is to help define affect beyond the brief references provided in Deleuze and Guattari's, connecting it with the latters broader ontology. It's important to understand that while affect is an important

concept to Deleuze and Guattari, it is merely one amongst many that all tend to reinforce their wider contributions to a non-representational philosophy. These later authors help to make these reinforcing connections explicit. As I will try to illustrate in this chapter, and as some associated with the affective turn have shown, affect animates and runs through much of Deleuze and Guattari's thinking, even where the term itself is absent. Inversely, one could also say that affect, particularly in its more contemporary usage, is a kind of shorthand for an entire way of thinking about the production of subjectivity in Deleuze and Guattari's theory. While the literature I will bring in here borrows from Deleuze and Guattari, it also participates in its own buggery of sorts, creating a definition of affect that is anchored in their thought, but also bleeds off in different directions.

In providing this Deleuzian understanding of affect, I hope to hone in on a couple dimensions of affect that are important for the following sections, but also refer back to the previous ones. One is an understanding of affect that separates it from versions that tend to use the term interchangeably with emotion. Here I want to mark out an ontological difference between emotion, and affect. Secondly, and connected to the

first point, I want to elicit a version of affect that positions it within the wider process of subjective production. The importance of affect for Deleuze and Guattari and others who further develop their thought, is in its ability to produce new forms of becoming, but make it clear that affect operates on a level that is prior to the subjective formations that are the result of such productions. Third, connecting both the two previous points, I hope to highlight an understanding of affect tied particularly to aesthetic production or poesis. This is particularly important for later chapters where affect is employed to speak specifically on forms of aesthetic production within capitalism.

When Deleuze and Guattari Met

What we call idealism in psychoanalysis is a whole system of projections, of reductions, in analytical theory and practice: the reduction of desiring production to a system of so-called unconscious representations, and to corresponding forms of causation or explanation… (N: 17)

When Deleuze and Guattari met one another in June 1969, the two had been occupying somewhat different professional and intellectual worlds. Guattari had been working for several

years under the tutelage of Jacque Lacan, a figurehead of the French psychoanalytic scene, and came from a primarily clinical background. He was just starting to get his intellectual life off the ground, was not well published and struggled to find a voice outside of the shadow of his mentor. Deleuze, on the other hand, was quite a well-established philosopher within intellectual scene in France, having published a number of successful works that offered novel readings of major continental philosophers. Despite these differences in status and disciplinary affiliation--the latter being a boundary that they would repeatedly disrupt throughout their joint works-- the two shared a certain disdain for established politics and theory of the time. Knowing what each of them was individually working on at the time they met, and having the privilege of looking back on what they would come together to write, one could say that the following were apparent points of resonance, among others, that would help explain the magnetism towards one another: (1) a shared interest in the unconscious and desire as integral aspects in the formation of subjectivity, and (2) a certain contempt for psychoanalytical and structuralist tendencies that placed linguistics and meaning at the center of social analyses and subjectivity. Both Deleuze and Guattari had a shared interest in the unconscious,

but wished to rid it of the structurizing and linguistic principles that were bestowed upon it by contemporary psychoanalytic theory, putting forth a theory of subjectivity propelled by unconscious productions, not representations.

In the latter part of the 1960s, Guattari's relationship with his mentor, Lacan, had begun to deteriorate as he found himself increasingly critical of his teachers' views. Guattari was convinced of the importance of the unconscious, but was critical of the primary view of it developed by Freud and filtered through Lacan and his disciples. The increasing gulf between Guattari and Lacan grew apparent in his renouncement of the latters 'Oedipal triangulation and the reductiveness in his thesis on the signifier' (cited in Dosse, 2010: 3). For Guattari, Lacan's insistence on the unconscious being structured 'like a language' became the antithesis of what he saw as a generating, creative capacity of the unconscious, one that was non-representative and unstructured. In the same year as his first meeting with Deleuze, Guattari published the article, 'Machine and Structure', arguing that Lacan 'linguistifies, diachronoizes, and destroys the unconscious' (1969/1984). Against this signifying, structured view of the unconscious, Guattari proposed a model

of a 'machinic unconscious', which is not located within the subject, but alongside it, exterior to it. The machinic unconscious is a disrupter, scrambling signs, in order to create new territories (Guattari, 1969/1984: 113); it is revolutionary, productive, and as Guattari insists we 'should make sure that it is fortified against any attempt to "structuralize" that potential' (Guattari, 1969/1984: 119).

Along similar lines, one can identify a certain variation of Guattari's thinking simultaneously being worked through by Deleuze prior to their acquaintance. Where Guattari's interests and concerns primarily laid within field of clinical psychoanalysis, Deleuze makes a similar case through philosophical explication, particularly in his analysis of Baruch Spinoza in his book dedicated to the thinker. Like Guattari and those engaging with psychoanalysis at the time, the unconscious, or at least some version of it, was critically important for Deleuze in understanding subjectivity. Indeed, what made Spinoza so important and controversial for Deleuze was precisely the former's rejection of the primacy of consciousness that had long been held central in philosophy (Deleuze, 1988: 17). In his reading of Spinoza, Deleuze emphasized the his conception of 'parallelism' that seeks to

highlight what he considered the shadows of philosophical inquiry: 'what a body can do'. For Deleuze, Spinoza's major breakthrough was in attending to the body, its affects and his discovery that "the body surpasses the knowledge that we have of it, and thought likewise surpasses the consciousness we have of it" (Deleuze, 1988: 18). This development allowed Spinoza to question the predominant image of mind over body found in most philosophy of his time. It was no longer a question of consciousness being the ultimate bearer of knowledge and propeller of action, but that the body itself contains knowledge that in many ways precedes and surpasses consciousness. Because of this, Deleuze credits Spinoza with "a discovery of the unconscious, of an unconscious of thought" (1988: 19).

In Spinoza's view, consciousness only registers effects, not causes. And in Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza, consciousness is merely a residue of interactions between bodies and their affective interaction. As Deleuze comments, "we are only conscious of the *effect* of external bodies on our own, *ideas of affections* (Deleuze, 1988: 59, emphasis mine). Consciousness becomes, in Deleuze's interpretation, secondary and reactive to an unconscious level of interaction animated by

affects and central to subjective production. I will come back to these ideas, and the notion of affect later, but for now I will define affect as the process through which a body, in meeting another body, goes through changes—changes 'by which the body's power of acting is increased or decreased, aided or restrained…' (Spinoza, cited in Deleuze, 1988: 49).

It is obvious here that Deleuze finds Spinoza's identification of the unconscious an important one, but that alone is not necessarily the only dramatic breakthrough. What is important for Spinoza's version of the unconscious for Deleuze was that, unlike the psychoanalytic understandings from Freud on, it is both *unrepresentative* and *active*. The unconscious for Spinoza is engaged in thinking, doing, *producing*. In this way we might say that what is important for Deleuze is Spinoza's identification of what Guattari, commenting during the same period, called the 'machinic unconscious'. Furthermore, what is just as important for Deleuze in his reading of Spinoza, which further underlines the similarities between Deleuze and Guattari's respective concerns, is that this unconscious also precedes or escapes representation. The unconscious realm for Spinoza was one in which affects between bodies circulate that are 'not indicative or representative' (1988: 49).

In both Deleuze and Guattari's solo works prior to their relationship we can see the beginnings of what will become a long engagement with an exploration of the unconscious that involves a movement beyond the boundaries of both structuralism and psychoanalysis of the time. And while such ideas might seem subtle and underdeveloped during this period, by the publication of their first joint work, *Anti-Oedipus*, their critiques and delineations from the status quo became anything but. Anti-Oedipus emerges as a battle cry against what the two saw as "the tyrannical, terrorizing, castrating character of the signifier", and psychoanalysis as "a whole system of projections, reductions" that limit the unconscious to "representations and the corresponding forms of causation and expression or explanation" (Deleuze and Guattari, N: 17,21). The great violence done to the unconscious since its discovery, according to Deleuze and Guattari, was to assume that it can be read like a great theatrical display of oedipal desire. They viewed this mistake as a product of the grand assumption that to enter the unconscious in a critical way is to be dominated and bounded by the signifier, leading one to search for meaning. In contrast, Anti-Oedipus argues, "The unconscious doesn't *mean* anything..." (N: 22). As the famous adage from

Anti-Oedipus goes, "the unconscious is not a theatre, but a factory", underlining their view of an unconscious that is machinic and productive. Deleuze and Guattari replace the search for representation, meaning and signs with a concern for how things work, how things get produced, "with [their] intensities, flows, processes, partial objects--none of which *mean* anything" (N: 22).

In a different way, one might say that what Deleuze and Guattari are arguing, which becomes more apparent in their latter works that are less preoccupied with countering psychoanalytic theory, is that the unconscious is engaged in the production of subjectivities. And within that process it is not language and representation that form the basis of this productive unconscious. As Guattari would later remark: "What the structuralists say isn't true; it isn't the facts of language or even communication that generate subjectivity" (Guattari, cited in Lazzarato, 2014: 56). Instead, subjectivity, at least in part, is generated on a level that exceeds representation, signification and language, in an intensive layer constantly escaping these boundaries. Subjectivity, being produced in the unconscious, is "collectively manufactured in

the same way as energy, electricity, or aluminum", as Guattari would later argue (2014: 56).

In Anti-Oedipus this non-representative layer of subjective formation is designated using the psychoanalytic concept of desire. Desire is that which animates all of human behavior within the depths of the unconscious, but in Deleuze and Guattari's usage, it does not lack any object as it is understood to in many of the existing psychoanalytic fields (AO: 25-26). It is productive, spilling out in all directions, breaking open new pathways. This is one of the reasons why Deleuze and Guattari prefer to model their version of the unconscious after the schizophrenic, rather than the neurotic (AO: 2). The schizophrenic scrambles meaning, escapes signification, producing partial objects as opposed to the neurotic who tries to overcode everything under the dominance of the signifier, and give everything meaning. Deleuze and Guattari are interested in how unconscious desires in specific assemblages produce "lines of flight, lines of absolute decoding" that escape from meaning and signification (Deleuze and Guattari, AO: 22). They become enveloped in a quest that seeks out these ruptures of desire that escape linguistic coding in the fields of film and literature, for example: "What we look for in a book is

the way it transmits something that resists coding…" (N: 22). Thus, what is important in Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of desire is that it is innovative, producing, and also non-representative.

From desire to affect

Years after the publication of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari continued to work together in publishing a number of significant works, most notably *A Thousand Plateaus* (ATP). One of the most marked shifts in their latter works when comparing it to AO is that 'desire' as a concept figures much less prominently. It's not that desire disappears altogether, but that it is used much more sparingly and no longer forms the central thrust of their argument; desire becomes but one term amongst many others that they use in their philosophical work. There are a number of reasons why this could be, the most obvious being that latter works like ATP served a different purpose than AO: they are no longer primarily driven by the critique of oedipal desire apparent in the latter, which, as a result, may have drifted their thinking away from psychoanalytic concerns. As the emphasis in ATP shifted away from an oedipal critique, different terms without a connection to the oedipal critique come into focus. It might also be

possible that AO was not quite radical enough in ridding philosophy of the problematics bound up in psychoanalytic terms, and as such they wanted to distance themselves from the term desire all together. As Foucault would say to Deleuze in private, "I can't stand the word desire; even if you use it differently, I can't stop myself from thinking or experiencing the fact that desire = lack, or that desire is repressed" (Deleuze, 2007: 130). It's possible such an exchange had an impact on Deleuze, who would then go on to develop an alternative way of approaching some of the fundamental philosophical ideas enshrined in his critique of psychoanalysis.

Despite the shift away from desire as a central concern, whatever reason that may be, there are a number of similarities and continuities between Deleuze and Guattari's latter works and AO. While the rhetorical devices and objects of discussion in some ways change, many of the core ideas contained in AO--and indeed their independent work prior to AO--live on. Interests with the non-representational and unconscious that were bound up in psychoanalytic term of desire in AO show themselves again in a different lexicon; the diminishing importance of the term desire, for instance, is replaced by a multitude of other terms with their foundation in

art, literature, geology, science, etc.. One of the terms that gains prominence in Deleuze and Guattari's latter works following AO is the concept of *affect* that Deleuze initially focused on in his work on Spinoza years earlier. It is a concept that seems to in some ways substitute, or at least supplement, their concept of desire in accounting for the ineffable, intensive, and non-representative level of experience and subjective formation found in AO. Indeed, Deleuze would even go as far to say desire *is* "an affect [...]" (2007: 130).

In the following section I wish to focus more specifically on this concept of affect and unpack many of the nuances that the term holds for Deleuze and Guattari. While the concept crops up quite frequently within the two's work, pinning down a definition and adequate understanding of the term requires a lot more work than simply lifting a definition out of their text. Like much of Deleuze and Guattari's work, it requires one to connect the term with their much larger philosophical project, demanding further references to a number of other Deleuzoguattarian concepts such as *the event, becoming*, *the virtual, haecceity,* and *individuation*. Additionally, the concept of affect establishes resonances with further foundational figures like Bergson and Gilbert Simondon, whose injection

bastardizes and complicates its original Spinozan foundations introduced above. These figures, too, will be necessary to introduce in order to understand Deleuze and Guattari's usage of affect. Finally, while I will be eliciting some help from the figures that were influential to Deleuze and Guattari's project, I will also reference contemporary figures of affect theory that develop Deleuze and Guattari's notion of affect beyond their analyses. These figures, particularly Brian Massumi, will help to 'connect the dots' of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of affect, so to speak, and will also help tie their theory of affect to their wider ontological argument.

Affect as Non-Conscious and Non-representative

"What we're interested in, you see, are modes of individuation beyond those of things, persons, or subjects: the individuation, say, of a time of day, of a region, a climate, a river or a wind, of an event" (N: 26)

As I have tried to elicit so far, in respect to Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of desire and the unconscious, two major themes animate Deleuze and Guattari's work: the critique of signification/representation and critique of consciousness. It's not that they deny either of these

phenomenon's existence, or even their importance, but that philosophical inquiry fixed to these poles cannot fully account for how subjectivity is produced. As I will try to explain in this section, for Deleuze and Guattari, an understanding of subjective formation and creativity must open up to an alternative plane of productivity operating quite separate than that of representation and consciousness. As I will further here, subjectivation, or the production of subjectivity, is not understood by starting with the conscious subject, significations and representations for Deleuze and Guattari, but rather through identifying the *virtual* that is fundamental to the production the subject, subjectivity and representations in a process of *individuation*. This level--prior to and quintessential to the individuation or subjectivation of individuals, which produces subjects and object but is neither subject or object--is where Deleuze and Guattari identify affect.

The critique of representation and consciousness for Deleuze and Guattari is manifest in varying ways throughout their work beyond the psychoanalytic commentary previously discussed. It is apparent in Deleuze's earliest works, such as *Difference and Repetition*, where he introduces the notion of "difference in itself" as a basis for his ontology of creativity and the related

attack on variants of philosophy that produce a predominant "image of thought". In terms of politics, it is obvious in Deleuze and Guattari's disdain for what might be understood as representational politics, and their alternative identification of 'micropolitcs' that exists outside of the field of representation. It is apparent, too, in Deleuze and Guattari's affinity for revolutionary 'minorities' that arise in both politics and art. Minor literature, for instance, is literature that escapes representation and signification, scrambling meaning and language, identified by Deleuze and Guattari particularly in Kafka's work. Crucially, for my discussion here, the critique of representation and consciousness is also embedded within their concept of affect.

Deleuze succinctly comments in one of his lectures that "every mode of thought insofar as it is non-representational will be termed affect" (Deleuze, 1997c: 1, cited in Seigworth, 2011: 161). Indeed, throughout Deleuze and Guattari's work, one could understand affect, on one level, as a conceptual gesturing towards a sort of fickle, non-representative quality that escapes linguistic signification. It is often associated with what they describe as a *haecceity*, a word derived from Duns Scotus's *haecceitas,* roughly translatable to 'thisness' in English.

It is a type of spatial and temporal *singularity* "different than that of a person, thing or substance" (ATP: 287). Affective haecceities are more elusive than subjectivities, and non-ascribable to a definite sign, or individual. They are, as Deleuze and Guattari caution, "not to be confused either with an intelligible, formal essetiality or a sensible, formed and perceived, thing hood" (ATP: 450). Instead, they are "vague essences" or assemblages that "cease to be subjects to become events... inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an air, a life" (ATP: 289).

These affective 'essences' should not be understood in the Platonic sense, however. Essence for Deleuze and Guattari is, as Brian Massumi explains, "always of an encounter; it is an *event*..." (Massumi,1992: 18). This conceptualization of affects as an *event* underlines an important aspect to their character for Deleuze and Guattari. Unlike a formed object or subject, haecceities and affects belong to a different plane of proliferation prior to their formation into objects and subjects. Affects are bound up in a process of *becoming* that is autonomous of things and subjects, but do "direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects" (ATP: 288). In this sense we could say affects are connected to a process of

individuation that is implicated in the production of individuality in both humans and objects, things, but do not amount to the same thing. In order to more fully understand what I mean by this, to demonstrate how affect relates to this process of becoming and individuation, it is useful to interrogate the roots of individuation for Deleuze and Guattari which undoubtedly starts in the work of Gilbert Simondon. Through introducing Simondon's concept of individuation, and the related term of 'preindividuality', we can begin to develop how Deleuze and Guattari's own conception of affect relates to creativity and subjectivation.

Here we can see how Deleuze's understanding of affect and haecceity begins to link up with the descriptions offered from designers in section two. If one remembers, designers spoke about the certain objects and aesthetics in a muddled, fickle manner that pointed not to particular consciously reflected traits, but in terms of the atmosphere and mood. They had a hard time putting into words exactly what the "it" value that they derived was; the material that designers draw upon was not concrete, linguistically definable and knowable, but rather something transitive and elusive, yet impactful and moving. The material they required, as Deleuze and Massumi would

describe, was "an event", which transpires and emerges, but which is not the same thing as a formed object or subject. Moreover, the affects designers spoke of are generative--they are absolutely critical in their own ability to create something. The affective power designers harness, as Deleuze and Guattari would say, "direct the metamorphosis of things and subjects", but they are in quality neither of those things.

Affect, the Pre-individual and Individuation

Individuation, or the process through which the individual, object, subject, or thing is produced, is a concept that Deleuze and Guattari partially adopt from Gilbert Simondon. Writing at a time that is very close to Deleuze and Guattari's own project, Simondon developed a definition individuation that begins with a critique of two separate ways of thinking about the constitution of the individual that has dominated most of continental philosophy: First is the "substantialist viewpoint, which conceives of the unity of living being as its essence, a unity it has provided for itself, is based on itself and is created by itself" (Simondon, 1992: 297); and second, the "hylomorphic" account, which sees the constitution of the individual as a product of "the conjunction of a form and some matter" (1992: 297). What connects these two separate

understandings, and what makes them problematic for Simondon and Deleuze and Guattari, is that they start with the assumption of an already stable individual, and "are then led to try to recreate the conditions that have made its existence possible" (1992: 297). What Simondon argues for is somewhat of a reversal of this process (Simondon, 2009: 5); to "*understand the individual from the perspective of the process of individuation rather than the process of individuation by means of the individual*" (Simondon, 1992: 300). In this way, to put it in Muriel Combes terms, "the individual is [...] neither the source nor the term of inquiry but merely the result of an operation of individuation" (Combes, 2013: 2).

To start as Simondon does with the claim that the individual is a consequence of a *process* of individuation, rather than its basis, prompts a repositioning of individuality as but only one part within the larger process of the production of being (Simondon, 1992: 87; Combes, 2013: 2). As Deleuze would highlight in his own review of Simondon's work, for Simondon "individuation is no longer coextensive with being; it [...] represent[s] a moment, which is neither all of being nor its first moment" (Deleuze, 2004: 86). What precedes this moment of individuality is "the preindividual", or "preindividual being".

The preindividual is a 'millieu' out of which individuation occurs, which "contains latent potentials and harbors a sort of incompatibility with itself" (Simondon, 1992: 87; see also Simondon, 2009: 5). Simondon refers to this domain of preindividual being as "metastable" and proliferating with "tensions" (Simondon, 2009: 5). Individuation doesn't arise out of stability, which Simondon relates to the substantialist and hylomorphic accounts, precisely because stability is a finality, a resolution that can no longer develop into something else, can no longer result in any new emergence. In short, nothing new would come about if being was anchored in stability:

> "Individuation has not been able to be adequately thought and described because previously only one form of equilibrium was know--stable equilibrium... Stable equilibrium excludes becoming, because it corresponds to the lowest possible level of potential energy; it is the equilibrium that is reached in a system when all of the possible transformations have been realized and no more force exists. All the potentials have been actualized, and the system having reached its lowest energy level can no longer transform itself" (Simondon, 2009: 6).

This understanding of preindinvidual metastability, which forms the milieu of which new individuations arise, is what Deleuze finds particularly informing within Simondon's account. Deleuze recognizes in the preindividual a way to think about *singularities* against the constitution of *individualities* which are different but dependent on the prior:

> "The importance of Simondon's thesis is now apparent. By discovering the prior condition of individuation, he rigorously distinguishes singularity and individuality. Indeed the metastable, defined as pre-individual being, is perfectly well endowed with singularities that correspond to the existence and the distribution of potentials" (Deleuze, 2004: 87).

As Deleuze highlights in respect to Simondon, the condition for the individual is a metastable field of singularities, full of potential, but distinctly different than the actualization of the individual itself. But in order for this potential energy, or singularities, to be transformed into an individual--whether that be a person, a thing, a subjectivity--it must go through a process of individuation proper, a process fundamental to actualizing this potential. According to Simondon, this is done

through a sort of ordering or organization of this potential (Simondon, 2009: 6,7). Muriel Combes, in her illuminating book on the work of Simondon, sums up the process that preindividual potential must go through in order to become 'actualized':

> "Before all individuation, being can be understood as a system containing potential energy. Although this energy becomes active within the system, it is called potential because it requires a transformation of the system in order to be structured, that is, to be actualized in accordance to structures" (Combes, 2013: 2).

Thus, for Simondon, the actualization of potential is synonymous with a type of structural ordering. But as this preindividual reality becomes ordered and actualized into the individual, through individuation, it is important to note that, for Simondon, the result is never a fully stable or individual form. A certain amount of the metastable preindividuality lives on within the individual that is both the result of the initial individuation process, and also the basis for further individuations. As Simondon remarks, "individuation does not exhaust all of the preindividual reality, and that regime of

metastability is not only maintained by the individual, but carried by it, so that the constituted individual transports with itself a certain associated charge of preindividual reality, animated by all of the potentials that characterize it" (Simondon, 2009: 8). Thus, while a certain amount of metastability is actualized and oredered, a certain amount of the preidinidualtity and potentiality lives on and acts as the foundation for further individuations, individuations Simondon describes as *psychic* and *collective*. These later individuations are what constitute more evolved formations like subjectivity. And significantly for the understanding of affect here, for Simondon, as Jason Read (2014: n.p.) argues, "affects are part of the metestable millieu that remains" after individuation occurs, and which forms the basis for further individuations.

At this point I would like to further reflect on the first two sections. I would like to suggest that the preindividual described here is akin to what autonomist theorists associated with the social factory. In other words, the affective milieu that designers draw upon is a preindividal substrate out of which their personal or individuated creations arise. Affective *singularites*, circulating throughout the wider society are the

raw material for what designers do, inform the creative *individualities* that arise out of these circulations. This preindividual, social factory milieu is a fully formed individuality, whether that be a personal idea, color, trait, or object, but rather a field of potentiality. The creation of the individual form comes out of this, in a later process of individuation. The important thing to understand here is that there are two different levels of production beginning to emerge. The first level is this level of the preindividual, which is animated by affective propagations, but is not a formed object or subject. This initial level leads to a later process, individuation, which is the constitution of individualities from the affective. This latter section I will associate later with the labor process, but for now it is important to begin to recognize the analytical differentiation between the two levels described. In the act of individuation, or what I will later refer to as a "secondary production", the preindividual is not fully individualized, or commodified into an object, as Simondon states, but lives on in excess of the particular object.

Affect, Becoming, and the Virtual

It is apparent, if we now return to the work of Deleuze and Guattari more directly, that many of the ideas contained in

Simondon's theory of individuation and its prefigurative level of the preindividual are at the very least mirrored in their ontology of affect, and more likely a part of its conceptual foundation. In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari explicitly reference Simondon's notion of individuation in respect to affect, writing "Simondon demonstrates that the *hylomorphic* model leaves many things, active and affective by the wayside" (ATP: 450). Obviously impressed by Simondon's arguments, they further his identification of a sort of preindividual with the affective: "to the formed or the formable matter [the individuated for Simondon] we must add an entire energetic materiality in movement, carrying *singularities* or *haecceities…*[what would be akin to the preindividual for Simondon]" (450).

While references like these to Simondon are sparse within their work, Simondon's ideas do resonate well with a number of other concepts found within Deleuze and Guattari's work. In particular, the Bergsonian concept of *the virtual* for Deleuze and Guattari acts as a way that the two similarly mark out a field of preindividuality against that of the constituted individual or object. The virtual for Deleuze and Guattari is a type of event, existsting in a sort of temporal limbo. It is "an

already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both going to happen and has just happened" (ATP: 289). French social theorist Jean-François Lyotard described Deleuze's understanding of the virtual as "a past located this side of the forgotten, much closer to the present moment than any past, at the same time that it is *incapable of being solicited by voluntary and conscious memory*--a past Deleuze says that is not past but always there" (Lyotard 1990: 12 cited in Seigworth, 2011:163, emphasis mine)". Gregory Seigworth offers the most transparent understanding of the virtual and its relationship with affect, worth quoting at length:

> "[T]he virtual can be understood, in part, as what has happened: as subsistent past, in full affective-accumulation, on this side of forgetting. However, crucially, the virtual is also always in contact and actively affectively participating with what is happening and about to happen contemporaneously [...]: in excess of consciousness, an affective-accumulation continually press-ing toward its differentiated actualization in the future. The virtual is perhaps easiest to consider as what transpires in those passing everyday moments that never

really present themselves to our conscious minds, generally because such moments (in their various contexts and variable durations) arrive with insufficient force or otherwise descend with an intensity that is altogether dispersed or atmospheric. As they slip well beneath the thresholds of consciousness, these intensive passages of affect [...] are, Lyotard writes, in excess like air and earth are in excess of the life of a fish (1990: 12). In fact, these low-level gradient changes in the passages of intensity are so much in excess that the word moment is not entirely adequate. This ongoing process of affective-accumulation [...] makes up most of our days, as the between-moments [...]that come to constitute 'a life'" (Seigworth, 2011: 163).

Here we can begin to see some of the similarities between Simondon's project and Deleuze and Guattari's. Like Simondon's understanding of the preindividual, the virtual is belongs to a plane that is different than that of the formed individual subject, but at the same time very much implicated in and anticipating its actualization or individuation. And like Simondon's view of the preindividual, while some of these virtual affects will become actualized or individuated, a

residual amount will remain "in excess" of that individuated thing, and will continue to proliferate outside of the field of actuality.

Importantly, as Siegworth's excerpt further illustrates, this plane of virtuality that is animated by an affectual unfolding (ATP: 283) below reflection, and prior to subjective and material manifestations. This understanding of affect, together with the concept of the virtual, underlines the ongoing critique of consciousness in accounting for subjectivity and everyday life for Deleuze and Guattari. It certainly retains the Spinozan foundations of the term that Deleuze found so pervasive earlier in his career which called into question the centrality of consciousness in human subjectivity, and correlative emphasis of mind over body. It serves to highlight how, as Nigel Thrift (2008: 6) puts it, "consciousness seems to be a very poor thing indeed, a window of time – fifteen seconds at most – in which just a few things (normally no more than six or seven) can be addressed, which is opaque to introspection and which is easily distracted". And in borrowing and expanding upon Spinoza's ideas on affect, Deleuze and Guattari reiterate his understanding that in many ways consciousness is but a

restrictive force in comparison to affect, coming secondary to the virtual level.

Massumi and the Intensivity of Affect

In order to put together and relate all of the conceptual pieces I have thus far laid out under the terminological umbrella of affect--*haecceities, events, the preindividual, individuation,* and *the virtual*--it is useful to turn to Brian Massumi's seminal work on the subject, *Parables for the VIrtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (2002). For Massumi, the Deleuzian notion of affect, as an *event*, captures a relationship that is left out of many philosophical and sociological approaches that restrictively "operate only on the semantic or semiotic level". As such, affect for Massumi is a way to contend many of the theoretical appraisals that rely restrictively to the dominance of *structure*: "our entire vocabulary has been derived from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure" (2002: 27). The affective is novel in that, similar to the way Deleuze lauded Simondon's identification of the preindividual, it directs our attention to the unstructured, the unindividuated, extralinguistic and non-conscious processes that animate our lives. In the affective event, "nothing is prefigured", "it is a

collapse of structured distinction into *intensity*" (Massumi, 2002: 27, emphasis mine).

Intensity, for Massumi, is a way in which we might better understand affect in relation to a separate but related, structured and extensive level of what he calls *qualification*. The intensive layer of experience is "not semantically or semiotically ordered". Echoing the descriptions found in Deleuze and Guattari's corpus, intensity is "where futurity combines, unmediated with pastness" (2002: 30). It is a prefiguration of things to come: "the pressing crowd of incipiencies and tendencies [...], a realm of potential" (2002: 30). Intensity is where Massumi positions affect. It is a level that is consistent not only with Deleuze and Guattari's virtual, but also the domain of preindividuality laid out by Simondon. As virtuality, intensities are understood as "[s]omething that happens too quickly to have happened" (Massumi, 2002: 30).

As affects circulate within this level of intensity they remain outside or below the level of consciousness, but none the less leave *traces* of themselves. The trace of affects "are conserved in the brain and in the flesh, but out of mind and body understood as qualifiable interiorities" (2002: 30). They are

conserved as what political scientist William Connolly (2002: 25), drawing upon Bergson, refers to as "virtual memories", made up of an "affective energy below the threshold of intellectual attention", but which "shape the color, tone, and direction of everyday perception" (Connoly, 2002: 25).

It is at this point we can introduce the separate but connected level that works alongside the level of intensity, what Massumi refers to as *qualification*. For Massumi, qualification is another way of speaking about the Deleuzian notion of *the actual*, which is the individuated level that emerges out of the virtualities. While the level of intensity is "embodied in purely autonomic reactions most directly manifest in the skin" leaving behind only traces of themselves, the level of qualification is associated with "depth reactions" that are related to "a rise of the autonomic into consciousness" (2002: 25). The level of qualification is an infolding of the affective event into higher forms of volition and reflection. On the plane of qualification, the affective event becomes "fixed" in the consciousness of an individual, requiring a type of semiotic or semantic ordering, an ordering that is defined either "linguistically, logically, narratologically, or all of these in combination, as Symbolic" (2002: 27). This is the level where, erroneously, most of social

theory restricts itself. And as such, according to Massumi, "[w]hat they lose, precisely, is the expression [affective] *event*-- in favor of structure" (2002: 27).

Thus, we have the two levels of Massumi's ontology that borrows from Deleuze and Guattari: the affective level of intensity, comparable to Deleuze and Guattari's virtual and Simondon's preindividual, which operates outside of linguistic qualification and consciousness, but that leaves autonomic traces of themselves and which forms the basis of new subjective formations; and the level of qualification that is a more reactive layer coming ontologically and chronologically second to affective proliferation, conceptualized as a linguistic, symbolic and conscious fixing of the affectual event. In order to better understand the relationship and features of each of these two levels, Massumi asks us to consider a couple of examples that point to what he refers to as "the missing half-second". Here Massumi invokes two scientific studies, one in which scientist monitored the brain ways of volunteers using an electroencephalograph machine (EEG). Participants of the study were told to flex their finger at any moment they chose while simultaneously registering the precise time of the decision using a clock. The results found that "the flexes came

0.2 seconds after they clocked the decision, but the EEG machine registered significant brain activity 0.3 seconds *before* the decision" (Massumi, 2002: 29). As Massumi highlights, speculating about the results of the study, the researcher suggested "we may exert free will not by initiating intentions but by vetoing, acceding or otherwise responding to them after they arise" (2002: 29).

So what is significant about this missing half second--the lapse between when a body is stimulated and when consciousness registers that stimulation, or the gap between the initiation of an event in the body and the conscious response to that initiation? Massumi suggests that this space of the half second is not empty, but is precisely the point of virtual proliferation, laden with potential. It is "overfull, in excess of the actually-performed action and its ascribed meaning" (2002: 29). And further, the missing half-second also proposes that consciousness is secondary to this virtual, affective level in that it is much more passive in relationship to the latter. What comes after the missing half-second--namely, consciousness--only operates negatively in relation to affectivity:

"Will and consciousness are subtratcive. They are limitive, derived functions that reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed. It should be noted in particular that during the mysterious half second, what we think of as 'free,' 'higher' functions, such as volition, are apparently being performed by autonomic, bodily reactions occuring in the brain but outside of consciousness and between the brain and finger but prior to action and expression. The formation of a volition is necessarily accompanied and aided by cognitive functions" (2002: 29).

While Massumi makes use of limited scientific research here to demonstrate his thesis, the ideas contained in his theory have explicit connections to Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, as described earlier, and both of Deleuze's most important theoretical interlocutors, Bergson, Spinoza, and Simondon. As Massumi acknowledges, "it is Bergson who stands as a philosophical precursor to many of these points: the brain as a center of indetermination; consciousness as subtractive and inhibitive" (2002: 31). And, to bring the discussions of affect here back to the beginning of this chapter, to the critique of representation and consciousness in Deleuze's earlier work,

we also find that it is Spinoza's prefigurative understandings of parallelism and affect that provide another foundational pillar to Massumi's explication. Like Deleuze before him, for Massumi an event is registered on two parallel planes of existence (intensity/qualification, virtual/actual) simultaneously. This idea he credits partially to Spinoza's definition of affect as "affection [in other words an impingement upon] the body, *and at the same time the idea of the affection*" (2002: 31). Massumi claims that the idea of affection is "not only not conscious but is not in the first instance in the 'mind'" (2002: 31). The idea of an affection is thus not a conscious idea or response to being affected, but rather a "trace of an encounter, the 'form' of an encounter, in Spinoza's terminology (an infolding, or contraction…)" (2002: 32). It is only later that this original idea, which is non-conscious and autonomic, may become conscious:

> "In Spinoza, it is only when the idea of the affection is doubled by an idea of the idea of affection that it attains the level of conscious reflection. Conscious reflection is a doubling over of the idea itself…" (2002: 31).

It is this doubling movement that Massumi assigns to the field of qualification, which comes after the affective level of intensity, subsequently situating, ordering and attempting to grasp the even that has already transpired.

Massumi's attention to figures like Spinoza and Bergson in his own conception of affect in many ways follows on from the implicit work done by Deleuze and Guattari. In Massumi's own words, "it is Gilles Deleuze who reopened the path to these authors" (2002: 32). But his indebtedness to Deleuze and Guattari does not stop there. For it is Deleuze and Guattari who truly give Massumi's understanding of affect its association with productivity and inventiveness, which is no doubt a continuation of Deleuze and Guattari's ontology of becoming. As Massumi explains in respect to affect: "it is all a question of *emergence*" (2002: 32). The potential for novelty and productiveness is, for Massumi, where the true value of affect lies: "the real conditions of emergence, not of the categorical, but of the unclassafiable, the unassimiable, the never-yet-felt, the felt for less than half a second, again for the first time--the new" (2002: 33).

The field of emergence, what I have thus far been describing in relation to Deleuze and Guattari's ontology, is a dual process that involves both the levels of intensity and qualification, virtual and actual, the preindividual and the individuated. As Massumi states, "[e]mergence is a two-sided coin: one side in the virtual […], the other in the actual" (2002: 35). But while we might say emergence requires both of these levels, we should also point out that it is affect, and it's connection to the virtual, which is the truly novel point in this relationship of emergence. In Massumi's language, it is the autonomy of affect which propels new relations to emerge:

> "The autonomy of affect is its participation in the virtual. Its autonomy is its openness. Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is. Formed, qualified, situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling functions of actual connection or blockage are the capture and closure of affect" (Massumi, 2002: 35).

Affect and its autonomy forms fundamental milieu out of which resulting actualities might and do emerge. Put differently, *it is "out of the pressing crowd [of intensities that] an individual*

action or expression will emerge and be registered consciously" *(2002: 30-31).* But once affect is actualized, by way of qualification in either language, perception or cognition, the affect ceases to be affect and at that point becomes that of a different order. Massumi argues that "[e]motion is the most intense (most contracted) expression of that *capture*" (2002: 35), thus marking out an ontological difference between affect and emotion. In this regard, Massumi is very clear:

> "An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is crucial to theorize the difference between affect and emotion" (2002: 28).

Here we have the difference between affect and emotion, as laid out by Massumi. Emotion belongs to the level of qualification, or the level Deleuze describes in terms of the actual. It is always bound up with the subject and their

interpretation and ordering an affective event according to semiotics and meaning. Emotion comes after an affective event, and in many ways limits the complexities of the event into a recognizable feeling.

While affect does in some cases become actualized and qualified into cognitions, perceptions or emotions associated with the subject and their actualization, affect is never fully qualified. The autonomy of affect is the "something" that always "remains unactualized" (2002: 35). It is this escape--the autonomy of affect in regards to qualification or actualization--that ensures new productions will go on. In Massumi's words, "[i]f there was no escape, no excess or remainder, no fade-out to infinity, the universe would be without potential, pure entropy, death" (2002: 35). Within this declaration are obvious resonations with the relationship between the preindividual and individuation previously described with regards to Simondon. In both accounts, affect is never fully realized and understood, and a residual remainder always lives on, which insures that future emergences will unfold.

These last lessons brought out by Massumi will help direct the section that follows. Following Massumi's analytic distinction

between the level of intensity and qualification, I hope to situate the production process of graphic design as an occupation that depends on both the production of affect, occuring at the level of what autonomists describe as the social factory, and the level of qualification, which I wish to associate with the defined labor process of graphic design. This later process of qualification is at this point admittedly vague, but it will hopefully become more clear as we move along. The important thing to note now is how Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon, and Massumi each lay out this distinction in different ways.

Conclusion: Towards an Affectual Politics of Work

In this chapter I have sought to lay out the operational understanding of affect that will be invoked and built upon throughout the remainder of this thesis. The purpose of this exercise was to lay out a conception of affect that underlines its association with the imperceptible, the unconscious or non-conscious, and the non-linguistic. Through this section I have tried to show the specificity of a Deleuzoguattarian understanding affect in relation to others which codify the term within psychoanalytic appraisals or those which use the term somewhat interchangeably with the ontologically

different domain of emotion. Most of all, I have attempted to show how affect is crucially implicated in the process of ontological emergence, related to the proliferation of new subjective formations. This last point is pertinent for positioning affect within the work process of graphic design, as the milleu out of which design pulls its creative capacity.

On the other hand, I have tried to lay out a relationship between two levels of subjective emergence that work together, but are by no means the same thing. I have referred to this relationship as the one between the preindividual/individuated, intensity/qualification, virtual/actual. The important point here is to understand that it is affect that belongs to the preindividual, intensive, and virtual side of emergence, while it is the individual, subjectivity, language and emotion that relates to the individuated, qualified, and actualized side. This latter side comes ontologically and chronologically second to the prior level of affect, though the two intertwine repeatedly. Language, cognition and emotion are a 'doubling over' of affect, which qualifies it and in some ways sutures up its virtual potentiality. The actuality or individuated side of proliferation is what I will align with the labor process in the following section.

Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Towards an Alternative Conception of Production

Capitalism and Schizophrenia figures as the subtitle to two of the most popular references to Deleuze and Guattari's political theory, *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. And in order to understand Deleuze and Guattari's politics developed throughout these two volumes, it is the relationship between these two terms that forges an appropriate entrance. While it may seem at first peculiar to connect such seemingly arbitrary terms, each apparently responding to seemingly different concerns in different disciplines, Deleuze and Guattari uncover a valuable schizoanalytic appraisal of capital and the process of accumulation on which it is based.

In connecting capitalism and schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari seek to underline the apparent madness that the former shares with the latter. They argue that, once we understand capitalism as a system that, at least in part, is propelled by a sort of schizophrenia, the mechanisms for which we might understand capital share the same foundations that

we might use to approach madness. In an interview published directly following the publication of Anti-Oedipus, Vittorio Marchetti asks Guattari: "[w]hy speak of capitalism and schizophrenia?", to which Guattari responds:

> *"It seemed to us that these two poles [capitalism and schizophrenia] have a connection in their common feature of non-sense... [I]n order to understand the true meaning of the politics of appropriation of surplus value, we would have to bring into play the same concepts that one relies upon to interpret schizophrenia"* (SS: 54-55).

Capitalism, as indeed many other power constellations for Deleuze and Guattari, is built upon the non-sensical or, delirious, to use another one of their descriptive words. At its core, nothing makes sense, though it comes to be codified into a perfectly rational system. It is in this sense we could say that the very rationality of a system is based upon its insanity. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "it [capitalism] has been mad from the beginning, and that's where its rationality comes from" (Deleuze and Guattari, cited in SS: 35). Deleuze expands upon this relationship between rationality and insanity further,

writing:

> *"Everything is rational in capitalism, except capital or capitalism itself [...] It is in this sense that we say: the rational is always the rationality of the irrational. Something that hasn't been discussed about Marx's Capital is the extent to which he is fascinated by capitalist mechanisms, precisely because the system is demented, yet works very well at the same time. So what is rational in a society? It is--the interests being defined in the framework of this society--the way people pursue those interests, their realization. But down below, there are [...] an enormous flux, all kinds of libidinal-unconscious flows that make up the delirium of society"* (SS: 36).

What is crucial to understand in respect to Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of capital is how it shifts from the delirious state, marked by a flux and flow of an unconscious milieu, into a realization of these flows within the mechanisms of a rational regime of capital. This latter state--the fixation of the delirious or schizo tendencies into the rational organization of capital--is the second pole of its composition. And it is in this way that as much as Capitalism could be said to be schizophrenic, one

might say that it is equally paranoid. Opposed to schizo delirium, the paranoid side of capital works through a "combination of signs" that seeks to control the delirious flows into "vast territories of reactive integration" (N: 28).

These two movements, displayed by the competing, though complimentary, notions of schizophrenia and paranoia, make up the two sides of capitalism identified by Deleuze and Guattari. Beyond the obvious critiques of psychoanalysis found in their first collaborative work of Anti-Oedipus, they develop a novel way of approaching how capital works through both unleashing a massive amount of unmediated schizophrenic desire, while simultaneously deploying a wealth of different mechanisms to control, channel, and suppress those same desiring flows. In their words, "capitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear" (AO: 34).

In the following pages I will seek to interrogate the relationship within capitalist production between this schizo level of the non-sensical, the unconscious, ambiguous and the non-representational on the one hand, with that of the

paranoid level of rationality, representation and consciousness. The point is to map out capital's oscillating movements between these two poles; to trace how capital moves from its nonsensical foundation into the more rigid and defined. Put differently, and building upon the work in the previous chapter, I will seek to reveal how, from the depths of the virtual level of affectivity, capitalist value, normativity, and discipline are built up.

There are two different sections that follow in this chapter, both relating to the two poles on which capitalist value production depends, alluded to above. The first introduces the delirious side of capital, which I relate to affect, and which Deleuze and Guattari further relate with the concepts of lines of flight, deterritorialization and decoding, amongst others. This is the side of production that deals with the emergence of the new, which constantly but temporarily escapes the more coded and subjectivated forms of control on which capitalist discipline, and ultimately value, relies on. Though these affective deterritorializations momentarily abscond forms of control, capital constantly reigns them in, or reterritorializes them, ensuring that these fissures of creativity are made commensurable to the foundations of capitalist accumulation.

This is the second, neurotic level of capital that reterritorializes the former deterritorializations, both expropriating the creativity from the affective productions for value, but also ensuring that the novel, deterritorialized affects do not precipitate into new subjective formations outside of capitalism. This second level will be discussed in the second section, which will map out the forms of discipline appropriate to this process.

In addition to uncovering some of the more affective or infinitesimal dimensions that compose capitalism, I will also introduce an alternate side of capitalist organization that is connected, yet in many ways opposed to the affective, what has been expressed so far in relation to the paranoid side of capital, or in Section 1, in relation to the forms of production outlined in *Capital*. This side of capitalist production—a side characterized by representation and organization--accounts for how the affective becomes integrated, imbricated and subsumed into capitalist value. In exploring this second feature of capitalism, I will also show how this process delimits, tames and confines the affectual, ultimately cleansing affect of any potential to become anything other than a capitalist subjectivity. This side of capitalism I wish to associate with the

second form of production, or what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the "production of production", that takes place largely within what I have described earlier as the 'social factory'. I will further uncover the different techniques of control that ultimately act to channel, code, and tie the various affects produced in the wider social factory.

Part 3, Section 2:

Creativity and Deterritorialization in Capitalism

"We weren't looking for anything timeless, not even the timelessness of time, but for new things being formed, the emergence of what Foucault calls 'actuality'".
- Deleuze and Guattari, *Negotiations*, pp. 86

Deleuze and Guattari's work, it could be said, is first and foremost an investigation into the mechanisms of emergence, flux, change, metamorphosis, and creativity. As Deleuzian scholar Craig Lundry notes, "Deleuze is widely and rightly regarded as a philosopher of creativity, one of the greatest of the last century, if not several before" (Lundry, 2012: 1). Indeed, Deleuze himself describes his method as one which

seeks to uncover not "the eternal or universal", but "the *conditions* under which something new is created (*creativeness*)". This way of approaching the social is borrowed explicitly, Deleuze says, from Alfred North Whitehead. But one can also identify resonations with another of Deleuze's theoretical interlocutors, Gilbert Simondon, particularly in the latter's notion of *individuation* and the *preindividual*. Opposed to epistemological research which "accords ontological privilege to the already constituted..." Simondon's method similarly calls for "looking for the principle of individuation [the constitution or emergence of an individual, subject, object, or thing] in a reality the precedes individuation itself [the preindividual, for Simondon]" (Simondon, 1992: 298). For both Simondon and Deleuze, there is a shared notion that, in order to understand unfoldings and morphogenesis in art, social life, political and economic structures, you begin not with the individual, object or institution in a formed, stable and articulated state of *being*, but with the subterranean, *rhizomatic,* infinitesimal micro-relations that prefigure and contribute to its constitution.

This method for understanding emergence and transformation is brought directly into conversation with Capitalism--

particularly capitalist production--within Deleuze and Guattari's thought. An excerpt from *Anti-Oedipus* is particularly relevant in this regard where, building off the foundational work by Marx in *Capital*, Deleuze and Guattari write: "We cannot tell from the mere taste of wheat who grew it; the product gives us no hint as to the system and the relations of production" (AO: 24). Though this passage might appear at first rather unremarkable, it speaks volumes about how they approach creativity, how that understanding extends into the field of economics, and how the economic can inform the way we understand creativity. Often we take the result of a process to be the primary level or means of analysis for understanding particular phenomena at the expense of the mechanisms that constitute a particular reality. Marx understood this often-misleading proclivity, and challenged it through his descent down into the relations of production below the visibility of commodities, uncovering the labor, organization, and mechanisms that give rise to their constitution. Deleuze and Guattari extend this method even further, however, directing us not only to the field of labor below the level of the commodity, but also to a micropolitical field of proliferation below "comprehension or expression" which they position as central for capitalist production of value

(AO: 24). It is this incomprehensible field makes up "the real process on which it [capitalism] depends" and which forms the primary focus of the first part of this chapter (AO: 24)"

To get to the core of this infinitesimal level that is buried below the surface of visibility, I will speak in the following pages of a few co-constitutive concepts developed by Deleuze and Guattari, particularly those promoted in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Each of these following concepts, to be sure, are formulated by Deleuze and Guattari around different concerns and issues, but they are simultaneously connected in their general desire to construct an understanding of a field of virtual proliferation often missed out in other analyses of politics and capitalism. While each section shares a certain orientation towards what I spoke of in the previous chapter in terms of virtuality, the preindividual and affect, in this chapter, the political and economic importance of this domain is brought to the fore. Each subsection, numbered one through five, will build upon one another to provide a more coherent picture of this field, while in turn also complicating that picture through folding in new layers. The idea here is that each new section will introduce a slightly different way to approach this

subterranean level, bringing together the characteristics that define it.

The Body Without Organs, The Virtual and Affect

Desire is [...] a process, as opposed to a structure or a genesis. It is an affect, as opposed to a feeling. It is a hecceity—the individual singularity of a day, a season, a life. As opposed to a subjectivity, it is an event, not a thing or person. Above all, it implies the constitution of a field of immanence or a body-without-organs, which is defined by zones of intensity, thresholds, degrees and fluxes. This body is biological as it is collective and political. It is on this body that assemblages are made and come apart, and this body-without-organs is what bears the offshoots of deterritorialization of assemblages or flight lines.

- Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 130

"[T] he socius, or the Body without Organs [...] is massive, imposing, and unavoidable. It defines the very situation in which we live. It is the milieu that all our thoughts and actions presuppose, the environment to which they all refer..."

- Steven Shaviro, "The Connective and Disjunctive Syntheses"

To begin to understand this alternative field with which Deleuze and Guattari's accord capitalist production--or indeed the production of any system, subjectivity, object, or thing--one starts with a sort of rhizomatic, subsurface plane, which they categorize as the *body-without-organs* (BWO), or interchangeably at times as the *plane of consistency* (POC) (ATP: 170). The BWO is a sort of milieu out of which "alluvisions, sedimentations, coagulations, foldings, and recoilings that compose an organism--and also a signification and subject--occur" (ATP: 176). It is on this plane on which Capitalism imposes a number of organizational techniques in order to extract useful labor (ATP: 176). But while the BWO serves as the object *of* manipulation, the source *against which* the organizations, significations, hierarchizations of capitalism are brought to bear--a process that I will discuss in the second part of this chapter--it is fundamentally opposed to such operations (ATP: 176). Put differently, while order is unleashed against the BWO, the BWO is not in itself any of these things, and in fact does its best to ward off the organization imposed on it.

The BWO derives its name precisely because it "opposes all strata of organization, the organism's organization *as well as*

power organizations" (TRM: 130; emphasis mine; See also ATP: 406). Contrary to the ordering and individuating level that is imposed against it, the BWO and the POC might be better defined as a plane of dis-organization. It is a level that disarticulates and desubjectivates, embracing the movement of "dismantling the organism" (ATP: 176). Describing the POC, Deleuze and Guattari write that "there is no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation of subjects. There is no structure..." (ATP: 294). In this way, the BWO can be thought of as a plane on which there is an unraveling of sorts, what Deleuze and Guattari would call the process of *decoding*. Codes for Deleuze and Guattari are sorts of traditional, implicit rules of a society that constitute what is admissible and what is not. As Jason Read explains, "[c]odes can be thought of as tradition, or prescriptions and rules bearing down on the production and distribution of goods, prestige and desire", often apparent when one hears the declaration "this is how things are done, how they have always been done" (2011: 142). The BWO works in part by undoing these traditional organizational forms, and replacing them with schizophrenic modes that "scramble meaning" (AO: 15). On the BWO, there is no meaning; there are no significations, no formed subjectivity. The BWO cries out against meaning--

"no signifier, never interpret!"--and unravels individual identities through "desubjectification" (ATP: 176). Thus the BWO not only unravels traditional codes, but also forms of linguistic significations, meanings, and specific formed, individualized subjectivities.

To say that the BWO is associated with the undoing of codes and subjectivities-- *de-coding* --does not imply that it is simply subtractive. There is a lot happening on the BWO; the plane is populated by numerous flows and proliferations of unconscious desires that are "[torn] away from meaning", which are more analogous to "colors and sounds, becomings and intensities" (ATP: 180) (ATP: 177). Deleuze and Guattari speak of the BWO as a type of 'egg' which is "not regressive", but a forms "milieu of experimentation", or a "milieu of pure intensity" (ATP: 181). Such descriptions do not mean that the BWO is completely undifferentiated matter, however (see ATP: 182). Difference proliferates, but they are differences of "gradients" (ATP: 179). In this sense one could say that the BWO is somewhat *atmospheric* in composition, containing a number of different tonalities which are distinctive yet not linguistically or consciously accountable for. Quoting Henry Miller's novel, *Tropic of Capricorn,* Deleuze and Guattari

describe the BWO as "'a gloomy fog, a dark yellow mist' that affects..." (ATP: 180). It is a vague composition of intensities that are concrete, yet ambient and out of consciousness, comprising of what I referred to in the previous chapter as a *haecceity*--a particularity that is undeniably present, inducing shifts in consciousness or emotion, but at the same time out of mind and unaccountable by language[1]. Put differently, one might say that the BWO is populated by numerous "*microperceptions*" (ATP: 179), which, as Brian Massumi explains, are "not a smaller perception", but a "perception of a qualitatively different kind. It's something felt without registering consciously" (Massumi, 2015: 107).

This should all be sounding familiar to some of the main themes developed in the previous chapter, and for good reason. The BWO and POC is another iteration of what Deleuze and Guattari call the *virtual* plane of existence that precedes and contrasts the field of *actuality*. It is, like the virtual, a way of highlighting the *affective,* which is qualitatively different than a linguistic and the conscious level of comprehension. In Deleuze's words, the BWO contains "affects, the wind, fine segmentation, microperceptions, [that have] replaced the world of the subject" (ATP: 179); on it "there are only

haeccities, affects" (ATP: 294). While "nothing subjectifies" on the POC, "haecceities form according to composition of non-subjectified powers or affects" (ATP: 294). Both the BWO and the level of the virtual are traversed by affects that have not yet been defined and confined to language, meaning and subjectivity. The BWO *is* virtuality.

Along a similar vein, it might help to understand the BWO with reference to Gilbert Simondon's conception of the *preindividual*, discussed in the previous chapter. As highlighted, Deleuze's draw towards Simondon's thinking of the preindividual was in the latter's distinction between what the former describes as *singularities* and *individuals*. The *individual* is a product *of* a process; it's an actualized result, achieved by a sort of ordering, signification, and subjectivization. Singularities, on the other hand, belong to the field of the preindividual, and "correspond to the existence and the distribution of potentials" (Deleuze, 2004: 87). The BWO, we could say, is populated by preindividual singularities that are not yet formed into an individual, organized 'organ', subjectivity, society or object, but are the bedrock or raw-material from which those things will be formed.

In yet another way, the BWO could also be approached in relation to Deleuze's essay, "Immanence: A Life", where he describes '"a" life' as kind of 'thisness' not akin to a fully formed and articulable subjective individuality, but a certain affective liveliness that is much more elusive. 'A life' is an energy or, as Jane Bennett describes, a *vitality*, identified by Deleuze in small children who are "not yet individuals" but 'singularities' in that each [...] express just *this* smile, or gesture, or grimace" (Deleuze quoted in Bennett, 2010: 53). It is this quality that forms the BWO milieu, what Deleuze calls the "indefinites of life". Jane Bennet explains this force at length:

> "A life thus names a restless activeness, a destructive-creative force-presence [...] A life is vitally proper not to any individual but to "pure immanence," or that protean swarm that is not actual though it is real: 'a life contains only virtuals. It is made of virtualities" (2010: 54).

Once we begin to see the BWO in this more animated, vital and lively manner, we can appreciate its generative power; its ontogenetic force that propels things forward, in addition to the more destructive movements of *decoding* that it enacts. As a virtual-affective field of becoming, the BWO forges ruptures

into the surface of what is possible and permissible. It is the plane from which moments of novelty--that capitalism both depends on, welcomes, but also despises and suppresses--begin. Understanding this process is crucial in order to connect the understanding of the BWO, and the related concept of affect, with the wider shifts in capitalist development and production.

I would suggest that instead of associating the raw material of graphic design labor with what Hardt, Negri, and others refer to as the "social factory", it is perhaps better to understand it within the context of the BWO. In this way, I would like to insist that the affective raw material for cultural labor, discussed in earlier sections, *is* what Deleuze and Guattari would define as a BWO. Instead, I would suggest that the raw material cultural laborers draw upon is a proliferation along the lines of what is described here as a "milieu of experimentation", or a preindividual reality traversed by virtual haecceities. The thisness that laborers draw upon is not a definable reality, but rather, like the BWO, something much more intensive and non-explicable, a fog or atmosphere that affects them in different ways. Ultimately, the social factory or general intellect for cultural laborers is the BWO.

Escape, not Contradiction: Lines of Flight and Deterritorialization on the BWO

This productive character of the BWO further serves to highlight the way in which Deleuze and Guattari's own understanding of historical *becoming*, anchored in an understanding of virtual affectivity, is quite different than that of traditional notions of capitalist development and political transformations based in opposition. Against the orthodox Marxist version of historical dialecticism, Deleuze and Guattari dismiss the notion that contradiction drives the societal--and capitalist--development. Instead, "a society, a social field does not contradict itself, but first and foremost, it leaks out on all sides. The first thing it does is escape in all directions" (TRM: 127).[2] This anti-Hegelianism--apparent from Deleuze's earlier writings onward--is particularly demonstrative of how capitalism functions, and further underlines its connection to schizophrenia: "Schizophrenia is indissociable from the capitalist system, itself conceived of as primary leakage (*fuite*)..." (C: 14). Capitalism, and indeed any economic, political, or social system, is made up of a multitude of leaks that escape its organizational grasp. As Massumi points out in

his reading guide to *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, "a structure is defined by what escapes it" (Massumi, 1999:105). Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, in order to come to terms with the conditions for the emergence of any new social or political structure, capitalism included, one begins with tracing out these ambiguities that escape its control.

Deleuze and Guattari denote this elusive, discharging power with the reinforcing, and sometimes interchangeable, notions of *deterritorializtion* and *lines of flight*. A line of flight should be understood in the context of its original French denotation, *linge de fuite*, where, as the English translator of ATP, Brian Massumi, remarks: "*fuite* covers not only the act of fleeing or eluding, but also, flowing, leaking and disappearing into the distance" (ATP: xvii). Put differently, a line of flight denotes a movement of carrying something off and away into an unknown. Adding to this, Deleuze and Guattari conceive of these lines of flight as "a composition of speeds and affects", emphasizing an understanding of flight with not only movement, but with speed and linguistic and cognitive imperceptibility (ATP: 258).

The related term of *Detterritorialization*--"almost the same thing" as a line of flight--similarly identifies a transformative shift away from the more formed or organized level of actuality (TRM: 127). It refers specifically to a movement away from a territory, or, as Paul Patton puts it, "the movement by which something escapes or departs from a given territory". In this more literal sense, this transitory action is associated with spatial fleeing, often ascribed to nomads traveling freely over the 'smooth space' of the steppe, quite literally abandoning a fixed territory to perpetually deterritorialize (ATP: 421). Deterritorialization does not always hold a spatial connotation within Deleuze and Guattari's work, however, and is often invoked to describe an escape or transformation in a number of cultural fields, too. Music and sound, understood as a "sonorous block that opposes visual memory" (K: 5), is perhaps the most acute form of deterritorialization: "a cry that escapes signification, composition" where in "intensity alone matters" (K: 6). Writing and language, too, can be deterritorializing, and Deleuze and Guattari find the literature of figures like Franz Kafka and William Burroughs to be particularly demonstrative of this process (see Land, 2005). The power of Kafka's work, for instance, is the process of "*experimentation*" that it unleashes; a deterritorializing process achieved not through

"structure with formal oppositions and a fully constructed signifier", but through escaping "interpretation or significance" (K: 7). These more artistic examples of deterritorialization thus underline the asignifying and unconscious character that it shares with the concept of affect. Here, deterritorialization is not simply a movement away from a spatial territory, but also a movement away from meaning and conscious perception in order to experiment with something new. It is understood as "a simple *way out*, 'right, left, or any direction', as long as it is as little signifying as possible" (K: 6).

These lines of flight and deterritorializations are the points, cracks, and leakages that "draw [the POC] and cause it to rise to the surface" (ATP: 297). But to simply associate these movements of deterritorialization with the abstract notion of the BWO is not enough to understand who or what is behind deterritorializations and lines of flight that brings the BWO to the surface. The BWO and the related cracks and movements that escape organization are spawned by figures and things which themselves coalesce in the production of the BWO. Put differently, the BWO or POC, and the related deterritorializations that push it forward "must be constructed" (ATP: 174). This construction can take a number

of different forms, ranging from the "artistic" to the "scientific, mystical, political" (ATP: 174). What each of these different deterritorializations has in common, however, is that they are produced and made up by "a collectivity" (ATP: 179), which is given conceptual and political particularity in ATP with the concept of the "nomadic war machine".

The War Machine and the Production of 'Nomad' Science

In ATP, Deleuze and Guattari introduce us to yet another term that not only underlines the virtual level underneath the surface of linguistic and conscious perception, but also to the figures or components that are involved in its production. The *nomadic war machine* is a concept that Deleuze and Guattari use to denote collectivities that exist outside of centralized power and direction that engage in the formation of novel artistic, scientific, or political forms of deterritorialization. The war machine is the mechanism that pushes forth deterritorializations that flee the codes and the confines of what is perceptible, consciously intelligible and admissible. Put simply, this collective machine is what produces the BWO as an experimental plane outside of rigid organization, linguistic signification, and conscious perception. In Deleuze and

Guattari's words, "every creation is brought about by the war machine" (ATP: 253).

While Central authority will subsequently try to contain and channel the power of the war machine--a process to be discussed in the second section--the war machine itself is guided by more diffuse conglomerations of "bands" or "packs". A pack--the relational and (dis)organizational unit of the war machine--is not a hierarchical form, but a "rhizomatic" configuration (ATP: 395). And in constituting a BWO, the pack of the war machine attempts to ward off any hierarchy from establishing itself. Deleuze and Guattari liken these bands to gangs of street children in Bogata, where a "leader is prevented from acquiring stable power" (ATP: 395). But while bands like these prevent hierarchical power, they are still very much a collectivity with a shared cause: "These street gangs 'undertake their [criminal] activity in common, with collective sharing of the loot, but disperse or sleep separately'" (ATP: 395). These packs, then, are connected not by a transcendent power that governs over them, but by transversal "alliances" and act in orchestration (ATP: 395).

The packs that make up the war machine are also different than other organizational forms in that they communicate through *contagion* instead of more the formalized and categorical modes language or writing (ATP: 266-267); it is contagion that connects these bands and allows them to work in alliance. In this sense, we can relate, as Deleuze and Guattari do, the BWO and the war machine with a sort of crowd or 'hive' relationality: "A body without organs is [...] distributed according to crowd phenomena, in Brownian motion, in the form of molecular multiplicities" (ATP: 34). It's here, too, that Deleuze and Guattari's notion of crowd or pack communication links up with yet another theoretical figure, Gabriel Tarde. As Tony Sampson illustrates, Deleuze's notion of contagion in several ways follows or parallels Tarde's understanding of crowd proliferation as "mostly unconscious associations [...] of imitative social encounter" (Sampson, 2012: 18). Deleuze's formulation of the crowd is like Tarde's understanding of "immatative rays", which is a communicative transfer "not to be confused with a purely cognitive, ideological, or interpsychological transfer between individuals" but comprising of "affecting [...] non-cognitive associations, inferences and collisions that spread outward, contaminating feelings and moods before influencing thoughts, beliefs and

actions" (Sampson, 2012: 19). The pack is a rhizomatic unit that functions along these lines, communicating in a dispersed way through contagious affects that infect and are likewise infected.

The war machine is a 'machine' in the sense that it produces, and what it produces is a BWO and lines of flight that are experimental and deterritorializing. The productive process of the war machine, however, is much more haphazard, intuitive and malleable when compared to the types of production one witnesses on industrial scales with bureaucratic and organizational structures. What is produced by the war machine, and what this production depends upon, is "heterogeneity" as opposed to forms of production which are based upon and result in "the stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant" (ATP: 398). The war machine experiments with what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a "nomad" or "minor" science that is distinct and often conflictual to the more standardized and rational process which they denote as being "royal" or "imperial sciences" (ATP: 398).

Whereas royal science is understood as a method dependent on "templates", a "fixed model of form", "mathematical figures"

and precise "measurements" (ATP: 402), nomad science "develops eccentrically" and organically, engages in experimentation rather than standardization, and requires a much more affective experience with materiality (ATP: 399). In contrast to nomad science, Royal science's method, for Deleuze and Guattari, is based upon a "hylomorphic" assumption regarding form and matter, where form is understood as chronologically and ontologically primary. It implies that "form…organizes matter" and that "matter is prepared for the form" (ATP: 407). Materiality thus has a passive role in relation to form, in which the former is merely acted upon and not in any way acting. For Deleuze and Guattari, this understanding implies a specific division of labor, organizational structure, and hierarchy that produces dichotomies between "intellectual and manual, the theoretical and practical, [...] 'governors' and 'governed'" (ATP: 406). Once the hylomorphic model is adopted as a 'royal' science, 'royal' art or a way of production, the conception and idea precede the practice and execution of a task upon material. This results in the parceling off of the conception from the execution of tasks, developing hierarchical organizations that follow this separation. Deleuze and Guattari criticize this hylomorphic understanding, noting that "it assumes a fixed form and matter deemed homogeneous" (ATP:

450). It is flawed in that it "leaves many things, active and affective, by the wayside" (ATP: 450). It leaves out the *processes* of becoming that radiate under the surface of stable being, what Simondon relates to the *preindividual* affective layer that *becomes* individuated through the very process of individuation, or what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as "*singularities* or *haecceities*" (ATP: 450). Hylomorphism simply looks for the repetition of forms; how the 'ideal' form repeats itself the same way in matter and history, society and politics. It is a method through which pattern and sameness is assumed to be at the center of uncovering the transcendental form from which all matter replicates, and is the precise method that is used in what Deleuze and Guattari identify as 'royal sciences'.

In contrast to the royal sciences method that seeks "reproduction", the war machine's nomad science is based upon "following" (ATP: 410), and what it follows are the "connections between the singularities of matter" (ATP: 407). As such, this method does not start with the assumption that form guides matter, but rather that form and matter are co-constitutive. It is a process that occurs when one is "in search of the singularities of a matter, or rather a material, and not out to discover a form" (ATP: 410). This "ambulant" way of

experimentation is exemplified in forms of wood-working, for example, where the productive task "is a question of surrendering to the wood, then following where it leads by connecting operations to a materiality, instead of imposing form upon matter" (ATP: 451). This way of following, a form of nomadic science, is *artisanal*, as opposed of the more fixed, industrial forms of work which seek to impose a preconceived idea or form onto material. An artisan is defined as "one who is determined in such a way as to follow a flow of matter [...]. The artisan is *the itinerant, the ambulant*. To follow the flow of matter is to itinerate, to ambulate. It is intuition in action." (ATP: 452).

The revelations of the war machine highlighted here can further add some context to the raw material that cultural laborers draw upon. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I would suggest that the raw material they require is not something produced in a scientific way, but a milieu that is the result of various "bands" of artists or urban groups that itenerantly created various affects. This will be discussed further later on, but the point I wish to make here is that the BWO, which makes up the social factory for cultural labor, is not a product of one individual, but is largely the result of communal forms of

production--street trends, an urban atmosphere, or an intensity one gets when they are at a cafe. When laborers consume culture in order to do work, a form of productive consumption, the culture that they are consuming is often the product of various itinerant musicians, artists, and writers, not a formalized science.

Micropolitics and Minor Productions

So far we have discussed the BWO, lines of flight, deterritorialization, the war machine and nomad science. Each of these terms attends to specific concerns within Deleuze and Guattari's work, to be sure, but they also share the common purpose of illustrating the affective, non-conscious and non-representative field of reality that is bedrock of political, artistic, social, and economic becoming. In attempting to tie these notions together, and clarify their political potency, it is helpful to speak of two more terms: "micropolitics" and "minor" production. These two terms allow us to contrast the types of infinitesimal productions we have discussed thus far in relation to the BWO, deterritorialization and the war machine with a rather different but coalescent plane of actuality and organization that manipulates, harnesses and

directs these flows into concrete arrangements or "assemblages" of power and, ultimately, capitalistic mechanisms of value production.

For Deleuze and Guattari, "minor" productions and "micropolitics" are types of political becoming that are related and foundational to, but opposed and qualitatively different than, a macropolitical or major field characterized by "molar organization" and hierarchical forms of power (ATP: 235). I will speak more on the macropolitical or "major" side of politics in the latter section, but it is worth noting now, in order to draw out the contrast between the micro and the macro, that the macro or molar political form is closely aligned with 'state power', or with powers that are enshrined in very particular and coded forms of law and language. The macropolitical names a type of politics based upon identity or representation, and makes judgments based upon that identity which forms a *standard*. The key here is that the macropolitical is uniform, consistent, concrete, exhibits a certain reluctance to change and operates in a somewhat delimiting role.

The micropolitical and minor, in contrast to the macropolitical and molar, consists of "an entire world of unconscious micropercepts, unconscious affects…" (ATP: 235). In this way,

the micropolitical is much more elusive and less defined than the macropolitical; it is non-representative rather than representative, affective and non-conscious rather than coded and consistent. The micropolitical is a productive process that contributes to societal, economic and political *change*, whether it be a "'change in values', the youth, women, the mad, etc." (ATP: 236). Put differently, we could say that the minor and micropolitical field are deterritorializing; the politics developed here "flows or flees" and "escapes" the more molar organizations of power (ATP: 236). The micropolitical names a deterritorializing politics of becoming, flux, and disorganization that is virtual, subsisting below the more visible and articulable forms of major or macro politics. As Nicholas Thoburn explains, it "is the process of deviation or deterritorialization of life– it is a process of calling forth the virtuality of the world [...]" (Thoburn, 2003: 7). The first characteristic of the micro and minor, then, is that it is creative; it is a production that creates novel forms of life, subjectivity, perceptibility, aesthetics and politics. Like the BWO, it is a non-conscious and non-linguistic proliferation that absconds organization and control, however momentarily. It is an experimental plane of virtuality in the sense that it is "active,

yet unformed" (Thoburn, 2003: 7), producing a future that is not yet actual, but in the process of becoming.

To illustrate the contrast between the micropolitical and macropolitical, Deleuze and Guattari provide the rise of Nazism in Germany as an example. For them, the rise of Nazism involves two separate political movements—fascism, relating to the field of micropolitics, and totalitarianism, which relates to the macropolitical:

> *"[F]ascism implies a molecular regime that is distinct both from molar segments and centralization. Doubtless, fascism invented the concept of the totalitarian state, but there is no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: there are totalitarian states of the* Stalinist *or military dictatorship* type that *are not fascists. The concept of the totalitarian state applies only at the macropolitical level [...] and a particular mode of totalization and centralization. Fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State"* (ATP: 236).

Here Deleuze and Guattari further define and contrast the organizational and mechanistic features of micropolitical and minor positions against the macro and major. Whereas the micropolitical is diffuse and rhizomatic, macropolitical expressions like totalitarianism are centralized. Fascism works through mobilizing micropolitical flows that bleed out all over the place, that occupy all the little nooks and crannies of life outside or not immediately under the direction of a centralized state power. Fascism becomes totalitarian only after fascism's micropolitics--which have been radiating underneath or beside state power relations--become integrated into a centralized bureaucracy, and channeled into the state form (ATP: 236). Based upon these identifications laid out by Deleuze and Guattari, one might say that the micropolitical is a power of diffusion, flux, and change, while the macropoltical is one of contraction, coagulation and stability.

It is important to understand that while fascism is one of Deleuze and Guattari's more cited examples of micropolitics in action, it is but one of many. As they emphasize, "everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a *macropolitcs* and a *micropolitics*" (ATP: 235). Thus all forms of life are political, and all forms of politics involve an affective escape

that disturbs and morphs meaning, identity, and subjectivity. All politics begin, like all subjectivities and individuations, with a leakage, with what I referred to earlier as deterritorializations, or what Deleuze and Guattari similarly discuss here in relation to the micropolitical. It's in this sense that the student-worker manifestations of May 1968 in Paris are as much an example of micropolitical eruptions as the micro-fascisms that spread throughout German society in the rise of the Nazi party. As Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, During May '68, like the period preceding Hitler and his totalitarian ascent, the micropolitical was gaining momentum and proliferated at an increasing speed, building up like a wave or radiating like a forest fire: "a molecular flow was escaping, miniscule at first, then swelling, without, however ceasing to be unassignable" (ATP: 238-239). The importance here is that while this energetic becoming is maturing and shifting, it is 'unassaignable', uncoded and non-representable.

Both micropolitics and minor productions begin from a position of impasse or impossibility. They arise from a "cramped space" or a "segmented" reality where little or no conceivable avenues exist for creativity outside the dominant social, political and economic prescriptions that cage in the

majoritarian in on all sides. This segmentation is everywhere and occurs all the time: "we are segmented from all around and in every direction" (ATP: 230). Work, play, the spatial layout of the city, etc., can all be segmented, and all these segmentations are similar in that they develop according to a dualistic opposition. People are parsed out into identities of "social classes but also men-women, adults-children, and so on" (ATP: 230). In an almost Derridean fashion, these dualisms produce a major or molar standard against which its minor or micro opposition is put in a denigrated or deficient position; the worker, the woman, the ghettoized African-American, and the sexually deviant are all cast as hierarchically inferior to the major standard, or, completely blocked off from the major experience. The standard, major, or molar is thus not defined necessarily by its quantity or size, but by the or dominant norm that it constitutes:

> *"Let us suppose that the constant or standard is the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language (Joyce's or Pound's Ulysses). It is obvious that 'man' holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks,*

peasants, homosexuals, etc." (ATP: 105 cited in Thoburn, 2003).

Here the molar standard is abstract in the sense that it is a standard of judgment, but that no one is truly major. Put differently, the major or molar is a position of impossibility, but an impossibility which defines the terrain of what desires should be directed towards; it is an idea that is meant to be striven for. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, "the majority, insofar as it is analytically included in the abstract standard, is never anybody, it is always Nobody" (ATP: 105). The minor and micropolitical, on the other hand, are the fissures that break away from major, delineations from the norm that hold a virtual potential for a different subjective emergences or becomings.

It's helpful at this point to refer to the work of Kafka, which Deleuze and Guattari closely associate with minor creation, specifically, 'minor literature'. Kafka, as a Jew living in Prague, is in many ways removed from both the Czech milieu in which he writes, but is also cut off from the German language which serves as the official standard of the intelligence in Prague at that time. Despite his position as somewhat of an outsider in

relation to these molar surroundings, he, out of necessity, is forced to write in the official, "major" language of German-- an "oppressive", "paper language" that is both territorially and socially removed from his experience. He writes from what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a position of "impossibility", or an alienated, ghettoized situation in relation to the "major" that surrounds him on all sides (K: 16-17). So while the minor could be said to emanate from a position that is removed or swept to the margins of what the major defines as permissible and desirable, the minor takes the major form--in this case German--as its venue of expression. This is the first point of any minor creation: it comes from a "cramped space" of impossibility, and is forced to find its means of expression in what constitutes the major or molar standard. The minor, in the case of writing, is to "live in a language that is not [your] own" (K:19).

Though the minor uses the major form to advance itself, minor production deterritorializes the major form in its productive process: "Prague German is a deterritorialized language, appropriated for strange and minor uses" (K: 17). Kafka takes the German language and makes it intensive and vibratory, using language in productive way that opposes "all symbolic or

even significant or simply signifying uses" (K: 19). The language is bent, and becomes something other than itself as it is bastardized and intensified. This same minor relationship is found in African-American culture and literature, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, where the major form of 'proper' American English becomes altered through ebonic transformation (K: 17). The figure of the black American, a minor figure, is forced to express their minor desires through the major form, but through the process, creates a new language, a new sensibility. So while minorities are, as Nicholas Thoburn puts it, "a condition of those who lack these resources, or who experience them as oppressive or inadequate" they take a hold of the major, de-subjectify and de-signify it, creating something new that speaks to their position. In this way, minor productions are "seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majority" (ATP: 106 cited in Thoburn, 2003). As Nicholas Thoburn further summarizes, "It is from their [the minority's] very cramped and complex situations that politics emerges – no longer as a process of facilitating and bolstering identity, or 'becoming-conscious', but as a process of innovation, of experimentation, and of the complication of life, in which forms of community, techniques of practice, ethical

demeanours, styles, knowledges, and cultural forms are composed" (Thoburn, 2003: 8).

The deterritorializations set in motion by minor figures are, as is the case of Kafka's minor literature, not strictly individual and subjective in character. Minor compositions are immediately collective enunciations. They are of the pack and rhizomatic form, of which I previously spoke. The minor writer, for instance, is a subject that pushes forth a deterritorialization, but that deterritorializing process is already at work in a common field below the surface of perceptibility; "what each author says individually already constitutes a common action" (K: 17). Thus, another characteristic of minor or micro productions is that they are *collective* enunciations within, but against the major, bastardizing and deterritorializing the latter: "the minority is the becoming of everybody, one's potential becoming to the extent that one deviates from the model" (ATP: 105, cited in Thoburn, 2003). Minor productions, like the war machine, connect immediately to a collectivity; they are articulations of a desire that circulate and build below the thresholds of representation and consciousness that will deterritorialize the major or molar model itself.

Again, the discussions of minor and micropolitics reiterate much that has already been covered, but gives it political determinacy. I would argue that design labor draws largely upon the microproductions that escape models of linguistic and cognitive qualification. These productions on the BWO are moving, or deterritorialization--they take the designer in new and unforeseen directions, escaping the coded and stagnant forms of meaning. These microproductions are collective, too-- they are produced by the social at large, by the commons or urban milieu as collectivity.

Cultural Labor and Affective Deterritorializations

At this point it is worth taking a moment to bring the lessons of Part 3 discussed so far back into conversation with one of the other fundamental concerns of this thesis—capitalist production and cultural labor. How does this field that I have laid out through reference to the Deleuzoguattarian concepts of the BWO, deterritorialization, war machines, and micro or minor proliferations relate to how capitalism and cultural labor functions? To begin to bridge this gap, it is important to understand that for Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is not a

closed system that creates its own energetic, propelling force but, instead, is an open system that requires an outside energy source for its proliferation. For if it were to be a completely closed system, as classical economists imagined it was, it would be become entropic. In other words, capitalism does not self-renew, or produce its own means of creativity; it is not a system of equilibrium, but, as Steven Shaviro argues, one that requires a flux of creative energy from outside itself:

> *"Capital is not a closed, self-contained, self-renewing system [...]. Rather, it is what Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers call a dissipative structure, a far-from-equilibrium conductor of flows of energy. If the socius were only able to feed back upon itself, and live upon its own resources, it would either suffer a short circuit and quickly burn out, or else succumb to entropy"* (Shaviro, 2008: n.p.).

If capitalism does not produce its own energetic flows, but is rather a sort of 'conductor', it must obtain its creative source from an arena that is not within itself. It requires what Deleuze and Guattari refer to in AO as a "production of production", a "primary production" or "an energy-machine" (AO: 4). This primary production is what I have thus far spoke of as the

production of the BWO, or the virtual, preindividual plane which I have associated with affect. It is a deterritorializing force built from micro or minor relations of virtuality. These virtual deterritorializations or lines of flight will form the initial process of creativity on which capital will attach itself to. To put this more concretely, and in the words of Guattari, "capitalism has a very peculiar character: its lines of flight […] are the conditions of its own operation. It is constituted by a generalized decoding of all flux, fluctuations of wealth, fluctuations of work, fluctuations of language, fluctuations of art, etc.." (C: 47). In this way, capitalism can be "defined much more by what escapes [it] or [its] impotence than by [its] zone of power" (ATP: 239). Thus, in order to propagate, capitalism must tolerate escapes, and "in fact it requires a certain peripheral polymorphy" (ATP: 482).

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If, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, capitalism depends on these various affective escapes from the body without organs to engender itself with new and novel ideas, where might we

locate this in respect to graphic design labor? What and where is graphic design labor's own milieu of experimentation, and who are the characters behind these minor manifestations that provide the creative gold that they use for the production of their commodities? An answer to this question, I would like to suggest, begins with what I spoke of in earlier sections as the "social factory".

From preindividual affectivity to Individuated subjectivity

In Gabriel Tarde's 1893 Monadology and Sociology, the French sociologist lies out a novel way to approach the emergence of social phenomena. Challenging the dominant theoretical line of the time, Tarde sought to uncover the "infinitesimal" relations lying "beneath the appearance of uniformity", a layer "whose depths and secrets we have not begun to fathom" (Tarde, 1893: 45). This sort of subterranean reservoir, what Tarde describes as a "heterogeneous but not yet organized mass", would be identified as the foundation out of which all phenomena emerges (Tarde, 1893: 22). As Tarde argued, it is out of the "microscopic and even ultra-microscopic depths of the infinitely small" that all forms of life actualize (Tarde, 1893: 23). But while all forms begin within this microscopic layer,

Tarde also argued that they would, over time, gain more and more stability and individuality. What started out as this chaotic, unorganized, unconscious, and energetically charged amoebic state, would slowly become ordered, manipulated, and turned into a very organized, and representable structure. Everything for Tarde followed this trajectory, even the industrial developments he was witnessing during his time:

Industry, from a primitive phase where each does whatsoever and howsoever he likes, evolves rapidly to a second phase where professions and corporations are established, with their fixed and traditional processes of manufacture... The incoherence and administrative quirks [...] in its embryonic state are gradually replaced by unity, stable administration and centralized power (Tarde, 1893: 41).

Writing many decades later, Deleuze and Guattari laid out their own schizoanalytic appraisal of capitalism and, like Tarde's before them, they identify economic development as starting from an infinitesimal field of chaos (what has been discussed in this chapter in terms of the BWO and in the previous chapter as the affective level of virtuality), but tending towards the sort of 'second phase' Tarde speaks of that orders, defines and

organizes the prior level. The layer we spoke of in the previous chapter relating to virtual emergence and flux has a correlative process that is brought against it, and for every concept Deleuze and Guattari provide that grasps the affective leakages that form the bedrock for new ways of becoming, they have a concepts that describe a phase which controls, directs, and ultimately de-radicalizes the prior.

In ATP Deleuze and Guattari denote this latter layer with reference to what they call the "plane of organization" (PO hereafter), which is deployed by capitalism and other power constellations against what can be considered the plane of consistency and BWO. The PO is the opposite of the BWO; it is the 'organism' that the BWO constantly tries to ward off, often unsuccessfully. The PO constantly attempts to build up "a stratum on the BWO", a stratum that feeds off the BWO, cutting into its flows and ultimately organizing it up (ATP: 176). In this sense, the PO is "stratifying" in that it orders the unordered milieu that is the BWO. It is described as process of "sedimentation", "coagulation", "folding", and "recoiling"—and, most importantly, "accumulation"--wherein the energetic composition of the BWO is tamed and drawn into a new organized and hierarchized system (ATP: 176). The different

affective singularities of the BWO are brought into new compositions, creating different subjects, objects, and ultimately systems and structures, or "organisms" (ATP: 176).

Whereas the BWO is associated with the movement of deterritorialization, the PO is aligned with a process of reterritorialization. Reterritorializations, as already introduced, are processes in which the deterritorializing flows of the BWO slow down and become solidified or stabilized into specific territories. These territories can take a number of different forms that are not simply spatially defined. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "anything serve as a reterritorialization" and "'stand for' the lost territory [which disappears in the process of deterritorialization]", including "a being, an object, a book, an apparatus or a system" (ATP: 560). Thus, to paraphrase an earlier excerpt from Deleuze and Guattari, what capitalism deterritorializes on the one hand, it immediately tries to reterritorialize on the other by instigating the PO; while capitalism constantly deterritorializes, such deterritorializations are simultaneously "overlaid by reterritorializations on property, work and money" (ATP: 560). In this way, the schizophrenic lines of flight that capitalism pushes forth are at the same time grasped, controlled and

brought into its own body, and the charge and energetic intensity of the BWO is usurped and channeled into its own machinery and relations of production, pushing it forward. This is a process of sewchering up affective flows, which "indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or seals the lines of flight, performs a general reterritorialization, and brings the flows under a single flow..." (ATP: 243).

One of the primary reterritorializations that the BWO takes is in the form of significations. Signification is crucial in order to control the affective and nonlinguistic character of the BWO and align the later with a central power. As Guattari argues, "systems of signification are always linked with formations of power and each time the formations of power intervene in order to provide the significations and significative behaviors, the goal is always to hierarchize them, to organize and make them compatible with the central formation of power..." (C: 286). In the process of reterritorializing the BWO, the PO side of capitalism assigns affective power a sign, or attaches affects to a meaning which capital prescribes or finds compatible with its own organization. Affects "go through representatives, and result from a representation" (C: 277). This process of

conversion is what Guattari calls "semiotic subjugation", where various forms of affective, aesthetic and bodily becomings, "are reduced to the dominant language, the language of power which coordinates its syntactic regulation with speech production in its totality" (C: 283).

In this process of assigning affects with significations and meanings, the BWO is reduced to an individual expression. Whereas the BWO and its affects are multitudinal and undefined by meanings, the PO bends them into "systems of enunciation [that] tend toward the individuation of enunciation and toward the degeneration of collective arrangements of enunciation" (C: 283). As Guattari continues, "one moves toward a situation where the entirety of complex systems of [affective] expression [...] is abandoned for an individuation that implies the position of a speaker and an auditor" (C: 283). Here the 'rhizomatic', 'pack' character of the BWO is turned into univocal frame that fits within capitalism's intentions; the many differences and gradients of the affective field become one meaning. To borrow from the previous section, we might say that the minority productions of the BWO, with their singularities that immediately connect to a multidimensional collectivity of difference, is made to "speak"

or signify itself in accordance with a central and transcendent, singular voice. The affective becomings that carry a multitude of singularities and potentialities are thus reduced to One—one meaning, one sign, one emotion, one organization, etc.

A different way of understanding the reductive process enacted by the PO is to say that the diffuse and rhizomatic deterritorializing lines of the BWO are, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, "conjugated". While deterritorialization is all about leakage and flow of non-conscious and non-representative affects, the conjugation of these flows occurs when the overlaid signifier leads to "their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or seals the lines of flight, performs a general reterritorialization, and brings the flows under a single flow capable of overcoding them" (ATP: 243). Thus, not only is there an act of reduction going on, but in the process deterritorializing, the nonsignifying intensities are usurped and made to resonate with a 'single flow' that overcodes them. A type of unification happens on the BWO where, to use terms from the previous section, a molar flow directs and makes the micropolitical or minor productions speak or signify on its behalf. In Guattari's words, "in industrial societies this richness of [affective] expression is attenuated; all énoncés have to be

translatable to the language that encodes dominant meanings" (C: 241). Not only is the variable and rhizomatic character of the BWO reduced to an individuality through reterritorialization and overcoding, but an individuality that is 'molar', 'major', or 'macro'. It is in this way that Guattari explains: "what capitalism [capitalism] wants is: 1) people to express themselves in a way the confirms the division of labor; 2) desire to be only expressed in a way that the system can recoup or only if it is linearized, quantified in systems of production"   (C:284).

In addition to unifying, the process of reterritorialization stratifies the BWO into solidified categories that reinforce and resonate with the molar line that overcodes it. The plane of organization arranges the BWO into a number of "classes or segments" with "binary organization" (ATP: 243; 248). It names the BWO into distinctions that follow the imperative of the main overcoding line or molarity of capitalism: worker-boss, male-female, etc. In this way, "classes are indeed fashioned from masses; they crystalize them", meaning that from the very diverse and rhizomatic milieu of the mass arise particular partitionary codes that order that milieu according to the major overcoding line (ATP: 235). This is also

understood in Deleuze's terms as a process of 'segmentation' that attaches onto the affective line of deterritorializations and both gives it an identity or 'code' and makes sure that identity matches with the overcoding line or molarity's foundations.

To say that the PO and the process of reterritorialization provide meanings and significations is another way to say that a certain identity or subjectivity is produced in this process (worker, student, manager, women, etc.). In other words, reterritorialization not only cuts the BWO into discernable parts coded by language, it also creates ways of being and identities. Affects are forced to signify themselves, but they are forced to do so within the bounds of a specific capitalist way of life:

> *"The exercise of power by means of the semiosis of Capital proceeds concurrently with a control from above social segments, and by a constant subjugation of each individual's life [...] There is nothing less individual than capitalist subjectivity. The overcoding by Capital of human activities, thoughts and feelings makes all particularized modes of subjectivation equivalent and resonant with each other. Subjectivity, so to speak, is nationalized. Values of*

desire are reordered in an economy grounded on systematic dependence of use-values in relation to exchange values, to the point of making this opposition meaningless. Strolling 'freely' down a street, or in the country, breathing fresh air, or singing a bit loudly have become quantifiable activities from a capitalist point of view [...] The capitalist order claims that individuals should only live for an exchange system, a general translatability of all values..." (SS: 258).

As Guattari explains in this excerpt, the individual models of subjectivity allowed in capitalism are somewhat superficial. While they carry their particular nuances, some of which are important nuances, they share an important aspect in that they all sustain and propagate the fundamental exchange relationship which capital depends on. While someone might be particularly interested in art or literature, such a subjective relationship is only tenable to the extent that that individuality resonates with the larger imperative of capital accumulation. In this way the micropolitical productions of becoming are connected, channeled, and defined within a matrix in accordance to a molar standard, which is dictated by the capitalist relation. Here we could say that this side of

capitalism disperses all sorts of "axioms" which do "not constitute the cutting edge" [deterritorializtion], but "is much more a stopping point, a reordering that prevents decoded semiotic flows from […] escaping in all directions" (ATP: 509). Axioms create molarities out of minorities, constantly trying to define and denumerate them, bending them into their own body; providing a space for them, but a space that prevents the minorities own becomings; translating their effervescent desires into those that support capitalism's objectives (see ATP: 519).

At this point it is useful to think of this organizational side of capitalism as belonging to what I introduced in the previous chapter as "the level of qualification" found in Brian Massumi's writings. As Massumi argues, the affective or intensive level of proliferation has a correlative plane that arrests and 'doubles' the former, linearizing, signifying, linguistifying and fixing it within defined boundaries. Qualification is an act of "indexing" the BWO into "conventional meanings" which dampens the latter, delimiting the expression of the event "in favor of structure" (2002: 24; 27). In this process, not only is the level of affective intensity made to signify itself into "semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction

circuits, into functions and meaning", but it is also, at the same time made "conscious" and reterritorialized into subjectivities that are ordered around a molar norm.

Foucault, Power, and Representation

The understanding of capitalism presented so far has a number of parallels with the descriptions of power that we find in the writings of Michel Foucault around the same period. Both Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault's projects are similar in a lot of ways, and many of these similarities are highlighted within Deleuze's book, Foucault (1986/1988), as well as his essays and interviews dedicated to Foucault's work. In this section I want to pursue some of the parallels between the analyses of capitalist power presented thus far and the descriptions of power found in Foucualt's Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge. This process will help to not only further clarify many of the ideas presented thus far, but in a different way, the work of Foucault goes a little further than Deleuze and Guattari's in specifying various techniques in which the affective or intensive side of becoming that capitalism depends on gets translated and organized into very solidified and structured forms of individuality and subjectivities. Foucault

clarifies how power shapes the unsayable, the unrepresentative and unconscious into specific subjectivities, norms and representations. In Deleuze's analysis of Foucualt, we witness a Deleuze that is working out his own understandings of power. In this sense, Foucualt serves as a way in which we better understand Deleuze's own project, and many of the expressions that we find in Anti-Oedipus are worked through alongside Foucualt's own material.

Prior to the 18th century, Foucault tells us that power mostly worked through means of repression. In other words, power at this time—what he calls juridical power--acted primarily subtractive way, either through punishing bodies, through taking life, banishment, or through the denial of existence. In a certain way this juridical power could only say "no"; it could only respond negatively to any behavior that it opposed (WK: 138-   139):

> *"[P]ower was exercised mainly as a means of deduction...a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied at subjects. Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies and*

ultimately life itself; it culminated *in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it*" (WK: 136).

Thus, one could say, juridical power can either destroy, or ignore, and when meeting any type of resistance, it "has no other option but to try to minimize it" (SP: 789). Foucault recognizes this type of power in the repressive views towards sexuality in the Victorian era, for instance. Sex, seen as something morally or biologically dangerous at the time, and was "driven out, denied, and reduced to silence" (WK: 4). Power's injunction at this period was a "sentence to disappear…to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence, and, by implication, an admission that there was nothing to say about such things, nothing to see, and nothing to know" (WK: 4). If certain deviant sexualities were able to proliferate, they were made to do so in the shadows, in red light districts, or brothels, not acknowledged in "circuits of production, at leas in those of profit" (WK: 4). Power worked primarily through censorship, which subjugated sexual discourse and visibility, expunging its appearance.

Later, around the 18th century, Foucault identifies the emergence of a different power that is much more focused on

the proactive investment of the body and its affects or capacities and involves a number of techniques aimed at ways to "foster life" and "invest in life through and through" (WK: 138-139). Power at this time moves from the very restricted, juridical sense, where it was only exercised negatively, into a form that is more pre-emptive, and more involved in creating and fostering specific forms of life, or in disallowing others. In this sense, Foucault calls power an "action upon an action", similar to Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of capital as a "production of a production" (SP: 789). As Foucault explains, "[w]hat defines the relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future" (SP: 788). Power in this inflection does not work through violence, through killing, inflicting pain, etc., but through stimulating, modifying, and distributing the forces of the body; power doesn't simply say 'no' to relations, but rather "incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it contains or forbids absolutely…" (SP: 789). Power becomes what Foucault calls biopolitical or biopower, which is fixed on "optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general" (WK: 141).

In biopower we could say that instead of power repressing everything, power requires or even prescribes a certain amount of freedom. As Foucault argues, "power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (SP: 790). Individuals and collectivities must be free in the sense that they operate within "a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse compartments may be realized" and this freedom is at times a "precondition for the exercise of power" (SP: 790). In fact, Foucault even suggests that power should be understood first and foremost from the position those who resist it (SP: 780). Power requires deviation and resistance, for "it would not be possible for power relations to exist without points of insubordination, which by definition are means of escape" (SP: 794). Deviants are in many ways most important to power's operation, their lives, desires, and actions continually called forth, analyzed and spoken about. This is observed particularly in reference to sexuality in Foucault's work, where the desires and actions of subaltern groups, not the molar standard, become of central concern: "The legitimate couple, with its regular sexuality, had a right to more discretion…On the other hand, what came under scrutiny was the sexuality of children,

mad men and women, and criminals; the sensuality of those who did not like the opposite sex; revelries, obsessions…" (WK: 38). These figures, "scarcely noticed in the past" were now made visible (WK: 39).

In this sense, we could say that for Foucault, the process of optimizing life and its forces goes hand in hand with a certain type of illumination. Unlike Juridical power, which allowed for affects, desires, and bodies to remain in "the shade", biopower operates through "compulsory visibility" (DP: 187), and whereas death, denial and banishment was the ultimate exercise of power in older forms, it now became "power's limit, the moment that escapes it" (WK: 138). To speak here of illumination is to say that knowledge of the body, its desires and forces became central to power's functioning and grasp. For Foucault, power and knowledge become co-constitutive in the rise of biopolitics: "power produces knowledge […]; power and knowledge imply on another; […] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of the field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (DP: 27). Thus the constant and uninterrupted soliciting of knowledge becomes one of the main pillars of power at this time, and various

techniques arose to facilitate the production of knowledges of body, of life, and of desire because, as Foucault insists, "power can't be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets" (SP: 783). In this way the insistence of power is not merely a declaration of 'thou shalt not', but a prescription to speak, to act, to make all forms of life, particularly those of the subaltern, visible.

The visibility and freedom afforded and even prescribed by biopower does not mean to say that all forms of life become equivalent, and that all actions are accorded with the same degree of preference. Here it is important to understand that power has two poles: it both incites, but congruently, and at the same time, it modifies. The proliferation and incitement of life is crucial, but those proliferations are also acted upon; power must "have methods [...] capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general" while at the same develop techniques for governing these same proliferations (WK: 141). Governing for Foucault does not simply refer to "political structures or the management of states" but more inclusively as "the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups may be directed" (SP: 790, emphasis mine). Governing life in this

sense means making sure its forces are manipulated, translated, normalized and, in a word, disciplined. It's for this reason that when Foucault speaks of biopower in WK, he insists that it goes hand in hand with what he defines as 'disciplinary power' in DP. Discipline is one pole of biopower, crucial for its proliferation because it is both the mechanism through which the body and its capacities become useful, but also the mechanism that serves to create a specific type of body, a specific type of action. This is particularly relevant when we consider capitalism, which Foucault argues "would be impossible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes" (WK: 141). Capitalism requires both the growth of forms of life, "their reinforcement as well as their availability" and proliferation, but also their docility and modification (WK: 141). In this way we can say that the proliferation and accumulation of life and knowledges of life is not a benign process, but rather coincides with the disciplining of the body and its action. Without knowledge, the classification of behavior and the production of the biopolitical subject is impossible. Knowledge and discipline are co-constitutive. This is where the notion of power being an "action over an action" truly gains meaning.

Consider the example of Foucault's analysis of sexuality once more. Prior to the proliferation of sexual discourse beginning in the 18th century, Foucault argues that discussions of sexuality were largely absent from the public sphere. Sex as an action was unqualified, and if there was any truth to be gleaned from sex, it was in the "pleasure itself", "evaluated in terms of intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul" (WK: 57). This formulation of sex, what Foucault calls ars erotica, quickly shifted into the practice of what he terms scientia sexualis where sex had to be known, evaluated, qualified, and ultimately given meaning (WK: 58). This latter formation was the emergence of a tight and reciprocal relationship between what he calls "knowledge-power" in which eliciting knowledge of sex and sexual acts became an obsessive task, bound up with a power that could then discipline and codify sexual acts. Here the Christian ritual of the confession from the middle ages became the template for inducing knowledges about sexual acts, desires, and thoughts. The confession was "inscribed at the heart of procedures of individualization by power", and became a constant technology of power used by educators, doctors, psychiatrists, and lovers (WK: 59). Individuals were compelled

to confess all sexual desires and actions, none of which was too small or too trivial. In all these modes of confession, whether it be someone telling their psychiatrist what sexual dreams they had, or whether it be even an author describing their innermost secrets, the process of the confession existed as a means through which "fleeting impressions" were translated into "certainties of consciousness" (WK: 60). Hence the confession was a technology that took a very intensive, non-qualified relationship and turned it into something conscious, something reflected upon, and something that could tell us something; we move from sex being something "obscure", "elusive", "clandestine" whose energy "escaped observation" towards sex being integrated into scientific discourse, a discourse that became unambiguous (WK: 66).

Here the relationship between power and knowledge becomes more apparent, for turning intensive bodily relationships into forms of highly conscionable and unambiguous forms of knowledge is never a benign process for Foucault. The eliciting of knowledge always goes hand in hand with a form of evaluation of that knowledge, an ordering or interpretation of it that forms a norm or a center. In other words, the confession is always done so in relation to someone else who evaluates, an

individual or group who has the power to "forgive, console, and direct" (WK: 66, emphasis mine). To put this in Foucault's terms, the production of knowledge has two stages: "the revelation of the confession had to be coupled with the decipherment of what it said" (WK: 66). The second process here takes on a duty of not only coding knowledge, but of placing it in categories around a norm. Sexual acts and desires were transposed into "the normal and pathological" (WK: 67). Here homosexual acts, which have always subsisted, largely in the shadows, are brought out into the open, but in that process, the sexual act turns into an identity that is judged against the molar standard of the heterosexual white male. In other words, the eliciting of knowledge is formed into categories of normalcy, and delinquency with the white, male heterosexual as the standard. As Foucualt writes, "Not only did [power] speak of sex and compel everyone to do so; it also set out to formulate the uniform truth of sex" (WK: 69). Thus the constant eliciting of knowledge, and the replacement of saying "no" with the prescription of having to speak, is the basis of biopower's proliferation. All this is not to say, however, that that injunction to speak does not involve mechanisms to ensure that those proliferations of knowledge are not ordered, interpreted, and given a certain meaning in relation to power.

Up to this point we have spoken about three basic tenets of biopower: the eliciting of the body, its intensities and desires; the codifying and qualifying of those intensities into forms of conscionable knowledge; and, finally, the ordering of that knowledge, resulting in the production of a norm around which all actions are based. If we refer to Foucault's earlier work of DP, these primary components are made even clearer, and made more relevant in relation to capitalist production and forms of work within this system. Here Foucualt introduces us to what he refers to as 'disciplinary power'—a manifestation of power he latter attributes in the WK as part of what he refers to as biopower— which is centered on the body and bodily capacities. Specifically, disciplinary power aims to elicit the full capacity of the body, optimizing output, while concurrently making sure those bodily capacities are disciplined into particular modes of usefulness and specific confines of permissibility and desirability. In other words, similar to biopower, it both enhances and elicits, while also channels and manipulates.

Part 3: Graphic Design Labor and Affectual Control

In this final section, I wish to offer a sort of vignette, or case study that helps to clarify the theories I have put forth in this dissertation thus far. In doing so, it also serves to arrive at the particularity of the theory I am putting forth, and the necessity to return to Deleuze and Guattari's work to make sense of contemporary forms of cultural labor. Here I wish to focus on the work of design, which is an occupation that has both grown in the numbers of employees, but also in the centrality of their work to the occupation within the contemporary capitalism.

I will begin this section briefly introducing the occupation of graphic design, offering some statistics that situate it within the current economy. I will then lie out a definition of the field and then move onto how I constructed my methodology. Afterwards, I will then get into the interview data, which in many ways corroborates the thesis I have put forward thus far. I will show how design labor escapes the traditional confines of the labor process outlined by Marx in Section 1, pointing towards a sort of social factory that is described by autonomists. I then introduces some data that suggests the "basin of immaterial labor" that designers draw from differs in

that it is in many ways, aural, hard to consciously digest, and, in a word, "affective". This affective realm that designers draw from relates closely to what Deleuze and Guattari call the Body Without Organs—it is unformed, unstructured, effervescent and escaping meaning, yet productive and moving.

Once I outline the more affectual foundations of design work, and reveal their importance to the design process, I will then move forward to discuss a bit about how these affects are transformed, mediated, and disciplined within the work place. This management of affect is akin, I would like to argue, with what Deleuze and Guattari describe as "the plane of organization" or the reterratorializing characteristics of capitalism that transform, organize, and ultimately delimit the affectual and deterritorializing power of the BWO.

Ultimately, the data I will introduce will help to illustrate how one might situate the role of cultural labor like graphic design within contemporary circuits of capitalism. For one, I will wish to in a way challenge both the orthodox Marxist view of production, which is restricted to the labor process, while at the same time challenging the autonomist view that seems to view all types of production similarly. I will argue that Deleuze

and Guattari offer a more appropriate way to consider cultural labor by forwarding a two-tiered approach to production. For me, while production has increasingly escaped the confines of the traditional labor process, there is still a specificity of that process, and that is where cultural labor like design work is so integral. It is cultural labor that serves to both extract an ever increasing amount of value from affects produced within society at large, but it is also their labor process, and the control of that labor process, that is integral for delimiting and deradicalizing the deterritorializing power of affect.

The importance of Design

In recent years, figures like Lash and Urry, and Allen Scott have helped to adjust our attention towards the ways the creative and aesthetic productions have become fundamental to the wider production of goods and services today (Lash and Urry, 1994; Scott: 2001). As these marketed meanings and immaterial aspects of a commodity have become more dominant in production (Hancock and Tyler, 2001: 29; Hartley, 2005: 23), design has positioned itself as an integral part of the new economy. As Keedy (1998) argues, starting in the 1980s, designers have held a 'unique position in culture, one that

could have any number of political or ideological agendas'. This speaks to not only their unique position within the production of value, but also their increasing role in the manipulation and dissemination of culture. In this way, designers are not simply producers of a commodity, but as Andrew Blauvelt (1994) argues, they are also producers of cultures.

The importance of graphic design is not only represented by their qualitative importance, but also quantitatively reflected. In 2009, the UK Design Council estimated that there were 232,000 graphic designers employed, and that number was expected to consistently rise. The Department of Culture, Media and Sport estimated the total revenue generated by designers in 2000 to be £26.7 billion. Indeed, the value of a commodity in recent decades has increasingly been associated with not strictly the functional qualities of the product itself, but the aesthetic design elements that embellish a specific commodity. As Lash and Urry comment, "the design component comprises and increasing component of the value of goods" (1994: 15). This is perhaps why even the estimations of economic importance may be understated. Utility, in many ways, is not the sole, or, in many cases, not even the primary object of desire within the market. Sure, a functional watch,

pair of shoes, or car is nice, but the aesthetic components that dress the object are just as, or even more important today. This includes the design of the objects themselves, such as the critically important product design that Apple has become famous for, to the brand image that graphic designers build around marketing the product. As Power (2004) explains, it's not "just the aesthetic aspects of the product" that are important in order to compete in the market, but also the design related to "marketing and appeal to the consumer".

Profiling the Design Industry

It is for reasons such as those mentioned above that the occupation of "design" is so difficult to define. This is particularly true in recent decades due to technological transformations that have opened design up in a number of different venues of experience. It's also difficult due to the nearly endless forms one could say is *designed.* For the sake of being clear going forward on what I mean when I speak of design, I refer to the definition taken from the DCMS (2000), which breaks the occupation down into a number of different categories, expressed below.

Communications:

Graphics, brand, print, information design, corporate identity

Product and industrial:

Consumer/household products, furniture, industrial design (including Automotive design, engineering design, medical products)

Interior and exhibition:

Retail design, office planning/workplace design, lighting, display systems, and exhibition design

Fashion and textiles:

Fashion and textiles

Digital and multimedia:

Website, animation, film and television, digital design, interaction design

Service design:

Although no examples of service design were offered, a definition of this discipline was provided by the Design

Council: 'Service design is an approach concerned with the design of services. Service design can be both tangible and intangible, and can involve communication, environment And behaviours.' This was read out to survey participants who required an

explanation of the term.

Within my own work, the designers represented most tended to fall under the "communications" tagline above. I will get into the particularities of the occupation further into this section, but these individuals more often than not worked either freelance or for a small to medium firm, producing branding documents and illustration, or print work. That said, I did speak with fashion designers and product designers as well, and their contributions are also included here.

In addition to segmenting the occupation by these different facets of design, design is often split further into categories based upon whether designers work freelance, for an agency, or work in-house for a larger company. Within the UK, those numbers are 65,900, 82,500, and 83,600 respectively (DII, 2010). Among the design agencies, an overwhelming majority of them (87%) employ less than 10 people. The average age of

a designer employed in the UK is 38, and the occupation is largely white and male dominated. Geographically, in the UK, designers and agencies tend to be concentrated most in and around London. 23% of design businesses are based in London proper, 17% in the surrounding Southeast areas, and a further 10% in the East. Following these dominant areas, 8% of businesses are in the West Midlands, 7% in the Northwest, Yorkshire, and Scotland, respectively.

Despite the growing visibility of design both economically and culturally, studies on design are noticeably lacking. Much of the literature tends to radiate from within the industry itself, coming from magazine publications such as Eye (www.eyemagazine.com), and Varoom (www.varoom-mag.com), or from publications such as Phillip Meggs *History of Graphic Design* or books that tend to read more like a "how to" manual for becoming a successful designer like Shaughnessy and Brook's (2009) *Studio Culture: The Secret Life of Graphic Design Studio*. Within a more academic light, much of design inquiry follows a trajectory of self-criticality by designers themselves. There is a long history of such thought; a notable example is Audrey Bennett's (2006) edited volume, *Design Studies: Theory and Research in Graphic Design*. Here, mostly

designers reflect on their own position within the industry of graphic design, how to be more receptive to their audience (Tyler, 2006), or social responsibility within design work (Frascara, 2006), for instance.

Perhaps one of the reasons for the lack of design related studies specifically has to do with not only its historically close and complex relationship to the wider production of art and artistic inquiry, but also its overlapping relation to studies that fall under the larger umbrella's of marketing, advertising and branding. For this reason much of the literature is non-specific to design work per se, but with little imagination can be easily applied to the design industry, if not explicitly related. In this way, we could say that much of the emergent work on those aforementioned fields can be applied and informative to the specific work of design, and, as such, the wider relationships of graphic design hold a strong bond to a lot of the literature that seeks to understand and critique the "cultural" and "creative" industries. For this reason, the inquiry that follows holds both a unique position in that it examines graphic design and its relationship to the wider circuits of capitalist production and capitalist control, but also broad in that it acts as a window into the much wider and complex relationships between the

occupation and the wider turn towards cultural production. Indeed, what I have been building upon, and what follows, is explicitly related to these questions. For one, what I wish to present, is that design work, and cultural labor more broadly, holds a very specific political and economic position in relation to the wider aesthetic and affective productions that it ultimately feeds from.

Methodology

As has been the focus of the previous sections, this section will center on the concept of affect, it's role in production and capitalism, and how affect is disciplined and contorted into signifying, appropriate, and profitable forms. As such, while researching graphic design, there were a number of concerns related to researching affect in an empirical setting that guided my methodology. As has been covered thus far in this thesis, affect is an intensity that I understand as both nonconscious and non-signifying. This reality leads to obvious concerns about how one seeks to empirically uncover affect, but also how one seeks to analyze and discuss it. The understandings of affect as pre/non-conscious and non-signifying question modes of understanding that hinge on discourse as a site of

analysis. If affect is understood as pre- linguistic, then methods that rely on discourse become problematic in an affective application. Indeed, this tension is predominant in much of the literature on affect (Blackman, 2012; Clough, 2007; Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick, 2003; Thrift, 2004, 2008). Wetherell (2012) describes this uneasiness well, writing:

> "[F] Or a large number in the social sciences, the most interesting thing about affect is that it is not discourse. In studying affect, it is claimed we are accessing a lively sensual realm beyond the conventional, the cognitive and the discursive. In this view, affect as embodied intensity is more instinctive and immediate than any language-based act such as telling a story or having conversation. Discourse is identified with the conscious, the planned and the deliberate while affect is understood as the automatic, the involuntary and the non-representational. Discourse and affect are seen as having an almost antagonistic relationship. Discourse tames and codifies affect" (Lingis, 1991; Massumi, 1996) (Wetherell, 2012: 52).

Furthermore, the debates around the body and subject in affect studies, elaborated in the previous section, problematize the

idea of an insular speaking subject. As Blackman and Venn acknowledge:

> "It is clear in the shift to bodies as processes (rather than fixed or unchanging objects or entities) that affect is invoked to gesture towards something that perhaps escapes or remains in excess of the practices of the 'speaking subject'. This means that some established methods for studying bodies may not do justice to, or, importantly, may perform an exclusion of processes which might be characterized as less visible to the particular technologies of observation, seeing and listening that characterize the humanities, and particularly the reliance of many of our qualitative methodologies on language and sight. This is characterized as a form of 'representational thinking' (Stewart, 2007; Thrift, 2007), which assumes that narrative, and producing a discursive representation of our research object(s), is enough to illustrate the mediated nature of matter, or what we might also call the 'matter of mediation'" (Blackman and Venn, 2010).

In other words, the reliance on a subject of articulation, on

language and sight that standard forms of qualitative methods depend on are somewhat problematic when trying to understand and study affect.

This apparent problematization of language with respect to affect has been noted in wider empirical studies. Writing about an ethnographic project on the sensory aspects of gardening, Chris Tilley notes that certain activities are more about 'doing rather than saying', and are 'an escape from verbal discourse' (Tilley, 2006: 328, quoted in Pink, 2009). In his research he found that 'touch, sound and taste especially, were not sensory dimensions of the garden that were either usually verbalized or explicit' (2006: 313). Similar to the literature on affect, he associates the non-signifying activities of gardening with senses that belong to bodily, non-conscious activity. For him, 'touch, sound and taste...remain part of the sensory unconscious of gardening... rarely acknowledged, thought about or discussed' (2006: 314, emphasis added). In other words, these sensations seem to exist in an extra-linguistic domain, prior or outside of a conscious qualification. Katz (2000) similarly acknowledges this failure of discursive representation, stating 'if there is anything distinctive about emotions, it is that, even if they commonly occur in the course

of speaking, they are not talk, not even just forms of expression, they are ways of expressing something going on that talk cannot grasp' (Katz 2000: 4, quoted in Thrift, 2008: 176).

The aspects of affect that are tied up with an experience of 'doing rather than saying' make techniques such as the oft-employed interview limited in application. The difficulties of traditional methods that rely on language to be sensitive and reflective of affect forces one to take these concerns seriously when developing a methodological program. The technique of the interview, though still instrumental in many applications, can be problematic when focusing on affect and intensity. As Pink (2009: 84) points out,

> "...Even within more conventional discussions of qualitative interviewing, researchers have expressed the inadequacy of studies that depend solely on interviews for their 'data' to 'understand people's lived, situated, practices' (Rapley 2004: 29). Indeed, the relationship between what is verbalized in interviews and knowledge that is not articulated in this way is itself an interesting question".

For the reasons outlined above, it is no wonder why, as Crang

(2002: 536) notes, there is a noteworthy lack in methodological literature "that take[s] up the recent growth in interest in non-cognitive, embodied and haptic experiences". Similarly, Latham (2003) laments that 'we simply do not have the methodological resources and skills to undertake research that takes the sensuous, embodied, creativeness of social practice seriously'.

While these limitations of language and interviewing in relation to affect are well received, I do think that the interview and written accounts of affect do hold a place in identifying affect if used in a way that does not confine its use to some process of finding and connoting hidden, signified meanings. Examples of identifying affective experiences and their effects on individuals have been effective in certain applications. In order to express how I believe affect can be studied through interviews I find it helpful to invoke Brian Massumi's analysis on the difference between intensity and qualification, and how language can work on both these levels. Afterwards, I will highlight some empirical studies that help to provide a way in which affect can be approached through methods that trade on language.

Towards an Interview-based Approach to Affect

I would like to suggest that the work of social theorists Brian Massumi and Felix Guattari begins to offer a way in which language, and in particular interviews, can be used in a way that "gets at" the affective components of daily life. In terms of the former, Brian Massumi offers a way to consider language's intensive quality that is opposed and different than the more representational way that we traditionally think of language. For him the intensity of language, or what he also calls the "emotional" type consists of "words expressing the emotional tenor of [a] scene under way" (2002: 22). This level of intensive language is related to, but fundamentally different than the "factual" usage of language employed narrate and linearize a certain phenomenon. This later form of language is used to qualify and insert a specific form of meaning onto something that is unfolding.

The more intensive form of language that Massumi identifies is important in that, unlike the language that qualifies, it instead resonates the affective that we have discussed. It does not try to give a step-by-step account of an event or scenario that has occurred, but serves to instead point to the occurrence of a change in intensity, a shift in affectivity. When it does

intervene, it does not seek to provide a meaning to such an occurrence, but instead amplifies it. Thus, language can work in two different ways: as either a mode of capture and representation, of linearizing and territorializing, or it can be a force for a sort of a- signifying composition that works affectively. This bifurcational logic is apparent in the work of Guattari, where he succinctly describes how language can potentially escape signification and become machinic, i.e. productive. He writes,

> 'The same semiotic material can be functioning in different registers. A material can be caught in both paradigmatic chains of production; chains of signification... but at the same time can function in an a-signifying register. So what determines the difference? In one case, a signifier in what one might call a logic of discursive aggregates, i.e. a logic of representation. In the other case it functions in something that isn't entirely a logic, what I've called an existential machinic, a logic of bodies without organs, a machinic of bodies without organs" (Guattari cited in O'Sullivan, 2001: 131).

While these theoretical examples begin to bridge the divide and opposition that language is presumed to have with affect,

further empirical analysis that use the domain of language in attending to affect provides us with a more concrete understanding of how this logic can be usefully applied. Recent examples of understanding affect through interviews and ways of writing about affective experiences come closer to providing a framework that can be implemented in this research project.

In Julian Henrique's (2010) study on affect within the Jamaican Dancehall scene we see examples of interview excerpts that point to affective experiences. One respondent from his study seems to highlight the level of intensity, noting:

> 'There's something about just playing that bass that goes right through your toes to you fingertips. And you become part of it . . . part of the it. It's not music it's a feeling, a sensation . . .that vibration goes all the way through you. It's like an energy . . ."

Examples like this do not particularly represent affect in particular emotional realms (joy, sadness, lust, heartbreak, etc.), but point to an experience of some sort of intensity that is being experienced by the participant. These are not so much displays of a conscious specified meaning, but of a signal that affectual event has taken place. In other words, these examples refer to 'a structure of feelings in which "signification without

meaning" is created' (Gutierrez Rodriguez, 2007)'.

Similarly, Kathleen Stewart's (2007) book, *Ordinary Affects*, furnishes us with an example of how affects can be spoken about in text. Her book is a written collage of affective experiences that tries to 'provoke attention to the forces that come into view as habit or shock, resonance or impact'. Her writing offers a way to glean some sort of attunement towards those moments when that precarious 'something throws itself together in a moment as an event and sensation' (2007: 1). Instead of viewing the text as some sort of 'demystification and uncovered truths', she uses it as an object for 'speculation' and to direct attention towards affective experiences (2007: 1). In one of her entries, 'A Little Accident, Like Any Other' she exemplifies this style well, writing

'The room comes to a dead stop. All eyes and ears tune into the sentience of the crash still resonating in the bikers' bodies. Then, slowly, taking their sweet time, people begin to offer questions from their tables, drawing out the details. First there is just the simple will to know what happened. But the talk, once set in motion, expands into a thicket of stories and social maneuverings... Little seeds of speculation begin to sprout. The restaurant becomes an ordinary maze of inspirations and

experiments" (2007: 11).

Another way in which interviews and language can be used in affective studies --and indeed, can be seen in the examples from above-- is through positioning them in a way to elicit the effects of an affective experience. As Massumi denotes, affect is not un-analyzable. He writes, 'It is argued here that affect is indeed unformed and unstructured, but nevertheless highly organized and effectively analyzable (it is not entirely containable in knowledge, but is analyzable in effect, as effect)' (Massumi, 1996: 237). Furthering this line, Gilbert (2004) writes about the failure of auditory domains such as music to be signified in a linguistic way. He comes to the conclusion, however, that "music has physical effects which can be identified, described and discussed but which are not the same thing as it having meanings, and any attempt to understand how music works in culture must, as many commentators over the years have acknowledged, be able to say something about those effects without trying to collapse them into meanings".

Integrating a similar understanding within empirical research, Gutierrez-Rodriguez (2007, 2011) used interviews to look at affect and its relationship to migrant domestic labor in Germany. Arguing for a 'discursive-deconstructive perspective'

for analyzing affect, Gutierrez Rodriguez notes 'affect denotes a more or less organized experience, an experience which probably has empowering and disempowering consequences, registered at the level of encounter, and not necessarily to be understood in linguistic terms, but which is analyzable as effect' (2007). She argues that interviews can be used as tools to get at these 'effects' without following a framework of looking for signified meanings by 'tracing the moments of dis-identification or escape, so to speak, of intensity in these accounts'. The interview can be used in this way to also draw attention to moments of disruption whereby the focus is not on what is said, but what is left out:

> "I will trace what is "not being said". For the question I am dealing with here reading affect, it is the latter that interests us most...So, in our readings of the interviews, we will not restrict ourselves to attesting the reiteration of the interpellation, nor to a focus on the performative character in which this name is enacted and embodied. Rather, we will address the moment of transgression of this name by focusing on what is not said in the text and how affect works in it" (Gutierrez Rodriguez, 2007).

Along similar lines, Walkerdine (2010) employed interviews in

order to explore affect and its relationship with trauma and 'community beingness' within post-industrial towns in south Wales. She concurrently uses the interview in a way that pays 'attention to feelings that are incongruous when examined alongside the content of an interviewee's account, or that direct the interviewer to the gaps in an interviewee's account; what is left unsaid but that is communicated through other forms of bodily knowing' (Blackman and Venn, 2010). This formulation of analysis offers a way in which interviews can be used to look at how affect tries to escape language, instead of how it becomes territorialized by language.

Ultimately these examples have provided me with a good basis from which I have designed my own investigations. In my own interview methods, described further below, I tended to focus on the effects of an affectual experience, or points where some sort of difficulty or ambiguity resulted. This, as will be seen in latter sections, involved identifying slippery terms like "atmosphere" or "aura" that pointed to the occurrence of some phenomena, but that such a phenomena escaped the participants ability to fully qualify it in language. In this respect, often times it was the "gaps" or struggles that I looked for within the interview data, where respondents had trouble

with language, or where language failed them. I chose to focus on the words that worked along the lines of what Massumi called intensive or emotional that pointed to sensual unfoldings.

Interview Methods

Based on the ontological dimensions of affect (see Part 2) and the epistemological stance elaborated above, a qualitative method of inquiry was necessary for its ability to allow for graphic designers to uncover these affectual realities of design work to rise to the surface. Quantitative methods, obviously, were seen as less favorable because they create a distance between the participants and the researcher, proving insufficient in eliciting the subjective understandings and realities constructed by the workers, but also because of the way in which I have understood affect.

I chose specifically to employ semi-structured interviews for their receptiveness to these paradigms, while also providing an interview structure that can be easily followed (Hopf, 2004: 203). The interviews I conducted were not overly predetermined in structured content, so that more freedom was given to the workers to direct and control what was focused on, and what was not. Because I wanted a reality to be

developed by the workers, not myself, being pliable and not overly prescriptive was important.

It should be noted that, while I have attempted to overcome some of the challenges posed by studying affect, particularly in respect to language, that this is in many ways new territory and is experimental. The fickleness and unsignifying aspects of affect are still undeniable and I have yet to find an easy answer for overcoming them. In this way, the best I have done is to try to point towards those frustrations, to bring them out, rather than explain what they are. My own descriptive language does not try to explain what they are saying, but, rather, that there is a dimension to design labor that in many ways escapes traditional frames of linguistic analysis, and that those aspects are important in themselves.

Sample

The final sample from my interviews consisted of 15 graphic designers, with the cities of London and Manchester being most represented (see Appendix A). The designers interviewed came from cities in the UK and the US, which obviously poses some questions regarded to validity and whether the national and cultural differences affected the data. There are ten males in the sample and 4 females, which is just slightly lower than

the proportion of women industry as a whole with statistical estimates for women around 33% of the total graphic design work force (CCS, 2010). The sample represents a wide range of ages (24-60), with the mean age being 34 years. Most participants were employed by a medium sized company (6-20 employees). The most represented type of design was digital and print design. While most of my sample was employed by design companies (ranging from small, medium to large), two participants worked solely as freelancers and two other participants supplemented their company-employed work with freelance design on the side.

Access

In assembling my sample, I employed non-probability snowball sampling (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). As an existing sampling frame of graphic designers does not exist, probability sampling was not an option. This included the process whereby I relied on my participants to refer me to another person that might be able to participate, and so on, until I gained enough participants (Vogt, 1999). In using this method, I relied on participants to provide me with contracts from their person social networks and links (Thompson, 1997). Gaining access to the sample began by identifying the potential gatekeepers of

the industry (see Berg, 2001). Following Neyland (2008), this process included gaining trust and backing from "members of the group who are particularly useful in providing access to the group being studies, who can introduce the ethnographer and aid in the ethnographer's move from location to location" (Neyland, 2008 16). I started by contacting the heads of design firms and design departments by e-mail, explaining my project and my interest in finding participants for my research project (For an example of the e-mail sent, see Appendix B). In addition to contacting companies, I also sent e-mails to various university Art and Design departments as I felt that by being a part of the broader academic community, their interest and value in my project would be more likely. Finally, as freelance work is an increasingly common form of employment within the industry, I contacted self-advertised freelance designers using the same method. In the initial e-mails sent, I mentioned that I would be following up the e-mails with a telephone call the next four days. Based on existing research, I decided that speaking with the gatekeepers over the phone after the initial contact was made would heighten the rate of response (Comer & Kelly, 1982).

The initial thrust of e-mails and telephone calls provided me

with a sample that was smaller than I had originally hoped for. My primary sampling area was meant to only include graphic designers in the greater London area, but I was forced to expand my sample area to include the rest of the UK and some participants in the US in order to recruit more participants. In addition, I also utilized alternative methods of contacting participants, including social networking websites such as Facebook and twitter. I posted interview requests on graphic design oriented Facebook pages and 'tweeted' a number of different established design firms regarding my project. After obtaining positive responses from Facebook users and getting re-tweets as far away as New York, my sample size contained 6 members who had agreed to an interview. From here, the snowball method mentioned before (See Lewis-Beck, Bryman, Futing Liao, 2004) was successful in recruiting friends and co-workers of the existing participants until I was satisfied with the quantity and quality of data.

Because my final sample was geographically dispersed, the spaces that my interviews took place in varied. Facilitating the most comfortable and natural environment for my interviewees was tantamount, so decided to let the interviewees decide for themselves the most comfortable,

quiet, public space that they would like to meet at. I ended up meeting most participants at local coffee shops; two participants were met over lunch at a cafe, one in a library, and one at a local park. Perceived safety for both the participants and myself was a great concern, which was one of the reasons why I allowed my participants to choose the location. After a location was agreed upon, I personally made sure the place was comfortable and non-secluded before interviews commenced.

Going into each interview, I used a list of pre-developed themes and ideas that I wanted to touch on, which were initially generated using existing empirical literature on the creative industries. These original themes and ideas were further developed and refined through each successive interview and the ongoing analysis of theoretical literature. Here I use Beardsworth and Keil (1992) as mentors: '[T] he open-ended, discursive nature of the interviews permitted an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought identified by earlier interviewees could be taken up and presented to later interviewees' (1992: 261–2). This process loosely resembled a grounded theory approach (Bryman and Burgess, 1994: 4), in which theorizing and data collection

arose in tandem and were in a constant, back and forth conversation. Interviews were recorded using a hand-held dictaphone in order to later transcribe and review the data.

I began each interview with an introduction to the topic of study, a conversation on informed consent, an explanation on how the data will be used, and a reiteration of the right for the participant to pull out of the research process at any time (more on this in the ethical considerations section). My first questions were what can be referred to as 'introducing questions' (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009: 135-136), through which I tried to gain a general understanding of the interviewee and their occupational background. These questions were necessary in order to contextualize the more in-depth data that was later gathered. I followed the introducing questions with more in-depth 'probing questions' based on the themes that were pre- developed by the empirical and theoretical literature, and prior interviews (2009: 135-136). The pre-made interview aide was broad and included main ideas and themes, rather than pointed questions. I developed the aide in this manner so that the interviews flowed naturally and so the interviewee was not too constrained and able to go off on necessary and useful tangents

(see Leidner, 1993: 238).

Following each interview, I started the process of transcription within hours. It was my intention to transcribe interviews quickly after speaking with participants so that any ephemeral ideas, connections, or inconsistencies that I thought of during the interview could be flagged up and noted (see Lindloff and Taylor, 2002). It was also crucial to transcribe and analyze interviews as I went along so that the apparent themes that developed could be expanded and refined in subsequent meetings. The initial transcription phase also involved a preliminary form of 'open coding', explained by Corban and Strauss as 'the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data' (1990: 96). As more data was collected, my theories, themes, and hypothesis were re- worked until I felt confident that I had gained solid and saturated thematic groupings and sturdy connections with theoretical and empirical data.

The resulting data ended up totaling 20 hours and 17 minutes of voice recording. Once the interview process and transcription was finished, I began the second step of coding and immersed myself into the data to search out further patterns and inconsistencies using a method developed by

Atkinson and Hammersley (1983). At this point, I was further relating these patterns and inconsistencies with the theoretical and empirical literature on that I have been collecting in order to find connections (Lofland, 1971). I was also finding a number of more specific, sub-themes that naturally culminated into the different sections of my empirical analysis in this Thesis.

With the considerations regarding affect, I made sure that both the interviewing process and the coding process reflected a need to understand affect. Most often, this meant reviewing segments of interviews where there was an obvious difficulty in relaying specific attributes of their process, which will be discussed further below. Also, words like aura, atmosphere, and vibe came to be signifiers for some affectual unfolding.

Ethical Considerations

The interview data for this project was gathered with a conscious regard to how I might affect the participants involved. Because my research involves uncovering the realities of work, it was evident that I needed to ensure that the data I collected did not jeopardize, or harmfully interfere with the designers' employment relations. This concern was further heightened by the recent economic downturn and high

redundancy rate in the industry, potentially increasing the vulnerability of the workers. With these concerns in mind, I developed a number of safeguards in order to anonomize the identities of the employees:

- All of the real names of those involved in the research were replaced with pseudonyms in this final write up ⬚

- Any characteristics that might identify the individual were omitted from the write up ⬚

- Any names and characteristics that might identify the company the designers worked for were omitted from the final write up ⬚

- All data collected was transcribed as fast as possible and placed in a password protected database, accessible only by me ⬚

- Once transcribed, all voice recordings were immediately deleted ⬚

This research was also conducted with adherence to the ethical stipulations laid out by both the University of Essex Business School and British Sociological Society (BSA, 2002). In

following these guidelines, all data was collected only after gaining voluntary informed consent and receiving the signed informed consent form at the beginning of each interview (to see a copy of the consent form, refer to appendix B). Along with (1) stipulating that all data I receive would be made anonymous, the form provided: (2) an introduction to the main themes of the research; (3) my personal contact information and the contact information of the school; (4) a statement that the interviews would be voice-recorded; (5) information that the participant was welcome to terminate their participation in the research at any stage of the research; and (6) an understanding that the participants could ask to see a copy of their personal transcription at any point.

The 'Means of Production' for Design Labor

It's instructive at this point, I believe, to return to the beginning of Part 1, and to examine the work of graphic design against the Marx's theory of the labor process, and the assumptions by Labor Process Theorists built out of that theory. In this section, I will examine the fundamentals of the labor process theory in order to paint a picture of where it falls short when considering design labor. I will argue that the Marx's *Capital* and the subsequent LPT does not account for how the means of

production has shifted away from strictly materials that industrial labor depended on, towards immaterial forms that have become crucial to creative labor like design. Here I will offer data from designers that suggests their production process extends beyond the traditional bounds of the labor process found in *Capital,* and includes a number of activities throughout their waking lives. Based upon the failures of the more orthodox approach to account for design labor, I will suggest that the work of autonomists offers some ways to overcome the impasses of LPT and Marx's critique.

The contemporary components of the labor process

When both Marx and Braverman wrote their analyses of the labor process, they did so with the consideration of specifically industrial forms of capitalist production. Despite this particularity, some LPT theorist insist that the merits of LPT still stand when considering more contemporary service-dominated economies. While they may in some cases acknowledge the changing role of labor process theory in the emergent service-led economy, they refute the notion that there is a new economy that breaks with industrial forms of production and deserves a rethinking of the specificity of labor or the labor process in capitalist value accumulation. As

Warhurst et al (2008) argue, "There has been a continual tendency to present service work as somehow involving a break with one or more of the feature of the capitalist labor process. Yet, for LPT in principle, these features apply equally to manufacturing or services, though they may be manifested in different ways" (98-99 cited in Bohm and Land,). In this way, LPT at once insists that the labor power and concrete labor itself is still crucial for the accumulation of wealth in contemporary arrangements of capitalism, while at the same time accepting, as Bohm and Land (2009: n.p.) put it, "the labor process and its control mechanisms are continuously reformed and adjusted". In other words, the labor process is still the exclusive mode through which value is produced, though the labor process constantly develops new means to convert labor power into concrete labor, and those modes change depending on the type of work one does.

With the assumptions of Marx's labor process and LPT as a basis, I wish to now consider the work of graphic design labor in order to evaluate the extent to which these ideas are useful in understanding certain more contemporary forms of labor, specifically graphic design labor. Over the last several years I have interviewed numerous designers and accumulated a

fairly concrete picture of their working lives. In this process, one of the questions I repeatedly asked both my participants and myself is, "what are the sorts of things that are required or helpful in order for a designer to do their job". This is a question that arose through evaluating the initial interview data from a number of designers and then considering what might be considered "the means of production" for design labor. In some ways the answers designers gave would fit quite nicely into Marx's own categorization of the means of production, and in other ways the data I have accumulated brings to light some interesting divergences. Through comparing some of the overlap and differences that design labor has with industrial production in terms of the labor process, there are a number of interesting questions and concerns raised, and it is these divergences that I feel undermine and complicate the foundations of labor process theory, though these confrontations are fruitful.

The "Tools" or "Instruments" of Design Work

As I began to ask designers about the things they rely on to do their work, they often started by identifying either hardware (material objects) or software (programs and online interfaces), both of which are crucial for the manipulation of

aesthetic content that forms the bulk of what they get payed to do. In terms of the former, many designers spoke about more traditional tools such as pencils, paper, paint, paper cutters, and general artistic materials, but they also identified various hardware and computing technologies, such as commercial grade printers, external drawing tablets that plug into their computers, cameras, camera accessories, external hard drives and memory cards. Computers are probably one of the most important tools of their trade, and most designers, though not all usually use high-powered Mac options like the IMac or Mac Pro, the later retailing for close to $4000 USD or £3000. Often the image work, especially if they also do video editing, requires higher processing speeds and upgraded video graphics cards than a standard office computer, which means additional aftermarket add-ons are preferable. Since creating images is the primary purpose of their work, a high-resolution professional monitor is sometimes preferred.

Software, too, is absolutely integral to design work, and each designer I spoke with used a multitude of different programs in order to generate and alter visual content. Examples of these programs would be Adobe packages like Adobe Creative Cloud, Adobe Creative Suite, or a la carte Adobe applications like

Photoshop and Illustrator. In addition, there is thousands of different software "plug-ins" that helps designers with very specific details of their work, which are either sold or developed by larger companies or by individual designers. Some of these plugins are free to download, while others can cost hundreds of dollars or pounds. Many designers say that the bulk of their time is spent on the computer, using these various programs (more on the work-flow and process later).

Designers often also spoke about the actual physical workspaces that they required in order doing their labor. The workspace varied depending on different designers--some workspaces included a private office, a cubicle, or shared desk provided by the design studio or company that they worked for. Many who worked freelance, however, did so in a home office dedicated to their work, or, more frequently, in spaces that overlapped with traditional domestic spaces--the kitchen, their bedroom, or living room. If freelance designers were fortunate enough, or willing to spend the extra money on an office, they tended to work in shared office spaces, which would come out of their own pocket.

The tools and spaces that designers required are what Marx would fit neatly into the aspect of the labor process he defines

as "instruments of labor", described as "a thing, or a complex of things, which the worker interposes between himself and the object of his labor and which serves as a conductor, directing his activity onto that object. He makes use of the mechanical, physical and chemical properties of some substances in order to set them to work on other substances as instruments of his power, and in accordance with his purposes" (1976/1990: 285).

Put differently, these instruments of labor are any materials which "effects an alteration in the object of labor" when directed by "man's activity" (1976/1990: 287). Also included under instruments of labor for Marx would be things like the built spaces and infrastructure that allow for work to be done. In terms of graphic design labor, then, the instruments of labor include the workspaces that are either provided by a particular design studio, but could also include, particularly for freelance designers I spoke with, the homes or leased communal workspaces that these types of designers often utilized. In design labor, this would include the workspaces that are provided by a specific studio one is employed for, or, if workers are freelancing, the privately leased out shared-workspace or homes of the individual freelancer. Thus, while

the technology has changed drastically since Marx's time, these instruments are still somewhat easily identifiable within his original rubric laid out in *Capital*. Where we begin to see divergences, however, is when we start to consider the other two aspects of the labor process--work itself, and the objects of labor.

Objects and Raw Material of Design Labor

As I outlined above, for Marx, in order to produce a particular use-value, you not only need human labor and various instruments and tools that help in that process, but you also need an actual material that the labor is done on or what I described previously as "the objects of labor". These objects are transformed, through the labor process, into a new commodity; it is this material, mixed with expanded human energy that turns into a particular good that is sold. But when one considers what Marx refers to as "objects of labor", the example of graphic design production complicates this picture. To understand why this is the case, it's helpful to consider some of the empirical data from graphic designers that problematizes the assumptions bound up with the concept.

While identifying the object of labor in industrial and agricultural forms of production is relatively easy, identifying

the object of labor for graphic design labor is a much more complicated task. Sure, material objects play a role--pen and paper are transformed through human labor into images, for example--but the main material that is transformed is cultural and aesthetic in composition. When designing a particular image, font, or illustration, designers aren't simply transforming a material object; they are more often manipulating immaterial *perceptions*. These different immaterial forms offer nuggets of creativity that are rearranged, changed, and manipulated into the production of new aesthetics. They are so primary in design work that most designers will insist that, as one designer put it, "there is really nothing new in design" (interviewee #2). Instead of an industrial laborer transforming material objects as Marx describes, designers manipulate already existing aesthetic ideas, transforming them into a new image. One interviewee explains this process, noting that in design work "none of your ideas end up being actually yours; it's more about you linking together things to create something new. Nothing is really new, it is just in some sense recycled and combined" (interviewee #7). Yet another notes "graphic designers always, whether they admit it or not, steal from others constantly. Like, 'oh, that's a good idea, I will take that and turn it upside down and

do that'" (Interviewee #5). In this way designers often spoke of the objects of design work not in terms of a specific material that they transform, but instead in terms of "inspirational idea" that is transformed through their labor process into an new aesthetic commodity. When I specifically asked one participant "what is the raw material for your work, or what is absolutely necessary for you to do your job?" they responded "for me it would be visual stimulation--I need that". In other words, the value of aesthetic inspiration eclipses material as the foundational object of their labor.

Because aesthetic inspiration formed one of the primary components to the work graphic designers did, a large portion of design work involved keeping up on aesthetic trends within their own field of graphic design, and also seeking out inspiration across multiple aesthetic fields outside of their occupation. In relation to various aesthetics, one interviewee insisted "We need to be aware of it all [aesthetic trends], because it all filters down" (Interviewee #8). Actively being aware becomes an integral part of design work because it in turn "filters down" or forms the material that will be transformed in the production process. This process of "having your radar on", as another designer put it, will sometimes

involve repeatedly seeking out other influential designer's work, or looking through design specific blogs and websites, such as itsnicethat.com, or publications like *Print*. One designer spoke, for instance, of how they approach existing design, explaining that a lot of the time they " look up what other people have done in the past, just to get an idea what people have done and think to myself how I could improve on what they have done, or I could borrow the things they have done and use them for my purposes" (Interviewee #2). Another designer told me, rather simply, that they "enjoy looking at people's graphic design and getting Ideas" (Interviewee #6).

While design specific media was a popular choice for inspirational ideas, designers often also pulled from artistic fields outside of the occupation as well. Most designers I spoke with would explicitly go out of their way in order to engage themselves and other designers in different cultural and artistic fields that could offer their work some inspirational content. One designer explains how this process has been more formalized at her work:

Interviewee #8: *So as a group, we have decided on a number of things that we can do to bring that [inspiration] in, which can be little things like all of us showing each other what books we like,*

bringing in posters, and leaflets that we have seen, or a day out to galleries. It's very easy to get caught up in the office space and not looking outside of it and everything we do is about what is going on around us and it's important that we remember that and step out and think about what is actually going on around us.

Fine art, architecture, photography, and even literature and music were all commonly cited aesthetic experiences that could form an inspirational object for designers. The examples of this are too numerous to list in total, but the few interview excerpts below are helpful in order to understand the importance of these different forms.

Interviewee #2: *I'm a graphic designer, but I like photography a lot. I get a lot of inspiration from looking at type, looking at creative portraits, nature, that kind of thing. Photography is a big part of my creativity.*

Interviewee #2: *[Art] is important because as a designer, any sort of painting, sculpture, you like to see that stuff. Even walking past, it always gives you something.*

Interviewee #3: *I love looking at architecture and photography--that also tends to inspire me. I'm a painter, so I like fine art.*

Interviewee #6: *I do love photography and painting and that sort of feeds my creative brain.*

Interviewee # 8: *Me and other creatives around me tend to have other pockets of creativity and things we like, whether it be music, theatre, drawing. If you are not aware of it, you won't be producing beautiful products, if you are not aware of what is going on around you in the bigger environment in any arts. You will find that everyone has some other interest in some kind of art and you will learn from that.*

Interviewee #10: *Like with my current project, music has been important. It can inspire you in different ways, of course. And sorta the way I usually listen to music, I get into patterns of things I'm listening to. I think that listening to different types of music can stylistically change what you're trying to do, too.*

Interviewee #1: *I can't work without [music]. Gotta have music.*

Interviewee #3: *I'm also a dancer, so I choreograph, and I perform, and I think a lot of that ties into how I design sometimes. A lot of my illustrations are rhythmic and have pattern. And I'm not necessarily like, oh, I dance, let me draw from that.... I just think it happens.*

The avenues that might offer creative material outside of

design varied so much that, when asked where they got inspiration, one designer replied "Uhh, honestly, everywhere. Like, really, everywhere and everything" (Interviewee #4). Another person offered a similar answer when asked the same question, telling me they get inspiration from "all over--It's not just graphic design" (Interviewee #6). One person noted a subway seat as offering a specific spark for one of the projects they did, while another cited an antique French fishing basket. It's important to note that design inspiration could be gathered not only contemporarily, but could also be drawn from past memories and impressions. One designer I interviewed who also taught university courses in design elaborated on the process of collecting aesthetic memories that would later be integral for a design project:

Interviewee #1: *Don't you forget, everything you have experienced since you were kids, everything you saw and how you felt--those little details you can bring forward. But also in nature, everything surrounding you. My radar is on all the time. It's gotta be. There is so much neat stuff happening that you gotta be sensitive to--color, texture, light, space; how people talk, how they move, their intonation. It's not just your present state that's important, but your past state, and those of others, it has a*

tremendous impact on what you do.

Because of this constant and unrelenting onslaught of potentially useful inspiration for design work, designers often catalogued interesting experiences or aesthetic images into a sort of design diary. These impressions would act as a reserve pool of different ideas that a designer could potentially use in the future. One designer explains this process as similar to what Andy Warhol time capsules (http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29125003), as a sort of collection of objects and notes that could invoke a particular aesthetic memory:

Interviewee #1: *Say you are Andy Warhol and I am David Bowie, or some shit. What you would do, or what Warhol would do, is after our lunch, he would take my napkin, he might take the receipt and might scribble on the back, 'lunch with Bowie', put it in the box, and then he would file it at the end of the day. Just as mementos of a sort of object-reflective-package of space and install a memory of that moment. And randomly he would go into his box one year and look through it. And so a lot of people who are designers are influenced by all sorts of stuff. I mean, for me that's really important. I could collect shit forever. I love interesting 'stuff' because, I mean, it has an intrinsic history unto*

itself.

A different designer described the process more straightforward, telling me they simply write interesting ideas down in a notebook or file them away in a computer folder:

Interviewee #10: *I am always inspired by things I see, or things that people have sitting next to me at the bar, or I'll just see on TV. I'll sort of see something and be like, 'oh, that's cool, what if I could do this, or what if I could manipulate that?'. A lot of times, I'm like, 'that's awesome, but I wish it looked like this'. So it sort of gets my brain moving around, and I'll either write it down as an idea to keep, or just let if fade. I actually keep like a collection of screenshots of different design things I like. I also always take my phone, so if I'm walking down a street and someone has a really cool sign or something and I like the typography. A lot of that stuff will stick with you, anyways. So sometimes, when you find yourself in a rut or something, you will have these sort of design elements to fall back on.*

As some of these excerpts begin to highlight, the process of gathering design inspirations that can provide a useful to the design process often happens temporally and spatially outside of what might be traditionally considered work. Inspiration can often happen anywhere or at anytime. Because of this,

designers "radars" are constantly on, and as another designer puts it "[designers] never switch off, they just switch down" (Interviewee #5). In other words, because what designers create aesthetic material dependent on new ideas or kernels of inspiration, the boundaries between work and life are almost ubiquitously understood by designers as blurred. A design project can be informed while strolling on a city street (more on the centrality of the urban environment later), or as another told me, even nursing a hangover while watching television on a day off.

It's at this point that the data suggests, in line with autonomist assumptions of the "social factory", that the labor process has in many ways escaped the traditional confines of what we consider "work", into the wider field of sociality outside of those boundaries.

As was elaborated on in Section 1, autonomists like Hardt and Negri suggest that once labor becomes immaterial, the boundaries between work and life dissolve, rendering the workday, and leisure as two realms that are increasingly hard to discern. Furthermore, as labor becomes creative and cognitive, the whole of the metropolis becomes, as Lazzarato said, a "basin of immaterial labor" open and, indeed, necessary

for immaterial laborers to do their work.

The data I have collected provides numerous examples of this dilation of working boundaries, some worth mentioning below:

Me: *What is the work schedule like for graphic designers? Do you tend to work a lot of hours?*

Interviewee #6: *That's a tough question. It depends on what your definition of work is. I mean, of course, like anyone, we clock in and clock out. But in terms of actual problem solving, we can bring a problem home with us, mentally. So, we might not have figured out how to solve something or work around a problem with design, but when we come home, maybe we're watching a show, or we're looking at something online, or reading a book and then we get a sudden spark.*

Me: *Do you ever come up with your ideas for work outside of work?*

Interviewee #3: *Yeah. I feel like it's kind of sporadic. Sometimes I get to a project at the end of the day, and I'm about to leave, and I'll go home and chill out for a bit, and then start to think about it again. Or I guess I might see something subconsciously that triggers it.*

Me: *And your creative process does that go on all the time, too?*

Interviewee # 9: *Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, always. Like, literally stuff just comes out of the blue. Like you'll just be walking down [the street], and just, like, notice something, a color, this, some weird interaction. And you would be, like, 'I could do that, maybe I could do that better, or that could lead to this'. Whatever. And you try to categorize that in your head.*

Interviewee #8: *I mean, I am always looking for things I can apply to my job. I've got a project that I'm working on and I'm thinking, that would be much nicer if we could do this--I'm always on the lookout and if I see it, I will take it in and say, 'have you seen this? We could use this for that job'. I think that's generally how good design practice works. It's very hard to sit in any place outside of work and not be thinking about something design related design related that triggers something you are working on. You are constantly thinking, 'well, that would be really good if we could use that'.*

For designers, it is ideas, colors, sounds, textures, and other aesthetic forms that largely provide the raw material for their labor, and this material is often gathered outside of what was traditionally defined as work. As I wish to show next, this

reality challenges many of the assumptions bound up with Marx's analysis of the labor process found in *Capital*, and the subsequent LPT that has emerged since.

Marx, Raw Material, Productive Consumption and the Labor Process

If, as I have argued, the raw material of graphic design is cultural, aesthetic and *immaterial* in content, rather than material, this poses a number of complications for Marx's theory of the labor process and the components that it involves. While these empirical examples complicate Marx's framework, one could say these complications are useful and point to some very interesting critiques that would not be as easily identified without Marx's contribution. First, we could say these observations complicate the idea of "productive consumption" bound up with the labor process theory. To reiterate my earlier discussion, productive consumption is when a particular object or instrument is "used up" within the labor process. Individual consumption, on the other hand, is when someone uses their own wage earned through working for different commodities used for subsistence. In graphic design labor, however, these two different versions of consumption are in many ways muddled together.

In graphic design labor, the object of labor, namely aesthetic images or experiences, are many times consumed outside what Marx and LP theorists call the labor process. Designers spoke about going to gigs, galleries, or taking a stroll on a Saturday in a neighborhood and collecting these particular raw materials. They could gain inspiration from an album or a magazine they had lying around and would then take those ideas back into work and manipulate them. Sometimes these materials were freely taken, gathered from open source websites or from experiencing the urban fabric, for instance. Other times, the workers would purchase these materials with their own money. A particular cool object that caught their eye at a flea market, for instance. The important point here is that this consumption happened outside of what Marx would consider the labor process, and sometimes required workers own money, but were, at the same time, still integral for doing good design work for a particular company or client within the confines of what would be considered the labor process. Thus, according to Marx, design work requires a consumption *is* productive, but happens in individual moments outside of what would be considered the productive space and time. In other words, this kind of consumption of materials is *productive* and *individual*. If this is the case, a significant

problem arises. The second point of contention, related to the first, has to do with how Marx and LP theorists define work compared with what designers spoke of. In Marx's assessment, the process of seeking out all of these productive kernels of aesthetic inspiration would not be considered labor, for labor is defined very specifically as confined to the direct labor process under the direct control of the capitalist. The designers, however, insisted that these processes were absolutely integral to the work that they did, part and parcel to constructing good design. I will speak about this more in the next section, but just through the interview data above it's clear that design would be virtually impossible without all the outside influence that is gathered from wider aesthetic trends. Whether they liked to or not, they were affected by certain things outside of their direct employment relations that were useful in their actual process of work. Work for designers thus leaked out of the particular spaces and times typically associated with industrial production. In other words, work increasingly happened all the time, and anywhere. Paraphrasing again what one designer said earlier, they don't turn off, they turn down.

Ultimately, these mediations between graphic design labor and

Marx's understandings of the labor process point to interesting questions that will be further elaborated on in the next sections. This helps frame a problem that I will seek to answer, both with respect to autonomist Marxism and the work of Deleuze and Guattari: how might we better understand the labor process of graphic design labor, and what other theories might help to do so?; and, how do we make sense of the raw material that designers draw from, is that a form of production, and what other theories might be useful in order to help us situate it within the wider framework of capitalist production.

The social factory for design: the city and its aesthetic productions

The metropolis is to the multitude what the factory was to the industrial working class [...]. The contemporary productive activities of the multitude [...] overflow the factory walls to permeate the entire metropolis, and in the process the qualities and potential of those activities are transformed fundamentally.

—Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth cited in Shukaitis and Figiel, 2016

When considering some of the empirical data from graphic designers introduced in the previous section, the understanding of the social factory and general intellect

provided above does seem to offer a good approach for understanding the production process of the occupation. As we previously saw, the cultural and aesthetic milieu from which design laborers draw has become crucial to the work that they do. Autonomism helps to validate these certain aesthetic experiences as a "raw material" for their labor, but also further situates that raw material within the wider labor process. The specific materials they draw upon, the certain aesthetic productions like art or architecture that they then "filter down" are understood as directly productive for design labor, instead of simply belonging to a realm of reproduction. Like autonomists, the data also suggest that the boundaries of work expands beyond what was previously the "factory walls" and includes the entirety of social relations that go on beyond in the wider "basin of immaterial labor". This too resonates with the interviews from designers. To recall what a couple interviewers spoke of in the previous section, designers never completely turn off. They often come of with many of their ideas outside of work, and use their personal time to seek out different kernels of inspiration that could be useful for their job. General cultural and artistic ideas that proliferate throughout the wider society become important within the design process and workers seek out these social productions

in both times and spaces that escape the labor process.

These lessons are particularly relevant when considering the importance of the city, and the active part the city and it's milieu plays in the production of graphic design. For designers I spoke with, the urban milieu that expands far beyond the boundaries of their labor process was an integral part of their work. The cultural life of the city provides designers an endless amount of raw material that sparked ideas for the workers. When asked what was important to doing design work, many of them often unhesitatingly told me that working and *living* in an urban context contributed to their work because, as one designer put it, "there is so much going on" (Interviewee #14). In the wider city designers are exposed to many different cultures, which many found important:

Interviewee #10: *The city, it's critical. That was probably one of the beautiful parts about working and living here, that it's right in the middle of the city. So you are exposed to everything, in terms of how the city works. It was kind of like its own petri dish.*

Interviewee #8: *Culturally, and all the diversity, that's why London is so great for that [finding raw material] You have so many different things coming in.* While it is obvious from a logistical standpoint why certain design firms congregate in

cities, designers also insisted the position within cities also offered something directly useful for their labor. As a couple other designers put it:

Interviewee #7: *You find a lot more agencies in places like London, New York, Berlin, Paris, Tokyo and not so many in places like Birmingham or Naples, Dresden. They tend to focus in on the main cities because, well, diversity. You have so many people living in such a close area that you are constantly influenced and bombarded by something new and that keeps your creativity up*

Interviewee #3: *[The city] just gives you more to draw from. Obviously, if there are a lot of people, a lot of things going on, a lot of events, then I think there's more to stimulate your brain than if you were out in the country.*

Interviewee #2: *I love the city. So I would love to get a job in New York. That's the place I want to be because there is always so much going on, there is so much inspiration you can draw from. Just walk down the street, there is so many things you can see, you know?*

For many designers the city, and the aesthetic experiences it provided, were so important that several of them suggested they would even partake in a sort of Dubordian dérive through

different neighborhoods on lunch breaks, or when outside of work in order to perhaps gain some inspirational value.

Through these excerpts we can begin to understand how the urban environment figures as a major character within the production of design work, but also how the social factory becomes productive for labor. The city here is not merely a sphere of life, separate from the sphere of work and labor, but is directly contributing to the work that designers do. It does well to illustrate how, as autonomists put it, the cultural productions that happen within the wider social factory come to directly contribute to work. It serves to supplement the notion that the production of work and the production of culture are increasingly bound together. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt in particular speak to this reality. As they note in *Commonwealth* (2009), the movement towards more immaterial or, in their words, "biopolitical" forms of production necessitates a wider mix of cultural values to draw from. In their words, biopolitical production requires "constant interaction with others, with those who are culturally and socially different..." (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 148). As they continue, "contemporary economists talk a lot about creativity, in sectors such as design, branding, specialized industries,

fashion and the culture industries, but generally neglect the fact that the creativity of biopolitical labor requires an open and dynamic [...] culture with a constant cultural flows and mixtures" (2009: 148). Like Berardi previously touched on, forms of labor like design increasingly require a constant bombardment of new, unique cultural productions from which they can pull. This reality brings Hardt and Negri to rightly uncover the wider city or "metropolis" and all its novel proliferations as the emergent raw material for forms of cultural or creative labor. The city acts as what Hardt and Negri define as a certain "commons" for many different forms of creative labor. In their conception, they refer to the city as something more broad than simply a built environment, as a living body, which produces a number of cultural flows that are necessary for labor:

> "[In] the biopolitical economy there is an increasingly intense and direct relation between the production process and the common that constitutes the city. The city, of course, is not just a built environment [...] but also a living dynamic of cultural practices, intellectual circuits, affective networks, and social institutions. These elements of the common contained in the city are [...] the

prerequisite for biopolitical production" (2009: 184).

Thus, for Hardt and Negri, the general intellect and social factory that was discussed earlier is closely tied to the city and all sorts of cultural and intellectual proliferations that are "commonly" produced within it. These productions are truly central, as the graphic design data also insinuates, to productive commodities.

Even mainstream business theorists, like Richard Florida have attempted to conceptualize the importance of the city for the production of value. In his descriptions of what he calls "creative class", a problematic category in its own right, he offers almost colonial descriptions of how different neighborhoods contribute to work. He argues, that the "street scene" of certain neighborhoods provide creative employees with the raw material that is necessary in order to have a thriving urban economy (Florida, 2005: 137). Like the empirical examples provided by designers, and many of the autonomists covered, Florida also understands that there is somewhat of a coalescence between the consumption of cultural raw material for work, and the act of producing creative goods. One cannot produce creative labor without consuming, productively, the different culture products that

the city offers. This, Florida argues, re-aligns the creative class not as a class of leisure consumption, as we might imagine the flâneurs found within Walter Benjamin's *Arcades Project* (2003), but as consumers that do so for the sake of work:

> "The members of the Creative Class are less a leisure class in Veblen's sense of the term and more an 'active class'. Their consumption is not so crudely conspicuous and they certainly do not participate in time-killing activities of any sort, for they do not have the time to kill" (Florida, 2005: 137).

Thus, for even figures like Richard Florida, the categories between production and consumption become blurred. The city itself, and all the various cultural streams circulating through it are a raw material, and the act of going out and consuming these various streams is a form of production.

There is a level of hesitation that must be acknowledged when considering the data provided on the city and its involvement that is undeniable. First of all, an overwhelming majority of designers interviewed were from urban environments. As such, the data might suggest that they are simply reflecting on their own particular experience with the city, rather than a fundamental part of design itself. In other words, there is no

telling that the town or country and their social productions cannot be equally as informative to design work as a city can be. Indeed, designers also spoke with me about how sitting in the park and absorbing its beauty can be a source of inspiration. Thus, what I want to warn against is a romantisization of the city as a form of productive activity. Secondly, it must be said that the reasons for a design firm moving to a city might in many ways trump the atmospheric prospects that it could provide workers with. Design, tends to be concentrated in urban environments for the same reasons that other occupations tend to be clustered in urban regions. There is a large pool of labor, transportation is easy, and other businesses and clients tend to also be located in those areas.

That said, I do think there is still an important lesson that these discussions on the city offer. Whether or not it is the city per se that is crucial to design work, it has become obvious through the discussions related to the city that there is a certain commonly produced element that designers are tapping into. We could very well bracket out the city in this case and say that there is some aural and intensive layer that designers draw off from the city, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it is specific to cities.

From the General Intellect to the General Affect

In Part 1, I suggested that it was Marx's Grundrisse, and the autonomist reading of it, that offered an alternative to some of the issues that arise when trying to understand cultural labor in respect to orthodox Marxist theories of the labor process. Above, I have tried to introduce how empirical data seems to reveal these weaknesses, and, begins to point towards the breakdown of traditional boundaries between work and society at large. Here I would like to expand on these ideas and introduce further data that supports the idea that society and broader societal productions, have become in a way productive for capital.

Here I will show how the data suggests there is in fact some kind of social factory or, as Lazzarato (1996) refers to it, "a basin of immaterial labor" that becomes directly productive for the work of design. Simultaneously, however, I wish to show the limits of autonomist theory in accounting for graphic design labor. First, I will introduce data that points to the more affective and indeterminate form that this social factory follows. I will point to data from design that suggests this power that designers draw from in the wider basin of

immaterial labor is more intensive rather than discernable and informational.

Secondly, I will point to data that suggests autonomists are perhaps too willing to paint the social production occurring in the social factory as equivalent to the forms of labor done within the labor process. In other words, I wish to argue that while there is a broadening of production and the social processes that contribute to the production of design, that designers still insist that there are analytical differences between the social production they rely on, and the production process in which they are charged with organizing such social productions. I will argue that graphic design labor, while requiring what might be called a general intellect, necessitates two important addendums. First, is that while certain aspects of design labor do in fact occur outside the traditional boundaries of work, in a space and time of what autonomist denote as "the social factory", there is still a distinctness that designers give to the labor process that occurs within what the Marx of Capital would refer to as the labor process. In other words, while designers require a type of production within the wider socius, that production is analytically different in a number of ways to the work they perform within the labor

process. The labor process, I will argue, still holds an integral role that is in some ways different than the labor that occurs within the social factory. This seems to undermine the idea that, as some autonomists seem to be willing to argue, that work has become somewhat autonomous to the organization of capital to the extent that Hardt and Negri (2000: 294) suggest it allows for a form of "elementary communism". Second, and related to this point, the descriptions of what could be considered the social factory for designers' points to a slightly different quality than what autonomists define. The social factory they rely on is not formed intelligible pieces of technological or cultural ideas, but is a much more intensive, unconscionable quality that requires further interpretation. This quality, I will argue in the next section, is better understood as what Deleuze and Guattari define as "affect".

Design as affective accumulation

Consider the following scenario. A graphic designer exits their flat in East London on a foggy Saturday morning in December, and begins walking towards the local coffee shop several streets away to enjoy a hot beverage. They have headphones

on, and their new favorite ambient music is playing at a steady beat. As they walk through the neighborhood, observing the people, the streets, and the light as it makes it way through the dense fog, they are left with an impression that stays with them all the way until they arrive at the coffee shop.

Once at the coffee shop, after they order a coffee and sit down, they take out their computer and start brainstorming ideas for a new project they are working on for a client at the office. Without even thinking about it, they begin doodling, at random, and are instantly affected by their walk over--the aesthetic combinations and feelings that hit them as they walked through the city streets. Perhaps it was the music that set the somewhat uncanny mood, or maybe it was the fog that shrouded everything in the distance and made them feel as though they were meandering through a 19th century industrial city. Whatever it was, the experience inspires them to start working on a design that in some way captures the sensations of that walk.

Like the light filtering through the fog that day, the aesthetic that the designer begins with is somewhat muted, but not dark. It reminds them of specific memories as a child, hiking with their mother in the Yorkshire Dales on a similarly foggy, winter

day. The designer is also reminded of an L.S. Lowry painting, that they vaguely regcall being imbued with same sort of color and impression that they just felt on their way over to the coffee shop. They then search on Google L.S. Lowry paintings and find the one they were thinking of--"A Football Match" from 1949. While looking at that picture, though, they come across an even more intriguing painting--"Oldfield Road Dwellings"--that better captures the intensity that they are going for.

The designer begins by extracting certain elements from these two paintings, the impression on the walk over, and the more distant memories of the hike as a child. They begin integrating these impressions into the image they are beginning to create, "filtering them down" as a designer earlier spoke of. They can't quite describe this process, it just comes naturally.

The scenario above typifies the initial processes of design that many graphic designers spoke of in the interview data I collected. Their work often begins by pulling from a wide range of impressions that they have experienced throughout various times and spaces in their lives. These impressions can come from any number of different happenings. As I highlighted in the previous section, they can come from a painting, music, a

film, a television show, or on the Tube as they make their way to work. The more elusive part of this extraction process begins when designers attempt to explain exactly what 'it' is that they are pulling from. The "it" value of a particular walk, or a particular painting is very difficult to relay into language, for the quality that is important is not really a defined quality at all, but rather something aural and atmospheric.

When one designer I spoke with insisted that the city was an important aspect to their design work, I responded by asking her what quality was so important about the urban environment. Her response was rather muddled. It was obviously difficult for her to express this quality, so she reverted to adjectives like the "vibe" or the "atmosphere" that the urban milieu offered. When I once again asked for her to clarify what she meant by that, she responded with the following:

Interviewee #3: *Well, as much as I'm struggling right now, I would say there are some things that are hard to put into words. Because when you talk about vibe and atmosphere, sometimes it's hard to describe the specific aspects of something that's fun, or cool...um...yeah. I don't know the answer to that question.*

Many more interviewees shared this difficulty, and almost

universally words like "vibe", "atmosphere", and "aura" were cited as crucial for design labor. A different designer referred to this quality as the "buzz" that defines an urban environment and also underlined its centrality to good design work:

Interviewee #8: *I've worked in studios in smaller cities and I think it [design] gets lost a bit. Unless you have got that buzz around you, you have got to make a big effort to surround yourself with things. If you are going to do it in anywhere outside a big city, you have to push going into big cities, seeing other things, and making that more a part of the studio.*

Aside from the city, music provided this ineffable quality, and in the case of the designer below, the preferred adjective was "mood" and "aural environment":

Interviewee #1: *I can't work without it [music]. Gotta have music. It sets the mood; it sets the atmosphere, creatively. It varies. You might start with British music from the 70s and then drift over to classical. It depends on the mood, but I have to have that aural environment.*

Objects, too, were important in many ways not simply because they offered a specific color or shape that the designers used, although that could also be the case, but because they offered

some unnamable quality that left an impression on them. For many designers it wasn't exactly the materiality of the object itself that was intriguing and inspirational, but the intensity of it. As the excerpts above illuminate, the "it" of a certain raw material was almost mystical. Indeed as the excerpt below suggests, it was "magical". When asked to elaborate on this value, one respondent told me:

Interviewee #11: *It's like when you go to a flea market and out of the corner of your eye, and I don't know what it is, there is this little toy, this old ashtray, this old book. Out of the corner of your eye, you'll just be walking and you are drawn to it. And it's just a cool fucking object. It has just some kind of a magic...magic, mystery quality to it...that parallels something else you have experienced.*

In many ways, this unnamable quality, identified but not qualifiable, finds a certain resonance with a budding stream of scholarly interest across multiple disciplines concerned with "atmospheres" and their centrality to social life (see Julmi, 2017 for a review of this literature). In particular, we have seen a number of theoretical engagements with the connection between the atmosphere and aesthetics, thanks in large part to the work of Gernot Böhme and his "new aesthetics" (1993,

2003). Böhme's work seeks to give theoretical relevance to the atmospheric dimensions of aesthetics; an association that he argues has long been around, but largely under-analyzed. In it, Bohme understands the atmosphere neither as a quality assigned with the object's particular qualities (color, for example), nor with the individual perception of the atmosphere (the internalities of the one perceiving), but rather as a thing in itself that affects the individual corporeally. Here perception is given a different attunement than what one finds in classical aesthetics, where 'making sense' of a particular atmosphere only comes after the perception as such:

"The concept of perception is liberated from its reduction to information processing, provision of data or (re) cognition of a situation. Perception includes the affective impact of the observed, the 'reality of images', corporeality. Perception is basically the manner in which one is bodily present for something or someone or one's bodily state in an environment. The primary 'object' of perception is atmospheres. What is first and immediately perceived is neither sensations nor shapes or objects or their constellations, as Gestalt psychology thought, but atmospheres, against whose background the analytic regard distinguishes such things as objects, forms, colours etc"

(Bohme, 1993: 125).

Bohme's new aesthetics arrived at here is in contrast to what he defines as the classical aesthetics. The latter he defines as an aesthetics of art concerned with judgment--whether something is beautiful or not, for instance. The dominance of such categorization, Bohme argues, has led to an over reliance on language and linguistic interpretation of art and aesthetics at the expense of the atmospheric qualities that a particular piece gives off. New aesthetics, by contrast, is interested with "aesthethesis", a concentration on the more sensual and bodily perceptions and receptions of a particular aesthetic work. As Bohme explains, "atmospheres are evidently what are experienced in bodily presence in relation to persons and things or in spaces" (Bohme, 1993: 119).

Recently, Bohme's conceptual development of the "atmosphere" has become a useful concept in discourse around work and organization. Organizational researchers like Biel-Missal and Saren (2012) find Bohme's new aesthetics useful in order to understand "how the overall atmosphere of a carefully designed marketing setting may unfold a sensual impact upon people's bodies and minds" (168). Here the notion of atmosphere has become useful in order to describe how

atmospheres are produced and cultivated in retail settings in order to produce a specific effect on a consumer. This understanding generally follows Bohme's elaboration of "aesthetic labor", which describes the work involved in the production of atmospheres (Bohme, 1993: 125). The research, too, following Bohme, allows us to understand "how atmospheres touch, invade, and permeate people's bodies, being able to subtly influence and manipulate their emotions and moods, sensual and mental states" (Biehl-Missal and Saren, 2012: 170-171).

Coming from a slightly different approach, what has become known as *affect* across multiple disciplines has given perhaps even more relevance to the empirical examples above. Like Bohme, Teresa Brennan has also spoke of an atmospheric presence that has the ability to draw out certain physiological and psychological reactions. In the beginning of her influential work, *The Transmission of Affect* (2004), she rhetorically asks in the first sentence, "[is] there anyone who has not, at least once, walked into a room and 'felt an atmosphere'" (2004: 1). Here she ties atmosphere to the "transmission of affect", whereby "the atmosphere or environment literally gets into the individual" (2004: 1).

It is here that the commons described by designers begins to be linked with what we could describe as "affect" introduced in Part 2 of this thesis. To reiterate Nigel Thrift and his discussions of affect, the kernels of inspiration designers were drawn to were affective in that they are a "force that is [...] moving" (Thrift, 2010: 293). The social factory is made of productions that are below the threshold of understanding, but which actively participate in affecting designers and inspiring their creative process. This would explain, for instance, the inability of designers to account for the value that they get from certain objects or experiences that inform their work. When designers spoke about their raw material, many of them were inclined to say that they often absorbed or were affected by different experiences that informed their work without even knowing it. As one designer remarked, "I am definitely subliminally taking in design trends". This was echoed by other designers, who told me "I think your environment definitely influences you...on a level that you can't quite comprehend" (Interviewee #2). In other words, designers are affected by specific events or haecceities, as described in Part 2, and these even impact them on a level that escapes consciousness. As another designer told me, "when I'm out, I'll see things that I'm not specifically looking for, in terms of seeking inspiration, and

I don't even consciously remember them, like specific stuff about it, but it definitely influences my creativity" (Interviewee #10). Music specifically was something that tended to inspire people on this affective level. As another interviewee commented, "It's something that's changing and it might be inspiring you subconsciously" (Interviewee #3). As I commented in section two, the city was another affective realm that moved participants in an unconscious way. As interviewee #3 commented about the relationship between her neighborhood and her work, "It's got a really creative vibe and I don't know if it's necessarily something tangible".

These further descriptions point to the relevance of affect in understanding the composition of design labor. They serve to substantiate the idea that there is a level of unfolding that happens outside of conscious thinking, and directs the production of individualities that happen within the work of graphic design. Affect helps to give ontological specificity to these occasions, without dismissing them as descriptions that lack proper linguistic evaluation. The designers were not simply speaking about the atmosphere and mood of different things because it was some sort of lazy stand in for all the particular words they could have used to express the quality

they took, but because there weren't any words to express the affects that hit them on a level prior to conscious reflection.

From affective proliferation to control

"Immaterial labor immediately involves social interaction and cooperation. In other words, the cooperative aspect of immaterial labor is not imposed or organized from the outside, as it was in previous forms of labor, but rather, cooperation is completely immanent to the laboring activity itself. This fact calls into question the old notion (common to classical Marxian political economics) by which labor power is conceived as 'variable capital,' that is, a force that is activated and made coherent only by capital, because the cooperative power of labor power (particularly immaterial labor power) afford labor the possibility of valorizing itself. Brains and bodies need others to produce value, but the others they need are not necessarily provided by capital and its capacities to orchestrate production. Today productivity, wealth, and the creation of social surpluses take the form of cooperative interactivity through linguistic communication, and affective networks. In the expansion of its own creative energies, immaterial labor thus seems to provide the potential for a kind of spontaneous elementary communism."

--Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* pp. 294

In the rather long epigraph above, Hardt and Negri make the claim that, in what they refer to as "immaterial labor", capitalist control and guidance of labor is no longer needed. According to them, immaterial labor organizes itself, outside of managerial command. Thus, it would seem to Hardt and Negri, the notion of the labor process introduced in Part One of this thesis seems to not only be unnecessary, but is in many ways seen to be a hindrance for creative inventiveness. In this section I would like to challenge this analysis brought forth by Hardt and Negri, ultimately offering what I think to be a more appropriate analysis of contemporary labor, one that acknowledges the wider productive activity that Hardt and Negri locate within the "social factory", whilst simultaneously insisting on the specificity of the labor process. To begin to situate this argument, I will first introduce some interview data from graphic designers that undermines Hardt and Negri's claim above. This data, in opposition to such claims, suggests that the work of graphic design is in many ways structured and managed. This working reality contrasts the labor process of graphic design with the sorts of aesthetic productions designers draw upon which are largely unstructured. Because of this reality, I will ultimately argue that Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of capitalism offers a better way to

contextualize the work of graphic design.

Graphic Design Labor---No Labor Process?

In Part One of this thesis, I introduced graphic design laborers and showed how much of their work is dependent upon the activities they do outside of what Marx understood as the labor process. I showed, for instance, how designers have to always have their "radar" on for novel aesthetic experiences and objects that might spark an idea for a current or future project. Designers spoke of strolling throughout the city and actively or passively seeking out creative kernels, sometimes even unconsciously absorbing them. This process was largely unsanctioned by their employer. Workers did this without oversight and organization by a manager, though one respondent did say that various firms she worked for had things like field-trip days where they would all go art museum or event centered around art as a means to fold in more inspiration.

In contrast to these very freely organized processes of design labor, which leaked outside of the working relationship into what would previously be considered their leisure time, designers I talked with spoke very differently about the actual time they spent at work. In many ways these descriptions

directly questioned some of the more popularized images of design work as all fun and games, or as Andrew Ross once mockingly called them, "jobs in candyland" (2004: 1). This is the idea that creative laborers autonomously control what they do and when they do it with little oversight from a boss. If they do answer to a boss, they are the new age manager more likely to resemble a friend, rather than the careless and domineering boss of the factory. The image painted, too, places designers in workspaces where they freely mingle together in between playing games of table tennis, or popping down to the first floor for a company provided coffee on a slide that one would likely see on a children's playground.

In some ways this image is superficially supported by my discussions with designers. A lot of them spoke about their comfortable work environments, for instance, with open floor plans and lots of natural light. Some said they had game rooms where they could take a break and play darts, and one even said their workplace had various brainstorming areas like a teepee that was set up in the middle of their large workspace where designers could retreat. While some designers obviously enjoyed this, a lot of them admitted that it was less for their enjoyment and more for the clients that came into the work. As

one designer summed it up:

Interviewee #9: *It's interesting because when you see different studios, you can see that some play up to it more than others. This sort of goes back to the idea that design studios like to be seen as being trendy. They do try to make a very creative environment for people to work in, but also to impress clients when they come in for meetings. It's sort of like practice what you preach; you have to have a creative environment so that they trust you will do good work. It's interesting because some companies do take it further than others, like, for example, you have the Googles who have their staircases as slides. It just comes down to who your client base is, really. Obviously, our clients are in suits, so our particular office is nothing outrageous, just clean white walls, models on the desks. You just sort of tailor it to who your clients are.*

Interviewee #6: *I think design studios fundamentally should support creative thinking, so you need to encourage the workers to be in a creative mindset. But, I think a lot of it is about showing off to your clients, to be honest. If you have a good-looking studio, you're obviously doing well as a company. I think perceived image is a big deal for graphic design companies.*

Thus, in a lot of ways the cool and open environment was a

sort of branding that was meant for clients, rather than the workers themselves. If the space did have an effect on workers, many suggested that it was to improve productivity. As one person told me, the studio's environment was viewed as a place that motivated them to get more work done, a process that working from home or within coffee shop didn't allow for:

Interviewee #2: *So at home I can't really get work done. It's not that it's too distracting; it's just too quiet, not enough people. I just get really tired when I'm at home. I don't really want to work; I just want to watch TV. Not in the studio, though. In the studio, it forces you to work. I mean, you take breaks here and there, walk around and talk to people because you can't work forever. As far as doing it at home, it's just harder to focus. I have a hard time focusing. I don't know why, I just do. And I feel like I focus better when I'm in the studio, when I am in this, like, creative space.*

The biggest difference between the predominant image of the creative and graphic design was in the actual work itself. In the beginning of a project, or when one is doing the work of seeking out inspiration, the work can in fact be very free. At these germinal stages, the designers tend to, as one person put it, "zone out":

Interviewee #3: *In the beginning of a project when I'm trying to figure out where I want to go with something, that's where I do the most zoning out. But when I'm drawing and getting stuff down, then I am physically involved with it.*

But after this initial stage of the design process, the freedom and ability to control their working process tends to become much more structured and defined. Once the workers are at work, they actually find themselves in a hierarchical environment where expectations are set. When I asked one veteran designer who bad been doing work in various studios for over two decades if they thought that designers had a lot of freedom in respect to management, they responded:

Interviewee # 6: *No, I think that it's pretty rare to find that. When I have found it, it has been created by the people who are doing the jobs and not management. I've always found that management is to be worked around, not worked with. They are sort of anti-life.* So despite being seen as "free" and "autonomous", the workers spoke of a certain structure of management to the design teams. One designer clarified the standard hierarchy below:

Interviewee #8: *Most agencies are broke down the same sort of way. You will have an head manager, one or several creative*

directors, and they will head up a team of designers; you will have a copywriter; a freelance resourcer who will source out photographers, anything you need that's not all the time, but you dip in and out of; you will have project directors and project managers that work below them. The design team itself will have a senior, a junior, and you will have art workers as well. Me, in a design team, my boss is the creative director, even though there is someone usually above them. It's the creative director that usually channels everything out.

Thus creative directors and managers above them tend to guide the work that designers do. Creative directors often steer the design towards a certain goal, delegate tasks to the team, and make sure everything is being done on time. Within the team itself, a certain informal hierarchy also exists, with more senior designers guiding the work of younger, more experienced once, making sure what they are doing fits with what the company wants. As another designer tells me:

Interviewee #7: *In both the small and large companies there is a certain structure. I'm working with two other designers here. They have been working at [large multinational banking company] for longer than I have, so to some degree they are my superiors. I tend to run a lot of things through them because they*

know the procedures and they know what people like. There is a
hierarchy that I have to follow in order to get things done.

As the excerpt suggest, even when management isn't explicitly telling designers what to do, there are informal structures in place. One person told me their title was a "creative art worker", which had the responsibility of working with designers and making sure they weren't doing anything too avant garde. They also served as a sort of manager structuring the labor process:

Interviewee #12*: I'm sort of what you would call a creative art worker. In many aspects that is exactly what graphic design is, but what I do is I am a bit of a problem solver and I make sure that everything prints correctly. I also work with the designer, if they are coming up with ideas that are pretty out there and could be problematic, I am the person who sits with them and says, 'well, this could cause a problem when it goes to print. Over the years, my job has evolved a bit because there isn't much print-based work and now I sit with the designer and come up with a concept and make it all sort of happen, I guess. Like me, I have been in the industry for 16 years, so I am kind of senior, and I am brought in to make the whole workflow move better. I am brought in to make it so they can produce work*

better and the whole sort of workflow works better. I am probably looked at as the old fogey of the company that can get stuff done and guide young designers as to how to do that.

Thus, in many ways, a hierarchy is still very much apparent, especially during the labor process. People are brought in with a number of titles, but their responsibility is in many ways to manage the labor process, to guide ideas, and to make sure designers are efficient and on-time with their duties.

Outside of the internal structure within the design studio or company, the relationship with the client can also structure and manage their design process. Ultimately, it is what the client wants that gets done, undermining the autonomy of the designer to control their creative input:

Interviewee #4*: think as a rule, over the years I have found, you do get very strong characters that are designers; they are very focused on what they want. However, the client will always end up winning. At the end of the day, it is what the client wants, and they have to ascribe to that because they pay the bills.*

Me: *And how do you navigate those boundaries between what the client wants and your own creativity?*

⬚Interviewee #3: *That's always a learning process. I think when*

you go to school, you have all this freedom and you can do projects exactly how you want. And then you get to the work place, and it's very client driven.

Interviewee #10: *sometimes a client says, 'hey, I want you do something like this', something different that what you typically go for, they typically want to have more control over the final output. It all depends on the client and the communication during the process. Some people just really want to give you the freedom, and want to pretty much show them when you're done; others, more typically, are like, show me three ideas, and I'll work with one, and we'll go from there and it spirals.*

In this way, even the few designers I spoke with that did freelance were in many ways managed by the client and had to manipulate their design in order to fit their preference:

Interviewee #8: *I've done freelance where, you know, your client just gets too involved and you start feeling like a puppet really.*

This relationship with the client often leads to a back and forth between the client and the designer where the designer is in constant communication and at the mercy of what the client wants to change:

Interviewee #10: *That's usually a process of either you changing*

something, or the client changing it half way through based on iterations of what you've done through the process. So, you could show one or two things, they might like it, you might like it, and that will sort of flow into what it will actually move on. If I have it my way (which I don't) I would actually like to not show [the client] anything until I have it done, because it would eliminate their choices to veer off.

The relationship with the client, and the power the client has over a designer's work can lead to a lot of frustration. As one interviewee told me, "the classic frustration with graphic design is the client or management watering down their designs. So, like, making suggestions on how to improve it, when, in actual fact, it won't improve it" (Interviewee #8).

Because of these management structures, the work of graphic design is often very repetitive. Unlike the image of the creative doing whatever they want and thinking up crazy ideas, designer's work is often much less glamorous:

Interviewee #2 *It gets repetitive sometimes. When, let's say, I'm making a book, when every page has to be the same size, it gets repetitive when you have to cut the pages. In design there is roughly three phases: you design it on the computer, you have to produce it, and then you have to document.*

The degree of autonomy, and the degree to which the work itself is much more tayloristic, often depends on the amount of experience a designer has. More often, junior designers are the 'grunts' that do a lot of the more menial tasks:

Interviewee # 6: *Well when I started, I started as a junior. So, you know, I would show up at nine and do whatever the art director tells you to do. When I started it was checking film, finding out if the pages came back in order and all the plates were there, doing layouts and fixing layouts.*

The discretion and the ability to govern their own work process also tends to vary from company to company. Some people who worked doing in-house design for larger companies had less freedom and control over the content of their work. This also seemed to depend on the type of company they worked for and who their audience was. Doing design work for a bank, was a lot less Avant garde in their content than a small design studio that did marketing campaigns for youth-centered brands, for instance:

Interviewee #9: *My work is so corporate. It's very professional, so perhaps my work is not as playful as some other graphic designers'. Let's compare it to an agency graphic designer who obviously works for a trendy marketing company who comes up*

with more funky campaigns. Perhaps they can introduce more of their personal life and experience into that.

In the latter sections, I will bring in a number of other ways and techniques that structure the design process, but for now I wish to just highlight the rigidity and hierarchical nature of the work that questions some of the claims by Hardt and Negri that the labor process of contemporary forms of immaterial labor is unstructured and free. On the contrary, the designers I spoke with worked in a structured, repetitive and highly managed environment. Though in some ways their work differed in important ways from what we would associate with a factory system, there were notable similarities. These realities made it clear that while the initial stages of design, and the work that took place outside of the labor process was largely unsanctioned by management, once they took their ideas into work there was a thorough process of clarifying what those ideas should look like and making sure they did their work in a timely fashion. This was not the image of the artist creating abstract aesthetics in the form of whatever whim or fancy they thought appropriate.

Towards a Deleuzoguattarian approach to design labor

It's at this point I would like to begin to link together the

interview data more closely with Deleuze and Guattari's discussions of capital outlined in Part 3. For me, the data suggests that neither Marx's and LPT insistence on the particularity of the labor process holds up, while also questioning the alternative that autonomists propose. For one, the data suggests that the production process of design does indeed seem to "leak" out of the temporal and special boundaries of the workplace. Designers constantly seek out affective intensities that can be useful for their work, outside of the traditional labor process. This "basin of immaterial labor" is much more affective than it is formed, representable and conscionable. However, there is an analytical difference between the production of affect that designers draw upon in the wider "social factory" and the work that they do within the labor process. It is much more structured, routinized and prescriptive. This is where Deleuze and Guattari's understanding on production can be beneficial.

Deleuze and Guattari offer an ontology of capitalist production that places affect at the base of its proliferation. Affect is absolutely crucial for capitalism because it "deterritorializes" modes of identity and subjectivity, leading to novel aesthetics that are central to the production of new commodities. Without

this affective BWO, design would, like capital itself, be entropic. It requires a sort of unorganized and uncontained outside of proliferation. The city offers novel artistic and aesthetic productions, new ways of being-- becomings and deterritorializations--that can be worked into graphic design labor.

On the other hand, capitalist value production and control depends on harnessing and directing these flows of affect, making sure that they are translated and disciplined into specific forms of subjectivity. This latter process of "reterritorialization" is a second process of production that relates to what has been defined as the labor process. This is what they define as "the two poles of capitalism" that correlate with the affective commons that produces novel ideas and aesthetics, and the labor process that acts as what they refer to as a plane of organization that reterritorializes those affects.

This is where the political and disciplinary relevance of design becomes realized. In addition to graphic design labor serving as a means to cash in on the novel affective proliferations that occur outside and somewhat autonomous of "work itself", graphic design labor and the wider cultural industries serve a secondary purpose: to ensure that those autonomous affects

don't turn into something more radical that would confront the ethos of capitalist production itself. It is also a means of prevention, an intervention into affective becomings that might lead in unpredictable ways. Viewed in this way, the notion of commodification of what Deleuze would call "minor" becomings is political just as much as it is economic. Obviously, the affective is the wellspring of creativity, so it must be allowed some autonomy for it provides the creativity that promotes the production of new aesthetic commodities, but those minor developments must also be channeled through the market, through avenues of expression like graphic design and marketing in order to ensure their predictability.

I would like to first begin by suggesting that such command and organization of the labor process serves two primary purposes in relation to the affective flows that it depends on. First, the labor process is an integral factor in converting affect into value, and second, it is fundamental for ensuring that these affects are disciplined and given a certain meaning and consistency that is commensurable with the *values* of capitalist production. In other words, the labor process of graphic design is both a economic and political interjection; it is akin to the process of reterritorialization and coding that Deleuze and

Guattari spoke of.

Once we begin to understand the contemporary labor process of graphic design as method of reterritorialization, we can then begin to ask the questions of how this is done. Like the descriptions of reterritorialization that Deleuze and Guattari discuss, and the methods of governmentality and discipline that Foucault talks about, I will argue that the labor process of design works through the conversion and organization of affect into knowable, articulable, and representative forms of creativity. This is done, ultimately, through a number of techniques that I will outline.

The Labor Process of Design

As I spoke of in the beginning of this part, the labor process of design has a number of means through which it disciplines workers. The figures in charge of this process, as already discussed, were largely the management, the creative directors, the client, and various positions that designers had to answer to. These positions of oversight made sure that the workflow got done on time, but also steered the design process, and directed what the design output would look like. In other words, they set the creative expectations for a project,

determined what the aesthetic could and would be. As such the autonomy and discretion over the output of design was largely choreographed by these various managing individuals.

The process of directing the labor process began for designers at the very beginning of every project with the "creative brief", as some designers called it. These briefs were fairly ubiquitous in design firms or companies regardless of the size. These are sets of guidelines or expectations for what the specific project will be, what the client or company wants. As one designer commented, "at the beginning of a project you will be given a brief and that will be pretty much nailed at the beginning", continuing, "you will have to answer the brief" (Interviewee #8). The designer from that point forward reverts to this brief, and all design must follow it. Typically, the designers told me that the creative director was in charge of making sure that the brief is followed throughout the designing process, "making sure that the design ticks all the boxes and answers the brief" (Interviewee #12). Thus, the brief provided the boundaries of the project, guiding the work designers did towards a specific goal set by the company. Everything the designers did responded to these guidelines and designers had to "try to find inspiration within those parameters" (Interviewee #10).

In another way, the content or specific commodity that designers were designing for often dictated the design that they produced. Obviously, designers are not just creating an image of their own personal whim or fancy, but have to cater their aesthetic and design towards the campaign their design serves. If a designer is designing for campaign for a pair of basketball shoes, for instance, the design has to fit with that concept. This also goes for the brand they are designing for. If a particular project is for a sports company, they would have to design a sort of story that fits within that. One person described how the brand dictates design in a hypothetical example of designing for Nike:

Interviewee #7: *It depends on what you are designing for. For example, Nike: When you go to the Nike website or go to the store, it's sleek, very streamlined and sporty, cool, hip; it's what you would want to be if you were fit. I mean it would have a complete different effect if it were fluffy and cuddly, and warm. You would not feel that passionate about exercise, if it were like that. So it's all about realizing what your target is and what you want them to feel when they see your design or interact with what you've created.*

Some designers I spoke with often did work in print media. In

these instances, designers would have tailor their design to the particular story or piece of print media that their design would accompany. They first have to read the text, understand the story, and then design around what that story was trying to portray. One designer spoke about designing for a GQ article for instance, telling me:

Interviewee #14: *Well, my process is that I am given a bunch of articles, or a bunch of text, so what I would do is actually read the text, um, just to get an idea of what the text is about. So, for example, you look at GQ magazine and it's mostly about fashion, men in suits, that kind of thing. So as a designer, the first thing you would do if you were designing like a magazine spread or something, you pick a font that will work with that. So for GQ you want to pick a text that is modern, sophisticated, and goes with the suit. You don't want to pick a font that has squiggly font because that's too girly, it doesn't make any sense. So those are the things we think about when we want to match the font to the overall page layout, and that includes text and images. So that's a thing that I look for when I am designing something--how this font or image that I pick out relates to the subject of the text and how will that play with the images.*

The design agencies themselves often have a specific brand or

identity that dictates the character of the work. Studios will market themselves around particular aesthetics, and that image will largely structure the type of design done. Some tend to be anchored around more youthful and playful aesthetics and branding, serving clients that are marketing for younger generations, for example. Others tend to brand themselves as providing more traditional or classic aesthetics for more mainstream corporate clients. As one designer told me, "different design studios have different mission statements, different aesthetics. Different design studios have a different groups of people" (Interviewee #2).

This brand identity of various design studios has to constantly be reworked and renegotiated to make sure that everyone understands the different aesthetic and image that their work goes for:

Interviewee #8: *we had an away day recently in the company that I'm working for and we had a chat about the whole company structure and our own company brand essence and what we were about.*

A further aspect that constrains the work designers do is their position within the production process. Sever designers spoke of their work being "at the end of the line". In other words,

designers were often at the mercy of several other types of work that needs to be finished before they can start and finish their work:

Interviewee #9: *One thing that is worth mentioning is that graphic designers are usually at the end of the chain. So for example, obviously you have the architects who have to design the buildings; the technicians who have to work out how it works. They will then pass that information onto the graphic designers who will put it into a presentation. We can only do that at the end when it's all been done, so as a result the hours can be long because you do have very strict deadlines. As a result, we usually get our work kind of late in the process and we are at the mercy of the others, really.* Interviewee #6: *Design is almost the end of the line, so you have to wait for everyone to get their stuff in. So that was frustrating and difficult to manage—to get everyone to get their stuff in.*

This reality of being "at the end of the line" reiterates how the previous content from either the higher up positions, the client, or those who are creating the commodity that designers are branding around, guides the content of the design. They are not only temporally at the mercy of others, but their aesthetic content is also at the mercy of other positions before their

labor process. Depending on whether their company, agency, or client is an architect, a shoe brand, or a banking company will greatly guide the particular design that they do.

The fact that designers are at the end of the line also brings forward another constraint: time. Almost all designers I spoke with reiterated the deadline character of their work.

Interviewee #9: *We can only do that [our work] at the end when it's [the content and brief] all been done, so as a result the hours can be long because you do have very strict deadlines. As a result, we usually get our work kind of late in the process and we are at the mercy of the others, really.*

Me: *So, you have to work extra to meet deadlines?* ⸮

Interviewee #9: *Yeah, graphic design is very much deadline driven work. It's quite rare that you will be given a brief that doesn't have a deadline. Ideally, you would like a good amount of time to make the best of the brief, but generally, the reason why people use graphic designers is because they need something done professionally, but they need it done by a certain time.*

Deadlines not only mean that designers often have to cram in long hours at the end of a project, but also that their time is highly constrained. Because they have a very limited

timeframe to complete a design, they obviously have less freedom and autonomy to put their own creative touch on whatever work they are doing. What is most important is not creating something completely authentic and creative, but making sure the design answers the brief in a timely manner.

The main point here is that once at work, in the labor process, under the direction of management, brands, clients and creative directors, there is always a "target" as the person above describes; there is always a predetermined idea, object or understanding that dictates their work. These briefs, objects, stories and brands are all determined by a company or management, and are largely outside of the creative discretion of the designer. As such, all these characteristics of design tend to undermine the predominant image of design as free and autonomous. The design process, unlike what Hardt and Negri seem to suggest, is indeed vary structured.

The Labor Process and the Organization of Affect

It is at this point that I would like to suggest that the labor process of graphic design and the particular techniques above that guided and structured the work of designers is a kind of "plane of organization" that Deleuze and Guattari speak of. The labor process of graphic design deploys various methods in

order to reterritorialize the affective BWO that design initially draws upon, both utilizing affect and disciplining according to a particular norm. This process begins, as Deleuze and Guattari tell us, with a certain kind of narrativization or representation of affect.

As Deleuze and Guattari tell us, the plane of organization (PO), is a point of stoppage for affective proliferations that come out of the BWO. It is a number of stratums or hierarchies that are set up on the BWO that control their character of actualization. In respect to design work, I would like to argue that the labor process is precisely this plane of organization that seals up affectual unfoldings and makes them compatible with capitalist production. The brief, the client, the brand ethos, and deadlines all serve to order the creative raw material that designers draw upon and structure that milieu into a dominant form.

The first way in which the labor process succeeds at ordering the affective flows it draws upon is through signification. While designers often start out with all sorts of affective experiences that they have built up over the years, the process of graphic design, under the guidance of the client, brand, and management is to turn those affects into a story. In other words, designer are inspired by numerous affective

experiences and productions from what I have called the BWO, but their job is to translate these experiences into something concrete:

Interviewee #2: *I think as a designer your job is to clearly communicate the information so that it looks good, but is also visually effective in communicating whatever that is.*

Interviewee #12: *Now I am strong with printed media, and how that affects people. I try to put the information in a very clear way, so people look at it at different points of entry, so that people can enjoy reading. The point is that you want to ease the reader, not to make it harder for them to read.*

So while designers often understood their raw material or what they drew upon as a highly affective, unconscionable and unrepresentative milieu, what they create is understood as the opposite--easily communicative and un-ambiguous. In order to translate the affective material they draw upon into this more structured form of communication, however, they first had to understand what it is the client, boss, or brand is going for; designers had to place themselves in the position of the brand identity and identify with the company. This process is what one designer associated with a kind of acting:

Interviewee #2: *I like to think of design as a little bit of acting; it's a little bit like acting. You have to kind of get into the role, you have to live it. You have to understand what it's like to be this or that, especially when you are designing for a particular company or a particular brand. That brand has a identity, so you have to kind of get in the rhythm and the role of that brand. And at the same time, you are still bringing a little piece of yourself. So you look at great actors, and it's sort of the same thing, you know, they are playing that role and they are executing that character, but at the same time you still know it's DeNiro. You know, there is still a little bit of them. And maybe that's what distinguishes good design? So maybe a great architect or designer is the same way because they are able to get into that role for the company--and this relates more specifically to brand work.*

Once the designer understood and began to identify with the brand, company, brief, or wider ethos, they could start designing in a way that confirmed that particular message. This often began with a form of storyboarding:

Interviewee #12*: Ummm, I think in the beginning, when you are given a project, you kind of have to think about the concept, like, what you are trying to go for. Like are you trying to go for this*

vintage, old west look, or this modern, utopia look.

When at this phase, what the designer is going largely has to match up with what the brand, brief, or client dictates. It must be a representation of their idea or their aesthetic. One designer described this process in respect to designing for a sportswear company where they were involved in both the architectural design and the design of the packaging to accompany the sports apparel:

Interviewee #4: *The tagline or mission statement of [the sportswear company] is 'protect this house'. So, there was this whole idea of what the house is, which we were interpreting as the body, you know, working out, work out more, buy more of the brand, haha. So we then turned that into a packaging project because we had already got the gig and were designing the store. So we came up with this theme of where the architecture of the space was inspiring the packaging, the actual aesthetic of the packaging, how the packaging works and how you interact with it. And that was the same way that you interact when you walking through the space, it was really cool. And the packaging became what we called 'bricks', and was stacked in the walls.*

In this case, the design starts with what the previous designer described as a sort of acting. They sought to try to figure out

not their own meaning of what "protect the house," meant, but what the company meant by it. They had to try to identify with what the company wanted, and then designed from there. Again, here design became a way of making a sort of story or representation around the particular brand they were working for. The brand's image and goals were what guided the project, not necessarily the ideas of the designers. The designer's ideas were helpful to the extent that they could be mobilized towards this specific goal.

Once the designers have a particular goal in mind that matches with the brief or branding they are intending to do, they look for inspiration within those confines. This is where they can draw upon their more aesthetic experiences and inspirations. Within this process, however, those aesthetic experiences get coded or are ascribed to the meaning of the company or client. A particular cool street culture that they pick up on the Tube is provided a meaning as it relates to something like a sportswear brand's idea of "protecting the house". This process of oscillating from the affective and the undefinable into the more representative and definability of branding is summed up by the designer below:

Interviewee#10: *I think there are a lot of stages to each sort of*

project you work on. So, if you were to do it sort of project by project basis, which is what I do, there is sort of like an initial brainstorming, sort of, uh, aesthetic phase, of what your looking to do in general. That's where you sort of find inspiration either from online or through other work you've done, or, if you're doing client stuff, basically asking them what they like, stylistically. You put it all together and make a sort of inspiration board, if you will, of stylistically what they're looking to do. So day-to-day your in like a specific phase, like if you are in the beginning of a project, you're putting together bits and pieces of putting together what it's hopefully going to look like. And then when you sort of go down the road of, 'yeah, this is what we're doing', then day-to-day after you're trying to stay within that. It can actually be really tough; everyday being in a certain phase of the project and making sure you're doing the right thing stylistically and trying to hit milestones.

Thus, the inspiration drawn from wherever it may be has fit within the preferences of the client. The client is the one who directs these particular inspirations into their meanings and desires.

In terms of Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault's previous analysis, I believe the labor process of graphic design can be positioned

as a form of reterritorialization and a means through which affective productions are both utilized and disciplined. While design draws upon a particular BWO or social factory of affective proliferation that is generally unorganized, once they begin the actual design process they are under the direction of management, the client, and the brand. The labor process of design is a way in which the affective aesthetics are directed. The affective atmospheres that make up the raw material of design is in many ways transformed, given direction, meaning. Designers begin by hunting out affects that are largely communally produced, or produced by certain packs or groups, but then work to translate these communal productions into a particular individual expression. This process is guided by the brand, the client, the brief, the content and the creative directors who give it an dominant *meaning*.

In this way, we can say that the production of design labor, like Deleuze's analysis of capitalism, wants "people to express themselves in a way that confirms the division of labor", to reiterate a quote from earlier. It allows for creativity as long as it fits within the parameters of a specific version of creativity that ultimately confirms the singular vision of a company or brand. The dominant meaning or expression of a company is

overlaid on the affects that the designer brings into the labor process from outside. This major or molar form that dictates design is a point of frustration for workers. To reiterate a quote from earlier, "one of the biggest frustrations is having the client muddle down your work".

Graphic design labor as an occupation requires the designer to bring in all the various affects and becomings that are necessary for them to their job. It requires new aesthetics that are largely taken from the BWO and the deterritorializing productions that various minor groups produce. Once within the design process, however, various techniques are integrated to make sure those affects are given a particular meaning that aligns with the companies' goals. As I have sought to show, this form of translation and discipline is done, as Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault tell us, through a form of representation. Designers represent the affects they draw upon through various stories that match up with the brand or client's goals or the brief at the beginning of the project. In this sense, I would argue that it is helpful to recast these techniques as a form of what Foucault would call "governance" and "discipline" which provides some "certainty" to the "fleeting impressions" that design work depends on. While, like biopower, design has

a propensity to say "yes" and to demand that designers bring in various desires and affects into the design process, the labor process acts as a sort of sorting out of various affects, of interpretation and of telling the designer what they should mean. As Foucault speaks about biopower as providing a uniform truth of sex, design labor and management seeks to provide a kind of uniformity or truth of affect.

Discussion and Conclusion: The Two-fold Character of Creative Labor

Throughout this thesis I have attempted to offer what I called in the introduction as an alternative 'topology' of production. I have attempted, through reference different theories, and to the work of design labor, to build up an understanding of capitalism that involves two-levels or poles that relate to both its proliferation and its governance, organization and discipline. The first pole, I have argued, is related to what Deleuze and Guattari call "a production of production". This is a type of productivity I have associated with affect. Affect, as I described in Part 2 and 3 is what creates new forms of being, it is what "deterritorializes" and is an intensity wrought with potentiality. I have associated affect with becoming—becoming something that is not already explicit, stable, knowable and articulable. Affect is virtual in the sense that it is already present, but is directed towards a future actuality that has not already emerged; the virtual is real, but it is not actual. The first layer of affective production I have outlined here makes up what Deleuze and Guattari call the BWO. This is the milieu of experimentation out of which all subjectivities and formations arise, not an object, or thing, or subject but that

which "direct[s] the metamorphosis of things and subjects" (ATP: 288). It is what I described in reference to Simondon in Part 2 and 3 as the "preindividual", which is a plane of existence prior to the constitution of the individual that "contains latent potentials": it is a process of becoming full of singularities instead of individualities (Simondon, 1992: 87). These singularities that animate the BwO are more of a "thisness" as I described in Part 3, which is a quality that is not describable but leaves a lasting impression or trace on those who experience it.

In terms of design labor, I have associated this level of affect with the raw material that designers draw upon. As I described in Part 1, designers spoke of their raw material in ambiguous terms—auras, atmospheres, and mystical qualities. These certain aesthetic intensities were difficult, as affects, to qualify consciously and linguistically by designers; they escaped. Designers often spoke of the initial stages of their work as involving a seeking out of different affective intensities that could be "filtered down" into their work. Designers would have to have their "radar" on at all times. They could gather this material anywhere and anytime, in spaces and places associated with what autonomist theorists have called the

social factory. The entire city and all its affective proliferations is what offer designers the raw material they engage with. Designers could be walking to get a coffee on a Sunday and be affected by a particular aesthetic intensity that would later spark an idea. In Part 3, I suggested that these spaces should be understood in relation to Deleuze and Guattari's BWO—a creative milieu out of which all creative formations emerge, but is largely unstructured and unheirarchized.

Designers sought out affective trends or aesthetics produced by informal "underground" niches that had no real structure. In other words, the affects designers drew upon were taken from what Deleuze and Guattari would call "minorities" or "bands" of people located throughout the wider social factory who ambulantly pushed forward lines of flight and deterritorializations. No person or hierarchy is in charge of the production of aesthetics that designers draw upon—they were freely and collectively produced. Chav culture, or urban culture could inform design aesthetics, but these originators of these productions often didn't have an individuality, they were innumerable, as Deleuze would say.

Qualitatively different, and in many ways opposed to this first pole of production, I have identified what Deleuze and Guattari

refer to as the production of recording. This second layer or pole is a level that is responsible for qualifying the affective flows that proliferate on the BWO into actualized value for capitalism. This process is what I have referred to in reference to Deleuze and Guattari as a plane of organization, that hierarchizes, siphons, manipulates, and stops affects. It provides affect with specific signs and qualifies affect into specific meanings. Ultimately, this second level of production directs the flows of affect that proliferate throughout the social factory, unorganized and unqualified as they are, in to capitalist structures that exploit and discipline them. This second level of production is what I have tried to associate with the labor process of graphic design. Design labor—the work done within a specified time that is remunerated— is organized in many ways. This qualification and organization begins with the brief, which stipulates what direction the affects and aesthetics designers accumulate within the broader BWO should be aimed towards. The brand ethos, or company aesthetics also directs the ideas and aesthetics. Creative directors and clients make sure designers answer the brief and are designing towards a specific end. Even the brand, object, or story that the design is accompanying can direct the design in a particular way.

As Foucault teaches us in respect to power, capitalism depends both on these sorts of unbounded proliferations, but also on forms of discipline and governance that direct these flows. Power must "say yes", not only allowing for subjective becomings but demanding them. If it were not for these deterritorializations, it would, as I quoted Foucault in the introduction, become "entropic". In reference to Deleuze and Guattari, we could say that capitalism is both schizophrenic and neurotic or paranoid. It depends on affective generations, but also must capture and define them. Capitalist production is "a power bent on generating forces, making them grow and ordering them" (Foucault: 1976/1998: 136). This "ordering" or territorializing process is necessary for two reasons. First, as Foucault relays in Discipline and Punish, discipline ultimately ensures that power can maximize the utility of the body and its affects. The body and its capacities must be mapped and then disciplined in order to ultimately "[increase] the forces of the body (in terms of economic utility) " (DP: 138). This is, I would like to suggest, the first purpose of the reterritorializing process of graphic design labor. It ensures that the affects that circulate are given a specific utility, become valuable instead of being simply virtual; that they are actualized and valorized. In this way, "the disciplinary power appears to have the function

not so much of deduction as of synthesis...as a coercive link with the apparatus of production" (DP: 153).

A different way of understanding the necessity of the second form of production, or the reterritorialization I have associated with the labor process of design is to revisit the difference between the labor power and labor proper that I discussed in the beginning of Part 1. As Marx and the labor process theorists argue, labor power is a kind of pure potentiality, but it is not labor proper. Labor power must be organized in order to properly guide its potential and activity towards a specific end. This is why the labor process is a crucial link in Marx's analysis of production, for without it, potential would remain just that. It is only "through working, the [labor power] becomes in actuality what previously he only was potentially, namely labor-power in action, a worker" (1976/1990: 283). In the words of Braverman, labor power is an "undefined quality and quantity", "infinite in potential, but in its realization it is limited..." (1998: 39). Thus, labor power is just as I have defined affect—infinite in potentiality, but undetermined and unrealized. Labor power, like affect, is a virtuality. This is why, like labor power, affect must be ordered, and defined in order to direct, and ultimately realize that potential within circuits of

capitalism. Just as Muriel Combes argues in relation to preindividuality, like the preinvidual affect "requires a transformation of the system in order to be structured, that is, to be actualized in accordance to structures" (2013: 2). This transformation is the labor process, the guidance and control over the labor process by various techniques of power such as the brief, the client relationship, and the hierarchy of power within design labor. Only through these mechanisms does affect become useful or become, as Marx would describe, a use-value. Thus, labor process of design labor can be seen as a necessary link through which capital converts the potentiality of affect that it draws upon into actualized use-values and ultimately exchange value.

In addition to this utilitarian and economic component of the second form of reterritorializing power, it also has a political component. The reterritorialization that occurs within the labor process doubles to effectively temper and deradicalize the potentiality of affects. While translating affect into use-values for capitalist production, the labor process also normalizes, subjectifies and yokes them to capitalism meanings. As I argued in respect to biopolitcs in section 2, and Deleuze and Guattari's theory in Part 3, affect is the milieu out

of which all forms of radical becoming that may be antithetical to the capitalist organization of labor also emerge. If capitalism lets the affective becomings that circulate throughout the social factory or BWO go too far, they might lead to alternative forms of subjectivity, to revolutionaries. Just as Foucault describes power as one that generates forces and causes them to grow, the disciplinary side of it "diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)" (DP: 138). Thus, the graphic design laborer, as a poacher of some of these affective becomings that radiate freely and unorganized, serves a secondary purpose as a figure that channels these affects into a structured, representable, stable, and knowable form. The designer, along with other positions within the creative economy, has become a channel through which capital funnels affectual becomings into its own body, and ascribes them with its own meanings. Thus, what I have sought to identify in this thesis is a two-fold process of production within capitalism, which the graphic design laborer startles. These two productive processes are analytically different, though both of them are productive. The first produces the generative power and potentiality that is necessary for capital's proliferation, and the second produces the forms of governance and discipline that attaches to these affects. In this way, I wish to

have offered an understanding of production that lies between both orthodox Marxist position that focuses too heavily on the labor process, and the autonomist view of production offered by Hardt and Negri. Design labor involves both unstructured productive activity, drawn from the body without organs or the social factory while also mobilizing forces of control, manipulation and hierarchy through the labor process.

Conclusion: Towards a New Understanding of Labor

I started this thesis by laying out some of the issues involved in existing appraisals of labor—specifically those tethered to both orthodox notions of the labor bound up in Marx's labor process theory, as well as more contemporary analyses associated with Italian autonomist thought. Throughout this process I have argued that a theory of cultural and creative labor is better justified by referencing Deleuze and Guattari for several reasons. First, Deleuze and Guattari's theory of affect helps to better clarify the ontological dimensions of what exactly it is that drives creativity, and the creation of commodities in capitalism. Affect, rather than simply "intellect", "culture", or "symbols", I argued, is at the basis of novel emerging forms, and without this propelling power capitalism would become

entropic. In this respect, this thesis has contributed to how we think about what makes up creativity more broadly, but also what is necessary for capitalism to function. Here I offered an alternative to a strictly symbolic field on which the social factory functions, and instead forwarded the idea that such discussions would benefit from a more in-depth consideration of affect and affectivity.

Following an introduction to affect labor, which sought to sort out both the redundancy and novelty of such a concept, I then turned to a more in-depth ontology of affect focusing on Deleuze and Guattari. This section helped to situate affect, as a force that is intricately bound up with creativity, and a dimension of unfolding that is both unconscious and non-signifying. In later parts I associated this with the move of deterritorialization and the Body Without Organs described by Deleuze and Guattari. This important gesture was instrumental in marking out affective unfoldings as different, and in many ways opposed to forms of control and manipulation that Deleuze and Guattari attribute to the "plane of organization" of capital which tirelessly attempts to both control and expropriate the body without organs for its own advantage. Here I tried to make two major points: the BWO is both crucial

for capitalism, as it furnishes it with the creative power to produce new commodities, but is simultaneously dangerous as it is also the same generative power that can produce subjectivities outside of capital. For these reasons I argued, through reference to Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault, that capitalism must at once foster forms of deterritorialization, while at the same time reigning them in and controlling them. Thus, the purposes of the plane of organization are two-fold: the plane of organization is necessary to deploy in order to extract value from the affective proliferations on the BwO, but also as a means of disciplining affects, attributing them meaning that is commensurable with capitalist ideology, and prohibiting radical affects from becoming antithetical to its own logic.

Within the context of these debates, the domain of cultural and creative labor should not be lost. What I have tried to lay out is that cultural labor functions on the boarder of these two domains of affective deterritorialization and capitalist control, acting as the nexus between the two. This is why the specificity of creative labor is so important within contemporary arrangements of capital. On the one hand, creative labor acts to draw out the affective proliferations of the BwO, seeking new

affects that are produced within what we might describe as the social factory. Creative workers like designers *need* these proliferations in order to produce cultural and aesthetic goods, and indeed capitalism in many ways encourages them to seek them out. Without these affective inputs into their design process, their work would quickly dry up. On the other hand, however, creative labor has a second role, related to the plane of organization: through its labor, affects seize to be affects and become representative markers commensurable with capitalism.

This second pole of creative labor is what I have associated with the labor process of creative labor, specifically design. While creative workers depend on affects circulating on the BwO, it is their labor process, directed by managers, briefs, clients, and ultimately the logic of capital that acts as what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the plane of organization that reterritorializes affects, makes those affects profitable, and directs their unpredictability into a prescribed usage. As such, creative labor is one of perhaps many ways that affect is converted into something manageable, articulable, and profitable.

Through laying out this dual nature of capital, particularly in respect to cultural labor, I have interjected into existing debates in a number of ways. Firstly, I have sought to counter the orthodox notion that production for capitalism begins and ends within the labor process. As I have shown, creative occupations like design labor often seeps out of the defined labor process as workers often draw upon the totality of their lives for the work they produce for profit. Every event throughout ones life can form the inspirational push for a project. In other words, the raw material for design work cannot strictly be reduced to material objects, but involves all sorts of aesthetic unfoldings that might lead a worker in different directions. These "productions of productions" to use Deleuze and Guattari's vocabulary are indeed productive, just not in the sense that Marx in *Capital* may have seen.

On the other hand, I have also offered a means through which to counter some of the prevailing literature that provides an understanding of this process. While a certain type of production does happen outside of the confines of the labor process, it is not of the same type as that which does happen within the labor process. The labor process is in many ways particular in that it is much more rigid, prescribed, and

directed than the types of production that occur outside it's confines. Each form is productive, but they are productive in different ways. And this is the problem that I have tried to lay out in relation to contemporary autonomist theories: not every form of production is the same—there is an analytical difference between two types of production in cultural labor that mirrors Deleuze and Guattari's two types of production. In other words, not everything is productive in the same way—there are affectual productions, which the labor process depends on, which are distinctly different than the form of production that the labor process takes. One form of production unleashes affects, and the other is charged with the duty of controlling them.

It is in this sense that I have offered an understanding of contemporary capitalism that goes beyond both the orthodox view of production, and the contemporary contestations of it. In a way, the theory I have laid out in reference to Deleuze and Guattari is one of 'both, and...' Both in the sense that, in a certain light, both the orthodox theory of the labor process, which seeks to underline its specificity is right, but so is the autonomists necessity to go beyond such theories, and to point to the way in which production depends on numerous

productive activities outside of what was previously defined as "work". It goes beyond this, however, in that instead of offering a stark view of production that either posits only certain activities within work as production, or the view that everything is productive, there is a *topology*, or a number of different productive forms that are important to distinguish.

Beyond the intellectual movements of Marxism and Italian autonomist Marxism, this dissertation also offers a means through which to readdress the idea of affective labor as well. For one, I have tried to offer specificity of what affect means when deployed in conjunction with terms like labor. While many who use the term 'affective labor' seem keen to, at least in some ways, yoke the term to previous discussions of emotional labor, caring labor, etc., isn't also useful to see where discussions between affect and labor can take us in different directions? It is here that I have sought a re-examination of the ontology of affect, which in tern has led me to bridge the two operative words, affect and labor, into a new direction. I have sought to make a distinction between affect as that which is tied to feelings and emotions, into a concept that denotes something much more emergent, unpredictable, and generative. In a different way, the connection between affect

and labor I have offered differs from those that have previously used it. For me, it is much more important to understand, not how labor *is* affective, but how labor is precisely non-affective; to understand how labor is in many ways anti-affective, and controls affective productions. Understanding this is only possible if one understands affect according to Deleuze and Guattari, and how affect works alongside the other terms I have discussed.

In addition to these contributions, this thesis can also be seen as a supplement to a growing body of work that has sought to engage the thought of Deleuze and Guattari with organizational studies. Figures like Bent Meier Sorensen in organizational studies have similarly incorporated Deleuzian thought in order to, as he quotes from Strati (quoted in Warren 2008: 561), engage with "knowledge that is not entirely verbal, nor entirely sayable" (Sorensen: 2013: 48). In this sense, this work resonates well with Sorensen's interventions into the relationships between Deleuze and organization, and the ways in which capital exalts its "control over individuals, connecting them to a decoded flux", such as "non-work, or the exhausting work of being available for a 'decoded' that is an arbitrary and undefined" (Sorensen, 2009: 74). In addition, this thesis does

well to contribute to the work of organizational scholars Linstead and Thanem (2007), who find in a Deleuze a way to forward a view of work and organizations that, instead of being completely closed off to change and dynamism, is predicated on its ability to conjure and harness creative divergences of "the virtual".

While I believe this thesis begins a very useful contribution to, and dialogue with, existing literature, I also understand that this is also the beginning, and that new research, theories, and historical transformations will take this writing in different directions. The importance going forward, I think, is to address to what extent the ideas I have outlined might be transformed by other empirical fields of the cultural industry, and renewed by different ideas emerging in the fields of social theory, cultural studies, and sociology. A concern here, for instance, might be with not only how designer's draw upon affects in order to produce, but how what the produce, the brand and the image surrounding the products, creates its own affects. Useful in this regard is the work of Don Norman (2002), and how the user experience created by design can influence consumers on a more affectual level.

Furthermore, while I have tended to focus here on the ways in which labor delimits and constrains affectual becomings, it would be useful going forward to seek out ways in which these affectual unfoldings are resisting capitalism, and to identify avenues for which they might be reterritorialized into a future beyond it. Is it always inevitable that affect be reterritorialized into capital, or might there be another viable configuration that it can plug into?

Appendix A: Sample E-mail to Prospective Participants

Dear _____,￼I am a PhD researcher at the University of Essex doing a research project on the experiences and realities of graphic design work. I'm E-mailing you in hopes of finding some individuals that would be willing to participate in a brief interview for this project.

The interviews will be about an hour to an hour and a half long and will consist of some basic questions about the occupation and some more specific questions on the positive and negative aspects of doing this kind of creative work. All the information gathered from the interviews will be made anonymous in the final write up and all participants will be able to withdraw from the study at any point.

This project has been approved by the University of Essex Business School ethics board and conforms to all of the institutional ethical procedures this body requires.

I will be following up this e-mail with a telephone call in the next few days to clarify any ambiguities, answer any questions, and make sure you received this e-mail. If you are interested in participating or have any additional question, please e-mail me. Participation would be a huge help to me and the furtherance of academic research into the creative industries.

Thank you so much for your time!

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