A CENTRIPETAL FORMULA FOR TURKEY: A MULTICULTURALIST PROPOSAL FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE REPUBLIC'S LONG-RUNNING KURDISH QUESTION

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Abstract

Like consociationalism and territorial pluralism, centripetalism is a multiculturalist way of managing ethno-cultural diversity. Many scholars have examined how a consociational or territorial pluralist formula might help Turkey to resolve its long-running Kurdish problem. To date, no one has paid enough attention to the merits of centripetalism by scrutinising whether they might contribute to the solution of the problem. There is a general neglect of centripetal solution in the academic literature on Turkey's Kurdish question. As an interdisciplinary study, this thesis seeks to fill the centripetal research gap in the literature. The thesis argues that neither consociationalism nor territorial pluralism might be the optimal multiculturalist approach that Turkey should embrace in resolving its Kurdish issue. The thesis comes up with an original centripetal formula for the resolution of the issue. The proposed formula is constructed on the following three cornerstones: 1) a parliamentary system which is built on a 560-member legislature elected via an original version of the Alternative Vote Plus electoral system; 2) asymmetric territorial autonomy for each Kurdish-populated province; and 3) cultural autonomy for individual Kurds residing in the Turkish-dominated provinces. According to the thesis, this centripetal formula might enable Turkey to satisfy or begin to satisfy all main Kurdish demands, the fulfilment of which is regarded by almost all segments of Kurdish society as the basic requirement for the solution of the Kurdish problem. The formula might also create a multiculturalist Turkey less likely to witness some problematic political scenarios that would happen should the Republic establish a consociational or territorial pluralist model for the solution of the problem.

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List of Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
AİH	Wise Persons Commission [*Akil İnsanlar Heyeti*]
AK Party	Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*]
AKAM	Euroasia Public Opinion Research Centre [*Avrasya Kamuoyu Araştırmaları Merkezi*]
AMS	Additional Member System
ANAP	Motherland Party [*Anavatan Partisi*]
ASSAM	Justice Defenders Strategic Studies Centre [*Adaleti Savunanlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*]
AV	Alternative Vote
AV+	Alternative Vote Plus
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BBP	Great Union Party [*Büyük Birlik Partisi*]
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party [*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*]
BİLGESAM	Wise Men Centre for Strategic Studies [*Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*]
CHP	Republican People's Party [*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*]
CIA	American Central Intelligence Agency

ÇAÇA	Framework Association for Children [*Çocuklar Aynı Çatının Altında Derneği*]
ÇİAÇ	People Demanding Justice for Children [*Çocuklar İçin Adalet Çağrıcıları*]
DAESH	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [*ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām*]
DBP	Democratic Regions Party [*Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi*]
DDKO	Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths [*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları*]
DEHAP	Democratic People's Party [*Demokratik Halk Partisi*]
DEP	Democracy Party [*Demokrasi Partisi*]
DEV-GENÇ	Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey [*Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu*]
DİSA	Diyarbakır Institute for Political and Social Research [*Diyarbakır Siyasal ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Enstitüsü*]
DP	Democrat Party [*Demokrat Parti*]
DSİP	Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party [*Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi*]
DSP	Democratic Left Party [*Demokratik Sol Parti*]
DTP	Democratic Society Party [*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*]
DYP	True Path Party [*Doğru Yol Partisi*]

ECtHR — European Court of Human Rights

EMEP — Labour Party [*Emek Partisi*]

ESP — Socialist Party of the Oppressed [*Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi*]

EU — European Union

FETÖ — Fethullah Terrorist Organisation [*Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü*]

FP — Virtue Party [*Fazilet Partisi*]

FPTP — First Past the Post

GABB — Union of the Municipalities of South-eastern Anatolia [*Güneydoğu Anadolu Belediyeler Birliği*]

GoWA — Government of Wales Act

GÖÇ-DER — Association of Social Cooperation and Culture for Migrants [*Göç Edenlerle Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği*]

GÜNSİAD — Southeast Industry and Business Association [*Güneydoğu Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*]

HADEP — People's Democracy Party [*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*]

HAK-PAR — Rights and Freedoms Party [*Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi*]

HDK — Peoples' Democratic Congress [*Halkların Demokratik Kongresi*]

HDP — Peoples' Democratic Party [*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*]

HEP — People's Labour Party [*Halkın Emek Partisi*]

HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationery Office
HPG	People's Defence Forces [*Hêzên Parastina Gel*]
HPJ	Women's Defence Forces [*Hêzên Parastina Jinê*]
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HÜDA-PAR	Free Cause Party [*Hür Dava Partisi*]
IBBS	Turkey's Nomenclature System of Territorial Units for Statistics [*Türkiye İstatistiki Bölge Birimleri Sınıflandırması Sistemi*]
ICCPR	International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
ICG	International Crisis Group
İHD	Human Rights Association [*İnsan Hakları Derneği*]
İHOP	Human Rights Joint Platform [*İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu*]
KCD	Democratic Society Congress [*Kongreya Civaka Demokratîk*]
KCK	Union of Kurdistan Communities [*Koma Civakên Kurdistan*]
KKK	Peoples' Confederation of Kurdistan [*Koma Komalên Kurdistan*]
KONDA	KONDA Research and Consultancy [*KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık*]
Kongra-Gel	Kurdistan People's Congress [*Kongra Gelê Kurdistan*]

Kurd-Der	Kurdish Democracy, Culture and Solidarity Association [*Kürt Demokrasi, Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği*]
Kurdi-Der	Kurdish Research and Development Association [*Kürt Dili Araştırma ve Geliştirme Derneği*]
LHT	Law of the Historic Territories
LNTS	League of Nations Treaty Series
LoT	Law of Turkey
LPV	Limited Preferential Vote
MEYA-DER	Cooperation and Solidarity Association of the Mesopotamian People Losing Their Relatives [*Mezopotamya Yakınlarını Kaybedenlerle Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği*]
MGH	National Outlook Movement [*Millî Görüş Hareketi*]
MHP	Nationalist Action Party [*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*]
MİT	National Intelligence Agency [*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*]
MP	Member of Parliament
Mustazaf-Der	Association of Solidarity with the Oppressed [*Mustazaflar ile Dayanışma Derneği*]
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
OHAL	State of Emergency [*Olağanüstü Hâl*]

OHCHR   Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

               Rights

OIC   Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

OSCE   Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

ÖZDEP   Freedom and Democracy Party [*Özgürlük ve Demokrasi*

               Partisi]

PÇDK   Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party [*Partî Çareserî*

               Dîmukratî Kurdistan]

PJAK   Kurdistan Free Life Party [*Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê*]

PKK   Kurdistan Workers' Party [*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*]

PP   People's Party [*Partido Popular*]

PR   Proportional Representation

PYD   Democratic Union Party [*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat*]

QSD   Syrian Democratic Forces [*Quwwāt Sūriyā al-Dīmuqrāṭīya*]

RP   Welfare Party [*Refah Partisi*]

RTÜK   Supreme Board of Radio and Television [*Radyo ve Televizyon*

               Üst Kurulu]

SAMER   Political and Social Studies Centre [*Siyasal ve Sosyal*

               Araştırmalar Merkezi]

SDP   Socialist Democracy Party [*Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi*]

SETA	Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research [*Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı*]
SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party [*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*]
SMP	Single Member Plurality System
SNP	Scottish National Party
SP	Felicity Party [*Saadet Partisi*]
STV	Single Transferable Vote
SV	Supplementary Vote
SYKP	Socialist Party of Refoundation [*Sosyalist Yeniden Kuruluş Partisi*]
TAK	Kurdistan Freedom Falcons [*Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan*]
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey [*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*]
TCE	Constitutional Court of Spain [*Tribunal Constitucional de España*]
TDK	Turkish Linguistic Institute [*Türk Dil Kurumu*]
TESEV	Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey [*Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı*]
TEV-DEM	Movement for the Democratic Society [*Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk*]

TİHV   Human Rights Foundation of Turkey [*Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı*]

TİP   Workers' Party of Turkey [*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*]

TRT   Radio and Television Corporation of Turkey [*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu*]

TSE   Supreme Court of Spain [*Tribunal Supremo de España*]

TSK   Turkish Armed Forces [*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*]

TSXG   High Court of Justice for Galicia [*Tribunal Superior de Xustiza de Galicia*]

TTK   Turkish Historical Institute [*Türk Tarih Kurumu*]

UK   United Kingdom

UKAM   International Cultural Research Centre [*Uluslararası Kültürel Araştırmalar Merkezi*]

UNTS   United Nations Treaty Series

USA   United States of America

WGC   Wales Governance Centre

YAKAY-DER   Solidarity Association of the Families Losing Their Relatives [*Yakınlarını Kaybeden Ailelerle Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği*]

YDG-H   Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement [*Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi*]

YJA-STAR   Free Women's Units [*Yekîneyên Jinên Azad ên Star*]

YÖK   Higher Education Board [*Yükseköğretim Kurulu*]

YPG   People's Protection Units [*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*]

YPJ   Women's Protection Units [*Yekîneyên Parastina Jin*]

YPS   Civil Protection Units [*Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl*]

YRK   Eastern Kurdistan Defense Units [*Yekîneyên Parastina Rojhilatê Kurdistan*]

YSP   Green Left Party [*Yeşil Sol Parti*]

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Kurdish problem is a long-running political issue of the Republic of Turkey that has two main dimensions, an identity rights dimension and its armed conflict counterpart. The identity rights dimension is the consequence of numerous assimilationist Turkification policies implemented through the cultural togetherness policy – an official policy embraced by the early republican regime, the military administrations taking up the reins of government in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and their successor governments. Because Turkey had not solved this dimension of the Kurdish question, and because it had continued to implement its repressive or coercive assimilationist policies towards its Kurdish-origin citizens, the Kurdish question produced its armed conflict dimension with the foundation of the Kurdistan Workers' Party [*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (PKK)], which is listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU).[1]

The Kurdish question has caused a very bloody and violent armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the PKK that has not only left at least 50,000 people dead, but also generated other significant humanitarian costs, including village evacuations, forced migrations, persecutions and extrajudicial killings. In

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[1] For the list of countries that label the PKK as a terrorist organisation, see http://www.mfa.gov. tr/pkk.en-.mfa.

addition, the conflict has cost the economy at least 300 to 450 billion USA dollars (Ensaroglu, 2013: 9; Yayman, 2011: 21). Even the lowest estimates would enable the Republic (i) to build 30,000 kilometres of expressways (almost fifteen times longer than the current length); (ii) to open 5 million new classrooms; (iii) to cover its last 80-year health expenses; (iv) to construct 375 new health campuses similar to the Ankara Etlik Healthcare Campus, the largest health campus in Turkey; (v) to build 75 new dams identical to the Ataturk Dam, the largest dam in Turkey; (vi) to construct 60 new railway tunnels akin to the Marmaray Tunnel, Turkey's Bosphorus sub-sea tunnel linking Europe and Asia; and (vii) to build 1500 new sports complexes the same as the Afyonkarahisar Sports Complex, the largest sports complex in Turkey. The list can easily be extended, but what I would like to underscore here is just to demonstrate how the conflict has held back development.

From the early 2000s to April 2015, the Republic made a significant number of democratic reforms in order to solve the Kurdish problem, especially through its Kurdish-specific government policies – the Kurdish Initiative [*Kürt Açılımı*] and the Resolution Process [*Çözüm Süreci*], or the Peace Process [*Barış Süreci*] – e.g. (1) the abrogation of the state of emergency in the Kurdish-populated provinces; (2) the establishment of a compensation mechanism for harm caused by terrorism or the fight against terrorism; (3) the removal of constitutional and legal bans on Kurdish broadcasting rights; (4) the foundation of TRT KURDÎ, a publicly-funded television channel broadcasting in Kurdish for twenty-four hours a day; (5) permitting private language centres, universities, municipalities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to offer Kurdish language courses; (6) allowing public secondary schools to offer elective Kurdish language courses; (7) authorising private schools to form a bilingual education system that enables both Kurdish and Turkish to be used as the

languages of instruction; (8) empowering public universities to offer Kurdish degree programs, including bachelor's, master's and doctoral degrees; (9) the abolition of the radical nationalist oath (*Andımız*); (10) the elimination of legal prohibitions on the usage of Kurdish personal and place names; (11) permitting Kurdish to be used in making political propaganda; (12) enabling this language to be used in courts and prisons; and (13) granting the Resolution Process, a government policy seeking to disarm the PKK and resolve the Kurdish problem by democratic and peaceful means, certain legal status.

These reforms have transformed the assimilationist Republic. This had recognised, protected and promoted solely Turkish identity – the identity of the dominant ethnic group (Turks) – in both public and private realms and banned the recognition, protection and promotion of all minority identities, including Kurdish identity, in both realms. Turkey is now an integrationist republic where not only Turkish but also Kurdish and other minority identities are recognised in the private domain, but only the majority identity is recognised, maintained and promoted in the public area. The reforms have not, however, resulted in a political resolution to the Kurdish question. The Dolmabahce Agreement [*Dolmabahçe Mutabakatı*], declared on 28 February 2015, had provided a ten-point roadmap for such a resolution. This Agreement was rejected by Turkish officials not long after its declaration. This refusal paved the way for the end of the Resolution Process that completely ended without reaching an ultimate political resolution following the 7 June general election, when the PKK waged a new terror campaign against Turkey. This led to a new round of armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish security forces that has continued since July 2015.

Turkey has been trying to resolve the Kurdish issue through its securitisation and socio-economic approaches since the end of the Peace Process. According to this thesis, neither approach will enable the Republic to resolve the issue. In accordance with the securitisation approach, Turkey defines the Kurdish problem not as a political question consisting of the identity rights and armed conflict dimensions, but as the PKK issue threatening its national unity and territorial integrity. By describing the Kurdish problem as the PKK issue, the securitisation approach might hinder the Republic from solving the identity rights dimension of the problem. It is true that the problem has an armed conflict dimension that might be called 'the PKK issue', but it also has a political dimension, the identity rights dimension that might be solved only with multiculturalist political arrangements recognising, preserving and promoting Kurdish identity and its characteristics in both public and private areas.

The securitisation approach might be problematic even for the solution of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish problem. The approach restricts the political arena in which the Kurds can freely voice their democratic demands. It also puts individual Kurds in an awkward position both in the Kurdish-populated provinces, where they face several economic, educational and social issues, and in the Turkish-majority provinces, where they experience some physical and verbal attacks by ultranationalist Turks. All these problems and attacks might significantly damage the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks, and accordingly dampen the Kurds' desire for coexistence. Moreover, they might radicalise ethnic Kurds, particularly Kurdish youth, who might then consider violent methods as the sole way of persuading Turkey to fulfil Kurdish demands, stimulating them to join the PKK. This radicalisation might be the main reason for a constant and dramatic increase in

the number of PKK recruits, making the resolution of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish issue via the securitisation approach very difficult.

The socio-economic, or modernisation, approach might contribute to the eventual solution of the Kurdish problem. This approach alone, however, would not allow the Republic to completely solve the problem because ethnic Kurds, whose socio-economic demands have been fulfilled, would not become new loyal citizens of Turkey supporting all Turkish-based integrationist policies. They would still ask the Republic to satisfy their multiculturalist demands that require Turkey to adopt a political settlement enabling Kurdish identity and its characteristics to be recognised, protected and promoted in both public and private areas.

While Turkey has failed to come up with an ultimate political resolution formula for its long-running Kurdish issue, a number of scholars have examined what constitutional features would be appropriate. Besikci (2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g) maintains, for instance, that the formula should allow for Kurdish independence. Many scholars – such as Duran (1998, 2008); Yavuz (1997, 1998, 2000, 2001); Yavuz and Ozcan (2006) – reject all secessionist formulas and offer a pro-Islamic integrationist formula calling for convergence on Islamic identity in Turkey's public domain. According to some others, however, any potential formula should be built on neither a separatist nor an integrationist policy, but a policy of multiculturalism enabling the recognition, protection and promotion of Kurdish identity not only in the private realm but also in its public counterpart (see Keyman, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Keyman and Ozkirimli, 2013; Kirisci and Winrow, 1997; Koker, 2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Mousseau, 2012; Oran, 2001, 2007; Ozkirimli, 2013, 2014).

A multiculturalist policy might be based on three main approaches, namely centripetalism, consociationalism and territorial pluralism. Some scholars, such as Aktas (2014); Aktoprak (2009); Baysal (2016); Kirisci and Winrow (1997); Sandikli and Kaya (2012); Yoruk (2009a, 2009b), have examined how a consociational model might help Turkey to solve its Kurdish question, while many others – e.g. Akkaya and Jongerden (2012, 2013); Aktar (2014); Arin (2015); Cicek (2011, 2012); Ersanli and Bayhan (2012); Gurer (2015a, 2015b, 2015c); Jongerden (2015, 2016); Jongerden and Akkaya (2013, 2014); Kucuk (2015); Kucuk and Ozselcuk (2015a, 2015b, 2016); Sonmez (2012); Toksoz and Gezici (2014); Uygun (2012) – have scrutinised how a territorial pluralist formula might contribute to the solution of the question. To date, no one has paid enough attention to the merits of centripetalism by studying whether they might help the Republic to solve its Kurdish problem. There is a general neglect of centripetal solution in the academic literature on Turkey's Kurdish issue.

As an interdisciplinary study, this thesis seeks to fill the academic gap by coming up with an original centripetal formula for the resolution of the Kurdish problem. According to the thesis, it might be better for the Republic to replace its current integrationist formula with a multiculturalist one in solving the problem. There are some normative and pragmatic reasons for such a shift. From a normative point of view, the present integrationist formula allows for the recognition, preservation and promotion of only Turkish identity in the public area. This renders the Republic unable to ensure true equality between ethnic Kurds and Turks. It would be better for Turkey to introduce a multiculturalist formula that recognises equality between the two ethnic groups via enabling both Turkish and Kurdish identities to be recognised, safeguarded and promoted not only in the private domain but also in its

public counterpart, ultimately empowering the Kurds to form, secure and develop their own societal culture.

The normative argument is not the only element urging the thesis to call on the Republic to replace its integrationist formula with a multiculturalist one. There are also some pragmatic reasons. Turkey is less likely to resolve its Kurdish issue through political methods that try to manage ethno-cultural diversity without constructing a multicultural arena. According to the thesis, the Republic is unlikely to resolve the issue through its current integrationist formula or the pro-Islamic version of this formula, which is backed by such prominent Turkish scholars as Burhanettin Duran, Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan. This is unable to satisfy the main Kurdish demands – e.g. the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity; the recognition of Kurdish as an official language; and the acknowledgement of Kurdish as the language of instruction that can be used in public schools and universities. The fulfilment of these demands requires Turkey to make many multicultural reforms enabling Kurdish identity and its characteristics to be recognised, preserved and promoted in both private and public areas.

These reforms are impossible to reconcile with the use of assimilation as the Republic's method of managing its ethno-cultural diversity. Any assimilationist policy obliges Turkey to prohibit the acknowledgement, maintenance and advancement of its ethno-cultural diversity in both public and private domains. An assimilationist Turkey would be unable to fulfil the main Kurdish demands that are considered by almost all sectors of Turkey's Kurdish society as the basic requirement for the solution of the Kurdish problem.

Secession is another method of managing ethno-cultural diversity without establishing a multicultural arena where not only majority but also minority identities are recognised, safeguarded and promoted in both public and private areas. This method might not be the most appropriate for solving the Kurdish problem. Although secession is advocated by Ismail Besikci – a well-known Turkish sociologist – it is rejected by most segments of Turkey's Kurdish society.

In light of all the above normative and pragmatic reasons, the thesis argues that it would be better for the Republic to try to solve its long-running political problem through a multiculturalist formula. Centripetalism, consociationalism and territorial pluralism are the three main approaches that might be used in producing a multiculturalist formula. According to the thesis, however, neither consociationalism nor territorial pluralism would be the best solution for the Kurdish problem. The Republic might generate some problems should it construct its multiculturalist formula on consociationalism or territorial pluralism.

Consociationalism might not be the optimal multiculturalist approach for the resolution of the Kurdish issue because Turkey is a country where there is some degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level. In the presence of this mass-based interethnic moderation, a consociational formula might offer political incentives to the leaders of the minority ethnic group (Kurds) to cooperate and enter into consociational power-sharing arrangements with their counterparts representing the Turks (the majority ethnic group). The same, however, cannot be said with regards to Turkish leaders, who do not have enough motives to engage in conciliatory behaviour. This will make consociational power-sharing arrangements difficult to enforce in the Republic. In the absence of such motives, multicultural reforms that have been made with the construction of the

consociational formula might not be sustainable in Turkey. There would simply not be a large enough number of intercultural citizens to support the reforms.

Territorial pluralism is supported not only by the PKK, the pro-Kurdish mainstream party, the Peoples' Democratic Party [*Halkların Demokratik Partisi* (HDP)], and its fraternal party, the Democratic Regions Party [*Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi* (DBP)], but also by such significant scholars as Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, Kubilay Arin, Cuma Cicek, Cetin Gurer, Bulent Kucuk, Ceren Ozselcuk and Joost Jongerden. This thesis argues that territorial pluralism would not be the best multiculturalist approach for Turkey. This approach requires the Republic to establish an autonomous Kurdistan in its Kurdish-dominated region. Most Turks reject such a self-government arrangement. They believe that it will result in the secession of Kurdistan from Turkey in the near future. It is unlikely for the Republic to eliminate this Turkish anxiety should it build its multiculturalist formula on territorial pluralism.

This thesis argues that Turkey can avoid secession if it embraces a centripetal model as its multiculturalist formula for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. The thesis proposes an original centripetal model that is constructed on three cornerstones: 1) a parliamentary system, built on a 560-member legislature elected via an original version of the Alternative Vote Plus (AV+) electoral system, under which 70 per cent of the total seats (392 out of 560) are elected through the Alternative Vote (AV) voting system with the Coombs rule, and the rest (168 seats, amounting to 30 per cent of the total seats) are elected through the regional vote both employing the d'Hondt divisional method and asking parties to clear a 5 per cent nation-wide electoral threshold in the district (AV) vote to obtain regional seats allocated equally to seven geographical regions of Turkey (24 seats for each region);

2) asymmetric territorial autonomy for each Kurdish-majority province; and 3) cultural autonomy for individual Kurds living in the Turkish-dominated provinces.

Consociationalism is less likely to produce secession with the adoption of my centripetal formula. The original AV+ voting system, which is incorporated into my centripetal formula to be used for the Republic's parliamentary elections, provides political incentives to stimulate both Kurdish and Turkish leaders to cooperate and enter into power-sharing arrangements with each other. Furthermore, the system might enable Turkey to foster interculturalism and increase the number of its intercultural citizens since it provides incentives for political parties to not only move towards the moderate middle but also develop interethnic conciliation and cross-ethnic cooperation through pre-electoral coalitions.

My proposed solution is also more likely to eliminate the main Turkish anxiety about the solution of the Kurdish problem. My centripetal formula does not result in a single autonomous Kurdistan, nor does it establish various Kurdish-majority autonomous units having constitutional and institutional links with each other. Instead, the formula authorises each Kurdish-occupied province to exercise asymmetric territorial autonomy in accordance with its own statute of autonomy.

My formula will create a Turkey that is less likely to witness the problematic political scenarios that would happen should the Republic construct its multiculturalist formula for the solution of the Kurdish question on consociationalism or territorial pluralism. My centripetal model might also enable Turkey to satisfy or begin to satisfy all essential Kurdish demands, the fulfilment of which is considered by almost all Kurdish tendencies as the basic requirement for the resolution of the Kurdish issue: (a) the demands for identity rights, by removing

all discriminatory ethnic biases in Turkey's constitution, primary and secondary laws; allowing for the official usage of Kurdish; adopting a pluralist educational curriculum; and permitting both public and private schools and universities to use Kurdish as the language of instruction from kindergarten level to the end of higher education; (b) the demands for political representation, by introducing a comprehensive decentralisation policy; and reducing the electoral threshold in operation for the Republic's parliamentary elections; and (c) the demands for transitional justice, by adopting a law that forms an amnesty and reintegration mechanism for PKK militants, Kurdish political prisoners and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe; and establishing an independent truth and reconciliation commission able to investigate gross human rights violations by both Turkish security forces and the PKK, bring all perpetrators of these violations to justice, and offer all victims of such violations compensation.

1.1. Research Questions

This interdisciplinary study fills the centripetal gap in the academic literature on Turkey's Kurdish problem. The main research question to answer in this thesis is: Can centripetalism help the Republic to resolve its long-running Kurdish issue? In answering this main question, the thesis also addresses several others. Chapter 2 addresses:

- What is Turkey's Kurdish question?
- Can the Republic solve the question via its current securitisation and socio-economic approaches?

Chapter 3 considers the question below:

- Why should Turkey adopt multiculturalism?

Chapter 4 moves on to address the following questions:

- How does consociationalism deal with the issue of managing ethno-cultural diversity?

- Is consociationalism the optimal approach that Turkey should embrace in forming a multiculturalist formula for the resolution of the Kurdish issue?

- How does territorial pluralism deal with managing ethno-cultural diversity?

- Is territorial pluralism the best multiculturalist approach for the solution of the Kurdish problem?

Having answered these questions in the fourth chapter, the thesis introduces an original multiculturalist centripetal formula for the solution of the Kurdish question in Chapter 5, where the following questions are considered:

- How does centripetalism manage ethno-cultural diversity?

- Which constitutional characteristics might Turkey have as a result of adopting a centripetal model?

- How can we construct such a model for Turkey?

- Are there any specific issues that we should take into consideration in the construction of the model?

- What are the basic merits of the model?

After introducing my original centripetal model in the fifth chapter, the thesis examines whether the model can fulfil the main Kurdish demands. Hence, the following question is answered in Chapter 6:

- Might the main Kurdish demands be satisfied through the centripetal model?

1.2. Aims and Objectives

This thesis aims to come up with an original centripetal formula for Turkey's Kurdish problem. In doing so, the thesis initially explores the Kurdish problem in Chapter 2. This establishes that the problem is a long-running political issue that has two main dimensions – an identity rights dimension and an armed conflict. The second chapter then explores why Turkey is unlikely to resolve this political problem through its current securitisation and socio-economic (modernisation) approaches. It examines some theoretical and practical issues that limit the ability of the two approaches to create the political and constitutional elements essential for the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

Chapter 3 explores the integrationist policy that Turkey is now using in managing its ethno-cultural diversity. This recognises Kurdish and other minority identities in the private realm, but requires all minority ethnic groups, including the Kurds, to converge on Turkish identity in the public area. Chapter 3 examines normative and pragmatic arguments that indicate that it might be better for the Republic to manage its ethno-cultural diversity through a policy of multiculturalism allowing for the recognition, protection and promotion of both majority and minority identities in the private and public domains.

Having shown that it might be better for Turkey to attempt at managing its ethno-cultural diversity through a multiculturalist policy in lieu of its current integrationist policy, Chapter 3 provides an answer by benefiting from various pragmatic arguments why neither assimilation nor secession might be the optimal political method that Turkey should use in resolving its Kurdish issue.

I argue that it would be better for the Republic to solve its Kurdish question via a policy of multiculturalism rather than by trying to manage ethno-cultural diversity without constructing a multicultural arena. Chapter 4 explains why neither consociationalism nor territorial pluralism might be the best approach that Turkey should embrace in forming a multiculturalist formula for the solution of its Kurdish question.

Chapter 5 formulates an original centripetal solution to the Kurdish problem. This chapter draws on various constitutional, sociological and theoretical arguments while also taking into account Turkey's demographic structure. Chapter 6 presents the strengths of the centripetal formula by examining how it might pave the way for the fulfilment of all main Kurdish demands. The thesis examines these demands by looking at the common desires of the following Kurdish segments: (i) ordinary Kurds, (ii) pro-Kurdish NGOs, (iii) pro-Kurdish political parties and (iv) the PKK.

1.3. Research Methods

This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach in order to come up with the most appropriate solution to Turkey's Kurdish question.[2] Interdisciplinary research draws on different disciplinary perspectives and synthesises their insights by producing a comprehensive understanding (Boix-Mansilla, 2005; Repko, 2007). It is a mode of research that integrates concepts, data, perspectives, techniques, theories and/or tools from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialised knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to resolve issues that are 'too broad or complex to be

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[2] In academic discourse, a discipline is 'any comparatively self-contained and isolated domain of human experience which possesses its own community of experts' (Nissani, 1997: 203).

dealt with adequately by a single discipline or profession' (Klein and Newell, 1997: 394).

Multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary studies are similar to their interdisciplinary counterparts. All of them can be defined as 'cross-disciplinary' studies that draw on different disciplines in order to gain a well-developed perspective (Scott and Hofmeyer, 2007: 494). It is possible to differentiate interdisciplinary studies from their multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary counterparts (Lowe and Phillipson, 2009). An interdisciplinary study 'analyses, synthesises and harmonises links between disciplines into a coordinated and coherent whole' (Choi and Pak, 2006: 351). It is 'like a melting pot such as a fondue or stew in which the ingredients are only partially distinguishable' (*ibid*: 360). A multidisciplinary study 'draws on knowledge from different disciplines but stays within their boundaries' (*ibid*: 351). It is 'like a salad bowl such as a vegetable platter or mixed salad in which the ingredients remain intact and clearly distinguishable' (*ibid*: 359-360). A transdisciplinary study 'integrates the natural, social and health sciences in a humanities context, and transcends their traditional boundaries' (*ibid*: 351). It is 'like a cake in which the ingredients are no longer distinguishable, and the final product is of a different kind from the initial ingredients' (*ibid*: 360).

The term 'interdisciplinary' was first used by the Social Science Research Council of the USA in the 1920s to describe research involving two or more professional societies (Scott and Hofmeyer, 2007). However, many academic projects published before that period involved interdisciplinarity (Ausburg, 2006). In the seventeenth century, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz sought to create a universal system of justice by drawing on knowledge from many disciplines, including

economics, management, law, philosophy and politics (Andres-Gallego, 2015). Since the early 1970s, interdisciplinarity has become a popular label ascribed to numerous research projects (Jantsch, 1980; Keestra, 2013; Rosenfield, 1992). Scholars have connected and integrated several academic schools of thought and professions in their studies aimed at solving complex problems (Fischer, Tobi and Ronteltap, 2011; Tobi and Kampen, 2017).

Turkey's Kurdish question is mainly a political issue, but like all other ethno-political problems in the world, it has legal and sociological dimensions as well (Bilgic and Akyurek, 2009). It is unlikely to find the optimal solution to the question without adopting an interdisciplinary approach that scrutinises and synthesises legal, political and sociological sources. A monodisciplinary approach drawing on sociology may enable a researcher to understand whether there is any degree of social cohesion between ethnic Kurds and Turks. This understanding may help the researcher to contribute to the resolution of the Kurdish question. But she is unlikely to offer the optimal resolution without understanding which political reforms should be undertaken in order to resolve the question, and which political approach Turkey should take in undertaking those reforms. Another monodisciplinary approach drawing on history may enable a researcher to understand the historical roots of the Kurdish question. But the researcher is unlikely to propose the best resolution to the question without understanding which minority rights should be bestowed on ethnic Kurds, and how the adoption of such rights can be justified from a normative perspective. This requires her to take an interdisciplinary approach drawing on knowledge from political science and constitutional law.

The interdisciplinary approach taken in this thesis draws on knowledge from constitutional law, political history, political sociology, empirical, normative and

comparative political science. The thesis draws on political history and constitutional law in order to understand what Turkey's Kurdish question is. It draws on knowledge from constitutional law, empirical, normative and comparative political science to explore whether Turkey should adopt a multiculturalist approach in order to manage its ethno-cultural diversity. Knowledge from political sociology, constitutional law, empirical and normative political science is utilised to explore whether consociationalism or territorial pluralism might be the best multiculturalist approach that Turkey should adopt in order to resolve its Kurdish question. The thesis draws on all legal, political and sociological perspectives and synthesises their insights in constructing its centripetal resolution to the Kurdish question.

This thesis benefits from many empirical reports published by Turkey's well-known research centres.[3] There are numerous individual studies that collect Kurdish and Turkish opinions on the solution of the Kurdish problem, including Al (2016); Bilali (2014); Bilali, Celik and Ok (2014); Celik, Bilali and Iqbal (2017); Celebi, Verkuyten and Smyrnioti (2016); Dixon and Ergin (2010); Hemmerechts, Smets and Timmerman (2017); Ocakli (2017); Sarigil (2010); Sarigil and Fazlioglu (2013, 2014); Sarigil and Karakoc (2016); Tomen (2015); Yanmis (2016). Some methodological issues encourage me not to pay too much attention to these individual studies. For instance, Hemmerechts, Smets and Timmerman (2017) collect Kurdish opinions only from one Kurdish-dominated province, Van. In addition, their sample group is delimited to the population aged between 18 and 39.

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[3] The research centres concerned are the Wise Men Centre for Strategic Studies [*Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi* (BİLGESAM)], the International Cultural Research Centre [*Uluslararası Kültürel Araştırmalar Merkezi* (UKAM)], the Justice Defenders Strategic Studies Centre [*Adaleti Savunanlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi* (ASSAM)], the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research [*Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı* (SETA)], the KONDA Research and Consultancy [*KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık* (KONDA)], the Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey [*Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı* (TESEV)] and the Political and Social Studies Centre [*Siyasal ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi* (SAMER)].

This sample is not representative because it does not involve any Kurds aged over 40 and those Kurds living in other provinces of Turkey. A very limited sample group is used by Bilali (2014) as well. Her sample group consists of merely 161 people (103 Turks and 58 Kurds) selected from four provinces (Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and Diyarbakir). Other individual studies have similar methodological issues that make their findings difficult to generalise to the whole population. This motivates me to draw on empirical reports published by the prestigious research centres based in Turkey, the ASSAM, BİLGESAM, KONDA, SAMER, SETA, TESEV and UKAM.

These research centres have published many qualitative and quantitative reports on the Kurdish question since the late 2000s.[4] Some of these reports seek to understand Kurdish and Turkish perspectives on how to resolve the question, while others examine various constitutional, legal, political and sociological matters that would play a role in the resolution of the question. All reports are accessed via the official websites of the research centres.[5] The quantitative reports use representative sample groups that reflect the characteristics of the whole population as accurate as

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[4] The scientific method of qualitative research is exploratory, inductive or bottom-up. That of quantitative research is confirmatory, deductive or top-down. The most common objective of qualitative research is to describe, explore and interpret social interactions or phenomena. That of quantitative research is to test specific hypotheses and make predictions. Qualitative research collects data via interviews, field notes and reflections, open-ended questions, participant observations, etc. Quantitative research collects data via structured and validated data collection instruments, including rating scales and closed-ended items. Qualitative research analyses data by searching for themes, patterns and holistic features. Quantitative research analyses data by identifying statistical relationships. The findings of qualitative research are generally particularistic. Those of quantitative research are generalisable. The final report of qualitative research is narrative. That of quantitative research is statistical. It is possible to combine qualitative and quantitative methods in a single research project. This makes the project a product of mixed reseach methods. For more details, see Johnson and Christensen (2008).

[5] The official websites concerned can be accessed via http://www.assam.org.tr/en/ (ASSAM), http://www.bilgesam.org/en (BİLGESAM), http://konda.com.tr/en/home/ (KONDA), http://www.ssa-mer.com/index.html (SAMER), http://www.setav.org/en/ (SETA), http://tesev.org.tr/en/ (TESEV) and http://www.ukam.org/en (UKAM).

possible.[6] This enables me to make inferences that can be generalised to the whole population.

A BİLGESAM report that was published in 2014 is one of the reports that this thesis takes into account in order to explore whether there is any degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks.[7] The sample group of the BİLGESAM survey consists of 3,612 people selected from all provinces of Turkey.[8] The age distribution of the survey participants is as follows: 32.4 per cent are between the ages of 18 and 29; 60 per cent are between the ages of 30 and 49; and 7.6 per cent are at the age of 50 and older. 41.6 per cent of the participants live in middle-income households, while the remainder live in high-income (34.6 per cent) or low-income (23.8 per cent) households (Akyurek and Koydemir, 2014: 89).

A KONDA report that was published in 2016 is one of the reports that this thesis takes into consideration in order to understand whether there are enough intercultural citizens in Turkey.[9] The sample group of the KONDA survey consists

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[6] Sample groups can be selected via random or non-random sampling methods. Selecting groups via random methods minimises bias in a representative sample because they provide every member of the population with an equal chance of being selected. There are four main random methods, simple random sampling, stratified random sampling, cluster sampling and systematic sampling. Non-random sampling methods are categorised into three main classes, convenience sampling, purposive sampling and quota sampling. The quantitative reports used in this thesis select their sample groups by random sampling methods that take into consideration various characteristics of the whole population, including socio-economic and demographic features. For more details, see the research methodology sections of each report.

[7] BİLGESAM is one of the prestigious think-tanks in Turkey. It conducts scientific research projects on regional and international affairs, as well as on domestic problems in political, sociological, economic, environmental, cultural and technological areas. The research institute provides decision-makers with policy options, proposals and practical recommendations. In recent years, the BİLGESAM has published many reports on the Kurdish issue that are available at: http://www.bilgesam.org/en/kategori/9/-raporlar/. These reports seek to understand Kurdish and Turkish perspectives on the resolution of the issue, while analysing various sociological, demographic and cultural matters that may play a role in finding a political resolution to the issue. For more details on this research centre, see its official website, http://www.bilgesam.org/en.

[8] There are 81 provinces in Turkey.

[9] KONDA is a research and consultancy company engaged with knowledge production to provide insight for the needs of academics, business leaders and policy-makers. The company collects data and makes suggestions that challenge existing prejudices and established orthodoxies in the analyses of society and politics. In recent years, the KONDA has published many reports on the Kurdish problem that are available at: http://konda.com.tr/en/reports/. Some of these reports seek to

of 2,587 people selected from 28 provinces of Turkey. The gender distribution in the survey is of 52.4 per cent male to 47.6 per cent female. The age distribution of the survey participants is as follows: 26.6 per cent are between the ages of 18 and 28; 34.6 per cent are between the ages of 29 and 43; and 38.8 per cent are at the age of 44 and older. 17 per cent of the participants are higher education graduates, while 30.4 per cent are high-school graduates. The remainder are primary school graduates (46.9 per cent), literate but not primary school graduates (1.5 per cent), or illiterate (4.2 per cent). The ethno-demographic distribution of the participants is as follows: Turks (81.7 per cent), Kurds (13 per cent), Arabs (3 per cent) and others (2.3 per cent). The overwhelming majority of the participants identify themselves as Sunni Muslims (92.2 per cent), while 5.2 per cent identify themselves as Shia Muslims. The remainder (2.6 per cent) describe themselves as having other religious/non-religious identities. Almost two-thirds of the participants live in middle-income households (65.2 per cent), while the remainder live in low-income (20.1 per cent) or high-income (14.7 per cent) households. The KONDA survey has a margin of error of plus or minus 2 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence. These terms simply mean that if the survey were conducted 100 times, the data would be within a certain number of percentage points above or below the percentage reported in 95 of the 100 surveys (KONDA, 2016: 103-107).

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understand Kurdish demands for the solution of the problem. Many others intend to examine constitutional, political and sociological matters that would play a key role in finding a resolution to the problem. For more details on the KONDA, see its official website, http://konda.com.tr/en/home/.

Table 1: Quantitative Reports Used in the Thesis

Sample Group		2009 SETA Report	2012 SAMER Report	2013 UKAM Report	2012 TESEV Report	2016 KONDA Report	2009 BİLGESAM Report	2011a BİLGESAM Report	2011b BİLGESAM Report	2011c BİLGESAM Report	2012 BİLGESAM Report	2013 BİLGESAM Report	2014 BİLGESAM Report
							Quantitative Reports						
Total Participants		10,200	755	2,985	2,699	2,587	8,607	8,607	8,607	6,810	2,922	2,570	3,612
Ethnic Identity	Turks	-	9.1%	12%		81.7%				79%	-	81.5%	77.6%
	Kurds	-	82.3%	82%	-	13%	-	-	-	17.4%		10.7%	9.1%
	Others	-	8.6%	6%		5.3%				3.6%		7.8%	13.3%
Provincial Distribution	Kurdish-majority	All provinces	11	12	4	2	10	10	10	3	All provinces	All provinces	All provinces
	Turkish-majority		0	1	25	26	9	9	9	13			
Gender Distribution	Male	-	56%	54%	-	52.4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Female		44%	46%		47.6%							
Level of Education	Higher	-	19%	16%		17%	21.2%	21.2%	21.2%	-	80.2%	-	80.1%
	High-school	-	35%	32%	-	30.4%	28.3%	28.3%	28.3%	-	16.8%	-	16.7%
	Primary or lower	-	46%	52%		52.6%	50.5%	50.5%	50.5%		3%		3.2%
Economic Status	Low income		34%			20.1%							23.8%
	Middle income	-	44%	-	-	65.2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	41.6%
	High income		22%			14.7%							34.6%
Religious Identity	Sunni Islam		95.1%			92.2%	92.9%	92.9%	92.9%	92%			
	Shia Islam	-	2.9%	-	-	5.2%	4.2%	4.2%	4.2%	6.3%			
	Others		2%			2.6%	2.9%	2.9%	2.9%	1.7%			

A TESEV report that was published in 2012 is one of the reports that this thesis uses in order to understand the main Kurdish demands and Turkish anxieties.[10] The sample group of the TESEV survey consists of 2,699 people selected from 29 provinces of Turkey. The survey has a margin of error of plus or minus 2.6 per cent at a 99 per cent level of confidence. The political positions of the participants are as follows: leftists (12.8 per cent), centre-leftists (4.2 per cent), centrists (15.7 per cent), centre-rightists (4.7 per cent), rightists (25.5 per cent) and others with no political positions (37.1 per cent). The ideological positions of the participants are as follows: Kemalists (28.2 per cent), Islamists (18.9 per cent), conservatives (15.6 per cent), nationalists (15.1 per cent), democrats (7.2 per cent), social democrats (5.6 per cent), idealists (4.7 per cent), socialists (2.1 per cent) and others (2.6 per cent) (TESEV, 2012: 102-103).

Qualitative reports utilised in the thesis are as representative as their quantitative counterparts. A BİLGESAM report that was published in 2012 is one of the qualitative reports that this thesis uses in order to understand Kurdish and Turkish opinions on the resolution of the Kurdish question. The report collects data by conducting semi-structured interviews with 192 people from 25 provinces of Turkey. 13 of the provinces are Turkish-dominated, and the rest are Kurdish-occupied. 124 of the interviewees are ethnic Kurds, and the remainder are ethnic Turks. 179 of the interviewees are Sunni Muslims, while 13 of them are Shia Muslims. Most of the interviewees are higher education graduates (110). 45 of them are high-school graduates, and the remainder are primary school graduates (27) and those who are

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[10] TESEV, one of the prestigious think-tanks in Turkey, conducts scientific research projects that offer solutions to domestic societal issues by providing evidence-based policy recommendations. In recent years, the think-tank has published numerous reports on the Kurdish issue that are available at: http://tesev.org.tr/en/reports/. Many of these reports are aimed at understanding what demands ethnic Kurds ask for the resolution of the issue. The others intend to analyse several constitutional, political, legal and sociological matters that would affect the resolution of the issue. For more details on the TESEV, see its official website, http://tesev.org.tr/en/.

literate but not primary school graduates (10). 36 of the interviewees are merchants, 26 public servants, 24 religious officials, 18 industrialists, 18 intellectuals (e.g. lawyers and journalists), 16 academics and teachers, 13 artisans, 11 representatives of civil society organisations, 10 high-level politicians (mayors, members of parliament and provincial heads of political parties), 6 tribal chiefs, 5 military veterans, 5 farmers, 2 workers and 2 unemployed citizens. Other qualitative reports that this thesis utilises, including the 2015 ASSAM Report, and the 2008 and 2011 TESEV Reports, are similarly representative (see ASSAM, 2015: 36-44; Ensaroglu and Kurban, 2011: 8-10; Kurban and Yolacan, 2008: 13).

In order to understand Turkey's Kurdish problem, Chapter 2 looks at the status of ethnic Kurds in the Ottoman Empire. It examines the Empire's minority rights regime, the *millet* system. It then examines how this status changed with the establishment of the Turkish Republic by analysing books, journal articles, reports, as well as the Republic's official sources, including constitutions, parliamentary documents, statutes, decrees and regulations. Books, journal articles and reports are accessed via Essex University's Library, Google Scholar or online academic platforms, including ResearchGate and Academia. The official documents are accessed via the official gazette of the Turkish Republic.[11] These materials are studied to understand not only the assimilationist attitudes of the military regimes towards ethnic Kurds, but also the integrationist attitudes of the modern Republic toward its Kurdish minority. Chapter 2 uses similar materials, as well as some theoretical and practical works written by such prominent scholars as Ted Robert Gurr, Henry Hale, Donald Horowitz and John Wood, to scrutinise political and constitutional dynamics of various ethno-nationalist movements around the globe

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[11] The official gazette is available at: http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/default.aspx.

and to explain why it is difficult for Turkey to solve the Kurdish question through its current securitisation and socio-economic (modernisation) approaches.

Chapter 3 argues that there are normative and pragmatic reasons for replacing Turkey's integrationist policy, under which its ethno-cultural diversity is recognised only in the private realm, with a policy of multiculturalism enabling the Republic to recognise, secure and promote its ethno-cultural diversity in both public and private domains. In order to understand the difference between the integrationist and multiculturalist methods of managing ethno-cultural diversity, the chapter examines journal articles, (edited) books and conference papers by such prominent political scientists as Seyla Benhabib, Will Kymlicka, John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary and Charles Taylor.

Chapter 3 then examines some normative and pragmatic arguments to explain why it might be better for the Republic to try to resolve its Kurdish issue by a multiculturalist rather than the current integrationist strategy. The chapter examines various theoretical and practical studies that suggest that states fail to ensure true equality between their majority and minority ethnic groups when they try to manage their ethno-cultural diversity through the political methods other than multiculturalist ones. The chapter draws on normative theories constructed on the principles of equality and fairness, especially Will Kymlicka's liberal normative theory of minority rights.

Chapter 3 contains an analysis of the constitutional systems of three European countries – Finland, Spain and the United Kingdom – to indicate how some democratic states ensure equality between their majority and minority ethnic groups by means of their multiculturalist constitutional systems that empower both majority

ethnic groups and national minorities to establish, maintain and develop their own societal cultures. This shows that Turkey will not be the first country authorising its national minority (Kurds) to form, secure and advance its own societal culture. This chapter examines not only general academic works paying attention to the constitutional systems of these countries but also the constitutional and legal materials on which the systems have been constructed.

After presenting the normative argument, the third chapter provides many pragmatic reasons for dealing with Turkey's Kurdish issue through a multiculturalist formula and compares this with systems that try to manage ethno-cultural diversity without establishing a multicultural arena, namely assimilation, integration and secession. The pragmatic argument rests on the perspectives of Turkey's Kurdish society on how the Republic could resolve its long-running political issue. The argument is developed by considering the desires of that society. The Kurds expect the Republic to come up with a multiculturalist formula.

In order to understand such perspectives, the chapter pays attention to not only the standpoints of ordinary Kurds, but also those of pro-Kurdish political parties – the HDP, DBP, the Rights and Freedoms Party [*Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi* (HAK-PAR)] and the Free Cause Party [*Hür Dava Partisi* (HÜDA-PAR)] – and the PKK. The chapter does not restrict its scope to the viewpoints of ordinary Kurds because this would weaken the argument that most segments of Kurdish society are in favour of a multiculturalist formula. The chapter listens to a range of perspectives to strengthen the pro-multiculturalist argument.

Chapter 3 benefits from various ASSAM, BİLGESAM and UKAM reports in order to comprehend the perspectives of ordinary Kurds.[12] The chapter uses these reports not only because they are recent reports published by the prestigious research centres, but also because they are comprehensive academic reports collecting Kurdish opinions from all regions, not merely from the Kurdish-occupied regions or their Turkish-populated counterparts. Individual reports of the Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the Wise Persons Commission [*Akil İnsanlar Heyeti* (AİH)] are also taken into account. The AİH is a 63-member independent commission established by the Turkish Government in April 2013 with the following tasks: (i) understanding both Turkish and Kurdish perspectives on the resolution of the Kurdish issue; (ii) generating support for the Peace Process; and (iii) creating a public space where issues can be debated. The AİH was divided into seven committees corresponding to Turkey's geographical regions. It began work in April 2013. In summer 2013, all committees prepared their individual reports following a significant number of meetings with NGOs and invited contributions from ordinary citizens, irrespective of their sociological, political and religious backgrounds. As the reports of the Eastern and South-eastern Committees involve some sections in which ordinary Kurds express their ideas on how to resolve Turkey's long-running political issue, Chapter 3 benefits from these two reports as well.[13]

In order to discern the standpoints of the political parties, the third chapter examines general programmes, party constitutions, and electoral manifestos of four

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[12] ASSAM is a prestigious research institute based in Istanbul. It conducts research projects on domestic, regional and international affairs with a particular interest in Islamic nations and countries. In recent years, the ASSAM has published several reports on the Kurdish problem. Some of the reports try to understand Kurdish and Turkish perspectives on the solution of the problem, whilst many others intend to study a significant number of constitutional, sociological and legal matters that would have an impact on the solution of the problem. For more details on this think-tank, see its official website, http://www.assam.org.tr/en/.

[13] For more details on the AİH, see Democratic Process Institute (2013); UKAM (2014).

pro-Kurdish parties – the HDP, DBP, HAK-PAR and HÜDA-PAR – together with some special reports on the Kurdish problem, prepared by these parties. All materials of these parties are accessed via their official websites.[14] There are some minor left-wing, particularly socialist, parties in Turkey that sometimes take a pro-Kurdish stance, including the Green Left Party [*Yeşil Sol Parti* (YSP)], the Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party [*Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi* (DSİP)], the Socialist Democracy Party [*Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi* (SDP)], the Socialist Party of Refoundation [*Sosyalist Yeniden Kuruluş Partisi* (SYKP)], the Labour Party [*Emek Partisi* (EMEP)] and the Socialist Party of the Oppressed [*Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi* (ESP)]. All these minor parties are in line with the HDP and DBP, which are the main political representatives of the Peoples' Democratic Congress [*Halkların Demokratik Kongresi* (HDK)], a leftist platform made up of various left-wing groups and parties, including the HDP, DBP, YSP, DSİP, SDP, SYKP, EMEP and ESP.[15] Accordingly, this chapter does not examine these minor left-wing parties. The chapter also examines other pro-Kurdish parties, the centre-left HAK-PAR and the far-right Islamist HÜDA-PAR, because these parties take a pro-Kurdish stance different from those of the HDK.

Finally, the third chapter examines the perspectives of the PKK on how Turkey can solve its long-running political problem. This armed organisation represents another important sector of Kurdish society. This chapter draws on recent academic sources – journal articles, (edited) books, conference papers and reports – written by many scholars who conduct scientific research projects on the PKK, mainly Ahmet

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[14] The official websites concerned are available at: http://www.hdp.org.tr/ (HDP); http://www.dbp.org.tr/ (DBP); http://www.hakpar.org.tr/ (HAK-PAR); and http://hudapar.org/ (HÜDA-PAR).
[15] For more details on the HDK, see its official website, http://halklarindemokratikkongresi.net/.

Hamdi Akkaya, Cengiz Gunes, Cetin Gurer, Michael Gunter, Joost Jongerden and Paul White.

Chapter 3 suggests that it might be better for Turkey to try to resolve its Kurdish issue through a multiculturalist formula. Chapter 4 explains why neither consociationalism nor territorial pluralism might provide the optimal approach to its multiculturalist resolution of the issue. This chapter examines how consociationalism deals with managing ethno-cultural diversity. It benefits from various theoretical and practical academic works written by well-known supporters and developers of this multiculturalist approach, mainly Arend Lijphart, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. Consociational power-sharing arrangements encounter some enforcement problems in countries where there is mass-based interethnic moderation between majority and minority ethnic groups. Accordingly, this chapter benefits from several BİLGESAM and SETA reports and recent political developments to understand whether there is any degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level. [16] These comprehensive academic studies examine the presence of social cohesion and proximity between ethnic Kurds and Turks in all regions of the Republic. Consociational power-sharing arrangements might face some implementation issues in Turkey, where there is some degree of mass-based interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks.

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[16] SETA is one of the prestigious research institutes in Turkey. It conducts research projects on economic, political and socio-cultural issues at the national, regional and international levels. The SETA provides decision makers with policy recommendations. In recent years, the institute has published many reports on the Kurdish problem. Some of these reports try to find out which demands ethnic Kurds ask for the solution of the problem. Many others seek to deeply analyse various constitutional, sociological and economic matters that would have an effect on the solution of the problem. For more details on the SETA, see its official website, http://www.setav.org/en/.

Chapter 4 explains how multicultural reforms that have been made with the adoption of the consociational model encounter sustainability problems in the Republic because there are not enough intercultural citizens backing the reforms. The chapter examines several theoretical and practical studies, written particularly by Will Kymlicka, in order to explore the role of the intercultural citizen and assess the correlation between the number of intercultural citizens and the sustainability of multicultural reforms. This maintains that such reforms might not be sustainable in a country unless a majority (at least fifty per cent plus one) support the reforms. The chapter demonstrates that there are not enough intercultural citizens in Turkey by using recent BİLGESAM, KONDA and TESEV reports that collect Kurdish and Turkish opinions on potential constitutional reforms.

Chapter 4 concludes that consociationalism is not the optimal approach to Turkey's multicultural solution to the Kurdish question. It then turns its attention to whether territorial pluralism provides the best multiculturalist approach for the solution of the question. In order to understand how this multiculturalist approach deals with the issue of managing ethno-cultural diversity, Chapter 4 benefits from general academic sources, e.g. journal articles, (edited) books, conference papers, etc.

Chapter 4 explains why any multiculturalist formula constructed on territorial pluralism might prevent the Republic from eliminating the main Turkish anxiety about the solution of the Kurdish problem. The chapter benefits from recent BİLGESAM and AİH reports. It uses these reports not only because they are prepared by the well-known research centre or the AİH, but also because they record Turkish opinions on the resolution of the Kurdish issue from all regions.

The thesis develops a novel centripetal formula for the solution of the Kurdish problem in Chapter 5. It explains how centripetalism deals with the issue of managing ethno-cultural diversity through analysing many academic works written mainly by Donald Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly, who are the supporters and developers of this approach. The chapter then studies a significant number of works critically examining both theoretical and practical dimensions of centripetalism in order to comprehend whether a multiculturalist formula constructed on centripetalism is likely to succeed.

After understanding the weaknesses of centripetalism, Chapter 5 outlines an original centripetal model for the resolution of the Kurdish issue by considering such weaknesses. This chapter draws on recent BİLGESAM, KONDA, SETA and UKAM reports examining both the existence of social cohesion between ethnic Kurds and Turks in Turkey and the Republic's national and regional demographic features.[17] The findings of these reports play a key role in the construction process of my centripetal model.

Chapter 5 reviews both theoretical and practical academic papers on different electoral systems, including proportional representation, majoritarian-preferential and mixed voting systems. Since my model develops a hybrid, or mixed, voting system for Turkey, the chapter pays attention to some mixed electoral systems used in Europe, e.g. the Additional Member Systems used in the Scottish and Welsh parliamentary elections. Hence, various academic sources concerning these mixed

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[17] UKAM is a well-known research centre based in Istanbul. It conducts qualitative and quantitative research projects on cultural, ethnic, and peace and conflict studies. In recent years, the research centre has published a significant number of reports on the Kurdish question. Some of these reports aim to collect Kurdish demands for the solution of the question. Many others seek to analyse several sociological, legal and cultural matters that would affect the resolution of the question. For more details on the UKAM, see its official website, http://www.ukam.org/en.

electoral systems are the specific ones from which the chapter benefits in the construction of the original AV+ voting system.

Finally, Chapter 5 uses numerous autonomy-specific academic sources written by such prominent scholars as Hurst Hannum, Ruth Lapidoth, Thomas Benedikter and Yash Ghai in shaping its two-fold autonomy package for the Kurds – (a) asymmetric territorial autonomy for each Kurdish-majority province; and (b) cultural autonomy for individual Kurds residing in the Turkish-dominated provinces. Many constitutional characteristics of the Spanish State are also taken into account in preparing the two-fold autonomy package. Thus, several academic works examining such characteristics, e.g. journal articles and (edited) books, as well as various Spanish constitutional sources, mainly the Constitution of 1978 and statutes of autonomy for a few Spanish autonomous communities (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country), are scrutinised in forming the two-fold autonomy package.

Chapter 6 explores how the centripetal formula may pave the way for the fulfilment of the main Kurdish demands. It examines those demands by looking at the common aspirations of the following Kurdish segments: 1) ordinary Kurds, 2) pro-Kurdish NGOs, 3) pro-Kurdish political parties (the HDP, DBP, HAK-PAR and HÜDA-PAR) and 4) the PKK. The chapter explores the demands of these Kurdish segments, rather than limiting its scope merely to the aspirations of ordinary Kurds, since it seeks to understand the demands of wider Kurdish society, including NGOs, political parties and the PKK.

In order to understand ordinary Kurds' demands, Chapter 6 benefits from recent ASSAM, BİLGESAM, KONDA, SAMER, SETA, TESEV and UKAM reports.[18] Individual reports of the Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the AİH are also considered. The chapter examines various declarations and other similar materials published by many pro-Kurdish NGOs to understand their demands.[19] In order to detect the demands of the political parties, Chapter 6 examines general programmes, party constitutions and electoral manifestos of the HDP, DBP, HAK-PAR and HÜDA-PAR in depth. The chapter also scrutinises some special reports prepared by these political parties with the aim of listing all their demands for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. Finally, Chapter 6 finds out the demands of the PKK by looking at numerous declarations made by the leading figures of this armed organisation, including Abdullah Ocalan, Murat Karayilan, Cemil Bayik, Remzi Kartal and Sabri Ok, as well as several academic sources analysing the political aspirations of the PKK.

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[18] SAMER is a leading research centre based in Diyarbakır. It conducts qualitative and quantitative research projects in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia. In recent years, it has published numerous reports on the Kurdish question. Some of the reports collect Kurdish demands from the East and Southeast. The rest seek to analyse various constitutional, political, legal and socio-cultural issues that would affect the solution of the question. For more details on the research centre, see its official website, http://www.ssamer.com/index.html.

[19] The NGOs concerned are the Southeast Industry and Business Association [*Güneydoğu Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* (GÜNSİAD)], the Union of the Municipalities of South-eastern Anatolia [*Güneydoğu Anadolu Belediyeler Birliği* (GABB)], the Kurdish Democracy, Culture and Solidarity Association [*Kürt Demokrasi, Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği* (Kurd-Der)], the Kurdish Research and Development Association [*Kürt Dili Araştırma ve Geliştirme Derneği* (Kurdi-Der)], the Diyarbakır Institute for Political and Social Research [*Diyarbakır Siyasal ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Enstitüsü* (DİSA)], the Azadi Movement [*Hereketa Azadî*], the Association of Social Cooperation and Culture for Migrants [*Göç Edenlerle Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği* (GÖÇ-DER)], the Cooperation and Solidarity Association of the Mesopotamian People Losing Their Relatives [*Mezopotamya Yakınlarını Kaybedenlerle Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği* (MEYA-DER)], the Solidarity Association of the Families Losing Their Relatives [*Yakınlarını Kaybeden Ailelerle Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği* (YAKAY-DER)], the People Demanding Justice for Children [*Çocuklar İçin Adalet Çağrıcıları* (ÇİAÇ)], the Framework Association for Children [*Çocuklar Aynı Çatının Altında Derneği* (ÇAÇA)], the Democratic Society Congress [*Kongreya Civaka Demokratîk* (KCD)] and the Peace Assembly [*Barış Meclisi*].

1.4. Significance of Research

Centripetalism is similar to consociationalism and territorial pluralism, in that it is a multiculturalist approach to managing ethno-cultural diversity. Various scholars have scrutinised how a consociational or territorial pluralist formula might help Turkey to solve its long-running Kurdish question. But no one has paid enough attention to the merits of centripetalism by examining whether they might contribute to the solution of the question. Hence, there is a negligence of centripetalism in the academic literature. As an interdisciplinary study, this thesis fills the academic gap by coming up with an original centripetal formula for the solution of the Kurdish problem. The formula is a significant contribution to knowledge that makes this thesis a novel study. It might pave the way for the satisfaction of all main Kurdish demands. It might also create a multiculturalist Turkey less likely to witness some problematic political scenarios that would happen should the Republic construct its multiculturalist formula for the solution of the Kurdish question on consociationalism or territorial pluralism.

The thesis also has some remarkable contributions that are built on the critical review of the existing literature on Turkey's Kurdish question. It critically examines those studies arguing that:

- Turkey can resolve the Kurdish problem through its securitisation approach;
- The Republic can solve the Kurdish question by introducing socio-economic policies;
- A pro-Islamic integrationist policy of managing ethno-cultural diversity should be introduced in order to resolve the Kurdish issue;
- The Kurdish problem can only be solved by establishing an independent Kurdistan;

- Turkey can solve its Kurdish question by adopting a multiculturalist policy of managing ethno-cultural diversity that is constructed on consociationalism; or

- A multiculturalist policy that is built on territorial pluralism should be introduced in order to resolve the Kurdish issue.

The thesis explains why none of these proposals might be the optimal solution to Turkey's long-running political problem. The critical arguments on these proposals are remarkable contributions that develop the literature. In addition, there are some minor contributions to the literature in this thesis, including (1) an up-to-date review of the Kurdish question; (2) a summary of all recent reforms made by the Republic to resolve the Kurdish problem by democratic and peaceful means; and (3) a summary of the Republic's current political climate when ethnic Kurds encounter several social, economic and judicial problems.

Finally, this thesis contributes to the discipline of Human Rights. As the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey [*Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı* (TİHV)] argues, Turkey's Kurdish question is not just a political problem, it is also a human rights issue. Making constitutional reforms that recognise Kurdish identity and enable ethnic Kurds to exercise their minority rights would play a key role in the resolution of this human rights issue (TİHV, 2009). This thesis proposes an original centripetal solution to the Kurdish question that allows the Kurds to enjoy several minority rights, including cultural and linguistic rights. All centripetal strategies of the proposed solution may be used in resolving similar human rights issues in countries where there is some degree of interethnic moderation between territorially concentrated majority and minority ethnic groups.

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Chapter 2

Understanding Turkey's Kurdish Question

2.1. Introduction

Ethnic Kurds form the majority population in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. The other regions of Turkey are also home to minority Kurdish groups. Most Kurds practice Sunni Islam, but Shia Islam is also practiced by some Kurdish tribes. Kurmanji is a Kurdish dialect that most Kurds speak in the Republic. The Zazaki dialect of Kurdish is also spoken by some segments of Turkey's Kurdish society.

The Kurdish question is one of the most significant political problems of Turkey that has two main dimensions, an identity rights dimension and an armed conflict. The identity rights dimension is the result of numerous assimilationist Turkification policies implemented through the cultural togetherness policy – an official policy embraced by the early republican regime, the military administrations in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and their successor governments. Turkey did not resolve this dimension of the Kurdish problem and continued to enforce its repressive assimilationist policies towards ethnic Kurds. This resulted in the emergence of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish question just after the establishment of the PKK.

From the early 2000s to April 2015, Turkey implemented various reforms in order to solve its long-running political problem, particularly through its Kurdish-specific government policies, namely the Kurdish Initiative and the Resolution or Peace Process. These two strategies led Turkey to undertake the following democratic reforms compensating numerous harms done in the previous decades: emergency rule in the Kurdish-dominated provinces was abandoned; the Republic began providing compensation for harm caused by terrorism or the fight against terrorism; constitutional and legal bans on Kurdish broadcasting rights were removed; TRT KURDÎ, a publicly-funded television channel broadcasting in Kurdish for twenty-four hours a day, was established; private language centres, universities, municipalities and NGOs were allowed to provide ordinary citizens with Kurdish language courses; public secondary schools began offering elective Kurdish language courses; private schools were authorised to establish a bilingual (Kurdish-Turkish) education system; public universities were able to offer Kurdish degree programs, including bachelor's, master's and doctoral degrees; the radical nationalist oath (*Andımız*), extolling Turkish nationalism, was abolished; legal prohibitions on the use of Kurdish personal and place names were eliminated; the Kurdish language was allowed to be used in making political propaganda; ethnic Kurds were allowed to use their mother tongue in courts and prisons; and the Resolution Process, a government policy aimed at disarming the PKK and resolving the Kurdish question by democratic and peaceful means, was granted certain legal status.

All these positive developments did not resolve the Kurdish question, however. The Dolmabahce Agreement, announced on 28 February 2015, provided a ten-point roadmap for such a resolution, but the Agreement was rejected by Turkish officials

just after its announcement. This rejection paved the way for the end of the Resolution Process. It completely ended without reaching an eventual political resolution not long after the 7 June general election, when the PKK waged a new terror campaign against Turkey. This led to a new round of armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish security forces that has continued since July 2015.

Turkey has been trying to solve the Kurdish problem through its securitisation and socio-economic (modernisation) approaches since the end of the Peace Process. I argue that neither approach will enable the Republic to solve the problem. The securitisation approach might hinder Turkey from resolving not only the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish issue but its armed conflict counterpart. The modernisation process might contribute to the ultimate resolution of the issue, but would not allow the Republic to completely resolve the issue as it would still need to offer a political resolution formula that satisfies the multiculturalist Kurdish demands.

This chapter is organised as follows. Having provided some general information about the Kurds of Turkey, Section 2 examines the Kurds' political status in the Ottoman Empire and during Turkey's War of Independence. Section 3 then scrutinises the early republican regime and its assimilationist cultural togetherness policy that led to the emergence of the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish question. Sections 4 and 5 examine how the continuation of coercive Turkification policies resulted in the emergence of the armed conflict with the establishment of the PKK. Section 6 pays attention to the capture of Abdullah Ocalan – the leader of the PKK. This opened a new era when Turkey began to employ democratic and peaceful methods in solving its long-running political question. Accordingly, Section 7 studies the two Kurdish-specific government policies – the Kurdish Initiative and

the Resolution Process – which were launched to resolve the Kurdish question by democratic and peaceful means. The subsequent section examines the current political climate of Turkey when the Resolution Process has ended without reaching an ultimate political solution, causing a new round of armed conflict. The final section explores why Turkey is unlikely to resolve the Kurdish issue through its securitisation and socio-economic approaches.

2.2. Kurds, Ottoman Periods and War of Independence

The Kurds, a tribal community with an estimated population of 35 million, constitute the largest ethnic group without their own state in the world.[20] Ethnic Kurds predominantly inhabit their historic territory that remains divided today between Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. The ethnic group does not have a single common language, but Kurmanji and Sorani (the most widely spoken Kurdish dialects) are generally mutually understandable. Kurmanji is mainly used in Syria and Turkey, whilst Sorani is the dominant Kurdish dialect in Iraq and Iran.[21]

Ethnic Kurds form the majority population in many eastern and south-eastern provinces of Turkey, including Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli and Van. The Kurds also dominate several towns in the other eastern and south-eastern provinces, e.g. Adiyaman, Ardahan, Elazig, Erzurum, Erzincan, Igdir, Kars, Malatya and Sanliurfa. While most of the overall Kurdish population live in the East and Southeast, the rest reside in the

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[20] This number has been provided by the *World Factbook 2017*, which is a reference resource prepared by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
[21] According to Unver (2013) and Gunter (2004), Kurdistan's difficult geographical conditions forced Kurdish tribes to pursue a nomadic way of socio-political organisation. This led to the creation of different Kurdish dialects, while preventing the adoption of a common language spoken by the tribes. For more details on basic Kurdish ethno-cultural features, see Gunter (2014); McDowall (1996a); Torelli (2016); Yildiz and Muller (2008).

Turkish-populated northern, south-western and western provinces, e.g. Adana, Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and Mersin. The largest Kurdish city is not Diyarbakir – the largest Kurdish-occupied province in South-eastern Turkey – but Istanbul, where more than two million residents of Kurdish-descent live (Yegen, Tol and Caliskan, 2016: 16, 25-37).[22] Kurmanji is the most widely spoken Kurdish dialect in Turkey, but the Zazaki dialect, which is akin to the Iranian Kurds' Gorani dialect, is also spoken in some Kurdish-dominated provinces, especially the province of Tunceli.[23]

The Kurds had exercised territorial autonomy over their historic territory until the late Ottoman period. The Ottoman-Safavid conflict over Eastern Anatolia ended with the victory of the Ottomans after the 1514 War of Chaldiran during which the Kurdish chieftains had allied with the Ottoman sultan. The chieftains were then rewarded with autonomous fiefdoms that could rule their internal affairs.[24] The alliance between the central Ottoman government and the chieftains worked up until the nineteenth century, when the Empire initiated western-style modernisation reforms aimed at centralising the provincial administration, eventually resulting in centralised rule by appointed Ottoman governors.[25]

Following the First World War, the Empire was obliged by the Treaty of Sèvres to grant the Kurdish-majority region territorial autonomy allowing the Kurds to hold an independence referendum to decide their own fate (Cizre, 2001: 229). The Treaty also included provisions stipulating the renunciation of all non-Turkish Ottoman regions and their cession to the Allied powers. This created hostility and nationalist

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[22] For more demographic details, see Chapter 5, where the demographic context of Turkey is deeply analysed.

[23] For more linguistic details, see Bilgic and Akyurek (2012); Bilgin (2013); Pope (2013).

[24] Some of such autonomous fiefdoms were Emir Serefuddin of Bitlis, Emir Davud of Hizan, Emir Halid of Hasankeyf, Emir Huseyin of Imadiye, Emir Ali Bey of Cezire, Emir Halil of Cemisgezek and Emir Kasim of Pertek (see Balci, 2009; Epozdemir, 2005).

[25] For more details on the fiefdoms, see Chapter 3.

feelings in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey [*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* (TBMM)], which was established on 23 April 1920 by the founding leader of Turkey – Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The treaty eventually led to the War of Independence during which Ataturk and his friends sought 'statehood for the multicultural entity of Anatolia, heir to the Ottoman Empire' (Ergil, 2000: 124).

The TBMM, the Parliament, drafted a framework law, regarded as the Constitution of 1921 (Law of Turkey (LoT) 20/1921), for a new state in January 1921 when the Anatolian resistance against the Allied forces had already begun. This framework law created a fraternal atmosphere between ethnic Kurds and Turks by stipulating that the new state would be constructed by the partnership of these two ethnic groups. The law not only considered the Kurds as the equal partners of the new state, it also devoted five of its twenty-three articles to self-government rights for the Kurds. Article 11 of the law read, for instance, that 'schools, education, health systems, economy, agriculture, public works and social welfare shall be under the governance of provincial councils'. Having adopted the framework law, the TBMM also abolished the Sultanate on 1 November 1922, rendering the TBMM the sovereign body of Turkey, while officially annihilating the Ottoman Empire (LoT 308/1922). This annihilation did not, however, destroy the fraternal atmosphere between the Kurds and Turks. On 16-17 January 1923, Ataturk remarked:

> according to our constitution, local autonomous areas will be established. Thus, if the population of a region is composed of Kurds, the equal partners of the new state, they will govern themselves in that region (cited in Calislar, 2013: 31).

The fraternal atmosphere enabled the Kurds and Turks to fight together against the Allied forces and achieve independence as a result of the Treaty of Lausanne, the founding treaty of Turkey. When the war ended with the victory of Turkey, however,

the promises were forgotten, and republican elites began to construct a pure Turkish nation-state embracing liberal, pragmatic, rational and secular features (Ergin, 2008; Tasdemir and Oner-Ozkan, 2016).

2.3. Assimilationist Republic and its Cultural Togetherness Policy

The elites established Turkey as a republic on 29 October 1923. They then began to purify the state from religious values, which represented poverty, philistinism and backwardness (Efegil, 2011). The TBMM abrogated the Caliphate on 3 March 1924 (LoT 431/1924) and adopted the Law on the Unification of Education (LoT 430/1924). This closed down all religious schools. Another law annulled the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (LoT 429/1924). These secularisation policies were not welcomed by the traditional Islamic society, particularly the Kurds, who were loyal to the ideology of Islamism. As Toprak notes:

> the state, by its secular policies and its program of Westernisation, had threatened the dominant value system of a traditional Islamic society without providing, at the same time, a new ideological framework which could have mass appeal (1981: 45).

This circumstance resulted in a Kurdish insurgency under the leadership of Sheikh Said against the republican regime on 13 February 1925. The insurgency was suppressed following the arrest of Sheikh Said on 15 April. The Sheikh was executed on 29 June.[26] Just after the insurgency, the TBMM adopted the Law for the Maintenance of Order (LoT 578/1925). The Republic would seek to secularise the state and implement a cultural togetherness policy using Turkish nationalism as a new source of mobilisation (Tufekci, 1983).

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[26] For more details on the Sheikh Said Riot, see Chapter 3.

To secularise the state, the TBMM adopted the Hat Law (LoT 671/1925) in October 1925. This ordered the wearing of western clothing and brimmed hats while prohibiting the wearing of the fez, a symbol of Ottoman modernity. In addition, a law came into force in December 1925 that banned religious titles and ordered the closure of religious cells, lodges and orders (LoT 677/1925). Parliament adopted a new western-style Civil Code in October 1926 (LoT 743/1926) and then amended Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution to remove references to Islam as the official religion of the Republic. Finally, the Ottoman Turkish alphabet, based on the Perso-Arabic script, was replaced by the Latin alphabet through a law that came into effect on 3 November 1928 (LoT 1353/1928).

The new Republic started to implement some nationalist policies emphasising Turkish ethno-cultural characteristics with the adoption of the 1924 Constitution (LoT 491/1924). The Constitution, which entered into force on 20 April 1924, did not recognise the existence of any ethnic group other than the Turks in the country. It defined the citizen as a Turk by stipulating that 'all citizens, irrespective of their religious or racial differences, are Turks' (art. 88(1)). It also acknowledged Turkish as the only language of the state (art. 2).[27] In addition, the 1924 Constitution did not grant the Kurds any of the self-government rights that had been promised during the War of Independence. All these policies had reflected some aspects of the newly-created Turkish nationalism based strongly on Turkish ethno-cultural features. The republican regime's nationalist policies were aimed at assimilating all minority ethnic groups, including the Kurds, and shaping a homogeneous Turkish nation following the adoption of the Law for the Maintenance of Order.

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[27] The phrases 'Turkish nation' and 'Turk(s)' were also involved in Articles 4, 10, 11, 38, 68, 69, 70, 82, 87 and 92 of the Constitution.

On 21 April 1925 when he was installed as Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Inonu announced:

> we are openly nationalist […]. Besides the Turkish majority, none of the other [ethnic] elements shall have any impact. We shall at any price Turkicise those who live in our country and destroy those who rise up against the Turks and Turkdom (cited in Muller and Linzey, 2007: 22).

Justice Minister Mahmut Esat Bozkurt similarly described the status ethnic Kurds could expect in Turkey as follows:

> We live in a country called Turkey, the freest country in the world […]. I believe that the Turk must be the only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves (cited in Nezan, 1980: 65).

In order to assimilate all ethnic groups other than the Turks, the regime introduced its cultural togetherness policy, according to which Turkish identity was the basic source of national unity, while non-Turkish features, including Kurdish ones, were potential threats to the national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic (Somer, 2004). The policy sought to not only mobilise all public forces to propagate and popularise Turkish ethno-cultural characteristics but also subdue or deny all non-Turkish identities (Kolcak, 2015b). While all secularisation policies had a negative impact on the Kurds, the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish issue emerged as a result of the assimilationist and repressive cultural togetherness policy.

As a product of the policy, the government initiated a linguicidal policy in 1927, namely the 'Citizen, Speak Turkish!' [*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!*] campaign. This linguicidal policy aimed to exterminate all minority languages by fiercely condemning those using any language other than Turkish (O'Driscoll, 2014). In addition, the Sun-Language Theory [*Güneş Dil Teorisi*] was developed in the 1930s. The Theory was based on the assumptions that Turkish was the basis of all

languages spoken on the globe, and that the Turkish language, which was spoken in Anatolia, was the continuation of this original form of Turkish. The Theory, which extolled the Turkish language, became a tool for mobilising national consciousness in the 1930s (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997). Another tool for the mobilisation was the Turkish Linguistic Institute [*Türk Dil Kurumu* (TDK)], a public institution founded in 1932 with the aim of generating a cohesive Turkish language (Al, 2015b). The Institute sought to eliminate all non-Turkish (mainly Arabic and Persian) words and influence and replace them with new Turkish words or integrate some others assembled from several Turkic dialects (Morin and Lee, 2010).

The TDK was indeed part of an arsenal of other public entities propagating and popularising Turkish ethno-cultural features, such as the Turkish Historical Institute [*Türk Tarih Kurumu* (TTK)]. This body was established in 1931 with the goal of writing and disseminating a new Turkish history for the Republic (Hanioglu, 2012; Zeydanlioglu, 2012). The new history was based on the Turkish History Thesis [*Türk Tarih Tezi*] that was developed by a study group under the supervision of the Turkish Hearths [*Türk Ocakları*] – a civil society organisation aimed at promoting Turkish nationalism. According to the Thesis, ethnic Turks migrated from Central Asia to different parts of the earth with the goal of spreading civilisation, including Anatolia, where all former ancient civilisations, e.g. the Hittites, Phrygians and Sumerians, were Turkish-inspired (Xypolia, 2016). The Historical Institute, like its linguistic counterpart, became a tool for nationalist mobilisation in the 1930s (Ersanli-Bekar, 1992; Tuncay, 1992).

Various assimilationist policies began to be implemented in education as well. The 1924 Law on the Unification of Education prohibited the use of languages other than Turkish in education. In March 1933, the radical nationalist morning vow,

called 'Andımız', was officially imposed as a duty on all primary school students who would take a pledge of allegiance to the Republic at the beginning of every school day by uttering the oath. The vow included a significant number of radical nationalist remarks, including (i) 'I am Turk' [*Türküm*]; (ii) 'May my existence be a gift to the Turkish existence' [*Varlığım Türk varlığına armağan olsun*]; and (iii) 'How happy is a person who calls herself Turk' [*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene*]. With regard to citizenship education, school textbooks emphasised the slogan 'one language, one culture, one ideal', while also defining the concept 'nation' as a socio-political community 'formed by citizens, bound by a unity of language, culture and ideal' (Ince, 2012: 119). The Turkish language was also extolled by the textbooks which described this language as the most beautiful, easiest and richest language on the world while saying nothing about the other languages spoken in Turkey. Finally, the textbooks stressed the significance of 'being born a Turk, living as a Turk and dying as a Turk' by referring to a verse of the morning oath: 'how happy is the one saying I am Turk' (*ibid*: 121).

The cultural togetherness policy was not welcomed by the Kurds, who rebelled against the Republic eighteen times until the end of the 1930s, including the Ararat Riot and the Dersim Resistance (Celik, 2010).[28] Kirisci and Winrow (1997) argue that these uprisings were the Kurdish responses to the cultural togetherness policy. The central government did not take the identity rights dimension of these insurgent movements into account and defined them as the secessionist movements threatening the national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic. The response

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[28] The Ararat Riot was launched by Ihsan Nuri Pasha in 1927. He was backed by the *Khoyboun* movement, a transnational Kurdish nationalist organisation seeking to establish an independent Kurdistan (Gorgas, 2014). The rebels declared a Kurdish Republic in the early period of the Riot, but the insurgency was completely crushed with Iranian cooperation in 1931. The Dersim Resistance was initiated by Sheikh Sayyid Riza in 1936. He led the insurgency until his death in 1937. The resistance was quashed by the Turkish Army in 1938. For more details, see Al (2015a); Boyraz and Turan (2016); Gunter (2008); Strohmeier (2003).

of the State was therefore not the annulment of the cultural togetherness policy; instead, it was the continuation of all coercive assimilation policies originated by the 1925 Reform Plan for the East [*Şark Islahat Planı*] (Besikci, 1991).

Numerous Turkification policies continued to be implemented towards the Kurds: (i) administrative appointments in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia were filled with ethnic Turks (Kurban, 2004); (ii) various boarding schools were established in those regions with the task of educating Kurdish pupils in an environment that physically separated them from their cultural habitat (Yegen, 2007); (iii) many ethnic Kurds were forcefully deported from their historic territory by the 1934 Settlement Law (LoT 2510/1934) and were settled in Western Turkey, where they were expected to become assimilated into the dominant Turkish culture (Bozkurt, 2014); (iv) the usage of non-Turkish surnames was prohibited (Yegen, 2009); (v) the use of languages other than Turkish in courts was banned (Kuzu, 2016); (vi) Kurdish place names were Turkified (Dogan, 2012); (vii) the Kurds were defined as 'Mountain Turks' [*Dağlı Türkler*], and the use of the word 'Kurd(s)' was penalised (Gunes, 2013a; Zeydanlioglu, 2008); and finally (viii) all individuals applying to be employed in the public sector or in the army and its academies were required to be of pure Turkish race (Kurban, 2003).

2.4. Continuing Assimilationist Policies with Military Coups

The Kurds suffered from many Turkification policies from 1923 to 1945, during the single-party period ruled by the Republican People's Party [*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP)]. They were subjected to similar coercive assimilation policies in the second half of the twentieth century, when the Republic witnessed three military

interventions (Gunter, 1988). The 1961 *coup d'état* was staged on the grounds that the Democrat Party [*Demokrat Parti* (DP)] softened radical secularist traditions in the 1950s and was continually violating the 1924 Constitution. The new military regime introduced a constitution that contained similar provisions as its 1924 counterpart with regard to the recognition of the Kurds. It did not recognise the Kurds. According to the Constitution of 1961 (LoT 334/1961), Turkish was still the only official language of the country (art. 3(2)). Citizens were still defined as Turks: '[e]veryone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk' (art. 54).[29] In addition, the regime pursued the implementation of the previous assimilationist policies too. For instance, it continued to Turkify Kurdish place names through the Expert Committee on Altering non-Turkish Names [*Ad Değiştirme İhtisas Komisyonu*] (Entessar, 1992).[30]

It is worth noting, however, that the somewhat liberal nature of the new constitution enabled the Kurds to express their grievances (van Bruinessen, 1993). The Constitution included some liberal provisions allowing for the foundation of trade unions and student organisations, among which the socialist Workers' Party of Turkey [*Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (TİP)] was one of the first examples. Many Kurdish intellectuals joined the left-wing TİP just after its establishment in 1962, when the

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[29] The phrases 'Turkish nation' and 'Turk(s)' were incorporated into the Preamble of the Constitution, as well as Articles 4, 7, 11, 35, 65, 68, 96 and 153.

[30] The Committee was a steering commission formed in 1956. It Turkified almost twenty-eight thousand non-Turkish place names from 1956 to the 1970s. Turkey had been Turkifying non-Turkish place names before the establishment of this committee. The 1893 Ottoman Decree on Turkifying Armenian, Bulgarian and Greek Place Names [*İskân-ı Muhacirin Nizamnamesi*] was used by the early republican regime as the tool for Turkifying non-Turkish place names, including Kurdish ones, though the Decree did not involve any provisions asking for the alteration of Kurdish place names. The regime was Turkifying Kurdish place names through the decisions taken by provincial councils. In the 1940s, the Turkification process was pursued through the Decree on the Alteration of non-Turkish Place Names, issued by the Ministry of Interior Affairs in 1940. The Turkification process acquired a full statutory character with Article 2(1)(d) of the 1949 Law on Provincial Administration (LoT 5442/1949). The Ministry then established the Committee and pursued the Turkification process by means of this steering commission. For more details, see Dogan (2012); Inal (2012); Konuksever (2009).

Kurdish issue was still being considered as the 'Eastern issue' due to the existence of the ban on the use of the word 'Kurdish'. The TİP gained fifteen parliamentary seats in the 1965 general election, among which Adil Kurtel (Kars), Behice Boran (Urfa), Saban Erik (Malatya) and Tarik Ziya Ekinci (Diyarbakir) were elected from the Kurdish-dominated provinces. In its Fourth General Assembly, the socialist TİP decided to form a 'Convention to Investigate the Kurdish Issue'. The decree of the general assembly was the first document in which a Turkish political party recognised the Kurdish issue as a major problem of the Republic. The decree read that there was a Kurdish question in Turkey that was not only the result of the economic backwardness of Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia but also the consequence of the presence of various bans preventing the Kurds from exercising their cultural rights (Calislar, 2013; Yegen, 2016a).

In addition to the TİP's culture-based discourse, leftist worker movements provided other political outlets for the Kurds in the 1960s, leading to the establishment of nationalist Kurdish groups, e.g. the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan [*Türkiye Kürdistanı Demokratik Partisi*] and the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths [*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları* (DDKO)] (Balli, 1992). These were the organisations that originally sought to persuade the Turkish Government to recognise the Kurds and grant them their identity rights. In time, their leaders developed a more radical, revolutionary and secessionist rhetoric, eventually intensifying street clashes between leftist Kurdish groups and nationalist Turkish organisations (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997; Unver, 2013).

The clashes were the basic reason for the 1971 military intervention, which did not change the assimilationist policy of the state towards the Kurds; instead, they began suffering from additional oppressive policies, such as the ban on the use of

non-Turkish personal names (Moustakis and Chaudhuri, 2005). But nevertheless, the Kurds still attempted to voice their grievances in the 1970s, when various pro-Kurdish organisations were formed. The Freedom Path Movement [*Özgürlük Yolu Hareketi*], led by Kemal Burkay, was one such organisation. The essential goal of the Movement was to peacefully convince the Turkish Government to recognise the Kurds and bestow Kurdish identity rights on them (Calislar, 2013). In the 1978 municipal elections, independent candidate Mehdi Zana was elected as Mayor of Diyarbakir with the support of the Movement. In the next year, Orhan Alpaslan, another independent candidate supported by the Movement, won the municipal election in the province of Agri (Yegen, Tol and Caliskan, 2016: 48).

Some other pro-Kurdish violent organisations were also established in the same decade, mainly the PKK. This was formed by Abdullah Ocalan after he had declared at a meeting of the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey [*Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu* (DEV-GENÇ)] in 1974 that the pro-Kurdish segment of the Federation should break its links with those leftist groups that refused to recognise Kurdish identity rights and then establish a pure Kurdish movement. Following this declaration, the pro-Kurdish group, called the 'Revolutionaries of Kurdistan' [*Kürdistan Devrimcileri*], left Ankara in 1975 and began to operate in the Kurdish-populated provinces, where the group waged political campaigns underlining that the repressive assimilationist policies of Turkey have resulted in a Kurdish question resolvable solely through Kurdish independence (Gunes, 2013b, 2016). Members of the group were sent to the Kurdish-dominated towns and villages where they were tasked with mobilising local workers, farmers and students to achieve independence. Ocalan also travelled various Kurdish-occupied provinces where he sought to make ethnic Kurds aware of the Kurdish

question (McDowall, 2007). The group ultimately declared the establishment of the PKK on 27 November 1978. The essential aims of the outlawed organisation were as follows: Kurdistan, divided into four regions by colonist countries – Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey – should be liberated and united through the construction of a Marxist-Leninist independent Kurdistan. These aims could be achieved only by means of armed struggle, according to the PKK (Bacik and Coskun, 2013; Yegen, 2016b).

2.5. The 1980 *Coup d'État* and the Rise of the PKK

Turkey was on the verge of a civil war in the late 1970s. In the Turkish-dominated provinces of the country, thousands of young people lost their lives during street clashes between militant right-wing Turkish ultranationalists and radical leftist groups (Celep, 2010). In the Kurdish-majority provinces similar violence occurred, but with different actors. The PKK was directing its armed struggle against Kurdish tribal heads and notables who were opposed to the ideology and purpose of the insurgent organisation, while also clashing with extreme nationalist Turkish groups (Grey Wolves [*Bozkurtlar*]), leftist Turkish groups, called 'social chauvinists', the police and the army (Gunter, 2013). This violent environment ended with a new military coup on 12 September 1980, when General Kenan Evren declared that the governance of the country was in full control of the Turkish Armed Forces [*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* (TSK)]. The 1980 *coup d'état* was the basic reason for the popularisation of the PKK among ethnic Kurds. As Kemal Burkay, the leader of the pro-Kurdish Freedom Path Movement, said in an interview with the Research Turkey, a research centre based in London,

> if the 1980 military coup had not happened, the inclination toward violence would not have been developed among the Kurds. The people who chose the methods of legal and peaceful struggle would have been successful, and they would have achieved more than what has been achieved today. At the same time, thousands of young Kurds would not have died, and thousands of villages would not have been destroyed (cited in Research Turkey, 2013).

The military regime that ruled Turkey from 1980 to 1983 adopted numerous discriminatory and draconian measures, including illegal detentions, tortures and extrajudicial executions. Some PKK-affiliated prisoners burned themselves in defiance of the widespread persecution in the Diyarbakır Military Prison while many others organised hunger strikes (Zeydanlioglu, 2009). There were other human rights abuses as well. Many Kurdish intellectuals and politicians were arrested, regardless of their opinions, e.g. Serafettin Elci, a former CHP deputy, who was sentenced to one year in jail for having declared that 'there are Kurds in Turkey, I am a Kurd' (cited in Kirisci and Winrow, 1997: 112).

In addition to these human rights abuses, the regime underscored, what Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 109) say, the 'Turkishness of Turkey' in its political discourse. The Constitution of 1982 (LoT 2709/1982), drafted under the aegis of the regime, was the basic material reflecting the characteristics of this discourse. The Constitution defined the citizen as a Turk by stipulating that '[e]veryone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk' (art. 66(1)). It began giving priority to Turkishness in its preamble by reading that 'no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish existence and the principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of Turkishness […]'. It was also stated in the same section that '[this constitution] has been entrusted by the TURKISH NATION to the democracy-loving Turkish sons' and daughters' love for the motherland and nation'. The

Constitution, like its predecessors, acknowledged Turkish as the only language of Turkey (art. 3), but unlike them, it rendered the relevant article an irrevocable provision (art. 4). The use of any language other than Turkish in the dissemination of information was prohibited at the constitutional level as well (art. 26).[31] The Constitution also revitalised the Turkish Historical Institute and its linguistic counterpart (art. 134). The two institutions were expected to reintroduce the political discourse of the early republican regime that asserted that the Kurds were 'Mountain Turks'. The regime advertised any book or article claiming a common ancestry for the two ethnic groups, in addition to arguments maintaining that there was no separate Kurdish language. Those arguments maintaining that the Kurds have their own separate identity were regarded as the fabrications of separatist groups and western intelligence services that were inclined to divide up Turkey (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997).

According to Candar, these were the policies enabling the PKK to gain 'an enormous moral high ground in the mind of the Kurdish public' (2013: 66). Bacik and Coskun agree with Candar:

> the 1980 military regime set the PKK on the path to becoming the sole representative of the Kurds. The systematic oppression of the Kurds by the military regime after the 1980 coup helped the PKK sway the Kurdish masses to its ideology. The army's severe policies toward the Kurds in the 1980s precluded the possibility of moderate Kurdish politics. Having experienced the brutal face of the military regime, even the larger masses, who had previously been critical of the PKK's radical discourse, came to a sympathetic understanding of the PKK's thesis (2013: 146).

In this atmosphere, Abdullah Ocalan, who, together with the other founders of the PKK, had fled to Syria in 1979 with the help of the Hafez al-Assad government,

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[31] In parallel to this constitutional provision, the regime adopted the LoT 2932/1983, which prohibited the use of any language other than Turkish in the broadcasting, explanation and publication of ideas and opinions. This statute allowed the regime to confiscate Kurdish-related books, newspapers and films (Hughes and Karatas, 2009).

announced during the PKK's second congress in Damascus in August 1982 that the insurgent organisation would initiate guerrilla warfare against Turkey (Markus, 2007).[32] In August 1984, the PKK carried out its first attacks against Turkey by assaulting gendarmerie stations in the provinces of Hakkari and Siirt, resulting in an armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the PKK. Following these initial attacks, life in the Kurdish-populated provinces became chaotic. The insurgent organisation increased violence by attacking city centres and military establishments. The Turkish security forces, particularly military forces, used PKK attacks as an excuse and 'burned and/or forcefully evacuated the villages in areas of PKK influence and treated everybody there as terrorists' (Calislar, 2013: 36).

In order to suppress PKK attacks, Turkey employed, what Sederberg (1995: 295) calls, the 'war model'. According to Sederberg (1995), states employ two main methods in disengaging terrorist organisations: a) the war model; and b) the rational actor model. The former represents the conventional wisdom that political regimes should never bargain with terrorists and choose a repressive military response. The rational actor model is the method attempting to end terrorism through elements of conciliation, e.g. political debates, negotiations, bilateral agreements, etc. Once Turkey witnessed the 1984 PKK attacks, it began using the method of conventional wisdom in suppressing the armed organisation. As Bacik and Coskun note,

> Turkey implemented a strict military policy to suppress it [the PKK], without ever taking seriously the possibility of a political solution, eschewing even negotiation with the PKK; rather, the army was recognised as the only effective suppressor of the Kurdish rebellion (2013: 145-6).

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[32] The Syrian government was providing Ocalan with a safe haven in Damascus, while enabling the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley of Lebanon to be used by the PKK for the military training of young Kurds (Bacik and Coskun, 2013).

As a product of the war model, the government introduced the village-guard system in April 1985. This militarist strategy was adopted with the main purpose of enabling the villages difficult to reach because of logistical issues to safeguard themselves against PKK attacks. Not long after the introduction of the strategy, the government hired almost 80,000 village guards. This poorly controlled army became a major problem in the Kurdish-dominated provinces. A significant number of guards were dismissed for leaking information about prospective military operations to the PKK, while some others killed innocent villagers on the grounds of aiding and abetting the PKK, exacerbating tensions between loyal and secessionist Kurdish tribes. The system thus increased instability in the East and Southeast (Bacik and Coskun, 2013).

As another product of the war model, Turkey declared a state of emergency [*Olağanüstü Hâl* (OHAL)] in eleven Kurdish-populated provinces in July 1987 that must be renewed every four months by the TBMM. A regional governor, known as the 'super governor', was appointed to Diyarbakir, from where he could control all the eleven provinces. This governor was authorised by law to ban strikes, censor news, and more importantly impose internal exile (Statutory Decree 285/1987). A regional military commander was also appointed who was vested with additional powers. The emergency law and the regional governor system worsened the situation since it brought an end to civil rule in the Southeast (Cizre, 2009; Robins, 1993). The Kurdish-populated provinces were left to a military rule capable of exercising extraordinary powers, including (i) the right to censor the media; (ii) the right to regulate all aspects of daily life, from health services to road traffic; (iii) the right to keep people in custody for fifty days; and (iv) the right to evacuate villages and displace people on national security grounds. According to a report prepared by

the TBMM, Turkish security forces destroyed or evacuated approximately 3,000 villages and displaced about 3 million people in the region from 1984 to the late 1990s (Sarihan, 2013).

As Bacik and Coskun (2013: 150) say, the OHAL 'transformed the fight with the PKK to a struggle on a daily-life level which traumatised Kurdish society'. The trauma contributed to the rise of a violent Kurdish nationalism, as a group of deputies in Parliament argue in their report: 'the security operations and the practice of village burning was fuelling Kurdish nationalism and was forcing especially young people to join the ranks of the PKK' (cited in Kirisci and Winrow, 1997: 132). Violence also led to polarisation in society. Extreme nationalist Turkish groups began using the funerals of martyrs and other victims of PKK attacks as occasions for nationalist propaganda, resulting in discriminatory acts against innocent Kurds in Western Turkey, e.g. the denying of jobs to the Kurds and the boycotting of Kurdish-owned shops. Like OHAL wrongdoings, this contributed to the rise of Kurdish nationalism, as Barkey underlines: 'The combination of army operations and societal polarisation has raised the consciousness of even the most assimilated Kurds' (1993: 58).

The 1991 Anti-Terror Law (LoT 3713/1991) was the other tool that increased this nationalist consciousness. The act entered into force in April 1991 with the aim of dealing with any PKK threat to domestic security and order. A terrorist act was defined by this statute as:

> actions including repression, violence and force, or the threat to use force, by one or several persons belonging to an organisation with the goal of changing the constitutional characteristics of the Turkish Republic, involving its political, legal, social, secular and economic system (art. 1).

This broad and ambiguous definition led to numerous human rights abuses. Article 8 of the same statute made calling for a political resolution to the Kurdish question a terrorist act. A large number of academics, intellectuals and politicians were detained, prosecuted and/or arrested on the grounds of violating the Anti-Terror Law. Ismail Besikci, a Turkish sociologist and Kurdologist, received sentences totalling up to 200 years in jail for his publications in breach of the Anti-Terror Law. An amendment to Article 8 of this act in October 1995 resulted in the reduction of some sentences. Nevertheless, it did not create a fully democratic environment enabling the free discussion of the Kurdish problem.[33]

Despite all these incidents, some Turkish politicians began to declare that there might be a political resolution to the Kurdish question. Having announced himself as a person having Kurdish blood in June 1989, President Turgut Ozal held meetings with Kurdish political leaders from Northern Iraq to encourage an open discussion of the Kurdish problem in March 1991. One year after this meeting, in April 1992, the President even suggested that Kurdish broadcasting and education rights might help Turkey to deal with the Kurdish issue more effectively. In a similar vein, in November 1991, the newly formed coalition government between the True Path Party [*Doğru Yol Partisi* (DYP)] and the Social Democratic Populist Party [*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti* (SHP)] promised major reforms for Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia that would address the Kurdish issue. Deputy Prime Minister Erdal Inonu, leader of the SHP, asked for the recognition of Kurdish cultural characteristics while Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, leader of the DYP, declared that he recognised the reality of a Kurdish existence in Turkey.

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[33] The amendment of the Anti-Terror Law was the result of a new government protocol signed between the DYP and CHP.

It is worth noting that the coalition government was making the above declarations mainly because of the electoral alliance between the SHP and the pro-Kurdish People's Labour Party [*Halkın Emek Partisi* (HEP)]. These two parties had formed an electoral pact in the 1991 general election, thereby enabling 22 HEP candidates to enter Parliament on an SHP ticket. The HEP was a left-wing party that demanded: a) Kurdish education and broadcasting rights; b) abolition of the state of emergency in the Kurdish-dominated provinces; c) abrogation of the village-guard system; d) annulment of the Anti-Terror Law; and e) creation of a democratic political arena where the Kurdish issue can be discussed freely. In order to satisfy the SHP's HEP-origin deputies, the DYP-SHP coalition incorporated some HEP demands into its programme. The political compromise between the SHP and HEP initially allowed for the formation of the DYP-SHP coalition. When the SHP violated the 1991 election programme of the two parties by going along with the DYP to extend emergency rule in the Kurdish-occupied provinces in March 1992, the HEP split from the SHP and formed its own group in Parliament.[34]

The early 1990s was also the period when the PKK softened its separatist programme. During its fourth congress in February 1990, the insurgent organisation acknowledged federalism as another possible way of solving the Kurdish problem.

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[34] The HEP was closed down by the Constitutional Court in July 1993 on the grounds that it sought to dissolve the national unity and territorial integrity of Turkey. Before the closure, some HEP deputies had formed the Freedom and Democracy Party [*Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi* (ÖZDEP)] in October 1992. Just four months after its foundation, the ÖZDEP was closed down by the Constitutional Court on the same grounds. Following the closure of the HEP, some HEP members joined the Democracy Party [*Demokrasi Partisi* (DEP)], a pro-Kurdish political party established in 1991. The DEP was closed down by the Constitutional Court in June 1994 on the same grounds. Before the closure of this pro-Kurdish party, the immunities of its thirteen parliamentarians were lifted in March 1994. They were prosecuted that ended with the imprisonment of one independent and seven DEP deputies in December 1994. Four of these deputies were released after later court rulings, but in October 1995 the Turkish Court of Appeals [*Yargıtay*] affirmed the sentences of all deputies, including those who had been released. Six other DEP members of parliament who had fled abroad played a key role in the establishment of a Kurdish parliament-in-exile in the Netherlands in April 1995. Yasar Kaya, an exiled DEP official, became the chairman of this parliament. Remzi Kaya, former deputy leader of the DEP, became the head of its executive council. For more details, see Kirisci and Winrow (1997).

Ozal's readiness to discuss federalism stimulated the PKK to declare a unilateral ceasefire in March 1993. The ceasefire did not survive after the sudden death of President Ozal in April 1993. PKK militants stopped a bus carrying 33 unarmed soldiers and executed all of them in Bingol in May 1993. The end of the ceasefire then witnessed the 'worst and bloodiest episode' between May 1993 and February 1999 (Candan, 2013: 69).

Following the death of Ozal, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, leader of the DYP, was elected by the TBMM as the ninth President of Turkey, obliging the DYP to find a new leader and Prime Minister. Another DYP-SHP coalition government was formed after the presidential election, and Tansu Ciller, new leader of the DYP, was sworn in as Prime Minister of Turkey. Soon after her election, Ciller declared that Kurdish broadcasting and education rights might enable her government to deal with the Kurdish question more effectively. This declaration was criticised by DYP deputies and the TSK, both of whom looked on the PKK's ceasefire announcement 'as a sign of weakness and proof of the value of pursuing a military solution' (Kirisci and Window, 1997: 139). President Demirel supported this approach: 'unless terrorism is solved, cultural issues cannot be debated' (cited in *ibid*: 39).

2.6. Capture of Ocalan: Beginning of a New Era

The war model was still the only method being used to resolve the Kurdish issue until the capture of Ocalan in February 1999. Having left Syria due to Turkey's strong pressure on the Syrian government to exile him in the autumn of 1998, Ocalan stayed in Russia, Greece and Italy for a short period. He was then captured by CIA officials in February 1999 in Kenya and remanded to Turkey. The capture

had initially seemed to open new possibilities to resolve the Kurdish issue by democratic and peaceful means. After he was captured, Ocalan called for a democratic resolution to the Kurdish problem. When he was awaiting trial in prison cell on Imrali Island, an island near to the province of Bursa, Ocalan said that 'a solution based on the unity and independence of Turkey which would guarantee peace and real democracy […] is our innermost wish' (cited in Gunter, 2008: 63). During his trial for treason and separatism, Ocalan made a similar statement emphasising that the Kurdish question could be solved through implementing true democracy rather than separating the Kurdish-populated region from the unitary state (*ibid*).[35] In parallel to the statements of its leader, the PKK, which had declared a unilateral ceasefire in September 1999, announced the end of the fifteen-year-long armed conflict (1984-1999) in February 2000 (Ozcan, 2006). Having withdrawn its militants from Turkey to Northern Iraq, the PKK also made public that it would peacefully ask for territorial autonomy for the Kurds of Turkey rather than pursuing a violent separatist agenda (Somer, 2004).

After he was sentenced to death on 29 June 1999, Ocalan sought to use all potential diplomatic channels for a stay of execution. On 18-19 September 1999, representatives of more than fifty states gathered in Istanbul for a summit meeting of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Kurdish question was not on the agenda of the meeting, but it was undoubtedly on the minds of many representatives of EU member states, who were considering the solution of the Kurdish problem as a crucial step for the consolidation of Turkish democracy.

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[35] It is noteworthy that Ocalan was making similar statements since the 1990s. In March 1994, he announced that the PKK was open to any potential democratic solution not aimed at dividing up Turkey. In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), he expressed similar views by emphasising that the PKK was seeking a democratic union within Turkey. In November 1995, Ocalan also underlined that the idea of federalisation might be a way of establishing such a union, while also saying that 'I am in love with Turkey, I am not a Kurdish nationalist' (cited in Kirisci and Winrow, 1997: 149).

Ocalan and his associates were all aware of this, and that is why they sent a letter to OSCE leaders, stressing that Turkey could not become a genuine democratic country without resolving its Kurdish issue by peaceful and democratic means. From his prison cell, Ocalan also averred that a democratic resolution would be a certain guarantee for peace in Turkey (Gunter, 2000).

All these attempts succeeded in receiving EU support not only for a stay of execution but also for the idea of democratic resolution to the Kurdish question. After the Turkish Court of Appeals had refused Ocalan's appeal, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), to which Turkey has belonged, immediately issued interim measures calling for the suspension of the execution. Turkey's candidate member status was recognised during the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Hans Joachim Vergau, German ambassador to Turkey, announced that 'if Turkey executes Ocalan, then forget Helsinki' (cited in Gunter, 2008: 82). In addition to the suspension of the execution, a democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue was also acknowledged by the EU as a requirement for membership.

Ever since Ataturk proclaimed the Republic's aim to be the achievement of the level of contemporary civilisation, Turkey had sought to join the West. This eventually came to mean membership of the EU. The achievement of this aim, however, depended on the democratic resolution of the Kurdish issue that was already apparent to Turkish politicians. Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the Motherland Party [*Anavatan Partisi* (ANAP)] underscored,

> [t]he road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir. First of all, we have to strengthen democracy not only in its form but in its substance as well. My party [ANAP] does not see the broadening of rights and freedoms as a danger that threatens the state […] that would, on the contrary, strengthen the state (cited in Kolcak, 2015a: 34).

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Democratic Left Party [*Demokratik Sol Parti* (DSP)] was cautious. His foreign minister Ismail Cem, however, maintained that '[e]veryone should have the right to speak on television in their native language, just as I am sitting here today speaking in my own native tongue' (cited in Gunter, 2008: 83). President Demirel also declared that Turkey should postpone Ocalan's execution in deference to the Republic's higher interests (Kinzer, 2000). All these statements eventually resulted in the postponement of Ocalan's execution until the ECtHR ruled on the relevant appeal.

Whilst suspending the execution, Turkey was also obliged to abrogate capital punishment for EU membership and fulfil the so-called 'Copenhagen Criteria', including provisions on respect for and protection of minority ethnic groups. In fulfilling EU demands, Turkey abolished death penalty. Ocalan's death sentence was rescinded and commuted to life imprisonment in 2002. The Republic also initiated a new democratisation process with the 2001 constitutional revision package (LoT 4709/2001), paving the way for the removal of various bans on Kurdish identity rights. The process was accelerated when the Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AK Party)] came to power in the 2002 general election.

2.7. Kurdish Initiative, Resolution Process and Democratic Products

The conservative, centre-right AK Party recognised Turkey's Kurdish question during its first term in office (2002-2007). Having repeatedly welcomed all ethno-cultural differences in the Anatolian Peninsula, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recognised the Republic's Kurdish problem during his official visit to Diyarbakir in August 2005. The Prime Minister maintained that the cultural

togetherness policy was an assimilationist and repressive policy leading to the emergence of the Kurdish issue. As for the resolution of the issue, he declared that the AK Party government would progressively eliminate the cultural togetherness policy and tolerate different ethno-cultural identities in Turkey (Mitchell, 2012).

While the above Prime Minister's speech was regarded as the beginning of the process in which Turkey would initiate a new democratisation process for the solution of the Kurdish question, the AK Party did not make concrete strides until the 2007 parliamentary election in which the Party repeated its earlier electoral success and secured its absolute majority in Parliament (Guzeldere, 2008). In its second term in office (2007-2011), the AK Party focused on the resolution of the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish issue through the so-called 'Kurdish Initiative', a policy aimed at liberalising Kurdish cultural rights by means of eliminating traditional legal barriers to the exercise of globally-respected freedoms, including freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of peacefully assembly and association, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Nykanen, 2013). Not long after its adoption in May 2009, however, the Kurdish Initiative was fiercely criticised by the political parties in Parliament, except for the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party [*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi* (BDP)][36] – namely the CHP and the Nationalist Action Party [*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (MHP)] – on the grounds that it would lead to national fragmentation. The AK Party government did not abolish the Kurdish Initiative owing to such criticisms, but changed the name of the policy as

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[36] The BDP – the successor of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party [*Demokratik Toplum Partisi* (DTP)], established in August 2005 and closed down by the Constitutional Court in December 2009 on the grounds of becoming the centre of illegal activities – was a pro-Kurdish, left-wing party established in May 2008. During the parliamentary session between 2011 and 2015, BDP deputies joined the newly founded HDP in June 2014. The BDP then changed its name as the DBP in July 2014 and intensified its political operations only in the Kurdish-populated provinces. The HDP became the nation-wide pro-Kurdish party that operates in all regions of Turkey.

the National Unity and Fraternity Project [*Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi*] (Ayata, 2011).

While the National Unity and Fraternity Project was still in operation, the AK Party also paid particular attention to the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish issue during its third term in office (2011-2015). The PKK had withdrawn its militants from Turkey and announced the end of the fifteen-year-long armed conflict in February 2000. Since Turkey did not offer a concrete political resolution to the Kurdish question, the PKK reactivated its attacks in 2004, when the National Intelligence Agency of Turkey [*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı* (MİT)] began to hold secret talks with PKK representatives, including Ocalan, in Turkey and in Oslo. While the second round of the armed conflict was still continuing, Prime Minister Erdogan, in an interview with a private TV station in December 2012, affirmed the continuation of these talks, whilst also announcing that a new process aimed at disarming the PKK would be commenced. Not long after this announcement, the government commenced the Peace Process, or the Resolution Process, a policy seeking to disarm the PKK and rehabilitate its militants, while also continuing to abandon traditional bans on the exercise of Kurdish cultural rights. The Process officially started on the Kurdish national day – Newroz – on 21 March 2013. Ocalan's message 'calling for an end to armed militant struggle' and underscoring the 'need for unity to build a new Turkey' was read in both Turkish and Kurdish by BDP deputies Sirri Sureyya Onder and Pervin Buldan to hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Diyarbakir. In his message, Ocalan declared:

> we have come to a point today where guns shall be silenced and thoughts and ideas shall speak. A modernist paradigm that ignores, denies and externalises has collapsed. Blood is being shed from the heart of this land, regardless of whether it is from a Turk, Kurd, Laz or Circassian. A new era begins now; politics comes to the fore, not arms. Now it is time for our

armed elements to move outside [Turkey's] borders. Our fight has not been against any races, religions or groups. Our fight has been against all kinds of pressure and oppression. Today we are waking up to a new Middle East, a new Turkey and a new future. It is time for unity. Turks and Kurds fought together in Canakkale [Gallipoli] during World War I and launched the Parliament of Turkey together in 1920. I call on everyone to build democratic modernism to escape the pressures that are clearly against history and fraternity. This is not an ending, but a new beginning. This is not giving up the struggle, this is the launching of a different struggle. The ground of the new struggle is ideas, ideologies and democratic politics (cited in Hayatsever, 2013).

Following Ocalan's declaration, the PKK announced a new unilateral ceasefire in April 2013 and declared that it would withdraw its militants from Turkey to Northern Iraq. The outcome of this ceasefire would be the same as that of the previous one. Before turning our attention to the end of the ceasefire, however, let us first list all democratic developments made with the purpose of resolving the Kurdish question:

- The complete lifting of emergency rule in the Kurdish-dominated provinces;[37]

- The adoption of the Law on Providing Compensation for Harm Caused by Terrorism or the Fight against Terrorism;[38]

- The removal of the ban on Kurdish broadcasting rights;[39]

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[37] Having been renewed for forty-six times, the emergency rule was completely lifted in November 2002.

[38] Since the entry into force of the LoT 5233/2004 in April 2004, the Turkish Government has provided compensation for harm caused by terrorism or the fight against terrorism. Many citizens inhabiting the Kurdish-dominated provinces applied to their provincial councils in order to recover their damages. From July 2004 to August 2013, the councils received 364,032 applications in total. They approved 173,875 of these applications as those that should be paid compensation, while rejecting 154,027 applications on the grounds that they did not fulfil the criteria set out in Article 7 of the LoT 5233/2004. Three billion Turkish liras were paid to these approved applications (TBMM, 2013: 335-6). The councils continued to provide the victims of terrorism with compensation in the following years. In 2015, 187 million Turkish liras were paid to 10,196 victims of terrorism in Batman (*Haber 7*, 2015). In the same year, 470 million Turkish liras were paid to about 30,000 victims of terrorism in Bitlis, Mus and Van (*Pusula*, 2015). Similar compensation processes are still continuing in both these provinces and the other Kurdish-occupied ones.

[39] The first attempt at liberalising Kurdish broadcasting rights was made by Article 9 of the 2001 constitutional reform package (LoT 4709/2001). This removed the ban on the usage of languages other than Turkish in expressing and disseminating thoughts and ideas in the media. Article 8(a) of

- The establishment of TRT KURDÎ;[40]

- The adoption of elective Kurdish language courses in public secondary schools;[41]

- The adoption of Kurdish language courses for ordinary citizens;[42]

- The introduction of bilingual (Kurdish-Turkish) education in private schools;[43]

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the LoT 4771/2002 and Article 14(2) of the LoT 4928/2003 then enabled Anatolian languages and dialects other than Turkish, including Kurdish dialects, to be used in the public and private media. These statutory provisions began to be implemented by the Supreme Board of Radio and Television [*Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu* (RTÜK)]. Its initial executive regulations – the 2002 and 2004 RTÜK Regulations – imposed several time and scope restrictions on the use of such languages and dialects in the media. All the restrictions were removed by the 2009 RTÜK Regulation. This regulatory permission was guaranteed in a statutory manner by Article 5 of the new Turkish media law (LoT 6112/2011). There are currently a significant number of private television channels and radio stations that broadcast in Kurdish in Turkey. The list of such channels and stations can be reached at http://kurtce.tvfrekansi.com/. For more details, see Kolcak (2016).

[40] TRT KURDÎ is a publicly-funded television channel broadcasting in the Kurmanji, Sorani and Zazaki dialects of Kurdish for 24 hours a day since January 2009. This television channel was established by the LoT 5767/2008. This permitted the Radio and Television Corporation of Turkey [*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu* (TRT)] to broadcast in any language or dialect other than Turkish (art. 6(5)). TRT KURDÎ is still airing its programmes on Kurdish cuisine, culture, history, literature, as well as general interest programs on debates, news, health, travel, religion and cartoons for children. For more details, see Kolcak (2016).

[41] Turkey established a new education system with the LoT 6287/2012 that extended compulsory education from 8 to 12 years. This new education system permitted public secondary schools to provide elective language courses in Anatolian languages and dialects other than Turkish. All public secondary schools are now obliged to provide such elective courses should they be demanded by at least ten students. There were almost 21,000 students taking such elective courses in the 2012-2013 school year. The number reached about 85,000 in the 2015-2016 session. For more details, see Kolcak (2016).

[42] Kurdish language courses for ordinary Kurdish citizens began to be established after Article 11 of the LoT 4771/2002 and Article 23 of the LoT 4963/2003 had enabled private language courses to teach Anatolian languages and dialects other than Turkish. There were a significant number of Kurdish language courses that had been closed down due to various problems in the 2000s, e.g. the lack of Kurdish language tutors; the absence of financial assistance from the State; and some challenges pertaining to the curriculum of the courses. There are now a significant number of public and private courses teaching Kurdish, including NGOs – such as the Geoaktif Culture and Activism Centre and the Istanbul Kurdish Institute – municipalities (e.g. Baykan District Municipality, Tatvan District Municipality and Yenisehir District Municipality) and public universities (e.g. Dicle University, Siirt University and Tunceli University). For more details, see Kolcak (2016).

[43] Article 11 of the LoT 6529/2014, known as the 'Democratisation Package', allowed for the establishment of private schools using Anatolian languages and dialects other than Turkish as the language of education. In order to implement this statutory provision, the Ministry of National Education amended its Regulation on Private Schools in July 2014. This introduced a four-step administrative procedure for bilingual education in Turkish and other Anatolian languages or dialects (art. 49): a) any private school intending to use an Anatolian language or dialect other than Turkish should initially apply to the Ministry; b) the Ministry should then make a decision on whether the school fulfils all general requirements set out in the Regulation; c) having authorised the opening of the school, the Ministry should also determine in which courses (such as geography, maths, music, etc.) the school can use the language other than Turkish; and finally d) the school should be allowed to conduct bilingual education. Since the entry into force of this regulatory provision, a dramatic

- The abolition of the radical nationalist oath (*Andımız*);[44]

- The elimination of the prohibition on the use of Kurdish personal names;[45]

- The removal of the ban on the usage of Kurdish place names;[46]

- The establishment of Kurdish degree programs at public universities;[47]

- The elimination of the prohibition on the use of Kurdish in making political propaganda;[48]

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number of private schools carrying out bilingual education in Kurdish and Turkish have been established, e.g. the Primary School of Ferzad Kemanger in Diyarbakir, the Primary School of Berivan Berivan in Sirnak, the Primary School of Fatma Tokat in Van, the Primary School of Uveys Ana in Hakkari and the Primary School of Ehmet Bayhan in Mardin. It is worth noting that these schools have conducted bilingual education as educational support centres so far, since they have not satisfied all criteria laid out in the Regulation. For more details, see Kolcak (2016).

[44] The Ministry of National Education abolished Article 12 of its Regulation on Primary Education Institutions on 8 October 2013. This eliminated the requirement of uttering the morning vow.

[45] In liberalising the use of Kurdish personal names, the first attempt was made with the LoT 4928/2003. This removed the ban on the use of non-Turkish personal names by amending Article 16(4) of the Civil Registry Law (LoT 1587/1972). The removal did not, however, create a full liberal environment for the usage of all Kurdish personal names because Article 222 of the Turkish Penal Code (LoT 5237/2004) was still punishing the use of non-Turkish letters – Q, X and W (common in Kurdish). This provision of the Penal Code was abrogated by the LoT 6529/2014 in March 2014, thereby allowing Kurdish parents to give their newborns Kurdish names, including Bawer, Berwan, Ciwan, Dijwan, Xwezan, Bedirxan and Rojbin. For more details, see Kolcak (2016).

[46] The usage of Kurdish place names was liberalised with Article 16(a) of the LoT 6529/2014, which abrogated Article 2(1)(d) of the Law on Provincial Administration (LoT 5442/1949) – the article enabling the alteration of non-Turkish place names. For the restoration of non-Turkish place names, there is now a two-fold procedure: 1) restoring non-Turkish names of towns and provinces; and 2) restoring non-Turkish names of other places, including neighbourhoods, streets and villages. The former procedure can be completed through acts of Parliament (art. 2(1)(a) of the LoT 5442/1949), while the completion of the latter requires a three-step bureaucratic process: non-Turkish place names should initially be restored by provincial councils and municipal assemblies; such a restoration should then be submitted to the Ministry of Interior Affairs; and the Ministry should endorse the restoration. A restoration process has continued since May 2014, and many non-Turkish place names have been restored so far. For instance, the villages of Catili, Cinarsu, Dereyamac and Oyacik in Siirt have been renamed as Sinep, Hatrant, Fersaf and Teylan, respectively. For more examples, see Kolcak (2016).

[47] The Cabinet Decree 15597/2009 allowed the opening of research centres providing degree programs in Anatolian languages and dialects other than Turkish. This enabled Mardin Artuklu University to open the Living Language Institute, which offers postgraduate education in Kurdish. Following this university, many others located in the Kurdish-populated region – e.g. Bingol University, Siirt University, Tunceli University, Dicle University and Van Yuzuncu Yil University – began to offer degree programs in Kurdish, after having been authorised by the Higher Education Board [*Yükseköğretim Kurulu* (YÖK)], such as a BA in Kurdish Language and Literature, a BA in Zazaki Dialect and Literature, an MA in Kurdish Language and Dialects, and a PhD in Kurdish Language and Literature. The total number of graduates of these Kurdish degree programs has reached 1,500. For more details, see Kolcak (2016).

[48] The LoT 6529/2014 abolished Article 43(3) of the Law on Political Parties (LoT 2820/1983), which had prohibited the use of languages other than Turkish in making political propaganda. Kurdish has been used during all the electoral campaign periods since the abolition of this statutory provision in March 2014, the campaign periods of the 2014 local elections, the 2014 presidential

- The adoption of the right to defence in Kurdish in courts;[49] and

- The adoption of the Framework Law on Ending Terrorism and Strengthening Communal Integrity.[50]

All these positive developments were followed by the so-called 'Dolmabahce Agreement', a ten-point roadmap for an ultimate solution of the Kurdish problem that had been unveiled on 28 February 2015 by a *de facto* committee, consisting of Deputy Prime Minister Yalcin Akdogan, Minister of Interior Affairs Efkan Ala, AK Party Deputy Parliamentary Group Chair Mahir Unal and three pro-Kurdish HDP deputies – Sirri Sureyya Onder, Idris Baluken and Pervin Buldan. According to the Agreement, the following ten points are the first steps in turning the 2013 ceasefire into an enduring peace:

- Understanding the definition and content of democratic politics;

- Comprehending the regional and national dimensions of democratic resolution;

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election, the 2015 general election and the 2015 snap general election. For more details, see Kolcak (2016).

[49] Ethnic Kurds have been allowed to use their mother tongue in courts by Article 1 of the LoT 6411/2013, which entered into force in January 2013. It is worth noting that a defendant or complainant intending to defence herself in Kurdish should provide the court with a translator who would translate Kurdish into Turkish. In addition to the right to defence in Kurdish, the Ministry of Justice have enabled the Kurds to use their native tongue during prison visits through amending Article 41(1) of the Regulation on Prison Visits in November 2009.

[50] This act (LoT 6551/2014), entering into force on 16 July 2014, is the law providing the Resolution Process certain legal status (art. 1). According to this statute, the Council of Ministers is the responsible organ for making all necessary decisions concerning the Resolution Process (art. 3(1)). The secretary and coordination of the Process is the responsibility of the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security, an organ of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (art. 3(2)). Article 2 of the act reads the responsibilities of the Council of Ministers as follows: (i) determining necessary initiatives in the areas of politics, law, human rights, culture, security and disarmament, and psychology that would be launched with the purposes of ending terrorism and strengthening communal integrity; (ii) developing dialogue with domestic or foreign actors; (iii) taking necessary social measures for those PKK militants who lay down their arms; (iv) informing the public about the Resolution Process; (v) and coordinating all institutions taking part in the Process and supervising their works. Finally, Article 4(2) of the act stipulates that officials tasked with any issue concerning Article 2 of the act do not have judicial, administrative or criminal liability in completing their tasks. For a detailed analysis of this act, see Celikkan, Balta, Celik, Mutluer and Korkut (2015).

- Understanding and recognising the legal and democratic guarantees of liberal citizenship;

- Comprehending the relationships of democratic politics with the state and the nation, and institutionalising these relationships;

- Determining and resolving socio-economic issues concerning the Resolution Process;

- Providing legal resolutions and guarantees in the areas of culture, ecology and women rights;

- Developing a pluralist approach in defining and recognising the term 'identity';

- Understanding the relationship between democracy and security without threatening public order and individual freedoms;

- Determining the standards of a democratic republic, homeland and nation, and providing such standards with pluralist constitutional and legal guarantees; and

- Creating a new constitution embracing and welcoming all the aforementioned points of this agreement.[51]

2.8. Ending Peace and Reigniting Hostilities

Following the announcement of the Dolmabahce Agreement, Ocalan urged the PKK to hold a congress in the spring of 2015 to discuss disarmament in Turkey. In turn, the AK Party government declared its intention to successfully complete the Resolution Process before the 2015 general election that would be held on 7 June. Not long after, however, this positive atmosphere began to collapse over the

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[51] For the original Turkish version of the Agreement, see Cicek and Coskun (2016: 9-10).

establishment of a group of observers to monitor formal talks between Ocalan and state officials in March 2015. Once Deputy Prime Minister Yalcin Akdogan announced that 'there would be such a monitoring committee consisting of five or six members, some of whom have already been identified' (cited in *Hürriyet*, 2015), President Recep Tayyip Erdogan immediately criticised this announcement: 'I am completely against such a committee. Officials of the National Intelligence Agency should be the only actors taking part in those talks' (cited in *Ülke*, 2015).[52] This was not the President's only criticism. He also declared that the term 'agreement' was not the accurate word to be used for the roadmap unveiled at Dolmabahce Palace:

> What is the Dolmabahce agreement? Where did this come from? There is no such an agreement. Why? Because here there is the [AK Party] government on the one hand and a political party on the other. Who is reaching an agreement with whom, on what and for what purpose? (cited in *Turkish Minute*, 2015).

The Peace Process, which had already been negatively affected by the Kobane Crisis, the above declarations and similar statements made during the campaign period of the 2015 general election, did not end with a resolution to the Kurdish question.[53] The Process ended with the termination of the two-year-long ceasefire in July 2015. In the 7 June election, the AK Party was the largest party, but lost its absolute

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[52] Erdogan, the founding leader of the AK Party, was elected as President of Turkey in the 2014 presidential election, held on 10 August. After Erdogan had been sworn in as the 12th President of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu became the new leader of the AK Party and the new Prime Minister of Turkey on 28 August.

[53] The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [*ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām* (DAESH)], an internationally-recognised terrorist organisation, launched the siege of Kobane, a Kurdish-populated province in Northern Syria, on 13 September 2014. In response to this military attempt, once Ankara refused to support the pro-Kurdish People's Protection Units [*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel* (YPG)] – an armed group in Northern Syria considered by Turkey as the Syrian wing of the PKK – the HDP organised public protests. This led to various street clashes between the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement [*Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi* (YDG-H)] – an armed organisation founded by the youth sympathising the PKK – and supporters of the HÜDA-PAR, a pro-Kurdish, Islamist political party founded in 2012, in the Kurdish-dominated provinces and between the YDG-H and ultranationalist Turkish groups in the other regions of the country. The street clashes dramatically polarised the public during a period when the Peace Process was still being pursued. They cost 46 lives and left 682 wounded and 323 arrested. For more details, see Amnesty International (AI) (2015); Human Rights Association (İHD) (2014).

majority in Parliament (258 out of 550 seats), while the pro-Kurdish HDP crossed

the nation-wide ten per cent electoral threshold and gained 80 seats in Parliament.

The CHP (132 seats) and the MHP (80 seats) also obtained parliamentary seats. Just

after the election, on 8 June, Deputy Prime Minister Yalcin Akdogan furiously

announced that:

> the HDP can only make the movie of the peace process from now on. The peace does not come by saying 'peace, peace'. If they got 13 per cent of the vote, then they should call on Qandil [the headquarters of the PKK in Northern Iraq] and the PKK to lay down their arms. I express my gratitude to our people who allowed the AK Party to be the leading party. Our priority is Turkey (cited in *Hurriyet Daily News*, 2015).

Following this announcement, President Erdogan repeated his earlier position on the

Dolmabahce Agreement, with an approach demonstrating the HDP not as 'a

legitimate, moderate interlocutor for the Peace Process' as Goksel (2015) argues, but

as the political wing of the PKK:

> I, by no means, accept the expression of Dolmabahce agreement. If a step is to be taken concerning the future of the country, it should be taken at the Turkish Parliament. An agreement cannot be made with those [the HDP] who lean their backs on the terrorist organisation [PKK] (cited *in Daily Sabah*, 2015).

While these statements were already preparing the end of the Peace Process, the

final step was taken by the PKK, which announced the end of the two-year-old

ceasefire on 11 July:

> guerrilla fighters would begin targeting dams in Southeast Turkey. The Turkish State has used the ceasefire not for a democratic political solution but for preparing for a new war and strengthening its hand in this future war, by building dozens of military posts, roads and dams for the use of the military […]. We have repeatedly warned the Turkish State not to build military posts, roads and dams for military use and stressed that these would mean the end of the ceasefire and the start of a war. Our people have stood as human shields in the face of such moves that would start this war and many of our people, including the youth, lost their lives in the attacks by the state (cited in *Nenanews*, 2015).

This announcement was the final step in ending the Peace Process without reaching an ultimate political resolution to the Kurdish question. Not long after the announcement, on 22 July, some PKK sympathisers killed two Turkish police officers in the province of Sanliurfa.[54] There was a rapid response from Turkey: hundreds of people were arrested with suspected links to the PKK (*Bianet*, 2015), while PKK training camps in Northern Iraq were bombed by F-16 jets (*Aljazeera Turk*, 2015), leading to a new round of armed conflict that is continuing at the time of writing.

The armed conflict was mainly in the form of urban warfare between Turkish security forces and the PKK-affiliated Civil Protection Units [*Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl* (YPS)] – an umbrella organisation of all armed groups of the YDG-H – from July 2015 to June 2016.[55] Since then the conflict has returned to conventional guerrilla warfare. The armed wings of the PKK – the People's Defence Forces [*Hêzên Parastina Gel* (HPG)] and the Free Women's Units [*Yekîneyên Jinên Azad ên Star* (YJA-STAR)] – have been pursuing their fight against Turkish security forces using tactics such as ambushes, raids, sabotages, suicide attacks, car bomb attacks and hit-and-run attacks.

The Resolution Process has completely collapsed. The new round of the armed conflict has cost thousands of lives, including Turkish security forces, Kurdish

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[54] Turkish officials declared that the attack was carried out by the PKK. This declaration was rejected by Demhat Agit, a leading PKK official, who announced that the attack was conducted by some PKK sympathisers not in control of the PKK (Hamsici, 2015).

[55] The AK Party could not find a junior coalition partner from among the parties in Parliament – the CHP, MHP and HDP – after the 7 June election. This resulted in a snap election on 1 November in which the AK Party regained its absolute majority in Parliament (317 seats). The other seats were won by the CHP (134), HDP (59) and MHP (40) (Onis, 2016). A new AK Party cabinet was then formed under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoglu. Just after the 4 May meeting in which Prime Minister Davutoglu and President Erdogan could 'not manage to smooth out their [political] differences', Davutoglu resigned from the office, resulting in the foundation of a new AK Party government under the leadership of Binali Yildirim (Letsch, 2016).

rebels and civilian citizens.[56] In addition, at least 500,000 Kurds have been forced to leave their homes, and numerous curfews had been imposed by the State to remove the barricades and trenches set up by the YPS in the central areas of several Kurdish-populated provinces (AI, 2016b: 9; Gurcan, 2016: 48-53).[57] Moreover, hundreds of pro-Kurdish civil society organisations have been closed down on the grounds of having ties to the PKK (AI, 2017: 46-7; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2017b; OHCHR, 2017: 20-21). Furthermore, more than 10,000 pro-Kurdish politicians and activists, including HDP deputies, whose parliamentary immunities have been lifted through a constitutional amendment made by the TBMM on 20 May 2016, DBP co-mayors and thousands of HDP and DBP party members, have been detained, prosecuted and/or arrested with suspected links to the PKK (AI, 2016a; HRW, 2017a; İHD, 2017: 46-72). Finally, trustees have been appointed by the Interior Ministry to run 94 municipalities, including Diyarbakir, Mardin and Van Metropolitan Municipalities, which had been run by DBP co-mayors before their arrest or dismissal (ICG, 2017: 9; İHOP, 2018: 44-47).

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[56] According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the armed conflict has taken at least 2,981 lives since the breakdown of the ceasefire in July 2015. Among the deaths confirmed by the ICG's open-source data collection, almost half were PKK militants (1,378), followed by Turkish security forces (976) and civilians (408). 'The remainder (219) were "youths of unknown affiliation", a category created to account for confirmed urban deaths, aged 16-35, who cannot be positively identified as civilians or members of the PKK or its urban youth wing' (Mandiraci, 2017). According to Turkish official sources, the recent armed conflict has a larger death toll. 10,091 PKK militants (7,071 killed, 1, 983 captured and 1,037 surrendered) were neutralised from July 2015 to April 2017 (Oymak, 2017). During the same period, the PKK and PKK-affiliated Kurdistan Freedom Falcons [*Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan* (TAK)] conducted various attacks against Turkish security forces, including 80 car bomb and suicide attacks (Coskun, 2016e, 2016f; Duran, 2016). All these attacks cost hundreds of lives, including 593 civilians, 553 soldiers, 303 police officers and 63 village guards (*Diken*, 2017). In addition, according to the weekly reports of the Interior Ministry, which are available at: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/basin-aciklamalari, 1,552 more PKK militants (970 killed, 208 captured and 374 surrendered) were neutralised between April 2017 and February 2018, rendering the total number of the neutralised PKK militants from July 2015 to February 2018 11,643 (8,041 killed, 2,191 captured and 1,411 surrendered).

[57] For more details, see the Human Rights Joint Platform [*İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu* (İHOP)] (2018); TİHV (2016, 2017); ICG (2016, 2017); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2017).

2.9. Inabilities of Securitisation and Socio-economic Approaches

Turkey has been trying to resolve the Kurdish issue through its traditional two approaches rather than coming up with a political resolution formula for the issue since the end of the Peace Process in July 2015. The Republic is unlikely to solve its long-running political problem through these approaches. Let me examine the inabilities of the two approaches in depth.

In accordance with its securitisation approach, Turkey tries to convince its citizens to accept the Kurdish question not as a political problem but as the PKK question threatening its national unity and territorial integrity. It acknowledges the eventual victory of its security forces against the PKK as the only way of resolving this question. It recognises the identity rights and political representation demands of Kurdish society as those made solely by the PKK-affiliated groups, but not by all segments of that society. It regards such demands as injurious to its national unity and territorial integrity. It narrows the democratic political arena with the purpose of rendering any critical analysis of the Kurdish issue an attempt aimed at dismantling its national unity and territorial integrity. It detains, prosecutes and/or arrests human rights activists, intellectuals, journalists, politicians and other individuals who support the democratic and peaceful solution of the Kurdish question by political means allowing for the fulfilment of Kurdish demands on the grounds of having suspected links to the PKK. It closes down civil society organisations on the grounds of having suspected ties to the PKK.

The Republic is unlikely to resolve its Kurdish issue through using the above security methods. The main reason for this failure is the inaccurate definition of the issue under the securitisation approach. It is true that the issue has an armed conflict dimension that might be called 'the PKK problem', but it also has political

dimensions that can only be solved by democratic and peaceful means rather than the securitisation approach.

If Turkey had defeated the PKK, would this dissolution mean the solution of the Kurdish problem? The answer is no. This dissolution might solve the armed conflict dimension of the problem, but its identity rights dimension would still be waiting for a political formula without which it is unlikely to be solved. As Coskun (2016c) emphasises, ethnic Kurds would not give up their multiculturalist demands for a new pluralist constitution, mother tongue education and a comprehensive decentralisation policy. It can only be resolved by political reforms recognising, protecting and promoting Kurdish identity and its characteristics in both public and private realms. Having dissolved the PKK, Turkey would still need to resolve another dimension of the problem by satisfying the multiculturalist Kurdish demands (Kramer, 2000: 52).

One may still argue that ethnic Kurds would give up their multiculturalist demands after the dissolution of the PKK. This is unlikely to happen. As it will be noted in Chapter 6, these demands are made not solely by the PKK but by almost all segments of Kurdish society. It is unrealistic to expect that these demands would be renounced by the Kurds following the dissolution of the PKK. Anyone with a knowledge of the history of Turkey would dismiss this argument.

Multiculturalist demands were voiced by the Kurds in the early years of the Republic. They rebelled against the coercive or repressive assimilation policies of the Republic eighteen times. The Republic succeeded in quashing all these uprisings, but failed to convince its Kurdish citizens to give up their identity rights and demands for political representation. These unsuccessful Kurdish insurgent movements did not lead the Kurds to renounce their multiculturalist demands. Even

though they encountered numerous social, political and judicial problems, the Kurds continued to ask Turkey to satisfy the demands. The Republic's refusal to fulfil the demands by adopting a political formula resulted in a better organised and more powerful insurgent movement with the establishment of the PKK. In the absence of such a political formula, the Kurds not only continued to democratically voice their multiculturalist demands, but also formed a new insurgent organisation using violent methods.

A similar scenario is likely to occur following the dissolution of the PKK as well. Having dissolved the PKK, Turkey might expect the Kurds to become integrated into its republican values without asking for the adoption of any multiculturalist policy. The Kurds are unlikely to meet this expectation. They would still call on the Republic to fulfil their identity rights and demands for political representation after the dissolution of the PKK. Turkey may still insist on refusing to offer a political resolution formula satisfying the demands. This refusal would stimulate a new Kurdish insurgent movement voicing more radical demands and using more violent methods than the PKK.

I have argued that Turkey is unable to solve the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish question through the securitisation approach. This approach may not solve the conflict either. Turkey had used various repressive security methods in order to end the violence in the 1980s and 1990s. These methods have not resulted in the dissolution of the PKK, but a PKK strengthening its support among ethnic Kurds.

It is likely that Turkey's current securitisation approach will have similar consequences. The new round of the armed conflict has cost thousands of lives. It has obliged 500,000 Kurds to leave their homes. It has worsened education and

social life in the East and Southeast. It has inflicted psychological and social damage to the Kurds. It has damaged cultural and historical heritage of several Kurdish-dominated provinces. It has caused traumas that will be difficult to heal, particularly for Kurdish children. Furthermore, more than 10,000 pro-Kurdish politicians and activists have been detained, prosecuted and/or arrested with suspected links to the PKK, and hundreds of pro-Kurdish civil society organisations have been closed down on the grounds of having ties to the PKK.

The current securitisation approach has restricted the political arena in which the Kurds can freely express their democratic demands. It has also put numerous individual Kurds in an awkward position both in the Kurdish-populated provinces, where they have faced various economic, educational and social problems, and in the Turkish-occupied provinces, where they have experienced physical and verbal attacks by ultra-nationalist Turks (Yanmis, 2016: 40-1). As Belge (2016a, 2016b, 2016c), Cemal (2016a, 2016b, 2016c), Coskun (2016a, 2016b), and Yanmis (2016) underline, all these problems and attacks may significantly damage the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks, and accordingly dampen the Kurds' desire for coexistence. Moreover, they may radicalise ethnic Kurds, especially Kurdish youth, who may begin to consider violent methods as the sole way of persuading Turkey to satisfy Kurdish demands, stimulating them to join the PKK (Akyol, 2016; Bayramoglu, 2015; Candar, 2016a; Coskun, 2016d). This radicalisation would produce a constant and dramatic increase in the number of PKK recruits, making the resolution of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish question through the securitisation approach very difficult (Cicek and Coskun, 2016: 21-2; Sevinc, 2016; Todorova, 2015: 118; Ustundag, 2015). Hence, the securitisation approach might also prevent Turkey from ending the armed conflict.

It seems that ordinary citizens are aware of the inability of the securitisation approach to solve the problem. According to a recent survey-based report, prepared by the Euroasia Public Opinion Research Centre [*Avrasya Kamuoyu Araştırmaları Merkezi* (AKAM)] in 2016, a vast majority of Turkey's population (74.4 per cent) are of the belief that the Kurdish issue can be resolved through political dialogues, but not through the securitisation approach, while only 22.2 per cent of the population regard security methods as enabling the Republic to solve the issue (Aslangul, 2016). Having answered why Turkey is unlikely to resolve the issue through security methods, let me now turn my attention to whether the Republic can solve the issue via socio-economic methods.

Many Turkish state officials and political elites who define the Kurdish issue not as an ethno-political problem but as a problem of regional terrorism rooted in feudalism, ignorance and poverty argue that Turkey may resolve the issue through improving socio-economic conditions in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. They maintain that the improvement would suppress ethno-nationalist attitudes and beliefs among Turkish-citizen Kurds, eventually rendering them new loyal citizens of the Republic backing its Turkish-based integrationist policies.[58] This argument can easily be dismissed.

The socio-economic approach is a product of modernisation theory. This assumes that socio-economic underdevelopment and backwardness increase the likelihood of ethno-nationalism and separatism, while higher levels of income and education weaken primordial ethnic loyalties and identifications and reduce the likelihood of ethno-nationalism and secessionism (Sarigil and Karakoc, 2016: 336). There are

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[58] For all details of the socio-economic approach, see Brown (1995); Cornell (2001); Icduygu, Romano and Sirkeci (1999); Kushner (1997); Loizides (2010); Lundgren (2007); Mutlu (2001); White (1998); Yegen (1996, 2007, 2011).

some significant studies confirming the assumptions of modernisation theory. For example, in his comprehensive study analysing various separatist movements around the globe, Donald Horowitz concludes that 'rich regions are not the leading secessionists. They are far outnumbered by regions poor in resources and productivity' (1981: 170). In his later study scrutinising African, Asian and Caribbean ethno-nationalist movements, Horowitz (1985: 233-9) finds a similar result: backward groups in economically and socially underdeveloped regions are more likely to support ethno-nationalism and separatism. Gellner (1983), Hayes and McAllister (2001), Hechter (1975, 1992), and O'Gara (2001) agree that rich groups in economically and socially well-developed regions are less likely to support ethno-nationalism and separatism.

Other studies have questioned these arguments. For instance, John Wood argues in his comprehensive article examining separatist movements as social and political phenomena that 'there are many instances of economically worse-off people who do not attempt secession, as well as some cases of better-off people who do ([Yugoslav] Croatians, [Nigerian] Ibos, [Spanish] Basques [and Catalans])' (1981: 116). Similarly, in his pioneering work scrutinising various ethno-nationalist and secessionist movements in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, the Middle East and Africa, Ted Robert Gurr notes that 'Spanish Basques [and Catalans], [Canadian] Quebecois, [Soviet] Armenians, [Soviet] Ukrainians, and [Yugoslav] Slovenes all were separatist in the 1980s despite regional prosperity, limited autonomy, and significant national political influence' (1993: 82).

In addition to these works questioning the assumptions of modernisation theory, there are also other studies disproving them. In his Soviet-specific analysis, Henry Hale concludes that there is a strong positive correlation between socio-economic

development and secession, meaning that the more a regionally concentrated ethnic group is economically and socially developed, the more it is willing to secede (Hale, 2000: 44-48). In their Russia-specific study examining popular support for secessionism among Russians and non-Russian titular nationalities in ten autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, Hagendoorn, Poppe and Minescu reach a similar conclusion that socio-economic development and prosperity are likely to promote secessionism rather than suppress it (2008: 365-9). Many other studies, including Emizet and Hesli (1995); Frye (1992); Roeder (1991); Sambanis and Milanovic (2011); Sorens (2004); Treisman (1997); Wallerstein (1961), agree that socio-economically advantaged groups are more prone to ethnic activism, nationalism and separatism in comparison with their disadvantaged counterparts.

In light of all these studies contesting the assumptions of modernisation theory, we may argue that increases in the socio-economic status of Eastern and South-eastern Turkey might not decrease or restrain the likelihood of Kurdish ethno-nationalism; instead, it may result in the opposite. I should emphasise that I am not saying socio-economic development would certainly engender a more powerful Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement that might perhaps back even an outright independent Kurdish state established in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia, or an irredentist formula asking for the amalgamation of all Kurdish-dominated regions in the Middle East under the title of a new Kurdish nation-state. I argue that having been socio-economically developed, ethnic Kurds might not become the loyal citizens of Turkey who support all integrationist policies recognising, protecting and promoting solely Turkish identity. The Kurds would still voice their identity rights and demands for political representation and call on Turkey to offer a multiculturalist political formula enabling the recognition, protection and promotion

of Kurdish identity. In the absence of such a formula, the socio-economic approach would not enable the Republic to solve its long-running political question.

The Kurds have made some socio-economic demands, e.g. introducing province-based projects on agricultural, rural and livestock development; initiating a comprehensive demining process to obtain new agricultural and grazing lands in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia; providing entrepreneurs with special grants and loans to set up factories in the two regions; providing regional infrastructural investments, especially in the areas of transportation and energy; launching new government policies to advance nature and winter tourism in the regions; and constructing cultural, rehabilitation and social centres for children and women (ASSAM, 2015: 3-4; Kurban and Yolacan, 2008: 6-9). The fulfilment of these socio-economic demands and their similar counterparts would contribute to the ultimate resolution of the Kurdish issue, but the Kurds are unlikely to give up their identity rights and demands for political representation following the satisfaction of the socio-economic demands.

A significant number of Kurdish-specific studies also suggest the improbability of such a scenario. In their interview-based work examining whether Turkey can solve its Kurdish question only through the socio-economic approach, Kurban and Yolacan (2008) conclude that the approach may contribute to the eventual solution of the problem, but if the Republic embraces this approach alone, it would be unable to resolve the problem. If socio-economic demands have been fulfilled, the Kurds would still ask for the satisfaction of their multiculturalist demands. This requires Turkey to introduce a political settlement allowing for the recognition, protection and promotion of Kurdish identity and its characteristics in both public and private areas. Many other interview- and survey-based studies, including Al (2016);

ASSAM (2015); Sarigil (2010); Sarigil and Fazlioglu (2014); Sarigil and Karakoc (2016), agree with Kurban and Yolacan (2008) that the socio-economic approach, without a political settlement aimed at addressing the political aspirations of the Kurds, would be incapable of solving Turkey's long-running political problem.

The socio-economic approach might contribute to the ultimate resolution of the Kurdish issue, but this approach alone would not enable Turkey to solve the issue because the Republic would still need to come up with a political formula satisfying the multiculturalist Kurdish demands. I am not the only researcher who considers such a formula as one of the most essential steps that Turkey should take in the eventual solution of the Kurdish problem. The scholars whose strong support for a multiculturalist Turkey will be recorded in Chapters 3 and 4 – such as Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, Kubilay Arin, Cuma Cicek, Cetin Gurer, Fuat Keyman, Kemal Kirisci, Levent Koker, Bulent Kucuk, Baskin Oran, Umut Ozkirimli, Ceren Ozselcuk, to name just a few – agree. Despite not offering any multiculturalist political formula, numerous academics, columnists, human rights activists and other intellectuals – e.g. Aktoprak (2014); Bayramoglu (2016a, 2016b); Cakir (2010); Calislar (2016a, 2016b, 2016c); Cemal (2016b, 2016d); Coskun (2016c, 2016d); Ekmekci (2014); Ensaroglu (2013); Goksel and Mandiraci (2016); Gultekin (2016); Gunter (2016); Kahraman (2015); Kayhan-Pusane (2014); Kentel (2015, 2016a, 2016b); Larrabee and Tol (2011); Mert (2016a, 2016b); Mousseau (2012); Nykanen (2013); Onanc (2016); Ozhan and Ete (2009); Selcen (2016, 2017); Somer (2015); Tekdemir (2016); Yegen (2016c, 2016d, 2016e) – also agree that Turkey is unlikely to resolve its Kurdish question without coming up with a multiculturalist political formula enabling the satisfaction of Kurdish demands.

2.10. Conclusion

The Kurdish issue is one of the most important political problems of Turkey that has an identity rights and armed conflict dimension. The former is the consequence of various assimilationist Turkification policies implemented by way of the cultural togetherness policy that was an official policy implemented by the early republican regime, the military administrations ruling the country following the military coups and their successor governments. Since the Republic had not resolved the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish question, and since it had continued to use assimilationist and repressive methods to manage the Kurds, the Kurdish problem produced its other main dimension with the foundation of the PKK, namely the armed conflict dimension.

Between the early 2000s and April 2015, Turkey launched a significant number of reforms so as to solve the two dimensions of the problem. During this period, the Kurdish Initiative and the Resolution Process were the main policies by which several democratic strides were made, e.g. the removal of various constitutional and legal bans on Kurdish cultural rights; and the legalisation of the Resolution Process. But nevertheless, this period did not lead to the adoption of an ultimate political resolution to the Kurdish question. The Peace Process ended without reaching such a resolution, creating an environment in which a new round of armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish security forces has continued since July 2015.

The Republic has been trying to solve the Kurdish question through its securitisation and socio-economic approaches since the end of the Peace Process. I argue that neither approach is likely to enable Turkey to resolve the Kurdish issue. Securitisation might prevent the Republic from solving not only the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish problem but also its armed conflict counterpart. Economic

development might contribute to the ultimate solution of the problem, but it alone would not allow Turkey to solve the problem since the Republic would still need to offer a political resolution formula fulfilling the multiculturalist Kurdish demands. In the next chapter, I will try to explain why Turkey should adopt a policy of multiculturalism in dealing with its ethno-cultural diversity and in resolving this long-running political issue.

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Chapter 3

Why Should Turkey Adopt Multiculturalism?

3.1. Introduction

In managing its ethno-cultural diversity, Turkey uses an integrationist approach under which the Republic recognises Kurdish and other minority identities in the private domain, but then asks all its minority ethnic groups, including the Kurds, to converge on Turkish identity in the public realm. I argue that it might be better for Turkey to replace its integrationist policy, which is built on the nation-building principle, with a policy of multiculturalism for both normative and pragmatic reasons.

From a normative perspective, the current integrationist policy renders Turkey a country unable to ensure true equality between ethnic Kurds and Turks. It would be better for the Republic to introduce a multiculturalist policy. Such a policy would ensure equality between the two ethnic groups. It would enable both Turkish and Kurdish identities to be recognised, protected and promoted in both public and private realms, eventually enabling the Kurds to establish, secure and develop their own culture.

The normative argument is not the only reason to call on the Republic to replace its integrationist policy with a multiculturalist one. There are also pragmatic reasons for suggesting that Turkey is less likely to solve its Kurdish problem via political methods that aim to manage ethno-cultural diversity without establishing a multicultural arena. The Republic cannot resolve the Kurdish question through its current integrationist policy nor its pro-Islamic version, which is supported by such prominent Turkish scholars as Burhanettin Duran, Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan. These solutions cannot satisfy the main Kurdish demands – e.g. the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity; the recognition of Kurdish as an official language and the acknowledgement of Kurdish as the language of instruction that can be used in public schools and universities. In order to fulfil these demands, Turkey is required to make various multicultural reforms allowing for the recognition, preservation and promotion of Kurdish identity and its characteristics in the private and public domains.

Such reforms are impossible while Turkey is employing assimilation to manage ethno-cultural diversity. Any assimilationist policy prohibits the acknowledgement, preservation and advancement of the Republic's ethno-cultural diversity. An assimilationist Turkey is unable to fulfil Kurdish demands.

Pragmatism compels me to consider secession as another method of managing ethno-cultural diversity without establishing a multicultural arena where not only majority but also minority identities are recognised, preserved and promoted. This method might not be optimal. Although it is considered by Ismail Besikci as a way of solving the Kurdish problem, secession is not appropriate because it is rejected by most sectors of Turkey's Kurdish society.

This chapter proceeds as follows. It first analyses Turkey's present policy of integration. It then examines how multiculturalism deals with the issue of managing ethno-cultural diversity. It then explains why it is better for the Republic to take a multiculturalist position from a normative perspective. Finally, this chapter examines several pragmatic reasons why it might be better for Turkey to introduce a multiculturalist policy.

3.2. Integration: Turkey's Current Policy on Managing its Ethno-cultural Diversity

Integration is constructed on, what Charles Taylor calls, a 'politics of universalism' (1992: 37). It is this method that Turkey uses in managing its ethno-cultural diversity. Before analysing the Turkish case in depth, let me first provide some basic information about this universalist way of managing ethno-cultural diversity. There are two parts to this approach. First, it grants every individual citizen a full package of standard liberal rights and entitlements, such as rights to freedom of association, conscience and speech, and entitlements to several protections of the welfare state. Second, it asks the state to embrace a stance of 'difference-blindness' with respect to the ethno-cultural differences of its citizens (Choudhry, 2008b: 146; Patten, 2008: 93).

The first part of the universalist approach attempts to deal with ethno-cultural differences by allowing individuals to 'enjoy the freedom to form, express, and revise cultural and other identities in the spheres of private life and civil society' (Patten, 2008: 94). The second part is less universal. States may use two distinct principles in achieving difference-blindness. 'The disestablishment principle gives no recognition or assistance to *any* cultural identity to which its citizens attached'

(*ibid*; italics original). 'The nation-building principle picks out *one* cultural identity and systematically promotes it for all citizens' (*ibid*; italics original). Irrespective of which of these two principles it adopts, the state 'makes no attempt to acknowledge, accommodate, or assist the variety of different cultures and identities to which citizens are attached in a diverse society' (*ibid*).

The disestablishment principle reflects a pure liberal approach to religions: the value of neutrality. According to the liberal approach, the state ought to be neutral on matters of religion by rejecting the recognition, maintenance and promotion of any religion followed by its citizens. The proper response of the state to religious diversity is to establish a framework of rules fair to all religions and then to enable individuals to protect and promote their own faiths and to select their religious affiliations. Depending on the choices of individuals, some religions would flourish while others might decline, pass into oblivion, or even disappear. The state should not assist or fetter any of these religions, regardless of their flourishing or declining status. What it ought to do is just to establish fair background rules under which religions can strive for success (Patten, 2008: 94).

Numerous integrationist states embrace the disestablishment principle in dealing with their religious diversity. By adopting secularism or laicism as one of their basic characteristics, states become neutral on matters of religion. The disestablishment principle may not be successful in the management of ethno-cultural differences as much as it may do in managing religious diversity (Patten, 2003: 366). This is because of the inability of integrationist states to be neutral on such matters, most importantly linguistic ones. As Will Kymlicka notes,

> [i]t is quite possible for a[n integrationist] state not to have an established church. But the state cannot help but give at least partial establishment to a

culture when it decides which language is to be used in public schooling, or
in the provision of state services (1995a: 111).

This is probably the reason why integrationist states are inclined to adopt the nation-building principle in managing their ethno-cultural diversity. An integrationist state supports a single identity and culture – which is in most, but not all, cases the identity and culture of the *staatsvolk*, 'a national or ethnic people who are demographically and electorally dominant group in the state' (O'Leary, 2001b: 284-5). The state encourages the others to *converge on* this identity and culture in the *public* realm (Patten, 2008: 97).

Calls for *convergence in the public domain* does not mean that integration is the same as assimilation. The former does not welcome ethnocide (the deliberate killing of cultures), linguicide (the deliberate killing of languages) and theocide (the deliberate killing of religious cultures). All these genocidal methods are used by assimilation policies in order to standardise, monopolise and homogenise the entire public (McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon, 2008: 43). Integration respects ethno-cultural diversity in the *private* area. Assimilation ignores and, more importantly, prohibits such diversity both in the public domain and in its private counterpart (Choudhry, 2008a: 27; O'Leary and McGarry, 2012: 80).

Integration is the general method that Turkey uses in managing its ethno-cultural diversity, but with some exceptions. The current policy allows for the *privatisation* of ethno-cultural differences. The Republic has eliminated various constitutional and legal bans on the usage of Kurdish and permitted its Kurdish citizens to use their mother tongue in the *private* area, such as authorising *private* schools to use Kurdish as the language of education; allowing *private* universities to provide Kurdish bachelor's and master's degrees; authorising *private* language courses and civil

society organisations to teach Kurdish; and permitting *private* television channels and radio stations to broadcast in Kurdish.[59]

The policy is also based on the nation-building principle since it asks all minority groups, including the Kurds, to *converge on* Turkish identity in the *public* domain. The current policy has some multiculturalist characteristics allowing for the recognition of Kurdish identity in the public realm. This includes the establishment of TRT KURDÎ (a *publicly-funded* television channel broadcasting in Kurdish for twenty-four hours a day); authorising *public* universities to provide Kurdish degree programmes; allowing *public* secondary schools to offer elective Kurdish language courses; and permitting *municipalities* and *public* universities to provide Kurdish language courses.[60] All these policies, however, are exceptions to the current integrationist policy.

The Constitution of Turkey (LoT 2709/1982) acknowledges Turkish as the *sole language* of the Republic (art. 3). It also inhibits *public* schools from using any language other than Turkish as the language of instruction (art. 42(9)). Moreover, the Constitution defines all its citizens as Turks (art. 66(1)). The phrases 'no Turk', 'every Turk' and 'all Turks' are thus the common phrases in the Constitution and other legal sources, including statutes, decrees and by-laws (Kurban and Ensaroglu, 2010: 26). Furthermore, the Constitution enshrines Turkishness in its preamble and other sections. The preamble states that:

> no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish existence and the principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of Turkishness […].

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[59] For more integrationist policies, see Chapter 2.
[60] For more details on these multiculturalist policies, see Chapter 2.

It also reads that '[this constitution] has been entrusted by the TURKISH NATION to the democracy-loving Turkish sons' and daughters' love for the motherland and nation'. Many such phrases as 'Turkish citizens' [*Türk vatandaşları*], 'Turkish Motherland' [*Türk Anavatanı*], 'Turkish existence' [*Türk varlığı*], 'Turkish Nation' [*Türk Milleti*], 'Turkish State' [*Türk Devleti*] and 'Turkish society' [*Türk toplumu*] are incorporated into a large number of constitutional provisions (e.g. arts. 5, 7, 9, 41, 42, 59, 62, 66, 67, 76, 81, 101, 103, 104 and 174) as well as numerous other primary and secondary laws.[61]

All these constitutional provisions are basic features of Turkey's current integrationist policy based on the nation-building principle. This policy might not be optimal in managing ethno-cultural diversity. There are some normative and pragmatic reasons why it would be better for Turkey to adopt a policy of multiculturalism instead of its current integrationist policy. Before examining the reasons in detail, let me first say something important about multiculturalism in the following section.

3.3. Multiculturalism: Accommodating Ethno-cultural Diversity

Multiculturalism tries to manage ethno-cultural diversity through accommodationist politics – what Charles Taylor calls, 'a politics of difference' (1992: 38). According to Taylor, such a politics provides all citizens with a full set of basic liberal rights and a package of difference-sensitive policies designed to reach out to members of ethnic, linguistic, national and religious minorities by recognising, accommodating and assisting their ways of life (*ibid*: 38-44). The difference model does not only

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[61] For a list of such laws, see Kurban and Ensaroglu (2010).

take into account 'the idea of individuals as autonomy seekers of their own conceptions of the good, but it [also] adds to this view of individuals the idea that they are also bearers of a cultural identity that they do not share with all other citizens' (Patten, 2008: 101).

States may embrace two distinct principles, namely 'the principle of cultural preservation' and 'the equality-of-status principle' (Patten, 2008: 101-2). The principle of cultural preservation implies that the state operates 'a set of policies designed to secure the cultural preservation of minorities – groups whose distinctiveness would otherwise be jeopardised by the homogenising pressures of the majority culture' (*ibid*: 101). The equality-of-status principle operates when the state 'extend[s] to minority cultures the same recognition – the same forms of acknowledgement, accommodation, and assistance – that it extends to the majority', rather than making the purpose of cultural protection the measure of accommodation or assistance to several identity groups (*ibid*).

The principle of cultural preservation implies that the state neither even-handedly refuses to assist any specific culture or identity to survive or flourish in the public and private realms, nor does it monopolise one national identity and culture and try to integrate all citizens in that framework. Rather, it props up vulnerable identities and cultures by providing them with the resources required for their survival and promotion (Patten, 2008: 105). By adopting the equality-of-status principle, the state expresses a commitment to the idea of neutrality that is also the case with the disestablishment principle of the politics of universalism. State neutrality implies that the state should not set out to empower or discourage any particular way of life; instead, it should establish rules that enable all ways of life to strive for success.

This is, however, the first interpretation of neutrality that is expressed by the disestablishment principle. There is also another interpretation that is voiced by the equality-of-status principle. The state can observe neutrality on ethno-cultural diversity by not only refusing to help or hamper any particular way of life, but also recognising, accommodating and assisting both majority and minority identities and cultures in the public and private domains (Patten, 2008: 105-7). For example, if a state grants the language spoken by the majority official status, it should also recognise minority languages used by its citizens as its official languages. Similarly, if the state enables the majority language to be used as the language of instruction in public schools, it should also allow for the use of minority languages as the languages of education in public schools.

Regardless of which one of these two principles it adopts, the state attempts to acknowledge, preserve and promote its ethno-cultural diversity *both in the public area and in its private counterpart* (O'Leary and McGarry, 2012: 82). Uniformity in the public realm is not the only goal of multiculturalism. It recognises multiple public identities and cultures and respects ethno-cultural differences to ensure that minority groups have a public space where they can freely express their distinct ethno-cultural identities and safeguard themselves against autocracy, despotism and tyranny by the majority (Swenden, 2012: 614).

Multicultural policies ensure such a public space via a politics of difference built on the reconstruction of 'our understanding of citizenship with an equal and multicultural constitutional citizenship as a way of creating unity within diversity' (Keyman, 2010: 95). This constitutional citizenship constitutes 'a common language among diverse groups to voice their own identity demands as a way of enlarging their citizenship rights and freedoms' (*ibid*). It also provides the state with a

democratic ground to effectively deal with such identity claims by recognising diversity in order to promote equality among different groups (*ibid*: 96). Multiculturalism implies the adoption of ethno-cultural group rights and freedoms as 'the development of individual rights and freedoms as they are articulated with one another within the realm of an equal and multicultural constitutional citizenship' (*ibid*: 95). Will Kymlicka explains this as follows:

> [M]ulticulturalism is first and foremost about developing new models of democratic citizenship, grounded in human rights ideals, […] constructing new civic and political relations to overcome the deeply entrenched inequalities that have persisted after the abolition of formal discrimination (2010: 101-2).

Multiculturalism thus seeks to manage ethno-cultural diversity by rejecting the notion of 'equality as sameness' and constructing a new constitutional conception of equality: 'equality in difference' that allows for unity within diversity with the adoption of a multicultural constitutional citizenship (Benhabib and Isiksel, 2006: 230). This citizenship has three key definitional characteristics: 1) it is not based on identity; 2) it attempts to go beyond the purely legal-universal notion of citizenship; and 3) it assumes that citizenship and identity is not solely political and legal membership in a state, but a norm that enables the recognition of group rights for the sake of providing equality among persons belonging to different ethnic groups (Benhabib, 2004: 14, 2005: 674).

An ethnic group may make two main sorts of identity claims. The first includes 'the claim of a group against its own members' (Kymlicka, 1995a: 35); and the second includes 'the claim of a group against the larger society' (*ibid*). Groups make both claims to ensure their stability, but they resolve different sources of instability. The claim on its members safeguards the group from the destabilising effect of

'internal dissent' (for example, the decision of individual members of the group not to follow their own customs and practices). The second safeguards the group from the effect of 'external decision' (for instance, the political or economic decision of the larger society). Kymlicka calls these 'internal restrictions' and 'external protections' (*ibid*).

Internal restrictions enable 'the ethnic or national group [to] use […] state power to restrict the liberty of its own members in the name of group solidarity' (Kymlicka, 1995a: 36). By imposing internal restrictions, the group may give precedence to collective, not individual, rights and oblige all its members to follow their domestic customs and practices. Some members may be unwilling to do so, raising the hazard of individual oppression. Internal restrictions may restrict the essential civil and political freedoms of group members (*ibid*).

External protections are the other tools by which the group may aim at preserving its distinct existence and identity through limiting the influence of the decisions of the larger society. External protections may also produce certain dangers, but in the form of 'unfairness between groups' rather than the form of 'individual oppression within a group', which might be the case with the imposition of internal restrictions (Kymlicka, 1995a: 36). Such unfairness was recorded in South Africa, where the larger society (Blacks) was marginalised and segregated in the name of protecting the smaller group's distinctiveness (Whites) under the apartheid regime. But nevertheless, external protections do not always create such injustice; instead, they generally put 'various groups on a more equal footing, by reducing the extent to which the smaller group is vulnerable to the larger' (*ibid*: 36-7).

Multiculturalism supports the adoption of external protections where they ensure fairness between groups, while refusing the imposition of internal restrictions because they place a limit on the right of group members to call into question and revise their traditional practices (Kymlicka, 1995a: 37). Group members might be provided with external protections via three main types of 'group-differentiated citizenship' rights, namely a) 'special group representation rights'; b) 'self-government rights'; and c) 'polyethnic rights' (*ibid*: 37-8). Special group representation rights guarantee the representation of the minority group in the political institutions of the larger society, enabling the minority not to be ignored on decisions made on a country-wide basis (*ibid*: 37). Self-government rights provide the minority with the opportunity to exercise political autonomy in its territorial and/or cultural forms.[62] The minority cannot be outbid or outvoted by the majority

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[62] The term 'autonomy' derives from the following Greek-origin words: *auto* (self) and *nomos* (law or rule). The very basic meaning of the term is to make one's own laws. In the modern world, the term is used so widely in many branches of science, from theology to philosophy and psychology, but even within constitutional law and political science, autonomy has numerous meanings and interpretations. Lapidoth (1997) classifies the definitional debate into four main categories: i) autonomy as a right to act upon one's own discretion in specific matters, whether on an individual basis or via a public body; ii) autonomy as synonymous to independence; iii) autonomy as a synonym of decentralisation; and iv) autonomy as a reference to a (non)territorial unit which enjoys exclusive legislative, executive and/or judicial powers in certain areas. The fourth concept has been considered by many eminent scholars, e.g. Ghai (2000); Hannum (1996); Heintze (1998); Lapidoth (1997); Nordquist (1998), as political autonomy. However, there is still no consensus on what political autonomy means as a term of constitutional law. Nevertheless, we can reach a widely-accepted definition by paying attention to common points of various relevant definitions made by the aforementioned scholars: political autonomy is 'a means of internal power-sharing aimed to preserve the cultural and ethnic variety, while respecting the unity of a state' (Benedikter, 2009: 19). There are two main types of political autonomy: (1) territorial autonomy; and (2) cultural (non-territorial) autonomy. Territorial autonomy may take its shape in two different forms: local (administrative) autonomy and full (legislative) autonomy. Administrative autonomy is 'an expression of decentralisation and sets forth a delegation of certain powers but not includes any legislative powers exercised by locally elected bodies' (Benedikter, 2009: 41). In administrative autonomies, there are special administrative institutions, (partially) funded by the state, in addition to general administrative units (e.g. districts, municipalities and counties). These special institutions are permitted to make secondary laws in the fulfilment of their tasks, empowering the residents of the administrative unit to look after their own (minority-related) matters. Legislative autonomy is the most common form of political autonomy that provides a group with the highest degree of self-rule. Carrier of full autonomy is a local (or regional) authority rather than an association of persons. Local (or regional) institutions established through this form of autonomy are independent from the central state. Full autonomy is the special status of a certain territory within the state that grants the population of that territory the right to manage their own affairs via their own government, parliament and administration. The degree of self-rule being exercised through legislative autonomy exceeds that of administrative

on decisions vital to the maintenance and development of its identity and culture, e.g. issues of education, language, family law, immigration, resource development, etc. (*ibid*: 37-8). Finally, polyethnic rights ensure protection for specific cultural and religious practices that might be disadvantaged by existing legislation (such as exemptions from dress codes incompatible with religious beliefs), or that might not be sufficiently supported through the market (such as funding language programmes) (*ibid*: 38). Each of these three types of group-differentiated rights help to 'reduce the vulnerability of minority groups to the economic pressure and political decisions of the larger society' (*ibid*) and contribute to the advancement of individual rights and liberties because they are vested in persons belonging to minority groups via an enlarged understanding of citizenship, namely a constitutional multicultural citizenship (Oran, 2001: 217).

Multiculturalism implies that the adoption of polyethnic rights is an important step in managing immigrant groups – 'those newcomers to a country who are legally admitted, and who have the right to gain citizenship' (Kymlicka, 2001: 2).[63] It also recognises special representation and self-government rights as basic citizenship rights that should be adopted in the management of national minorities (Banting and

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autonomy. Local (or regional) institutions are granted not only executive powers, which is the case with administrative autonomy, but also legislative powers that enable the institutions to make primary laws. Cultural autonomy is a type of political autonomy that applies to all individual members of a minority group which is mostly, but not always, territorially dispersed (Abushov, 2015; Weller, 2010). This autonomy 'grants a precisely defined set of rights to individuals on the basis of their membership in a particular group' (Benedikter, 2009: 39). The rights safeguarded under cultural autonomy can be personal (double citizenship, access to educational facilities, etc.), cultural (e.g. media and language rights), or political (such as a certain number of reserved seats in parliament and a minimum representation within public bodies) (Benedikter, 2009; Lapidoth, 1997). These rights are generally exercised by *an association of persons* administering ethnic, cultural, linguistic and/or religious life of the group by means of self-governing representative and administrative institutions. These institutions do not enjoy legislative powers and refer to *no particular territory*. For more details on territorial autonomy, see Barkey and Gavrilis (2016); Benedikter (2009); Legare and Suksi (2008); Olausson (2007); Schulte (2015); Tkacik (2008).

[63] Immigrant groups are distinct from illegal immigrants – asylum seekers and guest-workers 'who do not have the right to become citizens, even though they may be permanent residents in the state' (Kymlicka, 2001: 2).

Kymlicka, 2013: 582; Kymlicka, 2009: 375). A national minority is a group of persons in a state who

    a) reside in the territory of that state and are citizens thereof;

    b) maintain longstanding and firm ties with that state;

    c) display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics;

    d) are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state; and

    e) are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, traditions, religion or language.[64]

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[64] This definition of national minority is provided by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in its Recommendation 1201. This is the Draft Additional Protocol on the Rights of Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights – a protocol adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 1 February 1993, but not by the Committee of Ministers. This renders it an Assembly document which is not legally binding. Many scholars propose similar definitions by benefiting from Capotorti's widely-accepted and frequently-cited definition of minority. According to Francesco Capotorti, UN Special Rapporteur on the Prevention of Discrimination, minority is

> [a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language (Capotorti, 1979: 96).

This definition has objective and subjective criteria. The objective criteria are those certain features distinguishing a group from the rest of the population, e.g. its numerical size, culture, history, ethnicity, religion, language and non-domination. The subjective criteria are those that provide the group with minority consciousness. This enables group members to recognise their distinct status and protect it collectively (Goldman, 1994: 46-7). According to many scholars, e.g. Goldman (1994: 47); Henrard (2000: 20); Kurban (2003: 160); Oran (2001: 142), national minorities are those who satisfy both objective and subjective criteria, whilst immigrant groups (or cultural minorities) are those fulfilling solely objective conditions, but fail to satisfy the subjective ones due to their desire to integrate into the dominant culture. Similarly, Kymlicka defines national minorities as those who want to 'maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture and demand forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies' (1995a: 10). According to him, such minorities consist of two main types. The first is indigenous peoples whose 'traditional lands were overrun by settlers and then forcibly, or through treaties, incorporated into states run by outsiders' (Norman and Kymlicka, 2000: 20). These peoples seek to preserve their traditional beliefs and ways of life while nonetheless participating on their own conditions in the contemporary world. The second is stateless nations who are those without a state where they constitute the majority. 'They may have been conquered and annexed by a larger state or empire in the past; ceded from one

The Kurds of Turkey are not an immigrant group, they are a national minority. This ethnic group has maintained longstanding and firm ties with Turkey and its predecessors, the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires. The group has resided in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia for many centuries (Kurban, 2003: 180). Most Kurds speak the Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish. Zazaki, a dialect akin to Iranian Kurds' Gorani dialect, is also spoken by a significant number of Kurds. Most Kurds practice Sunni Islam, but Alevism, a mystical branch closely linked with Shia Islam, is also practiced by a dramatic number of Kurds. These internal differences have not precluded the Kurds from establishing their own identity over 2,000 years (Goldman, 1994: 47). They have maintained their identity, resisting all Turkification or other coercive assimilationist policies (see Chapter 2). Rejecting such repressive policies is only one dimension of the maintenance process. The Kurds have also demanded the official recognition of their identity and adoption of various group rights that would enable them to develop and promote their distinct ethno-cultural features (see Chapters 2 and 6).

In light of all above characteristics, I argue that the Kurds of Turkey are a national minority. They are a *de facto*, not *de jure*, national minority. The minority system of Turkey is based on Articles 38-44 of the Lausanne Treaty, the founding treaty of the Republic. The Treaty only recognises *non-Moslem* groups (Armenians, Greeks and Jews) as minority communities. It does not recognise non-dominant *Muslim* groups as minority communities. Because most Kurds practice Islam, and because they have been considered as a Muslim community for many centuries, the Treaty does not grant the Kurds *de jure* minority status (Kolcak, 2015a: 31).

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empire to another; or united with another kingdom through royal marriage' (*ibid*: 19-20). In his recent works, Kymlicka considers national minorities encompassing both indigenous peoples (e.g. the Maori and the Inuit) and stateless nations (e.g. the Basques and the Quebecois) as old minorities (see Kymlicka, 2008, 2009, 2011).

Since the Kurds form a (*de facto*) national minority, multiculturalism implies that Turkey should resolve its long-running Kurdish question by adopting special representation and self-government rights for its Kurdish citizens. This would eventually allow not only the recognition, protection and promotion of Kurdish identity in both public and private realms but also the introduction of multicultural reforms, including 1) cultural and/or territorial autonomy for the Kurdish minority; 2) official language status for the minority language; 3) guarantees of minority representation in the country-wide constitutional, political and/or legal institutions; 4) public funding of minority language schools, universities and/or media; 5) constitutional and/or parliamentary acknowledgement of multiculturalism; and 6) providing an international personality for the minority (e.g. allowing persons belonging to the minority to sit on international organisations, granting minority autonomous organs the right to sign treaties and/or have their own Olympic team (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006: 60)).

According to many scholars – e.g. Keyman (2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012a, 2012b); Keyman and Ozkirimli (2013); Kirisci and Winrow (1997); Koker (2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2013); Mousseau (2012); Oran (2001, 2007); Ozkirimli (2013, 2014) – Turkey ought to adopt a policy of multiculturalism to manage its ethno-cultural diversity. Is it better for the Republic to replace its current integrationist approach – under which its ethno-cultural diversity is recognised in private, but not in public – with a multiculturalist approach to manage its ethno-cultural diversity? There are normative and pragmatic reasons for making multicultural reforms in the Republic. Let me first express the normative argument in the following section.

3.4. A Normative Argument for Multiculturalism in Turkey

Is it better for the Republic to introduce a policy of multiculturalism to deal with its ethno-cultural diversity? In answering this question, we should start with responding to the following question: is Turkey neutral to its ethnic groups? A state may observe neutrality by adopting either an integrationist policy built on the disestablishment principle or a multiculturalist policy constructed on the equality-of-status principle. Neither of these two policies has been implemented in Turkey so far.

Not long after its establishment, the Republic began to implement an assimilationist policy towards all its ethnic groups other than the Turks. Only Turkish identity and its characteristics (e.g. language, culture, history, traditions, etc.) were recognised, protected and promoted in the public and private realms, while the recognition, preservation and promotion of the other identities and their features, including Kurdish, were prohibited (see Chapter 2).

Turkey began to step back from its assimilationist policy in the 1990s. This has not created a republic that manages its ethno-cultural diversity through an integrationist approach constructed on the disestablishment principle or through a multiculturalist approach built on the equality-of-status principle. Rather, the process has formed a republic that seeks to manage its ethno-cultural diversity through an integrationist approach constructed on the nation-building principle. Turkey recognises Kurdish and other minority identities in the private realm, but requires all its minority ethnic groups, including the Kurds, to converge on Turkish identity in the public area. This integrationist policy, under which Turkish identity and its characteristics are still the sole ones recognised, safeguarded and promoted in the public domain, demonstrates Turkey's ongoing partiality for Turkish identity at the public level.

How does this partiality of the Republic affect the Kurds? It is obvious that the Kurds are disadvantaged due to the existence of this partiality. In the field of education, for instance, Turkish is recognised by the Constitution of Turkey (LoT 2709/1982) as the only language of instruction in public schools (art. 42(9)). In accordance with this constitutional provision, public schools provide ethnic Turks with the opportunity to receive education in their mother tongue. It does not offer the same opportunity to the Kurds. Many Kurds understandably feel at a disadvantage compared to the Turks. Rusen, an ethnic Kurd who received his education in Turkish, said 'for one thing, Turkish children start ahead of you. When they read a text, they understand it completely. We did not have that opportunity. We generally did not understand' (cited in Coskun, Derince and Ucarlar, 2011: 50).

Baran had similar things to say during his DİSA, a research centre based in Diyarbakir, interview:

> Children whose mother tongue is Turkish start ahead of you. Children in Istanbul or Konya and children in Diyarbakır do not begin their language education under the same conditions. These children learn a completely new language. And the teachers ask them to make comments in that language. For example, we had writing classes. But we could not express ourselves. Our sentences were always inverted. And when you could not succeed, it influenced your knowledge in math and science too (cited in Coskun, Derince and Ucarlar, 2011: 50).

Sabahat was also of the same mind during her DİSA interview:

> The feeling I had was of being left behind. At school at first you seem to learn a language. But you do not actually get an education until you learn that language. That is why, when you look at the whole of Turkey, instead of looking only at the Turkish-Kurdish situation, I believe that when I compare myself with other people who do not speak Kurdish, it is as if I began to receive an education a year later (cited in Coskun, Derince and Ucarlar, 2011: 50).

Lezgin also underlined during her DİSA interview how such a disadvantage had prevented Kurdish students from completing their study on time:

> Because I could not speak Turkish, I had to repeat several years. The year I first failed, my teacher did not speak any Kurdish. That is why we had a problem. We just could not communicate. It was not only me; my cousins from the village also had the same problems. That is why my cousins and I had to repeat that year (cited in Coskun, Derince and Ucarlar, 2011: 50).

Education is only one area where we may understand how the Kurds have been disadvantaged. There are many other fields. Turkish cultural, linguistic and historical features are all protected by the Constitution of Turkey. This also guarantees public funding for the promotion of such Turkish characteristics (art. 134). The same funding and protections are not offered to maintain Kurdish characteristics.

The Turkish language is the only language of government, administrative organs, courts, health services, welfare agencies, etc. Ethnic Turks can easily communicate with the state's institutions. This does not apply to the Kurds. Their native tongue is not recognised as an official language. In a recent interview with the Turkish daily newspaper *Milliyet*, Selahattin Demirtas, the jailed ex-leader of the pro-Kurdish HDP, argued: 'there should be official languages other than Turkish in Turkey. Why does the Constitution not recognise Kurdish as an official language? Is it a damned language?' (cited in Celik, 2015: 13).

In short, the Kurds have been disadvantaged. Turkey should rectify this. The Republic is unlikely to ensure true equality between the Kurds and Turks in the absence of such a rectification. By true equality, I do not mean treating everyone the same for all purposes. This equality has a two-fold meaning, equality in law (legal equality) and equality in fact (substantive equality). Legal equality is a question of process whereby states are expected to provide all their citizens with equal protection before the law. Turkey's state officials embrace solely this dimension of

true equality. They argue that like all other Turkish citizens, the Kurds are constitutionally guaranteed equal protection before the law (see Kolcak, 2015a: 31).

Is this protection enough to ensure true equality between the Kurds and Turks? Kurban argues that 'such procedural (legal) equality is a necessary, but by no means sufficient, precondition of full [or true] equality' (2003: 162). I agree with her. Providing equal protection for the Kurds before the law is, of course, a duty that Turkey should fulfil in ensuring true equality, but it is not the sole one. Turkish identity and all its cultural, linguistic and historical features, which represent the identity and ethno-cultural features of the majority population (Turks), are recognised, safeguarded and promoted by the Republic in the public realm. As for the Kurds, who constitute a national minority, however, their unique identity and distinct ethno-cultural characteristics are not recognised, preserved and promoted in the public domain. In the absence of such recognition, the Kurds are not provided with substantive equality, or equality in fact, which is required for ensuring true equality.

Substantive equality requires a state not to treat its national minority as if it was part of the dominant population; rather, it requires the state to take a multiculturalist position and recognise, protect and promote not only the identity and ethno-cultural characteristics of its majority group but also the identity and ethno-cultural features of its minority group(s) in both public and private areas (Capotorti, 1979: 41; Kurban, 2003: 162). In order to ensure substantive equality between the Kurds and Turks, the Republic should introduce a multiculturalist policy. It should empower the Kurds to establish their own 'societal culture' that is

> a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across
> the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious,

> recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared language […]. [T]hey involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and practices (Kymlicka, 1995a: 76).

The Turks, the majority population, already have their own culture. This is the sole official societal culture of the country. The Republic deliberately formed this culture based on Turkish identity and its characteristics when it was founded. By asking all its citizens, including non-Turkish ethnic groups, to assimilate or integrate into this culture, the Republic has tried to get all its citizens to recognise their life-chances as bound up with participation in common societal institutions operating in Turkish and nurturing a Turkish-centred national identity.

The Kurds have become neither assimilated nor integrated into Turkish culture. They have maintained their own identity and have been disadvantaged in many ways. Legal equality, which is just one dimension of true equality, is not enough to rectify this disadvantage. True equality between the Kurds and Turks can only be ensured by providing substantive equality in Turkey. This means the Republic should recognise and support the construction of a Kurdish culture just as it has recognised and supported the establishment of the Turkish culture.

It is possible to promote more than one societal culture in a single country. As Kymlicka (1995b) maintains, it is certainly possible for government policies to sustain different cultures. This is already a requirement for states other than mono-national ones because true equality can solely be advanced by allowing the national minority to construct its own societal culture just as the majority has done so (Kymlicka, 2001). Many European countries have already fulfilled this requirement and empowered their national minorities to form, safeguard and develop their own cultures. Let us now look at some of such countries.

3.4.1. The Spanish Case

Turkey will not be the first country authorising its national minority to establish, preserve and advance its own societal culture. There are many European examples that have already completed such authorisation processes. Spain is, for instance, one of those European countries.[65] The Spanish Constitution of 1978 recognises not only the existence of the Spanish nation, but also the presence of the historic nationalities – the Basques, Catalans and Galicians (art. 2). The Constitution enables the three nationalities to construct their own societal cultures by permitting them to exercise territorial autonomy (arts. 2 and 151). All the three nationalities now have their own autonomous regions where they can establish, preserve and advance their own cultures.[66]

The Galicians had their culture recognised through the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the 1981 Autonomy Statute of Galicia.[67] These are still the main legal sources used in the protection and promotion of the Galician societal culture. The main institutional bodies are its legislative, executive and judicial organs. The 75-member Galician Parliament [*Parlamento de Galicia*] is the representative organ of Galicia enjoying full or partial legislative powers in many areas crucial to the survival and development of the Galician culture.[68] The Galician Government

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[65] Spain is, what the Spanish Constitutional Court [*Tribunal Constitucional de España* (TCE)] has defined, the State of Autonomies [*Estado Autonómico*]. This is a hybrid model of parliamentary monarchy which is neither a centralist nor a (con)federal, but a unitary and decentralised or a quasi-federal state (see Aja, 2001; Aja and Colino, 2014; Barcia, 2014; Moreno, 2007; Rius-Ulldemolins and Zamorano, 2014).

[66] The autonomous regions are ruled by the Spanish Constitution and their individual statutes of autonomy that establish the basic institutional codes of the regions. Each level of government is entitled to exercise three sorts of powers according to Articles 148 and 149 of the Spanish Constitution, exclusive, shared and concurrent.

[67] The following works have been frequently used in understanding the general structure of the Autonomous Community of Galicia: Bergantinhos (2014); Beswick (2007); Elias (2009); Losada (1999); Losada and Maiz (2005); Maiz (2003, 2010); Maiz and Losada (2000, 2011); O'Rourke (2014); van Morgan (2006); Warf and Ferras (2015).

[68] The Galician Parliament is elected for a period of four years in accordance with a proportional representation system (art. 11(2) of the Autonomy Statute). It has many legislative responsibilities set

[*Xunta de Galicia*], which is a collective body made up of the President [*Presidente*], Vice President(s) [*Vicepresidente(s)*] and Councillors [*Conselleiros*], exercises its executive powers to enforce both those acts adopted by the Galician Parliament and those primary laws introduced by the Spanish Parliament.[69] Finally, the High Court of Justice for Galicia [*Tribunal Superior de Xustiza de Galicia* (TSXG)] is the main judicial institution of the Galician Autonomous Community.[70]

All these institutional organs have enabled the Galician Autonomous Community to not only establish a culture based on Galician identity and its characteristics, but also protect and advance that culture. The Galicians now have their own national anthem, coat of arms and flag, recognised by Article 6 of the Autonomy Statute of Galicia.[71] They are able to use their mother tongue, Galego, as an official language in their autonomous community. While recognising Castilian as the official

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out in Article 10(1) of the Autonomy Statute. It exercises all its legislative powers with certain exceptions and restrictions in the areas laid out in Articles 148 of the Spanish Constitution and Articles 27, 28 and 30-34 of the Autonomy Statute.

[69] The President is appointed by the Spanish King after being elected by the Galician Parliament from among its members (art. 15(2) of the Autonomy Statute). She is the head of government of Galicia who represents both the Autonomous Community and the Spanish State in Galicia (art. 15(1)). Representing the Spanish State does not mean that the President represents the state's central administration. This position is represented by a delegate of the central government (Aldecoa and Cornago, 2009: 242). The President appoints both Vice President(s) and Councillors (art. 16(3) of the Autonomy Statute). She has the authority to dismiss any of these officials pursuant to Article 16(3) of the Autonomy Statute. The detailed organisation of the *Xunta* is regulated by the Law on the Regulations of the *Xunta* and its Presidency (Law 1/1983 of February 22). This is a regional law adopted by the Galician Parliament. For more details on the Galician Government, see that act.

[70] The TSXG authorises Galicia to create its own judicial system that consists of three types of courts: (i) Civil and Penal [*Sala do Civil e Penal*], (ii) Contentious-Administrative [*Sala do Contencioso-Administrativo*] and (iii) Social [*Sala do Social*]. The High Court must serve without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Spain [*Tribunal Supremo de España* (TSE)] – the highest Spanish court for all matters (administrative proceedings, civil and criminal issues, labour law, military law, etc.), except for those pertaining to constitutional guarantees and rights that are monitored by the TCE. The TSXG looks over Galician provincial courts settled in A Coruña, Lugo, Ourense and Pontevedra. It regulates functions of the judges sitting in those courts. It is the court of last instance in the Autonomous Community. Its decisions can be appealed to the TSE and the European Court of Justice. For more details, see Article 152(1) of the Spanish Constitution and Articles 20-26 of the Galician Statute of Autonomy.

[71] Details of the national symbols are listed in the Galician Law 5/1984, entitled 'the Law on the Symbols of Galicia' [*Lei de Símbolos de Galicia*]. The national anthem of Galicia is 'The Pines' [*Os Pinos*]. Its flag is white with a blue diagonal band crossing from the upper left to lower right. The coat of arms of Galicia is a golden chalice surrounded in a field of azure. The Galicians have their own national day, the Day of the Galician Fatherland [*Día da Patria Galega*]. This falls on 25 July.

language of the Spanish State (art. 3(1)), the Spanish Constitution, at the second paragraph of the same article, permits the official use of languages other than Castilian by stipulating that the autonomous communities can adopt their own regional official languages in pursuit of their statutes of autonomy. Article 5 of the Autonomy Statute recognises Galego as the language of Galicia and acknowledges Galego and Castilian as the official languages of the autonomous community. This statutory provision is further implemented by the Galician Law 3/1983, entitled 'the Linguistic Normalisation Law of Galicia' [*Lei de Normalización Lingüística de Galicia*], under which the use of Galego in administrative sectors (Title II), education (Title III) and the media (Title IV) has been guaranteed.

Galego is currently used by all government institutions of the Galician Autonomous Community, including the *Parlamento* and *Xunta*, in communications with the Galician public. The study of Galego is now mandatory at all compulsory education levels, and Galician pupils receive their pre-school and primary education in their native tongue. The Galician Autonomous Community has its own publicly-funded radio-television corporation, the Radio-Television Corporation of Galicia [*Corporación de Radio-Televisión de Galicia*], created in July 1984 with the adoption of the Galician Law 9/1984 [*Lei de Creación da Compañía de Radio-Televisión de Galicia*].[72]

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[72] The corporation has television channels that broadcast in Galego, e.g. *Televisión de Galicia*, *Televisión de Galicia 2*, *Galicia Televisión Europa* and *Galicia Televisión América*. It also has a radio station broadcasting in Galego, *Radio Galega*. This station has two broadcast channels, *Radio Galega* and *Radio Galega Música*, and one internet channel, *Son Galicia Radio*. In addition, there are many private radio stations in Galicia, e.g. *Kalimera Radio*, *Radio Clavi*, *Radio Filispim*, *Radio Roncudo*, to name but a few only.

3.4.2. The Finnish Case

Like Spain, Finland allows the Alanders to form, preserve and develop their own culture. Article 120 of the Finnish Constitution recognises the existence of the Alanders in Finland and enables this Swedish-speaking minority to establish, secure and advance its own culture by guaranteeing its right of self-government in accordance with the Act on the Autonomy of the Aland Islands.[73]

The 1991 Alandic Autonomy Act – the successor of the 1920 Self-Government Act of Aland, the 1922 Aland Guarantee Act and the 1951 Alandic Autonomy Act – is the main legal source that the Alanders use to establish, protect and advance their culture.[74] The 30-member Legislative Assembly of Aland [*Lagting*] is the unicameral Parliament of Aland. This exercises full or partial legislative powers in various areas that are crucial to the survival and advancement of the Alandic societal culture.[75]

The government of Aland [*Landskapsregering*] is the executive branch chaired by the Premier [*Lantråd*], who is appointed by the *Lagting*.[76] The government is assisted by an administration made up of a central board and six departments (the chancellery department, the finance department, the department of education and culture, the department for social affairs and environment, the department of

[73] The following works have been frequently used in comprehending the general structure of the Alandic Autonomy: Ackren (2011); Blomberg (2015); Erland (1988); Hannikainen (2002); Joenniemi (2014); Malloy (2013); Stanbridge (2002); Stephan (2010, 2014); Suksi (2011a, 2011b, 2013).

[74] The Autonomy Act is an act of exception that cannot be subordinated to any Finnish acts. It creates a special protection mechanism for the institutional relationship between Aland and Finland. It is a *de facto* constitutional law in practice that can only be annulled or changed by following the procedures prescribed for constitutional amendments (see Suksi, 2011b, 2013).

[75] The Alandic Parliament has legislative powers on the matters laid out in Article 18 of the Autonomy Act. The Finnish Parliament may transfer its legislative powers to the Alandic Parliament on the matters set out in Section 29 of the Autonomy Act.

[76] The First Minister is elected by the Alandic Parliament following elections. She then submits the composition of her government to the Parliament in order to obtain a vote of confidence. After receiving parliamentary confidence by a simple majority, the government starts to function (Suksi, 2011a).

transport, and the department of trade and industry).[77] The government exercises its executive powers in order to implement Alandic laws, i.e. the executive competence of the *Landskapsregering* originates in and flows from the legislative powers of the *Lagting* (art. 23 of the Autonomy Act).[78]

The Aland Delegation is a mediator and facilitator. It is a semi-judicial, joint body of legal and economic experts that exercises *advisory* judicial powers in settling disputes over administrative, legislative and economic matters between Aland and Finland. The Delegation consists of two legal experts appointed by the Finnish Council of State, two appointed by the Alandic Parliament and finally one chairperson who is most likely the Governor of Aland.[79] There may also be another person appointed by the President of Finland in agreement with the Speaker of the *Lagting* (art. 55(1) of the Autonomy Act).[80]

These institutional bodies have empowered the Alanders to establish a culture constructed on their own characteristics and safeguard that culture. The Alanders now have their own national symbols, including a national anthem, coat of arms and

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[77] The Bureau of Statistics and Research Aland are the other administrative bodies that perform as advisory boards to the *Landskapsregering*.

[78] Vice versa the administrative structures of the Finnish State in Aland are responsible for enforcing legislation enacted by the Finnish Parliament. It is worth noting that both sides can transfer their executive powers to each other by means of consent decrees. These are issued by the President of Finland following the *mutual agreement* of the Finnish and Alandic Governments (art. 32 of the Autonomy Act).

[79] The Governor is the head of the State Agency in Aland (arts. 3-4 of the 1991 Autonomy Act). She is not part of the Alandic Government. She is in charge of those administrative powers that belong to the competence of the Finnish State in accordance with the Autonomy Act. Nevertheless, Alandic authorities play a significant role in the appointment of the Governor, who generally opens and closes the session periods of the Alandic Parliament on behalf of the President of Finland (art. 14). The Governor is appointed by the Finnish President after having agreed on the matter with the Speaker of the Alandic Parliament. If the two high officials have not reached a consensus on the appointment of a Governor, the President appoints the Governor from among five candidates nominated by the Alandic Parliament (art. 52(2)).

[80] The Delegation reaches a quorum only when all its five members are present (art. 55(2) of the Autonomy Act).

flag, recognised by both Alandic and Finnish authorities.[81] Swedish, the mother tongue of the Alanders, is the official language used in Aland. While the Finnish Constitution recognises both Swedish and Finnish as the official languages of the State (art. 17(1)), Swedish is the sole official language of Aland pursuant to Article 36 of the Autonomy Act. All Alandic public bodies, including the *Lagting*, *Landskapsregering* and Aland Delegation, use Swedish as their official language. All Finnish public bodies, including the Council of State, are entitled to use Swedish in communications with the Alandic institutions (arts. 38 and 43 of the Autonomy Act). Furthermore, all state officials in Aland, including those who represent the Finnish State, are required by law to have proficiency in the Swedish language (art. 42 of the Autonomy Act).

The Alandic societal culture enables the Alanders to use their native tongue in education (art. 40 of the Autonomy Act). Education in the Aland Islands is a matter for the Alandic institutions. All public schools in the archipelago have a monolingual education system. Swedish is the only language of instruction at all educational levels, including primary, secondary and higher levels. Finnish is an optional foreign language module. It is worth noting, however, that private schools in the archipelago may, if they wish, carry out bilingual (Finnish-Swedish) education, after having been authorised by the *Landskapsregering*.[82]

The Alanders have their regional citizenship, called the right of domicile. This plays a key role in the survival and advancement of the Alandic culture. The regional citizenship entitles people to vote in Alandic parliamentary and municipal

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[81] The Song of the Alanders [*Ålänningens Sång*] is the official national anthem of the Aland Islands. Its coat of arms features a golden red deer on a blue zone. Its official flag is a Swedish flag that is defaced by a red cross symbolising Finland. The flag has been used since 1954. Other details on the national symbols can be reached at http://www.aland.ax/en/.
[82] For more details on the education system, see Ihalainen and Saarinen (2014).

elections and become a candidate. It also enables people to operate a business in Aland and own or possess real property (arts. 6-12 of the Autonomy Act). An Alandic citizen is exempt from compulsory Finnish military service owing to the demilitarised and neutral status of the archipelago. [83] The word 'Aland' is incorporated into the cover page of the passport of those who have the right of domicile (art. 30(2) of the Autonomy Act). Article 6 of the Act follows the principle of *jus sanguinis* for the acquisition of the regional citizenship:

> [The right of domicile shall be granted to] a person who at the time of the entry into force of this act had the right of domicile in pursuit of the Autonomy Act of 1951 and a child under 18 years of age who is a citizen of Finland and a resident of Aland, provided that her father or mother has the right of domicile.

Article 7 establishes a residence-based approach – the principle of *jus soli*. It stipulates that the government of Aland may grant the right of domicile to a citizen of Finland who has been habitually resident without interruption in the archipelago for at least five years, and who has demonstrated a satisfactory knowledge of the Swedish language.

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[83] The archipelago was demilitarised and neutralised through the Paris Treaty of 1856. This was signed after the Crimean War (1853-1856) in which Russia had fortified Aland. Following the First World War, the status of Aland was secured through the Convention on the Demilitarisation and Neutralisation of the Aland Islands, signed on 21 October 1921. The Convention is still in force that prohibits the fortification of the archipelago. Moreover, those who have acquired the right of domicile in Aland are now free from compulsory Finnish military service. It is noteworthy that a person must take up residence in the archipelago prior to the age of twelve in order to be excluded from the compulsory military duty (art. 12(3) of the Autonomy Act). For more details, see Grahl-Madsen (1985); Naucler (2014); Poullie (2016).

3.4.3. The British Case

The United Kingdom (UK) is another European example authorising its national minorities – the Northern Irish, Scots and Welsh – to form their own cultures.[84] All three now have their own regional devolved administrations, thereby establishing, preserving and advancing their own cultures.

The *Government of Wales Act 2006* (GoWA) – the successor of the *Government of Wales Act 1998* – is the backbone of the Welsh societal culture.[85] The main institutional bodies of the societal culture are its legislative and executive organs.[86] The National Assembly for Wales [*Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru*] is the 60-member Welsh Parliament that enjoys whole or partial legislative powers in many devolved areas crucial to the maintenance and advancement of the Welsh culture.[87] The Welsh Government [*Llywodraeth Cymru*] – consisting of (1) the First Minister [*Prif Weinidog*], (2) the Cabinet [*Gweinidogion Cymru*], (3) the Counsel General [*Cyffredinol i Lywodraeth Cynulliad Cymru*], and (4) the Deputy Ministers [*Dirprwy Weinidogion Cymru*] – exercises its executive powers in the same devolved fields as those of the legislative institution.[88]

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[84] The UK is a devolutionist unitary state where asymmetric territorial autonomy is offered to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Such autonomy is offered by acts adopted by the Westminster Parliament. For general constitutional information about the devolutionist unitary state, see Himsworth (2007); Keating and Elcock (1998); Leyland (2011); Loughlin (2011); Lynch (2006); McGarry (2010, 2012); Tierney (2009, 2015).

[85] The following works have been frequently used in understanding the general structure of the Welsh devolved region: Mann (2007); Mitchell (2010); Rawlings (2015); Scully and Wyn-Jones (2015); Shortridge (2010); Trench (2010, 2012); Wyn-Jones and Scully (2012).

[86] The Welsh societal culture does not have its own judicial organ because Wales is regarded as part of England in the administration of justice 'from the running of the courts and the appointment and deployment of judges to the punishment and rehabilitation of offenders' (Wales Governance Centre (WGC), 2015a: 2). For more details, see WGC (2015a, 2015b).

[87] The National Assembly is authorised to make laws, known as 'Acts of the Assembly' [*Deddfau Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru*] (section 107(1) GoWA). They have the same legal effect as those acts made by the UK Parliament insofar as they are within the legislative competence of the Assembly (s. 108(2)). The Assembly can exercise its legislative powers with certain exceptions and restrictions in the areas set out in Schedule 7 to the GoWA.

[88] The Welsh Government may make secondary legislation, e.g. orders, codes of practices, regulations, schemes, guidances and rules, on the devolved areas (National Assembly for Wales,

These institutional organs have enabled the Welsh to not only form their own culture but also maintain and develop that culture. The Welsh have their own national anthem, flag and royal badge recognised by both their devolved administration and the central UK Government.[89] The Welsh language [*Cymraeg*] is used as an official language in the devolved region. It is worth noting that the UK had enabled the official use of Welsh before the establishment of the devolved region. The Westminster Parliament permitted the use of Welsh in court proceedings through the *Welsh Language Act 1967*. This helped create an official bilingual public arena by the *Welsh Language Act 1993*. This granted Welsh equal status with English and permitted Welsh to be used officially in the entire public realm. The equal status of the two languages was affirmed by Section 47 of the *Government of Wales Act 1998*, Article 35 of the GoWA and the Welsh Language Measure 2011. In accordance with these statutory provisions, Welsh public bodies, including the Welsh National Assembly, Welsh Government, local councils and health boards, now use the two languages as their official languages.

Both English and Welsh are used as the languages of education in public schools. Education in Wales is governed by the main Welsh institutions, the National Assembly and Welsh Government. It is noteworthy that before the establishment of

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2011a, 2011b). The First Minister is the chair of the Welsh Cabinet who is appointed by the Monarch after being nominated from among Assembly Members by the National Assembly (Sections 46-47 GoWA). The Cabinet is appointed from among Assembly Members by the First Minister with the approval of the Monarch. It is the chief decision-making body of the Welsh Government (Section 48(1) GoWA). The Counsel General is appointed by the Monarch after having been recommended by the First Minister. She is the chief Law Officer for the Welsh Government. She acts as the legal adviser of the Welsh Government and represents it in courts (Section 49 GoWA). Deputy Ministers are appointed by the First Minister after having been approved by the Monarch (Section 50(1) GoWA). They are tasked with exercising functions on behalf of Welsh Ministers in specific areas of work (Section 50 GoWA).

[89] The flag of Wales is the Red Dragon [*Y Ddraig Coch*]. It has been used since 1959. Land of My Fathers [*Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau*] is the official national anthem of Wales. A distinct Welsh royal badge is officially appeared on the cover of acts passed by the Welsh Assembly. The Welsh celebrate their own national day – St Davis's Day – on 1 March. More details on these national symbols can be reached at: http://www.wales.com/about-wales.

devolution, the UK had already enabled bilingual (English-Welsh) education at the primary and secondary school levels in Wales through the *Education Act 1944*. This bilingual system was strengthened by the *Education Reform Act 1988*. It took its present shape with the construction of the devolved administration, which is the competent authority dealing with education in Wales.

Like Spain, Finland and the UK, Turkey is home to a national minority. Turkey uses an integrationist method of managing ethno-cultural diversity. This prevents the Republic from ensuring true equality between the Kurds and Turks. True equality is ensured between majority and minority ethnic groups in Spain, Finland and the UK. These democratic countries implement multicultural policies that recognise, preserve and promote minority identities in both public and private domains. This allows their national minorities to establish, protect and advance their own cultures. It might be better for Turkey to adopt a policy of multiculturalism. The Republic will not be the first country adopting such accommodationist politics to manage its diversity. Like the three cases studied above, multicultural policies may enable Turkey to ensure true equality between its majority and minority ethnic groups.

3.5. Pragmatic Reasons for Multiculturalism in Turkey

I have now explained why it might be better for Turkey to introduce a policy of multiculturalism to manage its ethno-cultural diversity and solve its long-running Kurdish problem from a normative perspective. The normative argument is, however, not the sole reason to suggest that Turkey should replace its integrationist policy with a multiculturalist one. There are also pragmatic reasons that indicate that Turkey is less likely to manage its diversity if it is unwilling to construct a

multicultural arena where not only Turkish but also Kurdish identities are recognised, protected and promoted. Integration is not the only method avoiding the establishment of a multicultural society, there are at least two more methods, namely assimilation and secession.[90]

3.5.1. Assimilation

Assimilation seeks to create a homogeneous society and a common public identity by eroding ethno-cultural differences in *both public and private* realms (Thornberry, 1991: 4). Assimilation works by one of two methods: acculturation, which is 'the merging of ethnic identities into one already established identity' (X+Y=X); and fusion, which merges ethnic identities into a new identity (X+Y=Z) (O'Leary, 2001a: 36).[91] Assimilation may use genocidal methods, including ethnocide, linguicide and theocide, to eradicate ethnic cleavages and standardise, monopolise and homogenise the public (O'Leary and McGarry, 2012: 80).

As noted in Chapter 2, in its early nation-building process, Turkey had implemented various Turkification policies towards ethnic Kurds, as well as the other smaller or non-dominant communities inhabiting the Anatolian Peninsula, such as the Arabs, Circassians, Lazes, etc. Most of the communities were dramatically affected by such ethnocidal and linguicidal policies – e.g. constitutional

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[90] Some other *extreme* and *violent* methods might have also been incorporated into the category, e.g. genocide, which is

> the systematic and intentional mass killing of very large numbers or proportions of unarmed or disarmed civilians of a community who share real or alleged ascriptive national or ethnic traits, or the indirect physical destruction of such a community through the deliberate termination of the conditions which permits its biological and social reproduction (O'Leary, 2001a: 30-1).

As McGarry and O'Leary (1994: 95-8) emphasise, such extreme and violent methods constitute internationally recognised crimes, urging me not to incorporate them into the category.

[91] McGarry and O'Leary consider French identity as an acculturation form of assimilation and its Soviet counterpart as a fusion model of assimilation (1994: 102). According to Heper (2007: 6), Turkish identity is an example for the acculturation version.

and legal bans on the public and private usage of languages other than Turkish; and the identification of all citizens as Turks. They became assimilated into the Turkish nation as dictated by the Republic's cultural togetherness policy (Kolcak, 2015a: 29). The Kurds did not welcome such Turkification policies. They resisted almost all coercive assimilationist policies and demanded the recognition of their distinct identity and adoption of their identity rights. This resulted in the emergence of the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish problem. The Republic's rejection of Kurdish identity and rights then resulted in an armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish security forces. This conflict was a Kurdish response to Turkey's persistent assimilationist policies (see Chapter 2).

In short, assimilation did not enable Turkey to manage its ethno-cultural diversity. It led to the emergence of one of the biggest political problems of Turkey – the Kurdish question. Turkey already realised the limits of its assimilationist methods in the 1990s and started to eliminate them by removing various constitutional and legal prohibitions, including the removal of the ban on Kurdish broadcasting rights; the elimination of the prohibition on the establishment of private language courses teaching Kurdish; and the removal of the ban on the use of Kurdish as the language of education in private schools (see Chapter 2). This has created a republic that operates an integrationist way of managing ethno-cultural diversity. The question is whether Turkey can solve the Kurdish problem via its integrationist method.

3.5.2. Integration

By embracing integration as its method of managing ethno-cultural diversity, Turkey recognises Kurdish and other minority identities in the private domain, but then asks all its minority ethnic groups, including the Kurds, to converge on Turkish identity in the public area. The Republic is unlikely to resolve the Kurdish question via its integrationist method because the main Kurdish demands would not be satisfied while the integrationist method is in operation. I will scrutinise such demands in depth in Chapter 6, but let me just note some of them to illustrate the incapability of the present integrationist method to fulfil them.

The Kurds want Turkey to remove all discriminatory ethnic biases in its Constitution and laws either by recognising both Turkish and Kurdish identities or by taking a fully neutral stance that does not privilege Turkey's ethnic identities in the public realm. They want their native tongue recognised as an official language, empowering Kurdish to be used in the public domain. They ask for the acknowledgement of Kurdish as the language of instruction that can be used from kindergarten level right through to higher education. Finally, the Kurds want to adopt a new pluralist educational curriculum that includes courses teaching a common history of Turks and Kurds, rather than paying attention to Turkish history and culture alone (see Chapter 6). These demands would be easily satisfied by a multiculturalist policy that recognised, protected and promoted Turkish and Kurdish identities in both public and private areas. It might be difficult to fulfil these demands via Turkey's current integrationist policy.

Some prominent Turkish scholars, mainly Burhanettin Duran, Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan, have already understood the limits of the present integrationist policy. They offer a new integrationist policy that calls for convergence on *Islamic*

rather than Turkish identity in the public domain as the way of resolving the Kurdish question. This approach maintains that if individuals identify themselves with Islamic values, the role of ethnicity or nationality in self-identification will decline, undermining the appeal to Kurdish nationalism. The approach assumes that Islam transcends national barriers based on territorial borders, in addition to ethnic, linguistic and racial particularities. Islam does not simply call people to faith, but it also proceeds to the construction of an Islamic state embodying a new nation, that of the faithful or the believers: *ummat al-mu'minin* (*ummat al-Islamiyah*) or shortly the *ummah*, which is the worldwide community, or commonwealth, of Muslim believers. As Vatikiotis notes, '[t]he very basis of this new nation and its nationalism, if you wish, has been the religion of Islam … [which] has integrative ambitions on a universal scale' (1987: 11). The *ummah* might consist of several ethnic and national groups, but the Islamic state does not welcome any ethno-national ideologies or movements due to their divisive characteristics threatening the unity of the *ummah*. This does not mean that the state neglects different cultures, ethnicities, languages or nationalities; instead, it acknowledges that the commonwealth of the believers is made up of various ethnic or national groups speaking different languages. It is worth noting, however, that each Muslim's primary loyalty shall belong to the *ummah* rather than his/her ethnicity or nationality (Ataman, 2003: 90-2).

The pro-Islamic integrationist approach has its roots in the Hamidian era in the late Ottoman period from 1878 to 1908, when many territorial losses produced a more Muslim Empire. In order to prevent further losses, Abdulhamit II attempted to promote the idea of 'Muslim solidarity' among all different ethnic constituents of the Empire by emphasising the Caliphate (van Bruinessen, 1992: 268; Zurcher, 2003: 79). In the multi-party Republican era, pro-Islamic or conservative political parties

have frequently emphasised the pro-Islamic integrationist approach, particularly those parties affiliated with the National Outlook Movement [*Millî Görüş Hareketi* (MGH)], such as the Welfare Party [*Refah Partisi* (RP)]. This was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1998 on the grounds of violating the republican principle of laicism. The Virtue Party [*Fazilet Partisi* (FP)], the successor of the RP, was also dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 2001 on the same grounds. This approach is also taken by the Felicity Party [*Saadet Partisi* (SP)], which is the successor of the FP and the current political representative of the MGH (Duran, 1998: 111; Sarigil, 2010: 535-6).

The SP believes that the collapse of Islamic brotherhood by the republican policies of secularisation and modernisation, including the abrogation of the Caliphate and religious orders, was one of the essential factors resulting in the rise of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey. The Party considers Islamic identity and consciousness as the basic shared identity between the Kurds and Turks that transcends ethnic consciousness. With regards to the resolution of the Kurdish problem, Professor Mustafa Kamalak, the ex-leader of the Party, states:

> We believe that in order to solve the problem, we should first disregard national or racial ideas and notions. Instead, we should focus on unifying concepts and common values between the Kurds and Turks. That would be Islam. Rather than race, Islam is the shared value between the Kurds and Turks, and we should keep it as powerful and alive … Any proposal or initiative excluding or ignoring Islam and Islamic sentiments would not have much chance to solve the problem (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2013: 553-4).

The ruling AK Party also considers Islam as cement between the Kurds and Turks. According to the Party, the Kurdish question is about forced secularism and Turkish nationalism, both of which were enforced by *Kemalist* ideology (Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006: 103). The Party believes that Islam is a shared value that might provide a

bridge between ethnic Kurds and Turks since it transcends ethnic, national and tribal identities. It stresses that Islamic brotherhood and common Islamic ties restrain or curb Kurdish ethno-nationalism that is un-Islamic and illegitimate under Islamic norms (Sarigil and Karakoc, 2016: 331). President Erdogan, the founder of the AK Party, has frequently attempted to delegitimise Kurdish ethno-nationalism. In his recent speech, Erdogan states:

> Those who perform *namaz* [*salat*, one of the five pillars of Islam], those who say '*La ilahe illallah*' [believing in and praying for only Allah] and those who have the love of Allah in their hearts cannot take sides with the terrorist organization [PKK]. This land has a history shaped by *ezan* [*adhan*, the call to prayer], the Koran [*Qur'an*, the central religious text of Islam], and *namaz*. My religious, Muslim, Kurdish brother! When will you be aware of this conspiracy? You are the grandsons of Selahaddin Eyyubi [a Kurdish Muslim establishing the Ayyubid dynasty in the twelfth century], and it is time for you to say 'Enough!' to this conspiracy. There cannot be any connections or relationships between you and the terrorist organization [PKK] that does not pray to Allah or turn to the same *qibla* [the *Caaba* in Mecca, the holiest place of Islam] as you (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2014: 441).

In short, the comprehensive modernisation and secularisation process, initiated by the early *Kemalist* regime of Turkey, led to the marginalisation of the Kurds, who had always attached great importance to Islam and identified themselves as part of the *ummah* under Ottoman rule (Yavuz, 1998: 12, 2000: 33-7, 2001: 6-9). The adoption of *Kemalist* nationalism which is secular and based on Turkish ethnicity burned the bridge between the Kurds and Turks. Thus, 'official Turkish nationalism contributed to the rise of its twin sister, Kurdish nationalism' (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1998: 77). The AK Party's approach claims that Islam bound the Kurds and Turks together under Ottoman rule and constrained Kurdish ethno-nationalism (Duran, 1998: 111; Yavuz, 1997: 74). Their approach implies that Turkey should adopt an Islamic identity that defines the citizen as a member of the universalistic *ummah* rather than Turkish (Duran, 2008: 97; Gunter and Yavuz, 2007: 298; Yavuz, 1998:

17). It is unlikely that this pro-Islamic integrationist approach will enable Turkey to solve its Kurdish problem.

As noted in Chapter 2, Kurdish tribes, who were organised under principalities (emirates), enjoyed a sort of *de facto* independence until the sixteenth century, when the struggle for regional ascendency between the Sunni Ottoman and Shia Safavid (Iranian) Empires resulted in the Kurdish principalities losing their *de facto* independence. Sunni Kurdish chieftains were then able to establish their *de jure* autonomous fiefdoms following the War of Chaldiran. The existence of the *de jure* autonomous fiefdoms allowed for a *de facto* confederative unity of Kurdish tribes who built their own sub-systems within the general Ottoman administrative system, enabling the Kurds to constitute a 'politico-social space where "Kurdishness" was constituted' (Yegen, 1996: 218).

The Ottoman Empire continued to recognise the *de jure* autonomous status of the fiefdoms until the mid-1800s, but the Empire, having faced various separatist movements and diplomatic-international pressures in the eighteenth century, began to centralise its administrative structure with the goal of becoming a modern western state in the nineteenth century (Unver, 2013: 199; Yegen, 1999: 557). This centralisation policy enabled the formation of Kurdish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. As a response to various western-style reforms – particularly the Tanzimat Edict of 1839 – Kurdish emirs who underlined the Kurdishness of their fiefdoms initiated a series of revolts aimed at preserving and expanding their privileges in the 1830s and 1840s. The most important was the revolt of Mir Muhammad of Rawanduz and that of Bedirhan Bey of Cezire-Bothan. The Empire succeeded in quashing all these revolts and eventually centralised the provincial administration with the abolition of the last Kurdish fiefdom in 1851. The centralisation policy not

only led to the formation of Kurdish nationalism under Ottoman rule, but it also had a profound negative impact on Kurdish society (Bajalan, 2013: 5).

The extension of the central government's writ did not produce stability in the Kurdish-populated provinces. The individualisation of Kurdish tribes, who had been united through the *de facto* confederative structure, led to numerous tribal confrontations following the dissolution of the *de jure* fiefdoms. The Kurdish emirs had successfully acted as arbitrators in tribal disputes, but the centrally-appointed Ottoman governors possessed 'neither the traditional legitimacy of the Kurdish emirs nor a sufficient grasp of local affairs to assert their authority' and were unable to mediate between the tribes, increasing the number of intertribal conflicts and making lawlessness a major issue in the provinces (Bajalan, 2013: 6).

The failure of the centrally-appointed governors to maintain order in the Kurdish-occupied provinces resulted in the emergence of the sheiks connected to Qadiriyya and Naqshbandi dervish orders as the new actors of Kurdish politics (Ates, 2014: 741; Ersal, 2016: 76). The sheikhs, whose influence exceeded tribal limits, eventually became the new political leaders of the Kurds as they 'were able to capitalise on their religious prestige to act as intermediaries in tribal clashes and present themselves as defenders of the Islamic order' (Bajalan, 2013: 6). Beginning in the 1870s, most Kurdish insurgencies were led by the sheikhs, who achieved political unity among ethnic Kurds.

The Ubeydullah riot of the 1880s was a significant example. The riot was led by Sheikh Ubeydullah, an influential Kurdish leader of the Naqshbandi order. It was directed against the Ottoman and Iranian Empires with the purpose of establishing an independent Kurdistan (Yegen, 1996: 219). The Sheikh used an explicit

nationalist vocabulary to justify his revolt and mobilise his followers from Ottoman and Iranian Kurdistans, as it was apparent in his speech to a western observer: 'the Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different, and their laws and customs are distinct' (cited in Bajalan, 2013: 6).

The Sheikh Said revolt of 1925 is another significant Kurdish rebellion with tangible nationalist undertones. The revolt was basically a religious insurgency aimed at defending the Islamic order against the secularisation policies of Turkey (Mumcu, 1992). According to Olson (1989) and van Bruinessen (1993), however, the revolt incorporated some nationalist motives as well that contributed to the enlargement of the riot throughout the Kurdish-dominated provinces. The Azadi Group, a pro-Kurdish clandestine organisation seeking to construct an independent Kurdistan, supported the revolt and attempted to mobilise its nationalist feeling among the Zazaki-speaking tribes. Seyyid Abdulkadir, the grandchild of Sheikh Ubeydullah, and a leading figure of modern Kurdish nationalism, took part in the executive board of the revolt. Sheikh Said's statement during his trial at the Independence Tribunal that 'first, I was an Arab, then a Turk and now have become a Kurd' also demonstrates the nationalistic dimension of the revolt. Strohmeier interprets the statement 'as referring first to his descent from the Prophet Muhammad (*sayyid*), second to his loyalty to the Sultan/Caliph, [and finally] [h]e had become a Kurd by virtue of his opposition to Kemalist Turkey' (2003: 92).

These two historical Kurdish insurgencies demonstrate that '[t]he sheikhs have never been "simple" religious figures in Kurdish politics. Rather, they fulfilled the role of a mediator between the religion of Islam and Kurdish nationalism' (Yegen, 1996: 219). Today, there are still sharp differences between Turkish and Kurdish

Islamists' approaches to religion. Islamist Turks believe that the idea of Muslim brotherhood is a key element to resolve the Kurdish question. This idea implies that any kind of ethno-nationalism is illegitimate and incompatible with Islamic values. Kurdish Islamists regard Islamic brotherhood as 'an acknowledgement of their created cultural particularity' (Houston, 1999: 91). According to Kurdish Islamist discourse, Islam welcomes ethnic subjectivity since Allah, who has not created all people the same, delights in diversity (Houston, 2001: 177). In employing this argument, Kurdish Islamists frequently refer to the Koran. In order to legitimise Kurdish ethno-nationalism, they always stress the presence of ethno-cultural differences and their equality in front of Allah by citing the thirteenth verse of *Al-Hujraat* (chapter 49 of the Koran):

> O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female and have made you into nations and tribes that you may know each other. Surely the noblest among you in the sight of Allah is the most godfearing of you. God is all-knowing, all-aware (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2013: 558).

The twenty-second verse of *Rum* (chapter 30 of the Koran) is another verse much quoted by Kurdish Islamists: 'And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and earth and the variety of your tongues and hues. Surely in that are signs for all living beings' (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2013: 558). By referring to these verses, various Kurdish *meles*, Kurdish religious scholars receiving 'unofficial *madrasa* education and training', attempt to justify the existence of ethno-cultural differences and their full equality in Islam. Mele Zahit Ciftkuran argues that:

> [t]hey [Islamist Turks] tell us that we are religious brothers, but they use Islamic brotherhood to suppress and silence Kurdish demands … When we look at the Koran, we see that Allah created different races and languages equally. One is definitely not superior to another … We are, however, unequal brothers (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2013: 558).

Mele Mehmet Gonden is of the same mind:

> If we look at the Koran, we see that Allah created different races and languages equally. Allah does not distinguish among them … If so, then how can you ignore or suppress a nation and its language … If you do that, then, you would violate the Koran (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2013: 558).

Many conservative Kurdish groups have contributed to the development of Kurdish Islamist discourse. Kurdish Hezbollah is an important example. This militant Kurdish-Islamist organisation is influenced by Iran. It engaged in a severe armed conflict with the PKK, which is an atheist and Marxist-Leninist organisation according to Hezbollah, in the 1990s. It was widely believed in Turkey that the Islamist group was protected and supported by the state in its armed conflict with the PKK (McDowall, 1996b: 433). However, the state began targeting the Islamists in 2000, when their leader Huseyin Velioglu was killed by police. Many other leading members, including Cemal Tutar and Edip Gumus, were arrested. Kurdish Hezbollah laid down its arms and sought to strengthen its social base in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey mainly through the Association of Solidarity with the Oppressed [*Mustazaflar ile Dayanışma Derneği* (Mustazaf-Der)], an Islamic charity association founded by sympathizers of the Islamist group in 2004. The Mustazaf-Der, which was dissolved by the Turkish Court of Appeals in 2012 on the grounds that it was affiliated to Kurdish Hezbollah, played a significant role in the foundation of the far-right Islamist and pro-Kurdish HÜDA-PAR. This is the current political representative of Hezbollah. The HÜDA-PAR looks at the Kurdish problem from an Islamist point of view consistent with Kurdish ethno-nationalists' perspectives on the Kurdish issue. Nuri Guler, a leading HÜDA-PAR figure, argues that:

> every nation or race should live its own culture and language freely … In the Ottoman period, this region [Southeastern Anatolia] used to be known as Kurdistan. Furthermore, Kurdish education was the common practice in

madrasas. Thus, today we should reinstall Kurdish education in Kurdistan … Islam does allow it. Although the language of the Koran is Arabic, Islam does not really suppress any languages or cultures (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2013: 554).

In a similar vein, Huseyin Yilmaz, the vice chairman of the HÜDA-PAR, maintains that:

> [t]he Kurds should gain official recognition and status. The state [Turkey] should adopt a policy of affirmative action *vis-à-vis* the Kurds, who have been disadvantaged by the Turkish state. Kurdish language should be taught in schools […], it should be recognised as an official language. Public service should be provided in Kurdish in the region [Southeastern Anatolia]. In addition, the Directorate of Religious Affairs [*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*] should initiate Kurdish sermons during Friday prayers (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2013: 554-5).

Several HÜDA-PAR standpoints on the resolution of the Kurdish question will be considered in Chapter 6, where I explore Kurdish demands in detail. The HÜDA-PAR view is not an integrationist perspective like that of Islamist Turks. It is a multiculturalist approach in line with Kurdish Islamist discourse.

The pro-Islamic Zehra Group, organised around the Zehra Foundation [*Zehra Derneği*] and constituting the pro-Kurdish wing of the Nur Movement, is also among the groups shaping Kurdish Islamist discourse.[92] Muhittin Kaya, a prominent figure in the Group, looks at the Kurdish question from a point of view analogous to those of the other actors of Kurdish Islamist discourse:

> Certain conservative circles emphasise the notion of 'Islamic brotherhood' as a solution for the Kurdish problem. Actually, by using religion they try to undermine the legitimacy of Kurdish demands. This is not really sustainable. On one hand, you regard the Kurds as your brothers but on the other hand, you ignore their language and cultural rights. If a Turk enjoys certain language and cultural rights in this country, a Kurd should also enjoy the same rights and freedoms. As Prophet Muhammed also states, as

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[92] The Movement is a mass-based religious organisation based on the writings of Said Nursi – a Sunni Muslim Kurdish theologian arguing that the Koran is a living document in need of being continually reinterpreted.

> brothers, Muslims should not oppress each other. Thus, rather than Islamic brotherhood, legal brotherhood and equality would be the real solution to the problem (cited in Sarigil and Fazlioglu, 2013: 555).

As evident from all these statements, Kurdish Islamists are critical of the idea of the integrationist Islamic brotherhood, which is regarded by pro-Turkish Islamists as the way promoting unity and solidarity between the two ethnic groups. Such an integrationist approach is not embraced by Kurdish Islamists. Ethnic Kurds demand the introduction of various multicultural reforms. The question is whether the integrationist Islamic approach proposed by Islamist Turks fulfil all those demands. This integrationist policy would result in the privatisation of Kurdish ethno-nationalism, but would not be able to satisfy such demands on the grounds that their fulfilment would violate Islamic values. If it fulfilled the demands, the integrationist approach would already turn into a multiculturalist Islamic approach reflecting the characteristics of Kurdish Islamist discourse rather than those of its Turkish counterpart.

Supporters of the pro-Islamic integrationist approach have begun to understand the limitations of this approach.[93] Yavuz and Ozcan (2015) are convinced that a multiculturalist approach is more likely to resolve the Kurdish question. The two scholars argue that such an approach might be the only way of solving the question *within* the frontiers of Turkey; otherwise, ethnic Kurds would support an outright independent Kurdistan should the Republic insist on implementing an integrationist policy that does not recognise and support Kurdish identity in the public domain. Let us now turn our attention to the last question of this chapter: is secession the best

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[93] It is worth noting that various recent studies, including Aktoprak (2010); Gurses (2015); Sarigil (2010); Sarigil and Fazlioglu (2013, 2014); Sarigil and Karakoc (2016), also support the view that the integrationist pro-Islamic approach might not help Turkey to curb Kurdish ethno-nationalism and resolve the Kurdish issue.

method that should be used in the solution of Turkey's long-running political problem?

3.5.3. Secession

Secession (or separation) is a method of managing ethnic diversity that eliminates ethno-cultural differences through partition, or, what McGarry and O'Leary call, 'the principle of divorce' (1994: 98). Before defining secession, I intend to differentiate this constitutional concept from some similar political scenarios that may enable us to better understand what secession is. First, secession is distinct from expulsion as the seceding territory lays no claim to the juridical identity of the existing state. If the territory challenges the entire unity of the state and lays claim to its juridical identity, there is a case of expulsion in lieu of secession (Beran, 1984: 21). Second, secession may be contrasted with revolution. The main purpose of the seceding territory, however, is different from that of the revolutionary. The seceding territory limits the legal framework of the existing state. It does not aim to overthrow the existing government, nor does it aim to make fundamental constitutional, socio-political or economic changes within the existing state. These two goals should be achieved in completing any revolution (Buchanan, 1991b: 326). Secession provides the seceding community with the chance to free itself from the authority of the existing state. This may also be the case with group emigration, but secession includes opposition to the existing territorial claim of the state, whilst emigration implies that a community removes itself from the jurisdiction of the existing state without questioning its boundaries (*ibid*: 327).

Hence, '[s]ecession is the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognised state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state' (Bartkus, 1999: 3). A similar definition is proposed by Pavkovic and Radan, who describe secession

as 'the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a territory and its population where that territory was previously part of an existing state' (2007: 5). The new state is, according to Pavkovic and Radan, the ultimate product of a process, during which delegates of the population settled in a certain territory in the existing state announce an independent state on that territory generally through a declaration of independence. If the announcement of independence is not questioned by the existing state, endorsed by the population of the seceding territory and the newly proclaimed state be recognised by other states, the new state may then complete its eventual secession (*ibid*).

Many other scholars come up with different definitions of secession. For instance, Australian academic James Crawford defines it as 'the creation of a State by the use of threat or force without the consent of the former sovereign' (Crawford, 2006: 378). This considers secession requires the use or threat of force and opposition from the host state. Norway's secession from Sweden in 1905, however, was peaceful.

Another definition of secession is proposed by Allen Buchanan as follows:

> [Secession is] a kind of collective action, whereby a group (whether officially recognised as a legitimate political subunit or not) attempts to become independent from the state that presently claims jurisdiction over it and, in doing so, seeks to remove part of the territory from the existing state (1991a: 75).

Buchanan defines not secession, what Pavkovic and Radan call, 'secessionist attempt' (2007: 5). This may turn into a successful secession when it is given adequate international recognition following the announcement of independence. It may become an unsuccessful secession due to the absence of the proclamation of independence, the lack of an endorsement from the population, or insufficient

recognition of the newly proclaimed state by other states (*ibid*). Accordingly, I understand secession in the way Bartkus (1999), and Pavkovic and Radan (2007) define it, meaning that it refers to political disintegration, territorial dismemberment and the partition of the original state.

Ismail Besikci is a Turkish sociologist imprisoned for 17 years in total for writing about Kurds and Kurdistan. He proposes secession as the way of solving the Kurdish question. Besikci (2014) defines the Kurdish issue as an international problem preventing a nation (Kurds) from exercising their natural right of self-determination and dividing their historic homeland (Kurdistan) into different parts ruled by colonialist states. According to him, Kurdistan is divided by four colonialist states – Northern Kurdistan/*Bakur* (Turkey), Southern Kurdistan/*Başûr* (Iraq), Eastern Kurdistan/*Rojhilat* (Iran) and Western Kurdistan/*Rojava* (Syria). It has no status at all, which makes it even 'below a colony' (Besikci, 2015a). He argues that the status of colony allows not only for the official recognition of the colonised nation's territory, such as the British Colony of Kenya and the Belgian Colony of Congo, but also for the official recognition of that nation's identity. Neither territorial nor ethno-cultural recognition is provided for the *whole* of Kurdistan, however: Only *Başûr* enjoys *de jure* constitutional status in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 (Besikci, 2016a, 2016b).

The non-status position of Kurdistan is, according to Besikci (2015a), also the essential element empowering all four colonialist states to implement various violent policies, e.g. coercive assimilation policies, forced deportations, mass executions and even genocides, towards the Kurds with the purpose of annihilating the ethnic group, obliging the Kurds to live under a regime worse than South Africa's apartheid regime. He maintains that the apartheid regime was constructed on

denominational, sectoral and spatial racism, but it did not seek to deny or assimilate ethno-cultural diversity. The whites and blacks were forced to inhabit separate neighbourhoods and towns, go to separate schools and work in separate sectors, while the blacks were also debarred from owning or possessing real property and engaging in politics.

Besikci (1990) asserts that in the twentieth century the Kurds were in a position worse than South African blacks under the apartheid regime. They were subjected to economic injustices. These included the confiscation of Kurdistan's natural resources by the colonialist states and the deliberate pauperisation of Kurdistan by these states. In addition, they were subjected to coercive assimilation policies, including the official rejection of the presence of Kurds and Kurdistan by the colonialist states and various constitutional and legal bans on the use of Kurdish. They were also victims of ethnic cleansings, e.g. the 1988 Halabja massacre recording an act of horrific barbarity committed by the Iraqi Air Force, which fired rockets and napalm into the residential areas of Halabja and was followed by a poison gas attack, killing some 3000-5000 innocent civilian Kurds (Besikci, 2015b).

According to Besikci (2016a, 2016b), the Kurds were in a better position in the twenty-first century after the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and the elimination of some, but not all, assimilation policies imposed on Kurdish ethno-cultural identities. Nevertheless, they should establish their own nation-state to guarantee a secure public arena where the Kurds can protect and promote their own national characteristics without being subjected to any repressive policy implemented by the colonialist states. In the absence of such a nation-state, Besikci (2015b, 2016e) argues, the Kurds would always be in a delicate position.

Kurdistan is surrounded by the colonialist states who are in favour of destroying all Kurdish features for the sake of preserving their own national interests.

He maintains that Kurdistan's delicate position can easily be understood when comparing Palestine and Kurdistan. Palestinian Arabs have, Besikci (2015b, 2016e) contends, just one enemy among the countries in the Middle East, Israel. All 22 Arabian states in the Middle East and Northern Africa and all 57 member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) condemn all Israeli oppressive and violent policies towards the Palestinian Arabs and support Palestinian independence. While these states express support for the Palestinian Arabs, they do not criticise any injustice the Kurds have been suffering since the adoption of the Sykes-Picot order.

Besikci (2016d, 2016g) argues that the Kurds are the sole Islamic nation without its own sovereign state. They can only remove this threat by constructing their own independent nation-state. Establishing such a state is, according to him, already a natural right bestowed on the Kurds with an estimated population over forty million. He emphasises that a number of states that adhere to the Council of Europe have a population less than forty thousand (Lichtenstein, San Marino and Monaco). Some EU member states have a population less than three million (such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia). A significant number of OIC member states have a population less than three million (e.g. Bahrain, Comoros and Qatar). Many other United Nations member states have similarly small populations (Barbados, Bahamas, Fiji, Iceland, Kosovo, Nauru, Vanuatu, to name just a few). Besikci (2013, 2016c, 2016f) maintains that if granting the right to self-determination to these small states is a fair treatment, then hindering Kurdistan, with a higher population, is problematic.

All in all, Besikci considers secession – the unification of all Kurdish-dominated regions, currently ruled by Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, under the name of an independent Kurdistan where the Kurds, as a sovereign nation, can exercise their natural right of self-determination, preserve their own national interests, and protect and advance their ethno-cultural identities – is the way of resolving the Kurdish question. Besikci's secessionist proposal is a normative argument that attempts to justify Kurdish independence rather than a proposal prepared in accordance with the demands of Turkey's Kurds.

There are two main types of normative theories seeking to justify some secessions and criticise others as unjustified or indefensible. They appeal to political or ethical standards, namely 'remedial right only theories' and 'primary right theories' (Buchanan, 1997: 34). Both types welcome special rights to secede – those rights generated by means of promising, [94] contract, [95] or some exceptional relationships.[96] Remedial right only theories stipulate that 'a group has a general right to secede if and only if it has suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of last resort' (*ibid*: 34-5).

Different remedial right only theories identify different wrongdoings, the existence of which guarantees the remedy of secession. According to Buchanan (1997), three kinds of injustices allow for unilateral secession: infringement of basic human rights (the Bangladeshi secession from Pakistan); unjust annexation of territories (the Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union); and systematic breaches of previous agreements on self-government (former Yugoslav republics). In addition to

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[94] The state may grant a right to secede, e.g. Norway's peaceful secession from Sweden in 1905.

[95] The constitution of the state may include a right to secede, e.g. Article 39(1) of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution.

[96] The agreement establishing the state may include a direct or indirect provision that enables a region to secede at a later date, e.g. the relationship between the American Southerners and the American Union.

the three injuries, Seymour (2007: 395) considers 'a failure to comply with internal self-determination' as an element leading to a remedial right to secede. According to Tamir (1993), minorities have a remedial right to secede if their cultural and linguistic identities have not been expressed through state bodies. Finally, Birch (1984) argues that a group enjoys a remedial right to secede if the host state has used force during the group's integration process and failed to protect the group's legitimate interests that involve both rights, including the right to physical security, and economic and political interests.

Besikci attempts at justifying a remedial Kurdish right to secede by taking into consideration various wrongdoings the Kurds have suffered so far in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. In addition to this remedial right argument, Besikci also seeks to establish another normative argument constructed on primary rights theories. These theories fall into two chief classes – 'ascriptive group theories' and 'associative group theories'. They maintain that some groups may secede unilaterally even in the absence of previous injustices (Buchanan, 1997: 37-8). Ascriptive group theories stipulate that every *nation* is entitled to establish its own state reflecting its characteristics (e.g. culture, history and language). Associative group theories maintain that any community, no matter how heterogeneous, enjoys the right to secession as these theories focus on 'the voluntary political choice of the group (or the majority of them) [and] their decision to form their own independent political unit' (*ibid*: 38-9). By recognising the Kurds as a *nation* with a population over forty million, Besikci tries to construct an ascriptive group theory under which the Kurds, as a nation, would have a primary right to secede.

Besikci's approach might be an appropriate response to the question why the Kurds should have their independent nation-state, but not to the question how

Turkey's Kurdish question can be resolved. It is true that the Kurdish issue has an international dimension affecting all countries where the Kurds are now living. Kurdish demands vary case by case, meaning that a demand that is made by the Kurds of Iraq may not be supported by the Kurds of Turkey. Hence, Turkey's Kurdish problem might have different dynamics from that of Iraq. Similarly, the resolution of Syria's Kurdish question may require the satisfaction of some Kurdish demands that might not be the case in solving Iran's Kurdish issue. It might therefore be better to resolve each Kurdish question separately rather than attempting to find a resolution considering the Kurds in a unitary manner.

Besikci's proposal might be taken into consideration in Iraq, where the Kurds seem to support an outright independent Kurdistan.[97] Secession might not be the optimal method in resolving Turkey's Kurdish question. Many reports published by well-known research centres based in Turkey suggest that Turkish Kurds predominantly renounce secession. According to a BİLGESAM report prepared in 2009, a mere 9.7 per cent of Kurds support Kurdish independence while the rest (90.3 per cent) reject this option as the way of resolving the Kurdish question (Bilgic and Akyurek, 2009: 90-2). Another BİLGESAM report, published in 2011, finds a similar result: 9.9 per cent of Kurds support Kurdish independence whilst the rest (90.1 per cent) believe that secession is not the solution (Akyurek, 2011a: 10). The UKAM finds a slightly different result in its 2013 report. Only 11.6 per cent of Kurds consider secession as the way of resolving the Kurdish issue (UKAM, 2013: 33). The Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the AİH all note that Kurdish

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[97] An independence referendum was held in Iraqi Kurdistan on 25 September 2017. 92 per cent of those who cast their ballots backed independence (Cockburn, 2017). The Federal Supreme Court of Iraq ruled that the referendum was unconstitutional. This made the results void (Rasheed and Jalabi, 2017). For a detailed analysis of Iraqi Kurds and their support for independence, see Anderson and Stansfield (2009); Kent (2016); Kinninmont, Stansfield and Sirri (2013); Stansfield (2003a, 2003b, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2016a, 2016b); Stansfield and Anderson (2009); Stansfield and Shareef (2016); Wivell (2016).

secession is not an option ethnic Kurds consider as the way of solving Turkey's long-running political question (UKAM, 2014: 16-30, 40-45). Finally, the ASSAM records in its 2015 report that most segments of Kurdish society reject Kurdish independence as the way of solving the Kurdish problem (ASSAM, 2015: 4-9).

Some sociological studies support the findings of these reports as well. A BİLGESAM report, published in 2012, finds that 90.3 per cent of Kurds believe that they have a common future with ethnic Turks in Turkey (Akyurek and Yilmaz, 2012: 12). The belief in the existence of the common future is strongly approved by another BİLGESAM report published in 2013, which finds that 97.3 per cent of ethnic Kurds believe that they have a common future with ethnic Turks in Turkey (Akyurek, Yilmaz, Atalay and Koydemir, 2013: 59).

As noted in Chapter 2, an identical version of Besikci's proposal had indeed been embraced by the PKK in the late 1970s and 1980s, when the insurgents believed that Kurdistan ought to be liberated and united under an independent state constructed on Marxist-Leninist, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ideologies. The PKK began to shift its position in the 1990s. The goal of secession was ultimately dropped in the 2000s. Since then, the PKK stands up for a multiculturalist model built on territorial pluralism that I will examine in Chapter 4.[98]

The pro-Kurdish mainstream party, the HDP, and its fraternal party, the DBP, also support an amended version of the PKK's multiculturalist model that I will also scrutinise in depth in Chapter 4. Finally, the other pro-Kurdish political parties, the HÜDA-PAR and HAK-PAR, do not favour secession. Instead, they support various

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[98] I will briefly touch on this amendment process in Chapter 4, but for a detailed analysis of the process, see Gunes (2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 2013c, 2016); Gutaj and Al (2017); Ozcan (2006); White (2015).

multiculturalist approaches aimed at solving the Kurdish issue *within* Turkey (see Chapter 6).

In short, secession might not be the optimal method of solving the Kurdish problem. When taking into consideration the standpoints of Turkey's Kurdish society, we can say that this option is not regarded by most sectors of that society as the way of resolving the Kurdish issue.

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that there are some normative and pragmatic reasons why it might be better for Turkey to attempt at solving its Kurdish problem via a policy of multiculturalism rather than those others which seek to manage ethno-cultural diversity without establishing a multicultural arena in which not only majority but also minority identities are recognised, protected and promoted.

The Republic might introduce such a multiculturalist policy by embracing one of the following three main approaches: centripetalism, consociationalism and territorial pluralism. In the next chapter, I will try to explain why either of the last two of these multiculturalist approaches – consociationalism and territorial pluralism – would not be the optimal multiculturalist approach.

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Chapter 4

Search for Optimal Multiculturalist Approach: A Critical Analysis of Consociationalism and Territorial Pluralism

4.1. Introduction

There are three main approaches by which Turkey might introduce a policy of multiculturalism in managing its ethno-cultural diversity: centripetalism, consociationalism and territorial pluralism. I argue that the last two approaches – consociationalism and territorial pluralism – are not the optimal multiculturalist approaches.

Many scholars, such as Aktas (2014); Aktoprak (2009); Baysal (2016); Kirisci and Winrow (1997); Sandikli and Kaya (2012); Yoruk (2009a, 2009b), have examined whether consociationalism might be the best multiculturalist approach. I agree with Kirisci and Winrow (1997) that this approach is not optimal. A consociational model would offer political incentives to the leaders of the minority ethnic group (Kurds) to cooperate and enter into consociational power-sharing arrangements with their counterparts representing the majority ethnic group (Turks). The same cannot be said of the Turkish leaders, who might not have enough

motivation to engage in conciliatory behaviour. This would make consociational power-sharing arrangements difficult to enforce in the Turkish Republic.

In the absence of such motives, multicultural reforms that have been made with the aim of establishing a consociational model would also encounter some sustainability problems in Turkey. There simply might not be a large enough number of intercultural citizens to support the reforms. The number of such citizens might be increased, but centripetalism, not consociationalism, is the multiculturalist approach that can increase the number of intercultural citizens. Centripetal electoral rules reward moderate politicians willing to foster interculturalism through interethnic conciliation and cooperation. Centripetal political incentives encourage political parties representing both majority and minority groups to move towards the moderate middle and form pre-electoral coalitions.

Territorial pluralism is another multiculturalist approach that is supported by the PKK, HDP and DBP and various scholars, such as Akkaya and Jongerden (2012, 2013); Arin (2015); Cicek (2011, 2012); Gurer (2015a, 2015b, 2015c); Jongerden (2015, 2016); Jongerden and Akkaya (2013, 2014); Kucuk (2015); Kucuk and Ozselcuk (2015a, 2015b, 2016). I argue that territorial pluralism would not be the optimal multiculturalist approach because the adoption of this approach would not eliminate the main Turkish anxiety about the solution of the Kurdish question. The anxiety is that authorising the Kurds to establish an autonomous Kurdistan would eventually dismantle the national unity and territorial integrity of Turkey with the secession of Kurdistan.

This chapter provides a critical analysis of consociationalism and territorial pluralism. It is organised as follows. It first critically examines whether

consociationalism might be the best multiculturalist solution. It then turns its attention to another multiculturalist approach, territorial pluralism.

4.2. Consociationalism

Consociationalism is a multiculturalist way of managing ethno-cultural diversity that is most associated with Arend Lijphart (1968, 1969). He develops the original form of the consociational model from a comprehensive examination of the characteristics of power-sharing democracy in a few continental European countries, including Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands. According to Lijphart, ethno-cultural diversity may be successfully managed through sharing, diffusing, separating, dividing, decentralising and limiting power (1983: 168). In order to establish such power-sharing systems, he proposes four main institutional elements: (i) grand coalition, (ii) proportionality, (iii) mutual veto and (iv) segmental, or group, autonomy (Lijphart, 1979: 500). Lijphart recognises the first and last elements as the primary tools of the consociational model and the second and third elements as its secondary tools reinforcing the primary ones (1985: 4, 2004: 97).

A grand coalition, the first primary element, is defined by Lijphart as a cabinet made up of representatives of *all* segments of the pluralist society who jointly govern the country (1979: 500). According to Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, such an executive organ is just one consociationalist version of executive power sharing, namely 'complete consociation in the executive' (2012: 94-5). 'In a complete consociational executive, the leaders of all significant segments of an ethnically differentiated territory are represented' (O'Leary, 2005: 12). To clarify, imagine that there are three ethnic groups, E_X, E_Y and E_Z, and that all voters in these

three groups split their votes between three political parties, engendering a nine-party political system: X_1, X_2, X_3 supported by E_X; Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 supported by E_Y; and Z_1, Z_2, Z_3 supported by E_Z. In a complete consociation, the executive body would be a coalition cabinet encompassing all these nine political parties.[99]

In addition to the complete type, there are two more forms of the consociational executive (O'Leary and McGarry, 2012: 94-5). In the concurrent version, 'each significant ethnic segment has representation in the executive and that executive has at least majority support in each significant segment' (O'Leary, 2005: 13). Hence, using the above example, a concurrent consociational executive would be made up of parties X_1, Y_1 and Z_1, all of which enjoy majority support within their own segments, E_X, E_Y and E_Z, respectively. In the plurality consociations, 'each significant segment has competitively elected political leaders in the executive, but, in at least one segment, the relevant leadership has only plurality (rather than majority) support among voters' (*ibid*). To put it differently, a plurality consociational executive is weakly consociational since one or more segments solely give their plurality assent whilst other segments give at least majority support to the government. Thus, using the above example, such a plurality executive would encompass parties X_1, Y_1 and Z_1, each of which is elected the first, but perhaps not the majority, party in their respective segments, E_X, E_Y and E_Z.[100]

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[99]A complete version of consociational executive operates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where three-person presidency consists of one Bosniak and one Croat, each of whom is directly elected from the region of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and one Serb who is directly elected from the region of the Republika Srpska (O'Leary and McGarry, 2012: 94).

[100] McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon (2008: 59) give Northern Ireland, a devolved region of the United Kingdom, as an example where both concurrent and plurality forms of consociational executive are in operation. A concurrent consociation operates in the autonomous region because the heads of its executive body – First Minister and Deputy First Minister – are elected as a team by a concurrent majority of nationalist and unionist members of the Northern Irish Assembly. A plurality consociation is also in operation there because the executive body might function without absolute majority support from either the nationalists or the unionists.

Group autonomy is the other primary element of the consociational model providing all ethnic groups that are consociational partners in a complete, concurrent or plurality executive with the autonomy to run their own domestic affairs, especially in the domains of culture, education and language. The autonomy vested in the groups might take a territorial form if the ethnic group concerned is territorially concentrated; or, a cultural form if the ethnic group is territorially dispersed (Lijphart, 2006a: 43).[101] Using the above example, imagine that E_X and E_Y are territorially concentrated ethnic groups whilst E_Z is a territorially dispersed one. In the existence of such a circumstance, the consociational model bestows territorial autonomy on E_X and E_Y, while granting cultural autonomy to E_Z.

The consociational model has important secondary elements. The first is the adoption of proportionality rules in legislative representation, civil service, military, police, public employment (especially for core state institutions) and public expenditure (Lijphart, 1996a: 258). According to Lijphart (2004: 100), the election of a broadly representative parliament is essential to manage ethno-cultural diversity. Proportional representation (PR) is the best way of electing such a parliament (Lijphart, 2006a: 45-6). The beauty of PR is, Lijphart argues, that it produces proportionality and minority representation. It is also able to ensure equality among all ethnic, linguistic, religious, racial, or even noncommunal groups by treating them 'in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion' (2004: 100).

PR allocates seats on the basis of the share of votes each party has received. A political party gaining 30 per cent of all votes should win 30, neither 20 nor 40, per cent of all seats (Soudriette and Ellis, 2006: 20). There are two main PR systems: (i)

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[101] For all important differences between the territorial form and its cultural counterpart, see footnote 62.

Party-List PR under which voters vote for a party; and (ii) Single Transferable Vote (STV) under which voters vote directly for candidates. There are three different types of Party-List PR: a) Closed-List PR, b) Open-List PR and c) Semi-open-List PR. In all cases, parties present their lists of candidates, and seats are allocated in accordance with their party's share of the vote. Voting style is different in each version, however. Under Closed-List PR, voters cast their vote for the party and the list as a whole. Hence, voters cannot express any preferences for candidates. Under Semi-open-List PR, voters have some influence on who is elected since they can choose their favourite candidates *within* the party list. Open-List PR gives voters a chance to elect even a candidate *outside* the party list.[102] Lijphart prefers Closed-List PR because it, he believes, 'encourages the formation and maintenance of strong and cohesive political parties' (2006a: 47).

Other consociationalists, including Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, do not agree with Arend Lijphart. An electoral threshold is used to determine a specified minimum percentage of national, regional or district votes that a candidate or political party must receive to gain any seats in the legislature. O'Leary and McGarry (2012) argue that Party-List PR used with a low threshold might enable hardliners whose radical parties may easily surmount such a threshold to wreck consociational deals. That is why they prefer STV. Under this system, voters rank candidates in order of preference. STV is used in multimember districts. Candidates need to achieve a 'quota' based on proportionality. 'The quota used divides the total number of seats to be elected, and then adds one to the result. For example, if there are 6,000 votes and five members to be elected, the quota for election is 6,000/(5+1), or 1,001 votes' (Reilly 2006a: 40). A candidate achieving the quota is immediately

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[102] For more details on PR, see Gladdish (2006); Lardeyret (2006); Lijphart (2006a, 2006b); Quade (2006).

elected, but if no candidate has achieved, the one receiving the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated, and her second preferences are redistributed to the remaining candidates. 'At the same time, the "surplus" votes of elected candidates (that is, their votes above the quota) are redistributed according to the lower preferences on the ballots, until all seats for the constituency are filled' (*ibid*).[103] According to O'Leary and McGarry, STV, under which the principle of proportionality is still retained, might be a better option than Party-List PR because it may facilitate vote transfers in favour of candidates backing the maintenance of power sharing (O'Leary, 1999: 1636; O'Leary and McGarry, 2012: 95).

The other secondary element of the consociational model is mutual veto which enables each consociational partner to block constitutional and legislative changes threatening their vital interests. Lijphart (2006a: 43) maintains that mutual veto rights contribute to the construction of a system where no consociational partner fears being outvoted by other partners. They also prevent a consociational arrangement from being amended, usurped or abolished unilaterally by a party to the arrangement or by a collective decision taken by most, but not all, parties to the arrangement. According to McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon, the presence of such a system would ultimately eliminate antagonism and historic mistrust between consociational partners (2008: 60).

In sum, consociationalism manages ethno-cultural diversity through four elements – (i) a consociational coalition, (ii) group autonomy, (iii) proportionality in legislative representation and the composition of other public institutions, and (iv) mutual veto rights on vital interests. It is aimed at securing the cultures, identities,

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[103] For more details on STV, see Amy (1996); Grofman and Bowler (1996); McBride (1996); Newman (1996); Taagepera (1996); Wolfgang, de Mino and Lane (1996).

freedoms, rights and opportunities of ethnic groups and enabling 'them to enjoy the benefits of equality without forced assimilation, and with only limited integration, common formal citizenship' (O'Leary, 2001a: 43).

The Netherlands adopted a consociational model in managing its diversity from 1917 to the 1960s. Various consociational formulas were also used in several ethnically divided countries, including Cyprus (1960-63), Fiji (1970-87), Lebanon (1943-75) and Malaysia (1955-69). A consociational system operates in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A significant number of consociational rules are also in force in Northern Ireland, a devolved region of the United Kingdom.

Is consociationalism the optimal multiculturalist approach that Turkey should embrace in solving its Kurdish problem? It is initially worth noting that a consociational model might satisfy all basic Kurdish demands, including the adoption of a comprehensive decentralisation policy enabling ethnic Kurds to enjoy some degree of self-government within Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. However, the satisfaction of such demands does not automatically imply that consociationalism is the best approach to resolving Turkey's long-running political question.

Various studies – e.g. Aktas (2014); Aktoprak (2009); Baysal (2016); Kirisci and Winrow (1997); Sandikli and Kaya (2012); Yoruk (2009a, 2009b) – have examined whether consociationalism might solve the Kurdish problem. Some of these studies reach the conclusion that consociationalism might not be the optimal approach. Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 189-91) argue, for instance, that Turkey may not successfully manage its ethno-cultural diversity through a consociational formula because it is a country where there is a clear ethnic majority, the Turks. Ethnic Turks

form the majority population in all regions of Turkey other than Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia and constitute almost 75 per cent of the Republic's entire population (see Chapter 5). The existence of such a majority group implies that consociationalism is not the best approach to managing Turkey's ethno-cultural diversity.

This argument rests on centripetal and integrationist criticisms of consociationalism. The presence of a majority ethnic group makes consociational power-sharing arrangements difficult to enforce. Donald Horowitz maintains that consociationalism does not offer political incentives to leaders of majority ethnic groups to cooperate and enter into consociational power-sharing arrangements with their counterparts representing minority ethnic groups (2002b: 20). Minority leaders would not only have group autonomy, they would also take part in the ruling of the entire country by means of a consociational cabinet and in the administration of many important nation-wide public institutions via proportionality rules. Hence, minority leaders are more likely to cooperate and enter into consociational power-sharing arrangements than majority leaders (*ibid*).

Consociationalists admit that their multiculturalist approach may not offer political incentives to majority leaders, but nevertheless they insist that such leaders would still be inclined to cooperate and enter into power-sharing arrangements with their minority counterparts because the alternative would be a civil war that is less desirable than cooperation and arrangements. In the absence of cooperation, consociationalists argue, there would always be a permanent majority dictatorship, e.g. a permanent Protestant dictatorship in Northern Ireland, and a persistent minority opposition unlikely to cycle into power, e.g. a persistent Catholic opposition in Northern Ireland. If the majority has no fear that it would be

overthrown democratically by the opposition, it may abuse its power. This would offend the minority, eventually resulting in a civil war (see Lijphart, 1975, 1996b; McGarry and O'Leary, 2004).

A war might be an option in *deeply divided* countries where there is a significant degree of hostility or antagonism between ethnic groups at the grassroots level. It is less likely in countries where there is some degree of interethnic moderation at the grassroots level. There is some degree of moderation among ethnic Kurds and Turks in Turkey, especially at the grassroots level (see Chapter 5). This moderation suggests that there is little support for a civil war.

There has been a long-running armed conflict between the pro-Kurdish PKK and Turkish security forces. This armed conflict has not turned into a civil war between ordinary Kurds and Turks. Turkey is now an integrationist country where most Kurdish demands are *not* satisfied, and where *no* pro-Kurdish political party shares in legislative or executive power. Even in the *absence* of a multiculturalist approach that might have fulfilled many Kurdish demands, most segments of Kurdish society do not support a civil war with ordinary Turks. In addition, it is apparent that numerous ethnic Turks get frustrated or irritated by violent PKK attacks, but most sectors of Turkish society have not transformed their frustration or irritation into support for a civil war against ordinary Kurds.

The existence of some degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level means that the alternative is not a civil war, as prominent consociationalists predict. The threat of a civil war might not provide a reason for Turkish political leaders to cooperate and enter into power-sharing arrangements with their Kurdish counterparts. There are, of course, some political

incentives urging Turkish political leaders to take a reconciliatory stand. Consociationalism, however, might not provide such leaders with motives for compromise behaviour. Centripetalism, by contrast, provides both minority and majority leaders with motives through electoral incentives, incorporated into the centripetal model via majoritarian-preferential voting systems. I will explore this feature of centripetalism in Chapter 5 when forming my original centripetal formula. Here what we should underline is just that consociationalism might not offer political incentives stimulating Turkish political leaders to cooperate and enter into power-sharing arrangements with their Kurdish counterparts.

Turkish political leaders, in particular, are less likely to adopt a reconciliatory stand in the absence of such incentives. This might not be the only consequence. Multicultural reforms, made with the establishment of a consociational model, would also encounter sustainability problems in Turkey. Kymlicka argues that a multiculturalist system is unlikely to succeed in managing ethno-cultural diversity without the adoption of the following two ideals: (1) the ideal of a state that impartially 'accommodates diversity in its laws and public institutions'; and (2) the ideal of an *intercultural* citizen who 'feels comfortable dealing with diversity in his or her individual interactions' (2003: 158).

Kymlicka notes that the state-level ideal can be adopted by three steps. First, the state should reject the traditional assumption that it belongs to a single national group; instead, it should acknowledge itself as a possession of all its citizens belonging to different ethnic groups. Second, it should repudiate all nation-building policies that assimilate or exclude its minority group(s). The state ought to allow all its individual citizens to access state bodies and act as full and equal citizens in the political arena, without having to conceal or deny their ethno-cultural identities. It

should also acknowledge an obligation to accord the language, culture and history of its minority group(s) the same recognition that has been accorded to those of the majority group. Third, the state should accept the historic injustice that has been done to its minority group(s) by policies of exclusion and assimilation, and offer some remedies or rectification for them.

As for the adoption of the second ideal, which is a community-level ideal, Kymlicka (2003) emphasises that most citizens of the state, at least 50 per cent plus one of the entire population, should support the three principles. Multicultural reforms can be sustained only with the endorsement of a large enough number of 'intercultural citizens', who welcome and support the state-level ideal (2003: 158). In the absence of such a number of intercultural citizens, Kymlicka's comprehensive analysis demonstrates, the state might nullify its multicultural reforms due to the rejection of a majority of its citizens to support the implementation of such reforms. This will eventually result in the state's failure to manage its ethno-cultural diversity via a multiculturalist formula.

Imagine that Turkey has embraced the state-level ideal and introduced various multicultural reforms allowing for the fulfilment of many Kurdish demands. Such reforms are not sustainable without the endorsement of a majority population of Turkey. So, the question will then be the following: would there be enough Turkish citizens in favour of such reforms? To put it differently, would there be enough intercultural citizens (at least fifty per cent plus one of the entire population) supporting such multicultural reforms? To answer this question, I draw on some recent comprehensive public surveys made by a few well-known research centres based in Turkey.

Imagine that Turkey has just established a consociational system in managing its ethno-cultural diversity and introduced a multicultural reform removing all current Turkish nationalist connotations from the constitution and defining the citizen as a *Türkiyeli* rather than a Turk.[104] According to a TESEV report published in 2012, most citizens of Turkey are in favour of keeping Turkish identity as the only identity recognised at the constitutional level: 55.8 per cent of respondents supported the proposition that only Turkish identity should be recognised by the constitution; 35.1 per cent favoured the recognition of all ethnic identities, including Turkish, Kurdish, Laz and Circassian, at the constitutional level; and 9.1 per cent supported a constitution recognising none of the identities (TESEV, 2012: 56).

This does not mean, however, that both ethnic Turks and Kurds reject a multicultural reform recognising either all or none of the ethnic identities at the constitutional level. According to the report, 71.6 per cent of Kurds favoured a constitution recognising all ethnic identities; 13.1 per cent supported a constitution recognising none of the identities; and only 15.3 per cent supported a constitution that recognised only Turkish identity (TESEV, 2012: 58). This suggests that ethnic Kurds (84.7 per cent) would overwhelmingly support a multicultural reform that

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[104] *Türkiyeli* means a person living in the territory of Turkey. It is 'a *territorial* definition of citizenship in contrast to "Turk" which is an *ethnic* definition of citizenship' (Oran, 2007: 6). Baskin Oran maintains that *Türkiyeli* is 'a direct counterpart for "British" while "Turk" is a direct counterpart for "English"' (2007: 6). Like British identity, which is a primary identity involving such secondary identities as English, Welsh and Scottish, *Türkiyeli* may represent a primary identity for all citizens of Turkey that encompasses various secondary ones, e.g. Turkish, Kurdish and Laz, without making any discrimination between such identities (*ibid*: 60). The term '*Türkiyeli*' is regarded by various scholars – e.g. Aktoprak (2009); Grigoriadis (2007); Gurer (2015a); Kolcak (2015a); Unlu (2016) – as a potential inclusive and pluralist citizenship definition for Turkey. It was incorporated in many historical, political and constitutional texts. For example, the first draft version of the 1924 Constitution of Turkey incorporated the term in its several articles, including (i) Article 12, reading that '[e]xcept for exceptional circumstances in Turkey the *Türkiyelis* are free to travel' (cited in Oran, 2007: 61); (ii) Article 13, stipulating that '[e]ducation is free. Every *Türkiyeli* is eligible to take public and private education' (*ibid*); (iii) Article 14, stating that '[s]chools and all such institutions are subject to supervision and inspection of the State. The education of the *Türkiyeli* must be in unity and order' (*ibid*); and (iv) Article 15, ruling that '[a]ll *Türkiyelis* are eligible to establish all types of companies to be involved in commerce, industry and agriculture in line with laws and regulations' (*ibid*).

recognised either all or none of Turkey's ethnic identities at the constitutional level. The same cannot be said about ethnic Turks, however: 61.4 per cent of Turks favoured their identity as the only one recognised at the constitutional level, while the rest (38.6 per cent) supported a multicultural reform recognising either all identities (30.1 per cent) or none of them (8.5 per cent) (*ibid*).

In light of the findings of the 2012 TESEV Report, we may argue that a multicultural reform that omits all present Turkish nationalist connotations from the constitution and introduces an inclusive and pluralist citizenship concept, *Türkiyeli*, might not be supported by enough intercultural citizens in Turkey. Despite strong Kurdish support for the reform (84.7 per cent), the total percentage supporting it would be 44.2 per cent, less than the required amount, which is at least 50 per cent plus one. There are, of course, some important ways of increasing support for the reform, but these are not associated with consociationalism. They are centripetal strategies that enhance the number of intercultural citizens through fostering interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation. I will briefly touch on such strategies later in this section, but will emphasise that multicultural reforms that have been introduced without centripetal electoral strategies might encounter sustainability problems in Turkey, where there is not a large enough number of intercultural citizens supporting such reforms.

In the presence of Turkish opposition to the aforementioned multicultural reform, some pro-Turkish radical or extreme political parties that do not support interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation might manipulate the reform and criticise it on the grounds that it would result in national fragmentation and threaten the unity of the (Turkish) nation. Because ethnic Turks, who constitute almost 75 per cent of Turkey's entire population, overwhelmingly reject the reform, they might be

inclined to support such radical or extreme parties in a general election, ultimately enabling radicals or ethnic extremists to participate in Turkey's consociational cabinet. As Horowitz (1991: 170-75) argues, such a consociational cabinet, involving radicals or ethnic extremists, might not produce a coalition willing to develop interethnic conciliation and cross-ethnic cooperation, but a coalition of convenience coming together solely for the goal of executive formation. This coalition in which there might be no mutual motivation to hold coalition partners together would do little to advance interculturalism. A coalition that involves radicals or ethnic extremists might prevent Turkey from increasing the number of its intercultural citizens, which is the basic requirement for sustainable multicultural reforms.

Centripetal electoral strategies might enable the Republic to increase the number of its intercultural citizens, ensuring the sustainability of multicultural reforms. It is true that the aforementioned reform would not be supported by a majority population of Turkey given the findings of the 2012 TESEV Report. Nonetheless, the findings of some other reports also suggest that the number supporting the reform might reach the desired level with the employment of some centripetal strategies. According to a BİLGESAM report published in 2011, 73.9 per cent of the Turkish population (72.4 per cent of ethnic Turks and 80.6 per cent of ethnic Kurds) want no reference to any ideology, including nationalism, at the constitutional level (Akyurek and Bilgic, 2011: 46). The same report identifies that 77.2 per cent of the population (75.4 per cent of Turks and 85 per cent of Kurds) want a Turkey fully neutral to its ethnic, religious and other societal differences (*ibid*).

A KONDA report, published in 2016, also asks some important questions on citizenship matters to both ethnic Kurds and Turks. According to this report, only

two-fifths of Turks and one-fourth of Kurds suggest that a person who cannot speak Turkish should not be a citizen of Turkey (KONDA, 2016: 25). The same report identifies that three-fifths of Turks and three-fourths of Kurds reject that a citizen of Turkey should belong to Turkish race (*ibid*). Finally, slightly less than three-fifths of Turks and more than three-fifths of Kurds support the proposition that legal status is enough to be a citizen of Turkey, and no common linguistic or religious characteristics are required to acquire the citizenship (*ibid*).

These two reports indicate that ethnic Turks reject any reference to nationalism at the constitutional level, want the Republic to be neutral to all its ethnic groups, and do not support a citizenship concept constructed on Turkish linguistic and racial characteristics. They might not oppose multicultural reforms with the employment of some electoral strategies originated by centripetalism. I will explore such strategies in Chapter 5, but nonetheless explore some issues here.

Centripetalism uses majoritarian-preferential voting systems that provide politicians representing both majority and minority groups with political incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions. In ethnically diverse countries where there is some degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic groups at the grassroots level, centripetal electoral rules may dramatically enhance the development of interculturalism and intercultural citizens by helping moderate politicians who are willing to develop interethnic cooperation and conciliation to win elections rather than their radical, or extremist, counterparts who are inclined to reject any cross-community cooperation with ethnic groups other than their own (see Chapter 5).

It is apparent that while adopting multicultural reforms, it would be better for Turkey to establish an electoral system that rewards politicians supporting such

reforms rather than those manipulating them. Centripetal electoral rules may play a key role in fulfilling this duty because they empower moderate politicians who are willing to welcome interculturalism and develop interethnic conciliation and cooperation to win elections (see Chapter 5). If the rules reward those parties moving towards the moderate middle, they may create a system in which most parties support reforms rather than manipulating them. The rules do not construct a political arena in which there is no radical or extreme nationalist party. There would, of course, be some parties manipulating reforms, but these would have a marginal position.

Some may question whether ethnic Turks may still be inclined to support a radical party rejecting interculturalism following the establishment of a system dominated by moderate political parties willing to develop interethnic cooperation. This is unlikely in a country like Turkey, where there is some degree of mass-based interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks. If there was not a system where multicultural reforms were being manipulated by many parties, ethnic Turks would be less likely to advocate nationalist standpoints. The 2011 BİLGESAM Report and the 2016 KONDA Report suggest that ethnic Turks predominantly want the Republic to be impartial to all its ethnic groups while also rejecting both any constitutional reference to nationalism and a citizenship concept built on Turkish ethno-cultural characteristics. Having been informed correctly about the evils of Turkish nationalism and the merits of interculturalism, I do believe that the Turks would also support multicultural reforms, and many would become new intercultural citizens of Turkey, ensuring the stability of such reforms.

In short, consociationalism might not be the optimal approach that Turkey should embrace in solving its long-running political question. There is some degree of

interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level. In the presence of this moderation, a consociational model would offer political incentives to Kurdish leaders to cooperate and enter into power-sharing arrangements with their Turkish counterparts. The same cannot be said of the Turkish leaders, who might not have enough motives to engage in conciliatory behaviour, rendering consociational power-sharing arrangements difficult to enforce.

In the absence of such motives, multicultural reforms that have been made with the construction of the consociational model might also encounter some sustainability problems in Turkey. There would not be a large enough number of intercultural citizens backing the reforms. The number of such citizens might be increased, but centripetalism, not consociationalism, offers the required elements to increase the number – e.g. (i) centripetal electoral rules that reward moderate politicians willing to foster interculturalism through interethnic conciliation and cooperation; and (ii) centripetal political incentives that encourage political parties representing both majority and minority groups to move towards the moderate middle and form pre-electoral coalitions.

4.3. Territorial Pluralism

Territorial pluralism is a multiculturalist strategy of managing ethno-cultural diversity. The state converts its territorially concentrated minority group at the national level into a constitutionally recognised self-governing majority within its *single* region. The *division* of the minority-populated region into small autonomous units having *no* constitutional and institutional links with each other is one of the essential *centripetal* strategies in managing ethno-cultural diversity. This is not

incorporated in the territorial pluralist model. Territorial pluralism aims to bestow constitutionally entrenched self-goverment rights directly on *the entire region as a whole*, rather than splitting it into small autonomous units having *no* constitutional and institutional links with each other. By adopting territorial pluralism, the state *draws its internal boundaries* in order to respect its ethno-cultural diversity (O'Leary and McGarry, 2012: 98).

This does not mean, however, that the autonomous region must be organised in a unitary manner. It may consist of several (con)federal subunits exercising self-government rights within the frontiers of the autonomous region. The Basque Country, which is an autonomous region of the Spanish State, is a good example. The autonomous region is made up of the so-called '*Foral* Territories' – Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa – each of which exercises territorial autonomy in accordance with the Law of the Historic Territories (LHT), known as the 'Federal Constitution of the Basque Country' (Goikoetxea, 2014: 147). All the historic territories send 25 deputies to the Basque Parliament and have their own governments and 51-member parliaments (Goikoetxea, 2013: 270).

Like the Basque Country, any autonomous region, formed through the territorial pluralist model, may thus organise its internal institutional structure in a (con)federal way. There are constitutionally recognised autonomous regions in different systems, including i) unitary states (e.g. the Aland Islands (Finland)); ii) union states (e.g. Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country (Spain)); and iii) federations (e.g. the Flemish Region and Wallonia (Belgium)) (Wolff, 2011: 1785). The region may be simply called an autonomous region, autonomous community, or federal region (e.g. the Autonomous Community of Galicia (Spain)). In accordance with the degree of its territorial autonomy, it may also be defined through some special terms, such as

federacy – e.g. the Faroe Islands and Greenland (Denmark) – and associate state –
e.g. Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands (USA) (see Bartmann, 2012: 548;
Benedikter, 2009: 196-201, 294; Rezvani, 2012: 94, 2014: 93; Stepan, 2013: 234-
40).

An ethnic group enjoying a significant degree of territorial autonomy through the
territorial pluralist model may be recognised at the constitutional level as the sole
sovereign power of its autonomous region. The other multiculturalist approaches –
consociationalism and centripetalism – are less likely to bestow such recognition on
the ethnic group. This recognition might grant the autonomous region the right to
secede without being authorised by its principal state, or it might even render the
region an internationally recognised independent state in free association with its
principal state, who is authorised by bilateral treaties or confederal arrangements to
govern just a number of areas – e.g. defence and foreign affairs – while all other
fields are governed by the institutions of the autonomous region. The
aforementioned associate states are recognised by the United Nations as independent
states in free association with the USA (McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon, 2008: 64;
Wolff, 2013: 30-3).

Finally, the strategy of territorial pluralism may enable an ethnic group to have
political, constitutional and/or legal direct relationships with its kin communities in
other states, particularly those neighbouring its principal state. Such relationships are
most likely to recognise cross-border institutional linkages between the ethnic group
and its kin communities (O'Leary and McGarry, 2012: 102).

A territorial pluralist formula that is constructed on the tools of radical
democracy ensuring 'politics beyond the state, political organisation beyond the

party, and political subjectivity beyond class' is proposed by Abdullah Ocalan – the jailed leader of the PKK (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013: 189). Ocalan was imprisoned in February 1999. His solution is influenced by Murray Bookchin.[105] Ocalan's proposals articulate some of his defence texts submitted to different courts where his cases were heard.[106]

According to the formula, Turkey should undertake three basic reforms to resolve its long-running political question: one for a democratic republic; one for democratic autonomy; and one for democratic confederalism (Casier, Jongerden and Walker,

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[105] Ocalan is inspired by Bookchin's ideas of democratic autonomy and confederalism. These ideas are constructed on communalism and libertarian municipalism. According to Bookchin, a radical libertarian socialist, there are two distinct ideas of politics, the Roman model and its Hellenic counterpart. The Roman model ensures a centralist and statist form of politics and government under which there is a herd of subjects but not citizens actively participating in every minute of political life. The Hellenic model provides a communal and participatory form of politics and government under which an active citizenship is guaranteed. Bookchin rejects the Roman model, which is the dominant model in contemporary times. He supports the Hellenic model, which found expression in the Paris Commune of 1871, the initial Soviet councils emerging in the 1917 Russian revolution, and the Spanish revolution of 1936-39. He maintains that democratic autonomy and confederalism might revitalise the Hellenic model in the modern era. Democratic autonomy establishes local democratic institutions that embrace the principle of direct democracy, including neighbourhood councils, town meetings and community assemblies. These institutions allow citizens to actively take part in political decision-making processes. In order to prevent the project of democratic autonomy 'from becoming vacuous or being used for highly parochial ends, Bookchin suggests the principle of confederalism as a "network" of local democratic assemblies' (cited in Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013: 187). He defines confederalism as a norm of social organisation that democratises 'the interdependence without surrendering the principle of local control' (*ibid*). Bookchin argues that confederalism should not take its shape in a nation-state that intends to enshrine the Roman model. It should establish a confederal union of 'direct-democratic popular local assemblies at the municipal, town, and neighbourhood levels' (*ibid*). The union should become an 'alternative to the nation-state' and operate as a network council of the assemblies. The council should not be allowed to make policy. It should coordinate and administer 'the policies formulated by the assemblies themselves'. It should consist of deputies who are responsible to the assemblies. They should be recalled by the assemblies (*ibid*: 191). For more details on Bookchinian ideas, see Akkaya and Jongerden (2013); Jongerden (2015, 2016); Jongerden and Akkaya (2013).

[106] The texts concerned are the followings: the 1999 text submitted to the court in Imrali; the 1999 text submitted to the Court of Appeals in Ankara; the 2001 text submitted to a local court in Sanliurfa; the 2001 text submitted to the ECtHR; the 2003 text submitted to a local court in Athens; the 2004 text submitted to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR; and the two defence texts submitted to the ECtHR in 2009 and 2010, claiming the violation of Ocalan's right of fair trial. All these defence texts were published in Turkish, English, Kurdish and many other languages. The first two were published under the names of *Declaration on the Solution of the Kurdish Question*, and *Urfa: The Symbol of History, Divinity and Wretchedness in the Basin of the Tigris-Euphrates*. Three of the texts, the 2001 and 2004 ECtHR texts and the 2003 Athens text, were published under the titles of *From Sumerian Clerical State towards People's Republic I-II* (2001), *The Defence of Free Man* (2003), and *Defending a People* (2004). The last defence texts that problematise capitalist modernity and support democratic modernity were published in four volumes. For more details on the texts, see Akkaya and Jongerden (2011, 2012); Jongerden and Akkaya (2014).

2011: 115). The first reform would transform the current integrationist republic into a multiculturalist one by adopting a new pluralist constitution and incorporating its characteristics into the legislation of Turkey. Such a constitution should emphasise the importance of universal values and human rights, e.g. equality, justice, democracy, etc., refuse to include any nationalist ideology and remove all present Turkish nationalist words and phrases. It should also adopt an inclusive and pluralist citizenship definition that is built on no ethnic base (*ibid*). The constitution may keep Turkish as the national language of Turkey, but it should also allow for the usage of languages other than Turkish as the regional official languages of the Republic. This would enable Kurdish and other Anatolian minority languages to be used in the public realm at the regional level. All such minority languages should also be acknowledged by the constitution as languages of instruction that can be used from kindergarten level to the end of higher education in both public and private schools and universities. Finally, the constitution should recognise and protect not only Turkish identity and culture but also all other Anatolian identities and cultures, including those of ethnic Kurds (Gurer, 2015a: 74-5).

The second reform seeks to create an autonomous Kurdistan in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. According to the formula, the democratic republic, constructed by means of a new pluralist constitution, should authorise its Kurdish citizens to determine their own economic, cultural, social and political affairs in Northern Kurdistan (*Bakur*) by granting juridical and political autonomous status to *Bakur*. Such an autonomous *Bakur* should embrace communalism in its internal administrative structure under which a bottom-up system for self-government is organised at the levels of village [*köy*], street [*sokak*], rural district [*kasaba*], urban neighbourhood [*mahalle*], district [*ilçe*], city [*kent*] and region [*bölge*] (Jongerden,

2015). The main policy-making actors are local communes at the village and street levels of self-government and local councils at the rural district, urban neighbourhood, district and city levels (Gurer, 2015a: 79). At each level of self-administration, there are also other actors directly participating in political life, including women assemblies, gender equality boards, interreligious and intercultural assemblies, youth assemblies and many other civil society organisations (Kucuk, 2015; Kucuk and Ozselcuk, 2016: 189-90). All these bodies, which are the primary policy-making actors at their level of government, are represented in a people's congress that is made up of directly elected representatives, as well as delegates from local communes and councils (Gurer, 2015a: 79-80; Kucuk and Ozselcuk, 2015b). The congress is not a legislative or executive organ that takes decisions that are binding on the communes and councils; rather, it is a regional institution maintaining relationships between the State and *Bakur* on behalf of the local entities (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2012).

The last reform is to empower the Kurds to establish a cross-border confederal union with their kin communities in Southern Kurdistan (*Başûr*), Eastern Kurdistan (*Rojhilat*), Western Kurdistan (*Rojava*) and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. This would allow the unification of Kurds as a nation without constructing a Kurdish nation-state and without challenging the established and internationally recognised boundaries between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran (Gurer, 2015a: 78).

Ocalan's territorial pluralist formula is supported by the PKK, which established the Peoples' Confederation of Kurdistan [*Koma Komalên Kurdistan* (KKK)] in 2005 to implement democratic autonomy and democratic confederalism in a *de facto* manner. In May 2007, the insurgent movement reorganised the KKK under the name of the Union of Kurdistan Communities [*Koma Civakên Kurdistan* (KCK)], an

umbrella organisation for all Apoist, or pro-Ocalan, segments of the so-called 'Greater Kurdistan' – the entire territory encompassing *Bakur, Başûr, Rojhilat* and *Rojava* – including the PKK,[107] the Democratic Union Party [*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat* (PYD)],[108] the Kurdistan Free Life Party [*Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê* (PJAK)],[109] and the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party [*Partî Çareserî Dîmukratî Kurdistan* (PÇDK)].[110] The KCK recognises Ocalan as its president and the PKK as its ideological force. It seeks to implement democratic confederalism through its 300-member legislative body, the Kurdistan People's Congress [*Kongra Gelê Kurdistan* (Kongra-Gel)], and its 31-person Executive Council. It also aims to put the democratic autonomy dimension of the formula in all regions of Greater Kurdistan into practice (Candar, 2011: 85-6).

Ocalan's proposals are supported by the pro-Kurdish HDP and DBP. The party constitution of the DBP, in Article 3, acknowledges Ocalan's territorial pluralist formula as the way of solving Turkey's Kurdish question.[111] Similarly, the HDP considers the formula as the way of managing ethno-cultural diversity in the

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[107] The armed wings of the PKK, the HPG and YJA-STAR, are also incorporated in the military front of the KCK.

[108] The PYD is an Apoist political party established in Northern Syria (*Rojava*) in 2003. It is the leading party in the Movement for the Democratic Society [*Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk* (TEV-DEM)], a multi-ethnic and multi-religious coalition that established the Federation of Northern Syria during the ongoing Syrian Civil War in November 2013. The federation is a *de facto* autonomous region that consists of four self-governing cantons – Afrin, Jazira, Kobanî and the Shahba Region. These cantons are safeguarded by the Syrian Democratic Forces [*Quwwāt Sūriyā al-Dīmuqrāṭīya* (QSD)], a multi-ethnic and multi-religious armed group founded in October 2015 to create a democratic, secular and federal Syria. The armed wings of the PYD – the YPG and the Women's Protection Units [*Yekîneyên Parastina Jin* (YPJ)] – are among the constituent units of the QSD. The federation is not recognised by the central government of Syria or any sovereign state. Nonetheless, it attempts to implement Ocalan's communalist formula of democratic autonomy in Western Kurdistan in a *de facto* way. For more details, see Ustundag (2016).

[109] The PJAK has two armed sections, the Eastern Kurdistan Defense Units [*Yekîneyên Parastina Rojhilatê Kurdistan* (YRK)] and the Women's Defence Forces [*Hêzên Parastina Jinê* (HPJ)]. It is an Apoist political party established in 2004 to design an autonomous *Rojhilat* in light of Ocalan's ideas of democratic autonomy and confederalism. For more details, see Gunes (2012c, 2013a, 2013b).

[110] The PÇDK is an Apoist political party established in 2002. The party aims to restructure the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan in light of Ocalan's ideas. The party has not succeeded in gaining any seats in the 111-member Kurdistan Parliament so far. For more details, see Gunes (2012c, 2013a, 2013b).

[111] The party constitution is available at: http://www.dbp.org.tr/index/partide-tay/demokratik-bolge-ler-partisi-tuzugu/.

Republic and aims to put it into practice (see Article 2(1) of the party constitution and the party programme). [112] It is worth noting, however, that these parties recommend democratic autonomy for the whole of Turkey. They maintain that the Republic should be divided into 20-25 autonomous regions, 4 or 5 of which would be occupied by ethnic Kurds (Gurer, 2015a: 68). These regions should enjoy territorial autonomy through their own legislative organs capable of making primary laws in various areas, including internal territorial and institutional organisation, agriculture, livestock, language, culture, health, environment, transportation, police, economy, industry, trade and energy. They should also have their own executive organs that enforce regional laws (Cicek, 2012: 29; HDP, 2015a: 10-13, 2015b: 6-9).

One may question whether the proposal of the parties is a territorial pluralist formula as it seeks to split the Kurdish-dominated region into 4 or 5 small autonomous units. The parties, however, stress that all Kurdish-populated autonomous units should be given unitary constitutional status, recognising them under the name of the 'Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan' (Gurer, 2015b: 164-5; Democratic Society Congress, 2011: 5, 7). The Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan, the parties contend, should also be authorised to have diplomatic relationships with the other Kurdish-populated regions in the Middle East and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, thereby trying to implement the democratic confederalism dimension of Ocalan's formula (Democratic Society Congress, 2011: 12).

Another question might be whether the proposal of the parties excludes Ocalan's idea of communalism in shaping political life at the regional level. The proposal calls for the establishment of regional parliaments and executives. This is not

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[112] The party constitution can be found at: http://www.hdp.org.tr/parti/parti-tuzugu/10. The party programme is available at: http://www.hdp.org.tr/parti/parti-programi/8.

incorporated into Ocalan's original formula. This does not mean, however, that the proposal puts an embargo on the establishment of communalist structures, including local communes and councils, as well as many civil society organisations actively taking part in the policy-making process at the regional level. Instead, the parties welcome such structures and their participation in political life at the regional level. They claim that an autonomous executive or parliament that is subject to public approval only at the time of elections may not be enough to prevent strictly centralised autonomous governments or regional dictatorships. Such an executive or parliament should always be supervised by communalist structures. Without this provision, we may talk about political autonomy but not about democratic autonomy. Such structures enable the people to influence their government to satisfy their own demands. They are able to supervise actions of the autonomous government. They are able to veto any policy prepared to benefit politicians rather than the people. The HDP and DBP incorporate communalist structures that make a territorial autonomous region a genuinely democratic autonomous region (Demirtas, 2015: 32-3; Gurer, 2015b: 166; Ustundag, 2016: 199-200).

The foundation of the KCD demonstrates that the HDP and DBP, whose many members have been elected as KCD delegates so far, welcome and support communalist structures. Pro-Kurdish politicians have sought to establish communalist structures in *Bakur* since the second half of the 2000s. They have established various informal local communes and councils, as well as formal civil society organisations. These communalist organs are brought under the umbrella of the KCD. This 600-member congress carries out similar duties to those fulfilled by the people's congress in Ocalan's formula. This defines the people's congress as the regional institution maintaining relationships between the State (Turkey) and *Bakur*.

Similarly, the politicians ask the State to cooperate with the KCD, which lobbies for Kurdish interests but might also become the interlocutor in the search for the solution of the Kurdish question (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013: 193; Gurer, 2015a: 79-80).[113]

The territorial pluralist formula originated by Ocalan and/or its amended version proposed by the pro-Kurdish HDP and DBP gains support from a significant number of scholars, including Akkaya and Jongerden (2012, 2013); Arin (2015); Cicek (2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012); Gurer (2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c); Jongerden (2015, 2016); Jongerden and Akkaya (2013, 2014); Kucuk (2015); Kucuk and Ozselcuk (2015a, 2015b, 2016). Is either this territorial pluralist formula or territorial pluralism in a general sense the best multiculturalist approach in order to solve the Kurdish problem? All main Kurdish demands might be fulfilled through territorial pluralism; but so do other multiculturalist approaches, including centripetalism and consociationalism. The satisfaction of Kurdish demands is, of course, a significant stride that ought to be made in the resolution of the problem, but it is not the sole one. As Serafettin Elci, an intellectual Kurdish lawyer and politician, argued before his death in 2012, the optimal resolution formula should not only satisfy Kurdish demands, but eliminate Turkish anxieties. Without reassurance for Turks it might be very hard to persuade them to implement the formula (Basaran, 2012).

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[113] The KCD is an umbrella organisation for hundreds of pro-Kurdish (in)formal entities. It is organised under four institutions: (i) the General Assembly, (ii) the Co-Presidency, (iii) the Presidential Committee and (iv) the Coordination Board. The General Assembly consists of 600 members. 60 per cent of its members (360 delegates) are those that represent local communes and councils, and the remainder (240 delegates) are those that represent civil society organisations. The Assembly has fourteen commissions: 1) the Commission on Science, 2) the Commission on Language and Education, 3) the Commission on Diplomacy, 4) the Commission on Ecology and Local Administration, 5) the Commission on Economy, 6) the Commission on Youth, 7) the Commission on Rights and Religions, 8) the Commission on Human Rights, 9) the Commission on Women, 10) the Commission on Culture and Arts, 11) the Commission on Political Affairs, 12) the Commission on Social Policies, 13) the Commission on Law and Status, and 14) the Commission on Societal Reconciliation and Dialogue. The current co-presidents of the KCD are Leyla Guven and Hatip Dicle. For more details, see the official website of the KCD, http://www.kcd-dtk.org/, in addition to Cicek (2010a); Gunter (2013); Pope (2013).

Remember that territorial pluralism does not welcome the division of the minority-populated region into small autonomous units having no constitutional and institutional links with each other. Rather, the territorial pluralist model grants the minority constitutionally entrenched self-government rights that authorise them to exercise territorial autonomy either in a *single* autonomous region, or in several autonomous units having certain constitutional and institutional links with each other. This allows for the amalgamation of all the units under the name of *one* constitutionally recognised entity. Ocalan's formula provides an example for the former case. It calls for the establishment of one *single* constitutionally recognised autonomous region for the Kurds – Northern Kurdistan (*Bakur*). The amended version, presented by the HDP, DBP and KCD, might be considered as an example of the other way of exercising autonomy via a territorial pluralist model. It asks for the aggregation of all Kurdish-populated autonomous regions under the name of the 'Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan' at the constitutional level.

The establishment of a Kurdistan, either in the form of a Northern Kurdistan or in the form of a Democratic Autonomous Kurdistan, is the main Turkish anxiety expressed repeatedly in numerous studies. According to a BİLGESAM report prepared in 2011, only 3.6 per cent of ethnic Turks welcome the entire federalisation or regionalisation of Turkey (Akyurek and Bilgic, 2011: 28). Another BİLGESAM report, prepared in 2012, finds a similar result: merely 2.5 per cent of ethnic Turks support a federalisation or regionalisation policy that would allow for the construction of an autonomous Kurdistan in Turkey (Akyurek and Yilmaz, 2012: 44). Furthermore, the Marmara, Black Sea, Aegean, Mediterranean, and Central Anatolia Committees of the AİH declare in their individual reports that the construction of an autonomous Kurdistan in the East and Southeast is the main

Turkish anxiety since the Turks believe that such an autonomous entity would be the first exact step in the collapse of the Republic's territorial and national unity (see UKAM, 2014: 45-84).

This Turkish belief has its root in the so-called 'Sevres syndrome' (Kaliber and Tocci, 2010: 197). The Sevres Treaty of 1920 aimed to divide up the Ottoman Empire, which had been on the losing side of World War I. The Treaty sought to leave the Ottomans solely with a rump state. It stipulated many provisions pertaining to the territorial dismantlement of the Empire and the colonisation of its geography among Britain, France, Greece and Italy. The Treaty looked forward to an Armenian state, the borders of which were to be determined by Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the USA, and the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan in the Southeast that might hold an independence referendum to define its fate in the following year (Argun, 1999: 101; Yanarocak, 2016: 407).

Figure 1: Map of Turkey in Accordance with the Sevres Treaty of 1920

The Sevres Treaty, which was rendered void by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 – the founding treaty of Turkey – has led ethnic Turks to reject any proposal aimed at federalising or regionalising Turkey, or establishing an autonomous Kurdistan within the boundaries of the Republic on the grounds that such a scenario would lead to the disintegration of Turkey (Arin, 2015: 3).

This perspective has frequently been manipulated by newspapers and politicians in Turkey. In 2006, for instance, as part of Turkey's EU accession process, the Turkish Government established 26 development agencies to decrease income differences and inter-regional disparities in the Republic. Not long after their establishment, the agencies were fiercely criticised by many daily newspapers, particularly *Aydınlık*, *Ortadoğu*, *Türk Solu* and *Yeniçağ*, on the grounds that their establishment was the first step to federalisation and would eventually result in the construction of an autonomous Kurdistan and then the fragmentation of Turkey's territorial and national unity with the secession of that Kurdistan from the Republic (Bora, 2010).

Figure 2: Map of Development Agencies in Turkey

Figure 3: Map of Development Agencies with Provincial Borders

The existence of this negative Turkish perspective on the federalisation or regionalisation of Turkey, or on the foundation of an autonomous Kurdistan within the boundaries of the Republic implies that territorial pluralism might not be the optimal multiculturalist approach that Turkey should embrace in solving its Kurdish problem because it is unable to eliminate the main Turkish anxiety. As Bora (2010) argues, the territorial pluralist model might be the best method for those countries where federalism or regionalism is supported by both the majority ethnic group and its minority counterpart(s). It would not be the optimal method for such countries as Turkey, where the majority overwhelmingly reject a nation-wide federalisation or regionalisation policy and a region-wide territorial pluralist formula allowing for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan.

In the face of this rejection, it is better for Turkey to find an option capable of eliminating the main Turkish anxiety while still satisfying the Kurdish demand for self-government. A province-based decentralisation policy that authorises all Kurdish-dominated provinces of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia to exercise

territorial autonomy without allowing them to have any constitutional and institutional link with each other and without amalgamating them under the name of a constitutionally recognised autonomous Kurdistan might eliminate the essential Turkish anxiety. I will develop and further analyse this option in Chapter 5 when formulating my centripetal formula to resolve the Kurdish issue.

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have maintained that either of consociationalism and territorial pluralism might not be the optimal multiculturalist approach for the solution of Turkey's Kurdish question. Consociationalism is unlikely to provide Turkish political leaders with political incentives stimulating them to cooperate and enter into consociational power-sharing arrangements with their Kurdish counterparts, eventually rendering consociational power-sharing arrangements difficult to enforce in the Republic. In the absence of such incentives, multicultural reforms that have been made with the foundation of the consociational model might also face some sustainability problems in Turkey. There would simply not be enough intercultural citizens supporting the reforms. Territorial pluralism might not be the best multiculturalist approach that Turkey should embrace in solving its long-running political problem because it would not eliminate Turkish anxieties.

The weaknesses of consociationalism and territorial pluralism might be strengthened by way of the other multiculturalist approach of managing ethno-cultural diversity, namely centripetalism which I consider the optimal multiculturalist approach that Turkey should adopt in resolving its Kurdish problem. In the next chapter, I will not only examine how centripetalism deals with the issue

of managing ethno-cultural diversity in depth, but also create my original centripetal

solution to the problem.

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Chapter 5

A Multiculturalist Centripetal Formula for Turkey

5.1. Introduction

Centripetalism is a multiculturalist way of managing ethno-cultural diversity. It was originally developed by Donald Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly as a critique of and alternative to consociationalism. Centripetalists argue that the consociational model does not provide any motives for conciliatory behaviour. Indeed, the model may promote conflict since it offers no incentives for pre-electoral cross-community cooperation. The optimal way of managing diversity could not be achieved without fostering interethnic moderation. Centripetalists introduce another type of power-sharing theory of managing ethno-cultural diversity that provides electoral incentives for political parties to moderate their rhetoric and move towards the moderate middle.

According to the centripetal model, ethno-cultural differences may be managed via (i) majoritarian-preferential voting systems, such as the Alternative Vote, Limited Preferential Vote and Supplementary Vote, for legislative elections; (ii) centrist governments formed through majoritarian-preferential electoral systems, or centrist, moderate presidents elected by majoritarian voting systems that ask

candidates to clear regional electoral thresholds; and (iii) territorial and/or cultural autonomy for ethnic groups with special problems or separate characteristics.

Centripetalism might be the optimal multiculturalist solution to Turkey's Kurdish question. Turkey is a country where there is some degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level. The existence of this moderation should help the Republic to manage its diversity through centripetalism. However, Turkey is also a country where there are two region-wide dominant ethnic groups (the Kurds in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia and the Turks in the rest of the country). Centripetal strategies are highly sensitive to demographic context. A centripetal model that does not take into account the demographic features of the Republic is less likely to contribute to the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

This chapter takes the demographic context of Turkey into consideration. It constructs an original centripetal solution to the Republic's long-running political problem. The solution is based on three main cornerstones: a) a parliamentary system that is built on a 560-member legislature elected via an original version of the Alternative Vote Plus electoral system; b) asymmetric territorial autonomy for each Kurdish-dominated province; and c) cultural autonomy for individual Kurds living in the Turkish-occupied provinces.

This chapter proceeds as follows. It first examines how centripetalism manages ethno-cultural diversity. It then examines the weaknesses of centripetalism by examining under what circumstances this multiculturalist approach may not contribute to the solution of an ethno-political question. Finally, this chapter introduces an original centripetal formula for the resolution of Turkey's Kurdish issue by taking into consideration some potential weaknesses of centripetalism.

5.2. Centripetalism: A Multiculturalist Way of Managing Ethno-cultural Diversity

Centripetalism was originally developed as a critique of and alternative to consociationalism. According to many scholars and practitioners, including Horowitz (2006a); Lijphart (2006b); Reilly (2006a), electoral systems can play a significant role in managing ethno-cultural diversity as elections help shape voter preferences and political behaviour. Centripetalism and consociationalism are the two predominant schools of thought founded on this argument.

As I have already analysed the consociational model in Chapter 4, I intend to start directly with the centripetal critique of this multiculturalist approach. This will enable us to better understand the centripetal model. Centripetalists criticise consociationalism mainly because it 'provides no motive for compromise behaviour' (Horowitz, 2003b: 72). The consociational model involves guaranteed group representation at the executive level through establishing a consociational coalition (see Chapter 4). The consociational coalition is formed by political elites who come together *after an election* to rule in the interests of society because they wish to avoid dangers of non-cooperation. According to Horowitz, the consociational model has a *conflict-promoting* character because it does not offer any political incentives for cross-community cooperation that should be taken into consideration *before the election takes place*. In the absence of such incentives, which may have stimulated a political party to seek votes from voters whose principal allegiance is to another party, Horowitz argues, parties may not have an incentive to *moderate* their rhetoric or *behave moderately* during the electoral campaign period; instead, they may tend to cultivate solely their own community (2006a: 7).

A good example of such a tendency is the Bosnian case. In the absence of political incentives for cross-community cooperation 'an ethnic party representing Serbs in Bosnia would compete intra-ethnically with another Serbian party, rather than with broader cross-community coalitions also inclusive of Muslims and Croats' (Loizides, 2016: 82). This prevents the construction and/or development of *a stable culture of compromise at the grassroots level* (Horowitz, 1985: 342). It may also result in the formation of a consociational cabinet that is not a coalition of commitment, but *a coalition of convenience* made up of *ethnic extremists* coming together solely for the goal of executive formation (Horowitz, 1991: 170-75). Such a coalition does little to promote *moderation* as there is no mutual desire for power holding coalition partners together (*ibid*).

Centripetalists criticise Party-List Proportional Representation (Party-List PR) – one of the favourite electoral systems of the consociational model (see Chapter 4). Horowitz concedes that minority opinions are underrepresented in non-preferential, plurality-winner systems, e.g. First Past the Post (FPTP).[114] He also notes that minority opinions may be better represented in Party-List PR, where 5 per cent of all votes obtains 5 per cent of the total seats. However, the adoption of a highly proportional party-list system where there are multiple social cleavages 'creates incentives for fragmentation rather than amalgamation of political tendencies' (Horowitz, 2006a: 10). He argues that if social groups are organised into different parties, each of which can secure a small portion of the total seats, this may create political differences that are magnified rather than compressed. In these circumstances, the so-called 'consociational coalition' may be formed only with

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[114] FPTP, also known as Single Member Plurality System (SMP), is a plurality-winner electoral system that is generally used in single-member districts. Under FPTP, voters put a cross next to their preferred candidate appeared on the ballot paper. The candidate gaining the most votes in the district is elected (Weaver, 2006: 57-8). For more details, see Bogdanor (1997); Norton (1997).

difficulty, its composition may not be predictable, and its durability may be doubtful. It may ultimately lead to the emergence of, what Giovanni Sartori calls, 'polarised pluralism', 'a situation fostered by PR and conducive to immobilism' (Horowitz, 2006a: 10).

Another centripetal critique on Party-List PR is about the level of electoral threshold. If there is a low threshold, this may induce parties to split into their component factions. These small groups may then 'make or break governments to have disproportionate impact in determining policy and receiving patronage, as small parties do in Israel' (Horowitz, 2006a: 13). Horowitz argues that 'the more perfect the proportionality built into such a system, the more disproportionate the ultimate policy results may be' (*ibid*).

While a low threshold might cause political instability, a high threshold might produce a more problematic result. A minority party might fall under the threshold and acquire no parliamentary seats at all. In these circumstances, a large seat bonus accrues to the parties clearing the threshold, ultimately resulting in the minority not being represented in Parliament. The 2002 Turkish general election in which the pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party [*Demokratik Halk Partisi* (DEHAP)] obtained no seats in the legislature, despite its clear victory in the Kurdish-dominated provinces, is the most striking example of such a scenario. The AK Party, which received 34 per cent of all votes, won 66 per cent of the total seats (363 out of 550), while the CHP, which received 19 per cent of all votes, gained 32 per cent of the total seats (178). The other parties, including the DEHAP, could not pass the 10 per cent nation-wide threshold. They could not acquire any seats, and 46 per cent of the total votes were wasted.

Centripetalists have developed a new power-sharing theory encouraging *interethnic moderation* through *electoral incentives*. According to the centripetal model, the optimal way of managing ethno-cultural diversity not be established without fostering interethnic moderation, the absence of which might lead to further polarisation between ethnic groups (Horowitz, 2000, 2014; Reilly, 2011). Centripetalists maintain that electoral rules requiring politicians to make cross-ethnic appeals in order to get elected will foster interethnic moderation (Norris, 2004). Horowitz defines politicians as rational actors who 'like being elected and re-elected – not exactly farfetched assumptions' (1991: 197). Hence, if electoral systems are constructed to foster interethnic moderation, politicians would be more likely to present themselves as cooperative and moderate in order to appeal to ethnic groups other than their own (Horowitz, 1990a, 2003a). He also confirms that in ethnically diverse countries, there are both moderate and extremist ethnic parties.[115] Extremists may still insist on rejecting cross-ethnic cooperation, despite the existence of electoral rules encouraging intergroup cooperation. The solution is to increase the number of electoral incentives supporting moderates against extremists, according to the centripetal model (Horowitz, 2008: 1217; Sisk, 1996: 43).

The adoption of a *majoritarian-preferential voting system* for *legislative elections* is one way of providing incentives to politicians. Horowitz contends that 'the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering for accommodation' is the electoral

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[115] Extremist parties are those vilifying other groups, rejecting cooperation, and compromising and equating group promotion with 'the totality of the common interests' (Horowitz, 2000: 297). These parties may have links to paramilitary groups. They may engage in outbidding tactics, e.g. 'accusing more moderate parties of selling out and betraying the group cause' (McCulloch, 2013: 116). Moderate parties are those which are inclined to engage in interethnic cooperation. They are prepared to collaborate with similarly designed political parties representing other ethnic groups. These parties are frequently prudent in their political behaviour. They do not back violent methods as a way of achieving political goals. They do not have links to paramilitary groups. Unlike extremist parties, moderates are always inclined to make electoral alliances through developing pre-electoral partnerships (*ibid*).

system (1991: 163). His favourite system is the Alternative Vote (AV). This is generally used in single-member districts. AV is a majoritarian-preferential electoral system requiring the winning candidate to obtain not only a plurality but also *an absolute majority* of votes (50 per cent plus one). Under AV, voters rank candidates in order of preference by putting numbers next to candidates appeared on the ballot paper. A candidate winning an absolute majority of first preferences obtains the seat; if no candidate gains more than half of the votes as first preferences, then the candidate receiving the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated, and voters' second-preference votes are redistributed among the remaining candidates.[116] This process of sequential elimination and transfer of votes is carried out until an absolute-majority (50-percent-plus-one) winner is found.[117]

AV is Horowitz's favourite electoral system for legislative elections. Nevertheless, there are other systems that are capable of inducing interethnic moderation, e.g. the Limited Preferential Vote (LPV) and Supplementary Vote (SV), both of which are majoritarian-preferential electoral systems in origin.[118] In addition, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) – a preferential-PR system regarded by Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry as a consociational tool of managing ethno-cultural diversity (see Chapter 4) – is considered by Reilly (2001) as capable of inducing interethnic moderation.

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[116] The Coombs system is a variation of the AV system. Under this sytem, the candidate receiving the largest number of last preferences is weeded out, not the candidate obtaining the lowest number of first preferences (Horowitz 2006: 10).

[117] For more details, see Bean (1997); Hain (1997); Horowitz (2006a, 2006b, 2007a); Reilly (2001, 2006a); Soudriette and Ellis (2006).

[118] Under LPV, voters do not rank all candidates, but rank their top three preferred candidates. The counting proceeds in a fashion akin to that of AV. SV is a shortened version of AV. Under SV, voters rank candidates in order of preference. The candidate receiving an absolute majority of first preferences gains the seat. If no candidate has cleared the absolute majority threshold, all candidates other than the top two are eliminated. Voters' second-preference votes are then redistributed among the top two candidates, one of whom will then be the 50-percent-plus-one winner. For more details, see McCulloch (2013); Reilly (1997b).

The centripetal model maintains that majoritarian-preferential electoral systems may pull parties towards the centre as candidates will need to campaign beyond their own ethnic group so as to gain enough votes to be elected. They will need to moderate their political claims as they may need to make explicit cross-ethnic appeals in order to be elected (Reilly, 2006b: 137). Centripetalists are pragmatic. They do not support the argument that a candidate will get first-choice votes from voters belonging to a group other than that of the candidate. Instead, they assert that picking up second or other lower-order preferences from such voters may provide the candidate with the margin for victory, e.g. 50-percent-plus-one under AV (Reilly, 2006a: 29). As political parties recognise that they may be unable to surmount the 50-percent-plus-one threshold in a given district or across a run of districts, they may form coalitions in advance of the election to exchange second and later preferences. According to Horowitz, parties will form pre-electoral coalitions providing 'inducements for aggregation or amalgamation of divergent interests into a few parties' (2006a: 9) not just because 'politicians like being elected and re-elected' (1991: 197), but because political parties know that if they do not form such coalitions, their opponents will (2006a: 11). The coalitions would eventually not only empower parties to gain seats, but their conciliatory thrusts also allow for interethnic moderation, as Reilly notes:

> Parties which broaden their support base in search of second preferences
> from other parties would be more likely to win seats than parties which
> were unable to garner preferences outside their primary support base. This
> could in turn provide an incentive towards moderation and accommodation
> between rival ethnic groups (1997a: 1-2).

Interethnic moderation fostered through pre-electoral pacts would then be realised at the nation-wide legislative and executive levels. Having established moderate platforms especially on ethnically divisive matters during the campaign period,

politicians elected by second-choice votes or other subsequent lower-order preferences would be more likely to consider those voters who have ranked them as second or later preferences in making legislation once in power. Furthermore, as pre-electoral coalitions are centre-minded, and as they are formed before the election, their components may easily form official cabinets after the election. These would be, what Horowitz defines, 'coalitions of commitment' willing to develop interethnic cooperation (2002a: 92).

Whilst coalitions of commitment are a matter primarily related to parliamentary systems, Horowitz also considers a presidential system constructed on AV or another majoritarian electoral system with territorial distribution requirements as capable of fostering interethnic moderation (2008: 1). According to him, a president not only winning at least majority support across the country, but also surmounting pre-determined regional thresholds may help foster interethnic moderation. He acknowledges the electoral system used for presidential elections in Nigeria as his favourite electoral system enabling the election of such a president (1990b: 76-7). In accordance with the Nigerian Constitution of 1999, the president needs to win not only a majority of votes cast at the election (art. 133(1)(a)), but she also needs to gain 'not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja' (art. 133(1)(b)). Hence, a candidate cannot be elected as President of Nigeria without securing a majority of all votes while also winning at least 25 per cent of the votes in no fewer than 24 Nigerian federal constituents.[119]

Horowitz contends that in ethnically diverse countries, this type of electoral arrangement will allow for the election of a moderate, centrist president willing to

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[119] Pursuant to Article 3 of the Constitution of 1999, Nigeria consists of 36 states in total.

advance interethnic cooperation (1991: 205). In such countries, a single ethnic group may not elect their extremist candidate as president since the system requires a majority of votes with additional territorial distribution requirements. What presidential candidates will do in these circumstances is, Horowitz argues, to present themselves as moderate rather than guardian of their own ethnic group, paving the way for fostering intergroup conciliation. Once elected, such a moderate president will, of course, desire re-election or the election of her successor if there is a term limit, as all politicians do so. That is why she cannot forget those who have supported her, despite her different ethnic origin. This is also the reason why the president, as a rational actor, cannot simply reward solely members of her own group once in power (*ibid*).

So far, we have noted three centripetal elements that might be used in managing ethno-cultural diversity – majoritarian-preferential electoral systems, centrist governments and moderate, centrist presidents. All these elements are mainly aimed at fostering interethnic moderation. Another centripetal element is territorial and/or cultural autonomy. [120] This pays attention to the recognition, protection and development of ethno-cultural features. According to Horowitz, territorial and/or cultural autonomy arrangements may be offered to minorities with special problems or distinct identities. He generally welcomes all cultural autonomy arrangements aimed at recognising, maintaining and advancing minority characteristics in both public and private areas. He underlines some important issues concerning territorial autonomy. He supports the adoption of territorial autonomy arrangements on the following grounds: (i) they may undercut support for separatists; (ii) they may help inhibit authoritarianism through dispersing power away from the centre; (iii) they

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[120] For all important details on territorial and cultural autonomy, see footnote 62.

may help quarantine ethnic conflicts at the local or regional level; (iv) they may help promote crosscutting politics not only by facilitating interethnic alliances based on common local or regional interests but also by facilitating both group proliferation and intragroup divisions within regions; and finally (v) they may help provide politicians with a training ground to take part in ethnic bargaining at the local or regional level (Horowitz, 2007b).

While noting these potential positive outcomes of territorial autonomy, Horowitz also considers the design of such autonomy arrangements as crucial. He suggests that the entire state may be divided into autonomous units, none of which has a dominant ethnic group. According to him, once the units are formed in a heterogeneous manner, this would permit centripetal electoral systems to foster interethnic moderation more easily (2006a: 14). Such divisions may not be possible in those countries where ethnic groups are regionally concentrated. In these cases, Horowitz maintains that the region occupied by an ethnic group may be divided into small local units that would then be given territorial autonomy. Vesting territorial autonomy in such small local units, rather than the region as a whole, might not only prevent regional majoritarianism, it might also contribute to the stabilisation of the country because such small units would be less likely to threaten the unity of the state. Horowitz finally underscores that the adoption of such autonomy arrangements without the other centripetal elements would be less likely to foster interethnic moderation as the arrangements might not require autonomous units to develop interethnic cooperation in principle. According to him, it might be better to combine the arrangements with the other centripetal elements that 'give regionally concentrated groups a strong stake in the center' (Horowitz, 1993: 36).

5.3. Originating a Centripetal Formula for Turkey

Having established a 'centripetal spin' to politics, centripetalists expect political parties to move towards the moderate middle (Sisk, 1996: 43). They also expect voters to support such moderate parties willing to foster interethnic cooperation (Reilly, 2011: 291). There will be no problem if parties adhere to electoral incentives to moderate, and if voters wish to elect moderate parties. However, what if parties are unwilling to move towards the moderate middle after the adoption of centripetal electoral systems? And, what if voters still support extremist parties, despite the existence of moderate political parties?

It may be argued that merely adopting centripetal electoral systems cannot create an arena where interethnic moderation would be immediately fostered. Even Horowitz declares that:

> [e]lectoral systems shape and constrain the way in which politicians and constituents behave, but they are only one small part of the forces affecting the total constellation of behaviour, even of political behaviour. Miracles do not follow from changes of electoral systems. No one should expect more than incremental changes in behavioural patterns once the configuration of electoral incentives is altered (2006a: 4).

Political parties may still embrace their extremist rhetoric following the adoption of centripetal electoral systems, particularly when they find such an extremist stance more electorally rewarding. As McCulloch (2013) demonstrates, this might be the case in states where there is *no interethnic moderation at the grassroots level before the adoption of centripetal electoral systems*. In such states, ethnic groups generally feel insecure, and they are likely to be attracted to parties that expressly offer to safeguard and promote solely the interests of their own group. This is indeed what extremist parties dream of. In such circumstances, extremist parties are aware that

they may get elected without explicit appeals to other groups. Hence, they may not be inclined to move towards the moderate middle.

Let us imagine even a scenario where some parties have moderated their political claims and formed pre-electoral coalitions. In such a scenario, voters are presented with a choice between moderates, who are willing to foster interethnic cooperation, and extremists, who give priority only to the interests of their own group. During the campaign period, it is most likely that '[e]xtremists will depict moderate parties as untrustworthy and willing to betray the[ir own] group while moderates will see extremists as confrontational and intransigent' (McCullloch, 2013: 124). Such campaigns would create an electoral arena in which voters have to make a choice between, what Kydd and Walter (2006: 76) say, 'a strong and resolute defender of the cause (zealots) or weak and ineffective stooges of the enemy (sellouts)'. At the end of the day, voters would reward extremists due to the absence of pre-existing mass-based moderation between ethnic groups. Kydd and Walter (2006) list three basic reasons for such a preference. First, having a hardliner representing their own ethnic group during negotiations may be thought more profitable because moderates would concede early in negotiations while extremists would press for a better deal. Second, voters may consider that conflict is inevitable due to high level of uncertainty and mistrust about their perceived adversary. This may lead them to prefer extremists as their representatives. Finally, electing extremists at the beginning of a new constitutional era may be regarded as a better choice on the grounds that office-holding would contain incentives for 'selling out'.

In short, if there is no interethnic moderation among the population before introducing centripetal electoral systems, political parties may not moderate their rhetoric as they need to present themselves as the guardians of their own ethnic

group. It is also important to note that even if some parties have moved towards the moderate middle by forming pre-electoral coalitions, voters would still support extremist parties at the ballot box since they consider such parties as more trustworthy in the absence of pre-existing interethnic moderation at the grassroots level. In a nutshell, centripetalism 'cannot invent moderation where none exits', as Reilly (2002: 167) says.

Accordingly, in forming a centripetal model for Turkey, we should assess whether there is enough moderation among ethnic Kurds and Turks. The answer is yes. In 2009, the SETA published a significant report examining the existence of social cohesion between the Kurds and Turks. According to this report, 87.1 per cent of Kurds would not be troubled by establishing a familial relation with an ethnic Turk. In a similar vein, the report identifies that 69.9 per cent of Turks would not be bothered by establishing such a relation with a person of Kurdish origin either (SETA, 2009: 75).

Marriage patterns are just one indicator of social cohesion and proximity between ethnic Kurds and Turks. Friendship patterns provide further evidence. The Report shows that 92.3 per cent of Kurds look favourably at making a close friend with a person of Turkish origin, while 75.5 per cent of Turks are also willing to become a close friend to an ethnic Kurd (SETA, 2009: 73).

According to the SETA Report, neighbourhood relations provide more evidence of social cohesion and proximity between the two ethnic groups. The Report suggests that having a Turkish neighbour would not bother 90.5 per cent of ethnic Kurds, whilst 78.3 per cent of Turks would not be troubled by having a Kurdish-origin neighbour either (SETA, 2009: 77).

The final illustration of social cohesion and proximity in Turkey is work relations. According to the SETA Report, 88.5 per cent of Kurds look favourably at having a Turkish-origin colleague, while 74 per cent of Turks are also willing to have a Kurdish-origin colleague (SETA, 2009: 78).

Chart 1: SETA Report on Social Cohesion between Kurds and Turks

| Question	Yes	No	No idea
Would you be bothered if you had a Kurdish colleague? (Turks)	20,8	74	5,2
Would you be bothered if you had a Turkish colleague? (Kurds)	9,5	88,5	2
Would you be bothered if you had a Kurdish neighbour? (Turks)	17,3	78,3	4,4
Would you be bothered if you had a Turkish neighbour? (Kurds)	8,3	90,5	1,
Can you accept a Kurd as close friend? (Turks)	75,5	19,3	5,2
Can you accept a Turk as close friend? (Kurds)	92,3		6,4
Would you be bothered if a Kurd became your relative through marriage ties? (Turks)	24,3	69,9	5,8
Would you be bothered if a Turk became your relative through marriage ties? (Kurds)	10,8	87,1	2

The findings of the 2009 SETA Report are confirmed by the reports prepared in the following years. A BİLGESAM report published in 2012 finds that a vast majority of Kurds (96.4 per cent) and Turks (91.4 per cent) are pleased with living together in the same neighbourhood or town (Akyurek and Yilmaz, 2012: 15). According to the same report, ethnic Kurds (90.3 per cent) overwhelmingly believe that they have a common future with Turks. The report also indicates that the belief in the existence of the common future is overwhelmingly shared by ethnic Turks (70.7 per cent) (*ibid*: 12). The belief in the presence of the common future is reaffirmed by a subsequent BİLGESAM report that finds that both Kurds (97.3 per cent) and Turks

(74.1 per cent) believe that they have a common future in Turkey (Akyurek, Yilmaz, Atalay and Koydemir, 2013: 59).

Another BİLGESAM report, published in 2014, also confirms the existence of social cohesion and proximity between the two ethnic groups. According to the Report, almost all ethnic Kurds (98.1 per cent) are pleased with living together with ethnic Turks in Turkey. Similarly, a vast majority of Turks (88.7 per cent) are satisfied with living together with ethnic Kurds in Turkey. The Report also finds that solely 3.3 per cent of Kurds would be bothered if a Turk became their relative through marriage ties. The rate is higher when looking at the Turkish response, but still not reaching a dramatic level. Only 24 per cent of Turks would be bothered if a Kurd became their relative through marriage ties (Akyurek and Koydemir, 2014: 17).

Chart 2: BİLGESAM Reports on Social Cohesion between Ethnic Kurds and Turks

Under all these findings, we may argue that there is some degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level in Turkey that would help the country to successfully manage its ethno-cultural diversity through

centripetalism. While welcoming the existence of this mass-based interethnic moderation, we should also pay attention to another issue before beginning to construct our original centripetal model for Turkey, namely the issue of regional demographic homogeneity with a nation-wide dominant ethnic group.

It is true that centripetal rules are highly sensitive to demographic context. Ethnically heterogeneous, or diverse, constituencies are exactly those where vote-pooling and cross-group appeals work much better than those where there is a dominant ethnic group. In a heterogeneous constituency, an ethnic party would be less likely to easily capture a majority of first preferences, stimulating it to form pre-electoral coalitions with the parties representing the other ethnic groups in the constituency. As for ethnically homogeneous constituencies, however, an ethnic party would be more likely to easily gain more than half of the votes as first preferences, and it might not tend to form pre-electoral coalitions with any other parties. Centripetalists already concede this demographic contingency. Fraenkel and Grofman (2006) argue, for instance, that AV may not be able to foster interethnic moderation in homogeneous districts where a dominant ethnic group can easily clear the 50-percent-plus-one threshold. Similarly, Reilly notes that 'centripetal methods can only work to encourage interethnic accommodation when constituency boundaries can be drawn in such a way as to create ethnically heterogeneous districts' (2001: 165). Horowitz agrees: 'heterogeneous constituencies together with incentives to vote pooling across ethnic lines are the key to moderate behaviour' (1990a: 472).

Drawing constituency boundaries in a way to create ethnically diverse districts may not be an easy task in those states where ethnic groups are regionally concentrated, e.g. an ethnic group occupying the north and east and another one

populating the south and west. In such cases, a single heterogeneous district, such as majoritarian-preferential electoral rules with territorial distribution requirements, should be created, according to Horowitz: 'Where territorial constituencies are homogeneous, it remains possible, as in the Sri Lankan and Nigerian presidential elections, to turn the whole country into a single heterogeneous constituency' (1990a: 472). I will adopt some original strategies in the construction of my centripetal model for Turkey, but before that let us first look at the Republic's demographic context.

It is initially worth noting that there is no official data indicating the sizes of ethnic groups in Turkey. But nevertheless, various studies have attempted to establish the sizes and distribution. According to a KONDA report prepared in 2006, the demographic context is as follows: Turks (76 per cent), Kurds (15.7 per cent) and others (8.3 per cent). A different KONDA report, published in 2010, finds the demographic context slightly different: Turks (73.6 per cent), Kurds (18.3 per cent) and others (8.1 per cent). Finally, another KONDA report, published in 2013, finds almost the same proportions: Turks (74.5 per cent), Kurds (17.7 per cent) and others (7.8 per cent) (Erdem, 2013a, 2013b). The KONDA findings are generally consistent with research on the size of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Van Bruinessen (1992), for instance, estimates a Kurdish population amounting to 19 per cent of Turkey's overall population. According to Agirdir (2008), the Kurds constitute 15 per cent of the total population. Finally, the *World Factbook 2017*, a reference resource prepared by the CIA, estimates that the Kurdish population amounts to 19 per cent of the overall population. All these findings demonstrate that there is a nation-wide dominant ethnic group in Turkey, the Turks.

Having indicated the existence of the nation-wide dominant ethnic group, let us also scrutinise the geographical distribution of the Kurdish population which is crucial in developing my centripetal model. A KONDA report, published in 2011, is a significant source demonstrating the regional dispersion of the Kurds in Turkey. The Report seeks to identify the regional dispersion through using Turkey's Nomenclature System of Territorial Units for Statistics [*Türkiye İstatistiki Bölge Birimleri Sınıflandırması Sistemi* (IBBS)], which divides the country into twelve regions: Istanbul, Western Marmara, Eastern Marmara, Aegean Region, Mediterranean Region, Western Anatolia, Central Anatolia, Western Black Sea Region, Eastern Black Sea Region, North-eastern Anatolia, Middle-eastern Anatolia and South-eastern Anatolia.

The Report finds the regional distribution of the overall Kurdish population as follows: 29.3 per cent in Middle-eastern Anatolia; 26.7 per cent in South-eastern Anatolia; 17.5 per cent in Istanbul; 10 per cent in North-eastern Anatolia; and 16.5 per cent in the rest of the country. 66 per cent of the overall Kurdish population live in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia, encompassing three IBBS regions – North-eastern Anatolia (10 per cent), Middle-eastern Anatolia (29.3 per cent) and South-eastern Anatolia (26.7 per cent). The Kurds form a dominant ethnic group in two of these three regions, Middle-Eastern Anatolia (79.1 per cent) and South-eastern Anatolia (64.1 per cent), while they constitute a minority ethnic group in the other, North-eastern Anatolia (32 per cent) (see KONDA, 2011).

Table 2: Regional Distribution of the Kurdish Population

Region	Kurdish Population (%)
Middle-eastern Anatolia	29.3
South-eastern Anatolia	26.7
Istanbul	17.5
North-eastern Anatolia	10.0
Others	16.5
Total	100

Table 3: Kurds in IBBS Regions

Region	Kurdish Population (%)
Istanbul	14.8
Western Marmara	0.9
Eastern Marmara	4.9
Aegean Region	6.1
Mediterranean Region	4.9
Western Anatolia	7.7
Central Anatolia	1.3
Western Black Sea Region	0.3
Eastern Black Sea Region	0.1
North-eastern Anatolia	32.0
Middle-eastern Anatolia	79.1
South-eastern Anatolia	64.1

Forming the dominant ethnic group in the East and Southeast does not mean, however, that the Kurds dominate all provinces in the regions. A 2011 BİLGESAM report examines the provincial distribution of ethnic groups in the East and Southeast in 19 out of 23 provinces.[121] The Kurds form the majority in twelve provinces – Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli and Van – while constituting a minority population in the other seven provinces – Adiyaman, Elazig, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras, Malatya and Sanliurfa (Akyurek, 2011b: 3).

Table 4: Ethnic Groups in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia

	First Group (12 Provinces)		Second Group (7 Provinces)			
	Agri-Batman-Bingol-Bitlis-Diyarbakir-Hakkari-Mardin-Mus-Siirt-Sirnak-Tunceli-Van		Adiyaman-Elazig-Erzurum-Gaziantep-Kahramanmaras-Malatya-Sanliurfa		Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia – 19 Provinces in Total	
Ethnicity	**Population**	**Percentage (%)**	**Population**	**Percentage (%)**	**Population**	**Percentage (%)**
Kurds	5,537,086	89.36	2,510,884	37.37	8,047,970	62.32
Turks	243,037	3.92	3,701,857	55.10	3,944,894	30.55
Arabs	372,117	6.00	488,353	7.27	860,470	6.64
Others	42,971	0.72	16,256	0.26	59,227	0.49
Total	6,195,211	100.00	6,717,350	100.00	12,912,561	100.00

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[121] The ethno-demographic distribution in the provinces of Ardahan, Erzincan, Igdir and Kars is not examined in the 2011 BİLGESAM Report. The demographic context of Kars is found by Yegen, Tol and Caliskan (2016: 62) as follows: Kurds (53.7 %) and Turks (46.3 %). Therefore, we can categorise this province in the first group of the BİLGESAM Report.

All in all, the demographic context of Turkey can be summarised as follows: there are two *region-wide* dominant ethnic groups (the Kurds in the East and Southeast, and the Turks in the rest of the country).

5.3.1. Parliamentary System with an Original Voting Method

This demographic context is the basic reason why I would like to incorporate a parliamentary, rather than presidential, system into my centripetal model. Turkey has recently adopted a constitutional reform package transforming its parliamentary system into a presidential regime. On 15 July 2016, the Republic witnessed a failed coup attempt that was orchestrated by a faction within the TSK, organising themselves as the Peace at Home Council [*Yurtta Sulh Konseyi*]. During the one-night coup attempt, many government buildings, including the Presidential Palace and the TBMM, were bombed. The failed coup cost 249 lives and left more than 2,100 wounded.[122]

Just after the failed coup attempt, the Turkish Government declared a nation-wide state of emergency to ensure public order and safety. On 11 October 2016, when the emergency rule was still in effect, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the far-right ultranationalist MHP, criticised the ruling AK Party for constructing a *de facto* executive presidential regime via statutory decrees. He called on the AK Party to either practice the existing *de jure* parliamentary system or constitutionalise the *de facto* presidential regime (*NTV*, 2016). The second option was supported by the AK Party. These two parties reached an informal agreement on a constitutional

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[122] The Peace at Home Council was led by those generals and colonels having suspected links to the Fethullah Terrorist Organisation [*Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü* (FETÖ)]. The FETÖ was known as the Gulen Movement [*Gülen Hareketi*] until the mid-2010s. It was labelled by Turkey as a terrorist group in May 2016. It is led by USA-based Turkish preacher Fethullah Gulen. For a detailed analysis of the coup attempt, see Ataman (2017); Chak (2016); Duran and Altun (2016); Esen and Gumuscu (2017a); Jacoby (2016); Karagoz and Kandemir (2016); Mis (2016); Nassar (2016); Unay and Dilek (2016); Yayla (2016); Yilmaz (2016).

amendment package aimed at shifting Turkey's parliamentary system into an executive presidency on 1 December 2016. Not long after the agreement, the AK Party submitted the package to the TBMM, which adopted it with 339 votes in favour, nine more than what was needed to put the constitutional amendments to a referendum, on 21 January 2017. President Erdogan then approved the package and started the two-month campaign period on 10 February (*TRT World*, 2017).

During the campaign period, the 'Yes' camp was led by the AK Party and MHP. The 'No' camp was led by the CHP and HDP. On 16 April 2017, the reform package was endorsed by the public. 51.4 per cent of participants opted for the replacement of Turkey's parliamentary system with a presidential regime on a turnout of 87.3 per cent.[123]

Figure 4: Turkish Constitutional Referendum of 2017

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
[123] For a detailed analysis of the referendum, see Esen and Gumuscu (2017b); KONDA (2017).

Chart 3: Kurdish and Turkish Votes in the 2017 Constitutional Referendum

In the referendum, most Kurdish-dominated provinces voted against the constitutional amendments. Although 63 per cent of Kurds voted 'No', the 'Yes' bloc was able to win (KONDA, 2017: 53). Kurdish opposition to the amendments could have been stronger if the far-right Islamist and pro-Kurdish HÜDA-PAR had not supported the proposed presidential system. The HÜDA-PAR and many Islamist Kurds believed that the new system will make the Presidency a strong executive position able to easily transform Turkey into a multiculturalist republic. This was the main reason why Kurdish Islamists backed the constitutional amendments (*Sabah*, 2017a).

The winning camp used an explicit Turkish nationalist vocabulary during the campaign period. It defined the proposed system on an ethnic base, the Turkish-style Presidential System [*Türk Tipi Başkanlık Sistemi*]. It repeatedly declared that there will be no future constitutional reforms aimed at eliminating Turkish-based ethnic phrases or federalising the Turkish Republic (*Sabah*, 2017b; *Yeni Şafak*, 2017). During the Peace Process, these had been recognised by the AK Party and President

Erdogan as constitutional reforms that would be undertaken in order to solve the Kurdish question and democratise Turkey (see *İnternet Haber*, 2013a). The AK Party did not support its previous view mainly because it wanted to please the ultranationalist components of the 'Yes' camp, the MHP and the Great Union Party [*Büyük Birlik Partisi* (BBP)], a far-right ultranationalist and Islamist party.

The new system makes the Presidency a strong executive position. It allows the President to act as head of state, head of government and head of the ruling party at the same time. It abolishes the Prime Ministry and authorises the President to appoint cabinet ministers without requiring a parliamentary vote of confidence. It grants the President the power to propose budgets, dissolve the TBMM and impose emergency rule. It lowers the age of political candidacy to 18. According to the new system, parliamentary elections should be held in tandem with presidential elections every five years. It is worth noting that the new system will function with all its elements in 2019. However, some articles of the amendment package, including that allowing the President to become a party member, entered into force just after the referendum. This enabled President Erdogan to return to the AK Party and be re-elected as its leader on 21 May 2017.[124]

The new presidential regime may not be the appropriate system in order to resolve the Kurdish question. In a country where there is a nation-wide dominant majority, a single-person presidency, even with centripetal electoral systems, may not provide enough electoral incentives for interethnic moderation. In the case of Turkey, the Turks are always able to elect a president unwilling to foster interethnic moderation and cross-ethnic cooperation because they constitute three-fourths of the

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[124] For more details on the new system, see Aytac, Carkoglu and Yildirim (2017); Buai and Atas (2017); Gulener and Mis (2017); Kissane (2017); Uzun (2017).

entire population and form the majority in all regions other than the East and Southeast. Such a presidential candidate can surmount the 50-percent-plus-one threshold and fulfil territorial distribution requirements with only Turkish votes. Having won the election, the president may also be inclined to offer special privileges to the Turks as a means of guaranteeing their re-election. This would not create confidence that Turkey belongs to all ethnic groups, including the Kurds.

The AK Party is inclined to keep the 'Yes' camp alive (*Milli Gazete*, 2017b; *Yeni Akit*, 2017). President Erdogan has an incentive to stand in the 2019 presidential election as a candidate of the 'Yes' camp (*Habertürk*, 2017; *Sabah*, 2018). This is the main reason why the ruling party continues to use an explicit Turkish nationalist vocabulary. It wants to please the radical Turkish nationalist components of the camp, the MHP and BBP. Like the recent referendum, the 'Yes' camp may clear the 50-percent-plus-one threshold in the 2019 presidential election. This enables President Erdogan to stay in power. However, the victory of the 'Yes' camp does not enable Turkey to resolve its Kurdish question. This camp defines the question as a terror problem. It supports all security methods that have been used since the end of the Peace Process in July 2015 (*Akşam*, 2017; *TRT Haber*, 2017). It is unlikely to solve the question by these methods. They will just lead to new democratic, economic and social costs and postpone the necessary reforms that should be made in order to solve the question (see Chapter 2).

No segment of Turkish society argues that Turkey should not resolve its Kurdish issue. Instead, all segments want to resolve the issue, but with different methods. Some agree with the 'Yes' camp that the Republic can resolve the issue via its securitisation approach. Some define the issue as a regional terror problem rooted in feudalism, ignorance and poverty. According to these segments, Turkey should not

only use security methods, it should also improve socio-economic conditions in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Some define the issue as a political problem caused by the replacement of the Islamist Ottoman policy with the Kemalist Turkish policy. These segments believe that the issue can be resolved via a pro-Islamic integrationist policy of managing ethno-cultural diversity. Some others define the issue as a political problem caused by numerous assimilationist Turkification policies. According to them, Turkey should introduce a multiculturalist policy of managing diversity in order to resolve the issue. Some sections of this pro-multiculturalist bloc support a consociational formula, while others favour a territorial pluralist model.

In short, no segment of Turkish society is in favour of keeping the Kurdish question unresolved. Rather, different segments propose different methods that the Republic may use in order to solve the question. In its previous chapters, this thesis has examined whether one of those alternative methods might be optimal for Turkey. According to the thesis, it is unlikely to resolve the question without adopting a multiculturalist policy of managing ethno-cultural diversity (see Chapter 3). It is better to construct such a policy on centripetalism rather than consociationalism or territorial pluralism because these two approaches may generate some problems in Turkey (see Chapter 4).

It is difficult for the 'Yes' camp to introduce a multiculturalist policy that is required to resolve the Kurdish issue. The HÜDA-PAR supports such a policy, but the extreme Turkish nationalist components of the camp, the MHP and BBP, will not back it. In order to please the radical nationalists, President Erdogan and his conservative AK Party may continue to use an explicit Turkish nationalist

vocabulary. In addition, they may refuse to undertake constitutional reforms aimed at making Turkey a multiculturalist republic.

The AK Party may return to its previous position that was taken during the Peace Process. Conservatives are likely to moderate their views when this enables them to stay in power. Once General Francisco Franco won the civil war in 1939, he consolidated his dictatorial regime that ruled Spain until Franco's death in 1975. During its ruling period, the regime refused to recognise Spain's ethno-cultural diversity and implemented numerous assimilationist policies towards the Basques, Catalans and Galicians. Most conservative circles of Spanish society supported the Francoist regime. Following the death of Franco, Spain underwent a democratic transition operation that took its shape with the adoption of the 1978 Constitution. This established a multicultural system in Spain and bestowed many self-government and identity rights on the Basques, Catalans and Galicians. During the transition period, the conservative circles moderated their radical nationalist views and formed a post-Francoist conservative coalition, the People's Alliance [*Alianza Popular*]. The coalition was transformed into a party in 1977, the People's Party [*Partido Popular* (PP)]. The PP is the ruling party of the Kingdom of Spain. It is the main conservative right-wing party in the Kingdom. It is among the strongest supporters of the multicultural system that was established via the 1978 Constitution.[125]

Like the PP, the conservative AK Party may moderate its current nationalist views. However, it is less likely to witness such moderation in the existence of a presidential system. This system does not provide enough electoral incentives for

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[125] For more details, see Aja (2001); Aja and Colino (2014); Anaya (2002); Beramendi (1999); Conversi (2000); Kolcak (2017b); Maiz and Losada (2011); Martinez-Herrera and Miley (2010); Moreno (2007); Rius-Ulldemolins and Zamorano (2014).

interethnic moderation in Turkey. It enables the Turks to elect a president who will not have an incentive to undertake multicultural reforms, foster interethnic moderation and develop cross-ethnic cooperation. In the 2017 constitutional referendum, the conservative AK Party made an alliance with the ultranationalist MHP and BBP. A similar coalition may be formed in the 2019 presidential election. This coalition may win the election, but it is unable to foster interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation. This will not create a peaceful arena where Turkey can resolve its Kurdish question. In order to create such an arena, the Republic should adopt a system that provides parties with electoral incentives to moderate their rhetoric, move towards the moderate middle and foster interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation. My centripetal model contains a parliamentary system that may provide parties with such incentives.[126]

The parliamentary system I propose is constructed on a 560-member legislature elected through an original version of the Alternative Vote Plus (AV+), also known as the Alternative Vote Top-up. AV+ is a hybrid, or mixed, voting system combining features of the AV system with those of the PR systems. AV+ was originally devised in 1998 by the Jenkins Commission, who proposed this hybrid voting system for legislative elections in the United Kingdom (UK) (see Jenkins Commission, 1998). AV+ works in two parts, namely (i) the 'AV' part and (ii) the 'plus' part.

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[126] It ought to be stressed that I am not making a general claim that parliamentary systems are better than their presidential counterparts or vice versa. Many scholars, including Hartlyn (1990); Horowitz (1990b, 1991); Lijphart (2006a); Linz (1990); Lipset (1990, 2000); Reynolds (2006), take part in this academic debate. I am not inclined to do. Every state has different characteristics and dynamics. It might be better for a country to adopt a parliamentary system. Its adoption might generate problems in another country with different characteristics and dynamics. I only argue that a presidential system would be simply less adequate for Turkey.

In the AV part, a certain number of candidates – 80-85 per cent of the total seats, according to the Jenkins Commission (1998: 20) – would be elected through ordinary AV rules. In single-member constituencies, voters numerically rank candidates in order of preference and the candidate obtaining an absolute majority of first preferences is elected. If no candidate wins more than half of the votes as first preferences, then the candidate receiving the lowest number of first preferences, or the candidate receiving the largest number of last preferences under the Coombs rule (see footnote 116), is eliminated and their second-preference votes are redistributed among the candidates left in the race. This process of sequential elimination and transfer of votes is carried out until a 50-percent-plus-one winner is found.

In the plus part, an additional group of members – 15-20 per cent of the total seats, according to the Jenkins Commission (1998: 20) – would be elected by way of regional party lists, also known as top-up lists, in order to ensure a degree of proportionality. This means that each voter gets a second vote to elect a regional-level representative. In casting their second vote, the regional vote, voters can either choose their favourite candidate from the regional party, or top-up, list, or select their favourite party. This implies that the top-up list is semi-open. Once voters have cast their regional votes, the votes are allocated to represent each party's share of the votes proportionally. The regional representatives are elected on a corrective top-up basis that takes into account the number of constituency seats obtained by each party in each respective area. The following method is used:

- the number of regional votes cast for each party is counted and divided by the number of constituency representatives plus one won by each party in each area;

- the party with the largest number of regional votes after this calculation is allocated the first regional representative;

- any second additional representative for an area is allocated employing the same method but adjusting to the fact that one party has already gained a regional representative.[127]

Having noted some basic information about AV+, let me begin to expound my original version that could be used for legislative elections in Turkey. In my centripetal model, Parliament is made up of 560 deputies in total. I propose that 70 per cent of the total seats (392 deputies) should be elected through AV. This implies that there would be 392 single-member districts, each of which elects a member of parliament (MP) in accordance with ordinary AV rules. These district seats are allocated on a province-based system taking into consideration how much of Turkey's overall population the province forms. A province forming 5 per cent of Turkey's total population is allocated 20 out of 392 MPs. Having allocated 20 MPs, the province is then divided into 20 single-member districts, each of which elects its district MP pursuant to ordinary AV rules. Finally, the Coombs rule, calling for the elimination of the candidate with the largest number of last preferences and the redistribution of second-preference votes among those who are not eliminated, is in operation for the process of sequential elimination.

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[127] For more details on AV+, see Gay (1998); Jenkins Commission (1998).

Figure 5: Provinces of Turkey

Figure 6: Geographical Regions of Turkey

While 70 per cent of the seats (392 out of 560) are elected through ordinary AV methods with the Coombs rule, the rest, 30 per cent of the seats (168 out of 560) are elected through the 'plus' part, according to my model. Turkey consists of seven geographical regions: Marmara Region, Black Sea Region, Aegean Region, Mediterranean Region, Central Anatolia, East Anatolia and Southeast Anatolia. The

model allocates the same number of regional seats to all these seven regions, irrespective of their demographic differences, meaning that 24 regional MPs are elected in each region.

For the election of these regional MPs, my favourite system is that used in Scottish legislative elections.[128] The Scottish Parliament (Holyrood) is made up of 129 deputies, elected via the Additional Member System (AMS), a hybrid voting system combining features of FPTP with those of PR.[129] AMS, like AV+, works in two parts: i) the FPTP component and ii) the regional vote component. In the former component, Scottish voters elect their 73 constituency deputies through the FPTP system; and in the latter, the voters elect their 56 regional deputies by means of the regional vote (Kennouche, 2016). The regional seats are allocated equally to eight Scottish parliamentary regions, meaning that each region is represented by seven deputies (Sanderson, 2016). Under the regional vote, political parties compile a list of preferred candidates in order, and Scottish voters select a party instead of an individual.[130] The regional deputies are then allocated to parties through a system of proportional voting, namely the d'Hondt divisional method.

There are two main types of methods for allocating seats in Party-List PR: 1) quota methods or larger remainder systems that use subtraction; and 2) highest average systems that use divisors. The d'Hondt method is a highest average system. It was developed by Victor d'Hondt in 1878 as an attempt to better accommodate

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[128] Scotland is a devolved region of the UK. It has exercised asymmetric territorial autonomy since the late 1990s. For more details on the constitutional structure of the Scottish Devolved Region, see Adam (2014); Connolly (2013); Dardanelli and Mitchell (2014); Keating (2015); Loughlin (2011); McGarry (2010); Nicoll (2014); Tierney (2009).

[129] The AMS is also called the Mixed Member Proportional.

[130] It is worth noting that an independent candidate can stand for election on the regional list (Sanderson, 2016).

Belgium's ethno-cultural diversity in Parliament.[131] 'Under the d'Hondt method, each party's total number of votes is repeatedly divided, until all seats are filled, by the divisor *1 + the number of seats already allocated*' (European Parliament, 2016: 3; italics original). Each division produces an average. The party with the highest average vote gains the first seat, the next highest the second, and so on, until all seats have been allocated (*ibid*).

Imagine that a parliamentary election has been held in the Republic of Utopia. In Ecotopia, the capital of Utopia, Parties A, B and C have received 18000, 15000 and 6500 votes, respectively. Ecotopia is represented by eight deputies in the Utopian Parliament. Under the d'Hondt method, Party A obtains four seats; Party B wins three seats; and Party C gains one seat. Each party's total number of votes is divided by the divisor 1 for Seat 1. This enables Party A to win its first seat because it is the party with the highest average vote (18000). For Seat 2, Party A's total number of votes is divided by the divisor 2 as it has obtained its first seat. The divisor is still 1 for Parties B and C. The second division produces the following average votes: 9000 votes for Party A, 15000 votes for Party B and 6500 votes for Party C. Because Party B is the party with the highest average vote, it gains its first seat.

For Seat 3, the divisor is 2 for Parties A and B, and 1 for Party C. The third division produces the following average votes: 9000 votes for Party A, 7500 votes for Party B and 6500 votes for Party C. This enables Party A to win its second seat. For Seat 4, the divisor is 3 for Party A, 2 for Party B and 1 for Party C. The fourth division produces the following average votes: 6000 votes for Party A, 7500 votes for Party B and 6500 votes for Party C. This enables Party B to win its second seat.

[131] The d'Hondt method is known as the Jefferson method in the USA, where Thomas Jefferson proposed its use for proportional allocation of seats in the House of Representatives in 1791. For more details, see Bochsler (2010); Gallagher (1991, 1992); Karpov (2015).

For Seat 5, the divisor is 3 for Parties A and B, and 1 for Party C. The fifth division produces the following average votes: 6000 votes for Party A, 5000 votes for Party B and 6500 votes for Party C. This enables Party C to win its first seat.

For Seat 6, the divisor is 3 for Parties A and B, and 2 for Party C. The sixth division produces the following average votes: 6000 votes for Party A, 5000 votes for Party B and 3250 votes for Party C. This enables Party A to gain its third seat. For Seat 7, the divisor is 4 for Party A, 3 for Party B and 2 for Party C. The seventh division produces the following average votes: 4500 votes for Party A, 5000 votes for Party B and 3250 votes for Party C. This enables Party B to win its third seat. For Seat 8, the divisor is 4 for Parties A and B, and 2 for Party C. The eighth division produces the following average votes: 4500 votes for Party A, 3750 votes for Party B and 3250 votes for Party C. This enables Party A to win its fourth seat. In the Table below, the highest average is marked in bold at each stage of the allocation process.

Table 5: Allocation of Eight Seats by the d'Hondt Method

	Party A		Party B		Party C	
Votes Received	18000		15000		6500	
Order of Seat Allocation	Divisor	Average	Divisor	Average	Divisor	Average
1st	1	**18000**	1	15000	1	6500
2nd	2	9000	1	**15000**	1	6500
3rd	2	**9000**	2	7500	1	6500
4th	3	6000	2	**7500**	1	6500
5th	3	6000	3	5000	1	**6500**
6th	3	**6000**	3	5000	2	3250
7th	4	4500	3	**5000**	2	3250
8th	4	**4500**	4	3750	2	3250
–	5	3600	4	3750	2	3250
Total Seats Allocated	4		3		1	

The d'Hondt divisional method is used for proportional allocation of regional, or top-up, seats in the Scottish Parliament. The top-up seats are allocated by following a calculation taking into consideration the number of constituency seats that parties have won in the region concerned:

> [The method] allocates each party additional members by adding up their regional votes and then dividing them by the number of constituency seats each party has won in that region plus one. After the votes have been divided in this way, the party with the most votes claims the first additional member [or regional] seat. This 'divisor' is increased by one for each party which gains an additional member, and the calculation is repeated until all the additional seats in the region are filled (Kerr and Vevers, 2016).

Under this divisional method, if a party has gained no constituency in a region, its regional votes would be divided by one, thus remaining the same. If a party has obtained five constituency seats in that region, however, its total number of regional votes would be divided by six.[132] That is why 'the better a party performs in the constituency vote, the more difficult it becomes to win regional list seats' (Kerr and Vevers, 2016).

In my centripetal model, the Scottish regional vote system, constructed on the d'Hondt divisional method, is adopted for the election of regional deputies (168 out of 560 seats). Hence, in determining the winners of regional seats, we would take the district seats that parties have gained in the regions into account. Finally, there is one more ingredient of my regional vote system I should mention: a 5 per cent nation-wide electoral threshold. According to the system, a party must receive at least 5 per cent of the total *district votes* in order to be able to win regional seats. This means if a party has not received at least 5 per cent of the total votes in the AV part of my AV+ system, it would be unable to obtain any regional seat.

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[132] Each parliamentary region has eight to ten constituencies (Sanderson, 2016).

Having briefly noted essential characteristics of the electoral system that would be used for legislative elections, let me answer various critical questions about the system. First, why have I created an AV+ model rather than using one of the existing majoritarian-preferential systems, e.g. AV, LPV and SV? Creating such a hybrid electoral system is required where there are two region-wide dominant ethnic groups – the Kurds in the East and Southeast, and the Turks in the rest of the country. Ordinary majoritarian-preferential systems, such as AV, LPV and SV, would be less likely to provide enough electoral incentives for interethnic moderation in these kinds of states. An ethnic party might clear the 50-percent-plus-one threshold without forming a pre-electoral coalition with a different ethnic party representing another ethnic group to exchange second and later preferences.

In some provinces in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia, e.g. Adiyaman, Elazig, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras, Malatya and Sanliurfa, which are relatively heterogeneous – Kurds (37 %), Turks (55 %), Arabs (7 %) – ordinary majoritarian-preferential systems may induce interethnic moderation. These examples are the exception. In the Kurdish-occupied provinces, including Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli and Van, a pro-Kurdish party may easily gain an absolute majority of first preferences in all single-member districts. In these circumstances, there might not be enough electoral incentives for such a party to form a pre-electoral coalition with a nation-wide party of Turkey not considering itself as the guardian of solely the Kurds. A similar electoral scenario can be realised in the Turkish-dominated provinces too. As noted previously, the Turks form not only a nation-wide dominant ethnic group in Turkey, but also a region-wide dominant ethnic group in all regions other than Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia. Given this demographic context, a nation-wide political

party that ignored the Kurds may surmount the 50-percent-plus-one threshold in single-member constituencies of the Turkish-dominated provinces. In these provinces, such a party may realise the likelihood that it might be unable to obtain an absolute majority of first preferences. This realisation may stimulate the party to form a pre-electoral coalition with another party neglecting the Kurds, rather than a pro-Kurdish party, in those provinces where the Turks constitute a dominant ethnic group. Ordinary majoritarian-preferential electoral systems would be less likely to provide sufficient electoral incentives for interethnic moderation and cross-ethnic cooperation in Turkey.

There are good grounds for believing that my hybrid formulation can provide incentives for cooperation. There are a significant number of incentives that motivate political parties to move towards the moderate middle. The AV component of my electoral system, used for the election of district MPs, may already induce interethnic moderation in the relatively heterogeneous provinces. For the first part of my model, it should also be underlined that the Coombs rule, asking for the elimination of the candidate with the *largest number of last preferences*, instead of the elimination of the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences which is the rule of the ordinary AV system, may also motivate parties to form pre-electoral coalitions in such provinces not to become the party of last preferences. These are not all my formula does, however. The second component of my electoral system, the regional vote, which would be used for the election of regional MPs provides various electoral incentives for interethnic moderation and cross-ethnic cooperation.

It is initially worth noting that my model allocates 24 regional seats equally to each of the seven geographical regions of Turkey, regardless of their population sizes. Two of the regions are populated by the Kurds – Eastern Anatolia and South-

eastern Anatolia – while the rest are dominated by the Turks. Hence, there would be 48 regional seats allocated to the Kurdish-dominated regions and 120 regional seats allocated to the Turkish-populated regions. Some may question why I have allocated the regional seats to the geographical regions. The logic behind this allocation is to foster interethnic moderation by stimulating nation-wide political parties to form pre-electoral pacts with pro-Kurdish parties. To be sure, allocating the regional seats to IBBS regions might have provided more proportionality in comparison with my formula. As Horowitz (2006a: 11) says, however, proportionality, which 'is generally indifferent to moderation', might not be the most important goal to achieve in the successful management of ethno-cultural diversity.

If I had allocated the regional seats equally to IBBS regions, what would have happened? As noted earlier in this chapter, the Kurds form the majority solely in two IBBS regions – Middle-eastern Anatolia and South-eastern Anatolia – while the rest (10 regions) are occupied by the Turks. This implies that only 28 regional seats would have been allocated to the Kurdish-dominated regions, whilst the remaining 140 seats would have been allocated to the Turkish-populated regions. The IBBS model may provide more proportionality by considering the population sizes of the regions in allocating the regional seats, but it attaches less importance to Kurdish votes by allocating the Kurdish-occupied regions fewer regional seats than my model. It would provide less incentive for nation-wide political parties to form pre-electoral pacts with pro-Kurdish parties.

Providing more regional seats is, of course, not enough to foster interethnic moderation. This promotion should be supported by an electoral system. The regional vote system I have borrowed from Scotland plays a key role here. As noted earlier, under the Scottish system, the better a party performs in the district vote (the

AV part of my model) the more difficult it becomes to gain regional list seats (the plus component of my model). Let me provide a real electoral example from Scotland. In the last Scottish parliamentary election held on 5 May 2016, the Scottish National Party (SNP) gained 59 constituency seats while the remaining constituency seats were won by the Scottish Conservatives (7), Scottish Labour (3) and the Scottish Liberal Democrats (4). As for the regional vote, the SNP picked up 41.7 per cent of the total votes, whilst the Scottish Tories, Scottish Labour and the Scottish Greens polled 22.9, 19.1, and 6.6 per cent, respectively. Because the regional vote is designed to compensate those parties that have lost out in the FPTP vote, or the constituency vote, the SNP gained just 4 regional seats, while the above three parties obtained more regional seats than the SNP, though they polled much less than the SNP: the Scottish Conservatives gained 24, Scottish Labour 21, the Scottish Greens 6 and the Scottish Liberal Democrats 1.[133] Let me now return to the Turkish-Kurdish case.

In the Kurdish-populated provinces, it is most likely that a pro-Kurdish party can win district seats that are elected through the AV system with the Coombs rule. Gaining such district seats would prevent the party from obtaining regional seats just like the SNP. In these circumstances, the party may form a pre-electoral coalition with another party to support it in the regional vote. At this point, the most important strategy might be that hindering the party from forming such a coalition with another pro-Kurdish party. That is why my model includes a 5 per cent electoral threshold. In the presence of this threshold, a party not receiving at least 5 per cent of the total *district votes* is unable to win any regional seat. The model requires a 5 per cent nation-wide electoral threshold in the district vote because introducing such

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[133] For more details on the election, see Clegg (2016); Kerr (2016a, 2016b); Macnab (2016).

a threshold in the regional vote (the plus part) would make no sense. A minor pro-Kurdish party that has formed a pre-electoral coalition with its mainstream counterpart not only winning most of the district seats in the Kurdish-populated regions but also gaining more than 5 per cent of the total district votes can easily surmount such a threshold thanks to its electoral alliance with the mainstream party.

To prevent such a scenario, my model requires both the mainstream and minor parties to clear the 5 per cent threshold in the *district* vote. Realistically, it is most likely that the minor party cannot pass such a nation-wide threshold in the AV part where the mainstream party is indeed its most significant rival, not its coalition partner. The inability of the minor party to surmount the threshold might provide an electoral incentive for the pro-Kurdish mainstream party to form a pre-electoral pact with a nation-wide party of Turkey. Such a nation-wide party would already be inclined to form the pact since it enables the party to gain a significant number of regional seats from the East and Southeast. The pact may include provisions calling for reciprocal vote-pooling. It may also enable the pro-Kurdish mainstream party to gain a significant number of regional seats from the Turkish-occupied regions. The existence of the pact mean that it is likely that both pro-Kurdish and nation-wide parties would move towards the moderate middle, enabling the development of interethnic moderation and cross-ethnic cooperation following the election.

The electoral threshold provides incentives for the pro-Kurdish party to form a coalition with a nation-wide party. Forming the coalition, however, is not obligatory. The pro-Kurdish party is not obliged to form it. In a similar vein, the nation-wide party is not obliged to form a pre-electoral pact with the pro-Kurdish party. Hence, we should answer the following question: does the regional vote system require parties to moderate their rhetoric and to move towards the moderate middle even in

the absence of the pact? The answer is, I think, yes. Regional seats would be gained by the parties losing out in the district vote. This would provide electoral incentives for parties not to embrace extremist rhetoric and not to ignore ethno-cultural diversity. There would, of course, be some extremists, but they would not be the choice of voters in Turkey, where there is already pre-existing interethnic moderation between Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level.

Finally, some may question the percentage of the total seats my model allocates to the regional vote. The original version of the AV+ system, designed by the Jenkins Commission, proposes the allocation of 15-20 per cent of the total seats to the regional vote. My model increases the percentage and allocates 30 per cent of the total seats (168 out of 560) to the regional vote. The model increases the percentage to strengthen the impact of the regional vote in the overall AV+ system. We have already noted how the regional vote can play a significant role in motivating parties to foster interethnic cooperation. This increase would be just another element providing electoral incentives for parties to move towards the moderate middle. In some European electoral systems, we can even find examples where a higher percentage is allocated to the regional vote. In Scotland, for instance, 43 per cent of the total seats (56 out of 129) are elected via the regional vote while the rest (73 seats, amounting to 57 per cent of the total seats) are elected through the constituency vote with the FPTP system. Wales is another example where a higher percentage is allocated to the regional vote. The 60-member Welsh Parliament is elected via AMS, under which 33 per cent of the total seats (20 out of 60) are

allocated to the regional vote, whilst the rest (40 seats, amounting to 67 per cent of the total seats) are allocated to the constituency vote.[134]

All in all, Turkey is likely to elect a predominantly moderate Parliament, enabling the construction of a cabinet willing to foster interethnic cooperation that would help the country to successfully manage its ethno-cultural diversity. Since my model is built on a parliamentary system, such a cabinet would be led by a prime minister who serves as head of government. There is one political post that we should also examine at this point, namely the position of head of state. In parliamentary systems, this position is generally occupied by either a constitutional monarch or a ceremonial president. For the occupation of the position, my model offers two alternatives: i) a non-partisan and ceremonial president elected by parliament; or ii) a prime minister serving not only as head of government but also as head of state.

I reject the election of a president by popular vote. This is not appropriate in a country where there is a nation-wide dominant ethnic group since it is likely that a president would be unwilling to foster interethnic moderation and cross-ethnic cooperation. In Turkey, the Turks, who not only constitute approximately 75 per cent of the overall population but also form the majority in all regions other than the East and Southeast, are always able to elect such a president, if they wish. Once elected, the president, who has been provided democratic legitimacy by popular election, may be inclined to offer special privileges to the Turks as a means of ensuring re-election. In addition, she may tend to become an active political

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[134] Wales is a devolved region of the UK. It has exercised asymmetric territorial autonomy since the late 1990s. Chapter 3 of this thesis involves some basic constitutional information about this autonomous region, but for a more detailed constitutional analysis, see Bradbury (1998); Jeffery (2009); Keating and Elcock (1998); Mitchell (2010); Russell and Bradbury (2007); Scully and Elias (2008); Scully and Wyn-Jones (2015); Shortridge (2010); Trench (2010, 2012); Wyn-Jones and Scully (2006, 2012).

participant potentially transforming the parliamentary system into a semi-presidential one, diminishing the importance of the moderate prime minister and cabinet in the political system.

To prevent all these potential scenarios from coming into existence, my model supports the idea of the election of the president by parliament. The president might be elected through the procedure proposed by the Australian Parliament as part of its 1999 unsuccessful constitutional amendment package that would have changed the parliamentary system from a monarchy to a republic.[135] The package proposed a procedure encouraging the selection of a non-partisan Australian president: 'the president would be appointed on the joint nomination of the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, and confirmed by a two-thirds majority of a joint session of the two houses of parliament' (Lijphart, 2006a: 50). A selection mechanism akin to the Australian model might be considered in the Turkish case. The model provides the legislature with the opportunity to elect a non-partisan president who would not undermine the executive role of the moderate prime minister and cabinet.

The second alternative is adopted in South Africa. The position of head of state may be occupied by a prime minister who also serves as head of government. In South Africa, the prime minister, serving as head of government, simultaneously serves as head of state (Reynolds, 2006: 131-2). The South African model is preferable for Turkey. The election of a mainly moderate Parliament through the AV+ system would pave the way for the formation of a cabinet willing to foster interethnic moderation and cross-ethnic cooperation. The leader of such a cabinet

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[135] The amendment package was rejected in the 1999 referendum because most of the pro-republicans were asking for the election of the president by popular vote (Lijphart, 2006a: 50).

must maintain parliamentary confidence. This would contribute to the further development of such moderation and cooperation.

5.3.2. A Two-Fold Autonomy Package for Ethnic Kurds

The other element of my centripetal model is to vest political autonomy in the Kurds. My model offers a two-fold political autonomy package to the Kurds: (1) asymmetric territorial autonomy for each Kurdish-dominated province; and (2) cultural autonomy for ethnic Kurds living in the Turkish-occupied provinces.

Some may question why the model offers territorial autonomy on a province-based, instead of region-based, system. According to the centripetal model, granting territorial autonomy to small local units, rather than to the region as a whole, may not only prevent regional majoritarianism, it may also contribute to political stability because the units are less likely to threaten the unity of the state (McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon, 2008: 55). These are not the sole advantages of the province-based system, however.

The system is more appropriate given the demographic structure of Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia in comparison with a region-based model. As noted earlier in this chapter, the Kurds form the majority in the East and Southeast, while the Turks and Arabs are a minority. The 2011 BİLGESAM Report makes it clear that the Kurds constitute the majority in many provinces, e.g. Agri, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli and Van, but not in Adiyaman, Elazig, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras, Malatya and Sanliurfa (Akyurek, 2011b: 3). The province-based system, which excludes the provinces where the Kurds do not form the majority from exercising territorial autonomy, is therefore more compatible with the demographic context of the East and Southeast.

In comparison with the region-based system, the province-based model would also be more likely to be accepted by Turkey, where there is a general antipathy to territorial autonomy on the grounds that it would lead to the break-up of the Republic (see Chapter 4). In the presence of the antipathy, the Republic would reject the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan as a regional political entity encompassing all provinces of the East and Southeast. The province-based system is likely to provoke less resistance since the provinces are less likely to threaten the national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic.

Another important question concerning the province-based territorial autonomy model is about the type of territorial autonomy – administrative or legislative – that would be bestowed on each Kurdish-dominated province.[136] I am not inclined to advocate either of these two types because some Kurdish-occupied provinces might be willing to have legislative autonomy, while others tend to exercise administrative autonomy. In the presence of such potential different views, what my model does is to allow the provinces to exercise *asymmetric* territorial autonomy, meaning that while some provinces can exercise legislative autonomy, some others can have administrative autonomy under my model.[137] Determining the provinces exercising legislative autonomy or others exercising administrative autonomy is not the duty of an individual researcher. Such a determination process can be completed through separate provincial referendums held in each Kurdish-populated province. Such a

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[136] For the difference between administrative and legislative autonomy, see footnote 62.

[137] Territorial autonomy may be established in a symmetric or asymmetric way. Once established in the symmetric way, all autonomous units exercise the same type of territorial autonomy. This implies that all units exercise administrative autonomy or legislative autonomy with no exceptions. The asymmetric way allows autonomous units to adopt different autonomy arrangements. This implies that some units can exercise legislative autonomy while others can have administrative autonomy. For more details, see Adeney (2007); Anderson and Stansfield (2010); Hechter (2007); Iacovino (2010); Lunch (2011); McGarry (2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2012); O'Leary (2010); Peeters (2007); Requejo (2011); Suksi (2013); Tarlton (1965); Weller (2010); Wheatley (2010).

referendum may authorise the electorate inhabiting a Kurdish-dominated province to directly decide on the type of territorial autonomy they would like.

The determination of the areas that would be ruled by the autonomous provinces is another issue. It is a general pattern that autonomous governments are granted the authority to rule in the areas of language, culture and education. However, there might also be some additional domains, e.g. health, tourism, local police and social services, that might be administered by autonomous governments (Benedikter, 2009: 51). In determining the fields ruled by the autonomous provinces, each province may have different interests. That is why my model follows the path the same as that followed in the determination of the type of territorial autonomy. There would be some provinces ruling solely the areas of language, culture and education, while others would be responsible for additional fields, as well as these three domains, e.g. health, tourism, etc. In short, the asymmetric way of establishing territorial autonomy is still in place in determining the matters that lie within the scope of the authority of the autonomous provinces. Providing a list of powers that would be exercised by the autonomous provinces can be finalised once provincial decision-makers have reached an agreement.

Such an agreement would be specified in a statute of autonomy. Under my centripetal formula, each Kurdish-majority province has its own statute of autonomy that might be regarded as provincial constitution. My formula proposes a five-step procedure akin to that followed in the adoption of the statutes of autonomy for Spanish regions.[138] In accordance with Article 151(2)(i) of the Spanish Constitution, the first step is to construct an interim regional assembly that is tasked with drawing up a statute of autonomy for the region seeking self-government. Like the Spanish

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[138] For each step of the Spanish procedure, see Article 151 of the Spanish Constitution.

model, my centripetal formula offers the establishment of an interim provincial assembly that is tasked with drafting a statute of autonomy for the province seeking self-government, as the first step.

Under my centripetal formula, each interim assembly is made up of *elected* representatives of the Kurdish-populated province concerned, including its deputies in the Parliament of Turkey and members of its general and municipal councils. My formula does not follow the Spanish path on this issue. This path, under which the assembly consists of solely members of parliament elected in the constituencies of the region seeking self-government (art. 151(2)(i) of the Spanish Constitution), might be adequate for a region-based formula, but it would be less adequate for my province-based formula since it might result in the establishment of interim provincial assemblies consisting of merely few parliamentarians, e.g. the two-member assembly of Tunceli; the three-member assemblies of Bingol, Bitlis, Hakkari, Mus and Siirt; and the four-member assemblies of Agri, Batman and Sirnak. In order to increase the number of assembly members that might be a crucial democratic requirement for such interim assemblies, my model calls on not only the deputies representing the Kurdish-dominated provinces in the Parliament of Turkey but also all elected members of the provincial general and municipal councils to become members of the interim assemblies. This would dramatically increase the number of assembly members. For instance, the interim provincial assembly of Bingol would not be made up of just three parliamentarians, twenty-two elected members of the province's general council and twenty-five elected members of the province's municipal council would also become members of the interim assembly, rendering it a 50-member assembly tasked with drawing up a statute of autonomy.

Once the draft statute has been passed by the absolute majority of the interim assembly, it would then be submitted to the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament of Turkey in which all parties in Parliament are proportionally represented. This is similar to the Spanish model (see art. 151(2)(ii) of the Spanish Constitution). The Constitutional Committee and a delegation of the interim assembly that has been tasked with negotiating the draft statute with the Committee must agree on the final form of the draft statute. This requires the mutual consent of the two legislatures. The legislative process for the draft statute during this second step is the same as that for a nation-wide bill, thereby allowing for the amendment of any provision of the draft statute.

After completing this legislative process with an agreement on the ultimate version of the draft statute, the third step is the submission of the resulting text to a referendum of the electorate of the province concerned. Once the text has been approved by the majority of validly cast votes in the province, it is referred to the Parliament of Turkey as the fourth step in which the Parliament ratifies the text. Following this ratification, the text is sent to the head of state who gives her assent to the text and promulgates it as an act, completing the adoption process. Once the statute has come into effect, the interim provincial assembly dissolves itself and calls for a provincial election. The outcome of this election shapes the province's institutional organs, mainly its legislative and executive bodies, in a democratic manner.

If the autonomous province wants to amend or alter its statute of autonomy, a procedure akin to that followed in adopting the original version of the statute is followed under my centripetal formula. The legislative organ of the province should first pass an amended or altered version of the statute by an absolute majority. It

should then be submitted to the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament of Turkey. The Committee and a delegation of the provincial legislature that has been tasked with negotiating the statute with the Committee should then initiate a process of negotiation. This is completed when the Committee and the delegation have given their mutual consent to the eventual form of the statute that might have been further amended or altered during the negotiation process. Once the Committee and the delegation have arrived at a consensus about the ultimate version of the statute, it is sent to a referendum of the electorate of the province concerned. In the provincial referendum, the statute should be endorsed by the majority of validly cast votes. Should the statute be approved by such a majority, it is referred to the Parliament of Turkey, which ratifies the statute and sends it to the head of state. The final step is taken with the approval of the amended or altered version of the statute and its promulgation as an act by the head of state.

Some may question why my centripetal model does permit neither an (interim) provincial assembly nor the Parliament of Turkey to *unilaterally* adopt, amend, change or abolish a statute of autonomy for a Kurdish-occupied province. This permission is not incorporated into my model because such a unilateral action might negatively affect the development of interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation in the Republic. Imagine that we have allowed the Parliament to unilaterally alter the statute of autonomy for the province of Bingol without receiving the consent of the provincial assembly of Bingol. In the absence of such consent, the amended version of the statute that has been unilaterally adopted by the Parliament might include some provisions not welcomed by the provincial assembly, while also excluding some others that the provincial assembly is willing to incorporate into the statute. Such a statute might do little to satisfy the demands of

the provincial assembly. It potentially stimulates the autonomous province not to trust the central government as its centripetal partner, ultimately shaking confidence in the institutional relationships. In such a political atmosphere, it would be very difficult to advance interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation between the Turkish-dominated central government and the Kurdish-populated autonomous province. In order to prevent this, my centripetal model requires both the Parliament and the provincial assembly to have an agreement about every action having impact on the province's statute of autonomy. This requirement might ensure confidence between the Parliament and the provincial assembly because the two centripetal partners would be aware that either of them could not make any changes to the statute of autonomy without receiving the consent of the other. This would contribute to the development of interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation between the Turkish-occupied central government and the Kurdish-majority autonomous province.

My centripetal model offers cultural autonomy to individual Kurds living in the Turkish-populated provinces. As noted earlier in this chapter, according to the 2011 KONDA Report, 34 per cent of the overall Kurdish population are living in those regions where ethnic Turks constitute the majority. My centripetal model cannot ignore the Kurds living in the Turkish-majority provinces because these Kurds should also enjoy their cultural rights, most importantly mother tongue education.

My proposal is to provide the Kurds residing in the Turkish-dominated provinces with an opportunity to exercise their cultural rights. I would grant them cultural autonomy under which they can protect and promote their ethnic, cultural and linguistic identities in both public and private domains. Such autonomy would not only enable the establishment of private schools using Kurdish as the language of

instruction, it would also authorise public schools to use Kurdish as the language of education. Mother tongue education is just one dimension of the cultural autonomy offered to the Kurds living in the Turkish-majority provinces. The autonomy would also enable the Kurds to establish private and publicly-funded institutions aimed at teaching, maintaining and developing the Kurdish language. In addition to the establishment of such institutions, the Kurds would also be authorised to construct private and publicly-funded associations seeking to safeguard and advance Kurdish traditions and other cultural characteristics. In short, the cultural autonomy offered to the Kurds living in the Turkish-occupied provinces would create an arena where the Kurds live together with the Turks without any requirement to assimilate into Turkish cultural identity.

The cultural autonomy proposal might be introduced as an act of parliament that would be enforced by the Turkish Government in every Turkish-majority province where a Kurdish population is residing. In adopting such an act, the Parliament of Turkey may follow its regular legislative procedure. The pro-Kurdish mainstream party in Parliament must be proportionally represented in the parliamentary committee that drafts the act. Under my model, the committee is not allowed to pass its act without the consent of its members representing the pro-Kurdish political party. The consent requirement must also be met in the second stage of adopting the act when the Parliament is called to ratify the draft statute. This means that the pro-Kurdish party is entitled to veto the draft statute during its ratification process in Parliament.

I incorporate the consent requirement into the cultural autonomy proposal to ensure confidence between Turkey's nation-wide mainstream political parties in Parliament and the pro-Kurdish mainstream party in Parliament. This will ultimately

contribute to the development of interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation in the Republic. Imagine that we have allowed the committee to pass a draft act of cultural autonomy for ethnic Kurds living in the Turkish-majority provinces without the consent of the pro-Kurdish mainstream party, and that we have authorised the Parliament of Turkey to ratify the draft act without the consent of the pro-Kurdish mainstream party. In the absence of such consent, the act might exclude some provisions that the pro-Kurdish party is willing to incorporate into it, while also involving some others that are not welcomed by the party. Such an act will do little to fulfil the demands of the pro-Kurdish party and shake confidence in the political relationships between the pro-Kurdish party and the nation-wide mainstream political parties that have played a key role in adopting and ratifying the act. Such a political arena where the pro-Kurdish party might not trust the nation-wide mainstream parties would therefore be a hindrance to the advancement of interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation in Turkey.

My centripetal formula tries to preclude this from happening in Turkey by incorporating the consent requirement into the cultural autonomy proposal. Such a requirement would make it less likely for the Parliament of Turkey to adopt and ratify an act of cultural autonomy for individual Kurds residing in the Turkish-dominated provinces that does not satisfy the demands of the pro-Kurdish party, because the Parliament would be aware that: (i) the parliamentary committee might fail to pass such a (draft) act due to the rejection of its members representing the pro-Kurdish political party to give their assent to the act; and (ii) the Parliament of Turkey might fail to ratify the act owing to the refusal of the pro-Kurdish party to give its consent to the ratification of the act.

It is worth noting that my centripetal formula asks for the fulfilment of the consent requirement not only in adopting the act of cultural autonomy, the requirement is also to be met in amending, altering or abolishing the act. My formula does not allow the nation-wide mainstream parties in Parliament to amend, change or abrogate the act without the consent of the pro-Kurdish mainstream party in Parliament. This would contribute to the development of interethnic moderation, conciliation and cooperation in Turkey.

Some may question whether recent developments in Spain and the UK might make Turkey less willing to adopt my two-fold autonomy package. Multicultural constitutional systems are established in Spain and the UK, where national minorities enjoy self-government and identity rights (see Chapter 3). However, establishing multicultural systems is not enough to stop their national minorities from building secessionist movements.

Scotland began exercising legislative devolution in 1998. The Scottish Parliament (Holyrood) was initially dominated by the unionist parties, the Scottish Conservative Party, the Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish Liberal Democrats, who seek to protect Scotland's constitutional ties with the UK (Connolly, 2013). Holyrood began changing its unionist character in 2007, when the pro-independence SNP came into power via a minority government (Meer, 2015; Kolcak, 2017a). The Parliament gained a strong separatist character in 2011, when the secessionist SNP and Scottish Greens gained 71 out of 129 seats (Adam, 2014). This resulted in a *de jure* Scottish independence referendum held on 18 September 2014 (Dardanelli and Mitchell, 2014; Tierney, 2013). In the referendum, 55.3 per cent of Scots rejected Scottish independence on a turnout of 84.6 per cent (Cairney, 2015). This did not settle the independence issue (Keating, 2015; Tierney, 2015).

In the 2016 Scottish parliamentary election, the SNP and Scottish Greens obtained 69 out of 129 seats, and the Scottish Nationalists formed a minority government (Kolcak, 2017a). Not long after, the UK held a referendum on its EU membership, regarded as the 'Brexit Referendum', on 23 June 2016. In the referendum, British voters endorsed the UK to withdraw from the EU. 51.9 per cent of Britons voted to leave on a turnout of 72.2 per cent (Dodds, 2016). There was no UK-wide consensus on the Leave vote. While England and Wales backed the Leave vote, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar opted to Remain (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2016). In Scotland, there was a consensus on the Remain vote because all local authority areas saw Remain majorities (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). The Brexit Referendum has resulted in another constitutional crisis for Scotland's feature (Hobolt, 2016). The ruling SNP argues that 'Scotland faces the prospect of being taken out of the EU against our will' (Sturgeon, 2016). This motivates the Scottish Nationalists to hold a second independence referendum after Brexit terms become clear (Dickie, 2017).

The Spanish transition to democracy enabled the Catalans to form and develop their own culture in an autonomous region that was established via the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the 1979 Catalan Statute of Autonomy (Barcia, 2014; Field, 2015). Catalonia's political arena was dominated by the unionists willing to preserve Catalonia's constitutional ties with Spain until the early 2010s (Blas, 2013; Elias, 2015). Then, two important constitutional incidents resulted in the establishment of a new Catalan political arena dominated by the secessionists who are prone to establish an independent Catalan republic, (1) the abrogation and amendment of several articles of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy by the Spanish Constitutional Court; and (2) the rejection of the Spanish Government to give

Catalonia full fiscal autonomy (Crameri, 2015; Guibernau, 2012, 2013, 2014; Judd, 2014; Kolcak, 2017b; Serrano, 2013).

The separatists came into power in the 2012 Catalan parliamentary election (Rico and Lineira, 2014). They held an independence referendum on 9 November 2014 (Gillespie, 2015). In the referendum, 80.8 per cent of voters supported Catalan independence, but the turnout was 35 per cent. The Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that the referendum was unconstitutional that made the results void. This led to a snap Catalan parliamentary election held on 27 September 2015 (Marti and Cetra, 2016). In the election, the secessionists managed to secure their majority in the Catalan Parliament by gaining 72 out of 135 seats (Orriols and Rodon, 2016). Then, they called on the Spanish Government to allow them to hold a *de jure* independence referendum (Kolcak, 2017b). Because the Spanish Government refused to authorise its Catalan counterpart to hold a legally-binding independence referendum, the separatists held another *de facto* independence referendum on 1 October 2017. In the referendum that was declared illegal under the Spanish Constitution, 92 per cent of voters supported Catalan secession on a turnout of 43 per cent (Jones and Burgen, 2017a). This encouraged the separatists to proclaim a Catalan republic on 27 October, when the Catalan Parliament approved the independence bill recognising Catalonia as an independent sovereign republic with the votes of the pro-independence deputies (Lasalas, 2017).

The Catalan crisis deepened after the secessionists voted to create a Catalan republic. The Spanish Government imposed direct rule on Catalonia under Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution. It took control of Catalonia's civil service, finances, police and public media, sacked Catalan ministers, dissolved the Catalan Parliament and announced regional elections to be held on 21 December (Jones, Burgen and

Graham-Harrison, 2017). In addition, eight sacked Catalan ministers were jailed by a Spanish judge over their role in Catalonia's declaration of independence. Catalan President Carles Puigdemont and four Catalan ministers did not show up to court because they fled to Brussels. These Catalan politicians 'are accused of rebellion, sedition, and misuse of public funds. The crimes are punishable by 30 years in prison' (Stone, 2017).

The Spanish Government believed that the separatists would lose their parliamentary majority in the election to be held on 21 December (Stothard, 2017). This did not happen. The secessionists kept their majority in the Catalan Parliament. The pro-independence three parties, the Together for Catalonia [*Junts per Catalunya*], the Republican Left of Catalonia [*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*] and the Popular Unity Candidacy [*Candidatura d'Unitat Popular*], won a total of 70 seats in the 135-seat Catalan Parliament (Jones and Burgen, 2017b). In short, with direct rule imposed by Madrid and Catalonia's political leaders in jail and exile, the Spanish Government could not staunch the pro-independence movement (Orr, 2017). The Catalan independence crisis is still waiting to be solved by political dialogues and negotiations (Murado, 2017).

Some may argue that the Scottish and Catalan independence movements make Turkey less willing to grant the Kurds self-government and identity rights. Examining the British and Spanish cases may help Turkey to find the optimal resolution formula for its Kurdish question. After such an examination, Turkey should not maintain that bestowing self-government and identity rights on the Kurds would enable them to build a strong separatist movement. Each country has different dynamics. Such rights may encourage minority ethnic groups to build secessionist

movements in some countries. But it is likely to see some other countries where minorities exercising self-government and identity rights do not support separatism.

There is a multicultural constitutional system in Finland, where the Alanders have enjoyed self-government and identity rights since the 1920s (see Chapter 3). The only pro-independence party in the autonomous Aland Islands is the Future of Aland [*Ålands Framtid*]. The party system of the archipelago is dominated by the unionist parties who are willing to protect Aland's constitutional ties with Finland, the Liberals for Aland [*Liberalerna på Åland*], the Alandic Centre [*Åländsk Center*], the Aland Social Democrats [*Ålands Socialdemokrater*], the Moderate Coalition for Aland [*Moderat Samling för Åland*] and the Alandic Democracy [*Åländsk Demokrati*]. The pro-independence party has neither won any elections nor become a coalition partner in Aland. In the 2003 Alandic parliamentary election, it attracted 6.5 per cent of the total votes and obtained two out of thirty seats in the Alandic Parliament. In the 2007 election, the secessionists secured their two parliamentary seats with 8.3 per cent of the total votes. In the 2011 election, the separatists received 9.6 per cent of the total votes and gained three parliamentary seats. In the last parliamentary election held on 18 October 2015, the pro-independence party won 7.4 per cent of the total votes and obtained two seats in the Alandic Parliament. The archipelago is governed by a unionist coalition made up of the Liberals, Social Democrats and Moderates at the time of writing.[139]

Like the Alanders, the Kurds of Turkey do not support separatism. As explained in Chapter 3, Kurdish secession is rejected by most segments of Turkey's Kurdish society. However, this does not mean that the Kurds of Turkey do not support an

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[139] For more details, see Ackren (2011); Ackren and Lindstrom (2012); *Nationalia* (2015); Wisthaler and Ost (2014).

independent Kurdistan. On 25 September 2017, an independence referendum was held in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the referendum, 92 per cent of those who cast their ballots backed Kurdistan's secession from Iraq (Cockburn, 2017). The Federal Supreme Court of Iraq [*Al-Mahkamah al-Ittihādiyah al-'Ulyā*] ruled that the referendum was unconstitutional. This made the results void (Rasheed and Jalabi, 2017).

During the referendum campaign period, some segments of Turkey's Kurdish society supported Kurdish independence. According to them, the Arabs and Kurds have failed to establish a common public space where they can live together without violating each other's rights and freedoms. This failure is the main reason why an independent Kurdistan should be established in Iraq (Bozarslan, 2017). The segments argue that Turkey's Kurdish question has different dynamics from that of Iraq (*Milli Gazete*, 2017a). Establishing an independent Kurdistan in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia would not resolve Turkey's Kurdish question (Ozdemir, 2017). Ethnic Kurds are living in all regions of Turkey. The best resolution is to create a multicultural constitutional system that guarantees equal citizenship between the Kurds and Turks (Dekak, 2017; Ozdemir, 2017; Simsek, 2017).

Such a constitutional system can be established via my centripetal formula that enables the Kurds of Turkey to exercise self-government and identity rights. My formula bestows asymmetric self-government rights in a centripetal manner. This is another element that may encourage Turkey to practice my formula. The British and Spanish multicultural systems are built on territorial pluralism. This multiculturalist approach enables the Scots and Catalans to exercise self-government rights in their single autonomous regions, Scotland and Catalonia. Granting such rights to the minority-populated region as a whole may result in regional majoritarianism (McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon, 2008: 55). This may turn into a secessionist

movement aimed at transforming the single autonomous region into an independent state (*ibid*). It is less likely to witness such a transformation under my centripetal formula because it does not establish an autonomous Kurdistan. Instead, the formula grants asymmetric territorial autonomy to the existing Kurdish-dominated provinces. It does not provide any constitutional and institutional links between the provinces, which are small units unlikely to threaten the unity of the state.

5.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have maintained that centripetalism might be the optimal multiculturalist approach that Turkey should adopt in order to resolve its Kurdish problem. The Republic is a country where there is some degree of mass-based interethnic moderation between the Kurds and Turks. The presence of this moderation should help Turkey to manage its diversity through centripetalism. Centripetal strategies are highly sensitive to demographic context. The demographic features of the Republic should be considered in creating a centripetal model.

This chapter takes the demographic structure of Turkey into account. It formulates an original centripetal solution to the Kurdish problem. The solution is built on three main cornerstones:

- A parliamentary system, constructed on a 560-member legislature elected through an original version of the AV+ electoral system;
- Asymmetric territorial autonomy for each Kurdish-dominated province; and
- Cultural autonomy for individual Kurds who reside in the Turkish-majority provinces.

In the following chapter, I will continue to explain how my centripetal formula can contribute to the solution of the Kurdish problem. The next chapter will demonstrate how my centripetal model can pave the way for the satisfaction of the main Kurdish demands, the fulfilment of which is regarded by almost all Kurdish tendencies as the basic requirement for the solution of the long-running political problem.

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Chapter 6

The Centripetal Formula and Main Kurdish Demands

6.1. Introduction

The main Kurdish demands can be classified into three basic categorises: 1) identity rights (remove all discriminatory ethnic biases in the Constitution, primary and secondary laws; allow the official usage of Kurdish; adopt a pluralist educational curriculum; and enable both public and private schools and universities to use Kurdish as the language of instruction from kindergarten level to the end of higher education); 2) political representation (introduce a comprehensive decentralisation policy; and reduce the electoral threshold in operation for Turkey's parliamentary elections); and 3) transitional justice (adopt a law that introduces an amnesty and reintegration mechanism for PKK militants, Kurdish political prisoners and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe; and establish an independent truth and reconciliation commission to investigate gross human rights violations by both Turkish security forces and the PKK, bring all perpetrators of these violations to justice, and offer all victims of such violations compensation).

My original centripetal formula satisfies the Kurdish demands for identity rights and political representation. It may also pave the way for the fulfilment of the demands for transitional justice by creating a peaceful arena in which Turkey can

establish an amnesty and reintegration mechanism for PKK militants, Kurdish political prisoners and the Kurdish diaspora, and form an independent truth and reconciliation commission.

This chapter is organised as follows. It first examines whether my centripetal model can fulfil the demands for identity rights. The chapter then scrutinises the ability of the model to satisfy the demands for political representation. Finally, the chapter turns its attention to the question whether the demands for transitional justice can be fulfilled.

6.2. Main Kurdish Demands and Centripetal Satisfaction

The main Kurdish demands can be categorised into three essential classes: (i) the demands for identity rights; (ii) the demands for political representation; and (iii) the demands for transitional justice.[140] I will now examine whether my centripetal model can satisfy these demands or not. Let me start with the first class, namely the demands for identity rights.

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[140] There are other Kurdish demands, e.g. introducing province-based projects on rural, agricultural and livestock development; initiating a comprehensive demining process aimed at obtaining new agricultural and grazing lands in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia; providing entrepreneurs with special grants and loans to set up factories in the two regions; providing regional infrastructural investments, particularly in the areas of transportation and energy; launching new government policies that seek to advance nature and winter tourism in the regions; and establishing cultural, social and rehabilitation centres for children and women. These, however, are not the demands specifically related to the Kurdish question, but to the socio-economic development of Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia. For more details on these demands, see ASSAM (2015: 3-4); Kurban and Yolacan (2008: 6-9).

Figure 7: Main Kurdish Demands

6.2.1. Identity Rights

The Kurdish demands for identity rights require Turkey to introduce a multiculturalist policy that enables not only Turkish but also Kurdish identities and their characteristics to be recognised, protected and promoted in both public and private realms. There are four basic Kurdish demands for identity rights: a) removing all discriminatory ethnic biases in the Constitution and laws; b) enabling the official usage of Kurdish; c) adopting a pluralist educational curriculum; and d) permitting both public and private schools and universities to use Kurdish as the language of instruction. Let me scrutinise the ability of my centripetal model to fulfil these demands in order.

6.2.1.1. Removal of Discriminatory Ethnic Biases in the Constitution and Laws

Rewording the Constitution of Turkey, all primary and secondary laws to remove ethnicity-based discrimination has been demanded by almost all Kurdish groups. The Constitution (LoT 2709/1982) is a legal document that not only neglects the presence of any ethnic group other than the Turks in the Republic but also stresses

the Turkishness of Turkey by incorporating various Turkish-based ethnic phrases into its text. For instance, the Constitution defines the citizen as a Turk by ruling that '[e]veryone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk' (art. 66(1)). The phrases 'no Turk', 'every Turk' and 'all Turks' are repeated in the Constitution, and numerous primary and secondary laws use them when giving rights and duties to the citizen(s) of Turkey.

In addition to its ethnicity-based citizenship definition, the Constitution also uses many Turkish-based ethnic phrases in its preamble and other articles. The preamble reads that 'no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish existence and the principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of Turkishness […]'. In the same section, it is also stated that '[this constitution] has been entrusted by the TURKISH NATION to the democracy-loving Turkish sons' and daughters' love for the motherland and nation'. Such phrases as 'Turkish homeland', 'Turkish nation', 'Turkish state', 'Turkish society', 'Turkish existence' and 'Turkish citizen(s)' are also incorporated into Articles 5, 7, 9, 41, 42, 59, 62, 66, 67, 69, 76, 81, 101, 103, 104 and 174 of the Constitution, as well as various primary and secondary laws.[141]

The Kurds predominantly want these ethnic undertones eliminated. According to a BİLGESAM report published in 2011, almost 90 per cent of Kurds prefer the removal of all discriminatory ethnic biases in the Constitution and laws. The Report finds that 30.2 per cent of Kurds want no reference to ethnicity, while 57.4 per cent of Kurds want all ethnic groups, including the Kurds and Turks, mentioned. The remainder (12.4 per cent) support the current legal discourse under which only

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[141] For a list of such laws, see Kurban and Ensaroglu (2010).

Turkish-based ethnic phrases are incorporated into the Constitution and laws (Akyurek and Bilgic, 2011: 60).

Chart 4: BİLGESAM Report on Ethnicity-based Phrases in the Constitution and Laws

Kurds (%)

- The Constitution and laws should include solely Turkish-based ethnic phrases
- All ethnic groups, including the Turks and Kurds, should be mentioned in the Constitution and laws
- The Constitution and laws should include no reference to ethnicity

The findings of the 2011 BİLGESAM Report are supported by many other reports published by some leading research centres based in Turkey. According to a TESEV report prepared in 2012, 71.6 per cent of Kurds want all ethnic groups, including the Kurds and Turks, mentioned in the Constitution and laws, whilst 13.1 per cent of Kurds want no reference to ethnicity in the Constitution and laws. The remainder (15.3 per cent) support the *status quo* (TESEV, 2012: 58).

Chart 5: TESEV Report on Ethnicity-based Phrases in the Constitution and Laws

Kurds (%)

13,1   15,3

71,6

- The Constitution and laws should include solely Turkish-based ethnic phrases
- All ethnic groups, including the Turks and Kurds, should be mentioned in the Constitution and laws
- The Constitution and laws should include no reference to ethnicity

While the 2011 BİLGESAM Report and the 2012 TESEV Report record Kurdish opinions from all regions of Turkey, another report published by the SAMER in 2012 pays attention to Kurdish opinions only from the Kurdish-occupied regions, namely Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia. The 2012 SAMER Report finds that: 62 per cent of Kurds want all ethnic groups mentioned in the Constitution and laws; 33 per cent of Kurds want no reference to ethnicity in the Constitution and laws; and the remainder (5 per cent) want solely Turkish- and Kurdish-based ethnic phrases mentioned in the Constitution and laws (Gurer, 2012: 32).

*Chart 6: SAMER Report on Ethnicity-based Phrases in the Constitution and Laws*

Kurds (%)

5

33

62

- The Constitution and laws should include only Turkish- and Kurdish-based ethnic phrases
- All ethnic groups, including the Turks and Kurds, should be mentioned in the Constitution and laws
- The Constitution and laws should include no reference to ethnicity

Chart 7: SAMER Report on Replacement of the Words 'Turk(s)' and 'Turkish Nation'

Which words or phrases should the Constitution and laws use in place of 'Turk(s)' and 'Turkish nation'?

3

10

13

42

32

- All citizens - Turkey's peoples - Citizen of Turkey - Peoples of Anatolia and Thrace - Others

The 2012 SAMER Report also examines which words or phrases should replace 'Turk(s)' and 'Turkish nation' when the Constitution and laws give rights and duties to the citizens of the Republic: 42 per cent of Kurds prefer 'all citizens'; 32 per cent

'Turkey's peoples'; 13 per cent 'citizen of Turkey'; and 10 per cent 'peoples of Anatolia and Thrace' (Gurer, 2012: 33).

Similar results are also repeated in a UKAM report published in 2013 (see UKAM, 2013: 33). In addition, the Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the AİH note in their individual reports that stripping all discrimination from the Constitution and laws by either recognising all ethnic groups or using a neutral legal language that does not give priority to any ethnic groups is a Kurdish demand (UKAM, 2014: 21, 32-3). In a similar vein, an ASSAM report published in 2015 states that removing discriminatory ethnic biases in the Constitution and laws is a Kurdish demand that almost all segments of Kurdish society, irrespective of their sociological, political and religious backgrounds, have agreed (ASSAM, 2015: 4). The final report confirming all the above studies is a KONDA report published in 2016. This report affirms that eliminating any sense of ethnicity-based discrimination in the Constitution and laws is a Kurdish demand (KONDA, 2016: 19-24).

The fulfilment of this mass-based Kurdish demand is supported by all pro-Kurdish political parties – the HDP, DBP, HAK-PAR and HÜDA-PAR.[142] Several pro-Kurdish NGOs also acknowledge the elimination of any sense of ethnicity-based discrimination in the Constitution and laws as a basic requirement. For instance, the KCD, an umbrella organisation gathering together various informal local communes

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[142] See Article 2 of the HDP's party constitution, available at: http://www.hdp.org.tr/parti/parti-tuzugu/10, and its party programme, available at: http://www.hdp.org.tr/parti/parti-programi/8, as well as the HDP's electoral manifestos prepared for the 7 June parliamentary election (HDP, 2015a: 7) and the 1 November snap election (HDP, 2015b: 11); Article 3 of the DBP's party constitution, available at: http://www.dbp.org.tr/index/parti-detay/demokratik-bolgeler-partisi-tuzugu/; Articles 2(1) and 3 of the HAK-PAR's party constitution, available at: http://www.hak-par.org.tr/root/i-mages/tuzuk.pdf, and its party programme, available at: http://www.hakpar.org.tr/tr/-program.html, as well as the HAK-PAR's report prepared to explore which reforms Turkey should make in solving its Kurdish question (HAK-PAR, 2009); Article 3 of the HÜDA-PAR's party constitution, available at: http://hudapar.org/Detay/-Sayfalar/206-/parti-tuzugu.aspx, and Section 3(A) of its party programme, available at: http://huda-par.org/Detay/Sayfalar/205/-parti-programi.aspx.

and councils in addition to numerous pro-Kurdish civil society organisations, maintains that the Constitution and laws should not give priority to any ethnic groups; instead, they ought to recognise all ethnic groups inhabiting the Republic through embracing a multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual and multireligious approach (see Ata, 2015; Celik, 2015).[143] Adopting such an approach is also regarded by the Peace Assembly – an NGO established in 2007 to contribute to the democratic and peaceful resolution process of the Kurdish issue – as an important step towards the solution of the Kurdish problem (see Celik and Mutluer, 2015: 25-6; Celikkan, 2015: 53).

Finally, the PKK agrees with the above segments of Kurdish society that removing all Turkish-based ethnic phrases in the Constitution and laws is important. As noted in Chapter 4, the territorial pluralist resolution formula of the PKK, originated by Abdullah Ocalan, already requires Turkey to be turned into a democratic republic recognising, protecting and promoting its multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual characteristics in both public and private domains.

The rewording of the Constitution and laws with the goal of removing all discriminatory ethnic biases is a Kurdish demand. As a multiculturalist approach constructed on the equality-of-status principle, my centripetal model may easily satisfy this demand.[144] This principle enables the model to express a full commitment to the idea of neutrality by recognising, protecting and promoting not only the identity and ethno-cultural characteristics of the Turks, but also the identity and ethno-cultural features of the Kurds and other minority groups.

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[143] For all general information about the KCD, see Chapter 4.
[144] For all important details of this principle, see Chapter 3.

My model does not include a monist constitutional citizenship definition constructed solely on one identity and its characteristics. Instead, the model defines the citizen as a *Türkiyeli*, which is a territorial definition of citizenship. As an inclusive term, *Türkiyeli* means a person living in the territory of Turkey. It does not make any specific references to one of Turkey's ethnic groups in defining the citizen. As Oran (2007: 6) rightly argues, *Türkiyeli* is 'a direct counterpart for "British" while "Turk" is a direct counterpart for "English"'. Like British identity, the primary identity of all citizens of Britain, who may also have such secondary identities as English, Scottish and Welsh, *Türkiyeli* might be the primary identity of all citizens of Turkey, who may also have such secondary identities as Turkish, Kurdish and Laz.[145]

In my centripetal model, the phrases 'no Turk', 'every Turk', and 'all Turks' are excluded, but the phrases 'no *Türkiyeli*', 'every *Türkiyeli*', and 'all *Türkiyelis*' are the common words both the Constitution and all other legal sources, e.g. acts, decrees, regulations, etc., would frequently use when giving rights and duties to the citizen. In parallel to this inclusive citizenship definition, my model does not incorporate monist ethnicity-based phrases into the Constitution and all other legal sources either. Accordingly, the model uses such phrases as 'the nation of Turkey' [*Türkiye ulusu*] in place of 'Turkish nation' [*Türk milleti*]; 'the citizens of Turkey' [*Türkiye vatandaşları*] in place of 'Turkish citizens' [*Türk vatandaşları*]; 'the State of Turkey' [*Türkiye Devleti*] instead of 'Turkish State' [*Türk Devleti*]; and 'the society of Turkey' [*Türkiye toplumu*] rather than 'Turkish society' [*Türk toplumu*].

These phrases must be defined in a pluralist way at the constitutional level to make sense. My model stresses that all these phrases recognise, preserve and

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[145] For the argument on the inclusive character of the concept '*Türkiyeli*', see footnote 104.

promote the multilingual, multicultural and multiethnic features of the Republic in both public and private realms. When using the phrase 'the state of Turkey', the model also constitutionally acknowledges that this state belongs equally to all ethnic groups inhabiting the Republic rather than belonging solely to the majority ethnic group. Similarly, when using the phrase 'the nation of Turkey', the model also acknowledges at the constitutional level that this nation is not made up of only the majority group, but consists of all ethnic groups living in the territory of Turkey, e.g. the Turks, Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, etc.

My model excludes the multireligious character of Turkey from such recognition, preservation and promotion in both public and private domains. It recognises secularism or laicism as one of its basic constitutional principles, eventually allowing the model to embrace an integrationist approach constructed on the disestablishment principle in managing Turkey's religious diversity. [146] By embracing this integrationist principle, my model observes neutrality about religious diversity as it refuses to recognise, protect and promote any religion followed by the citizens of Turkey. The model's approach to religious diversity is just to form a framework of rules fair to all religions and enable all individual citizens to protect and promote their faiths and to select their religious affiliation. Depending on the choices of individuals, some religions might flourish whilst others might decline or even disappear. My model neither assists nor fetters any of these religions. In short, in managing Turkey's religious diversity, my model only establishes fair background rules under which religions can strive for success.

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[146] For all significant details of this principle, see Chapter 3.

6.2.1.2. Official Use of Kurdish

In accordance with Article 3(2) of the Constitution of Turkey, Turkish is the only official language of the Republic. This article is the main legal provision limiting the usage of Kurdish in government, municipal offices, courts and other public bodies. Almost all Kurdish tendencies consider the removal of the limitation as a demand that should be fulfilled in the solution of the Kurdish question. According to the 2011 BİLGESAM Report, four-fifths of Kurds support the proposition that Kurdish should be an official language in Turkey (Akyurek and Bilgic, 2011: 65). Similarly, the 2012 TESEV Report finds that the Kurds are overwhelmingly in favour of using their mother tongue at the official level: almost three-quarters of Kurds want Kurdish recognised as an official language (TESEV, 2012: 44). The 2016 KONDA Report similarly suggests that three-quarters of Kurds prefer the official use of their native language (KONDA, 2016: 41). Finally, the South-eastern Committee of the AİH records in its individual report that integrating the Kurdish language into official life is one of the strongest Kurdish demands (UKAM, 2014: 21).

Chart 8: Support for Kurdish as an Official Language

Kurdish should be an official language in Turkey

Report	Kurds (%)
2016 KONDA Report	75
2012 TESEV Report	73
2011 BİLGESAM Report	80,3

The satisfaction of this demand is acknowledged by all pro-Kurdish political parties, the HDP, DBP, HÜDA-PAR and HAK-PAR, as an essential requirement for the resolution of the Kurdish issue.[147] Similarly, many pro-Kurdish NGOs, e.g. those assembled under the umbrella of the KCD, GÜNSİAD and GABB, maintain that while Turkish might be the national language of the Republic, Kurdish should be recognised as a regional official language used in the East and Southeast (see KCD, 2015; Kurban and Yolacan, 2008: 17). The resolution formula of the PKK also asks for the official usage of Kurdish at the regional level (see Chapter 4).

In sum, almost all Kurdish tendencies agree on the need to use their mother tongue in official life. This Kurdish demand may be easily fulfilled through my centripetal formula. My model follows the path established by the Constitution of Spain. This recognises Castilian, which is the language spoken by the majority population, as the official language of the Spanish State (art. 3(1)), while allowing for the official usage of languages other than Castilian by permitting the autonomous communities of Spain to adopt their own regional official languages in accordance with their statutes of autonomy (art. 3(2)). Several autonomous communities – the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarra and Valencia – incorporate many provisions into their statutes of autonomy that acknowledge not only Castilian (the dominant language) but also such minority languages as Catalan, Euskera (the Basque language), Galego or Occitan (Valencian) as their regional official languages (Kolcak, 2015b: 86).

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[147] See the HDP's party programme and its last three electoral manifestos prepared for the 2014 local elections (HDP, 2014), the 7 June general election (HDP, 2015a: 11) and the 1 November snap election (HDP, 2015b: 11); Article 3 of the DBP's party constitution; Section 3(C) of the HÜDA-PAR's party constitution; the HAK-PAR's party programme and its report on the resolution of the Kurdish issue (HAK-PAR, 2009).

A similar constitutional provision is incorporated into my centripetal model. Turkish would be the national official language of Turkey, while Kurdish and other minority languages are officially allowed to be used at the provincial level. As indicated in Chapter 5, my model provides ethnic Kurds with a two-fold political autonomy package: i) asymmetric territorial autonomy for each Kurdish-dominated province; and ii) cultural autonomy for ethnic Kurds living in the Turkish-occupied provinces. Like the autonomous communities of Spain, the provinces exercising territorial autonomy may recognise not only Turkish but also Kurdish dialects spoken within their frontiers – Kurmanji, Sorani or Zazaki – as their provincial official languages.

Having authorised the Kurdish-populated provinces to recognise their native tongue as one of the official languages used at the provincial level, my model also enables all publicly-funded Kurdish institutions, established with the aim of providing ethnic Kurds residing in the Turkish-occupied provinces with some degree of cultural autonomy, to use Kurdish dialects as their official languages. Hence, my model also allows for the official usage of Kurdish in all other provinces of Turkey where ethnic Kurds are inhabiting.

6.2.1.3. Pluralist Educational Curriculum

The demand for a new pluralist educational curriculum that includes courses teaching a common history of Turks and Kurds and gives full information about all cultures and ethnic groups in Turkey should be satisfied in the resolution of the Kurdish question, according to almost all Kurdish tendencies. As explained in Chapter 2, ethnic Kurds suffered from numerous Turkification policies in the history of the Republic. Education is one of the fields where such assimilation policies were frequently incorporated.

The early republican regime developed special theories canonising Turkish ethno-cultural characteristics. The Sun-Language Theory asserted that Turkish is the basis of all languages spoken on the world. The Turkish History Thesis also claimed that ethnic Turks migrated from Central Asia to different parts of the universe with the purpose of spreading civilisation, and that all ancient Anatolian civilisations, including the Hittites, Phrygians and Sumerians, were Turkish-inspired.[148]

Having developed these theories, the regime constructed specific public institutions tasked with advancing the theories and mobilising national consciousness through propagating and popularising Turkish ethno-cultural features, e.g. the TDK and TTK. The regime also incorporated all key points of the theories in its educational curriculum, extolling solely Turkish ethno-cultural characteristics. Early school textbooks paid attention only to Turkish history rather than the common history of Turks and Kurds. They stressed the slogan 'one language, one culture, one ideal', while also describing the nation as a socio-political community 'formed by citizens, bound by a unity of language, culture and ideal' (Ince, 2012: 119). Moreover, the textbooks defined Turkish as the most beautiful, easiest and richest language on the globe whilst saying nothing about Kurdish or other Anatolian languages and dialects. Furthermore, the textbooks emphasised the importance of 'being born a Turk, living as a Turk and dying as a Turk' by referring to a verse of the *Andımız* – the radical nationalist oath all primary school students uttered at the beginning of every school-day until October 2013 (see Chapter 2) – 'how happy is the one saying I am Turk' (*ibid*: 121).

In contemporary Turkey, the TDK and TTK are granted public funding and constitutional protection by Article 134 of the Constitution. They continue to

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[148] For further details on these theories, see Chapter 2.

maintain, develop and popularise Turkish ethno-cultural identities and neglect all ethno-cultural features belonging to the other Anatolian ethnic groups. The current educational curriculum still involves all basic points of the Sun-Language Theory and the Turkish History Thesis. Like their historical counterparts, current school textbooks 'do a poor job of representing the common history of Turks and Kurds' (ICG, 2013: 28). As noted in Chapter 2, Ataturk recognised the presence of Kurds and described how to grant them local autonomy. Similarly, Ismet Inonu, the first prime minister and second president of Turkey, said at the 1923 Lausanne Conference that Turks and Kurds had a common history and the latter would exercise state-guaranteed cultural rights in the Republic (Saracoglu, 2010: 46-8). The present textbooks touch on neither Ataturk's position nor Inonu's standpoint. Like their historical counterparts, they enshrine many key points of the Sun-Language Theory and the Turkish History Thesis. Almost all textbooks give place to the *Andımız* at their early pages (HÜDA-PAR, 2015: 10). A significant number of textbooks still attempt to propagate and popularise Turkish nationalism by incorporating various nationalist remarks, e.g. 'We are the Turks who have the edge over all others'; and 'Turkish territory! You are not the grave of those who love you. You should indicate your creativity for the Turkish nation, which has been the biggest, oldest, and purest nation in the history of humanity…' (HÜDA-PAR, 2015: 41).[149]

Many Turks still do not believe that the Kurds form a distinct ethnic group or culture and literature of their own, but solely a mixture of Arabic, Hebrew, Persian and Turkish cultures and languages (Ozturk, 2013: 193). The Kurds argue that the lack of knowledge about the shared history of Turks and Kurds and Kurdish ethno-

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[149] For more examples, see HÜDA-PAR (2015).

cultural characteristics is the main barrier for the Turks to understand that there is a distinct Kurdish identity and culture. The absence of such knowledge also lets the Turks ignore all Kurdish contributions to the civilisation of Turkey (Bilgic and Akyurek, 2012: 205; ICG, 2013: 18-9).

The Kurds maintain that all these misperceptions would be removed by adopting a new pluralist educational curriculum that is broadened to include Kurdish culture, the common history of Turks and Kurds, and a more inclusive narrative of Anatolian histories and cultures (ICG, 2013: 29). The South-eastern Committee of the AİH notes that introducing a new pluralist educational curriculum to provide courses about the common history of the two ethnic groups, as well as Kurdish history and culture, is demanded by almost all Kurdish groups (UKAM, 2014: 21, 23). In addition, the Kurds, according to the Eastern Committee of the AİH, also demand the establishment of Kurdish linguistic and historical institutes – Kurdish counterparts of the TDK and TTK. This would be an important step to the eventual solution of the Kurdish problem (UKAM, 2014: 34).

All pro-Kurdish political parties – the HDP, DBP, HÜDA-PAR and HAK-PAR – agree that adopting such a curriculum enabling students to learn Kurdish history and culture, in addition to the shared history of Turks and Kurds, would represent a significant stride to resolve the Kurdish issue.[150] Many pro-Kurdish NGOs, those assembled under the KCD, the Azadi Movement, GABB, GÜNSİAD, to name just a few, also support the adoption of the pluralist curriculum (see AZADÎ Hareketi, 2014; Doger, 2014; Kurban and Yolacan, 2008; Ongun, 2015). Finally, the

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[150] See the HDP's last two electoral manifestos prepared for the 7 June election (HDP, 2015a: 47) and the 1 November election (HDP, 2015b: 25); Article 3 of the DBP's party constitution; Section 3(F) of the HÜDA-PAR's party programme and its special report on the educational problems that should be resolved in Turkey (HÜDA-PAR, 2015); the HAK-PAR's recent declaration listing the educational reforms that should be made in Turkey (HAK-PAR, 2016b).

standpoint of the PKK, clearly expounded in its territorial pluralist formula, is not different. It considers the adoption of the pluralist curriculum a crucial element contributing to the disarmament of the insurgent organisation and the eventual solution of the Kurdish problem (see Chapter 4).

The adoption of a new pluralist educational curriculum that provides courses about the common history of Turks and Kurds, and Kurdish culture and history is a consensual demand among all Kurdish segments. This demand is easily satisfied by my centripetal model. As a multiculturalist model based on the equality-of-status principle, my centripetal formula recognises Turkey as a republic consisting of various ethnic groups, including the Turks, Kurds and Lazes, at the constitutional level. As a natural consequence of this recognition, my model offers a pluralist educational curriculum teaching the common history of all ethnic groups inhabiting the Republic, and their separate cultures and histories.

In the Kurdish-occupied autonomous provinces, the introduction of the pluralist curriculum could be a responsibility of the institutional organs of the autonomous provinces. The institutional bodies of each autonomous province could introduce primary and/or secondary provincial laws in the area of education and adopt its own pluralist curriculum. These bodies can construct publicly-funded provincial institutions to teach, protect and promote the common history of Turks and Kurds, as well as Kurdish history and culture.

Under my model, the pluralist curriculum would also be in operation in the Turkish-dominated provinces. As these provinces are not granted any degree of territorial autonomy, the central legislative and executive organs of the Republic are the institutions responsible for adopting the curriculum in these provinces. It is

worth noting that since my model bestows some degree of cultural autonomy on ethnic Kurds living in the Turkish-populated provinces, the Kurdish populations of these provinces are still entitled to construct private and/or publicly-funded provincial institutions that teach, safeguard and advance the common history of Turks and Kurds, in addition to Kurdish history and culture.

6.2.1.4. Mother Tongue Education

Mother tongue education is the means through which an ethnic group can use its native tongue as the language of instruction. This involves the teaching of the native tongue (e.g. linguistic course in Kurdish) and its usage in delivering the content of the curriculum (e.g. chemistry, geography, literature, maths, physics and/or biology courses in Kurdish). Mother tongue education can be achieved in at least three different ways, monolingual, bilingual and multilingual. A monolingual programme implies that the entire content of the curriculum is taught in the native tongue of the ethnic group (e.g. all courses in Kurdish). A bilingual programme implies that the content of the curriculum is taught in two languages (e.g. some courses in Kurdish and others in Turkish). Finally, a multilingual programme involves the content of the curriculum being delivered in at least three languages (e.g. delivering the content of the curriculum in English, Kurdish and Turkish).[151]

Mother tongue education in Kurdish is very limited in Turkey. Article 42(9) of the Constitution stipulates that:

> [n]o language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved.

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[151] For more details on mother tongue education, see Kaya and Aydin (2013); Saville (2007).

By reserving the provisions of international treaties, this article confers a constitutional guarantee for mother tongue education only on Turkey's religious minorities. In September 2003, the Republic ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), under which ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities are granted the right to use their native tongue in education (art. 27), but with a reservation hindering all Muslim minorities, including the Kurds, from exercising the rights secured under Article 27 ICCPR:

> The Republic of Turkey reserves the right to interpret and apply the provisions of Article 27 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights in accordance with the related provisions and rules of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne […] and its Appendixes.

Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne reads that:

> Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities […] shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense […] any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language.

The following article of the treaty also states that:

> [a]s regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language.

Turkey recognises solely non-Muslim groups as capable of exercising educational minority rights secured under Article 27 ICCPR. The Kurds predominantly profess Islam and have been deemed as a Muslim community since the very early Ottoman periods. They are unable to enjoy minority educational guarantees set out in the Treaty of Lausanne or other international documents in force because they do not constitute a religious minority in the Republic (see Chapter 3).

Article 42(9) of the Constitution allows for the usage of Kurdish as the language of instruction should it be regarded as a foreign language in Turkey. This approach is followed by Article 11 of the so-called 'Democratisation Package' (LoT 6529/2014), which paved the way for bilingual (Turkish-Kurdish) education in *private* schools (art. 11).[152] It is worth noting, however, that this is just a *limited* right. Only private schools have been authorised to use Kurdish as the language of education. Another restrictive character of the bilingual education provided through Article 11 of the LoT 6529/2014 is that it does not permit the use of Kurdish at the kindergarten level, which might have been the case with the amendment of Article 19(4) of the Basic Law on National Education (LoT 1739/1973).[153] To date, a full right to mother tongue education in Kurdish has not been adopted in the constitutional and legal system of Turkey.

The adoption of such a full right is one of the most widely-heard Kurdish demands. According to the 2012 TESEV Report, 78 per cent of Kurds would like the adoption of the full right (TESEV, 2012: 42). Similarly, the 2013 UKAM Report identifies this right as the most widely-heard Kurdish demand (UKAM, 2013: 8). In a similar vein, the Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the AİH record in their individual reports that the right to use Kurdish as the language of instruction from kindergarten level to the end of higher education is a widely agreed Kurdish demand (UKAM, 2014: 21, 32). The 2015 ASSAM Report agrees (see ASSAM, 2015: 3). Finally, according to the 2016 KONDA Report, 85 per cent of Kurds support the full right to mother tongue education in Kurdish (KONDA, 2016: 37).

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[152] For more details on the bilingual system established through Article 11 of the LoT 6529/2014, see footnote 43.

[153] This provision imposes all nurseries and kindergartens a duty of teaching their pupils how to use Turkish in an accurate and elocutionary way (Kurban and Ensaroglu, 2010: 40).

All pro-Kurdish political parties – the HDP, DBP, HÜDA-PAR and HAK-PAR – acknowledge this demand not only as a basic human right that should be granted to all individuals without any restriction, but also as an essential requirement for the resolution of the Kurdish issue.[154] Many pro-Kurdish NGOs, e.g. those assembled under the umbrella of the KCD, Kurdi-Der, Kurd-Der and DİSA, agree (see Celik, 2015; KCD, 2015; ICG, 2012b: 14). This is supported by the territorial pluralist formula of the PKK that would allow both public and private schools to use Kurdish as the language of instruction from kindergarten level to the end of higher education. This would contribute to the disarmament of the insurgent organisation and the ultimate solution of the Kurdish problem (see Chapter 4).

My centripetal model can accommodate this Kurdish demand. It permits all minority languages and dialects spoken in Turkey to be used as the language of instruction from kindergarten level right through to higher education, granting the Kurds the full right to mother tongue education in their native language. In the Kurdish-dominated autonomous provinces, adopting the full right would be a responsibility the institutional bodies of the autonomous provinces should fulfil. The institutional organs of the autonomous provinces that might be capable of introducing primary and/or secondary provincial laws in the field of education may recognise Kurdish as one of the languages of instruction, paving the way to the establishment of separate provincial education systems under which the Kurds are entitled to have education in their mother tongue in both public and private schools and universities.

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[154] See Article 2(a) of the HDP's party constitution and its party programme, as well as its last two electoral manifestos, HDP (2015a: 47, 2015b: 11); Article 3 of the DBP's party constitution; Section 2(Ç) of the HÜDA-PAR's party programme and its party declaration made just after the beginning of the 2016-17 educational session (HÜDA-PAR, 2016d); the HAK-PAR's recent declaration explaining which educational reforms Turkey should make (HAK-PAR, 2016b).

Under my centripetal model, each Kurdish-populated autonomous province adopts either bilingual or multilingual systems. My model prefers such systems because of their numerous benefits. For instance, Thomas and Collier (2003) compare bilingual/multilingual students with their monolingual counterparts and reach the conclusion that students learning in a bilingual or multilingual environment become more sophisticated thinkers than those learning in a monolingual environment. In their another study that also analyses the abilities of the two student groups, these scholars find that bilingual and multilingual students perform much better than their monolingual counterparts on tasks calling for problem solving, pattern recognition and creative thinking (Collier and Thomas, 2004). This performance of bilingual and multilingual students also enables them to have a more complex understanding of their mother tongue and greater linguistic awareness than their monolingual counterparts (Cuda-Kroen, 2011).

There are other benefits of bilingualism and multilingualism too. Proficiency in two or more languages empowers students to broaden their horizons through engaging with songs, folk tales, idioms, historical documents, expressions and many other basic sources without the mediation of translation (Vince, 2016). Such proficiency may permit bilingual and multilingual students to become better at deepening their understanding of ethno-cultural groups other than their own, in comparison with their monolingual counterparts (Benson, 2013). It may, moreover, allow bilingual and multilingual students to establish, maintain and develop economic, socio-cultural and political relationships with those of other ethnic groups (Chatel, 2014).

In light of all these benefits of bilingualism and multilingualism, my model stimulates the Kurdish-occupied autonomous provinces to adopt bilingual or

multilingual education systems to allow their inhabitants to exercise the full right to mother tongue education. It is worth noting that under my model, the full right would be in operation not solely for the Kurds living in the Kurdish-populated autonomous provinces, ethnic Kurds residing in the Turkish-dominated provinces are also entitled to enjoy the same right by exercising some degree of cultural autonomy. This is incorporated in the model with the goal of enabling individual Kurds to live together with the Turkish majority without any threat to become assimilated into the majority identity.

6.2.2. Political Representation

The Kurdish demands for political representation call on Turkey to provide the Kurds with a democratic political arena in which they enjoy rights of self-government and are represented in the central legislature of the Republic without the imposition of any unclearable electoral threshold. There are two main Kurdish demands for political representation: 1) introducing a comprehensive decentralisation policy; and 2) lowering the electoral threshold in operation for Turkey's parliamentary elections. Let me examine the ability of the proposed centripetal model to satisfy these demands.

6.2.2.1. Decentralisation

Turkey is a highly centralised unitary state with a significant number of core governmental functions, e.g. education, infrastructure, health and security, directed from Ankara or by provincial outposts of ministries. Turkey's eighty-one provinces have centrally-appointed governors, who are the senior representative of the state and the head of the government's executive branch in the province (art. 9(1) of the LoT 5442/1949), and elected mayors, who are the head of municipal administration in the province (art. 37 of the LoT 5393/2005). Both governors and mayors are

limited by decisions taken by the capital, which appoints provincial and district governors, judges, teachers, police chiefs and heads of local administrative departments such as education, health and tourism. Elected mayors and municipal councils enjoy authority over local transport, garbage collection, sewage and water, but little say over other core services, such as education, health and major infrastructure (see arts. 14-15, 18 and 34 of the LoT 5393/2005).

The Parliament of Turkey, the TBMM, has adopted several acts aimed at strengthening local government since the 2000s, e.g. the law increasing administrative powers of metropolitan municipalities (LoT 5216/2004); the law providing special provincial administrations with a degree of administrative and fiscal autonomy (LoT 5302/2005); the law enabling local administrative bodies to form regional unions (LoT 5355/2005); the law providing municipalities a degree of administrative and fiscal autonomy (LoT 5393/2005); the law increasing revenues of special provincial administrations and municipalities through higher tax shares (LoT 5779/2008); and the law adding fourteen new metropolitan municipalities to the existing sixteen, including Kurdish-majority ones (Mardin and Van), enhancing administrative powers of municipalities and increasing their revenues by way of higher tax shares (LoT 6360/2012).[155]

These attempts strengthening local government are, of course, important developments, but a much stronger form of decentralisation is demanded by almost all segments of Kurdish society. As noted in Chapter 4, a territorial pluralist formula which would empower ethnic Kurds to exercise a significant level of territorial autonomy in Northern Kurdistan (*Bakur*) is supported by the PKK, while a similar model allowing for the construction of the so-called 'Democratic Autonomous

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[155] For an analysis of these acts, see TBMM (2013: 305-16).

Kurdistan' is backed by the HDP, DBP and KCD. Similarly, the HAK-PAR advocates the federalisation of Turkey to enable the foundation of an autonomous Kurdish region in the East and Southeast with broad powers akin to those of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq (HAK-PAR, 2009, 2013a). According to the Party, such an autonomous region would be the most important element contributing to the solution of the Kurdish problem (HAK-PAR, 2016a). Finally, the HÜDA-PAR, which does not offer an autonomy or federalisation arrangement as strong as the others, also asks for the adoption of a more decentralised administrative system. The Party maintains that municipalities and their councils should have full administrative and fiscal autonomy as well as additional decision-making powers on all issues directly affecting their inhabitants (see section 3(Ç) of the party programme).

Further decentralisation is demanded by ordinary Kurds. According to the 2011 BİLGESAM Report, more than three-fifths of Kurds (61.2 per cent) want a more decentralised system (Akyurek and Bilgic, 2011: 28). The 2012 SAMER Report finds a similar result interviewing ethnic Kurds inhabiting only Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia: 62.2 per cent of Kurds are in favour of further decentralisation (Gurer, 2012: 28). The 2012 TESEV Report also notes that more than four-fifths of Kurds (82.5 per cent) want public services run by the bodies elected by citizens rather than those appointed by the central government at the provincial level (TESEV, 2012: 73). In a similar vein, the Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the AİH all record that the Kurds are predominantly in favour of a more decentralised system by which municipalities and their councils enjoy full administrative autonomy and additional decision-making powers, and provincial and district governors would be elected directly by popular vote (UKAM, 2014: 21, 32).

The findings of the Committees are supported by the 2015 ASSAM Report as well (see ASSAM, 2015: 7).

My centripetal model may easily fulfil this demand for decentralisation. As elaborated in Chapter 5, my model offers each Kurdish-populated province the opportunity to exercise asymmetric territorial autonomy in the form of either administrative (local) or legislative (full) autonomy.[156] The model does not impose either these two types because some Kurdish-dominated provinces might be inclined to have legislative autonomy, whilst the rest might be willing to exercise administrative autonomy. The proposed model authorises the provinces to exercise asymmetric territorial autonomy and permits them to determine which autonomy type they would like to establish within their borders through referendums (see Chapter 5).

My model embraces a similar approach in determining the areas that would be ruled by the autonomous provinces. It is a general pattern that autonomous governments are granted the authority to rule in the fields of culture, education and language. It is worth noting, however, that while some Kurdish-dominated provinces might tend to rule just these three areas, the rest might be willing to govern some additional areas, e.g. health, tourism, local police, etc. In the presence of such differences, the asymmetric way of establishing territorial autonomy is again in operation under my centripetal model. According to the model, the decision-making and political actors of each province might determine the matters that would lie within the scope of the authority of their autonomous provincial (legislative and/or executive) institutions after reaching an agreement on the issue with their central counterparts (see Chapter 5).

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[156] For the difference between these two autonomy types, see footnote 62.

Some may question why my model proposes territorial autonomy on a province-based, rather than region-based, system. As explained in a detailed way in Chapter 5, the province-based system provides a centripetal perspective on territorial autonomy. It is more consistent with the demographic structure of Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia than its region-based counterpart. In addition, it is more acceptable for ethnic Turks in comparison with the region-based system (see Chapter 5).

6.2.2.2. Lowering the Electoral Threshold

Most Kurds have demanded that Turkey reduces the 10 per cent national electoral threshold for parliamentary elections. This rule was introduced by the Constitution of 1982 and then reinforced by the Law on Election of Deputies (LoT 2839/1983) to maintain stability following the chaotic 1970s (see Chapter 2) and keep pro-Kurdish political parties out of Parliament.[157] The HDP has been the sole pro-Kurdish mainstream party that has managed to surmount the threshold, while its predecessors, namely the HEP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, DTP and BDP, were either unable to enter Parliament because of their failure to clear the threshold or entered Parliament through candidates contesting elections as independents.

According to the 2011 BİLGESAM Report, 30.5 per cent of Kurds support the retention of threshold without any amendment. The rest are either in favour of reducing the threshold (48.3 per cent) or support its complete abolition (21.2 per cent) (Akyurek and Bilgic, 2011: 106). Of those who favour lowering the threshold, 17.1 per cent support that the threshold should be reduced to 7 per cent; 22.1 per cent want the threshold lowered to 3 per cent; and the remainder (60.8 per cent) are in favour of reducing it to 5 per cent (*ibid*: 107).

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[157] Article 67(6) of the Constitution reads that 'the electoral laws shall be drawn up so as to reconcile the principles of fair representation and political stability'. Article 33 of the LoT 2839/1983 specifies that political parties receiving less than 10 per cent of the total votes are unable to enter Parliament.

Chart 9: BİLGESAM Report on the Electoral Threshold

Like the 2011 BİLGESAM Report, the 2012 SAMER Report finds that most of Kurds (54.6 per cent) support a reduction in the threshold, while the remainder are in favour of either abolishing the threshold (28.6 per cent) or maintaining it without any change (16.8 per cent) (Gurer, 2012: 36). In a similar vein, the 2012 TESEV Report finds that more than two-thirds of Kurds (68 per cent) want the threshold reduced (TESEV, 2012: 90). Similarly, the Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the AİH recommend in their individual reports that reducing or repealing the threshold is a consensual demand among all Kurdish circles (UKAM, 2014: 21, 32). Finally, the findings of the 2015 ASSAM Report are in line with those of the above reports (ASSAM, 2015: 5).

Chart 10: SAMER Report on the Electoral Threshold

Kurds (%)

- The threshold should be abolished — 28,6
- The threshold should be reduced to 3 per cent — 16,6
- The threshold should be reduced to 5 per cent — 31,9
- The threshold should be reduced to 7 per cent — 6,1
- The threshold should be in place without any change — 16,8

The fulfilment of this mass-based demand is regarded by all pro-Kurdish political parties – the HDP, DBP, HÜDA-PAR and HAK-PAR – as a democratisation step contributing to the ultimate resolution of the Kurdish question.[158] Various pro-Kurdish NGOs, such as those assembled under the umbrella of the KCD, as well as the GABB and GÜNSİAD, agree that reducing the electoral threshold would help solve the Kurdish problem (see KCD, 2015; Kurban and Yolacan, 2008: 6, 18). Finally, the PKK agrees by incorporating the introduction of a reform dramatically lowering the threshold or completely rescinding it into the democratic republic dimension of its territorial pluralist formula (see Chapter 4).

In brief, almost all Kurdish segments want the electoral threshold reduced or eliminated. My centripetal model may satisfy this Kurdish demand. As noted in Chapter 5, my model proposes an original Alternative Vote Plus (AV+) electoral

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[158] See the HDP's party programme and its last two electoral manifestos (HDP, 2015a: 8, 2015b: 12); Article 3 of the DBP's party constitution; Section 2(C) of the HÜDA-PAR's party programme; the HAK-PAR's party declaration that underlines all important strides Turkey should make in resolving its Kurdish issue (HAK-PAR, 2013b).

system, under which 70 per cent of the total parliamentary seats (392 out of 560) are elected through the Alternative Vote (AV) electoral system with the application of the Coombs rule, and the rest (168 seats, amounting to 30 per cent of the total seats) are elected through the regional vote both employing the d'Hondt divisional method and asking parties to surmount a *5 per cent* nation-wide electoral threshold in the district (AV) vote to win regional seats allocated equally to seven geographical regions of Turkey (24 seats for each region).

Under my original voting system, there is *no electoral threshold* political parties must clear in order to gain *district* seats, but any party receiving *less than 5 per cent* of the total votes in the district part of my AV+ system is unable to obtain *regional* seats that are elected through the second component of the voting system. The system reduces the threshold from 10 to 5 per cent that is in operation solely for the allocation of regional seats, not both district and regional seats. Some may still question why the system calls on parties to surmount the 5 per cent nation-wide electoral threshold in order to win any regional seat. As explained in Chapter 5, however, this is one of the most important centripetal strategies in fostering interethnic moderation and cross-ethnic cooperation between ethnic Kurds and Turks (see Chapter 5).

6.2.3. Transitional Justice

There are two basic Kurdish demands for transitional justice: a) adopting a law that establishes an amnesty and reintegration mechanism for PKK militants, Kurdish political prisoners and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe; and b) establishing an independent truth and reconciliation commission to investigate human rights violations by both Turkish security forces and the PKK, bring the perpetrators to

justice and offer all victims compensation. Let me analyse the ability of my centripetal model to fulfil these demands in order.

6.2.3.1. Amnesty and Reintegration Mechanism

Preparing a special law to grant amnesty to PKK militants with no link to serious crimes, and to regulate the ultimate return to normal life of PKK cadres is considered by almost all segments of Kurdish society as a step that should be taken in the solution of the Kurdish question. Adopting such a law was part of the 2008-2011 Oslo Process, an important step of the Kurdish Initiative in which several meetings were held in Oslo between high-level MİT officials and senior PKK leaders, including Adem Uzun, Remzi Kartal and Zubeyir Aydar, in the presence of an international mediator – the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The parameters discussed in Oslo included the proposition that PKK cadres would be offered asylum in European countries; that PKK militants without a criminal record would be able to return to Turkey; that PKK militants with a Turkish criminal record would need to go through some fast-track judicial processes; and that PKK militants willing to stay in Northern Iraq could do so as soldiers enrolled in military forces there.[159]

This approach was welcomed by senior PKK figures, including Abdullah Ocalan and Murat Karayilan, and Turkish officials. The Oslo approach began to be used in practice on 19 October 2009, when the PKK sent 34 returnees in total (8 PKK militants from the Qandil Mountains and 26 refugees from the Makhmur Camp in Northern Iraq) across the Iraqi border in accordance with the return-home policy that had been recognised by the Turkish Government as part of the Kurdish Initiative.

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[159] The Oslo Process collapsed following a PKK attack in Silvan district of Diyarbakir on 14 July 2011 that cost the lives of thirteen Turkish soldiers. For more details on the Process, see Ekmekci (2014: 566); Ensaroglu (2013: 13-14); Todorova (2015: 111); Villellas (2013: 20).

The returnees entered Turkey through the Habur Gate and were welcomed by a huge Kurdish crowd. After being questioned by officials, they were released and travelled to Diyarbakir, where enthusiastic thousands greeted them with cheers as war heroes.

The Turkish Government had indeed envisaged the returns as the beginning of a process of disarming the insurgent organisation in which the other PKK militants would also come back to Turkey in the following months. However, the Habur incident turned into, what Besir Atalay – a former Interior Minister of Turkey – called, 'a car crash' on the first returns (Karaveli, 2010: 20). The Government had not anticipated that the returnees would be welcomed as heroes by huge and cheering crowds expressing their support for the PKK and Ocalan. The returnees entered Turkey in militant uniforms and voiced no remorse for their former acts. This scene created a strong nationalist backlash and criticism of the Government's handling of the Kurdish Initiative. The Government was obliged to suspend the return-home policy. As a consequence, the Government lost its eagerness for the Kurdish Initiative and embraced a hardline discourse particularly after a PKK attack in Resadiye district of Tokat province in December 2009 that cost the lives of seven Turkish soldiers.[160]

An amnesty and reintegration mechanism, the scope of which is much broader than the return-home policy, is now considered by almost all segments of Kurdish society as a requirement for the ultimate solution of the Kurdish problem. According to the 2013 UKAM Report, general amnesty is one of the most widely-voiced Kurdish demands (UKAM, 2013: 8). In a similar vein, the Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the AİH record in their individual reports that most of Kurds are of

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[160] For more details on the Habur incident, see Aktoprak (2010: 660); Cakir (2010: 180-1); Candar (2009: 19); Gurcan (2016: 56); Karaveli (2010: 19-22); Kayhan-Pusane (2014: 86); Tezcur (2013: 80).

the view that the Kurdish question could not be solved in a certain manner without providing general amnesty for PKK militants, Kurdish political prisoners and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe (UKAM, 2014: 21, 34). Similarly, the 2015 ASSAM Report notes that ethnic Kurds predominantly believe that any resolution process not involving an amnesty and reintegration mechanism would not solve the Kurdish problem in an absolute way (ASSAM, 2015: 5).

Such a mechanism is regarded by all pro-Kurdish political parties as essential to the eventual resolution of the Kurdish issue. It is worth noting, however, that none of the parties is inclined to see an immediate amnesty and reintegration policy being implemented. Instead, the parties support the view that Turkey should initially fulfil the Kurdish demands for identity rights and political representation, and then turn its attention to the adoption of an amnesty and reintegration mechanism that would allow for the reintegration of PKK militants, Kurdish political prisoners and the Kurdish diaspora into the Republic.

According to the HDP and DBP, a general amnesty is essential requirement for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. Political attention should not, however, be paid to this requirement at the early stages of the solution process. Rather, having satisfied the demands for identity rights and political representation, Turkey may turn its attention to the fulfilment of this demand and adopt a social integration law that would allow for the reintegration of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, Kurdish political prisoners and demobilised PKK militants into civil society (HDP, 2015a: 6, 2015b: 11, 13; *İnternet Haber*, 2013b; *Radikal*, 2015). Similarly, the HAK-PAR maintains that an amnesty and reintegration policy should be adopted in the ultimate solution of the Kurdish question (HAK-PAR, 2009, 2013b; *NTV*, 2012). Finally, the HÜDA-PAR, which says nothing about a general amnesty for PKK militants, also

supports the adoption of an amnesty mechanism enabling the reintegration of the Kurdish diaspora and Kurdish political prisoners in Turkey (see HÜDA-PAR, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016e).

Many pro-Kurdish NGOs, including the Peace Assembly, GÖÇ-DER, YAKAY-DER, ÇİAÇ and ÇAÇA, agree that adopting an amnesty and reintegration policy might be a later step of the solution process following the fulfilment of the demands for identity rights and political representation (see Balta, 2015: 33-6; Celikkan, 2015: 45-7; Kurban and Yolacan, 2008: 5-6). The standpoint of the PKK is analogous to those of the NGOs and political parties. According to the insurgent organisation, reintegrating PKK combatants, the Kurdish diaspora and Kurdish political prisoners into political and/or civilian life is one of the final steps that Turkey should take after satisfying the Kurdish demands for identity rights and political representation (Candar, 2011: 77-8; ICG, 2012a: 23, 2013: 3, 2014: 18, 22).

The adoption of an amnesty and reintegration mechanism is acknowledged by almost all sectors of Kurdish society as a requirement that should be fulfilled following the satisfaction of the demands for identity rights and political representation. My centripetal formula may construct a peaceful arena in which Turkey could adopt a social integration law allowing for the reintegration of PKK militants, the Kurdish diaspora and Kurdish political prisoners into Turkey. As recorded in the previous sections of this chapter, the demands for identity rights and political representation may be easily satisfied by my formula. Having fulfilled these demands, I believe, there would be a certain peaceful atmosphere in Turkey as most segments of Kurdish society, whose essential demands have already been satisfied, would not support the continuation of the PKK's guerrilla warfare against the Republic, stimulating the PKK, who would welcome the fulfilment of the demands

for identity rights and political representation, to end its armed conflict against Turkey. In the absence of the conflict, I think, it would be more likely for Turkey to introduce a social integration law that enables the Republic to take one of the last steps in the eventual resolution of the Kurdish issue.

6.2.3.2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Establishing an independent truth and reconciliation commission is a step that should be taken to solve the Kurdish problem. This could be tasked with (i) investigating all serious crimes – e.g. murders, tortures, extrajudicial executions, etc. – committed by both Turkish security forces and the PKK, (ii) bringing all criminals committing such serious crimes from both sides to justice, and (iii) offering compensation to all victims of such crimes. According to the Eastern and South-eastern Committees of the AİH, most Kurds are in favour of forming such a commission. This would not only enable them to find out the perpetrators of historical injustices, but to establish the harms done and produce compensation (UKAM, 2014: 21-8, 32-6).

Similarly, all pro-Kurdish parties maintain that any peace process aimed at solving the Kurdish problem should include establishing such a commission because all citizens have the right to know the truth about the abuses they suffered. According to the parties, the commission should also be constructed for the dignity of victims who suffered from numerous gross human rights violations during the conflict.[161] Many pro-Kurdish NGOs, including the Peace Assembly, GABB, GÖÇ-DER and MEYA-DER, are also of the belief that the commission would positively affect the promotion of reparative justice and a new public accord in Turkey by

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[161] See the HDP's last two electoral manifestos (2015a: 16-7, 2015b: 13-4); the HAK-PAR's recent party declarations (2009, 2013b); Section 3(C) of the HÜDA-PAR's party programme.

providing its citizens with the chance to know the truth and compensation for all wrongdoings they suffered, eventually contributing to the further consolidation of peace in the Republic (see Budak, 2015: 226-35; Caliskan, 2015: 42-53; Kurban and Yolacan, 2008: 10, 36). Finally, according to the PKK, the resolution of the Kurdish issue, like all other peace processes around the world, should involve establishing a truth and reconciliation commission, perhaps through parliament, which may take into consideration the victims' wishes and hear their stories (ICG, 2014: 20).

The establishment of an independent truth and reconciliation commission capable of investigating gross human rights violations, bringing the perpetrators of these violations to justice and offering the victims of such violations compensation is regarded by almost all Kurdish segments as a key demand. Like the fulfilment of the previous Kurdish demand for transitional justice, I believe my centripetal formula may establish a peaceful arena in which Turkey can form such a commission.

In the existence of the ongoing armed conflict, I think, it would be less likely for Turkey to establish the commission since no state would be inclined to accuse its own security forces of committing serious crimes against its enemies during an ongoing armed conflict. Once the conflict has ended, however, any state would form the commission as its activities would contribute to building and maintaining peace by promoting reparative justice. It is essential to end the conflict.

My model might enable Turkey to take this key step. Having satisfied the demands for identity rights and political representation, most segments of Kurdish society may consider the continuation of the armed conflict as an unreasonable act. They may call on the PKK to end its war against the Republic while also urging the Republic to make the last strides in the solution of the Kurdish problem – (i)

establishing an amnesty and reintegration mechanism; and (ii) forming a truth and reconciliation commission. The PKK, who would welcome what Turkey has done in fulfilling the demands for identity rights and political representation, would then be more likely to respond to this Kurdish request positively by ending its armed conflict against Turkey, allowing for the construction of an exact peaceful arena in the Republic. This PKK act might subsequently stimulate Turkey to take the last two steps to solve its long-running political question. By fulfilling the demands for identity rights and political representation, therefore, my model might lay the foundation for the establishment of a peaceful arena in which Turkey would satisfy the demands for transitional justice.

6.3. Conclusion

The main Kurdish demands can be categorised into three basic classes: (a) the demands for identity rights; (b) the demands for political representation; and (c) the demands for transitional justice. In this chapter, I have ultimately reached the conclusion that my centripetal model may easily fulfil the Kurdish demands for identity rights and political representation. The model may also pave the way for the satisfaction of the demands for transitional justice.

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Chapter 7

Conclusion

The Kurdish question is one of the most significant political problems of Turkey. It has two main dimensions, an identity rights dimension and an armed conflict. The identity rights dimension is the product of many assimilationist Turkification policies implemented by way of the cultural togetherness policy – an official policy embraced by the early republican regime, the military administrations ruling the country after the coups staged in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and their successor governments. The Republic did not solve this dimension of the question and continued to enforce its Turkification policies. This led to an armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the terrorist organisation PKK.

Between the early 2000s and April 2015, the Republic undertook several democratic reforms to solve the question, e.g. (i) the ending of emergency rule in the Kurdish-majority provinces; (ii) the construction of a compensation mechanism for harm caused by terrorism or the fight against terrorism; (iii) the elimination of constitutional and legal prohibitions on Kurdish broadcasting rights; (iv) the establishment of TRT KURDÎ, a publicly-funded television channel broadcasting in Kurdish for twenty-four hours a day; (v) allowing private language centres, universities, municipalities and NGOs to offer Kurdish language courses; (vi) permitting public secondary schools to offer elective Kurdish language courses; (vii)

empowering private schools to form a bilingual (Kurdish-Turkish) education system; (viii) authorising public universities to offer Kurdish degree programs; (ix) the annulment of the radical nationalist oath (*Andımız*); (x) the removal of legal bans on the usage of Kurdish personal and place names; (xi) allowing Kurdish to be used in making political propaganda; (xii) enabling this language to be used in courts and prisons; and (xiii) granting the Peace Process, a government policy introduced in 2013 to disarm the PKK and resolve the Kurdish issue by democratic and peaceful means, certain legal status.

These reforms have transformed the assimilationist Republic. This had recognised, preserved and promoted solely Turkish identity in both public and private areas and prohibited the recognition, preservation and promotion of all minority identities, including Kurdish identity, in both areas. Turkey is now an integrationist republic where not only Turkish but also Kurdish and other minority identities are recognised in the private domain. The majority identity, however, is still the only one recognised, safeguarded and promoted in the public realm. These reforms have not resulted in the political resolution of the Kurdish issue. The Dolmabahce Agreement, announced on 28 February 2015, had provided a ten-point roadmap for such a resolution. This Agreement was rejected by Turkish officials just after its announcement. While this rejection paved the way for the end of the Peace Process, it ended without reaching an eventual political resolution following the 7 June parliamentary election, when the PKK waged a new terror campaign against Turkey. This led to a new round of armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the PKK that has continued since July 2015.

Turkey has been trying to solve the Kurdish question through its securitisation and socio-economic (modernisation) approaches since the end of the Peace Process.

This thesis argues that the Republic will be unable to resolve the question through these approaches. In accordance with its securitisation approach, Turkey defines the Kurdish issue as the PKK problem that threatens its national unity and territorial integrity. It regards the eventual victory of its security forces against the PKK as the only way to resolve the problem. It recognises the multiculturalist Kurdish demands as those made by several PKK-affiliated groups, but not by almost all Kurdish segments. It regards these demands as injurious to its national security. It restricts the political arena in which individual Kurds, pro-Kurdish political parties and civil society organisations can freely ask for the fulfilment of such multiculturalist demands.

By describing the Kurdish issue as the PKK problem, the securitisation approach precludes the Republic from solving the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish question. The armed conflict dimension of the question might be called 'the PKK problem', but the question also has another dimension – the identity rights dimension – that might be resolved only with multiculturalist political arrangements that recognise, secure and promote Kurdish identity in both public and private domains.

The securitisation approach would be problematic even for the resolution of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish issue. The approach restricts the political arena where ethnic Kurds can freely express their democratic demands. It also puts individual Kurds in an awkward position both in the Kurdish-dominated provinces, where they encounter many economic, educational and social problems, and in the Turkish-occupied provinces, where they experience some physical and verbal attacks by ultranationalist Turks. All these problems and attacks would significantly damage the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks, and dampen the Kurds' desire for

coexistence. Furthermore, they might radicalise ethnic Kurds, particularly Kurdish youth, who would then regard violent methods as the only way of convincing Turkey to satisfy the multiculturalist Kurdish demands, urging them to join the PKK. This radicalisation would produce a constant and dramatic increase in the number of PKK recruits. This makes the solution of the armed conflict dimension via the securitisation approach very difficult.

The socio-economic (modernisation) approach might contribute to the ultimate resolution of the Kurdish issue. This approach alone, however, would not enable Turkey to solve the issue since ethnic Kurds, whose socio-economic demands have been satisfied, would not become new loyal citizens of the Republic supporting all Turkish-based integrationist policies. They would still call on Turkey to fulfil their multiculturalist demands. This requires the Republic to adopt a political settlement that recognises, protects and promotes Kurdish identity and its characteristics in both public and private realms.

Whilst Turkey has failed to come up with an eventual political resolution formula for its Kurdish problem, many scholars have studied what constitutional features such a formula should have. Ismail Besikci contends, for example, that the formula should permit ethnic Kurds to construct their own independent state. Some scholars – such as Burhanettin Duran, Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan – reject all separatist formulas and offer a pro-Islamic integrationist formula that calls for convergence on Islamic identity in Turkey's public area. According to many others (e.g. Baskin Oran, Demet Yalcin Mousseau, Fuat Keyman, Gareth Winrow, Levent Koker, Kemal Kirisci and Umut Ozkirimli), any potential formula ought to be constructed on neither a secessionist nor an integrationist policy, but a policy of

multiculturalism that enables the recognition, preservation and promotion of Kurdish identity not only in the private domain but also in its public counterpart.

Three main approaches might be used in producing a multiculturalist policy, namely centripetalism, consociationalism and territorial pluralism. Some scholars, such as Atilla Sandikli, Elcin Aktoprak, Erdem Kaya, Gareth Winrow, Kemal Kirisci, Murat Aktas, Nurcan Baysal and Zafer Yoruk, have scrutinised how a consociational model might help Turkey to solve its Kurdish problem. Many others – e.g. Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, Bulent Kucuk, Busra Ersanli, Cengiz Aktar, Ceren Ozselcuk, Cetin Gurer, Cuma Cicek, Ferhan Gezici, Fikret Toksoz, Halil Bayhan, Joost Jongerden, Kubilay Arin, Mustafa Sonmez and Oktay Uygun – have examined how a territorial pluralist formula might contribute to the resolution of the problem. To date, no one has paid enough attention to the merits of centripetalism by analysing whether they might help Turkey to resolve its Kurdish issue. There is a centripetal research gap in the academic literature on Turkey's Kurdish question.

As an interdisciplinary study, this thesis has sought to fill the research gap by constructing an original centripetal solution to the Kurdish question. The thesis argues that it is better for the Republic to replace its present integrationist formula with a multiculturalist one. There are some normative and pragmatic reasons for such a shift. From a normative perspective, the current integrationist formula allows only Turkish identity to be recognised, secured and promoted in the public area. This renders Turkey unable to ensure true equality between ethnic Kurds and Turks. It would be better for the Republic to introduce a multiculturalist formula that recognises equality between the two ethnic groups by allowing both Turkish and Kurdish identities to be recognised, preserved and promoted in both private and public realms.

The normative argument, however, is not the only element that stimulates the thesis to ask Turkey to adopt a multiculturalist formula. There are also some pragmatic reasons. The Republic is unlikely to resolve its Kurdish problem via political methods that try to manage diversity without creating a multicultural arena. According to the thesis, Turkey is unable to resolve the problem by means of its present integrationist formula or the pro-Islamic version of this formula, which is supported by some prominent Turkish scholars, including Burhanettin Duran, Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan. This is unable to fulfil the main Kurdish demands – e.g. the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity; the official usage of Kurdish; and the use of Kurdish as the language of education in public schools and universities. The satisfaction of these demands requires the Republic to make several multicultural reforms that allow for the recognition, preservation and promotion of Kurdish identity in both public and private domains.

It is impossible for Turkey to undertake these reforms via an assimilationist way of managing ethno-cultural diversity. Any assimilationist policy compels the Republic to ban the acknowledgement, protection and development of its diversity in both public and private realms. An assimilationist Turkey would be unable to satisfy the main Kurdish demands that are regarded by almost all segments of Turkey's Kurdish society as the basic requirement for the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

Secession is another way of managing diversity without constructing a multicultural arena in which not only majority but also minority identities are recognised, secured and promoted in both public and private areas. This method would not be the most appropriate for resolving the Kurdish question. Although

secession is supported by Ismail Besikci, most sectors of Turkey's Kurdish society reject it.

In light of these normative and pragmatic reasons, the thesis maintains that it would be better for the Republic to adopt a multiculturalist formula in resolving its Kurdish question. Such a formula might be based on three main approaches, centripetalism, consociationalism and territorial pluralism. The thesis argues that neither consociationalism nor territorial pluralism would be the optimal solution for the question. Turkey might generate some problems should it build its multiculturalist formula on consociationalism or territorial pluralism.

Consociationalism would not be the best multiculturalist approach for the solution of the Kurdish problem since Turkey is a country where there is some degree of interethnic moderation between ethnic Kurds and Turks at the grassroots level. In the existence of this mass-based interethnic moderation, a consociational model would offer political incentives to Kurdish leaders to cooperate and enter into consociational power-sharing arrangements with their counterparts representing the Turks. The same, however, cannot be said of the Turkish leaders, who do not have enough motives to engage in conciliatory behaviour. This will make consociational power-sharing arrangements difficult to enforce in the Republic. In the absence of such motives, multicultural reforms that have been made with the establishment of the consociational model would not be sustainable in Turkey. There would simply not be enough number of intercultural citizens to support the reforms.

Territorial pluralism is advocated not only by the PKK, the pro-Kurdish mainstream party, the HDP, and its fraternal party, the DBP, but also by such prominent scholars as Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, Bulent Kucuk, Ceren Ozselcuk, Cetin

Gurer, Cuma Cicek, Joost Jongerden and Kubilay Arin. This thesis argues that territorial pluralism would not be the optimal multiculturalist approach for Turkey. This approach requires Turkey to establish an autonomous Kurdistan in its eastern and southeastern regions. Ethnic Turks overwhelmingly reject such an autonomy arrangement on the grounds that it will lead to the secession of Kurdistan from the Republic in the near future. Turkey is unable to eliminate this Turkish anxiety should it construct its multiculturalist formula on territorial pluralism.

This thesis originates a centripetal resolution formula for the Kurdish question that might enable the Republic to avoid secession. The formula is built on three main cornerstones:

- A parliamentary system that is constructed on a 560-member legislature elected via an original version of the Alternative Vote Plus (AV+) electoral system, under which 70 per cent of the total seats (392 out of 560) are elected through the Alternative Vote (AV) voting system with the application of the Coombs rule, and the rest (168 seats, amounting to 30 per cent of the total seats) are elected through the regional vote both employing the d'Hondt divisional method and requiring parties to surmount a 5 per cent nation-wide electoral threshold in the district (AV) vote to win regional seats allocated equally to seven geographical regions of Turkey (24 seats for each region);
- Asymmetric territorial autonomy for each Kurdish-occupied province; and
- Cultural autonomy for individual Kurds residing in the Turkish-dominated provinces.

Consociationalism is unlikely to produce secession with the adoption of my proposed solution. The original AV+ voting system provides both Kurdish and

Turkish leaders with political incentives to cooperate and enter into power-sharing arrangements with each other. Moreover, the system motivates political parties to move towards the moderate middle and develop interethnic conciliation and cross-ethnic cooperation through pre-electoral coalitions. This would enable Turkey to foster interculturalism and increase the number of its intercultural citizens.

My centripetal formula is also able to eliminate the main Turkish anxiety about the resolution of the Kurdish issue. The formula does not establish an autonomous Kurdistan in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Instead, it authorises each Kurdish-majority province to exercise asymmetric territorial autonomy in accordance with its own statute of autonomy.

My proposed solution will create a Turkey that is less likely to witness the problematic political scenarios that would happen should the Republic adopt a consociational or territorial pluralist model for the resolution of its Kurdish problem. My centripetal model might also enable Turkey to fulfil or begin to fulfil all main Kurdish demands, the satisfaction of which is regarded by almost all Kurdish sectors as the basic requirement for the resolution of the Kurdish problem: (1) the demands for identity rights, by eliminating all discriminatory ethnic biases in Turkey's constitution, primary and secondary laws; enabling the official use of Kurdish; introducing a pluralist educational curriculum; and allowing both public and private schools and universities to use Kurdish as the language of education; (2) the demands for political representation, by adopting a comprehensive decentralisation policy; and lowering the electoral threshold that is in operation for parliamentary elections; and (3) the demands for transitional justice, by adopting a law that creates an amnesty and reintegration mechanism for PKK militants, Kurdish political prisoners and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe; and forming an independent truth and

reconciliation commission to investigate gross human rights violations, bring all perpetrators of these violations to justice, and offer all victims of such violations compensation.

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