Policy-making, paradigms and change:

The origins of the Prevent counter terrorism policy in Great Britain between 2001 and 2011

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Glossary

ACPO: Association of Chief Police Officers

DCLG: Department for Communities and Local Government

DIUS: Department for Innovation, Universities and Schools

FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MCB: Muslim Council of Britain

OSCT: Office for Security and Counter Terrorism

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Summary

This thesis examines the origins and development of the UK Prevent strategy between 2001 and 2011, the extent to which it represented a change in policy and the factors that shaped it. Prevent was an important element of the UK government's response to the threat from home-grown al-Qaeda terrorism following 9/11 and the associated political conflict over Islam and the Muslim community. The study argues that the development of Prevent can be understood through two competing models of government and security, one centralised and coercive the other distributed and consensual. The Labour government combined both approaches in order to deliver short-term security objectives whilst embedding these in a longer term process of social change. However, whilst this approach enabled a broader response to terrorism, and created a new framework for decision-making, it also increased institutional disputes about its aims that ultimately motivated a narrowing of the agenda in 2011.

This study analyses the decision-making process through different lenses in order to understand the reasons why Prevent developed in this way. The study is based on a qualitative analysis of semi-structured elite interviews with a small targeted sample of individuals involved in decision-making, alongside primary documentation, to examine explicit and implicit influences on the process. It presents an in-depth narrative account that identifies the main decisions, including both formal and informal decisions and exogenous and endogenous inputs into the process. It then examines the influence of the decision-making community, including the structure of the relationship between central government, local agencies and civil society. The study explores how ideas and arguments about the causes of terrorism helped to integrate the two competing policy models and the trade-offs between the two. The study concludes by examining whether this process represented a significant paradigmatic change in policy and the lessons that can be drawn about Prevent and policy change more generally.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

This thesis presents a case study of the origins and development of the Prevent policy in Great Britain between 2001 and 2011.[1] Prevent is an interesting case study of a complex, high profile and contentious area of policy-making. It was developed following the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks on the US in 2001 as one strand of the UK's wider Contest counter-terrorism strategy and was one of the first preventative strategies to address 'home grown' radical jihadi terrorism (The Change Institute 2008b). It gained public prominence in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on London 7th July 2005 that were carried out by British nationals and influenced subsequent policy around Europe and the US. It was notable for its pre-criminal preventative approach that aimed to address the causes of terrorism and was framed by the concept of radicalisation, a socio-political model of recruitment and participation (Horgan and Taylor 2006; Kruglanski & Fishman 2009).

This study proposes that Prevent was based on a combination of two competing models of government and security, a centralised and coercive model rooted in the tradition of Hobbes's Leviathan, and a distributed and consensual model rooted in the tradition of Locke's Two Treatise of Government (Hobbes 1996; Locke 1996). Combining these models served to broaden the scope of the political and policy response to terrorism following the attacks of 9/11. In particular policy making focused on developing a consensual partnership with the Muslim community to address the social causes of terrorism. At the same time the combination of the models represented a contentious institutional and ideational framework for decision-making and created trade-offs between the roles of government and society. At the heart of this framework was the paradoxical issue of social integration as both a contributing factor to radicalisation and an essential pre-requisite for effective government action. The study shows

[1] There were a number of different names associated with the policy, however, for the purposes of clarity and consistency it will be referred to as Prevent throughout this study.

how trade-offs in the process of integration was fundamental to the short and long-term success of Prevent and its perceived failures.

The study tests this hypothesis by tracing the decision-making process, including the inputs, ideas and institutions that influenced them, and their outcomes (Yin 2003; Allison & Zelikow 1999; Bulpitt 2008; Denscombe 2010; Goodin, Rein & Moran 2006; Hall 1993; Heclo & Wildavsky 1974; Lasswell 1936; Lindblom 1959; Pierson 2000a & 2000b; Rhodes 1997; Sabatier & Wieble 2007; Stone 2012; Wildavsky 1979). In this model, policy making is an iterative and dynamic process that is founded both on formal powers and the authority that accrues from organisational capacity and legitimacy. Decisions are shaped by exogenous and endogenous inputs, including events, social and political trends and the impacts of prior decisions. These inputs are then interpreted through an iterative processes of deliberation, persuasion and feedback that is influenced by institutional relationships and priorities and new and evolving ideas, evidence and argument. In particular the study also illustrates how decisions interact at different levels, from national to local government and across a variety of agencies that can variously represent divergent or coherent networks of activity. Ultimately this study views policy as a dynamic and reactive process of decision-making in an open social and physical systems.

The conflict over Prevent is illustrative of the persistent sensitivity of the relationship between a strong state guarantor of security and a free and autonomous, and peaceful, civil society (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998; Huysmans 1998; Kaldor 2003). The two competing models that shaped the development of Prevent articulate competing conceptual and institutional views of this relationship. To assist the reader the study labels the two models Thomas and John as they are adapted from broader political science traditions that can be traced from Hobbes and Locke, but are not directly based on their theories (Pinker 2011). The study shows that the combination of these two models produced a new ideational and institutional framework for decision-making that dealt with the issue of cohesive political, legal, economic and cultural institutions as the foundation for security (Pinker 2011; Kaldor 2003). However, this

framework was contentious as it institutionalised conflict over the development of Islamic identity, minority activism and anxiety about the UK's cultural and political identity following the end of the British empire (Saggar 2010a; McGhee 2008; Goodwin 2011; Gilroy 2004; Cantle 2012; Modood 2007).

Ultimately the study shows how Prevent resulted from political pressure for a comprehensive response to terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. This pressure initiated a process of reform that moved beyond a narrow enforcement approach by introducing a distributed and consensual approach to addressing the social roots of terrorism. The new combined framework for decision-making was integrated by the concept of radicalisation, a socio-political process of recruitment and participation, that had its roots in New Labour's modernisation agenda of cross-government approaches to complex problems (6, Leat, Seltzer & Stoker 2002; Barber 2008; Bleich 2010; Coutts and Uberoi 2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Heath-Kelly 2012; Jackson 2007; Newman 2001a; Richards 2011; Saggar 2009; Sedgwick 2010; Thomas 2010). However, the new framework also required decision-makers to navigate conflict over the responsibility for the causes of radicalisation and the political aims of Prevent, particularly in relation to the Muslim community, their values and motivations. In this respect Prevent incorporated broader political debates about the relationship between security and integration that were taking place at the time, into a policy framework.

What this study does not directly answer is whether Prevent actually prevented terrorism. It explores how competing ideas about the aims of Prevent, interpretations of success and hypothesis about what was likely to work were incorporated into decisions. In particular the study will show that one of the main challenges for decision-making centred on how to evaluate the trade-off between short-term security objectives and a longer-term process of integration. In this respect the challenge that faced Prevent was not unique and is common to many preventative policies (Cairney 2007; Gough 2015; Heath - Kelly 2012). At the same time Prevent was a particularly complex problem as it was a response to organized terrorist and radical extremist groups that actively challenged the legitimacy of government and the safety

of society, and sought to avoid scrutiny to in order to achieve this. What this study does show is that Prevent itself became the subject of conflict and decision-makers at all levels ultimately struggled to establish trust and credibility in the agenda.

The study focuses on the initial development of Prevent between 2001 to 2011 when the focus was on radical Islamist terrorism. Unfortunately this challenge has remained persistent since then due to the on-going civil war in Syria and the major attacks in Paris in 2015, Berlin, Brussels and Nice in 2016 and Manchester, London and Barcelona in 2017 whilst concerns have also grown about the activities of the far right. The causes of these threats and attacks resist simple answers but reiterate the importance of addressing a persistent challenge. My research draws on a part of my career where I worked as an analyst on a series of projects in relation to radicalisation and Prevent, including for the Department for Communities and Local Government, English local authorities and regional government and the European Commission. My supervisor, Professor Shamit Saggar also worked for the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit and contributed to the early stages of the development of Prevent. My professional experience frames some of my perspectives but I have had no direct involvement in any of the decisions or organisations described in this study. I hope this perspective helps provide an honest assessment of the study's central questions.

The thesis starts from the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 attacks and concludes in 2011 with the introduction of a revised strategy under the Coalition government. It is structured across nine chapters that can be grouped in three sections. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the study's central questions followed by a literature review that explores the threat from terrorism and finds a gap in the analysis of the decision-making behind Prevent and similar policies. The first section concludes with theory and methods chapters that set out the theoretical and analytical frameworks employed by the study, including the theoretical models of the state and security and the policy making process. The middle section is comprised of three empirical chapters that provide a detailed insight into the key decisions that shaped the development of Prevent and identifies the organisations, problems and arguments that were

involved. Following this two analytical chapters explore what the process tells us about the institutional and ideational influences on the development of Prevent. The final chapter explores the extent to which Prevent represented a change in policy, the study's contribution and final reflections for policy makers and researchers.

Overview of Prevent

> *"The first priority of any Government is to ensure the security and safety of the nation and all members of the public."* Rt Hon Gordon Brown, Prime Minister (HM Government 2009a)

Prevent formed part of the UK's domestic response to the threat from international jihadi terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. It was first included in the 2003 UK Contest counter-terrorism strategy alongside the traditional Pursue strand that was focused on identifying, catching and prosecuting suspected terrorists, and the Protect and Prepare strands.[2] The Contest strategy was developed following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington and in the context of the UK's involvement in military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the US led Operation Enduring Freedom, often referred to as the 'war on terrorism'. During this time there were a series of arrests and prosecutions of individuals, including British nationals, for plots to attack UK and international targets. There was increased monitoring of Islamist terrorist groups and extremists in the UK and overseas by security services that was set alongside extended police powers of stop and search, detention without charge and further criminalisation of involvement or support for terrorist groups and acts (Evans 2007).

Prevent itself came to public prominence in 2005 in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombing of the London transport system by four British nationals that resulted in the deaths of 56 people, including the attackers. After the 7/7 attacks Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, called for more concerted action to combat extremists and the causes of terrorism (Blair 2005). This was

[2] The Protect strand focused on protecting vulnerable infrastructure and the Prepare strand on the emergency response.

followed by a Muslim community consultation exercise titled Preventing Violent Extremism Together that was followed by a £6 million pathfinder-piloting fund during 2006/07. The first full inter departmental Prevent strategy was published in 2008 (HM Government 2008a) and involved the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for Children Schools and Families and the Department for Innovation Universities and Skills (DIUS).

Prevent's stated aim was to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent-extremism (Department for Communities and Local Government 2007; HM Government 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b). One aspect focused on supporting mainstream voices by helping people, particularly youth, to speak out and contradict extremist messages where they came across them publicly and privately. Prevent also supported vulnerable individuals through referral programmes such as Channel, including training to help communities and public agencies recognise warning signs of radicalisation (HM Government 2010a). In addition there was support for community organisations to marginalise those promoting extremist and radical ideologies alongside broader efforts to promote integration of British Muslims and the community's positive role in British society at national and local levels. The programme also incorporated strategic communications, particularly diplomatic engagement with Muslim countries overseas, plus research and analysis to inform decision-making.

The main period of funding covered by this study concluded in the 2009/10 financial year, in advance of the 2010 general election. In 2008/09 £140 million was committed to Prevent delivery (HM Government 2009a) through a strategy that ran between 2008 and 2010. To put this into context the annual commitment on security services and policing at the time was £2 billion (HC deb 25 July 2007, c841WS). Out of the Prevent budget approximately £45 million was allocated by the DCLG, primarily through area based funding to 92 local authorities, based on the size of the local Muslim population. This funding was not ring fenced but was attached to the National Indicator 35 requirement that set out general expectations in line with Prevent's objectives. There was also £3.2 million funding for local authorities not receiving the Area

Based Grant and an additional £5.1 for the Community Leadership Fund to develop leadership capacity within Muslim communities. Funding was also allocated to develop schools curricula and a referral toolkit for universities and colleges (DIUS 2009).

Home Office funding, including funding for the police, was £47 million in 2009/10 and £37 million in 2010/11 (Gregory 2010). This included funding for local neighbourhood policing Prevent leads. For example, 137 police officer posts within 23 forces outside London were recruited in 2008/9 at a cost of £7,239,000 including training and other expenses, of which 87 were neighbourhood engagement posts and 50 counter-terrorism intelligence officers. In 2008/09 £578 million specifically targeted grants were made to support counter-terrorism policing, including enabling the establishment of an effective Police Counter-terrorism Network (PCTN) to facilitate intelligence sharing. The Home Office also provided £1.2 million in additional police funding for specific work with schools, colleges and universities. In addition £5.6 was granted to the National Offender Management Service and £3.5 million to the youth Justice Board in 2009/10.

Throughout its development Prevent was characterised by conflict about its aims, its treatment of the Muslim community and its effectiveness at preventing terrorism (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011c). Nevertheless it was retained alongside the other pillars across three iterations between 2003 and 2011 and through the change in government in 2010 (HM Government 2006, 2009a and 2011b). Under the 2011 strategy, responsibility for Prevent was allocated to the Home Office, which centralised a reduced volume of funding, ending area based grants to local authorities and focused work on targeted solutions such as the Channel programme (HM Government 2011a). The political context also changed following the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the assassination of Osama Bin Laden and the Arab Spring in early 2011 that had seemingly marginalised more extreme jihadist Islamist groups. However the issue has subsequently moved back up the agenda due to the participation of British citizens in the Syrian civil war, further terrorist attacks around Europe and the endurance of radical Islamist ideas.

Prevent and security

That Prevent was a controversial policy is unsurprising, decisions made in the name of security are often accompanied by significant conflict over the balance with the principles liberal democracy and human rights (Wilkinson 2006; Mulgan 2007). What this study proposes however is that Prevent as a policy was founded on different perspectives on of the relationship between the state and the protection of a free and autonomous civil society (Pinker 2011). The issue of security as it relates to the legitimate use force, is so fundamental to the authority of states that it can exert a particular influence across a range of policy agendas (Huysmans 1998). In this respect Prevent incorporated elements of two conflicting models of government and security in an attempt to develop a broad based response to the threat from terrorism. However, the approach served to expose and exacerbate different, and sometimes incommensurable, perspectives on the role of government and society in mediating differences and resolving and preventing conflict.

The first model of government and security, labelled Thomas for this study, is situated in the Hobbesian tradition where security is the sole responsibility of the state, is indivisible and stands apart and over society. The sovereign allows society to move out of a lawless state of nature where an individual's sole right of self-protection results in the classic *"war of all against all"* and a "*nasty brutish and short existence"* (Hobbes 1996). Security is based on the investment of an individual's right of self-protection into the sovereign which then has a monopoly on the use of force to protect citizens. At the same time the sovereign's authority rests on its reputation for competent protection of a citizens latent right of self-protection through fair and consistent use of its power, such as through the rule of law.[3] This is well illustrated by Hannah Arendt's argument that the use of violence by governments is a

[3] As Hobbes was writing in reaction to the English civil war his perspective is largely framed by the impact and consequences of an absence of a government whilst recognising the crucial importance of reputation and legitimacy to a sovereign's practical authority.

consequence of the breakdown of the institutional and cultural authority that underpins effective exercise of power (Arendt 1970).

The second model of government and security, labelled here as John, is situated in the tradition of Locke's Two Treatise of Government and shifts the focus back toward society (Locke 1996). In this model the authority of government is more distributed and is rooted in its embodiment of the material desires and social values of its citizens. The demands of society are diverse, and in some cases conflicting, so governments must also be able mediate between these differences through the creation of shared institutions. As with the Thomas model a government's authority is founded on its ability to protect the interests of its citizens but in this perspective government is more reactive, adaptative and representative of their demands. Effective government has to respond and mediate between differences and protect minorities in order to cultivate a cohesive and secure political society (Sen 2006). As a result model John places a greater emphasis on the effective representation of broader range of social interests and values by government.

When viewed through the prism of these models of government and security, non-state actors use terrorist tactics to challenge the authority the sovereign and to undermine the political and civic norms of society. Attacks on vulnerable soft targets, such as transport systems, serve to intimidate the public and undermine the authority of their government (Richardson 2006). Attacks may also polarise society, both directly and through counter-productive responses by government and society (Richardson 2006). Terrorist-style guerrilla attacks may be deployed for conventional tactical objectives, such as destabilising economies or degrading military forces. However, terrorism is typically used as part of asymmetric political and military strategies by non-state groups and is valued for producing wider political and social impacts beyond the damage of the immediate attack. As a result terrorism inevitably presents a complex political challenge for democratic governments that rely on the rule of law and shared institutions for stability and security.

Policy responses to terrorism are high contested and sensitive. Terrorism as an operational threat can be highly sophisticated or hard to track whilst the direct challenge to government authority and social norms makes it inherently political (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning & Smyth 2011). States often have legal and political latitude when responding to security threats, as illustrated by the right to self-protection that is enshrined in international law and embedded in international human rights standards.[4] At the same time the social reactions to terrorism can be heightened by the emotive combination of the unlikely but high impact of attacks and their deliberate nature (Aradau & Van Munster 2007; Beck 1992). As a result the threat of terrorism often has significant impacts on government priorities. It can serve to justify a wide range of government actions whilst shaping the legitimacy of ideas or social groups far beyond those who are directly involved in violence (Jackson 2007; Williams 2005).

Understanding what causes terrorism has been a feature of efforts to prevent terrorism following 9/11. In practice there are competing views about the relative emphasis on organizational, political, psychological, sociological and structural factors (Sedgwick 2010). The debate about the causes of terrorism has been increasingly framed by the concept of radicalisation that has brought together these different elements (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Heath-Kelly 2012; Richards 2011; Sedgwick 2010). The concept of radicalisation itself is highly contested. Its origins was directly linked to the post 9/11 security environment and, as with much terrorism research, it has been expressly framed by applied questions of how to stop it. In particular there has been a tendency for the concept to be treated as an overly linear and deterministic conveyor belt (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). Nevertheless, this study will show that this concept played a key role in moving security policy beyond the pursuit of

[4] For example Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights allows that *"In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law."*

rational organised terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda or ISIS, to address broader social and political questions.[5]

Crucially, the focus on the causes of terrorism has led to debates about what is realistic or legitimate for a security policy to address (Richards 2011). This has included scrutiny of Islam the values and beliefs of Muslim communities in the aftermath of 9/11. (Kundnani 2009; Stevens 2011). As shown by Saggar, policy in this field operates at the dynamic intersection between government action and multi-faceted and fissiparous social identities (Saggar 2010a & 2009). However, most analysis of Prevent itself has focused on aspects of its delivery. This includes analyses of areas such as policing and community relations, theological responses or a descriptive overview of the programme at a particular points in the development of Prevent (Birt 2009; Bleich 2010; Gregory 2010; Lowndes and Thorp 2010; Spalek and Lambert 2008 & 2010; Thomas 2010). Analysis has also argued that Prevent has exacerbated the alienation of the Muslim community itself and debates about multiculturalism and Islam (Abbas 2007; Brighton 2007; Gutkowski 2011; McGhee 2008; Thomas 2010). In this respect most analysis of Prevent invariably takes into account both the policy itself and a wider set of social and political dynamics.

Prevent and policy-making

To examine the influence of the models on Prevent this study examines its development as an process of decision-making, mediated by the ideas, interests and relationships of an evolving policy community. Policy making is often examined against the high modernist ideal where decision-makers strive for rational outcomes based on empirical analysis of clearly defined problems (Goodin et al 2006). However, this study examines what ideas influenced how problems were understood, conceptualised and explained and guided activity, and how institutional histories, interests, cultures and relationships structured decisions (Allison &

[5] There are important distinctions between al-Qaeda and ISIS. al-Qaeda viewed itself as a vanguard movement that sought to catalyze global change; 'Islamic State' seeks to carve out a territorial powerbase through sectarian conflict in Syria and Northern Iraq. However, both draw on shared ideological framework of jihadi Salafism and both have drawn on international networks, including the recruitment of westerners to carry out attacks.

Zelikow 1999; Hall & Taylor 1996; Stone 2012; Wildavsky 1987). At the same time the study also examines the institutional dimensions that shaped Prevent, including how structures, interests and values influenced decision-makers and advocates (Lasswell 1936; Sabatier & Weible 2007; Wildavsky 1979). By focusing on both aspects of decision the study shows how exogenous and endogenous factors combined to determine what problems and ideas received attention and shaped decisions (Bertelli, Jennings, & Beavan 2013).

What makes Prevent particularly interesting is the *idea* of trying to prevent people from being involved in terrorism and what that then entails. Ideas in policy making provide explicit and implicit frameworks for decisions. At the same time they may actively influence change through their capacity to clearly explain or communicate to different audiences (Stone 2012). Ideas describe problems in ways that make them manageable for decision-makers, or analysts, or may serve to place them out of reach (Wildavsky 1979). For example, in this study the traditions of Hobbes and Locke represent labels that capture different perspectives on the way governments protect rights and mediate differences. Similarly in the case of Prevent the concept of radicalisation was a way of understanding and communicating complex problems, incorporating personal, social, environmental or mechanical causes (Heath-Kelly 2012; Stone 1989). To take another example, earthquake policy may use measures to minimise harm from earthquakes based on an understanding of seismic activity, but can't realistically stop them. In this respect decisions are often framed in response to failures or gaps, such regulation of building in earthquake zones, resulting in incremental changes over time (Pierson 2000a).

Therefore this study examines how different ideas enabled decision-makers to evaluate their options based on an understanding of the problem, their preferences and the likely impacts of a solution. For example, tolerance of a phenomenon such as terrorism is set against the complexity of its causes when determining a preference for ex ante or ex post solutions. Similarly mechanisms such as market competition may produce less equal outcomes than central planning but may be valued for producing higher levels of innovation (Newman 2001b). Targets may be valued for directing distributed behaviour but may also distort wider outcomes

in a complex system. Professionally led models may encourage high levels of responsibility but may also be resistant to change when necessary. Legal powers or administrative hierarchies may produce more uniform outcomes but can be less adaptable to change. Therefore solutions can represent proxies for preferred priorities, such as equality and efficiency in health care and the merits of planning and markets (Majone 1989; Newman 2001a & 2001b).

At the same time ideas are embedded in institutional relationships. Policy may be framed by ideas but it is done by institutional networks or communities, that include government and its departments, its agencies and other organisations, that have responsibilities and powers over decision-making (Rhodes 1997). For example, Jim Bulpitt's seminal work describes the development of the institutions of central and local government as a historical process of negotiation over territorial control (Bulpitt 2008). In this model central government and local agencies have established mutually agreeable areas of competence. The centre is responsible for the high politics of government, including security and foreign relations and taxations and divests responsibility for the messy work of administration and delivery to local authorities. From the alternative perspective, local administration trades away its input into the decisions of high government in exchange for authority over local decision-making. Over time these boundaries may shift and conflict but ultimately policy is based on a mutually acceptable settlement that enables institutions to exert authority over their respective domains.

A theme of this study is how the size and breadth of the institutional community influenced decision-making and its outcomes. The importance of these dimensions was illustrated by Heclo and Wildavsky's classic 1974 account of financial policy making and the role of the treasury (Heclo & Wildavsky 1974). They showed that government decision-making was a collective process of problem solving by a community of departments and individuals. Therefore, the size and shape of a community influenced the range of ideas and interests need to be mediated to achieve a workable consensus. Larger communities can increase the range of ideas and interests in the process, including some that may be incidental to the central policy problem. Furthermore a shared interest in protecting the authority of government decisions can

mask incidental or controversial issues in the process, even if this is not always totally successful. Conversely smaller communities may lack sufficiently broad authority or capacity to adequately deal with the complexity of the problem at hand.

In addition to the size and breath of the institutional community, this study also illustrates how the structure of these relationships influences policy. Rhodes's work has shown how reforms of government since the late 1980s has made policy communities, and by extension decision-making, more diverse and diffuse (Rhodes 1997). This has included the growth of non-departmental bodies and regulatory agencies, with their own interests and competencies, that sit outside of Whitehall and the traditional territorial settlement. Similarly, policy increasingly works with independent civil society organisations and the private sector as partners for delivery (Newman 2001a). In some cases tight knit communities of decision-makers retain strong control over policy through shared interests and ideas formed through regular, close and reciprocal relationships. However, looser networked structures with more transient relationships and wider external scrutiny and inputs may produce more competition over decision-making. The structure of these relationships may also change due to internal feedback or external scrutiny of decisions, with consequences for decision-making.

The liberal model of government both recognises the benefits, flaws and limits of interlocking institutional relationships, whilst seeking to deliver its priorities through them. Institutional breadth can enable responsiveness to social needs whilst clear legal hierarchies can provide power and coherence to decision-making. In this respect institutional ideas and interests sit alongside the legal status of institutional relationships in determining the options available to government. In particular, the implementation of decisions may also be shaped by the way their aims and intentions are interpreted, deliberately or inadvertently, at the street level (Lipsky 1997). There are various levers open to decision-makers in order to influence how decisions are implemented across institutional systems, none of which are perfect. There are directive models such as contracts for the delivery of services and the enforcement of laws that may be cumbersome. Or there are more nuanced models of influence such as education, networked

governance or incentive frameworks but whose outcomes are less certain (6 et al 2002; Hughes 2010; Johnson 2010; Newman 2001a; Saggar 2010a).

Ultimately, in order to understand why prevent developed in the way that it did it is important to examine the process through both the ideational and institutional frames (Allison & Zelikow 1999). Decisions can simultaneously be understood through an empirically informed modernist framework and as a negotiated settlement of institutional interests and preferences. A policy may be developed as a rational response to a well-understood problem with a clear objective and knowable solution. At the same time decisions are also mediated by assumptions, political preferences and heuristics employed by policy makers (Wildavsky 1987). The process of negotiation within a policy community may balance short-term interests and priorities against long-term relationships and objectives (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Rhodes 1997). Similarly a change in government or public opinion may reshape political priorities whilst interlocking institutional relationships may also seek to entrench the status quo. Furthermore, evidence may improve the understanding of a problem but may not settle uncertainty about the solution or resolve competing institutional interests.

This interlocking picture might suggest institutional inertia, however policies do change and can shift substantially over time or in short periods. Crucial to change is a process of persuasion that makes a case for a particular course of action through ideas, evidence and the alignment of institutional priorities, values and interests (Lasswell 1936; Wildavsky 1979). Change is often driven by a deficit model where existing policy is insufficient or ineffective and there are better alternatives (Wildavsky 1979). Ideas and evidence can challenge existing policy by describing a phenomena or evaluating a policy's effectiveness or introducing new preferences for its aims. However the influence of evidence is fundamentally linked to how it is presented, communicated and interpreted against different priorities and interests. Coalitions with shared goals may implicitly adopt shared strategies of influence by presenting complementary arguments and evidence in order to capitalise on political opportunities (Sabatier & Weible

2007). Ultimately the success of advocacy is dependent on the ability to make a persuasive case for a particular course of action to those who have control of decision-making.

Hall's paradigms model is a useful tool for exploring how competing ideas influence decision-making and shape institutional change (Hall 1993). In most policy agendas a stable set of ideas is embedded into decision-making across a policy community and results in incremental models of change that are focused on refining existing approaches. However, different ideas may also compete for control of decision-making. Competing ideas may have fundamentally different starting points for the policy problem, may focus on different causes and ultimately recommend different courses of action. Hall used the example of monetary policy where there is competition over how government can best support economic growth between supply side monetarism and demand side Keynesianism (Hall 1993). Hall positions paradigmatic change as a zero sum contest between two competing models where ultimately one model becomes the dominant ideational framework for policy-making across an institutional community. In contrast different models of policy precludes the development of a working consensus in a policy community and results in counterproductive conflict over decision-making.

Hall's model is useful because it examines change as the pattern of authority of competing ideas in an institutional context. However, the extent to which analysis of policy as negotiated process of interests, values and ideas enables an evaluation of whether it was was good in the modernist sense is dependent on how success was defined by policy makers, analysts, or by a public that has to endure its outcomes. A policy may fail to deliver the outcomes that it aimed to achieve. Equally a 'good idea' that can't be implemented through the inconvenience of reality is a bad policy. The decision-making process that led to this outcome might be seen as 'flawed' (King and Crewe 2014). Flaws may originate from gaps in the evidence, prioritisation of narrow political priorities or interests or a failure to attract the support of necessary groups. Therefore, failures of policy can be a failure to explain, persuade and compromise but equally may represent a flawed idea that was imposed or a good idea that was sacrificed for compromise.

Methodology

The study presents a qualitative case study of decision-making and change. The study draws on Allison & Zelikow's multiple frames to analyse this process from a series of from different angles (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Cairney 2007). The study is structured around an examination of the influence of two competing models of security, a rights based and state-led Hobbesian model labelled 'Thomas' and a consensual and distributed model in the tradition of Locke labelled 'John'. It presents a detailed narrative account of decision-making and the patterns of institutional support, persuasion and inputs that can be observed during the process. It then examines this process from institutional and ideational lenses to trace features of the process against the expectations of the two models. Finally it concludes by examining the process against a series of tests and the features of the models themselves to assess the extent to which Prevent represented a change in policy. Through these multiple lenses the study examines why Prevent developed in the way that it did.

The study is a case study of government decision-making that aims to understand the factors that influenced the process (Denscombe 2010; Yin 2003). Formal decisions, such as the publication of Prevent strategies, are examined as the product of a process of exogenous and endogenous inputs and institutional negotiation and persuasion. In order to understand this process study presents evidence based on 16 semi-structured interviews with individuals that were involved in decision-making at national and local levels. In particular the study focuses on a set of advisors, many of whom were explicitly recruited to advise on engagement with the Muslim community. Their perspectives are augmented by in-depth assessment of speeches and ministerial statements, the parliamentary record and formal policy outputs to trace decision-making and evaluate the factors that shaped decisions throughout the process. These sources are critically assessed to understand their ideas in their institutional context and aims and the ideas that framed them. This data was prioritised to help understand the explicit and implicit trade-offs that shaped the process of decision-making in order to understand its outcomes.

Conclusion

This study explores how policy-making dealt with the complex challenge of preventing terrorism in the UK following 9/11. It examines how competing models of security rooted in the traditions of Hobbes and Locke, and their competing perspectives of the relationship between government and society, influenced the development of Prevent. It does this by tracing the ideas and institutional relationships that were embedded in an iterative decision-making process between 2001 and 2011. Although a study of this type cannot provide definitive conclusions about the merits and success of Prevent it develops a rich case study about the decision-making process. The study aims to understand the origins of Prevent, including how policy makers understood the problem and the role that ideas and institutions played in shaping the decision-making process and change. By analysing Prevent through these frames the study aims enhance our understanding of how the policy developed and why it has been the subject of so much debate and conflict.

Chapter 2: Understanding terrorism

Introduction

This chapter examines the complex threat from terrorism and its relationship with global and national political contexts. It establishes this study's starting point that a preventative approach to terrorism was a legitimate government agenda. The threat from al-Qaeda and associated organisations was real and complex due to its organisational structure, support base and political goals and patterns of recruitment. This threat was also linked to a wider political and social context, including Islamist movements and the experiences of the Muslim community in the UK. In this respect the chapter identifies a legitimate debate over the balance between disrupting recruitment by terrorist organisations and dealing with a wider set of structural and political factors that were directly and indirectly relevant. Therefore, this chapter argues that it was legitimate for Prevent to address the relationship between militant groups, a wider political Islamist movement and the domestic politics of Muslim identity and integration (Burke 2004; Gerges 2011; Kepel 2001; Roy 2004 & 2010; Saggar 2010a).

The literature on Prevent illustrates the difficulty of dealing with terrorist groups as well as their wider social and political context (Richards 2010; Githens-Mazer 2010; Sedgwick 2010; Birt 2009). The two dimensions are embedded into the concept of radicalisation, the *"process by which people come to support violent-extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups"* (HM Government 2009a p43). The broader concept incorporates a complex interaction between the organisational, social and psychological dimensions of participation and recruitment to high risk activism and terrorism, political mobilisation and escalation of violence. However, criticisms of the idea have centred on the nuances of the relationship between radical jihadi terrorists, a circle of tacit support and the wider values and attitudes of the Muslim community (Saggar 2006). In particular the relationship has been prominent in debates about models of multiculturalism and assimilation around Europe and the growth of

nativist European political parties that are overtly hostile to Islam (Eatwell 2004 & 2010; Goodwin 2011; Kestel & Godmer 2004; Malik 2010; Mudde 2007; Silj 2010; Sunier 2010;).

Furthermore, the literature also highlights the difficulty of dealing with the active strategic and tactical challenge of militant and radical groups. This includes the inherent risk in decision-making, including the cost of no action, potential unintended consequences and the importance of getting interventions right (Cronin 2010; Richardson 2006; Silke 2003). For example, the international military response to al-Qaeda helped to turn a disparate network into a cohesive militant movement (Cronin 2010). Furthermore, militant groups and their active and tacit supporters have used negative experiences of counter-terrorism policing or criminal justice powers, or social exclusion and marginalisation, as recruitment tools (Richardson 2006). In this respect Prevent was dealing with a challenge from radical Islamist militants that sought to expose an authoritarian anti-Islamic hypocrisy at the heart of the Christian West's liberal concepts of democracy and human rights (Silke 2003). At the same time the literature also points to the political and practical risks that no action may undermine the authority of government and allow extremist groups to advance their political objectives.

The terrorist threat

Prevent was originally developed in response to the genuine threat from al-Qaeda inspired terrorism following the attacks of 9/11.[6] Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi national, established al-Qaeda (The Foundation) during his time fighting in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union and via Sudan and ultimately Afghanistan from the mid 1990s under the Taliban. From Afghanistan the group set up training bases, developed funding sources and established international networks to carry out attacks on US targets overseas, including the 1998 US embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen's Aden Harbour. Al-Qaeda's high point was the attacks of 9/11 on New York and Washington that killed 2996

[6] Since 2013 the principle international Islamist terrorist threat for western governments has primarily centred on the so called 'Islamic State' (otherwise known as ISIS).

people. The attacks were planned by senior al-Qaeda leadership and were carried out by a group of Saudi nationals that formed the 'Hamburg cell'. Osama Bin Laden claimed responsibility for the attacks in 2004 citing, amongst other things, the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia and its support for Israel.

Box 2.1. The core ideological framework of al-Qaeda and jihadi terrorist networks

- **Jihadism**; a violent interpretation of a spiritual way of life and a permanent and individual obligation on all Muslims.
- **Takfir** (excommunication from the faith); of Muslim leaders for failing to rule by Shari'a, and, for some including the generality of Muslims for complicity or failure to believe and practice a form of Islam acceptable to extremists.
- **The world as an abode of war (Dar-al-Harb)**; the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds are assumed to be in a state of war until the rule of Shari'a is established. This means all rules for Muslim conduct can be suspended.
- **The principle of non-discrimination between civilian and military targets**; Civilians are seen as culpable, for example by voting and paying taxes to the state, or seen as collateral damage.
- **Attacking the far enemy**; a strategic switch from targeting the 'near' enemy (apostate Muslim governments) to attacking the US and its western allies directly. Here the underpinning rationale is probably that nationalist tendencies within the jihadist movements are minimised and that a pan-Islamic movement will be mobilised in a reaction to the 'war on terror.'

- **Suicide bombing**; justified as part of asymmetric warfare and the weak position of Muslims. As suicide is a sin in Islam, suicide bombing is recast as self-martyrdom and sacrifice for the cause.

- **The killing of other Muslims**; is justified on the grounds that they are either complicit through voting / paying taxes to Western or apostate Muslim governments, that they oppose the establishment of an Islamic state, or that they are collateral damage and, as Muslims, martyrs to the cause. Dependent on the school of Islam they may also be regarded as heretic.

- **The return of the caliphate**; a world government ruled by the precepts of Shari'a, beginning with the reestablishment of a caliphate somewhere in the Muslim world.

(Change Institute 2008a)

The 9/11 attack framed western security policy for over a decade and secured al-Qaeda a significance in security policy far beyond any other terrorist group and most states at the time. Its significance was predicated on its position as a well-funded group that undertook a highly successful and spectacular act that helped to align a variety of disparate Sunni militant groups (Burke 2004; Gerges 2011). It shared ideas with other Sunni Islamist militant groups that drew on many of the ideas of Sayyid Qutb that called for a new form of Islamic government to replace western clients across the middle east (Qutb 2006). Equally, al-Qaeda's focus on the US as the 'far enemy' rather than domestic authorities, was its most important strategic innovation (See Box 2.1 for explanation of some key concepts and tenets of al-Qaeda jihadism). Bin Laden positioned himself and al-Qaeda as both a titular or spiritual leader of a militant Islamist jihadi movement whilst also supporting networks of operatives and local affiliates (Burke 2004; Sageman 2008). However, as noted by Cronin the US's strategic and tactical response to al-Qaeda also helped to integrate a wider global militant movement:

> *"Al-Qaeda's global threat was in fact serious but not seamless. The western allies inadvertently reinforced it by swallowing the narrative of an endlessly adaptive, coherent movement with tentacles reaching throughout the world."* (Cronin 2010 p837)

Before 9/11 UK counter-terrorism policy had focused on domestic Irish republican groups and their loyalist counter parts until the 1994 ceasefires and 1998 peace agreement (HM Government 2009a). Much of this response focused on disrupting nationalist and loyalist groups though military patrols and resource for security agencies to identify and track those who were considered to be a threat. Special powers of internment were also exercised during the 1970s in Northern Ireland to stop, search and detain people suspected of membership of groups without charge. There were also physical measures, such as the 'peace walls', to keep nationalist Catholic and loyalist Protestant communities apart in order to minimise violence. Other steps included preventing the voices of the Northern Irish Republican leaders Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness being heard on UK media during the 1980s. Subsequently the conflict moved toward resolution through a negotiated integration of the different political communities into shared institutions, principally the Stormont legislative assembly and a reformed Police Service of Northern Ireland (previously the Royal Ulster Constabulary).

In contrast, Al-Qaeda and its wider networks were seen as a new form of terrorism that was distinct from domestic terrorism or state sponsored threats (HM Government 2009a). The idea of a terrorist threat being 'new' does risk making it unnecessarily exotic and prone to political manipulation (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning & Smyth 2011). Nevertheless there were features of militant Islamist terrorism that presented new challenges to security capabilities and policies, particularly where these had focused on other states (Hoffman 2006; Cronin 2010). In particular the internationally networked structure of al-Qaeda did stretch the capacity of security services to identify and track specific plots. Similarly, the use of suicide tactics presented a new challenge for protecting 'soft' civilian targets such as transport systems. Furthermore its global ideology sought to reframe the challenge in civilizational terms between

a wider Muslim community, known as the 'Ummah', and the Christian West. These features presented significant practical and political challenges both in Muslim majority countries as well as in western Europe (Wike and Samaranayake 2006).

Possibly the most significant feature of the al-Qaeda threat was its international reach via networks of affiliates and supporters (Gerges 2011; Sageman 2008). Although terrorist groups had collaborated in the past, international jihadi networks that linked a variety of national conflicts were a new challenge for western security agencies. Between 2001 and 2006 a number of British nationals participated in jihadi attacks overseas, including in Israel and Afghanistan, as well as in the UK, most notably on 7/7. In 2007 the head of MI5, Jonathan Evans, suggested 2000 people were being tracked in the UK due to their support for and potential involvement in terrorism (Evans 2007). In 2010 Evans also highlighted British citizens travelling overseas to new destinations such as to Somalia and Yemen to train and fight with militant groups. In the years since the focus has shifted to participation in the Syrian civil war, accessible via Turkey, and the growing use of the internet to recruit and disseminate propaganda. Furthermore, the risk of participants returning from overseas conflicts was also demonstrated by the attacks on Paris in 2015.

At the heart of this was a debate about methods of mobilisation and recruitment by terrorist organisations. This debate was between bottom-up mobilisation by a 'bunch of guys' attracted to violence and in search of an identity or purpose, versus hierarchical models of organisational recruitment and control working to political objectives (Atran 2010; Hoffman 2006 & 2008; Sageman 2004 & 2008). In this respect Al-Qaeda was a foreign organisation in terms of its leadership and command structures but was also linked to domestic patterns to recruitment and participation in the UK and other European countries by networks and affiliates. In terms of a policy response the bottom-up model suggested a more distributed preventative response that engages with the social dynamics of recruitment, such as the identity factors that drive participation. This is in contrast to what might be characterised as a more conventional counter intelligence model aimed at disrupting recruitment networks allied to counter propaganda

work. Aspects of both approaches can be traced through the development and evolution of Prevent.

The two dimensions are illustrated by the London 7/7 attackers who were a social group embedded in radical Islamist scene that established links with Al Qaeda networks through its ring leader Mohammad Sidique Khan (Briggs, Cole, Gilmore & Valentina 2011). The 7/7 attacks illustrate Sageman's socially rooted 'bunch of guys' model, with the group coming together via the domestic Islamist 'scene' made up of social networks of friends and acquaintances. On the other hand later investigations showed that the ringleader Mohammad Sidique Khan had visited training camps in Afghanistan and was in frequent contact with Pakistan, including just prior to the attack, suggesting coordination with international networks. As with the 7/7 attaches many of those arrested on terrorism offences between 2001 and 2005 had attended training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Somalia, or were associated with individuals who had (Briggs & Birdwell 2009). For example Khan was known to have associated with Omar Khyam, who was prosecuted for the 'fertiliser bomb' plot and may have been in Afghanistan at the same time. Although MI5 had intelligence of a potential second plot Khan was not prioritised and there was no detailed knowledge of their plan.

Militant and radical Islamism

The challenge from jihadi terrorism also illustrates how globalisation blurs the boundaries of domestic and international problems for governments. The 7/7 attackers were all born and raised in the UK there has been a discernible UK contribution to the international jihadi and Islamist landscape. For example during the 1990s the presence of dissidents from middle Eastern and north African states in the UK was tolerated by authorities, often referred to as the Londonistan period (Kepel 2001). Activists and recruiters such as Omar Bakri Mohammed and Abu Hamza promoted fundamentalist political Islam and jihadist world views in the UK and overseas through groups such as Al-Mujharoun and its successors (Wiktorowicz 2005b). British youth travelling overseas to conflicts in Afghanistan and the civil war in Bosnia in the

1990s also established links with overseas militant groups and adapted radical political and religious ideas for European audiences. Furthermore, ideas associated with radical Islam also have roots in postcolonial independence and politics, further illustrating the interconnected nature of the political challenge.

Groups such as al-Qaeda choose terrorist tactics to advance their ideological cause (Hoffman 2006; Pape 2003 & 2006; Richardson 2006). For al-Qaeda and other jihadists the objective was to advance Islamic governance on behalf the wider Muslim 'Ummah'. Groups that use terrorist tactics also tend to share similar strategic positions in that they oppose established political orders but are unable to realise their objectives through democratic, popular or peaceful means. As a result terrorist groups often share comparable ideas and concepts that justify their tactics and gather recruits to their cause. Common ideas include vanguardism to justify or encourage action without popular support, and concepts such as Takfirism that legitimise the deaths of civilians, including Muslims. Propaganda typically venerates those who participate in violence, particularly for groups such as the so called 'Islamic State' that are seeking to maximise active recruits. For example, suicide bombers are considered martyrs who receive special treatment in the afterlife.

As with most terrorist or militant groups, al-Qaeda inspired terrorism also had links with a wider body of political or religious thought, in this case Islamism (della Porta 1995; Rapoport 2006; Richardson 2006; Saggar 2010a). Islamism describes political groups based on a Muslim religious identity who support a model of government based on Islamic doctrines. Their growth has been traced from the failure of postcolonial Arab nationalism during the cold war and have often represented the main organised opposition to authoritarian Middle Eastern governments (Kepel 2001).[7] In particular the influential radical Islamist text *Milestones* by Sayyid Qutb challenged the corruption of the secular Arab nationalist regime of Nasser during the 1950s

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[7] Prominent Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have often been the subject of significant state oppression. The most recent example of this was removal of the elected Mohamed Morsi, President of Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood candidate, in a 2013 coup d'etat and subsequent crackdown on the group.

and 1960s and argued for them to be replaced by Islamic government (Qutb 2006).[8] However, whilst there are differing views on the influence that the Quran should have on politics the vast majority of Muslims around the world reject the use of violence in its name (Pew 2013). This situates jihadist militants on the violent margins of a political and theological movement that has presence and support across much of the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East as well as in Western European Muslim communities.

The tension between Islamist and western political ideas can be situated in a historical ontological divide that was chronicled by Edward Said, including in his 1978 classic *Orientalism* (Said 2003). In practical terms Islamist movements represented a direct challenge to incumbent Middle Eastern governments that were supported by the US and UK. The first major example of the emergent influence of Islamist politics was the emergence of Shia led religious government in Iran following the initial overthrow of the Western-backed Shah. The broader challenge from Islamism, and by extension Islam, was expounded by Thomas Huntingdon in his influential paper *'The clash of civilisations'* (Huntingdon 1993). He argued that Islamism was the next strategic challenge facing the United States after the end of the Soviet Union. He argued Islamism represented a regressive civilizational challenge to positive enlightenment values of western Christian democracy and social and economic progress.

The Islamist label has been applied to a diverse range of mainstream political groups since the 1980s. It includes the ruling Turkish AKP party that participates in the secular constitutional democracy of Turkey, through to the foundation of the Islamic republic of Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood itself, the most prominent Sunni Islamist group, is made up of national chapters with a diversity of political platforms that combine urban intellectual groups with support from the rural poor (Leiken 2007; Kepel 2001). The label also masks a range of theological, political and tactical disagreements, including approaches to implementing Sharia law and the validity of participation in democratic systems. Neither is the movement solely a theological one and

[8] Much of the book was written whilst Qutb was imprisoned following a crackdown on opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb's subsequent prosecution, and eventual execution, also drew on 'Milestones' as evidence of his threat to the Egyptian government.

Kepel himself argues that groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have evolved politically (Kepel 2001). This centres on a nascent rapprochement with democratic systems that had previously been rejected as western impositions, and the emphasis on other aspects of policy platforms, including nationalist identity. Views of this evolution can range between 'entryist' tactics, failure of pure Islamist platforms or the evolution of a political movement seeking power, or a combination of all three.[9]

Within the broader Islamist landscape, the strand principally associated with militantism in the West is jihadi Salafism (Wiktorowicz 2005a). Salafism more generally, including the conservative Saudi Wahhabi strand, is typically described as a literalist or fundamentalist interpretation of Islam that believes in the original word of God. It rejects human interpretations and logic as innovations, known as 'Bidah', that divert from the righteous path set by God and guided by a literalist reading of the Quran. This includes a rejection of cultural innovations from outside of the Arab Middle East, including culturalised or contextualised interpretations of Islam or innovations such as western style representative democracy. Instead there is a commitment to theologically sound systems of Sharia governance, which may include deliberative forums. As a result Salafism typically adopts highly conservative social views on the basis of the literal interpretation of Islamic texts, including differing rights for men and women and outlawing of homosexuality, and pious normative approaches to worship.

Even with a commitment to a literal interpretation of the word of God, as with all movements, there are a variety of different strategies and outcomes that result from a complex process of textual interpretation and preferences. Wiktorowicz, in his anatomy of the Salafi movement identified three strands, pietists, politicos and the jihadists (Wiktorowicz 2005a). These three strands adopted different approaches to achieving a religious authority, or 'caliphate', in Muslim lands. This distinction largely centred on their interpretations of the contemporary

[9] Perhaps the most significant current Islamist leader is President Erdogan of Turkey, a Nato member and EU candidate country, who has come to power through democratic elections on a nationalist Islamist platform. He is now reforming Turkey's constitution to concentrate power in the Presidency and curb the independence of secular institutions such as the judiciary, the military and the press.

political and social situation and the degree to which a universal caliphate is considered a practically realisable objective or a spiritual aim. For Wiktorowicz:

> *"The purists emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, and education. They view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicos, in contrast, emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, which they view as particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and the right of God alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant position and argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution."* (Wiktorowicz 2005a p 208)

Not all Sunni Islamists would necessarily be considered Salafi yet all Salafis would ultimately be Islamists by virtue of the commitment to religiously structured society and governance, even if purists focus on education rather than political agitation and mobilisation. There are also militant Islamist groups who are not Salafi jihadi, such as the Shia Lebanese militant group Hezbollah or Sunni Palestinian group Hamas, whose Islamic identities are part of a broader nationalist political platform. In particular, a central tenet of jihadi groups is a liberal interpretation of the concept of jihad – spiritual struggle - as a violent proactive religious duty. They see much of the world as Dar Al Harb – of war – with most authorities in the Muslim world considered Takfir – apostate – for failing to implement true Islamic government and for oppressing Islamist opposition. Similarly those who do not follow the right path of Islam may also be considered Takfir. Prominent examples of apostate Muslim authorities include the secular governments of Egypt, the Shia Iranian republic and, for Bin Laden, the Saudi government for hosting of US troops on Saudi soil.

Drawing on Qutb's ideas, radical Islamists integrate various conflicts into a global violent ontological struggle between the Muslim world and the Christian West (Qutb 2006; The Change Institute 2008a). This narrative links historical conflicts such as the Crusades with various contemporary disputes in the Middle East, particularly the perceived illegitimacy of Israel and its occupation of Palestinian territories, plus conflicts in Afghanistan, Algeria,

Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia and more recently Syria. Whilst the majority of militant Islamist groups have principally prioritised domestic political objectives, Bin Laden was notable for shifting the focus from the 'near enemy' of Middle Eastern governments toward 'the far enemy', their western masters. The attacks on the USS Cole and 9/11 were the high water mark of this strategy, though the subsequent invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan ensured that direct conflict with the US continued throughout the decade (Cronin 2010; Gerges 2011; Sageman 2008).

In the UK, British Muslim youth during the 1980s and 1990s also explored approaches to Islam that were distinct from their parents' traditions (The Change Institute 2008a; Wiktorowicz 2005b). They used translated Arab texts and materials disseminated through fissiparous social networks to explore a variety of empowering progressive, pious or fundamentalist identities. One strand of this dynamic can be seen in the appeal of some radical politico Islamist groups in the UK, the most prominent of which have been Hizb ut-Tarir as well as its radical offshoot Al-Mujharoun. Both share international radical Islamist ideas that espouse a strict adherence to Islam, defensive jihad to defend Muslims and the establishment of caliphates. Whilst Hizb ut-Tarir only argued for a caliphate in Muslim lands Al-Mujharoun often publicly agitate for Sharia governance in the UK. The groups are typically organised around social activities such as study circles and activist campaigning to promote the establishment of the caliphate. Both have attracted high levels of public controversy for street level agitation, such as burning of poppies at armistice commemorations, and overt or tacit support for attacks against British soldiers in Muslim lands.

The fortunes of the two groups have varied over time. Al-Mujharoun and its successors were proscribed as a terrorist group after it was found to be actively encouraging and helping individuals to travel overseas to join terrorist groups. Hizb ut-Tarir has been threatened with proscription on numerous occasions, including in the aftermath of 7/7, but has not been due to its non-violent stance, albeit ambivalent, and lack of direct evidence of terrorist recruitment. Hizb ut-Tarir in particular has been highly active on university and college campuses since the

1990s and have been a divisive presence amongst the student body, particularly with Jewish and LGBTQ+ student groups (Tyrer 2004). Yet both groups have also had varying fortunes over time with some anecdotal evidence suggesting that the popularity of Hizb ut-Tarir declined in the period running up to and following the Iraq war (The Change Institute 2008a). This has been attributed to the development of alternative political offerings, including the Stop The War Coalition and the Respect party that included prominent Islamist strands.

Islamist ideas in the UK also extend beyond Hizb ut-Tarir and Al-Mujharoun to a variety of other organisations have also been subject to scrutiny due to their perceived association with or support for Islamist ideas (Maher & Frampton 2009). The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the Cordoba foundation are claimed to have formal or informal links with the Muslim Brotherhood, denied in both cases. Other groups such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Federation of Student Islamic societies and activist group Cage have been subject of criticism due to Islamist political or religious positions (Maher & Frampton 2009; Quilliam 2011; Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed & Murray, 2011). A number of mosques, charities and events have also been criticised for giving platforms to speakers or texts with Islamist or conservative leanings, including the East London mosques and the annual Islam Expo (Quilliam 2011). Many of these debates have also been replicated at local levels, including conflict over the handover the Finsbury Park Mosque to leaders associated with the Muslim Association of Britain that had links with the Muslim Brotherhood (Lambert 2008).

The Muslim community in the UK

Much of the literature on Prevent has focused on its counter productive impact on the relationship between government and the Muslim community (Abbas 2007; Birt 2009; Briggs 2010; Githens-Mazer 2010; Brighton 2007; Lambert and Spalek 2010; Saggar 2010a; Stevens 2011; Thomas 2010). The criticism has focused on concern that Prevent actively alienated Muslims by explicitly and implicitly framing them as an object of suspicion. This was despite the fact Prevent was developed to improve engagement with the community to in order to deal

with the problem of recruitment to radical Islamist and militant groups. This type of criticism highlights the challenge facing Prevent in terms of how it dealt with the relationship between jihadists, Islamists, and areas of tacit and potential support in the wider community (Saggar 2006; Sobolewska 2010). How Prevent addressed the experience and politics of Muslim and minority ethnic identities in the UK lay at the heart of much of this debate and associated decision-making.

Analysis of Prevent has focused on its relationship with the political and cultural identity of the Muslim community in the UK (Saggar 2010a). As with other minority ethnic communities, polling of the Muslim community cited in research and by government illustrated the strength of British identity and a lack of affiliation with radical Islamist ideas (Sobolewska 2010). Furthermore the vast majority explicitly rejected violent and extremist groups on principle and for their corrosive impact on the experience of the wider Muslim community. However, as with many radical and terrorist movements, there were common concerns and ideas that were shared with the wider community that did not support violence or radical groups (della Porta 1995; Rapoport 2006; Richardson 2006; Saggar 2006). For example, radical Islamists frequently drew on wider concerns about Israeli occupied Palestinian territories and experiences of racism and discrimination in support of their world views.

In the UK Islamic identity politics has served as a platform to advance the status of the religion itself whilst also providing a shared political block and social identity for its constituent ethnic communities. This development is set in the context of different ethnic heritages and religious traditions as well as wider international Islamist political movements. In the UK Muslim identity politics is typically charted from protests against the publication of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* (Saggar 2010a). It has formed the basis for social, cultural and economic claims that bridges a number of minority ethnic groups, including those with Pakistani, Bangladeshi and East African backgrounds. This identity has served to mobilise otherwise diverse and distinct ethnic communities through shared experiences of racial and religious discrimination and concern about UK foreign policy (Saggar 2010a). Mobilisation around foreign policy has

often been based on shared perspectives of Britain and the empire and subsequent overseas interventions by the UK, in particular the UK's support for Israel and US foreign policy (Brighton 2007).

This has also taken place in the context of debates about British cultural identity and the status of Islam, Muslims and South Asian ethnic minorities in the context of increasing levels of immigration since the end of the Cold War (Cantle 2012; Ford 2010; McGhee 2008; Goodwin et al 2010; Goodwin 2011; Modood 2007; Silj 2009). For example, Paul Gilroy has described a growing anxiety about Britain's national identity as its global political and economic status declined following the end of empire (Gilroy 2004). Furthermore, a white 'native' identity has also been become increasingly salient in UK and European politics, as illustrated by the electoral success of a variety of racist, nativist and anti immigrant political parties across Europe (Ford 2010; Goodwin 2011 & 2010; Kestel & Godmer 2004). In the UK this includes the British National Party between 2001 and 2010 and the UK Independence Party from 2010 onwards, plus street protests by the English Defence League between 2008 and 2013. All three groups have had overt and implicit platforms that oppose to immigration and the 'islamificaton' of Europe whilst defending the UK's Christian heritage.

Equally, although there is an emergent Muslim community identity in the UK it is also diverse (Ali 2015; Bowen 2014; ONS 2011b; Saggar 2010a; The Change Institute 2009). The total Muslim population grew from 1.5 to 2.7 million people (5 per cent of the population) and 52% are men (compared to 49% of the general population). In 2011, of those reporting as Muslim, 68% were Asian (1.83 million of 2.71 million) and 32% non-Asian and 8% were white ethnicity. By far the largest groups are those with Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage and it is these groups who tend to shape the overall socio-economic statistics for Muslim groups in the UK (ONS 2011b). There are also significant theological, economic, social and cultural differences, including migrant origins and settlement in the UK. For example those groups who migrated from rural Pakistan to work in industries affected by deindustrialisation have different

experiences to educated and professional migrants from the Middle East who have settled in west London (Bowen 2014; The Change Institute 2009).

Notably, the Muslim community in the UK tends to be younger than the general population and experiences notable social and economic disadvantages. This creates greater biographical availability for high risk activism as well as potential salience for radical identity politics (della Porta 1995; Kruglanski et al 2009; McAdam 1986; Saggar 2010a). The median age of the Muslim community is 25 years, compared to 40 in the overall population with 33% of Muslims 15 years old or under in 2011, compared to 19% of the general population (see Figure 2.1). The Muslim community has the lowest rates of qualifications and employment and are over-represented in deprived urban areas. In 2011 46% (1.22 million) of the Muslim population lived in the 10% most deprived local authority districts in England, up from 33% in 2001 (Ali 2015; ONS 2011a).[10] In 2011 19.8% of the Muslim population was in fulltime employment, compared to 34.9% in the overall population and 7.2% unemployed compared to 4.0% in the overall population (ONS 2011a). The percentage of Muslims with no qualifications has dropped from 39% in 2001 to 26% in 2011 and there is now a similar percentage of Muslims (over 16) with degree level and above qualifications to the general population (24% and 27% respectively) (Ali 2015).

[10] In the 2011 Census only 45% of Muslims were in active employment in 2011 in comparison to 55% of the total population. However this figure masks different patterns of economic activity between religious groups. Unemployment amongst the economically active in the Muslim population was 13% compared to 6% in the total population and rates of inactivity due to looking after home and family was 30% in comparison to 10% in the total population. This is in part linked to the younger age structure of the Muslim community meaning that only 12% of economically inactive Muslims are retired in comparison to 58% of the total population.

Figure 2.1: Religion by age, England and Wales, 2011 (left) and population profile of Muslim population in England and Wales (right)



(ONS 2011b)

As a result, mobilisation of Muslim political identity has often centred on experiences of disadvantage and the generation gap between younger British born Muslims and older generations who migrated to the UK. This has included an interrogation of the settlement between an exclusive Muslim identity versus a more nuanced relationship with other aspects of identity (see for example Birt, Hussain and Siddiqui 2011). Roy argues that an absence of an engaging contextualised Islamic identity that fits the social circumstance of European Muslim youth is being filled by normative and radical religious and political identities (Roy 2010). However, this commentary can fail to capture fully the rapid development of hybrid national, ethnic and religious identities by second and third generation Muslim youth in the UK that span personal, social and political dimensions. This includes more active political dissent against experiences of racism and discrimination than their parents generation that is underpinned by social confidence of being born and raised in Britain as British citizens (The Change Institute 2008a).

The causes of terrorism

A notable theme in analyses of Prevent has been the causes of terrorism and the complexity of the process through which individuals and groups develop radical political views and translate these into violent action (Birt 2009; Brighton 2007; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Heath-Kelly 2012; Richards 2011; Saggar 2010a; Stevens 2011; Thomas 2010). Models of radicalisation typically incorporate a range of different types of factors, including structural and socio-economic factors, political mobilisation, organisation and objectives, organisational recruitment and personal psychological profiles (Atran 2010; Bouhana and Wikstrom 2011; Crenshaw 2000; della Porta 1995; Horgan 2008; Krueger & Maleckova 2003; Kruglanski & Fisher 2009; Sageman 2004 & 2008; Sageman 2008; Silke 2008; Taylor & Horgan 2006). The growing body of research into radicalisation has typically been led by the development of policy responses such as Prevent (Sedgwick 2010). However, the complexity and uncertainty around the concept has also led to questions about whether it is a useful concept for policy making (Richards 2011).

Conventional analysis of terrorism focuses on the tactics and operations of terrorist groups, including methods of recruitment and mobilisation, as notionally rational choices in support of political aims (Bloom 2006; Cronin 2010; Hoffman 2008; Pape 2003). This includes the formulation of strategic goals, such as polarising a population or claiming ownership of a movement by going further than other groups. Adding to this organisational layer are the social dynamics and connections that may push a group toward or away from violent tactics (della Porta 1995; Gill, Lee, Rethemeyer, Horgan, & Asal 2014; McAdam 1986; Sageman 2004). This includes the role of charismatic individuals or entrepreneurs who make contacts with training opportunities or ideas, and the intergroup dynamics of solidarity and shared identity. Wiktorowicz's case study of Al-Mujharoun illustrates how the social dynamics of radical Islamist groups creates opportunities for recruitment into terrorist networks and activity (Wiktorowicz 2004 & 2005b). These groups may form in a variety of social spaces, such as

gyms, bookshops, around the margins of religious or educational institutions or in closed venues and circles.

The second layer of analysis focuses on the personal psychology of individual participation in violence and high-risk activism. There is little or no clear evidence that participation in terrorism is linked to clinically diagnosed psychiatric conditions.[11] Similarly although this does not discount involvement some groups may even avoid people they consider unreliable for such high-risk activities (Silke 2008). Participation is often framed as part of a 'significance quest' or search for belonging through a new identity as an activist or member of a radical or terrorist group (Kruglanski & Fishman 2009; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek 2009). Although there isn't necessarily a direct relationship between poverty and education and participation in terrorism experiences of personal trauma or grievances, such as racism and discrimination, may create a cognitive opening for identity quests (Krueger & Maleckova 2003; Davis 2009). In some cases there may also be an element of risk seeking by those who have been attracted by conflict and wish to fight overseas (Sageman 2004). However any psychological profile of participation is highly diverse and fundamentally linked to a social context and opportunities for participation and recruitment (Crenshaw 2000; Taylor & Horgan 2006).

The third layer focuses on the role civic and political institutions and patterns of social integration play in the development of militant groups and extremist ideas. This plays a dual role in terms of processes through which group identities and social and political movements develop and the institutional and political context that influence the use of terrorist tactics. Fundamental to this is the role of civic and democratic institutions in fostering social solidarity and resolving and mediating grievances (della Porta 1995; Kaldor 2003). For example, intergroup segregation may influence competitive political strategies based on polarised

[11] Some recent research has suggested a potential link between depression and pathways of sympathy for violent protest and terrorism but this is not yet conclusive. The relationship with social connections, and the negative consequences of depression, may also connect with the model of an identity quest for personal meaning and empowerment.

exclusive identities that may undermine identification with a shared political and cultural body (Sen 2006). The importance of these relationships is outlined by the way that linking, bonding and bridging social capital helps to mediate social differences whilst also enabling collective public action (Putnam 2000). How these social dynamics mediate or exacerbate interact with civic and democratic institutions provides the wider context for group and individual level analyses of radicalisation.

This brief outline of radicalisation illustrates the complex interrelationship between recruitment and rational choices, small group dynamics, personal psychological profiles and wider structural and social contexts. The interplay between these factors has variously been framed as a conveyor belt or as a situational interplay between different factors. Crenshaw notes that the model of identity quest put forward by Kruglanski et all leaves questions about the causal relationship around extremism and ideology (Crenshaw 2009; Kruglanski et al 2009). For example many terrorists do not focus on ideological aspects of their participation or may have very limited engagement with radical ideas or texts (Githens-Mazer 2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). The work of Bouhana and Wikstrom attempts to address this by exploring the relationship between the personal and social circumstance and wider organisational and contextual setting (Bouhana & Wikstrom 2011). This suggests a wider frame of reference for interventions, away from soley focusing on vulnerability of individuals, to include the emergence of and exposure to radicalising settings.

The potential breadth of these models, including the uncertainty about isolating causes from correlations and symptoms has been a prominent feature of the debate about Prevent (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Richards 2011; Sedgwick 2010). In particular Sedgwick suggests that there are two different approaches to understanding radicalisation and Prevent, namely the security field and the integration field (Sedgwick 2010). This dual perspective illustrates analysis of the social and organisational aspects of the process but also competing policy approaches. This has also led to criticism of the vagueness of radicalisation that has diverted the focus of counter-terrorism into other social policy agendas with limited empirical evidence

or professional knowledge of their applicability (Stevens 2011). Similarly Githens-Mazer and Lambert and Brighton criticise the concept for being an overly politicised term that is a vehicle for a wider set of political agendas relating to tolerance of religious and political diversity and the segregation of Muslim communities (Brighton 2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010).

Extremism and ideologies

A central feature of the debate about radicalisation has been the relationship between extremism, ideology and violence. In the case of Prevent this study will highlight how definitions of extremism became a key feature of the debate about the relationship between Islam and Muslim identity and the impact of government policy on alienation and integration (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; Saggar 2009 and 2010a; Stevens 2011; Vermeulen 2014; Youngs 2010). In particular debates about extremism are ultimately about what ideas are considered politically acceptable or illegitimate. Furthermore their relationship with terrorism further serves to frame the extent to which they are considered an active threat to wider society and government or a minority but private views.

In the case of Prevent Gregory argues that the definition of extremism was a fuzzy concept that presented particular practical and political challenges for enforcement and policy makers. For example:

> *"For the purposes of the Prevent strategy, the offence categories should be seen not so much as providing criteria for the purposes of arrest and charge but rather as offering guidance to the police on various types of potential offending behaviour and activity that might be identified early enough for interventions to change potentially illegal behaviour and activity"* (Gregory 2010 p90)

This study will show that the fuzzy model of extremism that was employed in Prevent was indicative of the need to balance the protection of rights and maintain support for Prevent. The protection of freedom of conscience and belief is a central pillar of democratic liberal values

and is enshrined in international human rights standards, including the Human Rights Act 1998, but balanced against crimes of incitement to violence and hatred. The challenge of balancing these legal frameworks has been noted in relation to the targeting of counter-terrorism powers and the development of community policing and engagement designed to identify potential terrorists (Klausen 2009; Gregory 2010). The offence of glorifying terrorism that was introduced in 2006 targeted public support for violence rather than just direct or indirect participation in terrorist acts. In addition, the police-led multi-agency programme called Channel included both social behaviours as well as stated beliefs as indicators for identifying and diverting individuals considered to be at risk of radicalisation (HM Government 2010a).

Although the relationship is contested, it is essential to understand the ideas, ideology and values of terrorist groups. As terrorist groups often frame themselves in terms of their political objectives this aspect is central to most definitions of terrorism. The ideas of terrorist groups and movements also underpins most analyses of organisational objectives and tactics, such as John Rapoport's waves of terrorism thesis (Hoffman 2006; Rapoport 2006). Over time terrorist movements have been associated with various ideas linked to national liberation or emancipation, socialist or fascist ideologies or religious movements. In this respect contemporary Islamist terrorism is predicated on a war between Islam and the West and a desire to establish a caliphate in order to free Muslims from oppression around the world. The objectives and associated statements of terrorists are overtly political, identifying with particular causes and actively seeking support from sympathetic constituencies. As a result explicit and implicit political ideas are self evidently central to the motivations and rationales of terrorist groups.

Similarly in most accounts of terrorism there is acknowledgement that radicalisation involves changes in the ethical or belief system of groups and individuals (Kruglanski et all 2009; Wilner & Dubouloz 2011). The debate tends to centred on the ideological coherence of a group and its causal role in radicalisation. In some accounts, ideological discipline is a reinforcement process of participation in high risk activism (Githens-Mazer 2008; Horgan 2007; Sageman 2008).

Atran and Keppley-Mahmood emphasise personal or community grievances as the principal factors underpinning processes of radicalisation whilst Bjorgo highlights how different members of a group may have different levels of ideological attachment (Atran 2011; Bjorgo 2011; Keppley-Mahmood 1996). For Githens-Mazer, ideology is a secondary consequence with comparatively little disciplined practical ideological engagement (Githens-Mazer 2008). Whilst this can underplay the role ideology in providing meaning to these personal and social factors, it also illustrates how it can be a secondary to personal accounts whilst still being an important factor in mobilising and sustaining high risk activism (della Porta 1995).

The complexity is compounded by differing usages of concepts such as ideology, belief or narrative. Kruglanski et al apply a looser approach to ideology that also includes wider sense of injustice or belief rather than a highly codified ideology of the types that Githens-Mazer and Lambert are querying (Githens-Mazer 2008; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Kruglanski et al 2009). Halverson, Corman and Goodall point to the role of stories, characters and events, that justify and reinforce master narratives, for example support for Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories as part of a wider Jewish and Christian conspiracy against Muslims (Halverson, Corman & Goodall 2011). These narratives play an important role in integrating individual experiences to wider contemporary and historical events in a way that provides a new lens for understanding the world (della Porta 1995; Halverson et al 2011). In this respect, ideas and ideologies provide frameworks for understanding the world, to explain the origins and reasons for grievances and to provide frameworks or pathways for achieving transformational social and political change.

The weight given to ideology and ideas has tactical and strategic implications for counter-terrorism responses. This includes counter ideological work to disrupt the propaganda and combat tacit acceptance of ideas linked to terrorist movements (Hoffman 2006; Rapoport 2006; Saggar 2006). Policy responses also need to take into account the ways in which ideology gives coherence to grievances and experiences and the potential for responses to at the risk of having only limited success or exacerbating grievances to give terrorist ideas and mobilisation efforts

more traction (Davis 2009; Richardson 2006; Saggar 2009). The other aspect relates to the tactics of engagement and the boundaries of acceptability, including tacit support that extremist and terrorist groups rely on and the potential to win over ‘fence sitters’, both politically and as partners in operational responses (Klausen 2009; Lambert 2009; Mascini 2006; Saggar 2006 & 2010). The nuanced challenges presented by these questions are central to most responses to terrorism.

This is further complicated by the inherent sensitivity around defining extremism. Terrorist groups are extreme by virtue of their use of violence in opposition to accepted social and political norms and institutions. However, violence has also been used to challenge illegitimate ideas and institutions, such as fascism or apartheid. Equally there can be wildly divergent views on the legitimacy of violence in certain cases, such as in the conflict between Palestinian militants and Israel. Extremist ideas by definition are outside the dominant social and institutional consensus but can supplant dominant political frameworks, such as the divine right of monarchs. Furthermore, different perspectives on the boundaries and definitions of extremism, such as the role of religion in public life or attitudes toward immigration and race, may preclude private beliefs from being shared in public. Ideas influence social prejudices and interests or they may remain marginal and niche. At the heart of Prevent is the question of how government prioritises, understands and deals with these questions.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the complex strategic and tactical challenges presented by terrorism. It shows how government has to deal with groups that are actively seeking to mobilise support in order to challenge its legitimacy. As a result any response has to deal with the relationship between the threat from terrorist groups, a wider set of radical ideas and movements and the social and political context in which they operate. This is often framed by the debate about the causes of terrorism and the process of radicalisation, including the tension between top down recruitment or more bottom up social models of activism. This further

highlights the need for decision-making to consider the trade-offs between the use of coercive measures to degrade organisational capability and wider approaches for reinforcing social solidarity in opposition to terrorists. Ultimately dealing with complex threat and the social dynamics of terrorism is a complex short and long-term challenge for government.

This study will explore how decision-making balanced conventional counter terrorism efforts to disrupt terrorist groups and the wider debate about contributory political and social dynamics. On one dimension Prevent sought to deal with the complex challenge from al-Qaeda due to its international network of jihadi groups and affiliates who shared radical Islamist ideas. At the same time it sought to address the reasons why Islamist political ideas had some salience amongst the Muslim community in the UK, including patterns of social and political disaffection. In this respect, the role of Islamic identity and activism in the experiences of second and third generation Muslims is a key factor in any analyses of radicalisation. Furthermore, this dynamic was situated in a wider political debate about national identity, including mobilisation of white nativist politics. As a result Prevent inevitably highlights the tension between developing a practical response to the threat from terrorism whilst dealing with the inherently political features of the problem.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

Introduction

This chapter sets out how the study examined the development of Prevent as a process of policy decision-making. The study examines the development of Prevent against two competing models of the state, a centralised top down model and distributed consensual model, set out in box 3.1. These two theoretical models are used as ideational and institutional frames of reference for understanding the decision-making process (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Hall 1993; Hall & Taylor 1996; Heclo & Wildavsky 1974; Lindblom 1959; Pierson 2000; Rhodes 1997; Sabatier & Weible 2007; Stone 2012; Wildavsky 1979 & 1987). The first frame focuses on the institutional structure and patterns of decision-making. This includes the actors involved in the process, their relationships, interests and values and the institutional origins of ideas. The second frame explores the actual ideas that shaped decision-making, including views of the core policy problem, different models of causes and trade-offs. These dimensions can then be traced against the features of the two competing models to assess whether Prevent represented a state centred and coercive model of security or one that was based on a distributed social consensus.

The study argues that the influence of these two models of government and security can be traced throughout the development of Prevent. In practice it was the combination of these two models that shaped the development of Prevent as an innovative but controversial policy. The two models represented competing institutional and ideational framings of the core policy problem and solutions that informed an iterative series of decision-making. As models of government and security they framed how different exogenous and endogenous inputs were interpreted (Lipsky 1997; Power, 2008; Rhodes 1997; Wildavsky 1979). This study aims to trace how the models influenced on formal and informal decisions, from high-level strategy through to specific front line decisions, by establishing and the main ideational and institutional

trade-offs. By examining decision-making through these two models the study can explores the factors determined why Prevent developed in the way it did.

The study has adapted Hall's model of policy paradigms to establish a series of tests for whether there was a shift from one model of decision-making to another, set out in Box 3.1 (Hall 1993). The paradigms approach is useful as its captures how different ideational models of policy making compete for institutional control of decision-making. In this respect the study tested whether the process represented a shift from a centralised rights-based model of security toward a distributed and consensual model. The models used in the study were rooted in the political science tradition and represent implicit and explicit reference points that have shaped the development of government and security policy over time (Pinker 2012). As a result the models are suited to the paradigms approach as they include both ideational framings of the policy problem allied to different institutional models of government and its relationship with society. Therefore study used the paradigms approach as a conceptual tool for tracing how competing models compete for influence over decision-making.

The study augments Hall model of zero-sum policy change by tracing how the models influence each other through an iterative decision-making process. In this model, set out in figure 3.1, problems enter into the decision-making process by virtue of political agendas that may be linked to events or feedback from prior decisions. Decisions are then negotiated by supporters of the different models who seek to advance their policy preferences, including defining the nature of the problem itself. This results in a process of persuasion and negotiation that shapes authority over decision-making. Aspects of this process includes modernist or utilitarian frames of reference that emphasise the empirical power of ideas and evidence to explain phenomena as well as the more relational skills of advocates to align institutional interests and values in support of proposals (Goodin et al 2006; Lasswell 1936; Lindblom 1989; Schmidt 2008; Wildavsky 1979). Finally the study explores how this translates into formal and informal decisions at different levels in the policy making community and how these decisions feed back into the iterative process.

The model of change adopted by this study therefore incorporates three process indicators that indicate a likelihood of paradigmatic change that are then augmented by examining of the ideas and institutional features of decisions against the two competing models. The volume of decision-making was used to identify whether there was feedback into the system, indicating that new ideas were challenging incumbent approaches to policy. The next indicator was whether the ideas that shaped decisions originated from inside or outside the incumbent policy community. The study also tested whether there were formal and informal institutional changes, either of existing institutions or the structure size and membership of the policy subsystem. In addition the study examined the features of ideas and institutional change against the features of the two models of security. This includes the extent to which decision-making was centralised or distributed, whether there was an emphasis on process or outcomes and the extent to which the problem was framed by social grievances or rational terrorist groups.

Theories of the state

As set out in Chapter 1, Box 3.1 presents the two model of the state and security used in this study, Thomas and John. Both models can be traced from the writings of Hobbes and Locke and forward in to contemporary debates about the structure of government and decision-making (Almond 1988; Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett 2011; Krasner 1984; Lipsky 1997; Mulgan 2007; Newman 2001a; Nordlinger, Lowi & Fabbrini 1988; Pinker 2011; Rhodes 1997; Schmidt 2009; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). Model Thomas represents a Hobbesian state centric model of security that emphasises the role of a strong central government in order to protect the basic rights of citizens. On the other hand model John draws on the Locke tradition and represents a model of security based around a distributed consensual approach that accommodates the interests, norms and preferences of society. These archetypes provide points of reference for understanding decision-making that are particularly relevant for Prevent as they deal directly with the structural relationship between government and society in reducing violence (Pinker 2011). As a result these two models are helpful reference points for

understanding the ideas and institutional dimensions that shaped decision-making whilst placing them in a broader political science tradition.

Clearly neither Locke and Hobbes, or the Thomas and John models used here, are explicit reference points for most modern policymakers. For example, many of the factors that informed the writing of Hobbes and Locke in the aftermath of the English civil war, no longer apply, even if we are living in an age of apparent growing political discord. However, Steven Pinker and Geoff Mulgan have illustrated how these ideas have had direct influence on approaches to government and a bearing on the prevalence of violence in society over time that can be traced into contemporary debates about policy and security (Mulgan 2007; Pinker 2011).[12] Building on these traditions the models used in this study have different perspectives on the role of the state versus the role of civil society in security and different models of social and political norms. Thomas focuses on the investment of collective trust and authority in the central institutions of the state to deliver security for citizens. In contrast the John emphasises the need for civil society to establish moral and political norms that underpin the authority of the state. Both models are concerned with the respective role of governments and society in preventing violence and provide valuable organising frameworks for understanding the ideas and institutional influences behind Prevent.

[12] Geoff Mulgan's 2007 book '*Good and Bad Power: The Ideals and Betrayals of Government*' and his reference to Hobbes and Locke is notable as he was the head of the Downing Street policy unit between 2001 and 2005. This is therefore evidence of the ongoing direct salience of these political science traditions to modern policy makers.

Box 3.1: Models of the state and security		
	Models of the state and policy-making (Almond 1988; Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett 2011; Krasner 1984; Lipsky 1997; Mulgan 2007; Newman 2001a; Nordlinger et al 1988; Pinker 2011; Rhodes 1997; Schmidt 2009; Skocpol & Amenta 1986)	When applied to domestic terrorism
Model Thomas (Hobbes 1996)	Centralised unitary model. Top down directive rules based authority. Strong central powers but curtailed by ideas of rights for individual citizen and the need to maintain a reputation for competence. Includes a dominant role for the core state policy making community. Focus on outcomes delivered by the state.	Dominant role for security services and Home Office. Focus on rational terrorist actors, including disrupting plots and recruitment. Use of coercive powers of detention and surveillance to directly impact on terrorist group organisational capability. Civil society is an instrument for intelligence and interventions.
Model John (Locke 1996)	Distributed networked model. Flat negotiated norms based authority. Constrained role for central decision-makers and strong street level influence. Emphasis on social consensus. Risk prevention through upstream interventions. Focus on government mediation of social interests and values.	Inclusion of non-security and social participants in decision making. Focus on causes of political grievances and social alienation as push factors toward support for terrorism. Emphasis on indirect outcomes through the process of collective action. Civil society partners in process of reform.

In practice the study does not interrogate the theory of Hobbes and Locke, rather it uses these traditions as ways of labelling the competing models. The two models are also based on past and present debates about the shape and structure of the state and its institutions (Almond 1988; Krasner 1984; Nordlinger et al 1988; Schmidt 2009; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). This debate centres on the extent to which the central state is the primary agent in government decision making or whether it is reactive to social interests and ideas. On the one hand government can be understood as a strong central decision-making apparatus that sets the policy agenda and takes decisions on behalf of society. The state is responsive to external inputs, mediated via formal structures such as legislatures and elected executives, but remains the dominant actor. On the other hand there is a view that government decision-making should be understood as primarily reactive or subservient to social trends and interests. In this model the state is less the lead institution for decision-making but is a product of the constraints and negotiation of social interests and values.

These two models further illustrate how the institutional structure of government is a key part of understanding policy-making. For example, Bulpitt has illustrated how the UK state has evolved through negotiated allocation of responsibly for decision-making, particularly between national and local territorial decision-making. More recently there has been growing interest in the networked models of policy making that explores how a community of policy making organisations interact to make decisions. This approach has responded to deliberate steps to disaggregate government in the UK through a variety of arm's-length and next steps agencies from the 1980s onwards. This process has increased the range of organisations involved in decisions whilst also extending the reach of central government into new areas. For example the inclusion of private firms in delivery or the role of civil society in policy making has further increased the range of organisations that have a stake in decision-making but have also become subject to central government influence and control.

The networked model of government necessitates a systemic view of the patterns of power and authority in decision-making. This includes the ability of certain organisations to exert their

own views of a problem and its associated solutions, including front-line decision-making, and how they are also embedded in reciprocal and constrained institutional relationships. Rhodes has explored who different models of institutional relationships shape decision-making processes and outcomes. On the one hand are policy communities that involved a relatively stable and closed set of participants in decision-making. These relationships are likely to be more hierarchical but nevertheless reciprocal with regular interaction between participants that may exert dominant values and empirical norms. Alternatively more issue networked structures are flatter with a wider range of competing interests with less consensus and more scope for conflict. Nevertheless, organisations may still be constrained by the need to collaborate formally and informally to influence decision-making in flatter structures, such as through explicit campaigning or through more implicit models of agenda setting influence.

The study also takes into account how the components of systemic policy-making should be understood through their historical, rational and cultural make-up (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Hall & Taylor 1996; Wildavsky 1987). In particular, the formal and informal structure of power and authority matters can exert influence on the institutional participants to conform to dominant cultures or world views (Powell & DiMaggio 1983; Hall 1993). For example, institutions in modern liberal states continue to reference rational choice elements of decision-making that seek to maximise the utility of decisions in the public interest, albeit within dominant ideational norms. At the same time institutional decisions may also be shaped by cultural factors that introduce preferences into decision-making, such for coercive or developmental solutions or the empirical models of decision-making versus more values driven models. Finally the historical dimensions of institutions also determines who has power and capacity within the system and consequently has the ability to assert power over decision-making, either formally or informally.

The lens of Hobbes and Locke help to group these dimensions of government and its institutions into two broad models of the state and security policy. Model Thomas represents a centralised state led model of security in the tradition of Hobbes. This values a coercive model

of power that focuses on the ability of the central state to maintain a binary top down contract with its citizens. In this context the state is invested with an indivisible authority to protect the natural rights of citizens to self-protection that holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Authority in Thomas is based on the reputation for competently and effectively protecting citizen's rights. This is illustrated by Hobbes "*Reputation of power is power because it draweth with it the adherence of those in need of protection… Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves more willingly than others.*" (Hobbes 1994 p62). This makes model Thomas's legitimacy conditional on protecting citizens through the prudent exercise of power (Arendt 1970).

If this model were to be translated into Prevent a couple of features would have been expected from both the decision-making process and its outcomes. Firstly there would be a clear dominant role for central state institutions that have traditionally been responsible for security policy, such as the Security Services and the Home Office. These organisations would assert a clear hierarchical power and the use of legal tools to implement direct solutions. Conventionally this would focus on the use of coercive powers of detention and surveillance that are targeted at rational terrorist actors. There would be a focus on the importance of government's reputation for competence in terms of maintaining security that in the main would lead to the focus on demonstrable and immediate impacts. However it would also have necessitated the need to maintain a reputation for prudent exercise of power in the interest of citizens rather than the state itself.

On the other hand model John represents a distributed negotiated model that places more constraints on central government's authority. In this model there is a more prominent role for a moral civil society, in contrast to the individualist 'amoral' version described by Hobbes (Locke 1996). Security is predicated on the development of social consensus within civil society, which is then given form through the shared institutions of government. The authority of the model is founded on the consent of citizens through its ability to articulate the interests

and values of society. This envisages a more distributed consensual model of authority rooted in a negotiated contract within society and maintained by the state across three pillars of liberal government, the state, civil society and private property. These institutions serve to mediate the natural rights of individuals and collective interests of society through the relationship between each pillar, rather than the binary axis between state and individual citizens. In this respect the authority of government is founded on the integration of society around collective interests and values.

When translating this into counter terrorism policy the study expected a number of features. In terms of the institutional structure of decision-making there would be a wider range of participants with a more distributed authority that required greater negotiation and consensus. In particular this would serve to place a set of social grievances or interest onto the decision-making agenda. A Prevent policy based on this model would also be expected to place a greater emphasis on resolving these grievances both through government action but also through an indirect process of collective social action. This would include a negotiation over the parameters of shared values and identity that moved beyond a narrow rights based relationship between citizens and the state. Consequently the main focus for action and policy making would centre on the of civil society and the role of the state in mediating grievances. As a result this would place government in a more facilitative or representative role in developing and implementing policy.

Paradigms

The study uses Hall's policy paradigms model as a useful framework for understanding how decision-making is structured by a framework of ideas and institutional relationships (Hall 1993; Blyth 2013). Stable paradigms are often found in stable communities where success can be defined against a relatively stable set of objectives and technical parameters (Hall 1993). This includes security and counter-terrorism where success is evaluated against a stable objective of minimising the likelihood and impact of terrorism. However, even where policy

agendas are framed as 'technical' competence issues they often have social and political dimensions embedded within them (Newman & Head 2017). In the case of economic policy, where Hall originally applied the paradigms model, the debate between Keynesianism and Monetarism often focuses on technical models of securing economic growth. However in practice they also represent proxies for political preferences around the role of the state in securing economic benefits to labour or capital.[13]

Although different paradigms may share broad objectives, by employing different views of the problem different paradigms propose very different, and ultimately incommensurable, solutions. This conflict is rooted in the impact of different analyses of causes and objectives, as well as being imbued by cultural preferences and values, that may work at cross purposes (Hall 1993). These differences also prevent consensus about what constitutes success, meaning that a policy consistently receives negative feedback (Baumgartner & Jones 2002; Blyth 2013; Pierson 1993). Given this divergence, different paradigmatic models can produce very different policy preferences and outcomes. For example, regulation of abortion that places protecting the foetus as an unborn child as its central goal produces different decisions to one formulated around a woman's right of self-determination. Similarly environmental policy that prioritises variously conservation, carbon reduction or sustainability can produce conflict around the relative merits of wind and nuclear power.

Inherent in paradigmatic models are descriptions of social or physical system and how it should be shaped to achieve the desired policy outcomes. In this case the competing models emphasise the responsibility of rational terrorist actors versus a wider set of indirect and inadvertent social factors. A basic causal model proposes that problem W is produced by a combination of X+Y, which can be resolved through solution Z, allowing a complex phenomenon to be understood for the purposes of management (Stone 1989). These models identify agents, institutions or

[13] In health care for example, the debate in the UK tends to be based on support for 'free at the point of access' with debate focused on questions of organisation, between planned or market approaches. However they tend to act as proxies for values around equality of provision. In contrast in the US much of the debate is about whether the state should play a role in delivery of health care or whether it should be a concern for private citizens.

correlating factors that are part of the problem and the degree of responsibility that may be assigned to them, i.e. if X or Y is the principle cause and whether it is mechanical, accidental, inadvertent or deliberate. The varying description of causes underpins different approaches or priorities when formulating policies. For example, in the case of economic paradigms, Keynesianism and monetarism diverge over the relative importance of maintaining stable economic demand or stable supply of capital.

Different paradigms also incorporate assumptions about different solutions, or policy 'levers' and the implications for the aims and outcomes of policy (Newman 2001a; Majone 1989). In this case the tension sits between an emphasis on coercive power versus consensual social authority. Differing emphases clearly have significant implications for decisions depending on the objectives of the policy. For example, market mechanisms may produce higher levels of innovation but are more costly and produce less equal outcomes than a planned approach, yet both outcomes can have merit when applied to healthcare (Newman 2001a). The choice of a solution is also shaped by the capacity of government (Wildavsky 1979). To take the example of earthquake policy, it is unlikely that government can prevent earthquakes but can realistically monitor seismic activity and prevent people from building in potentially dangerous places. However, where it is not desirable to prevent people from living in 'dangerous' areas (e.g. the San Francisco Bay area) measures can be introduced that minimise the potential for harm, such as building regulations.

The study used the paradigms model as a way of exploring how competing models of government and security shaped the development of Prevent. The paradigms model is primarily an ideational model of change, however the size and structure of institutional relationships also shapes decision-making (Heclo & Wildavsky 1974). Policy communities become defined around a set of reciprocal or diffuse relationships but nevertheless can form collective identities, interests and norms through frequent interactions and collaboration (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow & Tinkler 2006; Hood 2007; Rhodes 1997). In this respect paradigms provide an ideational 'operating' framework through which a community can make decisions,

which in turn exerts pressures on actors to conform with the views, values and interests of the dominant paradigm (Kuhn, 1962; Powell & DiMaggio, 1983). Where community paradigms are strong they restrict contradictory signals, potentially producing forms of 'group think' in extreme cases. Given these risks, models of network governance are often interested in ways of exercising indirect control and influence across communities whilst encouraging space for innovation (Blanco, Lowndes, & Pratchett 2011; Power 2008; Reed 1999; Rhodes 2000).

Policy change

Ultimately Hall's policy paradigms model is a way of understanding degrees of change in decision-making. In Hall's perspective a paradigmatic change involves a more fundamental restructuring of institutional and ideational authority in decision-making than conventional incremental forms of change. This change comes about when the authority of an incumbent model is challenges by a new paradigm that may come about due to events or internal failings of a paradigm and the presence of alternative ideas. However, paradigmatic change is seen as a rare event because it has to overcome the dominant framing of the causes of policy problems and their associated solutions (Hall 1993). This is likely to condition decision-makers views of what will work that may be embedded structured into institutional interests and cultural preferences producing institutional inertia or opposition to change (Hall & Taylor 1996; Wildavsky 1987; Powell & DiMaggio 1983; Newman 2001b). In turn this may condition what types of information may enter into the a decision-making process and how it is interpreted, including what type of evidence may be produced, such the commissioning of research (Bachrach & Baratz 1962 & 1963; Blyth 2013).

Figure 3.1: Theoretical model of the decision-making process (adapted from Sabatier and Weible 2007)



In order to better understand how paradigmatic change happens the study developed Hall's model by unpacking the institutional and ideational elements of the policy process. The model used by the study is a simplified version of Sabatier's the advocacy coalition model and is illustrated in Figure 3.1 (Sabatier & Weible 2007). The process notionally starts with inputs into decision-making communities, typically in the form of political agendas that are often motivated by external social trends or events or more internal feedback from decision-making (John et al. 2013; Pierson 2000a). This is then mediated by institutional coalitions that may hold competing paradigmatic views of the policy agenda or more disparate priorities framed by their interests and values (Hall & Taylor 1996; Sabatier & Weible 2007; Wildavsky 1987). These loose coalitions then engage in an interactive process of ideational and institutional persuasion or negotiation to claim authority over decision-making (Lasswell 1936; Lindblom 1959; Newman 2001b; Schmidt 2009, 2010 & 2012; Stone 2012; Wildavsky 1979). This authority is translated into decisions that may take place a different levels and places across the

policy system, the impacts and outcomes of which feed back into decision-making (Bachrach & Baratz 1962 & 1963; Bulpitt 2008; Lipsky 1997; Rhodes 1997).

The process model used in the study is not intended as a strict sequence, rather it illustrates how the component parts of decision-making can notionally be understood as an iterative process. By using this model the study aimed to understand the strategic process of paradigmatic change in decision-making by interrogating the factors that influenced a series of first and second order decisions that took place throughout the period (Hall 1993). The model explores how decision-making responds to problems, be these external inputs or the result of internal feedback in the system. However, the analysis of decision-making was also mindful of how decisions, inputs, institutions and their relationships can interact in parallel to put problems on to the decision-making agenda. This is a challenge inherent to policy making in complex and open systems (Wildavsky 1979). As a result the model was used to trace decisions and their influences and whether this process indicates paradigmatic change.

Inputs

The first component of the decision-making process is an input or problem that requires a response of some form (Kern, Kuzemko, & Mitchell 2014; Stone 2012). The complexity and interlinked nature of most public policy-making means it is highly susceptible to external inputs, or events. External inputs can expose internal contradictions of action or the limits of organisational capacity whilst raising the political profile of the agenda, leading to more scrutiny of decisions. Inputs in the distributed model may include social trends that progressively reshape values and interests in ways which require a response by decision-makers. Alternatively in the state-centric model events may require a response by government in order to demonstrate its competency and ability to manage problems on behalf of society. Equally inputs into decision-making should also include the internal drivers of change (Almond 1988; Pierson 1993; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). This includes the feedback from the impact of policy that may then translate into social trends or events.

Inputs into decision-making may undermine the coherence of the incumbent policy model and the expose limits of the capacity of decision-makers to effectively manage a problem. The crisis can be framed by two dimensions, a utilitarian dimension focuses on the empirical ability of government to deal with an empirical problem as well as a more relational political dimensions that challenges the values underlying decisions. As a result political leadership is a key element in understanding how inputs are mediated and prioritised for decision-making. In short political leadership typically drives the agenda for change in response to a policy problem that is typically framed by a deficit of current government action. Ultimately a crisis in the dominant model of decision-making can be driven by events, social trends or impacts, which erode the authority of an incumbent paradigm. However, paradigmatic it is also inherently linked to the success of an alternative account of the policy problem that challenges internally reinforcing patterns of ideational and institutional authority (Baumgartner & Jones 2012; Blyth 2013).

Supporters

The second element of the process is concerned with the institutional context of decision-making. In particular the study explored how supporters of different models sought to frame the policy problem in line with their own preferences. How supporters develop preferences is linked to their own characteristics, such as rational interests that are mediated by cultural values and historical underpinnings. Supporters of particular views of the policy problem or paradigmatic models may work to advance their preferences in decision-making. This is particularly relevant to the paradigmatic model of change policy that is typically rooted in a crisis of incumbent ideas and institutional capacity. The crisis is in part linked to the breakdown in support for the incumbent approach by key groups or organisations that serves to expose the limitations of ideas and solutions. This is frequently driven by political leadership who identify a deficit in policy making, or lend support to those within the policy community who support change. This may be framed by the need to respond to events allied to more explicit reform agendas that seek to challenge the incumbent approach of the policy community.

Crucially different organisations may formally or informally collaborate to advance shared agendas. This advocacy coalition model can bring groups together around shared policy positions. The composition of these groups matters as they will determine the level of resource or agenda setting power that one perspective or other can bring to bear on the problem. In addition these coalitions are not static, either in their positioning or in their make up. Coalitions may evolve their position in response to iterative decisions or input into the decision-making process. These may include short and long term tactical considerations or the defence of core values or principles. At the same time the structure of coalitions may also evolve in response to evolving landscapes where contradictions in patterns of support may be exposed by different decisions that can lead to a realignment of implicit alliances. In this respect the composition and evolution of coalitions is an important factor in both identifying change and understanding its outcomes.

Authority

The third component focuses on the ideas that shaped the process, particularly how ideas gain authority in decision-making. The issue of authority element merits some further unpacking as it is key to understanding policy making, particularly in Hall's paradigms model (Hall 1993; Stone 2012). In some respects authority is a product of the whole process. However, by treating it as a discrete element of the process authority it is positioned as a product of persuasive interaction between framing ideas and institutional settings and a requirement for decisions (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Lindblom 1959). The authority of ideas can be rooted in a modernist utilitarian frame, i.e. what matters is what works (Newman 2001b). However, a utilitarian model is also founded on dominant assumptions about what works and why that may also be imbued with values and preferences (Blyth 2013). These assumption are a key element of the paradigms model as they facilitate decisions in complex and open systems that may have multiple and contradictory inputs. In this respect authority is based on an institutionalisation of a set of ideas about how the policy should and does work which can in turn limit the scope for decisions to change (Blyth 2013; Hall 1993).

Equally, authority can also be linked to the explanatory or performative qualities of the ideas themselves. For example, where rational utilitarianism is a dominant institutional value the authority of ideas may rest on their ability to empirically explain problems, support coherent decision-making and deliver positive real world outcomes (Goodin et al 2006; Newman 2001b). Equally, however, apparently utilitarian ideas may also derive their authority from their performative and communicative properties (Blyth 2013; Cox & Béland 2013; Stone, 2012). For example, concepts and analogies can be readily communicated across diverse networks, such as the analogy of prudent personal finances and national fiscal austerity (Schmidt & Thatcher 2013). Although ideas may not emerge fully formed as an integrated policy paradigm they are likely to possess sufficient explanatory power that challenges the coherence of the incumbent approaches and the way inputs into decision-making, such as events, should be interpreted. Events or windows of opportunity may also determine the success of ideas during periods where certain ideas may be attractive or are able to explain particular prominent signals or issues. In either case ideas still need to provide a coherent and realistic framework for decision-making that reflect institutional capacity and the complexity of the problem (Wildavsky 1979).

At the same time the utilitarian and performative lenses start to illustrate how authority is not solely about the accuracy or the salience of ideas. The final element of authority relates to the skill of persuasion or the deployment of institutional resource in support of them. In this respect the power and authority of ideas cannot be divorced from their institutional context (Blyth 2013; Schmidt 2009 & 2010). For example, it is rare or unwise for government to confront a problem that it cannot solve (Wildavsky 1979). A paradigm therefore needs to be a practical solution that has the support of a variety of actors and institutions, including those that will be charged with its implementation. Institutional support can be based on utilitarian factors but may also be linked to other rational interests or cultural values which condition an institution's priorities and preferences (Hall & Taylor 1996; Powell & DiMaggio 1983; Wildavsky 1987). Some institutions may hold hierarchical powers to impose a particular idea whilst others may

hold front line discretionary powers that may determine its success (Bachrach & Baratz 1962 & 1963; Lipsky 1997). As a result authority is also dependent on institutional factors and constraints.

Therefore for the purposes of this study authority is the relationship between utilitarian and performative characteristics of ideas and the relational process of institutional persuasion. However, for Blyth, and Hall, this model is more likely to reinforce incumbent paradigms, even where there are significant challenges to its dominant assumptions. Nevertheless, the persuasive skills of advocates can configure ideational and institutional authority (Lasswell 1936; Torgerson 1985; Wildavsky 1979). In particular, evidence and analysis can play an important role to challenge decisions and the legitimacy of incumbent interests or assumptions rooted in historical legacies. Evidence can shape decisions at different points in the process including farming the policy options that can respond to political agendas. Equally evidence may be shaped by the complexity of problem and the capacity of those seeking to influence decisions, be it government itself or organisations such as think-tanks that actively introduce new ideas. Therefore, the persuasive element of authority is linked to the capacities of the organisation or actors presenting the case which in turn can reproduce dominant patterns of authority without significant and concerted ideational and institutional challenge.

Decisions

The final component of the process are the different types of decision-making involved in policy making and change (Hall 1993; Pierson 2000a). The most common type are frequent 'first order' decisions, such as regular front line or operational decisions or regular processes such as annual budget allocations. First order decisions include decisions to improve the effectiveness of existing policy or refine a target to improve its clarity, for example directing investment into updating existing urban river bank defences to improve their effectiveness. These types of decisions tend to be less contentious as they don't involve changes to the core principles of the policy. In some respects these types of decisions represent small high

frequency decisions meaning that relatively small changes may have a significant accumulated impact, such as adjustments to front line welfare assessment criteria. However, as these decisions can also be heavily structured by dominant professional identities, assumptions and practices, as well as by conflicting resource demands, they can also involve significant institutional inertia that may take time to change. As a result they can also be framed as systemic failures of delivery that require significant institutional reform.

The study will also examine second-order decisions that involved changing systems and architectures. This might include a machinery of government change that changes responsibility or shifts between ex-ante measures or post-hoc cures. For example, a second order change in health care policy predicated on achieving efficient delivery of health care that is free at the point of use may shift between a market based approach or planned models. In the case of social access to university for example a second order type change would be to shift focus between university admissions practices and the outputs of the schools system. In the flooding model, a second order change would divert investment toward flood plain management rather than riverbank defences. As these types of decisions involve re allocating resources they may also be constrained by the interests of the policy community and act as proxies for more normative debates about policy preferences (Majone 1989). As a result these types of decisions can substantially reconfigure systems but may require a longer-term process to embed into distributed first order decision-making (Barber 2008).

The study approached decision-making as both clear high level decisions that are framed by strategic objectives and a more messy and contradictory set of decisions across a wider policy community. In particular, the study was also mindful of the fact that ideational authority may not always directly translate into tangible decisions. This may include examples where institutional inertia or front line discretion may diverge from the intent of a policy or ideas may ultimately be unworkable or flawed. Crucial to this question was how different types of institutional power shaped the decision-making agenda independently of the more persuasive model of authority. This includes hierarchical power to set the policy making agenda, front line

ability to interpret high level ideas into local practice plus the decision of different groups to participate in decision-making and the consequences for the scope of policy. This gives decision-making multiple layers, all of which may have relevance in an iterative process.

Indicators of change

In order to understand the influence of the different models over time and where there may have been dialogue between them, the study examined the development of Prevent as a decision-making process (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Cairney 2007). By focusing on the process the study derived a series of process indicators from Hall's model to assess whether there may be paradigmatic change (Box 3.1). The indicators were an increased volume of decision-making, changes in the institutional structure of decision-making and the introduction of new ideas in decision-making. These ideational and institutional process indicators were then compared against the expectations of models Thomas and John, with Thomas being treated as the incumbent approach at the start of the period and John the notional challenger. This dual approach allowed the study to explore the process of paradigmatic change as an iterative and discursive process rather than Hall's narrower zero sum model with a clear start and end point (Baumgartner & Jones 2002; Baumgartner & Jones 2012; Blyth 2013; Oliver & Pemberton, 2004; Schmidt 2009 & 2010).

Box: 3.2 Process indicators of paradigmatic change (Hall 1993)	
Volume of decisions	There is an increased volume of policy activity associated with preventing terrorism. There is evidence of increased interest in the issue and associated topics in parliament. There is an increased volume of advocacy from think

	tanks and media. There is an increased volume of output from ministers and Whitehall. There is a growing volume and breadth of local implementation and decision-making.
Origins of ideas	There are changes in dominant concepts that frame decisions. These ideas originate from outside an incumbent policy community and its dominant set of ideas. The new ideas emphasise a new or changed causal model and associated ways of defining success. The ideas would focus decision-making on indirect social causes and grievances and associated solutions.
Institutional change	There are new members of the policy community who exert influence on decision-making. These new members introduce new constraints and opportunities for decision-making. There is evidence of formal organisational change e.g machinery of government. There is evidence of informal organisational change, such as evolving advocacy coalitions. The changes are orientated around consensual and distributed institutional relationships.

The first process indicator focused on the volume of policy activity, including first and second order policy changes. A high volume of changes indicates possible paradigmatic change as new ideas and their supporters compete for control of decision-making. In itself a high volume of decision-making demonstrates an increasing intensity of policy and political activity that suggests a previously stable approach is being challenged (Baumgartner and Jones 2012 & 2007; John et al 2013; Lieberman 2003). Increased scrutiny of decisions can challenge an established consensus within a policy community by introducing new ideas, values and interests that undermine the old assumptions and relationships that underpinned decision-making. Ultimately this scrutiny challenges the authority and control of the incumbent community (John et al 2013). Therefore the study treated a high level of activity as evidence

of competition for control of decision-making and an potential indicator of paradigmatic competition and change.

As the paradigms model is primarily an ideational approach the second indicator examined the origins of ideas and how they framed policy problems and solutions. In a case of paradigmatic change, new ideas would enter into decision making from outside the dominant paradigmatic frame to challenge the foundational ideas of policy-making. These ideas may originate from alternative institutional settings, such as parallel policy subsystems, via academia and think-tanks or may be part of political reform agendas. In Hall's model of paradigmatic change in economics the main shift was from a Keynesian emphasis on economic demand to stability of fiscal supply. In the dominant Keynesian model government took an active role in stimulating demand and employment through investment, with more tolerance of inflation. In contrast a monetarist approach emphasised the need for stable inflation through the use of interest rates allied to market led investment, an approach that was advanced by think tanks that supported the 'Chicago school' of economics.

Hall's paradigms model also requires evidence of institutional change. In Hall's original case study the tipping point was when supporters of a paradigm gain institutional control over decision-making. The study explored whether there was evidence for internal changes in the approach of organisations based on new paradigmatic ideas and values. It also sought to explore whether there were more formal more structural changes, such as machinery of government changes, which in the case of monetary policy tended to focus on independence for the central banks. In addition the study examined whether there were less formal changes, such as increased participation of think tanks that increased the supply of ideas to challenge the ideas of the incumbent decision-making community. Finally the study examined whether there were new participants in a decision-making community and whether this created the potential for new patterns of authority in decision-making. Ultimately paradigmatic change in this model would include a reconfiguration of institutional relationships as well as the interests and cultures that mediate decision-making.

The study proposed that model Thomas was the incumbent policy model at the start of the period meaning that the process indicators were likely to indicate a change to model John. This is not to say that the UK represented a authoritarian Hobbesian state in 2001. The power of the sovereign is clearly subject to constraints, including international laws and treaties and domestic human rights frameworks. Nevertheless the 2000 Terrorism Act, which introduced permanent executive powers for dealing with general terrorist threats across the UK, encapsulated the dominant model of counter terrorism policy. This granted coercive powers to disrupt organised terrorist groups and prosecute individuals whilst also setting limits to state powers that protected the rights of citizens (Wilkinson 2006). Therefore, an intense period of decision making that included new ideas and institutional change would potentially be an example of a change toward the Lockian model John. On the other hand, if Prevent were an example of an incremental change based on the Hobbesian model Thomas there would be limited institutional change and few new ideas from outside the incumbent community.

The study expected to find an incremental change based on Hobbesian model Thomas to be led by a centralised community that was focused on improving the targeting of organised terrorist recruitment and plots. Decisions would be refinements based on a stable ideational framework of causes, solutions and priorities. This would have included improving the effectiveness of intelligence and policing to identify and prosecute individuals involved in terrorism. The causes of terrorism would be understood in terms of dealing with deliberate rational actors who are seeking to recruit support for their violent worldview and operations. Social and cultural causes would be viewed as second order issues that are used as instruments of recruitment by terrorist groups and beyond the scope of policy. Engagement with social groups would have been framed in instrumental terms with a focus on developing the means to deliver direct interventions. Social factors would primarily have been seen as issues to be mitigated or navigated in order to improve implementation of existing measures. Furthermore institutional authority over decision-making would have been linked to a stable policy community, primarily centred on the security services and the Home Office.

A paradigmatic change toward model John would have been based on a distributed consensual approach aimed at resolving the civil conflict as push factors that drove support for and participation in terrorism. This objective would have been founded on a belief that resolving social grievances, including structural and cultural dimensions, was a pre-requisite for successfully preventing terrorism, even where they may not have directly attributable causal links. In this model, support for and participation in terrorism was a product of social and political grievances, including government policy and solutions would focus on the process of resolve these cleavages. Decisions will involve a much wider set of actors, including non-security agencies and civil society, that presents more opportunities for the formation of new advocacy coalitions. Therefore both the ideas and institutional relationships behind decisions would be consensual, distributed and focused on collectively addressing social grievances.

Hypotheses

The basic hypothesis of the study is that Prevent can be understood as a product of negotiation between two competing models of the state and security. The two competing models, Thomas and John formed an implicit, and at times explicit, framework for decision-making and the ideational and institutional process that shaped it. As the incumbent model, Thomas was expected to be the dominant influence on decision-making. At the same time, the study assumed that the volume of activity and the introduction of community interests and ideas about social causes was indicative of influence from model John. As a result, the study expected that the competition between the two models combined to shape an iterative process of change that was not a settled linear process. Importantly, the study expected decision-making to be shaped by a series of formal and informal relationships at national and local levels that could be indicative of a distributed model John or extension of centralised state authority in model Thomas.

The study hypothesised that first and second order decision-making in Prevent broadly evolved from an enforcement policy that was neutral about wider social causes, including extremism,

toward a general integration approach and then to a more targeted model that incorporated non-violent extremism (Briggs 2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Klausen 2009; Lambert 2008; Maher & Frampton 2009, Mirza, Senthilkumaran & Ja'Far 2007; Simcox et al 2011; Spalek and Lambert 2010; Stevens 2011).[14] In this model solutions can be understood in relation to a four way axis with the Y axis representing differing emphases on ex post enforcement and ex ante integration and the X axis on neutral or values based community engagement. For example the emphasis on directly preventing violence through neural community partnership was the dominant frame at the start of the policy. Subsequently developmental approaches to promoting integration in partnership with community became the main focus for policy-making. After this there was a strong focus on more principles based engagement, including policing of 'non-violent' extremism that focuses on establishing parameters of acceptable beliefs and values This is illustrated in figure 3.2 below.

The study focused on the decision-making process, including its institutional structure and supporting ideas, in order to understand how the evolution of these decisions, and by extension the solutions, were determined by the two competing models of security. The study retained an open mind about the extent to which decisions and the process that developed them were framed by either Thomas or John. Clearly the middle phase of development that focused on an integration approach would be expected to be linked to model John. However the shift toward values based engagement is not indicative of a Hobbesian model Thomas approach and may instead be linked to pressure associated with the development of a social consensus about shared values and acceptability. Similarly an enforcement approach may be more closely linked to Hobbesian model Thomas but may also be linked to the development of a social consensus to support stronger government leadership. Finally the shift toward an integration model could also be interpreted as an extension of government control over civil society

Figure 3.2: Evolution of policy solutions

[14] Further details of how this hypothesis framed the narrative analysis and the analytical frameworks are set out in the Annexe B



Conclusion

This chapter has described the theoretical framework that the study has used to examine the decision-making process that developed Prevent. The chapter has set out how the process can be examined against two models of the state and security policy, a centralised top down

coercive model or a distributed consensual negotiated model. The two archetypal are based on contemporary debates about the relationship between the state as an autonomous agent and the influence of socio-economic interests that can be traced back to Hobbes and Locke. The relationship is particularly relevant in the case of Prevent as much of the literature and the policy itself focuses on the role that civil society should play in preventing terrorism and the on-going role of government to lead policy and deliver solutions. As a result there is a particular value to using these two models in order to understand what the ideas and institutional arrangements that influenced its development can tell us about Prevent.

The study employed these models to examine whether Prevent should be understood as a coercive top down or a distributed consensual model of security. The study employed a theoretical model that examined decision-making as an iterative ideational and institutional process. The study then traces the influence of these two models through the policy making process rather than just focusing on a static outcome. This include tracing the inputs into the decision-making process, the organisation of supporters of different approaches and how authority over decision-making across a policy system was negotiated. The features of the process, including the volume of decisions, the origins of ideas and evidence of institutional change can be used as indicators of paradigmatic or incremental change between an incumbent and challenging model. At the same time the ideational and institutional features of the process can be compared against the expectations of the two models to assess whether Prevent was shaped by model Thomas or John.

Chapter 4: Methodology

Introduction

This chapter sets out the methodology used by the study to examine whether Prevent represented a change in policy, to what extent and why. The study uses a qualitative case study approach to enables an in-depth examination of decision-making (Yin 2003). Although only a single case which limits generalisable findings the case study approach is particularly valuable due to the significance of Prevent and the contested nature of its development. In particular, by focusing on the decision-making process that developed Prevent the study represents a new contribution to the literature on Prevent (Thomas 2017). The case study was structured around Hall's model of paradigmatic change and tests whether Prevent was based on one of two competing models of security (Hall 1993). It presents an in-depth narrative analysis of decision-making that is compared against the ideational and institutional features of the two models and examines the process for indicators of paradigmatic change (Collier 2011; Mahoney 2012). By using these different frames of analysis the study developed a rich account of change in the decision-making process (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Cairney 2007).

The case study was based on data collected through 16 semi structured elite interviews and in-depth analysis of associated speeches, parliamentary statements, media coverage, reports and formal policy documents and records. The study used the theoretical frameworks set out in the Chapter 3 to examine whether Prevent was founded on a centralised coercive model Thomas or a distributed consensual model John (Box 3.2). It does this by presenting a detailed narrative account of decision-making to examine the ideational and institutional features of process, based on the model set out in Figure 3.1. This framework and associated indicators presented in Box 3.1 and Box 3.2 guided the collection and interrogation of data in a complex and contested area of policy making whilst providing a reference point for conclusions about the

change being observed.[15] However, the study is an in-depth exploration of a complex process that also required flexibility in the research design. This necessitated an iterative approach to the collection and analysis of data to interrogate multiple and conflicting influences throughout the process (Srivastava & Hopwood 2009). Given these complexities the study's conclusions should be treated as contributions to the on-going debate about Prevent rather than definitive answers.

What the study did not attempt to evaluate was whether Prevent was successful in terms of its impact on terrorism. Nevertheless, by examining the decision-making process the case study also presents an opportunity to evaluate Prevent against its own aims and objectives, including those of the participants in the process. In particular, this allows the study to consider the extent to which Prevent successfully engaged with the proxies that may have been employed to guide action. This is relevant as preventative policies typically rely on a notional theory of change to impact on social outcomes outside the direct control of government (Gough 2015; Stone 1989). This challenge is further exacerbated in the context of terrorism given the nature of the threat and political focus it tends to receive. As a result the study aims to understand how Prevent was developed and by extension enable some evaluation of whether it should be considered a success.

Case study approach

The study uses a series of analytical frames to present an in-depth case study of the decision-making process (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Cairney 2007; Denscombe 2010; Yin 2003). At the heart of the case-study is an examination of whether Prevent represented a change from a centralised model Thomas to a distributed model of the state and security policy and if so, the reasons why it developed in this way. The study approaches this question by exploring the structure of decision-making and influences on the process in order to draw conclusions about the characteristics of Prevent. The study assessed the likelihood of change and examined

[15] Further details of the analytical frameworks are set out in Annexe B

decision-making against the ideational and institutional expectations of the competing models. A focus on the process was used to understand policy as an on-going iterative process that may have conflicting features. This approach was used instead of one that compared Prevent as a singular and static entity at two distinct points in time.

The study is founded on a detailed narrative account of decision-making that provides an empirical foundation for tracing the institutional and ideational influences on Prevent (Collier 2011). The narrative account is organised around three high level phases in order to capture the interaction between different decisions and inputs over time. The first period ran from the attacks of 9/11 in the summer of 2001 until 2005 and covers the initial development of the Prevent strand of Contest. This was followed by the period from the 2005 London attacks that covers the activity that led to the publication of the full Prevent strategy in 2008. The third period ran from 2008 and covered the feedback from the implementation of the full Prevent strategy which in turn led to the revised strategy in 2011. These periods organise the narrative account but the subsequent analysis shows how the influences on decision-making can be traced across the different periods.

Although a case study approach was chosen as the best way to explore the decision making process in-depth it does have two principle limitations that should be taken into account. Firstly, as a single case study any generalisable findings can only be really inferred. However, Prevent is a significant and interesting area of policy in its own right. Furthermore, the study is grounded in the theory of policy change set out in the previous chapter to ensure that its findings are useful when looking at policy-making in contested areas more generally. At the same time the study chose to adopt a flexible and iterative approach to data collection and analysis in order to closely examine the decision-making process in what is a complex and contested area of policy making (Denscombe 2010). This created risks of bias in data sampling and analysis but these were mitigated these by grounding analysis in the theoretical framework presented in chapter three and the presentation of a detailed empirical account of the process to the reader.

A grounded but flexible approach to the study was particularly important given the need to simultaneously understand and deal with the uncertainty and conflicting views that make Prevent interesting. The gaps in knowledge and *a priori* views that characterised decision-making at the time were also important factors to consider when collecting and analysing data in this study. In some respects it is unrealistic that a study such as this can be shorn of all prior assumptions or bias. For example, this study adopts a sympathetic starting point that a preventative approach to political violence is a legitimate, and even positive, aim but queries the contribution of Prevent. This was shared by most respondents to the study, as indicated by their involvement in Prevent, and by the author. The study was mindful of this shared position whilst also using it to gain in-depth and candid insights about its development.

Data collection

The collection of data was based on the development of a detailed narrative account that captured formal decisions and their explicit and implicit influences (Collier 2011). The study first compiled a timeline for the whole period that included key events and the publication of the main Prevent strategies. The initial timeline represented a high level framework of inputs and decisions, as described in the model of policy change set out in Figure 3.1 in the previous chapter. This was populated from the secondary literature and existing analyses of Prevent that informed the selection of primary documentary sources and interviews. The historical timeline was then populated with primary data collected from interviews and contemporary documents. This data was then used to trace detailed inputs and decisions and the institutional and ideational dimensions of the process.

The focus on the decision-making process necessitated an iterative approach to identifying sources and interviews that was guided by the feedback that was received as the study went on. This allowed for a richer inductive approach to data collection. However this did present risks that the study might become self-reinforcing by progressively collecting data from sources with similar views or relationships to decision-making. This risked missing factors that may have

been on the margins of decision-making but which nevertheless exerted influence in other ways. As a result the study sought to identify sources that could provide insight into the conflicts and debates in decision-making. At the same time the study was also clear that the aim was to identify major decisions and what influenced them. This required triangulation of data to evaluate what sources could say about the influences on the process how these were interpreted by an interactive and iterative policy process.

Collecting data on a decision-making process that navigated uncertainty and conflicting views has to mindful to navigate the same uncertainties and conflicts (Torgerson 1985; Wildavsky 1975). As Blyth emphasises, empirical data has to be collected from and evaluated against the ideational and institutional contexts that the study wishes to describe (Blyth 2013). Therefore, the study sought to piece together the motivations and rationales for decision-making by collecting data from a variety of sources. For example, Government publications were treated as empirical records of decisions and policy priorities. A speech or evidence to a committee may set out detail of a decision but may also be constructed in order to reassure or challenge scrutiny. Empirical research, was used to shape the scope and focus of this study questions but the questions and findings were also used to understand contemporary policy. Individuals involved in the process provided observations on decision-making whilst also being active agents in the process.

The study focuses on the development of Prevent from 2001 to 2011. However, it made a particular effort to identify sources relevant to the period prior to 2005, before the London attacks, and before 2008 whilst the main strategy was originally negotiated. The study aims to understand this period as it was less well covered in existing analyses and there is also less detail about the policy on public record as it was still in its formative stages. Although the study actively sought to identify primary sources to provide insight into decision-making there were few of direct relevance. This presented some challenges for the study as it is exploring a policy before it has been given a clear institutional form which creates a greater reliance on first hand

recall from a period that was over a decade ago. As a result there is a greater use of inference about associated policy areas as well as parliamentary debates on related issues.

Selecting documents

The study selected documents from two broad categories, documents that record or presented government policy and decisions and documents that were intended or did have an influence on decision-making. The first set were selected for their direct insight or relevance to Prevent decision-making by organisations with formal authority to make decisions relevant to development of Prevent. This primarily includes government departments but the wider network of institutions involved in decision-making, including organisations that might convene local decision-making. These documents were considered part of the record of decision-making and include official reports, ministerial speeches or media statements and Hansard. These documents provided reference points for how decisions were framed, the ideas that were put forward and the different problems that were being factored into decisions. They provided a direct record of the influence of ideas and their origins and the focus and location of institutional activity at given points in time.

The second set were documents that are illustrative of influential ideas or organisations in decision-making. In particular this category included reports by think tanks or media commentary on the topic. These documents were selected on the basis of their potential or reported influence or direct or indirect link to decision-making. In some cases this influence or link was explicit, such as where reports were cited in subsequent decisions or where reports were produced with government support, or where influence was reported by interviewees or other documents. In this case media reporting was also useful in terms of being a record of how decisions may have been presented which gave further insight into the ideational and institutional context or framing for decision. Finally these types of documents were also used in order to gain perspectives for those seeking to influence decision-making but who may have

been more directly critical of the policy itself and so were not directly involved in decision-making.

Selecting interviewees

The study collected primary data through 16 semi structured elite interviews drawn from a specific and relatively small group of individuals who had been directly involved in or were close to decision-making at national and local levels (Goldstein 2002; Morris 2009). They were targeted for their first hand insight into decision-making, including the ideas and institutional factors that shaped their work. In addition interviewees were targeted to gather perspectives that were not typically on the public record. This means that the study focused on identify and targeting a small number of high value responses. This created risks in terms of coverage and balance in that there were only a small number of useful sources that were mitigated by the nature of the approach, an emphasis on anonymity and my own credentials (Goldstein 2002). They were selected on the basis of recommendation or direct reference in commentary or literature about the study and in some cases respondents were known to me by virtue of my prior work.[16]

The central set of interviews were with a set of advisors to government on Muslim community affairs. They are all listed as 'Advisor' in this study and included independent advisors associated with Islamic organisations or with Muslim community networks, ministerial faith and cohesion advisors and Muslim civil servants. A full list of interviewees including description is included in Annex A. The Muslim community advisors were of particular importance they have been identified as both influential and, in some cases problematic (see for example Bright 2006). The advisors were prioritised by this study for their insight into how government approached the relationship with the Muslim community as this was the primary focus for much of the policy and was central to much of the conflict around Prevent. In addition these individuals have had limited opportunity to put their own views of the process on the

[16] The full list of interviewees, including descriptions, is included in Annexe A

public record and represented an opportunity to capture their perspectives on the development of Prevent. Equally, because these advisors represented a small number and in some cases there was known to be a degree of rivalry between them it was important to get a useful spread of responses, however it was not possible to secure all of them.

The study also engaged with the more distributed policy community. This presented a challenge for a study that only had resource for a targeted sample of high value interviews. In some cases there were individuals who could be identified who played a role in national membership organisations to coordinate responses by local authorities or police forces that provided a perspective on the interaction between national and local decision-making. At the same the study also sought out some perspectives from font line decision-making in local government and policing to complement analysis of existing literature. Whilst these interviewees and sources could not speak directly for all front line implementation they provided an opportunity to understand how problems were interpreted by decision-making at different levels of the policy community. The interviewees were targeted on the basis of recommendations by other respondents or their involvement in aspects of the local implementation of Prevent that fed into national decision-making.

The third category represented highly influential individuals in positions of formal leadership. This included government ministers and the most senior civil servants involved in the development of Prevent during the period. In some cases direct interview access was possible however in the main the study focused on interrogating statements on the public record, including speeches and Hansard. These individuals were identified by virtue of their responsibility for decisions in the case of ministers or where they were clearly in prominent leadership roles, such as in the case of Charles Farr as director of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism. Using primary sources on public record was different to collecting interview data based on recall and discussion. However the study assessed the position and views of these individuals and the rationales for the decisions through these sources in a similar way to primary interview data. Furthermore, other interviewees also provided commentary on

their positions and approach that aided interpretation of these sources.

The study was extremely careful to protect the anonymity of interviewees. Reassurance about anonymity formed part of the strategy for securing interviews (Goldstein 2002). By selecting a small number of interviews from a small pool of those with first hand involvement there is a real risk that respondents can be identified from their views, role or personal characteristics. At the same time, although experienced professionals, involvement in the agenda has resulted in reputational risks that in some cases were on-going and which made many extremely sensitive about participating in the study. There were some individuals who declined to participate for these reasons. As a result the study has been very careful about how data is presented in the final study, particularly where quotes are used or where particular findings are attributed to the comments of respondents. In practice, and as illustrated in more detail in the analysis section later in this chapter, the study did not rely on interviews alone but sought to corroborate themes from multiple interviews and documents.

Conducting interviews

The study used semi structured qualitative 'elite' interviews to gain first-hand perspectives on the ideas and institutional relationships that influenced decisions (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; Morris, 2009).[17] Rather than directly asking about the influence of ideas and institutions interviews focused on gathering in-depth narrative commentary from which wider conclusions could be inferred. In particular interviews were structured around the role that individuals played in decision-making, how they attempted to influence the process and their observations on the wider process (Goldstein 2002). In this respect the personal and professional background and perspectives of the interviewee was central to the interview process and for eliciting views on the ideas, values and interests that they carried into the process. This approach helped to build personal rapport whilst also providing a narrative structure to interrogate the respondent's recall of events. Ultimately interviews focused on gathering a reflective assessment of the

[17] The question schedule is included in Annexe A.

process, including the objectives and approach of the respondent and the levels of influence that they or others had on decisions. Further details of the interview structure is presented in Annexe A.

The structure of interviews was crucial for gaining confidence of interviewees given the sensitivity of the subject and their involvement. Interviews used a combination of grand tour and targeted questions (Leech 2002). Grand tour or open-ended questions explored the respondents' views of the overall study questions which generated broad and rich feedback. At the same time they risked a lack focus and also limited the opportunity to establish credibility with the interviewee. On the other hand testing questions were used to focus on specific decisions and issues that had been identified from the timeline or background research. These helped to establish credibility but care had to be taken not to lead the subject, undermine rapport or limit the breadth the interview could offer (Aberbach & Rockman 2002). In practice interviews interchanged between the two types of question, often opening with a general question and then testing a particular view of Prevent at a relatively early stage. This encouraged the respondent to examine their own perspective and establish the interviewer's own knowledge of the agenda (Aberbach & Rockman 2002; Berry 2002;).

Although this study is dealing with a defined historical period it is also situated in the context of on-going debates about the contemporary approach to Prevent. This raises questions about the degree to which interviews accurately represented the issues of the time, or represented a reflective interpretation, either inadvertently or deliberately, that was coloured by contemporary debates (Morris 2009). The study addressed this challenge by structuring the interviews as a historical reflection that created the opportunity to directly probe questions of recall and the evolution of views over time. In order to challenge or aid recall it was important for the interviewer to introduce knowledge about the period and relevant to the interviewee, whilst being mindful to not to implicitly seek to confirm the study hypotheses. However in some cases it was helpful to explicitly test certain hypothesis or ideas with interviewees to gather their views. In practice it was notable that interviewees had thought extensively about

their involvement in Prevent and were able to engage in lengthy, nuanced and detailed discussion.

Data analysis

The study used a grounded theory approach that interrogated the collected data for evidence that Prevent was an example of paradigmatic change based on one of the two competing models (Denscombe 2010; Hall 1993).[18] The study structured analysis of data based on the model of change set out in chapter three. Data was first interrogated to identify decisions and the institutional interests and ideas that framed them, whilst examining how these were embedded in an on-going process. This was then followed by an assessment of the institutional and ideational dimensions against the two models of security, the top down model Thomas or a distributed consensual model John. This required an in-depth engagement with the primary sources that was iteratively analysed based on the model of policy change. Sources were weighted in terms of their significance and triangulated to corroborate their results. Finally the study subjected the analysed data to a series of process tests to examine whether this was an example of paradigmatic change.

The study grouped documents and interviews by their proximity to decision making. At the same time all sources were treated critically to assess whether they were framed in a particular way for a specific audience, including the interviewer. For example, Prevent strategies or statements in parliament about government decisions were treated as records of decisions. Ministerial or civil servant evidence to select committees, speeches or media briefings were treated as directly informative of the factors that framed or influenced decisions. Finally interviews, think tank reports and media reporting or commentary were treated as directly or indirectly illustrative of influences or debates in decision-making. These categories were not always discrete and in some cases the content in sources could be interpreted in more than one role, particularly where evidence, speeches or media briefings were intended to communicate

[18] Further details of the analytical frameworks are set out in Annexe B.

to a particular audience. However this in itself was indicative of an influence on decision-making.

The study adopted an iterative approach to analysis that revisited the narrative timeline and different sources and interviews as the study progressed (Srivastava & Hopwood 2009). This iterative approach enabled the study to build up a rich account of significant decisions and the factors that influenced decision-making. As the body of evidence developed different sources or contributions provided new insight into the process and how certain events or sources should be understood. This included how certain sources should be interpreted in their context, such as where insight into the position of certain respondents was gathered from alternative sources that may have cast a new light on an interview or statement. This approach did require careful reflection on how the research was being led by its findings and sources as it built up. This meant that a careful use of triangulation, the process structure for analysis and the final tests provided an important grounding for the analysis as well as critical reflection on potential biases.

The study analysed data based on the different elements of the decision-making process set out in Figure 3.1 (Denscombe 2010). The first round identified the main second order decisions made by government throughout the development of Prevent and traced them against significant inputs, primarily terrorist attacks and elections. The first round also identified different decisions taken by members of the policy-making community, for example decisions to participate in Prevent or approaches to local implementation. This included whether these types of decisions were likely to be an upstream influence on, a direct response to, or an indirect consequence of second order decisions. The study gave a particular focus to the precursors to major second order decisions, such as the decision to prioritise or adopt a particular approach to decision-making, and to understand their ideational and institutional influences. This initial round developed a detailed picture of the main decisions alongside distributed decisions that were being taken across the community.

The next stage focused on the institutional participants in decision-making. This included interrogating their explicit and implicit aims and priorities, their organisational interests and the values and preferences that were brought into the process. From this analysis of the source considered any insight into the tactics or strategy of organisations in the process. Of particular interest here was whether there was evidence from the sources that could allow institutions or sources to be grouped into advocacy coalitions on the basis of shared interests, priorities or tactics. This included how and why these organisations could be grouped in this way, such as whether alignment was tactical or values based, and whether it was implicit or explicit. This process also sought to identify whether there were changes in the composition of coalitions on the basis of shifting priorities or interests over time or in response to certain decisions or trends.

The next stage focused on the ideational perspective of sources. This included how the core policy problem was framed, such as the causes of terrorism and community engagement, and the likely effectiveness of different solutions. This stage examined how arguments were constructed or were positioned in relation to conflicting views. This sought to identify where there was common ground within the policy agenda and where there were points of divergence. Points of divergence were then examined to explore whether these were proxies for other disputes to identify where the fundamental trade-offs in decisions making lay. In particular the analysis examined how arguments and disputes were related to the core policy problem and whether they were directly or indirectly representative of fundamental paradigmatic or values based conflicts. The study examined how these ideas and debates evolved over the period and whether their implicit or explicit influence could be traced through decisions.

Weighting sources

In addition to identifying data at face value based on the respondents own recall the coding also applied a critical lens to the data sources. This lens assessed the collected data against the interests and backgrounds of different individuals and the ideas and how they framed their positions. In particular the study also considered how sources framed their relationships within

the policy community in order to understand patterns of authority and where there was informal or formal alignment between different groups or individuals (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). This is relevant to understand both where there may be evidence of institutional change through the formation of advocacy coalitions and the sharing of ideas and arguments across the new policy community. At the same time the nature of the relationships between these groups provides an insight into whether positions were shared on the basis of values or tactics which provides further insight into the patterns of authority over decision-making.

Furthermore, by considering the interests, values and relationships of respondents the study also made judgements about the significance of evidence. The weighting of evidence was particularly important for a highly contested case such as Prevent where there were conflicting commentaries about the process. By considering the weight that should be applied the study aimed to develop an accurate account of authority in decision-making whilst also understanding the different views and perspectives that were present in the process. For example data collected from significant decision makers may be used to draw conclusions about the framing of a particular decision. At the same time aggregated data from a number of sources in proximity to that decision-maker was used to evaluate the factors that influenced that decision. Similarly documents could also be situated within institutional relationships, including where there were documents that were cited by policy makers or official records of decisions such as strategy documents.

Analytic tests

The study then analysed the data to assess what conclusions could be drawn about a discursive process of decision-making and its outcomes. The first indicator focused on the volume of decision-making as a contextual indicator of paradigmatic change. This was then followed by institutional indicators, including changes in the composition of the policy community, the range of actors involved in the process and the formation of advocacy coalitions. Paradigmatic change involved evidence of distributed decision-making with new relationships exerting

influence on decision-making. The study then explored the ideational perspective, including the origins of ideas, the concepts that drove decision-making and how these related to the paradigmatic models. A paradigmatic change to model John entailed an emphasis on resolving conflict in civil society over the role of the state in preventing violence. For an incremental change the ideas that framed Prevent would have focused on improving government's capacity to target rational terrorists organisations.

To demonstrate a 'zero-sum' paradigmatic shift to John would have required a high bar of proof. Furthermore, the indicators used in this study are necessary but are largely not sufficient to prove paradigmatic change (Collier 2011; Mahoney 2012). As a result the study infers its conclusions through a cumulative assessment of the decision-making process through the different analytical lenses described in this chapter. This cumulative approach will be necessary as singular 'smoking gun' evidence is unlikely to be found in a discursive process of ideas and institutional relationships (Mahoney 2012). A failure to find institutional and ideational indicators of change was treated as evidence of incremental Hobbesian change based on Thomas , but process indicators of paradigmatic change evidence of potential shift toward John. By assessing Prevent through the different lenses the study also explores how conflicts between the models may have been settled and how they may have exerted influence throughout the decision-making process.

Conclusion

This chapter has set out how the study developed a case study of Prevent by testing whether decision-making was framed by one of two models of the state, Thomas or John. The case study was grounded in the theory of policy change set out in Chapter 3 and used a series of analytical lenses to build a cumulative assessment of whether the decision-making process represented a paradigmatic change. The study traced the main decisions, examined the ideational and institutional dimensions of the process and tested its features against two models of security. It used process indicators, including the volume of decisions and external inputs,

to provide further reference points for the analysis and conclusions. The study uses these lenses and indicators to examine in depth a dynamic and iterative process of decision-making that resists ‘smoking gun’ style evidence and conclusions. Through this approach the study examines whether Prevent represented a change in policy, the extent of change and why it came about.

Chapter 5: Origins of Prevent 2001 – 2004

Introduction

This chapter explores the period following the 9/11 attacks and concludes with the 2005 general election. It shows how the limits of the narrow Thomas model led to an emerging consensus in support of a broader preventative approach to terrorism. The limits of the Thomas model were exposed by heightened political scrutiny of the government's capacity to prevent terrorism. The security services themselves highlighted the limits of their capability to deal with complex terrorist networks that involved British nationals and the impact of foreign policy and domestic policing on terrorist and extremist recruitment. However, the legal and political limitations of extending and expanding coercive powers were also reached during this period. Crucially, these limits included growing concern about the negative impacts of government policy on the political grievances of the Muslim community and their support for policing. As a result Cabinet took two decisions during the period, firstly to develop a cross government approach to counter terrorism and secondly to address the political alienation of the Muslim community.

Support for a comprehensive approach was linked to the political prominence of security and counter terrorism following attacks in the US and Europe. The 9/11 attacks led to the development of Contest as a whole government counter-terrorism strategy, under the leadership of the then Prime Minster Tony Blair and coordinated by the Cabinet Office. However, the first decisions taken by government largely focused on conventional coercive measures. The most prominent of these were the overseas military interventions to degrade the command and control structure of al-Qaeda and eliminate any security threat from Iraq. Domestically the immediate response focused on reinforcing powers that could be used against terrorist networks and recruiters in the UK. This included a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights on the basis that terrorist threat represented a specific security emergency. These powers were supported by an increase in resourcing for the security services

and active efforts to disrupt domestic networks resulted in a series of high profile arrests and deportations of suspected terrorists.

This period also shows that many in the security policy community itself were concerned that intelligence and enforcement alone would be insufficient to address the complex threat posed by international terrorist networks and domestic recruitment. This concern situated the short-term security challenge in the context of a long-term and persistent threat from al-Qaeda inspired networks in the UK and internationally. This view can be traced in the initial decision to incorporate a Prevent strand as part of a cross-government Contest strategy and the subsequent decision to prioritise it after the Madrid bombings in 2004. In particular it was the security services themselves who highlighted the difficulties of identifying and stopping all terrorist plots even with additional powers and resources. In short, they believed that the challenge of dealing with radical networks that had links with Pakistan and Afghanistan that had been animated by the political conflict over invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan was likely to be beyond their capability, even with increased resources.

There was also growing criticism from outside the security policy community that a narrow state led approach to security was further exacerbating the problem it was trying to solve. This was set in the context of growing political conflict around UK foreign policy allied to concerns about degradation of civil liberties and religious and racial discrimination. Representative groups, such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), as well as Labour Party MPs raised concerns about the consequences of political disaffection amongst British Muslims. Similar concerns in relation to stop and search were also shared by senior police officers, and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. These positions often had different starting points, situated in tactical concern about intelligence flows or a principled focus on the long-term benefits of equality and inclusion. Nevertheless there was broader agreement that the negative consequences of enforcement should be considered. Therefore concern about community grievances was influential in encouraging a re-evaluation of the approach to Contest and the importance of Prevent in particular.

This period concludes with the Cabinet decision to prioritise the Prevent strand in the aftermath of the 2004 Madrid attacks. The decision reflected both the growing and immediate concerns about the terrorist threat alongside broader concerns about the impact of foreign policy and policing on the alienation of the Muslim community. The chapter shows that this resulted in a dual approach that sought to combine strong enforcement with social inclusion, in line with the Labour government's wider home affairs strategy. As part of this the Cabinet Office supported an approach based on a socially rooted causal model of radicalisation as a way of framing the role of different government departments and agencies in resolving a complex policy problem. As part of this the Home Office also drew on previous experience of community engagement work that had supported other public order objectives, including with Black Caribbean communities in London, Northern Ireland and the community cohesion agenda following the 2001 riots. As a result this period established a consensus that Prevent should improve relationships with Muslim civil society by addressing the root causes of terrorism.

Box 5.1: Timeline of events 2001 - 2004

- 9th September 2001: al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington killed 2,996 people
- 7th October: 'Operation enduring freedom', the US led invasion of Afghanistan, commenced with British support.
- 14th December: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act received royal assent.
- 22nd December: Richard Reid (aka 'the shoe bomber') attempted to bomb a transatlantic flight.
- Spring/summer 2002: The decision to develop a cross government counter-terrorism strategy was taken which was subsequently launched as Contest in early 2003.

- 5th January 2003: The Wood Green Ricin Plot arrests were followed by a raid and seizure of weapons from Finsbury Park Mosque, which was subsequently closed.
- 20th March: The US led invasion of Iraq commenced, a continuation of 'Operation enduring freedom', with support from the UK.
- 30th April: Two British citizens carried out bomb attack on Mike's place bar in Tel Aviv.
- 20th November: The British Embassy in Istanbul was bombed, killing 30 people. Two synagogues were also bombed five days earlier.
- 11th March 2004: The Madrid train bombings killed 192 people
- 30th March: The 'Operation Crevice' raids across the Thames Valley area led to arrests and subsequent convictions linked to a 'Fertiliser Bomb' plot.
- April: The Cabinet agreed to prioritise the Prevent strand of the Contest strategy.
- 16th December: The Law Lords ruled that control orders were incompatible with the Human Rights Act and European Convention on Human Rights.

Dealing with the threat of terrorism

This period was dominated by the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq including high profile incidents associated with jihadi terrorism. These included the foiled bombing of transatlantic flight in 2001, a military security presence at Heathrow in 2003 and arrests associated with a ricin bomb plot in 2003 that resulted in the killing of one of the arresting police officers, the 'fertiliser bomb' and 'dirty bomb' plots in 2004.[19] In addition there were successful attacks on the British embassy in Istanbul in 2003

[19] Kamel Bourgass, 31, a suspected al-Qaeda operative from Algeria was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Detective Constable Stephen Oake during a 2003 raid in Manchester and was subsequently sentenced to

that killed 30 people, the bombing of a Tel Aviv night club by two British men and the 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 192 people. Radical Islamists such as Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada also became prominent in the UK media due to their expressed support for militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda, and ideologies. Abu Hamza in particular became a cause celebre in part due to the public spectacle of his sermons outside Finsbury park mosque following his eviction in 2003 until his arrest in 2004.

One of the most significant decisions during the period was the Cabinet's decision in 2004 to prioritise the Prevent strand of the Contest counter-terrorism strategy (Gieve 2004). This was based on concern about growing discontent amongst the Muslim community due to the government's counter-terrorism response and foreign policy. It also linked these grievances and alienation to the potential for encouraging support for extremist views and terrorism. At the heart of this decision was an emerging idea that Prevent should help to 'win hearts and minds' within the Muslim community. This contrasted with the other elements of the Contest strategy that had primarily been based on coercive models of policing and intelligence, primarily underpinned by the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act. The discussion and decision to prioritise an alternative approach to preventing terrorism was set out in correspondence between the Permanent Secretaries to the Cabinet Office and Home Office:

> *"Cabinet recently discussed relations between the Muslim and other communities here in the UK. In a discussion on terrorism, Ministers focused on the need to encourage moderate Muslim opinion to the detriment of extremism both at home and overseas,*

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17 years for plotting to spread ricin and other poisons. Operation Crevice was series of raids in the south east of England and resulted in five men being found guilty in April 2007 of conspiring to cause explosions likely to endanger life. The plot is often known as the 'fertiliser bomb plot' due to the intention to use nitrate fertilisers. The group was led by Omar Khaym, a British man with Pakistani heritage from Crawley, East Sussex. Khaym allegedly travelled to the Malakand terrorist training camp in Afghanistan with Mohammed Sidique Khan the ring leader of the 7/7 London attacks. Mohammed Qayum Khan of Luton, and a potential associated of Omar Bakri Mohammed and Abu Hamza, was alleged to have encouraged and helped Khaym and Khan to travel to the camp, however no charges were ever brought against him. The dirty bomb plot was led by Dihren Barot, an Indian born British Muslim convert, along with seven other British Pakistani men from Luton however the group were convicted for possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism materials but didn't have equipment or funding.

and the extent to which a sense of isolation and disaffection within parts of the Muslim community is leading to acts of terrorism." (Gieve 2004 p1)

The decision was taken in the context of the government's wider focus on implementing a robust response to an exceptional international terrorist threat. The exceptional nature of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington is illustrated by the fact that Parliament was recalled three times in the immediate aftermath. Blair's statements to the House of Commons also highlighted the scale and international coordination of the attacks as evidence of the increased chance of catastrophic consequences from terrorism, and supported in much of the subsequent debate. The first recall of Parliament was on the 14th of September 2001, 3 days after the attacks to provide an initial briefing on the events. In his opening statement Blair set out the likelihood of a large number of casualties and anticipated that:

> *"In this case, we are talking here about a tragedy of epoch making proportions."* Tony Blair (HC Deb, 14 Sept 2001, c605)

The initial statements to the house also set out the actions that the government had taken or was planning to take in response to the attack. The first statement confirmed that NATO Article 5 of collective defence had been invoked and that the UN Security Council had passed a resolution to take all necessary steps to combat terrorism. Blair also outlined the security controls that were being introduced at ports, in particular at airports, to restrict movement of potential suspects and address vulnerabilities for aviation security. The statement also set out the medium term objective of targeting al-Qaeda, its networks and supporters:

> *"Our objective will be to bring to account those who have organised, aided, abetted and incited this act of infamy"* Tony Blair (HC Deb, 14 Sept 2001, c605)

The next two recalls of parliament illustrated the longer-term policy impact of 9/11. On the 4th October 2001 Blair set out the government's belief that al-Qaeda had coordinated the attacks from a safe haven in Afghanistan. The statement also set out the history of the group, including its ideological views, its declaration of war against the United States and the West and details

of various other attacks prior to 9/11. The third recall, on the 8th October 2001, confirmed that military action in Afghanistan had been launched with the intention of degrading al-Qaeda. In his statement Blair argued that the problem of al-Qaeda represented a long-term challenge.

> *"Even when al-Qaeda is dealt with, the job will not be over. The network of international terrorism is not confined to it… We in Britain have the most direct interest in defeating such terror. It strikes at the heart of what we believe in. We know that, if not stopped, the terrorists will do it again, possibly this time in Britain."* Tony Blair (HC Deb 08 October 2001, vol372 c813)

The framework for security policy appears to have been fundamentally changed by this new landscape, the most significant example being the decision to invade Iraq. According to statements by Blair at the time and subsequently, the US was justified in broadening the scope of its military response to include Iraq, even without direct links to al-Qaeda terrorism, as risk assessments had to change following 9/11. Blair also situated this position within the context of the government's decision to maintain a close strategic alliance with the United States, which on the basis of existing US policy also meant working toward regime change in Iraq. In his evidence to the Chilcot enquiry in 2011 Blair argued that the potential for catastrophic attacks meant that potential threats could no longer tolerated:

> *"Now where I think the analogy [with Hitler] is valid is in saying even though we may look at the world today and say does it really matter? Is Iran that much of a threat? Supposing we just let Saddam carry on, would it really have been such a problem? My anxiety is that yes, we cannot take that risk, that after September 11th, the calculus of risk had to change and change fundamentally."* (Blair 2011)

Although this view is likely to represent, at least in part, a post-hoc rationalisation of the various factors that led to the invasion, the decision itself and the use of this argument do suggest that decision-making was fundamentally changed by 9/11. This position also highlights a much lower tolerance of security risks and a resultant increase in the priority given to actions that

could prevent potential attacks. Other statements by Tony Blair from the time also corroborate this argument, including references to the potential impact of future attacks if non-conventional weapons were used:

> *"Let us make this reflection too. A week ago, anyone suggesting that terrorists would kill thousands of innocent people in downtown New York would have been dismissed as alarmist, yet it happened. We know that these groups are fanatics, capable of killing without discrimination. The limits on the numbers that they kill and their methods of killing are not governed by any sense of morality. The limits are only practical and technical. We know, that they would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We know, also, that there are groups of people, occasionally states, who will trade the technology and capability of such weapons."* Tony Blair (HC Deb, 14 Sept 2001, c606)

Notably, government statements on international action being taken following 9/11 made regular reference to dealing with the root causes of terrorism. This linked short-term concerns about the impacts of overseas military action with a longer-term international development agenda, including poverty alleviation, international trade and human rights standards. This approach also brought together the security and the humanitarian rationales for military interventions that had developed under Tony Blair, most notably in relation to Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000). This framed failed states, including the political, economic and social conditions that lead to social civil and ethnic conflicts, as spaces for the development of anti-democratic international terrorist groups. The link between development and violence was applied to Afghanistan where al-Qaeda had established a stable base for operations in the aftermath of a civil war and is illustrated by a 2002 Cabinet Office progress report:

> *"Addressing the root causes of terrorism is a major task requiring sustained international engagement over the long term. Much of this work ties in with the Government's broader foreign policy and development objectives. Well before the*

events of 11 September, the UK was actively engaged in working to spread the benefits of globalisation, to improve respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law and to promote democracy and good governance. We were at the forefront of international efforts to break the vicious cycle of poverty, working to reduce debt, remove unfair trade barriers, tackle killer disease and increase flows of development assistance. The UK was a strong and active supporter of the Millennium Development Goals, to which the international community committed itself. These remain the benchmark by which our efforts to eliminate poverty and its consequences will be judged. Since 11 September, all this work has become even more important." (Cabinet Office, 2002)

A whole government approach

The precursor to the 2004 Cabinet decision to prioritise Prevent was the introduction of the whole government counter-terrorism strategy, Contest. Contest was agreed toward the end of 2002 following the invasion of Afghanistan and took effect in early 2003 prior to the invasion of Iraq. The strategy was part of Tony Blair's leadership of the response to 9/11 and was supported by the Home Office in order to secure engagement by other departments and agencies with the goals of the agenda. Contest was preceded by the appointment of Sir David Omand to the new post of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet Office to improve the *'capacity to co-ordinate security, intelligence and consequence-management matters'* (CNN 2002). The approach aligned with the Cabinet Office's increased policy making role, including the Prime Minister's Strategy, Policy and Implementation Units, which represented a counterpoint to the authority of the Treasury under Gordon Brown.

The strategy was a risk management model in contrast to the preference for US threat elimination (Omand 2012). The benefits of the involvement of the Cabinet Office can be seen in the involvement of various government departments at the time, including those with

responsibility for transport, energy, health and emergency services (Cabinet Office 2002). The strategy was structured around four strands, Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. In addition to 'Pursuing' those involved in terrorism, early activity also focused on 'Protecting' potential targets and 'Preparing' in order to minimise harm. However, there was comparatively less activity around preventing people from joining terrorist groups. Some of this was linked to uncertainty about the what prevention would entail, and by extension therefore, limited engagement from other relevant departments (Advisors 2 and 6). Equally, this also represented a prioritisation of the other strands in the immediate response, in particular new security powers.

Limits of security powers

The whole government strategy, including Prevent, was motivated by a consensus that a narrow reliance on counter-terrorism powers to deter or disrupt plots down-stream was insufficient to deal with the threat. The Cabinet Office took on responsibility for coordinating Contest whilst implementation of the strategy remained the responsibility of the relevant government departments. The Home Office delivered the cross-departmental review that underpinned the strategic approach set out in Contest, which also shows it retained much of the policy making capacity behind Contest and Prevent at the time. The initial policy focus post 9/11 was on the extension of counter-terrorism powers. These were justified by the urgent need to stop attacks by ideologically committed groups that sought to challenge the authority of the government and the rule of law. These powers were also subject to extensive debate about the balance with domestic and international human rights laws that represented political and legal limits to security policy.

Following the 9/11 attacks the Home Office introduced the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act in October 2001. The measures reflected a continuation of the approach that underpinned the 2000 Terrorism Act and introduced new powers and offences to detain individuals suspected of involvement with terrorism. The 2001 Act also amended the Crime and Public

Disorder Act (1998) to include religion alongside racially aggravated offences. This represented an acknowledgement of potential public order issues following 9/11 as well as a need to allay the concerns of the Muslim community. The Home Office justified the new powers on the basis of the complexity of investigating plots involving international networks and the sensitivity of covert intelligence. The 2001 Act was explicitly introduced to parliament as an updating of the 2000 Act by the Home Secretary, David Blunkett:

> *"Although the nature and the level of the threat is different from what was previously envisaged, wholesale revision of our anti-terrorism laws is unnecessary. That is also the view of the law enforcement agencies. However, we do need specific and targeted measures, which is why I intend to introduce an emergency anti-terrorism Bill."* David Blunkett (HC deb 15 Oct 2001, c923)

Although this argument was intended to reassure critics it was also borne out to a degree by the prominence of 2000 Act powers throughout the subsequent decade, most notably stop and search powers. The 2000 Act itself had been introduced following the 1998 Good Friday agreement in order to formalise various temporary counter-terrorism powers that had primarily been introduced in response to terrorism in Northern Ireland. It updated the power to proscribe groups suspected of being terrorist organisations and prosecute members under terrorism legislation. In particular it introduced powers under Section 44 for police to stop and search individuals in designated areas without suspicion. However, the use of Section 44 was highlighted for having a disproportionate impact on Muslims and became part of the argument about the consequences on the police's relationship with the community. Nevertheless the power continued to be an important feature of counter-terrorism policing throughout the period.[20]

[20] The Section 44 power was significantly reformed by the Protection of Freedoms Act in 2012. Areas can be still be authorized by a senior police officer on the basis of reasonable suspicion that an act of terrorism may take place, but only for a maximum of 14 days and with a need for confirmation by the Secretary of State.

The 2001 Act did introduce significant new powers to detain foreign nationals considered a risk to national security. The power resulted in restrictions being placed on individuals who were thought to represented a potential threat due to their connections with terrorist networks, including some who had previously been tolerated, pending their deportation. Although this was an immigration power pending deportation the detention was effectively indefinite in nine cases as deportation was not possible due to potential human rights violations in the receiving country. All the individuals were Muslim men which led to criticism by activist groups, including radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tarir, that the power, alongside stop and search, was specifically targeted at Muslims. The power required derogation from Article 5 of the European convention on human rights, on the basis that there was an immediate public emergency threatening the life of the nation (Article 15). The subsequent 2003 Criminal Justice Act also extended the pre-charge detention period for terrorist offences from 7 to 14 days.

The powers were justified on the basis of preventing terrorist attacks and were founded on the difficulty of prosecuting terrorist offences due to the sensitivity of sources or the challenge of meeting a criminal threshold. Beverly Hughes, then Home Office Minister of State for Immigration, Citizenship and Counterterrorism, illustrated this during the debate about extending pre-charge detention in the 2003 Criminal Justice Act. She framed the extension of pre-charge detention as part of measures to prevent suspected attacks from taking place:

> *"In respect of terrorist suspects, somebody is most often arrested to prevent an event that intelligence has told the police and the security services might otherwise take place."* Beverly Hughes (HC deb, 20 May 2003, c943)

Significant political and legal limits were applied to the powers. The extension of counter-terrorism powers was supported by the Labour and Conservative party leaderships. However, parliamentary scrutiny and opposition to the legislation resulted in the inclusion of sunset clauses for some powers, particularly the detention of foreign nationals without charge.[21]

[21] A sunset clause in legislation typically means that a particular power is time-limited and required active renewal of consent by parliament to continue

Following criticisms of the 2001 Act by the Newton Committee of the House of Lords in 2004, the Home Office sought to defend its measures as a balanced response to upholding the government's contract with citizens to protect their individual rights of security:

> *"There is nothing new about the dilemma of how best to ensure the security of a society, while protecting the individual rights of its citizens. Democratic governments have always had to strike a balance between the powers of the state and the rights of individuals."* Forward by David Blunkett in Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society (Home Office 2004b)

On the other hand, the Newton committee argued that the derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was unsustainable. The Law Lords supported this view in December 2004 when they ruled on the power to detain foreign nationals awaiting deportation and the on-going derogation from the ECHR unlawful (HL opinions, 16 December 2004, UKHL 56). There was also persistent opposition to the powers in the parliamentary Labour and Conservative parties as well as civil liberties groups. These opponents shared principled and practical concerns that extension of executive powers could undermine the rule of law and the relationship between government and citizens. For example civil rights advocacy group Liberty argued that Section 44 stop and search powers were likely to result in unnecessary detentions and arrests and that the 2001 Act's provisions for detention without charge subverted the principle of habeas corpus. This opposition further contributed to the political and legal restrictions on the extent to which these types of powers could be extended.

Limits of the security and intelligence services

Although the role of the security and intelligence services was enhanced following 9/11 the complexity of the new threat also highlighted the limits of their capabilities. They advised that the terrorist threat was likely to be exacerbated by the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also highlighted the challenge of dealing with an internationally networked structure that was facilitated by key individuals, some of whom had already been detained

under the powers of the 2001 Act. The publication of Jason Burke's *'Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam'* in 2004 (Burke 2004), served to broaden understanding of the internationally networked nature of Islamist militancy and its range of affiliates amongst threat amongst policy makers. The growing understanding of the threat was also influential in encouraging further consideration of what role other parts of government could play. This included growing interest in how to address the supply of domestic recruits to international terrorist networks.

The al-Qaeda threat in this period was understood as a core command group linked to Osama Bin Laden and a looser global network of affiliate groups that shared radical Islamist and jihadi beliefs. Where previously radicals in the UK with relationships with overseas militant Islamist groups and networks had been tolerated, including as useful sources of intelligence, these individuals and networks were now viewed as a direct threats. The intelligence services also believed that this represented a new type of threat that contrasted with the experience of Northern Irish or state sponsored terrorism. This included the growing presence of British recruits into international jihadist networks, often with familial links to Pakistan that facilitated access to training camps in Afghanistan. The Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office highlighted these concerns in 2004:

> *"The Security Service has some evidence that those who go on to become involved in terrorist related activity have been radicalised as a result of associating with loose networks that revolve around a respected key individual. Indeed, many have been encouraged to retain a low profile and not to be seen to openly expose extremist views."* (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office 2004)

Both MI5 and MI6 clearly played an influential role in counter-terrorism policy during this period. This was supported by the hosting of the Joint Intelligence Committee by the Cabinet Office that was intended to provide intelligence on the threat from al-Qaeda and coordinate the government's response. This committee played a prominent role in the post 9/11 response and provided the intelligence assessments that informed the decision to invade Iraq. Furthermore,

the security services also played a role in informing the Home Secretary's decisions to detain individuals under the 2001 Act. This growing role was illustrated by comments from various heads of MI5 during this period. For example Stephen Lander, Director-General of MI5 until 2002, commented on how the relationship with policy makers changed at the time:

> *"During the Cold War the day to day work of the Service did not engage ministerial attention at all since it concerned the intricacies of security (vetting, visas etc.) in the context of a well understood strategic threat. Today with over 60% of our work on terrorism, what we do and what we find out can be of direct relevance to Ministers' day to day concerns."* (Lander cited in Andrew, nd)

The complexity of the threat helped the security services to secure additional resources for their statutory duty to protect against terrorism, foreign powers and actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy. Following the end of the cold war MI6 in particular had struggled to renew their role and focus. After 9/11 increased funding for both MI5 and MI6 reflected the renewed importance of intelligence to the effective implementation of Contest. This included a process of building internal capability to deal with the networked organisational structure of al-Qaeda that was outlined by then Director General of MI5 Eliza Manningham-Buller in a speech given in 2003:

> *"For the first time in many years, the Security Service is increasing in size. The Government has provided increased resources to the Agencies to meet the extra demands for our work. Recruitment is at an all time high. Last year, and as a direct result of open recruitment, we recruited over 200 new staff to the Service. Recruitment from the ethnic minorities remains a priority for me and, again, we had our best ever year's ethnic minority recruitment. Counter-terrorism has increased its share of the Service's overall effort. Last year over 32% of our effort was devoted to international counter-terrorism, this figure will increase still further."* (Manningham-Buller 2003)

The need to rapidly develop capacity in order to deal with the new threat was evidenced by open recruitment by both agencies and the increased proportion of activity tasked to terrorism. The Contest strategy itself required a tactical shift away from tolerating the presence of radicals and extremists that weren't actively involved in developing plots targeted at the UK or its close allies as intelligence sources. In particular, more aggressive prosecution, deportation or use of control orders against those suspected of involvement in terrorism meant this strategy was no longer viable. Also notable was Manningham-Buller's reference to an increase in ethnic minority staff. This was likely to be influenced by the on the immediate operational need for staff from ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds that could help in generating intelligence on the relevant networks and groups. In addition it will have been influenced by the wider government agenda of improving workforce diversity following the MacPherson report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (MacPherson 1999).[22]

[22] The inquiry found the failure of the Metropolitan Police investigation of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 was due to institutionally racist attitudes and made recommendations for race equality reforms that had wider implications for other public authorities.

Understanding radicalisation

> *"Our understanding of the radicalisation process (what we have begun to call the "Terrorist Career Path") is still developing. Much more work needs to be done to identify the steps along the path where Government and community groups can intervene and prevent radicalisation. As our research progresses, it will inform the cross-governmental work being done on engaging with the Muslim communities."* (Turnbull 2004)

During this period new ideas and evidence emerged about the causes of terrorism that were relevant to the subsequent development of Prevent. The security services highlighted the networked nature of recruitment, with the roles of individuals and social groups. The Home Office also undertook a wider analysis of various social and identity process that were thought to be contributing factors to recruitment. This analysis was developed as part of an assessment of policy options for preventing terrorism upstream and was influential in framing the response to the Cabinet's decision to prioritise Prevent. The briefing bought together input from a variety of sources, including the security services, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office's Strategy Unit and the Home Office. In particular framing recruitment as a process of radicalisation enabled consideration of different types of upstream interventions and the potential roles for different government departments not traditionally involved in security policy.

This model went beyond just a narrow focus on the strategy, tactics and recruitment practices of terrorist groups. In many ways it aligned with the bottom up 'bunch of guys' model put forward by Marc Sageman in his 2004 book 'Understanding Terror Networks' (Sageman 2004). This focused on the small group dynamics, often formed around friendship or kinship networks, and an entrepreneurial member who had relevant contacts and leadership skills. At the time the briefing acknowledged gaps in understanding, including how grievances were translated into radical political views and then action, including non-violent or violent action.

However, the briefing encouraged consideration of the formation of identity in a wider social context, including the socio-economic experiences of Muslim communities in the UK. One respondent who worked as an advisor to the Home Office and other departments during the period noted the role of the Home Office in leading this analysis at the time:

> *"The Strategic Policy Team at the Home Office were doing cross departmental work looking at Muslims and disaffection after the 2001 riots and 9/11, before 7/7. What was interesting at that time was how much the research literature looked at issues of social exclusion employment and education and Muslim identity politics and role that it plays, and that complexity wasn't in the public debate."* Advisor 2

The analysis also argued that Prevent had to address the ideological framework and narrative promoted by the radical Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tarir and Al-Mujharoun. It set out how the two groups sought to mobilise community grievances into a unified Muslim political bloc. The briefing also identified the personal and political salience of Muslim identity to the community that helped to frame contemporary concerns about foreign policy and policing. In addition it also positioned the socio-economic context for Muslim communities as a structural factor that was aiding the mobilisation of radical Islamist politics (Saggar 2010a). However this stopped short of a direct causal relationship between terrorism and with socio-economic status and noted that individuals involved in terrorism and extremism could come from a variety of educational and economic backgrounds. It also highlighted that the young age of Muslims in the UK presented a challenge to the traditional authority of community and family institutions that may increase the attractiveness of radical political and religious identities.

The analysis highlighted the importance of Muslim identity and political views in comparison to other faith groups, particularly amongst younger generations of the Muslim community born in Britain. This was allied to significant concern about foreign policy, including a widespread view that the war on terror was a war on Islam (57-70%) and opposition to the Iraq war (80%). The briefing also included analysis of Muslim attitudes toward their relationship with the UK.

For example between 7-15% thought the September 11 attacks were justified but a much greater proportion - between 67-85% - thought they were not justified; 67-87% felt very or fairly loyal/patriotic towards Britain while between 8-26% felt not very or not at all loyal/patriotic; 15-24% thought it was ok for British Muslims to fight with the Taliban but 62% disagreed. These figures were not benchmarked against the general population but were interpreted to indicate the presence a small group with antithetical views of Britain and the West, which had some tacit support in the broader Muslim population (Saggar 2006).

The focus on a set of causal factors also aligned with other multi-agency approaches that dealt with social exclusion. The Cabinet Office at the time had a strategic role for 'incubating and catalysing change' and challenging business as usual in Whitehall' (Institute for Government 2014). Tony Blair described the Strategy Unit of the Cabinet Office as looking ahead *'at the way policy would develop, the fresh challenges and new ideas to meet them'* (Blair 2011b p339). By developing an understanding of social causes policy makers could develop a strategic and systemic view of policy problems, failures and interventions and the role of different agencies (Newman 2001a & 6 et al 2002). In particular, the Strategy Unit commissioned and produced a number of reports looking at the root causes of policy problems in order to shape cross government policy interventions. The Cabinet Office was also able to disseminate expertise across government and beyond as well as coordinating national and local delivery.

This type of approach was particularly championed by the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU). The unit, which worked to improve policy-making specifically around social exclusion transferred in 2004 from the Cabinet Office to the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister, which had responsibility for local government delivery. Examples of reports prepared by the SEU included ethnic minorities in the labour market, jobs and enterprise in deprived areas, mental health and social exclusion, reducing reoffending and neighbourhood renewal (ODPM 2004). Notably, the 2003 report on ethnic minorities in the labour market set out a disaggregated view of ethnic minority communities and the complex set of intersecting factors that underpinned

economic exclusion. These included historic migrant origins and settlement patterns, educational performance and local engagement with public authorities and services. Similarly, the proposed solutions went beyond non-discrimination legislation toward proactive developmental activities to build the skills and capabilities of ethnic minority communities and support advancement in the labour market.

The relationships with the Muslim community

> *"[After 9/11] We were in and out of government offices. That is when we became engaged with government about radicalisation and extremism".* Advisor 3

The government decision to increase active engagement with the Muslim community responded to growing concern shared across government about the consequences of counter-terrorism policy. The first and most public engagement was motivated by public order concerns about potential increases in racially motivated attacks and intimidation against the Muslim community in the aftermath of 9/11, including public statements by Tony Blair in the aftermath of attacks. The second element related to concerns about the operational impact of alienating large sections of the Muslim community that was shared by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Security Services. Finally there were growing political concerns in relation to Muslim public opinion, particularly about the negative impact of overseas interventions, that was directly relevant to a number of Labour party MPs, including Cabinet members. This was influenced by the MCB, who had adopted a leadership position on behalf of the Muslim community by virtue of being a representative organisation for a large number of Mosques.

Following 9/11 much of this work focused on managing public order in the context of increased scrutiny of the relationship between Islam and the threat from al-Qaeda. In particular this included reassurance activity with the community to address concerns about reprisals against Muslims. There was a significant increase in the media scrutiny of Islam that focused on the views and lifestyles of prominent Islamist radicals, such as Abu Hamza. This increased scrutiny

is illustrated by the increase in mentions of Islam in Hansard following 9/11, many of which are examples of MPs stressing the need to avoid linking Islam and terrorism (Figure 5.1). Tony Blair's own initial statement on October the 4th 2001 emphasised that Muslims were victims of 9/11 who shared the outrage at attacks that were contrary to the teaching of Islam. There were also a series of events and outreach activities by Blair and other senior ministers, including joint condemnation of terrorism with Muslim leaders at events and press calls, often held at mosques.

Figure 5.1: Mentions of Islam in Hansard



(www,parli-n-grams.puntofisso.net retrieved 22 Feb 2017)

During this time Labour MPs representing constituencies with large Muslim populations also highlighted concerns around community relations. Cabinet members with significant Muslim populations included Jack Straw, who represented the constituency of Blackburn and as Foreign Secretary would have been involved in the 2004 Cabinet decision. Backbench MP Ann Taylor, MP for Dewsbury, which was home to three of the four 7/7 bombers, was also Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee would have had the intelligence briefings about the threat to the UK following military action. Other backbench Labour MPs also made regular contributions about issues associated with the integration and experiences of Muslim South

Asian communities. For example, Ann Cryer, MP for Keighley, made a series of parliamentary contributions about the segregation of Muslim communities in schools, abuse of immigration policy by families arranging marriages with cousins from Pakistan or Bangladesh (for example HC deb, 22 November 2001, vol375 c448-51; HC deb, 07 February 2002, vol379 c1027-40; HC deb, 19 March 2003 vol401 c270-94WH and HC deb, 17 September 2003 vol410 c264-71WH).

Box 5.2: Examples of engagement work underway by the Home Office and Policing as described in the 2006 Contest strategy (HM Government 2006):

- "We are discussing with Muslim representatives their community's concerns about the operation of anti-terrorist powers. Substantial progress has been made in building a closer relationship with the Muslim Council of Britain.
- The MCB letter of 31 March to Imams and Mosques urging them to be clearer about the incompatibility, of terrorism with Islam and about the need for Muslims to co-operate with the police represented a significant step forward.
- The Association of Chief Police Officers-chaired Muslim Safety Forum has become an increasingly important channel for Muslim/police relations and will be developed as necessary."

In addition to community reassurances, engagement was also driven by growing operational concern about the need for positive community relations for effective counter-terrorism policing (see for example Box 5.2). This initial rationale was highlighted in the 2002 Cabinet Office update:

> *"Liaison between the police and all sections of the community across the UK has been vital to provide essential reassurance and isolate those extremists seeking to promote terrorism and encourage community disquiet. It has also been important in ensuring*

> *that increased security demands do not have a detrimental effect on community relations – helped by the network of key community contacts and, most recently, by the embryonic Muslim Safety Forum."* (Cabinet Office 2002)

The operational consequence of poor engagement with the Muslim community was highlighted by senior police officers and the security services around 2003. Concerns raised by members of ACPO centred on the ability to identify potential terrorist networks and recruiters. This included mistrust fostered by underdeveloped institutional relationships and experiences of racism that were exacerbated post 9/11 by overuse of Section 44 stop and search powers and the use of detention without trial. Some police outreach initiatives, including the Muslim Safety Forum and the Muslim Contact Unit of the London Metropolitan Police, were established to address this problem. However, there was a view that the use of coercive counter-terrorism powers was doing significant damage to community relationships:

> *Prevent wasn't really on the table with a raft of active measures that you could point to and say that we were trying to do things, so the only thing was enforcement… They used Section 44 because 'what a great power it is', but that did us no end of harm, not just in terms of getting broader community support."* Chief Police Officer

At the time the MCB was actively working to establish its own position as the lead representative body for the wider Muslim community. It was set up in 1997 with the aim of representing Islam in the UK and to promote issues that concerned the Muslim community. Although it was structured as a membership organisation for Muslim religious organisations it adopted a much broader mission that included reformist Islamist positions that sought to actively advance the place of Islam in public life. The MCB's mission framed ethnically diverse South Asian and Middle Eastern communities in the UK through a shared Muslim identity. Its members included prominent institutions such as the East London Mosque, the Islamic Institute at Markfield and the Green Lanes mosque in Birmingham. Through this work the MCB had established a relationship with government, including funding from the Department for Trade

and Industry to raise awareness on the Employment Equality Regulations on sexual orientation, religion and belief between 2001 and 2005.

In the aftermath of 9/11 the Home Office and Cabinet Office and MCB discussed community safety concerns and ways to mitigate the negative impacts of policing. In these discussions the MCB actively highlighted the concerns about the impact of counter-terrorism policing on the Muslim community (MCB 2003) as well as via a number of other private and public channels. In particular the MCB gave evidence to the Home Affairs select committee as part of an inquiry into counter-terrorism policing in late 2004 and to the Independent Reviewer of counter-terrorism powers. Both agreed with the MCB view that stop and search was being overused on Muslims, with negative consequences for relations with the community. The MCB's view of the impact of counter-terrorism powers was presented to the Home Affairs committee in July 2004 by Sadiq Khan, then Chair of the MCB Legal Affairs Committee, and subsequently elected as Labour MP for Tooting in 2005:

> *"We believe it's use, as perceived in the community, is an extremely negative one and it is doing a disservice to the partnership that we believe there must be in fighting terrorism. Also we believe there are serious issues about the use of the intelligence with regard to Section 44 and query how that intelligence is being analysed. There are one or two explanations: either the intelligence is extremely flawed which begs serious questions or, frankly, the exercise of discretion by the police is seriously flawed which also requires examination."* (Home Affairs Committee 2005)

The MCB also actively opposed the Iraq war, reflecting the broader opinion in the British Muslim community. The primary reason for opposition to the invasion in the Muslim community was founded on humanitarian concerns about the impact of an invasion on Muslim's living in Iraq. This opposition was also shared by a many, if not a majority of the UK public, depending on the extent to which there was evidence of weapons of mass destruction and the level of UN Security Council support (Mortimore 2003). The consensus

rationale for opposing the Iraq war was articulated by Charles Kennedy's at a rally in Hyde Park on the 15 February 2003, as part of international protests against the invasion. The rationale put forward was that any intervention required the full mandate and legitimacy of the United Nations and that it had to be based on full information from the UN weapons inspectors.

The MCB was an active participant in the Stop the War Coalition that bought together a range of campaigning groups in opposition to the invasion. This aligned the MCB with left wing groups in opposition to the government, including the Labour Socialist Campaign Group that included backbench MPs Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell, plus London Mayor Ken Livingston. This group shared the MCB's humanitarian opposition to western interventionism and argued that military intervention was unlikely to solve the political and social problems of Afghanistan or Iraq. They advocated a strategy of non-intervention, plus political engagement and economic development and questioned the ability and likely commitment of the US government to undertake the necessary rebuilding work after military intervention. For the radical socialist and Islamist groups these arguments were also underpinned by shared anti-imperialist critiques of western foreign policy. This critique focused on US and UK support for Israel as well as questioning western support for other authoritarian governments in the Middle East.

Iraq was a highly divisive political issue for the Labour government and a persistent personal vulnerability for Tony Blair. Although public opinion about the invasion was split, as noted previously it tended to turn on the presence of WMD and UN support. In final polling before the invasion a quarter of the public told Mori polling (26%) that they would support British troops being used without proof that Iraq is hiding weapons or a new Security Council resolution, while 63% would oppose (Mortimore 2003). In contrast three quarters were in favour if inspectors did find evidence of WMD and a second Security Council resolution was passed. In contrast YouGov found a majority in support for the war at the time of the invasion but also found a progressive shift in attitudes against the decision over time (Figure 5.2). Although public opinion of the invasion and Blair's own handling subsequently declined in

light of the failure to find WMD and problems of occupation it did not prevent Labour from winning the 2005 election (Box 5.3).

Figure 5.2: YouGov polling of support for military action in Iraq



(Dahlgreen 2015)

Although Labour won the election in May 2005 the result highlight the Blair's political vulnerabilities associated with the post 9/11 response. Labour's majority fell from 160 to 66 which whilst still a comfortable working majority was a substantial reduction. In contrast the Liberal Democrats who had opposed the war won an extra 11 seats, up to 62 in total. Labour's vulnerability amongst Muslim voters was also emphasised by the victory of George Galloway for the Respect Party in Bethnal Green and Bow, a constituency with a large Muslim Bangladeshi population. Respect was formed out of elements of the Stop the War Coalition and brought together a number of far left and Islamist groups. Galloway defeated the sitting Labour MP Oona King, overturning a large majority of 10,000 to win by 823 votes, a swing of 26.2%. The campaign was highly controversial and included a number of accusations of voter intimidation and anti-Semitism due to King's mixed Jewish and African-American family heritage.

Box 5.3: Ipsos opinion polling of Tony Blair's handling of Iraq war

Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is handling the current situation with Iraq?

	25-27 Jul 2003	17-21 Feb 2005	11-13 May 2007
	%	%	%
Approve	32	28	17
Disapprove	55	63	77
Don't know	13	9	6
Net approve	-23	-35	-60

Base: c. 600-1,000 GB adults aged 18+

(Ipsos Mori 2007)

The Home Office believed that the conflict between the government and the Muslim community over the invasion of Iraq required pro-active management. Home Office ministers undertook a programme of outreach and engagement with Muslim community organisations and groups during 2003 (Advisor 7). However feedback from this engagement and its consideration in the Prevent agenda further highlighted the ongoing political conflict over the decision to invade Iraq. Given the contentious nature of the decision Blair had underpinned the government's authority through a parliamentary vote. Although taking the vote to parliament was potentially a high-risk strategy only 217 MPs supported an amendment opposing intervention. However, the government relied on Conservative support as 139 of its own MPs voted against, more than its official majority of 88 at the 2001 election. The vote afforded the

government's decision constitutional and parliamentary authority for the invasion but it continued to be an issue of ongoing political conflict and vulnerability for the Labour party.[23]

Persistent questioning of the decision to invade further exacerbated the Labour leaderships' political sensitivity. The Hutton Inquiry and Butler review, published in January and June 2004 respectively, raised questioned about the legitimacy of aspects of the decision. The Hutton inquiry reviewed the circumstances of the death of Dr David Kelly, a government advisor who had been the source of criticisms of the intelligence used in support of the invasion. This was followed by the Butler inquiry into the use of intelligence that criticised an informal sofa style of decision-making by the Blair government. Butler noted that the detailed use of intelligence in advocacy for military intervention was unique and that it went beyond a dispassionate assessment of intelligence on Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical and ballistic missile programmes. However, he also found that the publication did not go beyond the JIC position and suggested that the nuance had been lost in the process of translating material from the original assessment. Given the nature of the findings the invasion continued to be a significant division within the Labour party and point of conflict with Muslim community groups and representatives. [24]

Social inclusion policy

> *"The overriding assumption in the Labour government was that multiculturalism was about right. Other issues and tensions between different communities were essentially economy and poverty related; so as we got things going on living standards and tax credits things would be fine. We had a commitment to rigorous equal opportunities legislation but New Labour did not do identity. So when the Cantle report comes along*

[23] The ongoing salience of the decision to invade Iraq and the controversy in the Labour party can be traced to the election of Jeremy Corbyn, a perennial backbench rebel, as Labour leader by Labour members and supporters following the 2015 election defeat and again in 2016 after the referendum to leave the EU.

[24] The Butler report was actually highly critical of the quality of decision-making that led to the invasion. However, although its analysis was fascinating for those interested in the anatomy of such a sensitive and significant decision, it was of less interest for those looking for a smoking gun of culpability. Neither were its findings sufficient to challenge the political standing of Blair in the short term.

and says there is a whole heap of stuff about physical segregation but its also about values, identity and whether we have a common story, that was challenging." Government minister

The Labour government's wider programme for government, set out in the 2001 manifesto, framed much of the emergent response around the causes of terrorism and community engagement (The Labour Party 2001). Firstly there was an overarching agenda of public service renewal to deal with complex policy problems through institutional reform. The second important dimension was focused on local approaches to welfare and social inclusion that directed funding through the new deal for communities and new deal for employment. This focused on supporting individuals and communities to address problems barriers to employment through different types of tailored support. There was also a commitment to address racial inequalities in services by working with the voluntary sector including community and religious groups. Finally, and perhaps most importantly there was an on-going focus on criminal justice that positioned strong enforcement alongside community empowerment. This is illustrated by the following ambition set out in the 2001 manifesto:

Fourth, we will strengthen our communities. We will reform the criminal justice system at every level so that criminals are caught, punished and rehabilitated. And because we know that without tackling the causes of crime we will never tackle crime, we will empower local communities by combining resources with responsibility. Ambitions for Britain, Labour's manifesto 2001 (The Labour Party 2001)

The dual focus on public service reform and community development framed much of the Home Office and Cabinet Office's work during this period, including the initial development of Prevent. The approach was predicated on working with the Muslim community to address a variety of social issues that were indirectly linked to the causes of terrorism. This would help to improve relationships with the community whilst also developing opportunities to It promote changes in attitudes and behaviours. The Home Office emphasised improving engagement with

the Muslim community due to political conflict and mistrust. The Cabinet Office highlighted the challenge of implementing a complex programme that required the involvement of a range of agencies and organisations with little prior experience. This produced a consensus that Prevent would require a developmental approach with high-level and long-term objectives of social change, whilst emphasising short term partnership between the Muslim community and government agencies.

The broad approach to Prevent was set out in the briefing paper on Young Muslims and Extremism, which accompanied correspondence between Home Office and Cabinet Office following the Cabinet decision to prioritise Prevent (Turnbull 2004). The Home Office emphasised that a small but vocal minority were attempting to promote a radical approach to Islam by capitalising on alienation linked to counter-terrorism policing. Given this, the Home Office recommended the development of an engagement strategy that emphasised winning allies amongst the majority of the community, most of whom considered themselves British and were not especially religious or ideological. This also highlighted a particular need to give young people opportunities to explore Muslim and British identities in order to counter alienation and polarisation toward a narrow radical identity. Specific recommendations at this point also included avoiding alienating the wider community by linking expressions of Muslim faith and identity to extremism through use of phrases such as `Islamic fundamentalism'.

The briefing paper also drew on the Home Office's community cohesion work that had developed following the 2001 riots and other community engagement experience. Cited as an author of the briefing paper is Mark Carroll, Director for Race, Cohesion, Equality and Faith. This was a historic post that had its origins in the 1980s in response to the Brixton and Toxteth riots and the need to improve dialogue with black Caribbean communities. The Home Office and other public agencies were also responding to the MacPherson report that had found evidence of institutional racism and required public bodies to evaluate their engagement with minority communities for potentially discriminatory attitudes and practices (MacPherson 1999). Similarly the cohesion agenda raised questions about the role that public authorities

should play in fostering empowered local communities with shared identities. It had highlighted how community relations in local areas could be undermined by national policy decisions and a failure to proactively develop relationships between community groups and public agencies.

The cohesion work also highlighted the limited capability of central government to deal with complex issues of community identity. The Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion, set up in response to the 2001 Cantle report (Home Office 2001a) recommended that government aim to promote community cohesion by acting as an enabler and supporter of local community partnerships (Home Office 2001b). There were a variety of follow up activities during this period that explored how local authorities could implement local community cohesion strategies. This included 2002 guidance to local authorities and a 2003 report *'building a picture of community cohesion'* that encouraged local authorities and local agencies to develop a detailed understanding of the nature of the communities they serve in order to assess how well equipped they are to build community cohesion (Home Office 2003). The Home Office also published a report on improving consultative relationships between government and faith groups in February 2004 titled *'Working Together: Co-operation between Government and Faith Communities'*, further illustrating the faith community centred partnership work that was already underway (Home Office 2004a).

David Blunkett as Home Secretary championed the idea of active citizenship and engagement with civil society as part of his broader political strategy in relation to the extension of counter-terrorism powers. Many of these ideas about civic renewal were influenced by Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* (2000) that emphasised the role of social relationships, or 'capital', in mediating community identities and relationships with public institutions. This recognised the importance of developing confidence and trust by actively working with communities on issues that concerned them. In an essay published by the Foreign Policy Centre think tank he positioned active citizenship and cohesion as a core component of security policy, but which also relied on conditions of public order and security. Some of these ideas were repeated in the Home

Office response to the Newton Committee's criticisms of counter-terrorism powers in 2004 (Home Office 2004b) and highlights their influence on the subsequent development of Prevent:

> *"What this means is that we have to nurture trust, confidence and the capacity to get things done in communities. None of that is possible if an area is plagued by crime, disorder and social disintegration, any more than maintaining liberty and making progressive change is possible if the state is threatened. Establishing basic order and security is a prerequisite of building social capital."* (Blunkett 2002)

The adoption of high-level objectives around issues of radicalisation and extremism also aligned with approaches to policy reform supported by the Cabinet Office. For example a 2001 discussion paper by the head of the Performance and Innovation Unit, Geoff Mulgan, titled *'Better policy delivery and design'* evaluated different models of policy development and implementation in a variety of social policy areas (Mulgan and Lee 2001). It highlighted how many policy priorities of modern governments, including crime, were dependent on changing behaviours and cultures by working with organisations outside of direct government control. The paper proposed that in cases of limited knowledge about the problem and a diverse set of delivery partners, policy implementation should be designed in collaboration with stakeholders based on high-level objectives. Similarly, Michael Barber's model of deliverology, developed at the department for education and the Prime Minsters Delivery Unit, promoted strategies for delivering objectives across a complex delivery chain of agencies and organisations (Barber 2008). Many of these themes can be seen in the initial development of Prevent, including aims of influencing attitudes and cultures by working with non government partners to address a shared objective of stopping terrorism.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the complexity of the terrorist threat challenged the legal and political limits of the security community's conventional enforcement approach. At the same time endogenous feedback about the impact of policing and foreign policy also resulted in an

increasing political focus on engaging with Muslim representative groups and organisations. The complexity of the challenge and the sensitivity of the agenda increased political support for considering new ideas about the wider causes of alienation in the Muslim community. The Cabinet Office supported this idea as a way of framing the role that different government departments could play in preventing terrorism. Similarly the Home Office recommended a tactical approach to community through a dialogue around the question of longer-term root causes of alienation. These strands resulted in the decision to prioritise engagement with the Muslim community as part of the longer-term development of an integrated British identity. This represented the start of a consensual and socially orientated model of policy.

At the same time a number of important decisions were also left open that were indicative of areas of conflict within the new policy community over how Prevent should be implemented. The issue of socio-economic disadvantage and discrimination amongst the Muslim community was included as contextual political grievances rather than a direct causal factor. A wider set of non-violent extremist ideas were included as a tactical question that was subordinate to the short-term priority of improving engagement with the community without alienating potential allies. In addition there continued to be a strong political defence of counter-terrorism powers, as well as foreign policy, despite the prominence of significant concerns amongst the Muslim community. This in part reflected Prevent's origins in the desire to improve the effectiveness of traditional counter-terrorism powers and policing in face of political and legal limits. Instead security policy was set on a new course toward conflict over the appropriate scope and focus of Prevent.

Chapter 6: Establishing Prevent 2005 – 2007

Introduction

This chapter covers the period between the terrorist attacks in London on 7th July 2005 and concludes with the publication of the cross-government Prevent strategy in 2008. During this period decisions emphasized a distributed socially orientated approach based around collective action with the Muslim community to address the social causes of terrorism. In particular the approach was a response to the growing political scrutiny of the attitudes and integration of the Muslim community following the 7/7 London attacks. This resulted in the decision to bring a broader range of organisations into decision-making, including Muslim community representatives, the DCLG and local authorities. Many decisions sought to establish and maintain a consensus and support across a broader policy community. This included the decision to adopt a neutral approach to engagement with the Muslim community that emphasised collective action against violent-extremism and framed wider questions of non-violent extremism around shared values.

During this period Prevent was positioned as an approach that could reduce longer-term reliance on enforcement measures whilst also improving their effectiveness. Central to the approach was the decision by Number 10 and the Home Office to broaden the range of community organisations involved in the development of Prevent. The approach built on the Labour's wider programme of institutional modernization and reform to improve government's capacity to deal with complex social inclusion. The idea of dealing with the root social causes of terrorism provided a rationale for the involvement of a much wider range of groups and individuals in Prevent. Community engagement proceeded through the Preventing Violent Extremism Together working groups and the decision to give the DCLG and local authorities a leading role in the initial 'pathfinder' programme and the local coordination of Prevent. However, the emphasis on community engagement also gained immediate significance in the

aftermath of the 7/7 attacks due to growing political scrutiny of the attitudes and values of Islam and the Muslim community.

The chapter will illustrate how community engagement balanced competing views of the causes of terrorism and the role of extremism. The Cabinet Office under the leadership of Tony Blair pushed for an approach that dealt with radical Islamist ideologies and beliefs and the reasons behind their support. This position acknowledged the Muslim community's experiences of discrimination and marginalisation but challenged religious institutions and leaders to take responsibility for failures of community integration and to confront extremism. This position also drew on arguments that communitarian multicultural models of community engagement had emphasised separate ethic identities at the expense of developing a cohesive society. This included criticism that multiculturalism had resulted in relativist acceptance of Islamic identity politics that would undermine shared democratic principles and values. As a result many supporters of this position argued that Islamist and conservative Islamic thought were at best antithetical and at worst actively seeking to subvert western society and should be in scope of the policy.

In contrast many Muslim interlocutors, including advisors engaged by the Home Office and DCLG, and political allies, argued for an approach that dealt with the community's experiences of discrimination and exclusion as the main drivers of alienation and segregation. This group agreed on the need to improve integration and to deal with radical ideas but argued that this was also indicative of the failure of government and wider society to recognize Muslims and Islam as a legitimate part of British society. Many supporters of this position also sought to defend the legitimacy of conservative and normative Islamic practice and views. This informed a persistent criticism that Prevent implied a link between Islamic identity, activism and terrorism. Instead many advocates argued that UK foreign policy and military interventions in Muslim countries should be recognised as a both a direct cause of grievance and emblematic of the political marginalisation of the Muslim community. This perspective emphasized

engagement with Muslim community organisations in policy-making and prioritised issues of discrimination and disadvantage.

This chapter starts to show how this debate resulted in a series of ultimately unsustainable compromises, primarily by the DCLG, in order to establish a workable consensus around Prevent. These compromises were intended to facilitate widening engagement with the Muslim community through Prevent whilst managing the wider political risks associated with the agenda. The first priority was broadening the voluntary engagement of both the Muslim community and local authorities was necessary to broaden the breadth of the response and at the same time open up space to challenge extremist ideas and groups. However this necessitated a tactical compromise in relation to definitions of extremism that focused on violent-extremism whilst working with 'moderate Muslims' to promote shared values. This was accompanied by steps to broaden community engagement by actively identifying new and supportive partners whilst also maintaining the support of incumbent community leaders and institutions and the wider community itself. Similarly community input resulted in support for developmental activities in relation to integration and cohesion but at the same time substantive consideration of foreign policy was excluded by the Labour leadership.

Context

Decision-making during this period was dominated by the aftermath of the 7/7 on London transport system that killed 56 people, and failed attacks on 21st June in the same year and attempted attacks in London and Glasgow in 2007. The 7/7 attacks, and the failed attacks two weeks later led Tony Blair's 12-point plan for preventing terrorism followed by a programme of active consultation with the Muslim community by the Home Office. Prevent objectives were also incorporated into existing activities such as the Home Office's faith community fund (Home Office 2005b). The attacks also led to the Terrorism Act 2006 which included the offence of glorification of terrorism and the publication of the Contest strategy for the first time. Other prominent incidents included police shootings in Forest Gate, east London, during

a failed counter terrorism raid in the summer of 2006 as well as global protests against cartoon depictions Mohammed in Danish newspaper in early 2007. This was followed by the 2007 attacks on Glasgow airport and the Tiger Tiger nightclub in London.

The Labour government was elected in May 2005, prior to the 7/7 attacks and its programme for government continued the themes of social and civic renewal and public service reform from the previous term (The Labour Party 2005). A number of priorities had close connection with the development of Prevent. Firstly there was a view that the necessary counter terrorism powers had been introduced and the principle challenge was effective enforcement, although new powers of glorification of terrorism were subsequently introduced in 2006. There was also a clear commitment to local neighborhood policing models and an emphasis on local community development and service delivery, both of which were prominent themes in Prevent. This included self government for local communities and a role for voluntary sector to support the delivery of services and a commitment to addressing racial discrimination. There was also a commitment to expand the school academies programme to bring more autonomy and diversity to governance and missions.

This period also took place in the context of the transition between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as leader of the Labour party and Prime Minister, as well as a series of departmental restructures. The Department for Communities and Government (DCLG) was set up in 2006 out of the old Office for the Deputy Prime Minister to lead the government's localism agenda, with the support of both the Cabinet Office and the Treasury. At the same time the Home Office was declared 'not fit for purpose' by then Home Secretary John Reid due to a series of failures, principally on immigration, with a separate Department for Justice established in 2007. Hazel Blears, a Blair ally and former Home Office minister for Policing, was appointed Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government in June 2007 when Brown took over as PM. The Cabinet Office's role coordinating Contest was also handed to the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) after it was set up in mid-2007 with the appointment of Charles Farr, formerly of MI6, as Director-General.

Prevent was launched as a stand alone policy during this period in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks. This included an initial programme of community consultation and funding for engagement work by the Home Office, including work that would lead the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). This work transferred to the DCLG in 2006, along with the faith communities' fund and parallel work associated with the Independent Commission for Community Cohesion. The DCLG initiated a pathfinder programme that ran between 2006 and 2007 to support a range of local and national projects, which was then followed by the publication of a standalone Prevent strategy in 2007. This set out the department's plan for delivery of Prevent, including the allocation of funding to local authorities, for delivery between 2007 and 2010. Local police forces also established community policing initiatives typically through the appointment of a local Prevent Officer. During this period the Home Office commenced piloting of the Association of Chief Police Officers' Channel programme in London and Lancashire.

Box 6.1: Timeline of events 2005 - 2007

- 7th July 2005: The attacks on the London transport system killed 56 people including the 4 perpetrators.
- 5th August: Tony Blair made a statement that set out a series of proposals allied to a statement that the 'rules of the game; were changing.
- 3rd February 2006: Islamist groups protested outside Danish Embassy against a cartoon depicting the Prophet Mohammed with a bomb for a turban in a Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005.
- 30th March: The Terrorism Act received royal ascent, which included the offence of glorification of terrorism.

- 5th May: Ruth Kelly was appointed Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government
- 23rd May: John Reid, Home Secretary, described the Home Office as 'not fit for purpose'.
- 2nd June: Forest Gate police raid resulted in shooting of one man with no charges
- 27th of June: Gordon Brown took over as Prime Minister following resignation of Tony Blair
- July: Al-Mujharoun/ Al Ghurabaa/ Saved Sect were proscribed under 2000 terrorism act for eliciting support for terrorism.
- 9th August: 24 arrests were made in relation to a plot to blow up transatlantic aircraft
- April 2007: The Department for Communities and Local Government published its Prevent action plan 'Winning hearts and minds' strategy
- May: Home Office was restructured, including the formation of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism.
- June: Hazel Blears was appointed secretary of state for communities and local government resignation of Tony Blair
- 29th and 30th June: an attempted car bombing of Tiger Tiger night club in London was followed by an attack on Glasgow International Airport.
- July: Charles Farr was appointed Director of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism

Demonstrable action against causes of terrorism

> *"The first pillar is prevent… Effective security measures, intelligence and policing are essential. But ultimately, modern terrorism will be defeated only by addressing the political and social issues by a debate about values, by democracy and by public solidarity. That is why we are working with all communities to tackle the social factors underlying radicalisation, to block the ways radicalisation takes place, and to counter the radicals' arguments. But it is not just the Government that have a role in preventing radicalisation. Muslims and the wider community in the UK must also play their part if we are to be successful."* John Reid (HC Deb 10 July 2006 c 1116)

> *"In April 2007 the Government set out a series of practical actions to mobilise communities against violent extremists. These actions were based on the idea that it is ordinary people, with their extraordinary capacity for courage, who are best placed to stand up to terrorism, to make this country a safer place, and to celebrate the common values that bind us together as a society."* Hazel Blears (DCLG 2008 p4)

The need to demonstrate a practical response to home grown international terrorism following the 7/7 attacks dominated the development of Prevent. This helped to put Prevent high on the political agenda in a way that went beyond a community engagement agenda to include wider questions of the root causes of terrorism. The fact that the attackers were all British men moved the agenda from being an intelligence led problem to the top of the national political agenda. There was extensive public interest in the root causes of terrorism, particularly the link between integration, extremism and terrorism and the extent of the government's response. The prominence of Prevent in the Labour administration was also illustrated by a series of high profile interventions by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The agenda was picked up by opposition politicians, including by David Cameron who made a speech on the issue early in his time as leader of the Conservative party and Michael Gove who made a series of contributions in parliament following his election as an MP in 2005.

The growing prominence and breadth of the debate around Prevent was directly linked to growing public concern about terrorism and its causes. For example the Ipsos Mori public issues tracker showed a 42% point increase in the priority given to security issues in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 attacks, to a higher point than following 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq (Ipsos Mori 2006). The Glasgow attacks in 2007 also produced high profile media images and personal accounts which kept the issue high in the public consciousness. Other high profile events included a public argument between the home secretary John Reid and Islamist radical Abu Izzadeen following a shooting during a counter-terrorism raid in Forest Gate, East London (BBC 2006a). Similarly, high profile protests around Europe following the publication of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed also gained widespread media attention. As a result the public perception of the threat from terrorism and radical Islamist activism remained a prominent theme throughout the period.

Figure 6.1: Hansard mentions of 'Muslim community' and 'Islam'



(www.parli-n-grams.puntofisso.net retrieved 22 Feb 2017)

The debate about the causes of terrorism was accompanied by growing public scrutiny of the Muslim community itself. In the aftermath of the 2005 attacks parliamentary scrutiny of the Muslim community superseded general scrutiny of Islam (Figure 6.1). A series of polls in

Muslim public opinion and attitudes in relation to the UK highlighted areas of potential or perceived tacit support for extremism, in line with the 2004 Home Office analysis. An ICM poll in February 2006 for the Daily Telegraph reported that 20% of Muslims had some sympathy with the 7th July bombers, although 99% also thought the bombers were wrong (Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want sharia law in UK, 2006). The poll also reported that 10% did not feel loyal to the UK and 40% support for introduction of Sharia laws in predominantly Muslim areas, albeit with 41% opposing. In contrast a 2007 Ipsos Mori poll of the wider UK population for the Commission on Integration and Cohesion found that respect for the rule of law was considered the most important value for living in the UK, followed by tolerance for others, freedom of speech and respect for religions (Ames 2007).

This contributed to an important and, by this point, increasingly rare consensus amongst the senior Labour leadership. Tony Blair took on more public ownership of domestic counter-terrorism policy, where previously he had focused on the international dimension. As Chancellor, Brown gave public financial backing to the policy including personally launching the 2006 Pathfinder Funding. Brown's support also aligned with his broader positioning as Prime Minister-in-waiting and he also made public contributions on the importance of British values in the social and institutional response to global challenges such as terrorism and extremism. Despite this, Blairite ministers retained control of much of Prevent during this period. Hazel Blears and Ruth Kelly held the DCLG ministry and Blears, who had previously been Home Office Minister for Policing from 2004 to 2005 and was a key Blairite, was retained as Secretary of State after Brown became Prime minister in 2007. During this time John Reid also replaced Charles Clark as Home Secretary in May 2006, but handed over to Jacqui Smith under Brown. One respondent highlighted the importance of the general consensus and support for Prevent in the Labour party:

> *"There wasn't much exciting happening in labour policy so if you were a junior minister this was something that you could do to get a profile"* Civil servant 1

Box 6.2: selected points from Tony Blair‘s 12 point plan

1. New grounds for deportation including fostering hatred, advocating violence to further a person's beliefs or justifying or validating such violence.

2. New anti-terrorism legislation in the autumn to include offence of condoning or glorifying terrorism in UK or abroad.

4. Consultation on expanding the power to strip citizenship from individuals with British or dual nationality to apply to naturalised citizens engaged in extremism.

9. Ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir and the successor organisations of Al-Mujharoun.

10. Review of citizenship ceremonies to make sure they are adequate and a commission to advise on better integration of those parts of the Muslim community that are less so than others.

11. Consultation on a new power to close of a place of worship used as a centre for fomenting extremism.

(Blair 2005)

The political focus on Prevent pushed the Labour government beyond narrow questions of enforcement powers on to questions of national identity and values. This was a new area for the Labour leadership and was a topic more commonly associated with Conservative politics (Government Minister). Tony Blair’s initial 12 point plan signalled the policy interest in the relationship between identity, citizenship, cohesion and terrorism (see Box 6.2). The statement balanced conventional criminal justice measures, including incitement to hatred, with a specific element around the integration of the Muslim community. However, at this point there was not yet a settled view across the government about the objectives for the wider agenda and how it would be implemented (Advisors 1 and 2). For example, a number of the proposed actions

were not implemented due to various legal and political limitations, such as the ban on Hizb ut-Tarir, closing of places of workshop and stripping of citizenship.

Local implementation

> *"There were various novel elements to Prevent but the big thing was moving it out of the Home Office into DCLG. If there was any point in it, other than politics, it was about broadening the engagement and specifically getting local authorities engaged in that process more."* Civil Servant 2

> *"If you are thinking about some of the wider policy shifts at that time, the top down approach wasn't working and wasn't likely to. Local authorities are closer, theoretically, to their local communities, and are more likely to understand some of the more nuanced issues on their patch. If you look in other areas, local authorities have a big role in safe-guarding children or vulnerable adults, why should this be any different just because its got security implications. These are the theoretical positions."* Regional government officer

The most notable decision during this period was to give the DCLG a leadership and coordination role in the delivery of Prevent. This was in part linked to the wider localism agenda being pushed by the Cabinet Office as part of the Labour government's on-going agenda of public service reform. Equally it also indicated a commitment to a distributed and consensual model for Prevent that prioritised engagement with the Muslim community. Local authorities were seen as best placed to engage with local communities and to coordinate local delivery alongside the community cohesion agenda.[25] The decision was also taken in the context of a restructuring of the Home Office between 2006 and 2007. As a result the DLCG published its own Prevent strategy in 2007 and the subsequent 2008 strategy included Prevent

[25] The community cohesion agenda had originally been led by the Home Office as a public order agenda but was subsequently transferred to the Office of Deputy Prime Minister, the forerunner to the DCLG, in 2004.

objectives in local funding frameworks, Local Area Agreements, for local authorities with a significant Muslim population.

The enhanced role for local authorities and was linked to the wider localism agenda. The rationale was set out in the letter from Tony Blair appointing Ruth Kelly as the first Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (Blair 2006b). The localism agenda was intended to improve local service delivery and interventions by improving coordination between local agencies to resolve complex problems. The DCLG was formed in 2006 out of elements of the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister and was tasked with devolving more powers to local neighbourhoods aligned with new models of accountability and leadership. This agenda incorporated Local Area Agreements (LAAs) and local strategies to address relevant local challenges. Local Strategic Partnerships bought together relevant local agencies, including education, heath and social care and policing, and were coordinated by local authorities.

The DCLG was a new department and Prevent gave it a prominent role in a high profile agenda alongside the Home Office and other ministries. A described by Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government at the time, a small team consisting of one director and two senior staff, along with a supporting team joined from the Home Office and the department had to develop its understanding of extremism and radicalisation quite rapidly (Mirza et al 2007). There was a continuation of national level funding programmes, including the citizenship funding programme and the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board that had been set up by the Home Office. The department also set up a pathfinder-funding programme of approximately £6 million pounds for local authorities to explore local level activities in advance of a fuller funding round. This was followed by the publication by the DCLG of a dedicated Prevent strategy in April 2007 that set the basis for providing core funding to local authorities from 2008 onwards with performance assessed against National Indicator 35 (DCLG 2007) (See Box 6.3).

Box 6.3: National Indicator 35

- Understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities;
- Knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of violent-extremism and the Prevent objectives;
- Development of a risk-based preventing violent-extremism action plan, in support of delivery of the Prevent objectives;
- Effective oversight, delivery and evaluation of projects and actions.

(DCLG 2007)

The prominence of DCLG's role was in part linked to the wider challenges facing the Home Office at the time. The Home Office was criticised for its performance in a variety of other areas, including immigration policy and detention of foreign criminals. This had led John Reid to describe the department as 'not fit for purpose' shortly after being appointed Home Secretary in 2006. The Home Office's work on counter-terrorism policy, including Prevent, had previously been criticised in an internal review by the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit that was subsequently leaked to the Sunday times (*Labour's war on terror is failing, says leaked report* Sunday Times 2005). One advisor noted that the Blair's 12 point plan following the 7/7 attacks highlighted the pressure on the Home Office:

> *"Tony Blair did the announcement that the rules of the game have changed but civil servants at the Home Office were wondering where the proposals had come from. My sense is that Blair said his piece but the Home Office knew that it was not going to work, so they had the summer to come up with an alternative plan before the PM came back from holiday"* Advisor 2

Although the Home Office did retain a role in the delivery and coordination of Contest and Prevent the delivery of Contest was not part of its public service agreement. For example, the Home Office targets for 2005 – 2006 included no specific reference to terrorism and security and its strategic objectives associated with communities engagement racial and religious tolerance were dropped for 2006 – 2007. Although the Home Office did not prioritise issues related to the root causes of terrorism a number of important decisions were taken during this period that influenced the Home Office's future role in relation to Contest and Prevent. Following the restructure of the Home Office and the Department of Justice, and the downgrading of the Cabinet Office's general role under Brown, the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism was set up in later 2007. In addition in 2007 the Home Office started funding initiatives to develop targeted solutions to radicalisation, including ACPO to develop a local referral model for individuals at risk of radicalisation called 'Channel'.

The Home Office also continued to support local Prevent policing. The local approach to Prevent aligned with the neighbourhood policing agenda developed by ACPO, with the support of the Home Office. Norman Bettison, writing later in 2009, emphasised the role that community policing played in the police response and the need for improved engagement and soft intelligence from the Muslim community (Bettison 2009). The Association of Chief Police Officers published *"practice advice on professionalising the business of neighbourhood Policing"* (ACPO 2005) and the Home Office had also published its local public order strategy *'Building communities beating crime'* in 2004 (Home Office 2004c). Neighbourhood policing was predicated on improving links with local communities to identify and address relevant crime and disorder problems as well as development of softer interventions outside typical law-enforcement. It was a relatively important element of policing, including development and training, and aligned with a locally coordinated approach to Prevent in partnership with local authorities.

Muslim identity

> *"When we take time to stand back and reflect, it becomes clear that to address almost every one of the major challenges facing our country… you must have a clear view of what being British means, what you value about being British and what gives us purpose as a nation."* (Brown 2006)

The political focus on broader questions of Muslim identity reinforced the DCLG's role due to its work on community cohesion which addressed similar issues of segregation and grievances. This focus was supported by intelligence assessments of the role of Muslim identity in the recruitment and mobilisation strategies of extremists and terrorists. The Cabinet Office, the Home Office and DCLG supported a broader agenda of promoting a contextualised liberal version of British Islam as a counter-point to orthodox literalist interpretations. The focus on Muslim identity had some qualified support from Muslim community advisors and representatives as part of developing the place of Islam in the UK. However this was also tempered by strong opposition to the conflation of Islam with the causes of terrorism. Nevertheless, many advisors and representative organisations treated Prevent as an opportunity to address issues of concern within the Muslim community and to develop the role of Muslim faith identities in UK public life (Advisors 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6).

The decision to focus on Muslim identity followed on from the 2004 Cabinet decision and was a response the mobilisation of Muslim identity in opposition to western governments and societies. Blair argued that efforts to prevent terrorism had to combat the ideology globally and preventing it from gaining traction in the UK. Blair linked these ideas with pre-feudal interpretations of Islam emanating out of the Middle East and argued that it was necessary to articulate the values within Islam that aligned with modern liberal ideas, as illustrated in this speech:

> *"This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are confronted, head-on, in their essence, at their core. By this I don't*

> *mean telling them terrorism is wrong. I mean telling them their attitude to America is absurd; their concept of governance pre-feudal; their positions on women and other faiths, reactionary and regressive; and then since only by Muslims can this be done: standing up for and supporting those within Islam who will tell them all of this but more, namely that the extremist view of Islam is not just theologically backward but completely contrary to the spirit and teaching of the Koran."* (Blair 2006a)

Blair's position moved Prevent beyond a narrow strategy of community engagement to mitigate the impacts of policing toward a broader social change agenda to counter extremist ideas. This aligned with the community cohesion agenda that had developed following riots involving Asian and White youth in the summer of 2001. The initial focus of the community cohesion agenda under John Denham, as the ministerial lead in the Home Office prior to 2003, was on improving collaboration between local institutions, including community groups and politicians, in order to manage public order. This was then followed up by the Home Office *'Building communities beating crime'* strategy in 2004 that reiterated a commitment to addressing causes of crime and to developing engagement led neighbourhood models to policing (Home Office 2004c). When the work transferred to the DCLG in 2006 a Commission on Integration and Cohesion was set up to develop broader proposals about how to develop shared British and community identity and break down ethnic divisions (Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007).

The cohesion agenda had sought to move away from multi-cultural community engagement around fixed ethnic groups. This shift was recommended by Ted Cantle in his report on the 2001 riots, and supported by prominent leaders in the race equality sector, including Lord Ousely who had produced similar findings, and Trevor Phillips as chair of the Commission for Racial Equality. Phillips also made a speech titled 'Sleep walking to segregation' in September 2005 that made a direct link between community segregation, polarisation and extremism (Philips 2006). The speech addressed themes of national identity and highlighted issues of growing economic, geographical and social segregation between the UK's different ethnic

communities. Phillip's speech compared the UK positively with the United States' experience of entrenched racial segregation but warned about the potential for similar patterns developing without proactive government policy. This included addressing issues of social and economic marginalisation of minority groups but also actively working to bring different groups together around a shared social identity.

In contrast Prevent specifically engaged with Muslim religious and social identity and groups. This approach was an expedient response to the political focus on the Muslim community and the need to manage specific issues around policing and recruitment. It was also supported by the argument that Prevent needed to actively establish a positive place for Muslim identity as part of a shared British identity to counter the specific challenge from extremist Islamist ideas. In 2007 Ruth Kelly cited a literature review by Tufyal Choudhury that explored the nuanced role of identity in radicalisation. Choudhury argued that public disparagement of Muslim identity, including a sense of blocked social mobility and distorted medial portrayal led to greater in-group identification, with a particular emphasis on a defensive masculine identity. He also highlighted evidence from the Home Office citizenship survey to suggest that religious identity could mobilise positive civic activism and identification with Britain. In short Choudhury argued that Muslim identity dynamics amongst British youth should be channelled productively in support of integration:

> *"There are signs of a 'British Muslim' identity forming in reaction to violent radicalism, which is proposing a 'receptive, integrationist and dynamic' Islam. It is receptive because it is open to Western influences; it is integrationist because it believes Muslims ought to take full part in British society and political processes; and it is dynamic because it acknowledges that as contexts change, so will the ways Muslims conceive of and practise their religion. Thus, while Muslim identity politics can contribute towards radicalisation, it can also be a significant tool against it."* (Choudhury 2007)

The opportunity for Prevent to engage with a more nuanced picture of the relationship between Muslim identity and Britishness was also borne out by opinion polling at the time. This included polls on behalf of the BBC, the Sun and the Telegraph that highlighted a strong British identity amongst Muslim communities that was comparable to that of wider British society (Sobolewska 2010 p30). In addition the government's own citizenship survey showed a nuanced picture of political alienation. Muslim communities reported high levels of trust in institutions, a sense of belonging and reported high levels of influence and participation in society (Sobolewska 2010). Sobolewska did suggest that these patterns may also have been influenced by local experiences, including segregation, which could mask broader patterns of alienation. Nevertheless these findings lent weight to an approach that sought to engage with the nuances of British Muslim identity.

The Ajegbo review of citizenship education also recommended engaging with nuanced questions of citizenship and ethnic identity and was cited in DCLG's 2007 Prevent strategy (Ajegbo 2007). The review found that issues of issues of ethnic identity and diversity were often neglected or lacked depth, and where it was covered ethnicity and 'race' tended to be addressed more often than religion. It also found that much citizenship education in secondary schools did not sufficiently engage with contemporary local, national and international issues and how governments could deal with them. To address this gap the review recommended a strand of the curriculum called living together in the UK. This included critical thinking about ethnicity, religion and 'race', an explicit link to political issues and values and the use of contemporary history in teachers' pedagogy to illuminate thinking about contemporary issues relating to citizenship. As a result citizenship education framed much of the initial role for schools in Prevent.

There was also support for a discussion about the impact of conservative Islamic orthodoxies on British Muslim identity amongst senior members of the Labour party. This was illustrated by comments made by Jack Straw in 2006, as leader of the House of Commons, about the wearing of the veil by Muslim women in his Blackburn constituency office. Straw described

its increased prevalence as *"a visible statement of separation and difference"* that was *"bound to make better, positive relations between the two communities more difficult"* but acknowledged the sensitivity of the topic as he had *"thought a lot before raising this matter a year ago, and still more before writing this"* (*Straw in plea to Muslim women: Take off your veils* Lancashire Telegraph 2006). The comments generated significant media coverage but produced a rare area of agreement between the MCB and the Labour Party. Hazel Blears, as chair of the Labour party, framed it as a local constituency issue, defended the right of individuals to decide what to wear and emphasised the need for debate. The MCB adopted a similar position positioning it as an issue of theological interpretation and debate between different strands of Islam and ultimately personal choice (BBC 2006b).

Broadening community engagement

> *"Within DCLG there seemed to be different advisors who represented different parts of the Muslim establishment. There were people who represented the MCB wing, there was the Sufi Muslim council which was a new organisation that Ruth Kelly launched and there was Khurshid Ahmed's British Muslim Forum. They all represented very different ethnic and religious strands within the British Muslim community"* Advisor 2

> *"An interrogation and understanding of the root causes of terrorism (e.g., discrimination, deprivation and alienation facing British Muslims; UK foreign policy; the plight of Muslims across the across the world; etc.), their respective weight and how they relate to each other – i.e., it is not enough to tackle only the act of terrorism itself without addressing its root causes."* Young People Working Group (Home Office 2005a)

The role for the DCLG and local authorities was also based on deepening and broadening relationships with local Muslim communities. As with the cohesion agenda this emphasised a process of engagement between authorities and community organisations that in turn helped to

put a range of community concerns onto the national and local policy agenda. This included a decision to broaden the range of engagement in order to help mobilise community support and to move beyond a narrow set of community interlocutors. In the case of Prevent the broadening engagement presented a challenge to incumbent groups, particularly the MCB, whilst presenting opportunities for others who wanted to engage with government. Many of those who became involved in dialogue with government viewed the problem of radicalisation as a symptom of negative experiences of being Muslim in Britain that had been compounded by the UK's foreign policy. As a result Prevent was seen as an opportunity to address community concerns around religious discrimination, education and employment.

Following the 2005 attacks there was a programme of ministerial engagement with Muslim community groups around the country. To this point engagement with the community had largely focused on managing conflict in relation to issues of policing, foreign policy and extremist recruitment. Increasingly however community engagement also actively acknowledged the limitations of government in combating extremist ideas within a community, as illustrated by Blair in 2006:

> *"We are trying to engage with [the Muslim community] but in the end Government itself cannot go and root out the extremism in these communities. I am probably not the person to go into the Muslim community and persuade them that this extreme view of Islam is completely mistaken and completely contrary to the proper tenets of the religion of Islam. It is better that you mobilise the Islamic community itself to do this."*
> Tony Blair (HC Liaison Committee 4th July 2006 Q 355)

The meetings were framed as a ministerial listening exercise in order to hear community concerns and start the process of deeper engagement on shared solutions to terrorist recruitment and extremism (see Box 6.4). The Home Office also convened a series of workshops over the summer of 2005 titled Working Together to Prevent Extremism to develop policy recommendations. They highlighted concern about racism and discrimination, representation

of Muslims in the media, opposition to the Iraq war and wider concerns about access to services and employment. These issues were cited as both direct and indirect drivers of recruitment and a barrier for effective policy. These issues had been frequently cited in discussions around the community cohesion programme and at local level. The workshops directly linked these questions to the Prevent agenda and provided structured feedback about community concerns to the heart of government, including personal presentation of findings to Cabinet ministers and senior civil servants (Advisor 5).

Prevent also broadened the range of engagement with Muslim organisations. This approach aligned with the community cohesion agenda of developing broad based community engagement and avoiding reliance on a small set of gate-keepers or interlocutors. It was also in part motivated by the damaged relationship between the MCB and the Labour government over the invasion of Iraq and the government's desire to move away from the MCB as the main representative for the Muslim community. A group of advisors from different community backgrounds were retained by the Home Office, and subsequently the DCLG, to provide advice on ways to engage with the Muslim community. Activities such as Preventing Violent Extremism Together workshops and regional events actively incorporated a broader range of groups and individuals, including various groups and individuals working with government or in political parties. The arrival of 'new faces' was noted at this point by some who had been engaged in engagement work prior to 2005 (Police Officer).

The explicit focus of Prevent on engaging with groups on the basis of their Islamic identity contradicted the recommendations of the cohesion programme. Prevent incorporated elements of the community cohesion focused on the inclusion of women and younger generations in community institutions and challenging those who did not support social integration and shared values. At the same time the cohesion agenda recommended moving away from single group funding to prioritise action by organisations, including civic institutions and political parties, that would actively improve integration between ethnic groups. In contrast Prevent focused on the short term expediency and necessity of working with Muslim organisations to improve

relations, manage grievances and address wider questions of identity. However proponents of cohesion argued it was necessary to challenge the way local authorities and community leaders approached their relationships:

> *"[The cohesion agenda was] challenging the models of social development that had become established, both in terms of the leadership of certain types of men and the conservatism in the community about education that is being worked out in places like Birmingham [Trojan horse case]. So there were an awful lot of people whose behaviour was challenged"* Government minister

Some community advisors and representative groups supported broadening engagement as an opportunity shape Prevent and government policy more generally. The Home Office and DCLG were being advised by other groups and individuals that the MCB, whilst legitimate, was not representative of the whole Muslim community. The status of the MCB was challenged for representing particular theological strands and for not being representative of the experience and backgrounds of the whole Muslim community. This was predicated on a perception that the organisation was predominantly formed of London professionals from Wahhabi and Deobhandi backgrounds, rather than the Pakistani Kashmiri tradition of many British Muslims. Some also had concerns about the MCB's knowledge of community issues, extremism and terrorism and the sophistication of their approach to influencing government policy. As one advisor suggests:

> *"Very quickly in that process I began to feel that the community response wasn't really adequate that there wasn't really a coherent policy response coming out of the community, most of it was posturing. The MCB was already there and was trying to represent and that's its business, to represent Muslim voices to government. However, it wasn't really able to offer a coherent policy analysis of the issues or to then filter back policy recommendations to either government or to Muslim communities"* Advisor 1

Box 6.4: The engagement activities that were undertaken in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks, as outlined in The Contest strategy that was published in 2006:

- 19 July 2005: meeting between the Prime Minister and 25 Muslim community leaders to discuss the need to work together to prevent extremism in our communities.
- 20 July 2005: meeting chaired by The Home Secretary with Muslim community leaders which to establish seven community-led working groups to develop recommendations for tackling extremism.
- October 2005: the Minister for Women's biannual meeting with representatives of the Muslim Women's Network discussed the role women can play in tackling extremism in Muslim communities. Membership of the network included representatives from academia, non-governmental organisations and grass-roots community groups.
- November 2005: the Prime Minister attended a discussion group in Leeds of 50 people aged between 16 and 25 to find out about the challenges facing young British Muslims.
- February 2006: Dr Kim Howells met a group of successful and influential young Muslim men and women in Whitechapel, London.
- May 2006: the Prime Minister and Ruth Kelly hosted an event for 40 Muslim women at Downing Street, aimed at boosting understanding of the community through meeting a wider range of people from within it.

(HM Government 2006)

At the same time government did recognise the MCB's influence and networks and as a result maintained its relationship, despite a number of significant conflicts. This included conflict over the Iraq war and the MCB's criticism of the abortive attempt to set up the Sufi Muslim Council in 2006. There had been an attempt to improve relationships earlier in 2005, including a letter from Hazel Blears in 2005 setting out how the government intended to improve engagement with the Muslim community. The MCB also participated in a round table discussion with Tony Blair in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings and participated in the formation of MINAB. It also continued to receive government grants to support education initiatives domestically and overseas. Although it was the only significant national representative organisation, with by far the largest number of mosques in its membership, as a relatively new and developing organisation the MCB was also very defensive about its position.

The MCB's defensiveness about its status as the main representative body was illustrated by its trenchant criticisms of the Sufi Muslim Council when it was launched in 2006. The Sufi Muslim council was launched with support from Ruth Kelly at the Houses of Parliament. Its founder, Haras Rafiq, who went on to be involved in the Quilliam Foundation set out the objective for the council at its launch:

> *"Sufis count among the vast silent majority of Britain's two million strong Muslim community. Up to now they have lacked an externally visible voice and the intent of forming this council is to provide just such a strong voice. There is an urgent need for the British Muslim community to engage in an internal debate to isolate the ideologies who falsely claim to represent Islam, to develop a strong field of moderate, intellectually astute, forward-thinking leaders and scholars who can promote the moderate values of civic society, engagement and diversity which characterize classical Islam*." (Haras Rafiq quoted in Casciani 2006)

The MCB actively criticised the council as an attempt to undermine its position due to its criticism of government policy and argued that it represented an effort to promote a government

sanctioned version of 'moderate' Islam. A Guardian report on the launch of the council included this comment by an MCB spokesperson:

> *"When contacted by Guardian Unlimited, the spokesman for the MCB, Inyat Bunglawal, claimed Mr Rafiq was an "unknown". "Who is he? Who does he represent? Let's wait and see just how many groups affiliate to his group, but at the moment it's obscure and unknown."* (King 2006)

Many groups and individuals did support the need to reform community institutions as part of the development of their role in policy-making and public life. This included the advisors engaged by the Home Office and DCLG and many of those involved in the working groups, albeit with different emphases. Beyond the core set of advisors and number of Muslim groups and organisations were also supportive of efforts to explore the more nuanced perspectives of British Islam (Birt 2009). This reflected discussion about contextualised and cosmopolitan perspectives of Islam in the UK that were already taking place in many social circles, in particular amongst younger generations and professional groups. For example, groups such as the City Circle in London brought British Muslim professionals together into an active dialogue about the place of their faith in their social and political lives and identities. Some of these groups and networks were directly or indirectly engaged with government via members in advisory roles or forums.

The motivation of many who engaged in the process was illustrated by the preamble of the Preventing Extremism Together Workshops. Participants did not view themselves as experts in terrorism and extremism but as interlocutors who wanted to help address problems on behalf of the Muslim community by improving engagement and dialogue with public authorities. A chief concern of participants was the impact of terrorism on the status of the Muslims community and the demonization of Islam in the UK:

> *"The individuals involved in this process were acutely aware of the relevance and critical nature of this exercise due to the hostile climate that followed the events of 7th*

> *and 21st July, in the form of attacks on the Islamic Faith, the incessant demands for Muslims to repeatedly demonstrate their allegiance to the country, the demonisation of a whole community together with the unprovoked and marked attacks on Islam and Muslims by the media and in other more direct forms of physical attacks on mosques and individuals."* Forward to the report of the Preventing Violent Extremism Together Workshops (Home Office 2005a)

Many of the groups and individuals involved in the process recognised the need for reform in order to help combat extremism. The summer consultation exercise supported the Home Office's earlier assessment that a generational gap in religious teaching and identity development that had created opportunities for extremist recruiters. There was receptiveness to some of the issues identified by government, including the issue of recruiting Imams from overseas with little experience of the concerns of British youth, alongside the exclusion of women from the governance of community organisations. Similarly there were also balanced views of the problems of engagement between national and local government and the community, as illustrated by this comment:

> *"I think in a way we were honest about representation from our own communities. Those with the loudest voices had often received grants but this did not mean it necessarily went to the right groups. We found that in some areas like Tower Hamlets many Bengali women's groups lost out on major funding for essential programmes around language, education and employment. Many had responsibility for raising children whilst often their husbands spent time travelling to and from Bangladesh on business or family reasons. Language was often a barrier to new incoming Bengali women and cultural difference and other factors meant they often faced challenges in raising children and understanding educational differences. But this has changed with strong representation of many women's Bengali groups. A key recommendation was for evidenced based funding of groups, including data about their needs and regular monitoring of spend. We were honest about what was happening in our communities*

> *but also what was wrong in terms of the way central and local government funding was being allocated."* Advisor 5

The qualified support for reform of religious institutions ultimately led to the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) that established a framework of good governance for Muslim religious institutions. MINAB was launched in 2006 with the support of key Muslim representative organisations, including the MCB, Muslim Association of Britain, British Muslim Forum and the leading Shia Muslim representative group Al-Khoei Foundation (see Box 6.5 for the agreed standards). It was presented as an opportunity to work to develop the organisation and governance of Mosques in order to support their engagement with national and local government and their role in British society. However, the support of many participants was also heavily qualified by suspicion of government interference that linked Islamic teachings to extremism. The initiative was strongly criticised by radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tarir whilst the MCB spokesperson Inyat Bunglawal writing in Guardian article highlighted how the challenge for MINAB was to:

> *"walk [a fine line] between a government that will not accept that it has done anything that may have even inadvertently fuelled the terror threat we are facing and Muslim communities who will be understandably sceptical as to what its real intentions are."* (Inyat Bunglawala 2007)

The working groups also set out a large number of recommendations focused on addressing issues of settled disadvantage and integration of Muslim communities locally and nationally. This included a campaign to reframe a positive place for Islam in British society and break negative associations with Islam and terrorism. Building on this were recommendations to develop a place for Islam in citizenship education and national debates, including leadership training and service improvement for youth and support for student groups to counter extremist ideas. The working groups also recommended capacity building for mosques to facilitate

engagement with local authorities, subsequently developed through MINAB, and for actively including women's perspective in policy through dedicated local and national forums.

Box 6.5: Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board - five standards

1. Members apply principles of good corporate governance
2. Members ensure that services are provided by suitably qualified and or experienced personnel
3. There are systems and processes in place to ensure that there are no impediments to the participation in the activities, including governance, for young people
4. There are systems and processes in place to ensure that there are no impediments to the participation in the activities, including governance, for women
5. Members ensure there are programmes that promote civic responsibility of Muslims in the wider society

Not all of the recommendations put forward by the community were directly incorporated into Prevent, which was criticised by some who participated in the process and by politicians. Many of these decisions were justified on the basis of the need for a demonstrable direct or indirect link to preventing radicalisation, even if evidence was scarce. In practice this largely excluded recommendations that were not specific to the Muslim community. Religious discrimination was addressed through the inclusion of religion alongside other protected characteristics in 2006. The proposals for promoting a positive place for Islam in Britain, diverting youth from potential engagement with extremists and development for community groups and organisations were all included in the pathfinder programme and subsequent 2007 strategy. Broader issues, such as economic marginalisation, remained out of the scope either due to contested relevance or the existence of the such as Sure Start and New Deal education and employment programmes that also targeted deprived areas with Muslim populations.

Foreign policy

The exclusion of foreign policy and the nature of the relationship between Islam, extremism and terrorism, were the most significant points of conflict between government and community interlocutors. The working group focused on tacking extremism and radicalisation argued that British foreign policy was the key factor that motivated recruitment to radical and violent extremism. This included the Iraq war and the US-led war on terror but for many also included the UK's support alongside the US of Israel's occupation and control of the Palestinian territories. This working group called for space for dissent about foreign policy without being conflated with terrorists or *"being deemed inimical to British values"*. In a related point the young people working group prefaced its recommendations by highlighting political grievance due to a lack of Muslim youth influence in community and civic institutions and society. Foreign policy allied to political and social alienation was seen as a key factor underpinning the appeal of extremist ideas.

The desire to include foreign policy, particularly the invasion of Iraq, in the discussion about the causes of extremism and terrorism put many in the Muslim community into conflict with the Labour leadership. The Iraq war continued to be a highly sensitive political issue for the Labour party during this period. Although Labour won the May 2005 general election its majority was significantly reduced and Blair's personal association with the decision to invade was increasingly undermining his personal authority. Blair and his supporters opposed substantive consideration of the war as a cause and argued that this strand of thinking was reflective of extremist ideas that sought to undermine the legitimacy of democratic government. Blair argued that terrorist groups were using any action by western government to justify their beliefs and actions and should not be seen as a legitimate argument for changing foreign policy (Blair 2006a). In addition he also argued that opposition to foreign policy should be mobilised through democratic institutions, not through support for violent or extremist groups (Blair 2006a).

This position was supported by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), who resisted more substantive consideration of foreign policy in Prevent. There was an initiative that emerged out of the working groups recommendations to establish 'safe spaces' for Muslim youth to debate grievances and differences, away from settings that were dominated by ideologues and radicals. In addition there were efforts to improve communications about foreign policy domestically, including overseas development aid, that was subsequently supported by the set up of the Research Information and Communications Unit in 2007. The FCO also developed an engagement programme to improve communication of UK policy overseas, which included working with Muslim leaders and representatives form the UK in overseas engagement work. Overseas engagement was administered by the FCO separately from the programme of community engagement led by the DCLG and tended to work with traditional Muslim community leaders rather than the broadening range of individuals and groups.

Violent-extremism

> *"Do we care about terrorism or violent-extremism, or extremism, or cohesion and integration, or social conservatism. It cut right across it, to some extent it was trying to do all things to all men and women and not very well. So it was always slightly fudged."* Civil servant 2

> *"There were different layers of people having influence. There were advisors in government of Muslim background and I think they had varying levels of influence. Then you had people outside government who I think were disproportionately influential in the media. I remember civil servants were petrified about what might be said and some of the caution came from wanting to protect ministers from attacks, which creates a high degree of caution."* Advisor 1

The focus on violent-extremism and promoting shared values represented a tactical compromise between shorter-term community engagement versus the longer-term challenge

of radical Islamism. There were competing principled and empirical views about the legitimacy and practicality of working with or challenging ideas and groups associated with strands of radical Islamist activism and conservative Islamic thought. This included an empirical debate about the extent to which radical or conservative ideas actively or tacitly encouraged segregation, legitimised violence or facilitated terrorist recruitment. At one end it was argued that radical groups should be challenged as a point of principle and as a necessary first step in any long-term process of integration. This was set against principled and tactical concerns about the consequences of being seen to curtail freedom of expression and the risks of limiting engagement and alienating the wider community. The balance between these two positions produced a tactical approach to engagement that focused on challenging violent extremists and promoting shared values.

At the heart of the conflict was the debate over the definition of violent-extremism, British values and moderate Muslims. All three notions were highly sensitive amongst Muslim community due to concern about the implications for the status and views of Muslims and government engagement. The 2005 preventing violent extremism together working groups, and representatives such as the MCB, raised significant concerns that conflating terrorism and Islamic ideas, particularly in relation to conservative or normative interpretations, would exacerbate wider suspicion of Muslims. This also included concern that the notion of moderate Muslims and British values implied that Muslims were potentially a threat to the values of wider society. In practical terms this debate often focused on teachings of conservative Deobhandi and Salafist strands of Islam as well as criticism of UK foreign policy and the legitimacy of the state of Israel. More fundamentally it was founded on a general sensitivity about the way Prevent and government viewed and treated Muslims and Islam.

Given these concerns there was strong opposition in the community to broadening definitions of extremism in Prevent beyond direct support for the use of violence. This position was supported by research querying the empirical link between ideology and radicalisation (Githens-Mazer 2008). There were also practical problems around establishing a consistent

definition that could be implemented in Prevent whilst the potential for alienating potentially useful allies was also highlighted by advisors (Advisors 1 and 3). As a result Prevent included a public commitment to work with groups who supported taking 'long-term' steps to counter violent-extremism, as illustrated in this statement by Hazel Blears in 2007

> *"So let me be blunt. If you're serious about taking practical, long-term steps to counter violent-extremism, Government will support you and will work with you. Simple as that."* (Blears 2007)

At the time there were few practical definitions of violent-extremism beyond explicit support for violence. In practice the idea of violent-extremism was interpreted through a direct and indirect legal framework. The main legal definition of violent-extremism was the offence of glorification of terrorism that was included in the 2006 Counter Terrorism Act. In addition the 2006 religious discrimination act also served as an important reference point. Although human rights standards, including the 1998 Human Rights Act, protected the right to freedom of conscience and expression the 2006 religious discrimination also introduced offences of inciting religious hatred. The act was introduced in late 2005 to help reassure the Muslim community that they were protected against forms of hatred specific to religion and parallel concerns about new terrorism offences, particularly glorification of terrorism (Maer 2009).[26] Whilst glorification of terrorism was a new and controversial offence, incitement to hatred was more familiar to local authorities through race equality and cohesion work. In any respect, for the purposes of Prevent these frameworks were primarily guidelines, with prosecution of offences a separate matter.

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[26] The act was introduced shortly after the acquittal of the leader of the British National Party, Nick Griffin, on charges of incitement of racial hatred on the grounds. The link between terrorism and incitement offences can also be traced in previous terrorism legislation and associated debates, including the 2000 and 2001 Terrorism Acts. The 2006 Act reintroduced offences of incitement of religious hatred by amending the Public Order Act 1986. Offences of inciting religious hatred had originally been proposed in the 2001 Terrorism Act but were removed following objection in the lords about definitions of religion and hatred. The eventual 2006 Act was also amended by the Lords to remove reference to abusive and insulting behaviour and required an active intention to stir up religious hatred. (HoL 25 Oct 2005: Column 1070 and HoL 25 Oct 2005: Column 1122)

Hazel Blears' reference to long-term steps did illustrate the aim of developing shared-values as a counter point to extremism and, by extension, a preference for working with moderates who actively supported this objective. The 2007 DCLG Prevent strategy and subsequent guidance set out a high level framework of British values to guide activity associated with Prevent, including the aims of funded projects and initiatives and the groups involved in joint working (DCLG 2007) (See Box 6.6). The framework was based on recommendations from the Commission on Community Cohesion but had no legal status or conditions attached, other than being indirectly incorporated into local government performance frameworks. However, this framework did not resolve media scrutiny of extremist ideas and on-going pressure on government to actively challenge extremist views and groups. Equally, the approach was criticised for framing the values as exceptionally British, rather than universal, and whether they applied to Muslims in the same way as the wider population.

Ultimately the Home Office and the DCLG supported a focus on violent-extremism, rather than on more general definitions of extremism, for tactical reasons. The Home Office believed that some extremist and radical groups could serve as useful safety valves for individuals and groups who might potentially have violent tendencies (Civil servant 1). There were examples of intelligence relationships with conservative groups who also had methods of diverting individuals away from violence, the most notable being the Muslim Contact Unit of the Metropolitan Police and the Brixton Street Project (Lambert 2008). For the DCLG the broader challenge related to maintaining engagement and support for the Prevent programme amongst the Muslim community. Local authorities in particular highlighted concerns about the practicality and desirability of using controversial definitions of extremism to selectively engage with community groups (Regional government officer; Local government chief executive; Local government officer). As a result established legal frameworks for violence and incitement to racial hatred were allied to a more general definition of shared values were used to frame community engagement.

Box 6.6: Principles of British values:

- Respect for the rule of law
- Freedom of speech
- Equality of opportunity
- Respect for others and
- Responsibility towards others.

(DCLG 2007)

Some advisors encouraged a tactical approach to engagement in order to empower moderate reformers of conservative Muslim institutions (Advisors 1, 3 and 6). In some respects this reflected the basis of their access and influence with decision-makers but it also reflected the authority of the institutions and genuine debates that were taking place in them. They argued that reformist voices in key institutions, such as the East London Mosque or Islamic Society of Britain should be empowered to help develop more moderate contextualised approaches to the religion. They also argued that there was a risk that if this engagement was poorly handled these voices would be undermined to the detriment of Prevent. Similarly they also stressed that whilst liberal groups, such as British Muslims for Secular Democracy, had a role they did not yet have influence within the wider community. This position ultimately encouraged short-term engagement as part of a longer-term organisational reform.

The rationale for the tactical approach was also set out in a report by the think tank Demos that was commissioned by the DCLG. The report highlighted the complexity of defining extremism and recommended a practical approach to engagement that focused on engaging with the Muslim community to build partnerships. It highlighted the complex and contested causal link between ideas and violence. In particular, it highlighted the risk of alienating Muslim

communities if government was perceived as being overly selective and shutting down dissent about the wider causes of alienation. The principle recommendation was that the community had to be central to any preventative efforts and that this meant prioritising active engagement, including with those who may hold challenging political and cultural values. As outlined in the report:

> *"That is not to say that there is a clear line to be drawn between violent extremists and radicals. The former are always radicals, but radicals are very rarely violent, and because the government has a fairly poor understanding of the complexities within the community, it often finds it difficult tell them apart. Certain kinds of behaviour, dress and attitudes – for instance among the Salafi community – are problematic for a secular, liberal state such as the UK, and raise wider questions about the status of faith in British politics, the legitimacy or otherwise of certain forms of sharia law, and an individual's right to behave in the private realm in ways that might be at odds with social norms or even laws. These are important questions that we need to debate as a society, but we must not let them get in the way of the priority of tackling terrorism. The energy of these non-violent forms of mobilisation must be harnessed towards this shared goal."* (Briggs, Fieschi & Lownsbrough, 2006)

The tactical approach to extremism and engagement was criticised by those who believed that there needed to be a more explicit challenge to politicised and conservative Islam. As with Blair, they argued that fundamentalist Islam represented a significant threat to the values and safety of western democracies and the democratic development of Muslim countries around the world. They highlighted conservative social and anti-democratic views that encouraged social segregation and grievances against western governments and anti-Semitic opposition to the state of Israel. Critics of Prevent also argued that political Islamists were inserting themselves as community interlocutors and were preventing government from taking robust positions against extremist views. Finally, some argued that Islamists had an active strategy of entryism that aimed to exploit liberal multiculturalism to promote their world-views. As a result

they argued that government should only work with those that opposed to Islamism, supported UK foreign policy and held liberal religious views.

Although many of the more critical advocates were outside of government they placed significant pressure on decision-making (Advisor 1 and 4; Civil servant 1). The most prominent exponent of this position was the think tank Policy Exchange, including its founder Michael Gove who became an MP in 2005 and Dean Godson who joined Policy Exchange in 2005 to head its security programme of work. Both had been at the Times in 2005 where they regularly covered Islamist radicalisation as columnist and reporter respectively. Policy Exchange went on to publish two reports during this period. The first was '*When progressives treat with reactionaries'* in 2006 followed by '*Living apart together'* in 2007 that highlighted the existence of Islamist views in the Muslim community and increasing social segregation (Bright 2006; Mirza et al 2007). In 2006 Michael Gove MP, a Times columnist, and Melanie Phillips, a Daily Mail columnist, published 'Celsius 7/7' and 'Londonistan' respectively. Both books also highlighted the threat of entryist political Islam and the failures of UK's domestic and international response (Gove 2006; Phillips, M. 2006).

The 2006 Policy Exchange report 'When progressives treat with reactionaries' by Martin Bright criticised the government's approach to political Islam. It highlighted the challenge of engaging with the diverse range of ethnic, social, theological and political viewpoints under a single label of Islam. The report focused on the Foreign Office's accommodation of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and highlighted the influence of advisor Mockbul Ali and his role in facilitating entry into the country for radical political Islamists. Although primarily focused on foreign policy it raised parallel concerns about the government's relationship with the MCB. Domestically, Bright was supportive of the findings of the preventing violent extremism together working groups and criticised the government's failure to fully respond to their recommendations, including the call for an inquiry into the impacts of the Iraq war. However, he argued that Islamists, including the MCB, were hindering the development of progressive interpretations of Islam:

> *"Instead of tackling the ideology that helps to breed terrorism, Whitehall has embraced a narrow, austere version of the religion. I believe that when taken together, the documents provide a unique insight into the workings of the Foreign Office and show it is pursuing a policy of appeasement towards radical Islam that could have grave consequences for Britain."* He went on to say later in the report *"Although the MCB describes itself as an umbrella organisation for British Muslims, the clear Islamist sympathies of its leaders make this a difficult proposition to sustain."* (Bright 2006)

Gove and Phillips argued that appeasement of Islamists was continuing the failed strategy of tolerating the presence of radicals such as Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Mohammed and Abu Qatada during the 1990s under a 'covenant of security'.[27] Both made trenchant criticisms of multiculturalism for allowing space for separatist Islamist politics and identities and failing to recognise the scale and significance of the challenge that Political Islam presented to British values. They argued that government needed to scrutinise, monitor and check the actions, funding and operation of those who sought to spread Islamist ideas in Britain. They also argued that the appeasement of radicals was part of a wider failing of multi-cultural integration that had encouraged moral relativism and segregation. For Gove, the solution was stronger laws and a proclamation of common values that represented an ideological effort to develop an inclusive model of British citizenship that was based on moral clarity and free from divisive separatist identities.

Gove and Phillips advocated a highly selective approach to community engagement. They argued that many groups and individuals involved in Prevent were motivated by Islamist ideas and were using entryist tactics to promote their influence. Phillips specifically criticised the Muslim Contact Unit's approach, including its work around Finsbury Park mosque and the role of the Muslim Association of Britain, and with the Salafi Brixton mosque's Street project. Iqbal

[27] For further explanation of the 'covenant of security' see the Change Institute 2008a.

Sacranie, Secretary General of the MCB, and Inyat Bunglawal, also of the MCB, were criticised for links to Wahhabi doctrines. The Islamic Foundation at Markfield was also criticised for its adherence to the teachings of Jamaat-i-Islami. Individuals who questioned the legitimacy of Israel, including tacit or active justification of the use of violence against Israel were identified, including the reformist Islamist academic Dr Tariq Ramadan.[28] Islamist influence on the Federation of Islamic Societies and Hizb ut-Tarir presence on university and college campuses was also criticised (Gleese 2005). They identified preferred Muslim interlocutors, including individuals such as Haras Rafiq of the Sufi Muslim Council and Khurshid Ahmed, former chair of the British Muslim Forum.

Conclusion

During this chapter decision-making responded to political pressure following the 7/7 attacks by expanding the scope of security policy to address the wider social causes of terrorism. Political priority was given to demonstrating a comprehensive response to home grown terrorism allied to an operational need to improve intelligence relationships with the Muslim community. These decisions also responded to growing political conflict around the place of Islam in the UK and the status of the Muslim community. As a result policy focused on broadening and deepening strategic and tactical engagement with Muslim community groups to address patterns of social alienation, segregation and political grievances. At the same time the decision to restructure the Home Office and to decision to give the DCLG an enhanced role in the policy further embedded a consensual model of engagement through delegated local decision-making and activity. As a result decision-making was heavily influenced by a developmental model that sought to address terrorism and violence through the wider integration of the Muslim community.

[28] As the grandson of Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr Ramadan was often singled out for particular scrutiny.

At the same time these decisions created space for conflict over the scope and objectives of Prevent. At the heart of this was a conflict over the decision to adopt a tactical approach to non-violent extremism that set shorter-term priorities of expanding community engagement against competing models of longer term social change. This was linked to competing interpretations of radicalisation that focused on internal Muslim community responsibility versus responsibility for wider factors that shaped the experience of Muslims. The priority given to broadening engagement with Muslim groups and local authorities resulted in a tactical approach that minimised values conflicts over non-violent extremism and a preference for collective action around local community issues. This was criticised by those who believed that ideology and extremism was the key factor in recruitment and that shared values should be an issue of principle and a longer-term foundation for a cohesive society. These debates became significant fault lines in the new policy community at national and local levels

Chapter 7: Reviewing Prevent 2008 – 2011

> *"First, we will respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it… Second, we will prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support… Third, we will work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation."*
> Theresa May, Forward to the 2011 Prevent Strategy (HM Government 2011a)

Introduction

This chapter covers the period between the publication of the first full cross government Prevent strategy in 2008 and the revised strategy in 2011. It charts how implementing Prevent influenced decision-making through the transition from the Labour to the Conservative led coalition government in 2010 and changed government spending priorities. The key decision in this chapter was the decision to separate Prevent from integration policy in the 2011 strategy due to growing concern about community disengagement from Prevent. The new approach represented a compromise that retained elements on the social dimensions of radicalisation in the policy approach but emphasised personal characteristics to target interventions. At the same time the narrowing of the scope of the policy also represented a trade-off between a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism that was set against liberal concern about civil liberties. A key element of the compromise was the decision to give the Home Office control over Prevent in order to administer a revised tactical settlement around extremism.

The decision to give the Home Office control of Prevent followed an independent review of its implementation prior to the 2011 strategy. This chapter illustrates how the Home Office renewed its authority by proposing to improve the impact of Prevent through centralised administration and better targeting of interventions. The approach responded to growing concern about the relevance of indirect local integration work in the context of reduced public spending under the Coalition government after 2010. Prior to 2010 the Home Office also re-established its own policy capacity following the departmental restructure, in particular with

the development of the OSCT. It also supported the development of a new referral methodology for targeting interventions allied to a clearer definition of radical Islamist extremism. As a result, by the time the Coalition took office the Home Office was well positioned to deliver the twin objective of improving the effectiveness of Prevent whilst managing a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism.

This chapter also illustrates how the reassertion of Home Office leadership responded to concerns in the wider policy community that Prevent had become a cause of, rather than a solution to, Muslim community grievances. The DCLG supported returning the policy to the Home Office in order to protect its own reputation and policy priorities. This followed a high profile conflict between the DLCG and the MCB that was linked to the government's shift toward a more assertive approach toward extremism in 2009. This tension was also replicated at local levels where local authorities had sought to manage similar conflicts with local Muslim community groups over the aims and implementation of Prevent. Furthermore, after 2010 the DCLG also had to manage the largest budget reduction of all government departments whilst its wider role in coordinating local policy was also reduced. As a result the DCLG and local authorities supported the idea of dispensing much of their responsibility in relation to Prevent.

The chapter also starts to show how the separation of Prevent from integration policy under Home Office represented a tactical compromise by supporters of a broader socially orientated approach. The success of the Home Office's own arguments were in part based on widely held concerns that an unreformed approach to Prevent would undermine efforts to improve integration. Inherent to this argument was a shared view across the Prevent policy community, including the Conservative leadership, that root causes of terrorism were fundamentally linked to wider questions of integration. Those arguing for a more assertive values based approach to non-violent extremism supported taking decisions out of the hands of local authorities in order to improve the selection of partners. Those who emphasised a neutral approach to engagement supported separation and centralisation in order to limit the influence of an assertive values based approach on other social policy agendas, including integration and education. In this

respect the Home Office was positioned as the best option for managing these competing priorities.

Context

Although Prevent had been part of the Contest strategy since 2003 this was the main period of implementation. A series of guidance documents were published in 2008, which were then followed by an updated Contest strategy in 2009. There were also a series of reviews of the Prevent and an increasing volume of often critical media, academic and independent scrutiny of Prevent. A review by the Communities and Local Government Committee recommended in 2010 that Prevent and integration policy should be separated, a position that was also supported by an independent review in 2010. The 2010 reports also highlighted allegations that Prevent was a vehicle for spying on the Muslim community by the security services and police following the publication of Arun Kundnani's Spooked in 2009.[29] As a result there was a growing volume of local and national feedback and debate about the impact of Prevent throughout this period.

The perception of the threat during this period also changed. Although there was a continued belief among the security services that the threat was likely to be persistent over a period of time there was also a view that the acute threat that followed 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq was passing. There were fewer high profile arrests or attempted attacks and the UK largely withdrew forces from Iraq and Afghanistan by the end of the decade. The significance of al-Qaeda itself was also reduced following the death of Ayman Al Zawahiri and ultimately Osama Bin Laden who was killed by US Special Forces in 2011. Furthermore, by early 2011 the Arab Spring dominated Middle East politics and represented a democratic alternative to radical

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[29] This allegation was given particular credence in 2010 by the discovery of 'Project Champion' a covert system of CCTV cameras in predominantly Muslim areas of Birmingham, Washwood Heath and Sparkbrook. Although not directly connected to Prevent specifically the initiative was funded by Terrorism and Allied Matters (Tam) fund, administered by the Association of Chief Police Officers.

jihadi opposition to regional governments, with widely varying degrees of success in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. In June 2011 the government's own assessment of the terrorism threat was reduced from severe to substantial.

Crucially the Coalition government's agenda was dominated by the financial crisis and its consequences, allied to a shared liberal civil liberties platform. The crisis started in 2007 but reached a critical point in 2008 and subsequently resulted in the deepest economic recession since the 1920s. Fiscal consolidation was a core element of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition following the 2010 elections (HM Government 2010b). The Coalition agreement set out its most urgent task in relation to managing the financial crisis, with a particular emphasis on fiscal stability. Although the agreement did not make specific reference to extremism or Prevent, or integration, civil liberties was also a prominent theme. Commitments included the replacement of control orders with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) in December 2011 and the Protection of Freedoms Act (2012) which placed time limits on Section 44 stop and search powers. As a result by the end of the period the political agenda had largely moved away from security toward economic growth, public spending and, increasingly, immigration.

Box 7.1: Timeline of events 2008 - 2011

- June 2008: Prevent Strategy was published by the Home Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for Education and the Department for Culture Media and Sport.
- 24th March 2009: The Contest 2 strategy was jointly launched by the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown and Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith.
- 25th March: Hazel Blears announced a formal disengagement by the government from the MCB.

- 5th June: John Denham was made secretary of state for communities and Local Government following resignation of Hazel Blears.

- 17th October: ‘Spooked’ by Arun Kundnani was published with claims that Prevent was being used for spying.

- 14th January 2010: John Denham announced a lifting of the suspension of formal relations with the MCB.

- 16th March 2010: an inquiry into Prevent by the Communities and Local Government select committee recommended the separation of Prevent and integration policy

- 5th May 2010: the general election resulted in a Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government. Theresa May was appointed Home Secretary and Eric Pickles Minister for Communities and Local Government.

- June 2010: There was controversy over funding of CCTV in Muslim neighbourhoods in Birmingham by the Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters Fund.

- September 2010: The Home Office announced a review of the Prevent strategy by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile of Berriew.

- December 2010: Arab Spring protests took place in many middle eastern countries resulting in new governments in Egypt and Tunisia, the failure of the state in Libya and an on-going civil war in Syria.

- 5th February 2011: David Cameron gave a speech emphasising the need for ‘Muscular Liberalism as part of combating terrorism and Islamist extremism.

- June: A revised Prevent strategy was published under the leadership of the Home Office explicitly separating Prevent from integration policy.
- June: The terrorism threat was reduced to 'substantial'

Centralisation of control

The most significant decision taken prior to the 2011 Prevent strategy was the centralisation of Prevent under the control of the Home Office. The Home Office had rebuilt its capacity and status following the 2006/7 restructuring and had benefited from more stable ministerial leadership prior to the 2010 election. This had enabled it to renew its leadership of counter-terrorism policy, as illustrated by its role coordinating the development of the Contest strategy in 2009. In contrast the Department for Communities and Local Government experienced significant disruption during the period, including damaging political conflict over Prevent itself and the controversial resignation of Hazel Blears in 2009. As a result by 2011 the Home Office, through the OSCT, had set much of the agenda around the development of the 2009 Contest strategy and ultimately was well positioned to make the case for being the department to implement Prevent after 2010.

The revised 2011 Prevent strategy gave the Home Office sole ownership for coordinating and delivering Prevent. Theresa May's appointment as Home Secretary after 2010 gave the Home Office an independent political authority in the Conservative government, in part linked to the prominence of a Conservative party campaign promise to reduce net immigration. The 2011 strategy centralised funding under the control of the OSCT and the Home Office. This included control of funding for a specified list of 25 local authorities focused on London boroughs, Luton, Yorkshire and Lancashire and supported by an OSCT network of regional Prevent coordinators. The Home Office also continued to support the neighbourhood approach to

Prevent policing through funding for local police forces. In addition it also set out the intention to set up regional Prevent coordinators to liaise with different agencies but under Home Office leadership.

Although this approach maintained a local dimension for implementing Prevent it was a departure from the distributed general grant model and local coordination by local authorities between 2008 and 2011. The emphasis on improving the coordination of local implementation of Prevent had been a consistent theme throughout this period. The 2008 guidance document (HM Government 2008b) had emphasised the need for local flexibility as a core part of the strategy of bringing local partners on board and in recognition of the complexity of the agenda:

> *"This is a new and rapidly developing area of work. The Government is committed to ensuring that examples of good practice at a local level are shared and that local solutions help to shape the implementation of the national development programme… We recognise that this is a far-reaching and challenging policy agenda, and that local partners will continue to require support to deliver it."* (HM Government 2008b)

However, this flexibility also led to on-going concern about the clarity and focus of Prevent that was highlighted in the forward to the 2011 strategy (HM Government 2011a). This concern was also illustrated by the variety of guidance documents that were produced during the period. This included the 2009 Contest strategy and two guidance documents for local partners that sought to clarify the aims and objectives of the policy (HM Government 2008b & 2009b). In addition the DCLG's own next steps document included a detailed set of aims for its work and was supported by local guidance provided by networks of local authorities and regional government offices (Department for Communities and Local Government 2008a). This included examples of partnership working, such as setting up local prevent boards as part of Local Strategic Partnerships, that coordinated the work of various local agencies, as well as methods for responding to the framework set out by the NI35 performance framework.

The reassertion of the Home Office role in the run up to the 2010 election brought it into conflict with the DCLG over control of Prevent (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010). The revised 2009 Contest strategy was presented to parliament jointly by the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and the Home Secretary Jacqui Smith. In addition the Home Office increased its capacity through the OSCT and facilitated a series of workshops during 2007/08 as part of the revision of CONTEST. This engaged relevant departments and agencies, including DCLG and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Police, National Offender Management Service, Border and Immigration Agency, Crown Prosecution Service and the security and intelligence agencies. Furthermore, the OSCT also took on responsibility for strategic planning, the delivery of aspects of Contest, including oversight of the domestic security operations, crisis management, and Olympic security and strategy.

The Home Office also developed a more detailed analysis of the challenge, as illustrated by the 2009 Contest strategy. The new strategy set out a detailed view of the nature of the international terrorist threat, including its organisational and historical origins, ideological framework and its presence in the United Kingdom. It included discussion of the roots of radicalisation and highlighted issues of personal vulnerability and political grievances and the need to increase the resilience and ability of communities to challenge extremists. The more detailed description was included to support local partners with a narrative to that would help clarify the aims of the strategy. The need to improve communication around Prevent was also illustrated by the formation of the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) within OSCT to produce strategic communications in support of counter-terrorism. Charles Farr described their role to the Home Affairs Committee as:

> *"…advising the rest of government but actually, not just government, officialdom, from a brigade commander in Helmand province through to a chief constable in Yorkshire, about how they may wish to characterise the threat we face"* Charles Farr evidence to Home Affairs Committee, q129 ev21, 26th February 2009 (Home Affairs Committee 2009)

The Home Office through the OSCT and Charles Farr actively sought greater control over Prevent as a necessary step to improve the strategic direction and implementation of the overall Contest strategy. The Home Office highlighted concerns about the effectiveness of activity delivered by local authorities. In contrast the Home Office highlighted the effective implementation of Prevent by local police forces and their de-facto ownership and coordination of the agenda locally. Notably this view acknowledged but downplayed the problems associated with the Muslim community's suspicion of Prevent as a specifically police led agenda or the extent of the broader community engagement activity by local authorities and through Local Strategic Partnerships. For example:

> *"In many cases I have no doubt at all that the police, who are experts on rapid delivery, have gripped this problem and have made a lot of progress, but the price of that has sometimes been that they have become, as it were, the shop front of Prevent to a greater extent than they would like, or than we would like or, I suspect, our colleagues in DCLG would like."* Charles Farr, evidence to communities and local government select committee, 19 January 2010 (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010)

Notably the 2011 strategy retained a commitment to continue active engagement with local institutions that were potential sites of radicalisation. This included a strong local element through the proposal for a network of regional coordinators working with local partners, including local police forces, local authorities, schools, colleges and universities and youth services. However this was a departure from the previous approach to Prevent that had been gave more discretion and local leadership to local authorities. This regional structure was also a response to the ending of local area based grants after the 2010 election and the associated Local Strategic Partnership structures. The revised structure centralised control whilst retaining structures for local engagement with institutions outside of the Home Office's direct remit. As a result the approach sought to refresh the balance between engaging with the

problem of radicalisation at local levels whilst improving government capability to control and coordinate activity.

Separating Prevent and integration

> *"The Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism… [W]e will do more than any other Government before us to promote integration, but we will do so separately and differently from Prevent."* Theresa May, Home Secretary, forward to 2011 Prevent strategy (HM Government 2011a)

Home Office control was linked to the decision to separate Prevent from integration policy. This was set out in the 2011 Prevent strategy and was founded on a growing consensus that there was confusion about the relationship between the different pillars of Contest, Prevent and integration policy. This included criticism of the value of local integration and engagement work to preventing terrorism allied to concern that the focus on Prevent and Muslim communities had undermined necessary reform of community engagement policy. There was also growing concern that the conflict over Prevent was starting to damage the relationship between the Muslim community and public authorities with wider consequences for integration policy and local service delivery. This set of concerns resulted in support for separation of Prevent and integration policy as a necessary and practical step to improve the delivery of both strands.

The competing strands of Prevent were incorporated in the interdepartmental Public Service Agreements (PSA) that underpinned funding and implementation of Prevent across government between 2008 and 2010. PSA 26 focused on reducing the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, informed the development of CONTEST and

associated departmental Prevent action plans.[30] The PSA had three target outcomes that framed the work of the three main departments involved in delivery of the strategy (HM Government 2009a). The extent to which domestic Muslim communities reject and condemn violent-extremism was prioritised by the DCLG, as well as the Department for Schools Children and Families and the Department for Culture Media and Sport. Reducing the risk of individuals who come into contact with key sectors and services, becoming or remaining violent extremists was prioritised by the Home Office. Making a positive contribution to the resilience to violent-extremism of priority countries was prioritised by the FCO.

From the outset there had been a close conceptual and organisational relationship between Prevent and the community cohesion agenda that sought to reform community engagement policy. For example, PSA 21 – 'build more cohesive empowered and active community' - applied to both the DCLG and Home Office and was often cited in parallel to the delivery of PSA 26 objective of improving resilience (Home Office 2008; Department for Communities and Local Government 2008a; HM Government 2008a and 2008b). However, there were also continual efforts to clarify the difference with cohesion policy by stressing Prevent's focus on specific issues of violence and extremism (HM Government 2008a and 2008b). Nevertheless, the relationship between Prevent and community cohesion at local levels was actively acknowledged in the original decision to task DCLG and local authorities with a coordinating role. This was further reinforced and highlighted in 2008 guidance published by the DCLG in support of the delivery of its Prevent work which stated that:

> *"We recognise all policy areas of Communities and Local Government have a contribution to make to help build capacity across society to challenge any threat to our core values in the future"* (DCLG 2008)

The 2009 Contest strategy did attempt to clarify the role of different agencies in delivering Prevent but continued to qualify this by highlighting the close relationship with other policy

[30] The PSA also formed part of the Home Office's national community safety strategy 2008 – 2011

areas, in particular community cohesion. The 2008 guidance situated Prevent within a wider set of social policy agendas, including the contemporaneous social exclusion and civic renewal agendas. The various intersecting areas of policy that were identified in the 2008 guidance (DCLG 2008) including inequalities, housing, cohesion and local empowerment and accountability; regeneration and employment. Crucially, local authorities tended to integrate community cohesion and Prevent through joint officer posts (Communities and Local Government 2010). Much Prevent activity undertaken by local authorities also built on pilot phase activities that themselves were often built on activities that had already been developed as part of the cohesion agenda (DCLG 2008b). Projects included youth diversionary activities, community engagement projects particularly with women's groups, mosque governance and engagement and initiatives aimed at celebrating shared community identity.

In some respects the separation of Prevent and integration was simultaneously a presentational and a substantive change. Prevent and community cohesion had always been intended as related but distinct, a view that was frequently reiterated, for example by John Denham in 2009:

> *"Prevent is what it says. About preventing violent-extremism. It is a crime prevention programme—aiming to ensure that our fellow citizens do not commit act of violence against Britain or British people overseas and that people abide by British law."* John Denham (Communities and Home Affairs 2010)

However, there was clearly growing confusion within DCLG about how to deal with Prevent, the Muslim faith and integration (Advisor 4) In this respect, one of the main justifications for separating the Prevent and integration was disengagement by the Muslim community due to confusion and suspicion about the aims and motivations of the respective policies. Charles Farr highlighted this problem in 2010 as part of the case for greater Home Office control. The formation of RICU itself had been intended to help improve messaging around Prevent and counter-terrorism and although its work remained relatively limited during this period it was given more priority under the 2011 strategy. This emphasised a need to improve messaging

and communication and improve trust in the Prevent 'brand', noted by a number of respondents to this study and by the independent review of the policy conducted by Lord Carlyle in 2011. The practical problems associated with perceptions of Prevent were highlighted by Charles Farr:

> *"I spend as much time as I can talking to people who want nothing to do with the Prevent programme, which seems to me as important as talking to people who want to engage with it. I have to say that an awful lot of time I find the reasons for their not wanting to engage are rooted in the misrepresentations which Prevent suffered from notably in the articles that the Guardian ran, to some degree based on the IRR report by Kundnani, who I think you took evidence from yesterday."* Charles Farr Evidence to DCLG Select Committee 19 January 2010 (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010)

Notably however, many of the more significant community concerns about the aims and objectives Prevent were in practice linked to the Home Office strands of Contest. In particular trust in Prevent had been undermined by a series of accusations that it was a cover for covert surveillance of the community. This included the controversy over Project Champion that placed covert CCTV cameras in largely Muslim areas of Birmingham and Arun Kundnani's allegations that Prevent projects were being used as 'honey pots' for intelligence gathering (Kundnani 2009). Kundnani's accusation in part reflected the original Prevent objectives of improving soft intelligence and identifying individuals at risk, but claimed this was being done covertly rather than consensually. These criticisms were also repeated in the Communities and Local Government Committee review which noted that the suspicion had critically undermined trust in Prevent despite a lack of evidence (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010).

There was also the on-going suspicion amongst the community about the definition of extremism being used by Prevent. This came to a head in a high profile conflict between the

DCLG under Hazel Blears and the MCB following the introduction of a harder definition of extremism. On 25th February 2009 after just over a year as Secretary of State, Hazel Blears gave a speech at the LSE titled *'Many Voices: understanding the debate about preventing violent-extremism'* where she set out a distinction between Islam, Islamism and violent-extremism (Blears 2009a). Blears argued that whilst jihadi ideas were separate from legitimate Islamic teachings it did have wider social and political roots that should be addressed. She gave a qualified endorsement of engagement with groups with conservative social views who opposed to violent-extremism. However she also directly challenged those who justified terrorism overseas, questioned Israel's right to exist and promoted religious and cultural practices such as *"forced marriage, female genital mutilation, or homophobia"* (Blears 2009a).[31]

The speech set out a framework for the more selective community engagement strategy that had been signalled in the 2009 Contest published earlier that month. This suggests that the Home Office was increasingly influencing the DCLG approach to Prevent at this point. The intention to emphasise a more selective strategy was also illustrated by advance briefings to the media. On the day of the speech the Guardian reported, *"Extremist Islamist groups are to be confronted by the government as part of a new strategy to draw a sharper distinction between right and wrong, the communities secretary, Hazel Blears, will say today.*" (Watt 2009). Similarly the Daily Mail also reported that *"In a speech to be delivered tonight, she will also signal a tough new line on contacts with individuals and organisations which promote extremism in a call on the Government to challenge the practices of groups outside British 'core values'."* (Daily Mail 2009). The common reporting from very different editorial positions suggests the prior press briefing was of a more assertive approach to promoting British values.

[31] This shift took place whilst Sadiq Khan, a former chair of the MCB legal affairs committee, was Minister of State for Communities under Blears.

This new and more assertive position was swiftly followed by formal disengagement from the MCB. On the 13th of March Blears wrote to the MCB Chair (Blears 2009b) withdrawing the MCBs membership of the faith communities consultative forum until clarified its commitment to non-violence. It was linked to the signing of the 'Istanbul declaration' by the MCB deputy secretary-general, Dr Daud Abdullah Abdullah (Blears 2009c). The Istanbul declaration was produced over the weekend of 14th and 15th of February (Law 2009) following the 2008 – 09 Gaza war and subsequent Israeli blockade. This was part of the on-going cycle of violence that in this instance followed Hamas' seizure of power in Gaza after contested Palestinian National Authority elections in 2006 and subsequent rocket attacks on Israel.

The Istanbul declaration claimed there was an international conspiracy against the defence of Gaza and criticised neighbouring Arab states – primarily Egypt - for not opening crossings to allow supplies, including weapons, to enter. The preamble to the statement set out a view that essentially called for support for Gaza as a first step toward ending Israel as a self-determining Jewish state:

> *"This statement is addressed to the Islamic Nation, its religious scholars, its rulers and its peoples. In it we congratulate the whole family of Islam on the manifest victory which Allah has granted us in the land of Gaza, a land of pride and dignity, over the Zionist Jewish occupiers. Allah has appointed it as the first step in the complete victory for all of Palestine and the holy places of the Muslims."* (Istanbul Declaration 2009)

The government argued that as the MCB's apparent support for a statement that called for attacks on Jews and British forces disqualified it as legitimate partner for government. However, the MCB claimed that this was part of the long standing intention by the Labour administration to side-line it for its legitimate criticism of government foreign policy. The reasons given by government focused on the implied support for violence against British troops and interests due to the UK's support for Israel, including the following sections of the of the declaration (BBC 2009):

"The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard everyone standing with the Zionist entity, whether countries, institutions or individuals, as providing a substantial contribution to the crimes and brutality of this entity; the position towards him is the same as towards this usurping entity."

"The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to Gaza, is in effect a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a clear violation of the sovereignty of the Nation, that must be rejected and fought by all means and ways."

The conflict between the government and the MCB exacerbated wider conflict about the consistency and transparency of Prevent. This included concern that Prevent was being exploited by some groups to secure access, money and status at local and national levels and to exclude groups and interlocutors that were critical of foreign policy. These concerns became part of an debate within the Muslim community about the legitimacy of Prevent due to the perceived stigmatisation of Muslim identity and conflation with coercive surveillance. Organisations such as the Quilliam Foundation, a think tank set up by ex-Hizb ut-Tarir members to actively campaign against Islamist views, argued that organisations such as the MCB were trying to undermine Prevent to defend their own status. Lord Carlile also criticised the MCB for making unjustified claims that Prevent cast suspicion on all Muslims.

The conflict meant that local Muslim community organisations faced a complex set of local and national political pressures. This was set out in a report by the An-Nisa Society, a Muslim community organisation based in north London:

"Funding grassroots Muslim groups to deliver Prevent is unhelpful as it causes them to lose credibility and trust with the very groups the government wants them to engage. Hardened extremists are not likely to attend projects funded by the government. Nor are parents going to send their children to 'preventative' projects that will stigmatise

them. There is so much hostility to the strategy amongst Muslims once they become aware of it, that local councils and funded groups finding implementation difficult, are resorting to disguising the source and objectives of the funding by being 'economical' with information and using misleading labels." (An-Nisa 2009)

The An-Nisa submission illustrates the breakdown in trust around the motives of Prevent. This included the persistent concern that a focus on moderate Muslims was a form of cultural and ideological surveillance that stigmatised Muslims and Islam through the implied link with extremism and terrorism.[32] Other religious communities also opposed making links between religious integration and terrorism, most notably the Jewish Board of Deputies. The Deputies were supportive of Prevent due to their concerns about Islamist radicalisation and strongly backed the government's disengagement with the MCB over the Istanbul declaration. However, they also criticised conflation of orthodox religious views, including those that espoused religious and cultural segregation, with the risk from terrorism and advocated a clearer line between issues of integration and political extremism. Whilst this was based on general principles it was also a specific defence of groups such as the strictly orthodox, and highly segregated Charedi Jewish communities:

"Many Muslims may not be integrated, and may promote ideas that are antithetical to community cohesion, but are non-violent and are repelled by Islamism and Salafi jihadism. It is well to remember that the lead members of the 7/7 and Operation Crevice conspiracies came from well-integrated backgrounds. Neither is speaking English or wearing the veil the real issue. The issue is confronting an extremist and alien political ideology which promotes the supremacy of Islam over other faiths and democratic political systems, a core belief in anti-Semitism and the use of violence to

[32] Importantly John Denham when Secretary of State also argued that there needed to be a commensurate focus on far right extremism following the growing prominence of the English Defence League and made a direct link to radical Islamist extremism.

> *achieve its ends."* Jewish board of deputies, written evidence to Committee, September 2009 (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010)

The separation from Prevent was also supported by advocates for reform of integration and community engagement policy. This centred on concerns that the negative politics of Prevent was undermining attempts to address complex and sensitive issues associated with certain religious or ethnic group. Individuals such as Ted Cantle criticised Prevent on the basis that it was focused on a single ethnic community that served to stigmatise and displace wider discussions about community integration. Groups and organisations were resistant or fearful of addressing concerns in partnership with authorities due to the risk of feeding into perceptions and potentially undermining confidence in the community about their own motives. In turn this had confused and ultimately delayed dealing with complex and sensitive issues around certain cultural practices, such as forced and cousin marriages and female genital mutilation. As a result, rather than empowering the community to address challenging issues community groups had found themselves in the position of defending the status of Muslims in broader society.

Risk based rationalisation

> *"The Home Office and CLG had not taken responsibility for what was going on at local level… There was no useful practical guidance, so it was not surprising that you had a mixture of the genuinely good, the benign but worthless and stuff that made community cohesion worse. There was probably only a small amount of genuine counter radicalisation work."* Government minister

The Home Office's model of targeting interventions on individuals or groups was positioned as a viable alternative to an emphasis on the indirect benefits of integration and engagement. The Home Office argued that local administration of funding had resulted in support for projects and activities that had limited impact on preventing terrorism. In contrast the Home Office, through its support for the Channel programme, was able to present quantitative measures of engagement as evidence of impact. There were still persistent concerns about the

capability of organisations and agencies such as schools and local authorities and their level of commitment to deliver such an approach. Nevertheless, it was argued that a targeted approach would be a more effective use of resources. This approach gained further authority in the context of significant government spending cuts that was also a key factor in the DCLG support for Home Office leadership of Prevent and the separation from integration policy.

Figure 7.1: Hansard mentions of 'Muslim community', 'Islam' and 'Radicalisation'



(parli-n-grams.puntofisso.net retrieved 22 February 2017)

Parliamentary interest in radicalisation grew as a way of describing the complex set of issues associated with recruitment and extremism (Figure 7.1). The idea of radicalisation was central to the development of the Channel Programme that had been set up by the Association of Chief Police Officers in 2007 with funding from the Home Office. The objective was *"to provide support to people at risk of being drawn into violent-extremism."* and was based on Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) introduced in the 2003 Criminal Justice Act. Schemes included a coordinator and a Channel board, ostensibly led by the local authority, that brought together statutory agencies and services such as housing, health services and youth offending teams. Channel identified individuals 'at risk' and referred them to appropriate interventions such as counselling, faith guidance or more general civic engagement activities

and work with mainstream services (HM Government 2010a). By 2011 it had dealt with 1,120 cases (HM Government 2011b).

The OSCT advocated a targeted risk based approach to Prevent activities that could demonstrate a more direct impact on the risk of terrorism. The OSCT argued that Prevent should focus on disrupting the individual process of radicalisation rather than dealing with the wider root causes of radicalisation. This in part represented a failure to demonstrate evidence that a longer-term model of community mobilisation in support of social change was working, particularly given the growing conflict over Prevent itself. The difficulty of demonstrating the impact of Prevent was highlighted by Communities and Local Government and Home Affairs select committees in 2009 and 2010 respectively and by the subsequent review of Prevent in 2011. There were persistent criticisms of the quality of monitoring and evaluation, the lack of focus on outcomes and absence of clarity at a national level of how Prevent money was being spent.

Home Office evidence tended to focus on outcomes, in contrast to the process-oriented metrics being used by local authorities for NI35. In support of its position the OSCT argued that it was working to inform local agencies about local risks whilst highlighting the role of the Channel programme and other local mentoring and referral initiatives to provide targeted interventions. Channel provided figures on the number of individuals who had been diverted from harm following a risk assessment. Even though significant questions remained about the quality of models and referral systems the OSCT also draw on the growing body of evidence about the nature of the problem of radicalisation in support of the approach. This included the original work that framed the problem as a targeted issue of recruitment rather than a broader problem with the whole Muslim community. Furthermore, the OSCT, under the leadership of Charles Farr, could also draw on professional expertise and status to justify its approach.

Figure 7.2: Real terms cuts in departmental expenditure 2010-11 to 2015-16



(Institute for Fiscal Studies 2015)

A targeted approach aligned with the Coalition government's spending priorities post-2010. The 2010 comprehensive spending review resulted in an overall cut in spending of 9.1% across departments for the 2010-15 parliament. The DCLG agreed the largest departmental budget cut that resulted in a 50% cut to communities funding for coordination of local services and a cut of 27% to direct grants to local government for delivery of services (Figure 7.2). The Home Office itself saw a reduction of 24.9% and Department for Education 6.4%. In addition central government also withdrew from local decision-making in order to push accountability for spending decisions, and cuts, onto local authorities. In this context whilst Prevent funding was relatively minor in overall budgets it was an area of discretionary spending over which departments and local authorities and schools had control. For example, for the Department of Education spending on schools was protected meaning that its cuts came from discretionary activities, such as Prevent.

In the new fiscal environment the incoming Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Eric Pickles, supported the proposals as an opportunity to reduce the workload of the department. In this context Pickles took the view that the controversy around Prevent

outweighed the merits of local authority and DCLG involvement. The revised strategy did commit the DCLG to on-going engagement with the Muslim community beyond Prevent. In addition to general commitments on integration the 2011 strategy proposed that *'Policy and programmes to deal with extremism and with extremist organisations more widely are not part of Prevent and will be coordinated from DCLG.'* (HM Government 2011a). However, there was a rapid restructuring of activities to focus on new priorities, including the citizen services and big society agenda, whilst downgrading or closing units that had primarily been working on Prevent. One observer describes this process:

> *"Eric Pickles thought Prevent was a disaster that did more harm than good. He thought you could do mosque open days, which he did in Bradford, but that the whole securitisation of communities was a flop. The Prevent unit was slimmed right down and the bulk of the cash went off to national citizen services."* Advisor 4

The rationalisation was also supported by a number of the advisors who had been involved throughout the development of Prevent, the Communities and Local Government Committee and the independent review of Prevent (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011c). The common theme in these reports highlighted the problems that agencies and authorities were facing when dealing with a complex and sensitive agenda that was outside of their normal capabilities. This had led to wasting of money and the potential to be actively damaging to the agenda's core objectives. One advisor who had been involved and broadly supportive of an effective Prevent programme from the outset articulated a view of the decision as a tactical step to limit potential wider damage:

> *"For me this is about compartmentalising the agenda and not about saying there are simply no connections; but when it comes to policy how do you deal with the issue so that teachers and police officers don't feel that they are being asked to do something beyond their skill set and are using the skills they do have effectively."* Advisor 1

There was still a dispute over the notional model of radicalisation that was being used by the Home Office due to its association with a conveyor belt model. The model incorporated a range of ideological, identity and behavioural precursors that described a vulnerability to recruitment. The Home Office largely bypassed the debate about causality by framing it as a risk assessment tool to be used by professionals to guide interventions. However, there was on-going concern about the robustness of referral mechanisms, the extent of community involvement and the potential to stigmatise individuals if interventions were mishandled, particularly in schools. However, many of the broader criticisms about causality also applied to longer-term root causal approaches. For example, the allocation of funding to local authorities based on the size of the Muslim community population was criticised for lacking an empirical base and for stigmatising the whole community. Some funding opportunities for community engagement and development work were retained, including community safety work and community cohesion work and engagement with religious institutions and groups.

Engaging education

The new model was founded on a centralising administration to improve coordination of policy alongside actively engaging reticent sectors, particularly education. The revised 2011 strategy signalled an intention to improve the engagement of institutions that were potentially radicalising 'settings' or key points of contact with young people, such as schools, colleges, universities and prisons, in Prevent. This in part followed research into situational approaches to radicalisation that was commissioned by the Home Office and published in 2011 (Bouhana & Wikstrom 2011). This work emphasised the importance of the dynamics of placed as neutral and active radicalising settings and vectors for interventions (Bouhana & Wikstrom 2011). However, there had been resistance that was linked to principled, cultural and practical concerns about the implications of being involved in a security agenda, particularly in education. This included managing controversy about definitions of extremism and accusations of spying and concern about practical capacity and capability and implications of referring individuals to programmes such as channel.

The Department for Education had emphasised the role of citizenship education in preventing extremism. However, there were persistent concerns about the ability of teachers to address complex subjects such as the Iraq war and the relationship between Islam and the west. Schools also reported significant challenges in terms of managing concerns of parents and pupils about surveillance and stigmatisation associated with Prevent, even when framed as a duty of care. In practice Prevent was rarely, if ever considered alongside the Department for Education's priorities of academic attainment or schools reform. Similarly, the involvement of local authorities had also continued to be sensitive, despite the availability of money and extensive work to encourage engagement. For example a number of local authorities deliberately chose to either avoid the agenda entirely or focus on the cohesion parts with little or no mention of Prevent (Regional government official).

The 2011 strategy's focus on higher education was based on concern about radical Islamist speakers on campus and the risk of recruitment via student groups or networks. In particular the issue of campus radicalisation was highlighted following the prosecution of a former UCL student, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who confessed to having a bomb on board an aircraft. The representative group, Universities UK (UUK), had engaged with previous Prevent initiatives, such as the DIUS toolkit on managing good relations on campus in 2007. However, the 2011 Prevent strategy signalled an intent to actively engage universities in local Prevent structures. There was qualified support where Prevent was framed as an issue of a duty of care or law enforcement against terrorist recruiters. However, issues of non-violent extremism at universities presented challenges around the need for universities to balance responsibilities in relation to incitement to hatred and glorification of terrorism against a legal duty to promote freedom of speech within the law.[33]

[33] The legal duty to promote freedom of speech on campus had been introduced by the Thatcher government in the Education (No 2) Act (Section 43) in 1986 in response to student union opposition to conservative politicians and ministers on university campuses.

For example, following Abdulmutallab's arrest in December 2009, UUK produced guidance which focused on clarifying the law as it related to universities:

> *"Following the events of December 2009 it became clear that there was little guidance available to universities in this area, and that it would be helpful to provide greater clarity in relation to the legal framework within which universities must operate, and more information about how other universities had been addressing these challenges."*
> Forward by Professor Malcolm Grant, Provost UCL (UUK 2011)

The approach emphasised the high value the sector placed on protecting a culture of academic freedom and their legal autonomy from government. The student movement, including individual student unions, the National Union of Students and the Federation of Societies for Islamic Students were vocally opposed to Prevent. For many universities the main challenge centred on managing campus tensions between Muslim and Jewish students over Israel and its relationship with the Palestinian territories (UUK 2011). However, Islamists did have presence on some UK campuses through organisations such as Hizb ut-Tarir as well as various and formal and informal Islamic student societies, with examples of radical Islamist speakers being invited to events. As a result the sector's reticence was highlighted by the OSCT and the incoming Conservative led government. Similarly organisations such as Quilliam, the Henry Jackson society and 'Student Rights' and the academic Anthony Glees highlighted the presence of radical speakers on campuses and instances of UK graduates being recruited into terrorism (Glees 2005).

Managing community engagement

> *"[Our definition of extremism is} vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or*

overseas." Definition of extremism used in 2011 Prevent strategy (HM Government 2011a)

The Home Office's authority over Prevent was also founded on the need to manage the political risks associated with a more selective approach to engagement. Local authorities had done community-mapping exercises and established forums and partnerships to engage with local community organisations and representatives. The revised strategy, driven by the Conservative leadership of the Home Office, emphasised combating non-violent extremism by disengaging from groups who didn't actively support shared British values. However, this was set against the Coalition government's shared focus on civil liberties, an issues that was of particular importance to the Liberal Democrats. This tension served to strengthen the Home Office's position in order to balance the views of both sides. On the one hand the Home Office aimed to stop Prevent funding going to politically risky groups by centralising administration, away from local decision-making. At the same the civil liberties dimension was reassured through an emphasis on the legal rights around extremism and freedom of conscience, alongside a narrower scope for Prevent that was separate from integration policy.

The compromise between these two positions can be seen in the decision to not work with groups who 'actively' opposed key British values (HM Government 2011a). This responded to the Conservative party's support for a robust approach to a wider set of extremist views as part of a longer-term solution to radicalisation and an issue of principle to defend British values. Supporters of the approach included senior Conservatives, including David Cameron and Michael Gove as well as the incoming Home Secretary, Theresa May. For example, the Conservative manifesto had proposed banning organisations *'which advocate hate or the violent overthrow of our society, such as Hizb-ut-Tarir'*.[34] However, the coalition agreement with the Liberal Democrats was founded on a shared commitment to liberal principles, a common theme in the Conservative manifesto. For example the Liberal Democrat manifesto

[34] As with Tony Blair's stated intention to proscribe Hizb-ut-Tarir in 2005 the Conservative proposal was never implemented. In the absence of a connection to terrorism it was neither politically viable given the coalition with the Liberal Democrats or legally possible due to the Human Rights Act.

was committed to freedom of speech and constructive community engagement and the party adopted a more liberal position in relation non-violent extremism.

The Conservative manifesto emphasised a number of liberal themes outside of the main focus on fiscal consolidation (The Conservative Party 2010). This was particularly prominent in relation to foreign affairs which included a strong defence of open societies and liberal values. David Cameron set out the idea of muscular liberalism as part of a values based defence against terrorism and radicalisation in his 'Munich speech', February 2011. The speech was his first on security and terrorism as Prime Minister and reiterated an agenda of assertively promoting liberal values:

> *"But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in certain values and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality. It says to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things. Now, each of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty."* (Cameron 2011)

A more robust approach was also promoted by those who advocated challenging Islamist ideas as the central cause of terrorism. Prominent advocates during the period were the Quilliam Foundation, and its founders Ed Hussain and Majid Nawaz. Hussain came to prominence in 2007 with the publication of his book the Islamist, a memoir of his participation in Hizb ut-Tarir when at college in the 1990s, and his subsequent exit and conversion to Sufi Islam. Nawaz was also a former member of Hizb ut-Tarir who had spent time in jail in Egypt. They founded the Quilliam Foundation in 2008 to undertake counter extremism work and drew on their authenticity as ex-radicals and Muslims to secure financial support from a range of sources, including the Home Office. They framed radicalisation explicitly in terms of Islamism, which they defined as a fundamentalist anti democratic political ideology that was being promoted in the UK and Europe.

Both Quilliam and Policy Exchange argued that working with Islamist groups was short-sighted and encouraged a more selective values based approach to engagement. Notably Quilliam wrote a letter to the incoming Home Office minister criticising various Islamic institutions, including the MCB and the Islamic Foundation, for politicising the spiritual concept of the 'Ummah' and tacitly or actively supporting extremist ideas. Similarly the 2009 Policy Exchange report 'Choosing our friends wisely' (Maher & Frampton 2009), authored by Shiraz Maher, criticised local authorities and police forces for working with Islamist groups. This included the Salafist STREET project in Lambeth, the Muslim Contact Unit and funding of the Islamist Cordoba foundation by Tower Hamlets council. Examples of links to the MCB were also criticised. For example, £38,500 of Prevent funding from Bradford City council to the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) to 'actively engage with young people to discuss their identity and to become active role models in local and national democratic institutions' was criticised on the basis that the acting and outgoing Presidents of the ISB were affiliated to the MCB.

There had been persistent criticism that the general focus on Islam had stigmatised the Muslim community. The emphasis on Islam was also criticised for focusing funding on religious groups to the detriment of other groups. In this context some argued for more targeting of interventions based on assessments of beliefs, behaviours or other indicators. See for example Ed Hussein of Quilliam's calls for better risk based targeting:

> *"[Prevent] should target those communities in which there is a serious terrorism problem. My hunch is at times it is not targeting those communities in particular and hence this broad brush approach. That comes about as a result of not understanding where the problem lies."* Ed Hussein (quoted in Communities and Local Government Committee 2010 p47)

Equally many critics of the focus on the Muslim community criticised more targeting and advocated an approach that focused on a wider set of community experiences and long-term

indirect solutions. See for example evidence given to Communities and Local Government Committee that advocated for a focus on a wide set of indirect factors:

> *"The causal link between recruitment and underlying socio-economic conditions leading to vulnerability seem to have been included but not emphasised adequately by government in its approach, preferring to focus on security and religion. Problems of discrimination, hate crime, deprivation, identity and the impact of an unpopular foreign policy need greater emphasis. All these factors make the vulnerable more susceptible to ideologies of violence and add to feelings of disconnection from the state and a government failing to meet needs."* Evidence from International School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010 p25)

Conservative criticism of 'multi-culturalism' was also a factor in the centralisation of Prevent under Home Office control. The Conservative manifesto did briefly note community cohesion, alongside other dimensions of the public realm, as a dimension of effective national security (The Conservative Party 2010). The Conservative critique of multi-culturalism focused on the accommodation of separate ethic identities, primarily by local authorities that were often, though not exclusively, Labour led and formed the majority of areas receiving Prevent funding. These criticisms were supported by evidence given to the Community and Local Government Committee's review that highlighted how Prevent funding based on religious identity had been channelled via existing relationships. This had reinforced the role of faith leaders as community representatives and gatekeepers with money, prestige and access. The report argued that this hindered reform of community engagement to the detriment of addressing the inclusion of disaffected young people (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010).

In some respects funding went to organisations that were important and influential partners which also meant that allocations were often the result of local political competition and rivalry.

As noted by one civil servant, when reflecting on the extent to which local authorities engaged with the longer-term objectives of social change:

> *"In most of the places where it most mattered, there was strong Muslim political representation on the local authority representing the status quo, not change."* Civil servant 2

Many in the Muslim community criticised Prevent for reinforcing existing patterns of community authority and representation. This included an over emphasis on religious institutions and a reliance on conservative leadership that had failed to engage younger generations of British Muslim and contributed to the vacuum of authority that had opened the door to extremists and radicals. This lent further credence to the need for reform around the types of groups and organisations that were engaged in Prevent nationally and locally. Although this line of criticism from within the Muslim community was not necessarily supportive of an ideologically selective approach it did serve to justify reform of partnerships and engagement in Prevent. This perspective is illustrated by this contribution to the DCLG select committee review:

> *"The re-emergence of faith leaders as community representatives will have far-reaching, long-term consequences on disaffected young people who have never nor will ever consider these faith leaders to represent their experiences or interests."* Peace Maker, written evidence (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010)

The Home Office, through the 2009 Contest strategy, had sought to develop a clearer frameworks for selective engagement. This included a more detailed articulation of the nature of the radical Islamist ideologies associated with terrorist groups that drew on a growing volume of research into the nature of radical Islamism and jihadism. Whilst the exact nature of the link between extremist ideas and violence was still contested, the OSCT under Charles Farr had supported the need to challenge a wider set of non-violent but extremist views. OSCT argued that engaging with ideas before they were violent and working with groups that actively

promoted shared values was the best model for long-term prevention. This was a counter-point to an approach that relied on a neutral approach to extremism and engagement to address the root causes of grievances, as illustrated by this comment from 2009:

> *"There are ideologies of extremism which lend themselves to violence and by limiting yourself to challenging violent-extremism you are operating too far down the conveyor belt of radicalisation."* Charles Farr, 26 February 2009 (Home Affairs Committee 2009)

In practice the Home Office did not propose moving beyond the legal frameworks associated with incitement to hatred and glorification of terrorism. The 2011 strategy reiterated a general definition of extremism that continued to be framed by general concepts of British values, including democracy, human rights and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs plus calls for the death of members of British armed forces. However, the definition was qualified by reference to active and vocal opposition to these values that allowed for more scope for a nuanced and tactical assessment of different groups. For example this was used as justification to exclude proselytising Islamist groups, such as Brixton mosque and the Street project, from involvement in Prevent funded work. One influential analogy at the time was that it was akin to working with far-right organisations to divert people from violent far-right groups. The shift away from Islamist groups was also positioned as an evolution of the programme that had developed new partners that shared the long-term objectives and political values of Prevent. As noted in the independent review by Lord Carlile:

> *"Government, local authorities and the police do not need (if ever they have needed) to facilitate or work in partnership with extremists: a steady stream of new and non-extremist groups, with the knowledge and integrity to assist the authorities in the aims of Prevent and associated work, is stepping up to the plate."* (HM Government 2011c)

However, the managed approach to engagement adopted by the Home Office stopped short of a more proactive campaign against Islamist groups. This received notable criticism from

Quilliam that was set out in a private briefing note to the incoming ministers in 2010. However, the Liberal Democrats, as well as some Conservative MPs opposed broader definitions of extremism as part of a liberal civil liberties agenda, particularly where this was seen to be targeting conservative interpretations of faith. In addition there were also advocates for a tactical approach that avoided alienating the broader community. Advocates for this approach included Sayeeda Warsi who joined Cabinet in 2010 as minister without portfolio and went on to become Minister of State for Faith and Communities and sat in Cabinet. The Home Office itself also retained a commitment to means based community engagement by local police forces, including with those who might otherwise be considered extremist, to support counter-terrorism work.

The funding climate was also a helpful opportunity to manage political disputes over extremism by framing decisions in terms of value for money rather than ideologies and beliefs. Centralisation helped to address criticisms that funding was being used as a form of community patronage at local levels, or by the government, to reward compliant and supportive groups. For example:

> *"First of all, let me be clear: the groups have had funding withdrawn for all sorts of reasons, of which being extremist is not actually the principal one. Some groups have had funding withdrawn because Ministers felt, based on the information we provided them, that they didn't offer value for money, that they simply weren't addressing the issue in a way that was justified or that justified the amount of taxpayers' money that was going on them."* Charles Farr (Home Affairs Committee 2011)

Box 7.2: Home Office Funding to the Quilliam Foundation 2009 to 2012 (Home Office 2014)	
Financial year	Funding amount (£)

2008 to 2009	674,608.00
2009 to 2010	396,882.80
2010 to 2011	158,896.66
2011 to 2012	26,993.34

The decision to end core funding to the Quilliam foundation is one high profile case that lends some credence to the issue of value for money in funding decisions, as well as the need for political balance. The decision to end core funding was taken in 2010, prior to their critical briefing to the incoming minister (See Box 7.2 for a breakdown of core grant funding to Quilliam from the Home Office). The decision was subsequently justified by Home Office Minister Damian Green on the basis that it was part of the normal funding development cycle and that the organisation had not been entirely successful in delivering its original core aims and had pivoted into new terrain (HC deb, 15 Mar 2011, c23WH). This highlighted Quilliam's work on a broader range of activities beyond the original objectives of community engagement to challenge the ideology of terrorism and extremism. Quilliam had subsequently developed itself as a think tank and had failed to establish credibility amongst the broader Muslim community. This credibility gap was due to their perceived proximity to government, their previous history as extremists and a polarising style that alienated many even where there was sympathy for their objectives.

The qualified approach adopted by the Home Office also reflected the continued debate about the empirical link between extremism, the causes of terrorism and effective solutions. Selective engagement was criticised for lacking an empirically justified link between terrorism and radical political or religious views. This included criticism of inclusion of theological and ideological factors in a simplistic conveyor belt of radicalisation that underplayed the root causes of grievance and wider processes of identity formation. The criticism of the model was

prominent in evidence given to the DCLG select committee inquiry into Prevent. Arun Kundnani argued that Prevent had failed to empower communities to oppose to extremism and had instead chosen to engage in superficial behaviour modification:

> *"There does seem to be a strong view amongst a lot of people I have spoken to that a key part of it is a sense of political disempowerment and a sense that the British political system is pointless and does not listen to them... Unfortunately, too much of the way Prevent is thought about now is not about empowerment but about behaviour modification."* Arun Kundnani (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010)

At the same time many who were sympathetic to this view also acknowledged the changed the political context for Prevent and were ultimately supportive of the Home Office approach to managing definitions of extremism. This tacit acceptance in part represented a tactical retreat that had traded separation of integration policy for a more robust approach to non-violent extremism in Prevent itself. Many of the advisors, who were increasingly side-lined in decision-making, continued to recommend a tactical approach that prioritised nuanced engagement with the Muslim community. At the same time they argued that a centralised focus on non-violent extremism that didn't actively develop a broader base of support amongst the Muslim community was unlikely to resolve suspicions of Prevent and of initiatives such as Channel. One respondent to this study described what they saw as the negative consequences of the more selective approach to engagement:

> *"I think that the people who lost out were the Deobandi, which I think was tragic for the government to lose because they run the madrasah and they will be producing the next generation of imams in this country, not the Barelvi as they don't have many institutions, only one or two. And I think they are people we could have won over but we alienated. I think others who lost out are the moderates in the Ikhwan Jamaat camp."* Advisor 3

The more limited approach to engagement was also supported by the DCLG in order to manage political risks associated with Prevent. Following the resignation of Hazel Blears, John Denham had sought to diffuse some of the tensions around Prevent. This included efforts to highlight the issue of far right extremism in Prevent to balance community concerns about the narrow focus on Islam, and renewing engagement with the MCB. The MCB were reincorporated into the faiths consultative forum in 2010, following mediation by the Church of England with the Jewish Board of Deputies. This followed work by the DCLG to clarify the MCB's governance structure and a public rejection of Istanbul Declaration. Denham also actively highlighted the issue of far right extremism following street protests by the English Defence League targeted at Muslims and Islamic places of worship and he drew parallels between the different poles of extremism. However, although far right was included in the 2011 strategy and Channel referrals, the OSCT advocated retaining the focus on Islamist terrorism.

The 2011 Prevent strategy also committed the DCLG to undertake separate work to deal with extremism. DCLG prioritised managing its own political risks, with Conservative ministers adopting a position of selective engagement whilst Liberal Democrat ministers maintained wider community links. This also entailed a shift away from mechanisms such as the faiths consultative forum with a preference for more ad hoc engagement. Although this was justified on the basis of value for money it also allowed a more tactical approach to engagement. The decision to close the forum was justified by Liberal Democrat Minister Andrew Stunell in the following statement:

> *"It did not add value to the effective arrangements that Departments already have in place for consulting faith communities on policy. Our preference is to work with faith communities in a manner that is strategic and appropriate for particular situations. My Department will continue to liaise individually with national faith communities that provided members of the Council, and to convene ad hoc groupings to discuss policy as necessary. Officials from various Departments will continue to attend meetings of the Faith Communities Forum of the Inter Faith Network for the United*

Kingdom, in order to engage with faith communities collectively." Andrew Stunell, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Communities and Local Government (HC Deb, 23 June 2011, c440W)

Conclusion

Decisions during this period responded to the growing conflict over the policy by moving away from a distributed approach and strengthening central control. The Home Office gained leadership of the policy with a mandate to improve the coherence of national and local implementation. At the same time the scope of agenda retreated from broader questions about the root causes of grievances and alienation in preference for a focus on diverting individuals at risk of bring drawn into terrorism. The 2011 strategy retained the view that integration was fundamental to its longer term aims, but the decision to adopt a narrower approach was an explicit attempt to avoid the conflict impacting on Prevent and other areas of social policy. Notably however, the decision to adopt a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism was actually limited in its impact by the decision to separate Prevent and integration policy and the Coalition partnership's own liberal foundations.

These decisions represented a tactical compromise that sought to manage conflict over the policy by narrowing its scope in the context of reduced public funding. However, the compromise also moved the policy away from the challenges that had originally its motivated development. The failure to achieve a consensus over the development of shared social and political values was a problem that Prevent sought to address. Furthermore the failure to resolve mistrust of government policy, including amongst the Muslim community and critics of multiculturalism, was also a failure against one of its original motivations. Neither did the new approach fully resolve the problem of how to secure effective consensual engagement in the policy from a wider range of government departments and agencies beyond the Home Office. Therefore whilst the shift represented a tactical compromise that enabled a targeted it failed to address the challenges that had motivated the original development of Prevent.

Chapter 8: Institutional change

Introduction

This chapter examines the institutional features of the development of Prevent. In particular it shows how the size and structure of an evolving policy community, including evolving patterns of institutional support for the competing models, shaped Prevent (Heclo & Wildavsky; Rhodes 1997; Sabatier & Weible 2007; Hall & Taylor 1986). The distributed model John attracted support as a way of rapidly broadening the scope of security policy that contrasted with the institutional limits of the centralised model Thomas. In particular, the focus on broadening institutional engagement, particularly at local levels, meant that a consensual model was a tactical necessity. However, the focus on the tactical motivations for engagement, captured by the focus on violent extremism, also limited the depth of institutional trust in the new policy community. This failure meant that there were persistent questions about the motivations of members of the policy community and, by extension, the shared aims and objectives of Prevent. The resultant conflict led to support for a tactical compromise between supporters of the two models that narrowed the scope of Prevent in 2011.

Prevent was heavily influenced by the structure of engagement between government and the Muslim community. Political conflict over the narrow enforcement-led model Thomas in Chapter 5 motivated the development of a broader policy community founded on distributed and consensual institutional relationships. This structure was promoted by the Labour government in Chapter 6 as a tactical measure for dealing with the immediacy and complexity of the terrorist threat and its wider politics. The rapid expansion of the policy community engaged a wider range of agencies and community groups and addressed the need for demonstrable short-term action. It also provided a rationale for engaging government departments and local agencies, including local authorities, as well as Muslim community groups in a programme of collective action to isolate extremists. The expanded institutional

reach enabled government to engage with wider and highly complex questions of social inclusion, identity and institutional reform.

At the same time it was the distributed structure of the policy community that led to the compromise approach described in Chapter 7. The values based conflict within the policy community led to a tactical split in support for model John toward strengthening the authority of central government in decision-making. At the same time the compromise approach was also rooted in the institutional politics of the Coalition government. The Conservative party supported a centralised approach that removed local discretion over community engagement and funding and was more assertive toward non-violent extremism. At the same time the Liberal Democrats supported a narrower scope for Prevent that helped to protect a private rights based model of extremism. The broader policy community, including supporters of both models, supported clarifying the scope of Prevent, including the principles for engagement whilst limiting the wider political risks to integration policy. As a result separating Prevent from integration policy allowed for more assertive central government leadership but at the cost of the breadth and depth of institutional support and engagement.

This chapter shows how the institutional foundations of Prevent centred on tactical and principled differences about the appropriate constraints and authority of government decision-making. This came to the fore in relation to conflicting liberal values related to the tolerance of non-violent extremism, including socially conservative religious views. In this respect most decision-making in Prevent was constrained by the need to balance street level expansion of the policy community against wider political scrutiny of its membership. In particular the Muslim community held a dual status, as both targets for change and partners in the process that increased the sensitivity about their status in the policy community. This included scrutiny of the motivations and values of the organisations involved in Prevent nationally and locally, both amongst the wider the Muslim community, the media and parliament. This scrutiny exerted pressure on the Muslim community and government to disengage from Prevent that

limited the scope for government to lead institutional change across a broader agenda without increasing conflict.

Institutional limits of model Thomas

> *"We were starting to pick [Prevent] up early but the reality was it wasn't solely ours… Some of my colleagues in the enforcement side were reactive and weren't necessarily going as far as thinking downstream about a long-term systemic problem."* Chief Police Officer

Chapter 5 showed that Prevent originated out of the institutional limits of a narrow institutional model. At first security policy-making was led by a relatively narrow enforcement community centred on the Home Office. The enforcement community had received significant political support, including the extension of enforcement powers and the decision to coordinate a whole government approach through the Contest strategy. However, this support, combined with the political conflict over the invasion of Iraq exposed the political and legal limits of the approach. These limits, combined with the complexity of home grown recruitment, lent authority to street-level feedback that emphasised the need for more active engagement with the Muslim community. This included feedback from police forces about the operational problem of gathering intelligence on terrorist networks and from Labour MPs who were concerned about the electoral impact of political alienation. As a result the decision to prioritise Prevent in 2004 originated out of the limits of the enforcement community.

As demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, the government continued to emphasise strong enforcement powers, such as Labour's strong political defence of the 2000 and 2001 Terrorism Acts. However, the decision to move leadership of security policy from the Home Office to the Cabinet Office in 2002 was the first recognition of the limits of a narrow enforcement approach. The decision to give the Cabinet Office a role under the leadership of Tony Blair was intended to help coordinate government resources due to significance of the terrorist threat and its political profile. At first this focused on working with departments that were relevant to the

protect and prepare strands of Contest, in particular the emergency services and transport infrastructure. In practice, the enforcement community, through the Home Office and the intelligences agencies and the Association of Chief Police Officers, continued to coordinate security policy. In this respect Cabinet Office leadership helped to extended the authority of the enforcement community by drawing other departments into their decisions.

Chapter 5 shows that members of the enforcement community actively pushed for increased capacity in order to manage the complexity of home-grown recruitment. At the same time these concerns established the operational and political boundaries of the enforcement community's ability to deal with the threat. The complexity of the threat was noted in the intelligence assessment of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was reinforced by the series of arrests (see Chapter 5). Importantly however Manningham-Buller's own 2003 speech explicitly highlighted the problem of recruitment by extremist and terrorist groups and the challenge this presented to the security services' capacity to identify threats. By linking the impact and effectiveness of enforcement with political dynamics of alienation she set out the limits of a narrow enforcement approach. This theme was also prominent in the 2004 Home Office briefing to the Cabinet that supported the decision to prioritise Prevent (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office 2004; Manningham-Buller 2003).

The enforcement community was also divided over whether it should take the attitudes of the Muslim community into account in its approach. At one end the operational assessment of the threat undertaken by the security services and the Home Office acknowledged the role that Muslim social, religious and ethnic identities played in recruitment. Similarly, street level feedback also raised concern that mistrust in the legitimacy of enforcement was undermining flows of intelligence from the Muslim community. Both dimensions were supported by the recommendations of the MacPherson report that emphasised the need for forces to actively consider how patterns of institutional racism shaped minority experiences of policing (MacPherson 1999). However, there was clearly on-going local and national support for extensive use of strong enforcement powers that placed the problem of community concerns a

distant second. This sentiment was illustrated by Hazel Blears' evidence to the Home Affairs committee in 2005 where she said increased policing of the Muslim community was inevitable given the security environment.

In practice Chapter 5 showed that the enforcement community reached the limits of its institutional authority due to growing operational, political and legal scrutiny. They were restricted by internal concern about the legitimacy of enforcement amongst the Muslim community, nor did they have the capacity to address growing political concerns about the causes and politics of community alienation. This included the growing media and political interest in radical Islamists in the UK, including the street protests in late 2004 and early 2005, allied to attacks in Turkey in 2003 and Madrid in 2004. At the same time there was no appetite in parliament for further extensions to powers of detention, despite the Labour government's large majority. The 2004 Law Lords' judgement established the legal limits of detention and the scope of derogations from human rights standards. Similarly the External Reviewer also highlighted the need to limit the use of stop and search powers. These factors exposed the limits of the model Thomas's institutional capacity to deal with growing political scrutiny of the response.

Support for model John

> *"I think in some ways the initial integration approach was inevitable because it would have been difficult to do it another way."* Advisor 2

Chapter 6 showed how the Labour government gave support to a distributed model in order to improve the legitimacy of its response to terrorism. In this respect the integration of a new broader policy community was a key element of the short term response to terrorism. The model emphasised distributed collective action by government and the Muslim community to address the causes of terrorism. The approach originated out of the government's home affairs and social inclusion strategies, which combined enforcement with a wider consideration of how government and civil society could address complex social problems. It provided a solution to

the operational and political limits of the Hobbesian model by actively seeking the support of the Muslim community as part of a comprehensive response. The approach was also supported by a loose coalition drawn from community policing, community cohesion and social inclusion agendas, as well as many Muslim community representatives and advisors.

The support for a broader approach described in Chapter 5 was required to secure parliamentary support for enforcement powers and to mitigate the impacts of enforcement. At the same time such support was also embedded in the wider social inclusion agenda and associated approaches to public service reform. Labour's home affairs strategy, captured in Blair's famous axiom 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime' can be seen in in the positioning of development alongside military intervention in the post 9/11 response (The Labour Party 2001; Cabinet Office 2002). In addition David Blunkett made the link between security and the role of an active and cohesive civil society as part of the case for strengthened enforcement powers (Home Office 2004; Blunkett 2002). For the Cabinet Office, considering a wider range of social factors was a way of broadening engagement across government. For the Home Office a broader consideration of political and social alienation was a necessary tactical step for improving engagement with the Muslim community (Civil servants 1 and 2).

Chapter 6 showed how a consensual model of social integration helped to secure the support of a broader policy community. A focus on social integration addressed both Blair and Brown's interest in national leadership and identity. The 2005 workshops also show that this broader interest in integration was shared by many Muslim community interlocutors as long as it was a consensual developmental process, a position that was anticipated by the Home Office in 2004. Chapter five also shows that this model was supported by representatives groups such as the MCB who had raised concerns over discrimination, policing and foreign policy (Home Affairs Committee 2005). Civil liberties advocates and opponents of the Iraq war in the Labour party also welcomed the acknowledgement of the social consequences of security policy and the acknowledgement of the limits of government. Furthermore, an integration led approach received qualified support from race equality and integration advocates who argued that

patterns of segregation risked fostering inter-communal grievances and extremism (Home Office 2001a; Philips, T 2006).

The emphasis on distributed engagement between government and the Muslim community was repeatedly signalled in a series of government statements from 2005 onwards. The most prominent of these was Blair's 2006 statement that it was the Muslim community themselves that would solve extremism. Crucially, the model gained political impetus as a viable way of implementing a rapid comprehensive response in the aftermath of the 7/7 attack (Chief Constable; Advisor 2; Local government chief executive). The active engagement of the Muslim community and local partners was embedded as a key objective in all of the Prevent strategies and was a key reference point for success (Department for Communities and Local Government 2007; HM Government 2008a; HM Government 2008b). This approach acknowledged the limits of government's capacity to combat extremism and terrorism alone and positioned the Muslim community in a leading role. Similarly the capacity of the policy community was further expanded by delegating responsibility for implementing Prevent to local authorities, as well as local police forces.

The expansion of the policy community was founded on a reciprocal and consensual relationship between central government, local authorities and Muslim community organisations. Integration policy, including community engagement by public agencies, was an essential element of the support that was necessary to get Prevent off the ground (Advisors 1, 2, 3 4 and 6; Civil servant 2). Chapter 6 also showed that this rested on the idea that radicalisation was an inadvertent consequence of the socio-economic and political context in which Muslim youth were formulating their identity (Choudhury 2006; Home Office 2005a; Home Office 2001a). The neutral framing also helped to minimise, though not eliminate, conflict over responsibility for radicalisation and segregation and positioned Prevent as a consensual partnership in opposition to violent extremists. Polarised Muslim identity was largely framed as the inadvertent product of the minority experience and evidence of a need to

help support a British Muslim identity. Equally, this also focused Prevent on engagement and identity whilst minimising more structural questions such as employment and education.

The expansion of the policy community was enabled by the focus on violence as the reference point for defining extremism. The Home Office highlighted the benefits of engagement as part of a longer term process of change and the risk that selective engagement could alienate potential allies and even encouraging support for radical Islamist ideas (Saggar 2006). Notably, the tactical approach drew on the experiences of policing in Northern Ireland and with Black Caribbean communities in England (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home Office 2004). This elevated the influence of representative organisations and advisors as authentic interlocutors to the diversity of the Muslim community in order to guide effective engagement. The tactical approach was also supported by evidence from think tanks and academic researchers that emphasised the importance of nuanced engagement with civil society in order to support both the short and long-term objectives of Prevent. Examples included the reports by Demos and Choudhury, which were funded by the DCLG and largely reinforced the 2004 Home Office recommendations (Briggs et al 2007; Choudhury 2007).

Chapters 6 and 7 also showed how the new policy community further embedded a consensual model through local decision-making. In particular the broader policy community was founded on delegated authority to local government and police forces that emphasised street level sensitivity to the relationships with community groups (Local Government Respondents 1 and 2). This resulted in an emphasis on partnership development and collective action that replicated the prominent role for community interlocutors at local levels. The influence of local decision-making in Prevent was illustrated by the extensive guidance issued to local councils and the different approaches that were adopted by different local authorities (HM Government 2008b; Regional government officer). Furthermore local Prevent funding was often administered alongside community and cohesion work, often through combined posts which further embedded local community preferences. This further aligned Prevent with integration

policy and the priorities of local community groups and framed prevention as a secondary indirect benefit.

The formation of the DCLG helped to underpin a distributed and consensual approach to Prevent. The decision to adopt a local approach led to the DCLG's responsibility for coordinating Prevent as part of the broader localism agenda. Equally the DCLG played an influential role in further developing the distributed approach in the main 2008 Prevent strategy. The capacity of the DCLG was initially developed at the expense of the Home Office following the transfer of civil servants in 2006. This led to the Pathfinder programme in 2006 and the DCLG's own strategy in 2007 that focused on local community engagement and development. [35] This was aided by the alignment with the existing cohesion agenda that enabled the rapid development of new activities. Therefore by virtue of its involvement in various social inclusion agendas, DCLG also able to play a significant role in shaping the 2008 strategy.

The Locke model broadened the capacity of policy-making to address a wider range of problems by expanding the policy community at national and local levels. The distributed process was supported by the Cabinet Office's model of institutional reform as well as the input from community advisors and advocates. The approach directly addressed the limits of the Hobbesian model by emphasising a consensual partnership focused on collectively addressing violence. This created space for the Muslim community itself and local agencies, in particular local authorities, to address community concerns as contributing factors to radicalisation. Furthermore although the agenda was controversial, local government and many Muslim organisations did welcome the funding and the opportunity to influence an important national policy (Local government chief executive, local government officer and regional government officer). As a result the consensual and distributed model John addressed the immediate demands for demonstrable action as part of a longer-term process of institutional reform.

[35] Although the DIUS also produced it own guidance document for colleges and universities in early 2006 this was a much shorter document focused on explaining the issues and highlighting questions and did not set out a plan of action (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 2006).

Split in model John

> *"I recognise fully that in many ways the link between integration and Prevent was feeding into a line of thinking that I didn't agree with… that all of this is a result of bad theology, rather than foreign policy, discrimination and deprivation. I quite strongly disagreed with that."* Advisor 3

> "We took Prevent seriously and we put a lot of effort and investment into community cohesion. The main challenge was to protect the rest of the organisation from distracting controversies." Local authority chief executive

John's limitations were exposed by growing institutional conflict within the new policy community over membership and control over decision-making. Where the expansion of the policy community had been intended to improve the legitimacy of decision-making, the size of the community itself became the focus for conflict. Over the course of chapters 6 and 7 it is demonstrated that decision-making became dominated by conflict between tactical and principled approaches to engagement and the associated tension between national and local decision-making. This latent tension in the new community came to a head when the Labour government tried to move toward a more assertive model of engagement in 2009. This undermined the sensitive trade-offs that had underpinned the involvement of the Muslim community and local authorities and exacerbated conflict over responsibility for the causes of terrorism. The resultant conflict and increasing disengagement of Muslim community groups and local agencies undermined support for model John.

The conflict was directly linked to the compromises that were necessary to expand the policy community. As shown in Chapter 6 a tactical and consensual approach to engagement helped to minimise conflict over the policy. However, the sensitivity of the approach was illustrated by the conflicts over authenticity from two competing views of Prevent. On one side were those pushed for an authentic focus on the marginalisation and discrimination experienced by the Muslim community (Briggs et all 2006; Choudhury 2007; Communities and Local

Government Committee 2010; Advisors 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6; Home Office 2005a). On the other side were those who wanted to focus on substantial reform of cultural and religious attitudes and institutions within the Muslim community (Blears 2009a; Civil Servant 2; Gove 2006; Maher & Frampton 2009; Mirza et all 2007; Phillips, M 2006; Quilliam Foundation 2010a; Tony Blair HC Liaison Committee 4th July 2006 Q 355; Theresa May in HM Government 2011a). Although these perspectives were not mutually exclusive the divergent emphases underpinned different views on who was an authentic member of the policy community and who, by extension, was part of the problem.

Labour's attempt to shift toward a more assertive principled position in 2009 can be seen as a late attempt by Blears and the DCLG to assert control over the policy community. The position followed Blair's original view that it was necessary to challenge segregated Muslim organisations in order to achieve long-term success (Blair 2006a; Government minister; Maher and Frampton 2009; Mirza et al 2007). The Home Office also advocated a clearer framework for Prevent to guide local decision-making and engagement. The position was in part a response to growing concerns within some parts of the policy community about the merits of working with groups that didn't subscribe to liberal values of non-discrimination (Civil servant 1). Finally, the more assertive position can also be seen in the context of growing electoral pressure. This included the Conservatives in the run up to 2010 election who espoused a more assertive, though still liberal, national identity, and the success of the BNP who advocated a racially exclusive identity.

The shift exposed the tension between control of national and local decision-making that had been embedded into Prevent by the expanded policy community. The on-going efforts to clarify the implementation of Prevent set out in Chapter 6 clearly points to nervousness in Whitehall about the extent of control it had over the local use of Prevent funding. In this context a principled approach was in part an attempt to establish a more transparent framework around engagement at national and local levels. At the same time reaching down into local engagement decisions perpetuated national debates about the scope of Prevent. This included grievances

about policing and surveillance that came to a head in 2009 around Project Champion and the allegations in Spooked (Kundnani 2009). There was also increased pressure to address other types of extremism, in particular far right extremism, that was illustrated by John Denham's commitment to address it as part of an effort to shore up support for Prevent. Finally the unresolved tension around foreign policy continued to dominate debate about Prevent.

Labour's attempt to move toward a more selective approach further exacerbated intra-community competition. This included whether groups or individuals were authentic representatives or whether they were legitimising the stigmatisation of the wider Muslim community. This tension was originally identified in Chapter 5 but subsequently evolved into active pressure to disengage from Prevent, see Chapter 6. Selective engagement exposed the problem of community representation across diverse theological, geographic, economic, generational, ethnic and cultural dimensions. This is illustrated by the MCB's argument that government attempts to broaden engagement were an attempt to marginalise their role due to their criticism of foreign policy. This view was also supported by the political coalition that had criticised the Iraq war in Chapter 5, and it was in part true.[36] Equally this was also a question of balancing engagement with established conservative religious institutions with more reach into more marginal groups that were led by women and youth or held overtly liberal religious and social outlooks.

This tension contributed to suspicion over the extent to which the model John was a collective response to terrorism or was a vehicle for scrutiny and exclusion of Muslim values and identity. For example, the 2009 shift and subsequent 2011 strategy marginalised pious Salafists who had been involved in diverting 'angry young men' and conservative Deobhandi institutions who had reach into the community (Lambert 2008; Advisor 3). This was also framed by a more 'technical' debate over whether radical Islamism was a symptom giving expression to wider

[36] One respondent suggested that Blair's 2005 statement that the 'rules of the game' had changed was in part a coded challenge to the MCB's leadership of community engagement with the government. At the same time the on-going engagement with the MCB until 2009 illustrates the limits that were put on any attempt by government to move away from the MCB at the time.

concerns of alienation or a root cause of terrorism. Those who argued it was a symptom were often defending the legitimacy of Muslim identity activism and challenged the relevance of focusing on social conservatism (Choudhury 2007; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2009). Those emphasising the role of ideas, such as Quilliam, argued that radical Islamist ideas and conservative beliefs that were antithetical to western values and legitimate grievances and segregation were self evidently part of the problem (Gove 2006; Phillips M 2006; Quilliam Foundation 2010a).

The strength of these tactical and technical debates had their roots in a values conflict within the new policy community. The policy community was founded on a practical commitment to improving engagement between authorities and with the Muslim community in order to address causes of alienation and grievance. However, anti-racism advocates challenged the implementation of Prevent as an explicit and implicit threat to minority religious and cultural expression (Kundnani 2009). This was supported by Islamist and radical left groups who also sought to defend the legitimacy of anti-imperialist political activism in relation to Iraq and Israel. At the same time many integration advocates had principled and practical concerns about working with groups that tacitly supported violence overseas or did not personally share principles of non-discrimination in relation to gender, sexuality and religious tolerance (Civil servant 1; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011c). The position was bolstered by political support, and advocacy by Policy Exchange and Quilliam, for an assertively liberal British identity as a necessary condition to be trusted as a partner for Prevent.

Compromise

> *"The territory became so muddy and controversial that it relied on people with a credible voice. Mixing the two terrains, slipping from one to another, didn't help. In fact it undermined the credibility of some individuals and organisations."* Advisor 1

Chapter 6 described the emergence of a compromise that was based on separating Prevent from integration policy. This approach effectively traded improved control over decision-making by reducing the breadth and depth of the policy community. In this respect the reassertion of Home Office leadership was emblematic of a renewal of a central Hobbesian control and clarified the relationship between national policy and local decision-making. Equally, elements of the distributed model were retained, including the on-going focus on working with Muslim community groups to deliver targeted interventions. The compromise was rooted in the politics of the Coalition government and policy community itself. The compromise was supported as a way of improving the effectiveness of Prevent through a narrower set of institutional relationships. This included improving the management of political risks in the context of a more assertive and selective approach to engagement. In effect the compromise traded an improved central control at the cost of a narrower and shallower institutional reach.

The compromise described in Chapter 7 was a response to the conflict around Prevent. Key to the compromise was the positioning of the Home Office as a strong and neutral arbiter for managing the growing conflict over Prevent during that was identified in Chapter 6 and that continued in Chapter 7. Charles Farr's evidence to the Home Affairs and Communities Committees during 2009 can in part be seen as an attempt to gather support for this role. Notably this was at the same time as the conflict between the DCLG and the MCB that was in part motivated by the Home Office push for a more assertive approach as part of the 2009 Contest strategy. The Home Office's position was aided by the prospect of the Conservative party's expected commitment to a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism. The Home Office both demonstrated their commitment to a more assertive approach whilst also highlighting the political risks to the broader policy community.

The Home Office's position was further strengthened by the politics of the Coalition government that restricted the push for a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism. The Coalition agreement explicitly committed to protecting civil liberties whilst national government also withdrew from local decision-making as part of strategy for delivering the

austerity agenda.[37] The compromise produced an active definition of non-violent extremism that focused attention on campaigning groups rather than challenging conservative religious institutions, a point that was criticised by the Quilliam foundation in 2010. The nuances of this settlement strengthened the role of the Home Office in order to manage the political risks around engagement. This included not funding potentially risky or entryist Islamist groups. It also gave them the opportunity to select partners on the basis of their effectiveness and alignment with the strategy, as illustrated by the withdrawal of core funding from the Quilliam foundation.

The Home Office's leadership was also founded on its renewed authority following its restructure (Chapter 6). The establishment of the OSCT gave it increased capacity to set the policy agenda in relation to terrorism and security. This included gaining control of the development of the 2009 Contest strategy when the role of the Cabinet Office was downgraded under Gordon Brown in 2007. Through this process the Home Office had set the agenda around how the relationship between Prevent and the wider Contest strategy should be structured. The authority of the Home Office was also supported by the appointment of Jacqui Smith, a key Brown ally, as Home Secretary, allied to the political difficulty and subsequent resignation of Hazel Blears, a Blair ally, at DCLG in 2009. This shifting ministerial commitment to Prevent continued under the Coalition government when Eric Pickles prioritised protecting his department from controversy and managing major cuts, whilst Theresa May, then Home Secretary, defended sole ownership of agendas such as Prevent.

The Home Office's leadership of a centralised approach also anticipated the fiscal constraints after the 2010 election. It built on the repeated criticisms of the impact on terrorism that had been raised in Chapters 6 and 7 (Home Affairs 2009; HM government 2011c; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010). This was reinforced by Conservative criticism of local decision-making and the reform in community engagement (Civil servant 2). Charles Farr

[37] In effect the Coalition increased local authority discretion over local spending that helped to limit national political risks around the resulting cuts to local services

successfully argued that ‘upstream’ risk based interventions, such as the Channel programme, could demonstrate better short-term outcomes (Home Affairs 2009). This drew on the social, personal and ideational aspects of radicalisation that had largely been developed through the integration approach. However, instead of focusing on rectifying the root causes themselves it emphasised it as guide for targeting resources at individuals. This also helped to reframe Prevent and the model of radicalisation as questions of professional judgement that could be addressed through better coordination. As a result the approach was framed as improving value for money through better management.

The arguments put forward by Charles Farr in Chapter 7 framed community disengagement as evidence that the distributed approach had failed on its own terms (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; Home Affairs Committee 2009; HM Government 2011a; HM Government 2011c). This argument received support from many in the broader policy community, including DCLG and local authorities, who were concerned about the risk to community relationships in other areas of social policy. Notably however, disengagement was often linked to on-going grievances around enforcement activity, such as the 2006 Forest Gate shootings, 2010 Birmingham CCTV cameras and the *‘Spooked’* allegations (Kundnani 2009). These events, alongside the conflict over selective engagement and non-violent extremism, were the main drivers of community suspicion about the aims of Prevent. Nevertheless, the Home Office attracted support in order to improve communication about the aims and methods of Prevent and to avoid potential confusion and conflict due to local decisions.

The broader policy community also looked to the Home Office to manage competing pressures around a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism. The trajectory of Prevent under Blears and the arrival of a Conservative government demonstrated the political risks associated with a more assertive approach to extremism (Advisors 1, 2 and 3; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010). As a result the policy community and the Coalition government looked to the Home Office to protect rights to freedom of expression and conscious whilst delivering the decision to work with groups with more overt liberal identity and values,

particularly around principles of non-discrimination. Furthermore many supporters of a distributed approach supported withdrawing Prevent from local decision-making to guard against the Conservatives push to work with groups with a more overt British liberal identity (HM Government 2011a). In this context Home Office control was seen as best way of managing the new political settlement (Advisor 4).

The decision to separate Prevent and integration policy was at the heart of this compromise (Advisors 1, 2, 3; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011c). The separation described in Chapter 7 represented a tactical retreat from the broader policy community that was established in Chapter 6 to deliver a comprehensive approach to terrorism. For many supporters of a focus on integration, the separation was necessary to protect local control of community engagement. In particular, for many Muslim community organisations and representatives the broader focus on Islam, activism and attitudes presented risks in relation to other social policy agendas, such as education. Similarly, advocates for reform of integration policy believed the politics of Prevent and the pressure to expand the policy community had undermined attempts to reform the relationships between local authorities and community gatekeepers. Similarly those who were still concerned about wider issues of extremism and integration were partially reassured by the proposal for the DCLG to develop extremism and integration strategies.[38]

Structure of the policy community

The structure of the policy community both underpinned the development of the broader response whilst undermining its sustainability. This was linked to the relationship between a core reciprocal policy group and a wider network that exerted considerable influence on decision-making. The development of a core set of reciprocal relationships was key to expanding the size of the policy community, particularly at local levels. At the same time the wider issues network pushed for more accountability about the aims and values of the core

[38] These strategies were not subsequently developed by the Coalition government

policy community. The distributed structure of the community created opportunities for the wider issues network to exert significant influence by influencing decisions around engagement in the core policy community at national and local levels. This in part led to growing pressure to centralise decision-making under the Home Office to improve control and reinforce government leadership and authority. In this respect the structure of the policy community made the trade-off between establishing and maintaining a consensus and promoting change extremely sensitive.

The influence of this dual structure is illustrated by the shift toward a distributed policy community in Chapter 6 and then the return to centralisation in Chapter 7. In Chapter 5 the institutional limits of the narrow enforcement community were exposed by growing political concern about the alienation of the wider Muslim community. During Chapter 6 the focus was on bringing new local and non-government organisations into decision-making in order to broaden the scope of the response. This resulted in a distributed and consensual model of engagement that created opportunities for the core policy community to shape decision-making, such as the 2008 decision to give local authorities discretion over grant funding. At the same time this put constraints on national government decision-making, including on the assertive approach originally signalled by Blair in the aftermath of 7/7. The conflict over pushing toward a more assertive approach in Chapter 7 ultimately resulted in the centralisation of Prevent and administration of funding by the Home Office.

The core policy community was founded on the consensus that Prevent should improve the relationship between government and the Muslim community. This approach was based on advice from the Home Office and was clearly supported throughout by the Labour leadership. It was positioned as necessary step to underpin the governments capacity to deliver short and long-term solutions to terrorism. The first expansion of the policy community was in described in Chapter 5 when the Cabinet Office was brought in to work with the Home Office to develop the Channel strategy, including the empirical and conceptual foundations of the Prevent strand. In Chapter 6, Muslim community representatives and local authorities and local police forces

joined in order to develop and implement the Prevent strand. This step connected the policy community to local relationships between Muslim community organisations and agencies that significantly broadened and deepened engagement. This in turn reinforced the Lockian emphasis on collectively addressing community grievances and concerns through consensus. In chapter five this expansion was facilitated by the adoption of an inadvertent model of radicalisation allied to the focus on community development and integration activities.

Decision-making was influenced by two broad networks that challenged the core policy consensus from the margins of actual decision-making. One network was centred around wider Muslim community and political supporters who believed that the security response was stigmatising and inherently racist. In Chapter Four this network challenged the legitimacy of the enforcement approach that led to the decision to prioritise Prevent and the adoption of the consensual model in chapter five. Similarly in chapter six this wider network also influenced disengagement from Prevent that resulted in the separation of Prevent and integration policy. The other network challenged the extent of the government's commitment to promoting shared values and identity. This network included critics of multiculturalism such as right wing media commentators and think tanks, notably Policy Exchange, as well as Conservative MPs and leadership. This constituency exerted significant influence on ministerial decisions in Chapters 5 and 6. It also directly shaped the 2011 strategy's focus on non-violent extremism when key members such as Michael Gove joined the Coalition government.

Both extended networks exerted influence via members of the core policy community. In the case of the wider Muslim community this influence came via Muslim advisors and local authorities who were sensitive to patterns of community engagement. This is illustrated by the sensitivity of the debates about personal credibility and authenticity. At the same time these members could also influence advice and decisions by highlighting the prospect of community disengagement. Critics of multi-culturalism largely exerted influence through national decision-makers, including a sympathetic Labour leadership in chapter five and then via the Home Office in chapter six and the Coalition government after 2010. The influence of both

networks was aided by Labour's political triangulation around home affairs that attempted to balance a strong stance whilst broadening engagement. The incompatibility of the two networks led to the compromise between an assertive approach to extremism but a narrower agenda to minimise the wider risks of disengagement.

Members of the core policy community clearly kept their participation in Prevent under constant review on the basis of formal and informal accountability to these wider networks. The first and most sensitive was the trade-off for Muslim members of the policy community between influencing policy-making whilst potentially legitimising suspicion of Islam and Muslims. This was clearly articulated by the 2005 community working groups. The second tension from the perspective of public authorities was between the merits of working with certain groups, either to gain intelligence, gain support or to work or drive reform, and the potential political risks around political and cultural views. This was prominent in the debate about broadening engagement in chapter five. Local government also balanced the risks of a highly sensitive agenda that might disrupt local relationships versus gaining resource to undertake work on a high profile and important agenda. This shifting calculation was behind Muslim advisor and local authority support for a narrower approach to Prevent in response to the push for more selective engagement in Chapter 6.

The dual structure also constrained decision-making due to the need to maintain participation in decision-making as part of an implicit and explicit process of institutional reform. In the short-term consensus with Muslim community groups was prioritised to give legitimacy to the government's response. However, decision-makers were also under pressure to demonstrate leadership on the issue of extremism that challenged parts of the Muslim community. The sensitivity of this relationship was illustrated by Blear's positioning around the 2009 LSE speech where she sought to ally with the Muslim community against pressure from Islamophobic 'outsiders' like Melanie Phillips. At the same time the speech was also positioned with the media to demonstrate government leadership by challenging Islamist extremism, followed by the very public disengagement from the MCB. The sensitivity of this balance is

illustrated by the subsequent split in the policy community that centred on tactical and principled concerns about the approach to engagement.

The influence of this dual structure can be seen in the evolving settlements described in Chapters 6 and 7. The decisions taken in Chapter 5 emphasised the longer-term benefits of prioritising short-term engagement by focusing on causes of grievances rather than extremism. This was justified with reference to the short-term risks of exacerbating the alienation of the wider Muslim community and the tactical imperative of broadening the core policy community (Advisors 2, 3 and 6; Civil servant 2). However, this was challenged throughout Chapters 6 and 7 by a wider network who argued for a principled approach to engagement as a prerequisite for achieving longer-term objectives of social change (Maher & Frampton 2009; Quilliam 2010a). This then led to support for establishing a framework for engagement that emphasised the need for funding to be linked to a long-term and outward commitment to a shared set of values (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011a; HM Government 2011c; Advisor 7).

Status of the Muslim community

> *"The impact can be immediate. Having representation, having the right partners at the table. That's a quick win. I think the political will was definitely there at that time. I think it just wasn't executed well which is sad. It was about a disadvantaged community but that was never a priority area for Prevent."* Advisor 5.

The dual status of the Muslim community in the policy community was also a factor in Prevent's institutional reach and instability. The engagement of the Muslim community was the key reference point for the core policy community throughout the development of Prevent. This gave the Muslim community a direct stake and influence in Prevent. Equally, the expansion of the policy community was motivated by concerns about recruitment and the need for a demonstrable and comprehensive response. More fundamentally, Prevent also made the Muslim community the principal target for reform that further emphasised the sensitive

position of Muslim members of the policy community. Participants in the core policy community were partners in trying to improve trust and flows of intelligence by improving confidence within the Muslim community about the benefits of engaging with Prevent. However this was also set against scrutiny of Muslim organisations and an agenda that encouraged reform of community values and identities.

Because of this dual role there was persistent sensitivity about the extent to which Prevent was a consensual partnership between the government and the Muslim community. Muslim representative groups and advisors did exert influence on Prevent through the core policy community described in Chapter 6, particularly at street level. Similarly the community disengagement described in Chapter 5 and 7 also exerted significant influence on the initial development of Prevent and its subsequent rationalisation. However, both positions risked legitimising a link between the Muslim community and terrorism, either by accepting the premise of Prevent or by not supporting government efforts. The community's influence on decision-making was also limited by its minority status. Prevent did increase involvement in decision-making but Muslims remained a small minority across the civil service, local authorities, policing, politics and the wider media. Concern about influence was exacerbated by the exclusion of foreign policy or media representation from the agenda. In addition many ministerial statements, such as Blair's statement in the aftermath of 7/7, persistently maintained a tacit link between the community and terrorism.

The political, generational, ethnic and theological diversity of the community also exacerbated sensitivities around influence. The controversy around the Sufi Muslim council in Chapter 6, Quilliam in Chapter 7 and the on-going tension over the MCB's leadership of the community response throughout were all illustrative of the structural challenge of community representation. For many advisors it was possible to exert influence through the core policy community by highlighting where there was a risk that government policy would result in community disengagement. In this context attempts by government to cultivate a broader range of groups was often seen as an attempt to undermine this leverage. However, the diversity of

the community also precluded a coherent collective Muslim community view on how best to implement Prevent, an issue that was highlighted throughout Chapter 6. Diversity was an important part of the argument for a locally distributed approach that enabled street level influence. At the same time it undermined arguments that it was possible for advisors or representative groups to represent a collective Muslim community view or position.

The limits of the Muslim community's position can be traced through the breakdown in the support for a distributed model and the push for renewed central control over decision-making. In this respect the Muslim community could mobilise influence on Prevent by undermining the government's reputation by disengaging from the security response but at the risk of being framed as part of the problem. In addition the diversity of the community and its minority status limited the ability of Muslim representative groups and advisors to influence decision-making. The dual accusations of entryism or racism served further challenged the legitimacy of participants in the policy community and their motivations, and by extension the policy as a whole. Ultimately this position led to questioning of the legitimacy and authenticity of Prevent as a consensual partnership amongst the Muslim community that undermined the distributed policy community and ultimately led to the narrower compromise approach.

Shared purpose

The conflict in the policy community centred on tensions between the merits of a tactical approach to expanding engagement and the development of values-based relationships that could sustain trust in decision-making. This underpinned a question about who was part of the problem and who should be part of the solution, including where there was reasonable overlap between targets and partners in a process of change. In this respect the debate over non-violent extremism was a reference point for explicit and implicit suspicion about the motivations of members of the policy community and whether Prevent was Islamophobic and racist or a threat to liberal enlightenment values. Many in the core policy community actively sought to navigate these tensions by focusing on a process of establishing trust around a shared agenda of

preventing violence. However, this still left the new policy community vulnerable to conflict over the values that underpinned decisions and their short and long term motivations.

Nevertheless, the thread of high modernism – that there was an objectively and empirically testable problem that needed to be addressed - did help to mediate the structural tensions within Prevent. In practice the institutional consensus, certainly between government and Muslim representative groups, centred on action to prevent terrorism and improving the relationship between government and the Muslim community. In particular it encouraged the core policy community to make justifiable arguments about how to prevent terrorism, and the potential roles of different organisations in any solution. It can be traced from the Home Office's 2004 empirical analysis of Muslim community attitudes that emphasised a tactical approach to engagement to generate support for government policy making (Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office 2004). This was crucial to the decision to expand the policy community in Chapter 5. It encouraged policy makers and advocates to focus on the steps that were necessary to establish the new policy community whilst avoiding divisive values conflicts over extremism. Debates about implementation did act as proxies for principled and tactical positions but were also referenced against the core policy aims and the practical management of the new set of reciprocal relationships.

The shared agenda helped to mask differences in the values of the core community and whilst acting as a counter point to more fundamental criticisms by the wider networks. This modernist framing for policy development can be traced through the leadership of Blair and the input from the Cabinet Office in 2004. For example, the focus on a developmental process of change, with less emphasis on hard delivery targets, was linked to evidence and experience of wider policy reform agendas. This approach also built on the Barber model of 'deliverology' that was being used elsewhere in the government (Barber 2008). This further emphasised a focus on objectives, delivery chains and monitoring and the limits and potential of government capacity. The focus on the delivery chain helped to frame the management of the sensitive relationship

between central government and local agencies. At the same time this approach also contributed to the Muslim community's dual status as core partners in their own change.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how the institutional dimensions of decision-making played a pivotal dual role in shaping Prevent. Prevent emerged out of the concern that the institutional limits of a narrow enforcement model failed to address the operational and political need to address the alienation of the Muslim community. This led to support for a distributed consensual approach as a way of broadening the breadth of the response and demonstrating immediate action to address a complex problem. At the same time the distributed model placed constraints on government decision-making by emphasising the need for a consensual and tactical approach to expanding engagement. However, the underlying values conflict around the definition of shared principles for participation in the policy ultimately undermined support for the distributed model and led to a compromise approach. As a result the institutional structure of the policy community was both a direct focus for decision-making and highly influential in shaping and constraining the development of Prevent.

Much of the institutional conflict was linked to differing views of the balance between a tactical means based approach to engagement versus defining up front shared values for participation (Birt 2009). This undermined the stability of the new policy community by increasing suspicion about the motivations of the policy. The issues of non-violent extremism and foreign policy were emblematic of the concern amongst the Muslim community that they should be consensual partners in a collective effort to deal with the causes of terrorism. Furthermore, resistance amongst community organisations and local authorities to exploring the ideological roots of violent extremism and reforming of patterns of engagement placed further constraints on government's ability to lead a process of change through a distributed institutional model. In both cases this produced competition over the authenticity and motivations of members of

the new policy community that ultimately led to support for separating integration and security and clarifying national and local control over decision-making.

Nevertheless, Prevent was explicitly and implicitly negotiated by the new policy community. It developed as a direct response to the institutional limits of support for the enforcement community's institutional capacity and legitimacy. The distributed structure enabled a consensus around collective action by explicitly creating space for the priorities and interests of a wider policy community. At the same time the subsequent renewal of Home Office leadership under the new Coalition government represented a compromise established across the broader policy community. The new settlement recognised the institutional limits of national and local decision-making that had emerged around the trade-offs between tactical and principled approaches to engagement. Nevertheless, the tactical decision to narrow the institutional breadth of Prevent still acknowledged the persistent consensus that a broader agenda of social integration was ultimately part of any long-term sustainable solution. Therefore, rather than a zero sum competition between two competing models of policy Prevent was the product of institutionally negotiated change.

The evolving structure of the policy community described in this chapter indicates that it was the relationship between the two models of security that shaped the development of Prevent. Crucially there are clear indications that the John model was an important part of the development of Prevent. The new community was brought together by a shared objective of improving security policy in partnership between government and society. The structure of the new community was founded on reciprocal relationships that emphasised the voluntary participation of a wider set of civic actors in decision-making. Furthermore the structure of the policy community, including distributed local decision-making, focused on a process of establishing social norms and consensus through collective action. The reversion toward a narrower model under the control of the Home Office was also founded on a national consensus within this new community that supported the role of central government as a neutral arbiter for decision-making.

In this respect, Prevent represented an new institutional decision-making framework that established and maintained a comprehensive policy response to a complex and novel problem. Much of the work of the policy community was founded on a consensus about the shared role of society and government in security policy. It brought two broad policy groups, that had different priorities, together around a shared agenda of preventing terrorism whilst managing a values based conflict over the response. This necessitated a series of principled and tactical trade-offs around the definitions of extremism and the accommodation of grievances in order to facilitate short-term engagement and long-term social change. Whilst much of the analysis of Prevent has focused on the conflict associated with these trade-offs this study suggests there was sufficient institutional consensus that these questions were important enough to try and address. This is not to say that these questions were resolved successfully and the tactical step of narrowing the scope of the agenda to avoid conflict shows that they weren't.

Chapter 9: A new conceptual framework

Introduction

This chapter examines the ideas that shaped the development of Prevent (Blyth 2013; Hall 1993; Lindblom 1959; Stone 1989; Stone 2012). It shows that the conceptual framework for decision-making was shaped by arguments that were rooted in the strengths and limitations of the two competing models of security. The parameters of the debate were established by the Thomas model's focus on the rights of citizens and the John model's focus on social consensus. Notably the dual framework was brought together by the Labour government's wider model of policy reform that balanced strong enforcement and the social inclusion agenda. In the case of Prevent this led decision-making to focus on the respective roles of government and society. The resulting trade-offs centred decision-making on the process of developing shared social values and identities as a necessary condition for legitimate and effective government action. Ultimately this framework balanced establishing a consensus to enable action in the short term whilst working toward contentious objectives of longer-term social change.

This chapter shows that the main debates in Prevent centred on the dual aim of improving trust in government's authority as the guarantor of citizens' rights and as a reference point for social integration. The dual framework placed explicit and implicit constraints on government's ability to lead a long-term process of consensual social change whilst delivering short-term security objectives. The tension between these constraints is illustrated by the on-going debate the relationship between integration and enforcement and the need to develop a social consensus as a necessary condition for effective government action. Conflicting views of the role that government should play in defining and defending shared values in the interests of a cohesive society created a series of trade-offs. These included the debates about the relationship between integration and enforcement, engagement with Muslim identity and grievances and the balance between short and long-term process of social change and institutional reform.

The structure of the agenda meant that successful arguments engaged with the fundaments of the two models and their inherent limitations. Supporters of the Thomas model promoted the need for trust in government with community groups as an instrument for improving the capacity of government. These arguments came to the fore when engagement was framed as a direct response to declining confidence in the capacity and competence of government. On the other hand supporters of John positioned the resolution of social grievances and their causes as a pre-requisite for an effective and comprehensive action. These arguments positioned an equal partnership between government and society as a tactical and strategic necessity to deliver benefits in the short and long-term. At the same time this dual framing underpinned persistent debate about the appropriate breadth and depth of engagement that came to the fore during the later period of Prevent. Ultimately decision-making struggled to fully resolve whether shared values should be an outcome of a consensual process or a pre-requisite for participation.

The chapter also illustrates how these conflicts and debates were mediated by an empirical debate about the concept of radicalisation and the role of society. Radicalisation acted as a proxy for questions of responsibility for the threat from terrorism whilst at the same time providing a shared empirical framework for decisions. The concept made the connection between the benefits of an on-going process of social integration and the short-term security response as part of the debate about the relationship between the social and organisational dimensions of terrorism and recruitment. This included the extent to which wider community grievances were contributing to or were symptomatic of Islamist activism and identity politics agitation and whether they were relevant to terrorist recruitment. The chapter shows how the concept, a causal model that can be traced from the Labour government's social inclusion agenda in Chapter 5, served to mediate this dialogue. It played an influential role throughout the evolution of Prevent, including framing emerging concern about home grown recruitment described in Chapter 5, the emphasis on community input in Chapter 6, and the tactical compromise in Chapter 7.

The policy agenda

The decision-making agenda was founded on a shared role for government and society in order to legitimise and broaden the scope of the security response. This dual approach represented a point of intersection between the two competing models of security. It addressed both the issue of government's capacity to deal with threats and the social conflict around the response. The cornerstone of the new framework was the Thomas model's focus on expanding government's capacity to respond to terrorism where, as Blair put it, the 'rules of the game had changed' and all options were on the table. However, in practice the agenda was heavily influenced by the John model's emphasis on establishing a social consensus to underpin the legitimacy of the response, as illustrated by Blair's comments about the importance of the Muslim community in 2006. The two models were integrated by an empirical debate about radicalisation that captured debates about the role of government and society and focused decision-making on the benefits of active engagement with the Muslim community.

Chapter 5 demonstrated how the government's focus on its capacity to prevent terrorism was the foundation of the agenda (Civil servant 2; Advisor 3; HM Government 2006; HM Government 2009a; HM Government 2011a; HM Government 2011b; Turnbull 2004). This concern dominated decision-making in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, including the overseas military interventions and the extension of domestic counter terrorism powers. Furthermore, much of the initial development of Prevent in Chapter 5 focused on the capacity of government to deal with the complexity of the new threat. For example, the inclusion of a Prevent strand was part of a whole government approach that was supported by the enforcement community and led by Tony Blair. Similarly, the political prominence of Prevent in Chapter 6 was directly linked to Blair's push for an immediate, demonstrable and comprehensive government response in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 attacks.

Equally, government also adopted the view that effective security was fundamentally reliant on a social consensus. As a result the development of Prevent was founded on a process of

social integration as both a tool and an objective for security policy. The decision to introduce these ideas came in response to the political and legal limits and paradoxes of government-led enforcement that were exposed in Chapter 5. For example, these ideas can be traced through the link that Blunkett made between counter-terrorism powers and civic integration in 2002. In addition the 2004 Cabinet discussion was directly concerned with the political implications of grievances amongst the Muslim community about the government response to terrorism. In practice it was in Chapter 5 when ideas associated with the John model exerted the most influence over decision-making by positioning the need for a negotiated social settlement as a pre-requisite for effective action. The decision in 2006 to follow a distributed programme of engagement with community groups embedded this model into national and local decision-making.

The emergence of radicalisation as a concept for policy-making in 2004 helped to integrate the John model into decision-making. Radicalisation framed recruitment as a socio-political process that positioned the wider causes of grievances and social alienation alongside a narrower organisational model of recruitment by rational terrorist groups. The emergence and influence of the concept can be traced from Labour's social inclusion strategy in Chapter 5 that explored complex social problems in order to guide both targeted interventions and a process of institutional reform (Blair 1993; Blunkett 2002; Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home Office 2004; Home Office 2001a; Home Office 2001b; Home Office 2004b; Home Office 2004c; The Labour Party 2001). Equally, the model included a more conventional focus on the organisational links, or 'conveyor belt', between Islamist activism, extremists and terrorist groups. This can be traced in the initial analysis of the role of radical Islamist groups and community attitudes in Chapter 5 and the continuing tensions over the relationship between extremism and terrorism described in Chapters 6 and 7.

The debate over radicalisation, as a complex and novel concept, helped to integrate elements of the competing models into decision-making. In particular the complex interaction of multiple personal and situational factors created space for interventions associated with both

models. Furthermore it was this complexity that motivated the development of the broader policy community described in Chapter 6. At the same time it opened up debate about the scope and focus of Prevent that can be traced through the increasingly detailed descriptions in the Prevent strategies and the subsequent reviews of the policy in Chapter 7 (Bouhana & Wikstrom 2011; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; Home Affairs Committee 2009; HM Government 2009a; HM Government 2011a; HM Government 2011c;). The debate can also be traced throughout the dual focus on community institutions, such as mosques, as vectors for recruitment and interventions and as locations for the development of segregated or shared values. Furthermore in Chapter 6 the concept framed the debate over extremism as a symptom or cause of alienation and the role of foreign policy and discrimination.

Radicalisation embedded a role for both society and government into decision-making (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home Office 2004; Tony Blair HC Liaison Committee 4th July 2006 Q 355). This underpinned the developmental strand that focused on supporting the capacity of both government, its agencies and the Muslim community. In Chapter 5 Prevent was focused on improving intelligence flows and gaining support for enforcement amongst the Muslim community (Police respondent 2; Civil Servant 2). In Chapter 6 the interest in root causes was part of a process of improving the coordination of the response through non security agencies such as local authorities (The Labour Party 2001; The Labour Party 2005; Blair 2006b). In addition there was also a persistent focus on developing the capacity of community groups and local agencies, such as the MINAB work in Chapter 6. Similarly the model was used to guide Channel programme and the development of the capacity of agencies and community groups to support referrals and credible interventions in Chapter 7 (Advisor 2; Civil servant 1).

As a result the new framework represented a developmental process of collective action that sought to satisfy pressure for demonstrable action alongside by establishing social consent. This positioned community engagement, and by extension a role for local agencies and local policing at the heart of the Prevent to support a series of direct and indirect objectives.

Community engagement was supported by the narrow Thomas model's focus on maintaining the reputation of government whilst the John model positioned broader social consensus as a prerequisite for effective action. This dual emphasis helped to embed the question of dealing with upstream root causes as a long-term solution and as a short-term tactical measure for gaining community consent for policing. The importance of this dual model was at the heart of the development of Prevent in Chapter 5 and the development of distributed collective action. In addition, the focus on community partnerships was retained in Chapter 6 allied to a renewed focus on identifying and intervening with individual pathways of radicalisation.

Constraints

The dual approach to Prevent established crucial constraints on the policy agenda around the relationship between government and society. This centred on a dual model of rights and social consensus that constrained the role that government could play in leading a process of change. Crucially, Prevent was constrained by a need to focus on the Muslim community rather than wider structural questions. This feature was key to demonstrating direct and demonstrable action in response to patterns of recruitment and the need for relevant intelligence, in line with the Thomas model. However, the focus on rights also constrained the extent to which government could play an active role in shaping political and social values. At the same time the John model's emphasis on consensus limited the extent to which government could lead change without the active and consensual support of the Muslim community. More sensitively however the majority social consensus also framed segregation and alienation as a problem associated with the Muslim community rather than wider society.

The first and perhaps most crucial constraint on Prevent was its focus on the minority Muslim community rather than a wider focus on the rest of society. This was established from the outset and can be traced from the focus on reassuring the Muslim community in the aftermath of 9/11, the growing concern about alienation in 2004 and active community engagement in the aftermath of 7/7. A clear example of this approach was the decision to distribute funding to

local authorities on the basis of the size of their local Muslim population in 2008. The decision was influenced by the Thomas focus on practical and targeted interventions to improve intelligence in response to terrorist recruitment that targeted the Muslim community. However, this also belied a wider perspective, in part framed by the John model, that the social origins of the problem were associated with the identity and values of the minority Muslim community. In this respect the reassurances to the Muslim community allied to questions about British Muslim identity, all illustrated the political foundations of the agenda.

Government's ability to lead change was also limited by the legal and political protections for civil society and minority identity. This is best illustrated by Blair's 2006 comments about the Muslim community being in the best position to resolve the problem of extremism and radicalisation. Although this in part referred to his personal credibility in the community following the Iraq invasion it also spoke to the political constraints on government. The rights debate evolved from the focus on civil liberties and habeas corpus described in Chapter 5 toward the debates about freedom of conscience and minority rights in Chapter 7. At the same the debate about social norms evolved around the merits of the assertion of shared values and identity, the accommodation of diversity, and the risks of imposing majoritarian views that marginalised minority identities. The frequent reassurances from the Labour leadership about the legitimacy of Muslim identity described in Chapters 6 illustrated the sensitivity of this constraint. Similarly the space for autonomous civil society was an inherent theme in the Coalition government's liberal emphasis on civil liberties in Chapter 7.

The need to demonstrate competency and leadership also represented a constraint on decision-making. In effect, the prominence of the terrorist threat and the political sensitivity around the government's response made no action intolerable. This framed the cabinet discussion described in Chapter 5 and Tony Blair's leadership in the aftermath of 7/7 described in Chapter 6, and ultimately led to the development of a broader policy community. The political importance of Prevent was also illustrated by its role in Brown and Cameron's positioning as national leaders who could deal with security concerns and a broader historical narrative of

national identity. From the Thomas perspective government needed to demonstrate its capability to deal with the threat. From the John perspective a process of social and institutional change was necessary for the legitimacy of government action. This forced decision-making to demonstrate short-term action that was embedded in a longer-term process of social change. Equally the shift in the government's priority away from security in Chapter 7 also enabled the consensus behind a narrower compromise approach.

The final constraint centred on dual emphasis on government reputation for competence and establishing social consensus. This can be seen in the dual strategy of reassuring the Muslim community at the same time as responding to political scrutiny of Islam and the views of the Muslims. These debates further illustrated how the new paradigm represented both a security strategy and a political strategy for managing conflict over integration and identity. For example, the origins of Prevent was rooted in the Labour leadership's electoral concerns about the Muslim community described in Chapter 5 and subsequently to their political right in Chapter 7. The conflict was animated by Islamist protests about policing in 2004, the defeat for the Labour party in Bethnal Green in the 2005 general election and the Danish cartoons protests in 2006. Subsequently in Chapter 7 the electoral threats grew from the racist British National Party, who had success in the 2005 local elections and subsequently in the 2009 European elections, and from the Conservatives in advance of the 2010 election.

The different debates around the selection of partners were also illustrative of the constraints in the agenda. Ultimately the focus on the Muslim community placed a high degree of scrutiny on community representation and theological and political attitudes. This can be traced through the debates about the representation of religious, ethnic and generational diversity that was masked by a homogenous notion of the Muslim community. Equally these debates were framed by arguments about the reach of organisations to help drive wider social change or their proximity or insight in order to develop targeted interventions that could divert individuals away from extremism. This also intersected with questions about whether certain community organisations were inadvertently, or deliberately, part of the problem due to generational

divides, theological perspectives or political entryism. Ultimately this motivated the dual attempt in Chapter 6 to broaden engagement to new groups whilst at the same helping to reform the governance of incumbent organisations through MINAB.

Furthermore, the absence of a consensus about political and cultural diversity placed a political constraint on setting long-term objectives for social change. The Thomas model emphasised the rule of law and the protection of rights whilst the John model emphasised the development of shared identity and values as longer-term objectives for integration. This established pressure between the legal justification for excluding groups from Prevent versus establishing meaningful alliance based on shared values and identities. This tension was illustrated by the series of principled and tactical debate about non-violent extremism and the debate about the legitimacy of Islamist identity politics as a partner for the short and long-term objectives for Prevent. Examples of this tension include the conflict over Ruth Kelly's support for the Sufi Muslim council in Chapter 6 and with Hazel Blear's conflict with the MCB in Chapter 7. This was set against the persistent criticism of perceived government appeasement of Islamist groups, such as Policy Exchange's report 'Choosing our friends wisely' (Maher and Frampton 2009).

Trade-offs

This section examines how the combination of the John and Thomas models framed a series of principled and tactical trade-offs into decision-making. The first trade-off centred on the balance between a consensual process of social integration and the legitimacy of government authority and leadership. The second trade-off centred on the balance between addressing political grievances associated with Muslim identity politics whilst promoting integrated social and political values. The third trade-off centred on the balance between a focus on short-term security objectives and a longer-term and indirect process of reform and change. These trade-offs framed the decisions that determined the size of the policy community, the definition of extremism and the scale and urgency of the ambition for Prevent. Ultimately the trade-offs all

had practical implications for the level and patterns of support for Prevent and, by extension, its scope and focus.

Integration and enforcement

> *"It was always going to be a learning process but the lack of integration work prior to 2005 was the big gap that Prevent identified and tried to fill, and did some good work. I think the disentangling of integration and Prevent was good but it couldn't have happened before. Unless you had integration policy that was funded you weren't going to get away from the need to do that in the early years of Prevent"* Advisor 2

Although Prevent was a security agenda, integration policy was positioned as an essential element of the strategy throughout. However, the tension between the two dimensions was crystallised by the decision to separate them in Chapter 7. The centrality of this relationship can be understood through the influence of both the Hobbes and Locke models. At the heart of this was a shared question about the role that shared identity and belonging within society played in underpinning government authority. The Locke dimension foregrounded questions of inter-group relationships and the accommodation of difference within a cohesive social identity. This emphasised resolving horizontal social tensions between religious diversity and freedom of conscience and discriminatory views of religious, gender and sexual equality. The Hobbesian perspective focused on the vertical authority of government, the rights of citizens and the extent to which government should enforce the authority of shared norms and institutions. This can be seen in the emphasis on support for the rule of law, human rights and the institutions of liberal democracy as a reference point for extremism.

The fundamental importance of integration to Prevent can be traced through the high level political interest in questions of national identity and leadership. Integration of diverse British society was presented as counter point to the ontological divide promoted by radical Islamists. This created tension over whether integration was an open process with space for minority perspectives or was uncritically asserting 'western' and 'Christian' political institutions and

values. This was prominent in concerns about moderate Muslims and British values in the 2005 working groups. The debate was also given prominence by Blair at various points between 2001 and 2006, Brown in 2006 and Cameron in 2011 who all positioned an integrated national identity as a strategic response to a civilisational challenge from jihadist terrorism, and their own leadership in a global and historical context. Similarly, in 2002 David Blunkett situated new counter-terrorism powers in the historic contract between government and society as the foundation of a civil society tolerant of diversity (Blunkett 2002).

The importance of integration to Prevent can be traced throughout the main decisions. The decision to focus on the social roots of alienation in Chapter 5 and 6 framed the objectives of Prevent around a process of social integration. The process of community engagement and integration was also positioned as a tool for supporting the development of government capacity. Furthermore, the integration lens touched on the longer term questions about the causes of terrorism, including why people were attracted to these views and what government and society could and should do to address the problem. This dual role can be illustrated in Chapter 5 where integration policy was positioned as a tactical response to the need for improved intelligence and the wider challenge of political alienation. At the same time the importance of integration was also part of the rationale for narrowing and separating the two strands in Chapter 7.

The sensitivity of the relationship with security was linked to integration's role as a tool, process, objective and principle. The Hobbesian model emphasised defending the authority of government but recognised the importance of ensuring this authority was exercised in a fair and consistent manner within society. The Locke model prioritised establishing shared values within society with a role for government to support the process and to mediate conflicts. This meant that integration was both an upfront principle for guiding engagement and participation in policy making, as illustrated by Bears in 2009 and Cameron in 2011, and a developmental process. This can be seen in the decisions in Chapters 6 and 7 that moved between the benefits of neutral or values based engagement as part of a longer-term process of integration. These

decisions balanced the risks and realities of community disengagement, with consequences on the breadth and depth of the agenda.

The sensitivity of the relationship was also linked to the extent to which the security agenda justified government assertion of values and identity through integration policy. For example, decisions in Chapter 6 focused on the role of integration as a short-term tool for growing the policy community. This approach left multi-cultural space for minority Muslim religious and political identity as the reference point for engagement and dialogue in security policy. However, the assimilationist perspective, largely pushed by Gove, Phillips and Policy Exchange, positioned shared liberal British identity and values as a necessary pre-condition for participation in Prevent. They argued that upfront commitment to shared values was necessary to underpin a sustainable long-term consensus about the objectives for integration and by extension security. These were not mutually exclusive positions and there were efforts to balance the approaches, such as the 2006 Choudhury literature review that emphasised the benefits of engaging with evolving Muslim identity as part of a shared British identity.

The decision to separate Prevent from integration policy described in Chapter 7 was in part based on its importance to the long-term objectives of Prevent. For example, on-going mistrust of enforcement activity throughout, including the 2006 Forest Gate shootings, Project Champion and the 2009 Spooked claims, directly affected wider community confidence in Prevent (Kundnani 2009). At the same time there was concern with the core policy community that the link between integration and security agenda risked narrowing the range of acceptable values and identity with consequences for wider social policy agendas (Advisors 1, 2 and 3). The decision was supported by those who were concerned that the difficulty of building consensus behind Prevent had constrained a more assertive approach to British values and challenge community interests (Advisors 5 and 7; Civil servant 2). As a result the 2011 strategy formally separated the strands, citing the negative impact of Prevent on community attitudes but advocated a more assertive approach to shared values and emphasised the long-term importance of integration to Prevent.

The on-going conflict over the selection of community partners can also be seen as an on-going proxy for the debate between enforcement and the different models of integration. There was a tension around working with incumbent groups that were seen as resistant to change, but with greater authority and reach in the community (Civil servant 2; Advisor 3). This was set against supporting new groups that were committed to leading change in the values and identity of the community but without the same reach or influence. In Chapter 6 this debate was framed in terms of authenticity of representation but was also linked to suspicion of preferential government treatment on the basis of cultural and political views, particularly on foreign policy. In Chapter 7 engagement became more explicitly framed by shared values and principles, but in the context of a narrower agenda. The evolving balance can be seen in debate about the authenticity of liberal Muslim organisations and the fortunes of the Sufi Muslim council in Chapter 6 and the Quilliam Foundation in Chapter 7.

The balanced position of integration in Prevent placed constraints on government's role as a neutral arbiter and guarantor of rights (Blair 2006a; Cameron 2011; HM Government 2008a; HM Government 2011a). Both the Hobbes and Locke models framed integration as virtuous counterpoints to extremist visions of society. The tension centred on whether government was a neutral or consistent arbiter that protected the rights of minority social groups, in particular Muslims, or was uncritically asserting discriminatory majority values. For example, in Chapter 6 there was a broad consensus that violence was central to defining extremism but there were suspicions about how laws such as glorification of terrorism were being applied to Islamist groups in comparison to right wing groups. Equally, in Chapter 7 there was a consensus around the tolerance of diversity within a liberal democratic framework but a tension over whether this was being used to exclude conservative Muslim groups in a way that wasn't being applied to other religious groups.

The balance between security and integration meant that decision-making was closely scrutinised for how it dealt with conflicting rights and minority identity. This largely centred on whether Muslim beliefs and experiences were being subjected to exceptional scrutiny or

leniency in comparison to other religious or minority groups. For example, non-discrimination laws played a dual role in reassuring the Muslim community in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, and were directly linked to counter terrorism laws in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7. Equally the protection of religion and sexuality alongside race and gender in the 2006 Discrimination Act, plus the 2006 Terrorism Act offence of glorification of terrorism also became a soft framework for evaluating the attitudes of community partners in Chapter 7. There was a wider suspicion that glorification of terrorism was intended to challenge legitimate support for overseas resistance movements. This included support for Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation and opponents of US and UK occupations, which was a key feature of the split between the government and the MCB in 2009.

Identity and grievance

Decision-making also navigated a sensitive balance between accommodating and challenging Muslim identity. The trade-off was rooted in the role of government leading a consensual process of social integration and was linked to the debates about the causes of radicalisation. This included the debate about whether Muslim community grievances justified substantive action by government or were the product of mobilisation by radical Islamists. This can be traced in Blair's 2006 criticisms of Islamist grievance politics and into the assertion of a values based approach to engagement in Chapter 7 that was founded on wider criticisms of Muslim identity politics. Equally the development of Prevent in Chapter 6 was founded on the practical recognition of Muslim identity as a tangible and legitimate partner in developing effective short-term measures and a longer-term process of integration. In practice conflict over definitions of extremism were emblematic of the tension between challenging radical Islamist activism whilst protecting space for Muslim identity in British society.

Prevent was founded on an implicit challenge to the legitimacy of Muslim identity politics. In some respects the challenge is self-evident due to the persistent community concern that Prevent framed Islam and Muslims as a threat both to the authority of government and social

integration. Blair also dismissed grievances framed by an Islamic political identity, particularly the idea that western foreign policy was a war against Islam. Similarly Blears' 2005 statement around policing impacts also suggested a perspective that, at the very least, didn't fully engage with the political salience and sensitivity of a collective Muslim community identity. Salient topics that animated Muslim identity politics were either not treated as specific to the Muslim community, such as unemployment, or out of reach for government, such as media or political representation. The idea of moderate Muslims that emerged in Chapter 6 implicitly excluded Islamists, a tension that became more explicit in Chapter 7. Similarly British values and the debate about multi-culturalism carried implicit challenges to minority and migrant identities and values.

Prevent was a political response to the wider scrutiny of Muslim identity and values. This can be traced from growing interest in radical Islamists in Chapter 5, growing scrutiny of the wider Muslim community itself in Chapter 6 and the subsequent political shifts in Chapter 7. For example, the public debate about extremism and British values focused on the attitudes of the Muslim community rather than wider society (See for example Gove 2006 and Phillips M 2006). Prevent challenged the legitimacy of a Muslim identity that sought to exclude a British identity and limit participation in western society. Prevent also challenged public and private commitments to the rights and identities of other protected groups, particularly other faiths, gender equality and sexuality. These two strands were often used in parallel, such as in the assertion of liberal values as British, and in contradictory ways. For example, British Muslims were challenged on their private commitment to liberal values or their active commitment to promoting a shared national identity.

Equally, Prevent was also a pragmatic means based engagement with community organisations based on a shared religious identity in order to combat terrorist recruitment. In this respect Prevent worked with Muslim community organisations to support practical short and long-term objectives by minimising more divisive values questions. The prioritisation of Prevent described in Chapter 5 was in part a response to the political mobilisation of the community in

advance of the 2005 election (Turnbull 2004). In addition the whole Prevent programme was predicated on engaging with the Muslim community, even where alternative framings around Pakistani backgrounds could have been used (Local government respondent 2). Prevent also engaged with substantive grievances through the introduction of community policing and the recognition of faith discrimination in 2006. The 2006 report by Choudhury on behalf of the DCLG also illustrated tentative engagement with nuanced dynamics of Muslim identity that could engage the younger generation (Choudhury 2007). This translated into an engagement strategy that sought to work with Muslim community organisations at national and local levels.

The trade-off between challenging and working with Muslim identity is illustrated by the criticism that Prevent negatively reinforced Muslim identity politics. Prevent was criticised for reinforcing the organisation of a diverse community around a singular Muslim identity (Kundnani in Communities and Local Government 2010; Choudhury 2007; Briggs et al 2006). This engagement was also criticised for framing Muslim identity as separate and for entrenching incumbent community structures that had alienated young generations and marginalised women (Advisor 6; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010). At the same time an instrumental approach to community engagement was also criticised for being detrimental to community advocacy and empowerment, such as by Kundnani in his evidence to the CLG select committee in Chapter 7 (Home Office 2005a; Kundnani 2009; Advisor 5). For example, the avoidance of foreign policy, despite its clear influence on community attitudes and recruitment, was seen indicative of a failure to engage with the substance political grievances. Finally the sensitivity of need to work with Muslim community groups limited more constructive dialogue and challenge over community practices and attitudes (Advisor 5).

The attempt by government to adopt a more assertive approach toward Muslim identity politics in Chapter 7 represented a shift in this trade-off. The assertion of values based approaches to engagement moved away from practical elements of engagement with Muslim identity at the cost of narrowing the breadth and depth of engagement, and by extension the scope of the policy. The activist model of extremism that excluded Islamist groups implied a preference for

private or liberal Muslim identity that can be traced from the idea of 'moderate Muslims' (DCLG 2007; Advisor 3). For example, those who held normative conservative religious views were progressively excluded from Prevent, as illustrated by experience of the Salafist Street project in Brixton. The stance adopted by Blears in Chapter 7 in part challenged the mobilisation of an Islamic political identity in opposition to the government foreign policy (Blair 2006; Blears 2009a). At the same time the narrower agenda did leave space for local discretion over community engagement and negative liberal space for conservative religious organisations.

This trade-off underpinned the tactical approach to community engagement that persisted throughout Prevent. The initial focus on community engagement was framed as a practical tool to improve the legitimacy of government action. Similarly, the compromise in Chapter 7 was a tactical settlement that balanced concern about community alienation, maintaining protection for civil liberties and the assertive approach to non-violent extremism. Managing these competing demands underpinned the reassertion of Home Office authority through a fuzzy model of extremism (Bleich 2010). There is also evidence of tactical positioning by the Home Office to maintain community confidence in the context of the approach, including the withdrawal of funding from Quilliam identified in Chapter 7. The separation of Prevent from wider integration policy also allowed space to push more selective engagement with groups with outwardly liberal and British identity. At the same time the narrower agenda left space for local discretion over community engagement outside of Prevent.

Process and outcomes

> *"You are trying to isolate a group of [extremists] and move the community in another direction… It was an attempt to think about a long-term change of behaviour and there were some politicians who loved that. They might not have liked the political positioning but loved it conceptually. Others thought we were entirely in the wrong game"* Civil Servant 2

The final trade-off centred on the balance between demonstrable direct outcomes and an indirect process of change. The Locke model introduced consideration of the indirect benefits of improving the social legitimacy of government authority. In contrast the Hobbes model emphasised the need to demonstrate authority through a direct and demonstrable response to terrorism. As a result decisions tended to reference both the short and long-term dimensions. For example, the decision to include the Muslim community in an expanded policy community was a short-term intelligence measure that was situated in a longer-term process of social change. At the same time the sensitivity of this trade-off is illustrated by different ideas about the relative short and long-term merits of adopting means or values based approaches to community engagement. The compromise in chapter six re-orientated the trade-off to focus on directly targeted interventions whilst addressing questions of long-term change by working with groups who promoted an integrated liberal British identity.

Prevent embedded these trade-offs into an explicit and implicit process of institutional reform that aimed to improve government capacity and promote social integration. The reformist lens can be traced from the whole government approach to Contest in Chapter 5 and the active steps to develop a larger policy community in Chapter 6. Equally the subsequent debate about the management of distributed relationships in the new policy community was indicative of a tension between broadening engagement and selecting partners to support longer-term objectives. The process of engaging new participants in the policy, principally the Muslim community and local authorities, was a key short-term objective that necessitated minimising conflicts with influential groups such as the MCB. At the same time success was also embedded in an explicit process of change that led to debates about the long-term implications of engagement, the definition of extremism and the practical impact of interventions.

Chapter 5 illustrated how the focus on a process of institutional reform originated from the wider ideas associated with New Labour's modernisation agenda (6 et al; Barber 2008). Institutional reform was a key recommendation of the MacPherson report that forced public agencies to review how racial prejudices influenced their relationship with minority groups

(MacPherson 1999). Organisational reconfigurations were also a prominent feature of measures to deal with complex problems outside of direct government control (Barber 2008, Saggar 2010b). For example, Chapter 6 showed that Prevent was directly linked Labour's localism agenda and was integrated into local coordinating structures. Prevent itself was simultaneously framed in terms of intervening with individuals considered 'at risk' and at a population level to address wider social or structural problems that propagated grievances. This was similar to the dual approach of reconfiguring tax and benefits whilst providing individual support through sure start centres to end child poverty (Kenway 2010).

Chapter 6 also showed how the development of Prevent focused on the delivery chain, principally the relationship between government and the Muslim community, rather than direct impacts on terrorism. For example, although PSAs were established, they did not set hard targets to reduce low frequency high impact issues such as terrorism. Instead monitoring, such as NI35, focused on the process of engagement between public authorities and the Muslim community. Similarly, as Charles Farr noted in Chapter 7, the accuracy of counting the number of people diverted from terrorism lent heavily on the accuracy of an indirect and heavily contested model of radicalisation (Home Affairs 2009). However, the benefits of resolving wider community grievances also relied on similarly contested causal relationships. In practice Prevent was based on a consensus that focused on the benefits of establishing relationships between authorities and Muslim community groups as part of an indirect and distributed process of change.

In Chapter 6 Muslim community organisations were simultaneously positioned as partners for short-term interventions and in a process of change that was focused on the community itself. This approach aligned the intrinsic and long-term value of a process of government engagement with community groups with the instrumental benefits of good relations on enforcement and intelligence priorities. The approach effectively brought the Muslim community into a framework of modernisation and reform to reshape social attitudes around an integrated British identity (Advisor 5). For example, the MINAB initiative sought to reform governance of

religious institutions to facilitate engagement with public authorities looking for viable partners. However, the growing focus on reforming the values and the ideas of Muslim community organisations created the conflict over the longer-term aims of the process that undermined short-term objectives. This led to the compromise identified in Chapter 7 that aimed to clarify the Muslim community's role in the delivery chain by focusing on the instrumental dimension of engagement.

The compromise noted in Chapter 7 also aimed to improve government control of this process in order to manage the risk of unintended consequences (Saggar 2009 and 2010a). In contrast to efforts to stigmatise behaviours or actions, such as smoking, Prevent was an explicit attempt to shape political views about society and government through reform of complex issues of social identity and alienation. However, the unit of engagement, in this case the Muslim community also distorted the framing of the problem around the broader community rather than specific behaviours and attitudes. This problem was not unique and a contemporaneous agenda designed to engage and change behaviours of families or parents also highlighted similar difficulties (Bennet 2010). This created space for opponents of Prevent, including Islamist and nativist campaigners, to delegitimise collaboration and accommodation. The failure to resolve these tensions, particularly amongst the wider Muslim community, led to the compromise decision in Chapter 7.

The dual status afforded to the Muslim community in the new paradigm highlighted the inherently political challenge of Prevent's model of social reform. Saggar has shown how the process of defining problems around social identities for the purposes of policy-making risks unintended impacts on that identity (Saggar 2009). In the case of Prevent, reform of Muslim social institutions had to navigate competing ideas of success. In addition the Muslim community was a crude unit that resulted in poor targeting of resources and negative feedback about its consequences, including via local constituency MPs. It widened the range of individuals and groups with a stake in the process, in this case all British Muslims, without a settled technical or professional framework to give legitimacy to decisions around the trade-

offs between short and long-term dimensions. In this respect the new framework illustrated that complex population level change is outside the sole control of government without sufficient social consensus for laws and multi-generational education programmes.

The role of evidence

> *"It was very hard to establish an evidence base that people would agree on. We have hundreds of evidence-based papers but people could always find enough evidence to support their own personal views, whatever that might be. Therefore it was almost impossible, as a consequence of that, to have genuinely evidence-based policy-making in this area. It was always driven by senior people, ministers or civil servants."* Civil servant 2

The integration of the Hobbes and Locke models into decision-making was facilitated by an empirical debate about the causes of terrorism and the relationship with the Muslim community. As illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the debate about radicalisation challenged decision-makers and advocates to empirically justify their positions, rather than purely make claims against values and interests. At the same time the empirical debates were directly tied to the evolving trade-offs. For example, evidence of tacit support amongst the Muslim community came to the fore in Chapter 5 to justify broadening engagement with the Muslim community (Saggar 2006 and 2010a). This was set against evidence that the wider attitudes and integration of Muslims were unexceptional and fed into support for separating integration policy in Chapter 7 (Sobolewska 2010). Both positions could be demonstrated to be true but were variously elevated or minimised to justify alternative approaches to the key trade-offs in Prevent.

Influential research engaged with the core policy problem and its main trade-offs. For example, work by Burke, Sageman, Wiktorowicz and latterly Richardson highlighted some of the wider social and political questions inherent in terrorism (Burke 2004; Sageman 2004 & 2008; Wiktorowicz 2005a & 2005b; Richardson 2006). The 2004 Home Office briefing on

radicalisation and extremism in Chapter 5, the literature review on Muslim identity by Choudhury in 2007 and the 2006 Demos report, both supported by DCLG, supported the case for broadening of community engagement in Chapter 6 (Briggs et al 2006; Choudhury 2007). At the same time the outputs from Policy Exchange highlighted the alternative selective approach to engagement (Bright 2006: Mirza et al 2007 and Maher and Frampton 2009). The DCLG select committee inquiry collated street-level feedback that set the agenda for the subsequent recommendation from the independent review to adopt toward a narrower model of Prevent (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011c). At the same time the situational research by Bouhana and Wikstrom underpinned the Home Office's renewed emphasis on places of radicalisation in 2011 (Bouhana & Wikstrom 2011).

The disconnect between the government's and the Muslim community's view of radicalisation and recruitment was emblematic of the gap in government legitimacy that led to Prevent in the first place. In Chapter 5 the authority of the enforcement response was undermined by the reliance on blanket stop and search powers and detention without trial. In Chapter 6 Muslim participants in the development of Prevent simultaneously recognised the problem of recruitment whilst resisting the connection with the wider community. Analyses of the ideational and organisational framework for radical Islamism were repeatedly criticised for failing to address the role of foreign policy and discrimination against Muslims and Islam, including in the 2005 community workshops. At the same time evidence in relation the threat, including information that justified the detention of individuals pending deportation, was often kept secret. At the same time the Labour leadership, including Blair in 2006, and many others in government and beyond argued that a failure to accept the problem was evidence of the problem with community attitudes.

The decision to focus on expanding the policy community to include Muslim community organisations and representatives itself was supported by analyses of wider Muslim community attitudes. For example, Saggar's 2006 article was based on research and advice to the Home Office that argued that some beliefs, whilst not actively participating or even supportive of

terrorism, did need to be considered with care as part of a broader long-term preventative strategy. At this point in time the evidence supported the decision to actively engage with the wider Muslim community that framed the development of Prevent in Chapter 6. However, Sobolewska's later analysis highlighted how the limitations of polling skewed perceptions of the problem and justified growing concern that Prevent's focus on the Muslim community would exacerbate grievances. Both examples directly engaged with the debates of the day, from the need for a nuanced approach to community engagement in Chapter 5 to the need to manage growing conflict by separating integration in Chapter 7.

The focus of both the Hobbes and Locke models on the relationship between government and society elevated the authority of authentic Muslim community interlocutors in decision-making. This included playing an important role in navigating and embedding the approach to engagement in Chapter 6. The 2004 Home Office analysis provided sufficient evidence of reasonable concern about certain attitudes to legitimise the consultation process in Chapter 6. At the same time it also demonstrated sufficient evidence that mainstream Muslim community opinion identified as British and did not support extremist or terrorist views, which led to the neutral community engagement strategy. The third point of reference came from community advisors who provided feedback on community priorities and avenues for engagement with community groups. The combination of analysis and this feedback was a key factor in broadening the policy community but didn't resolve the normative debates about radicalisation and extremism.

The importance of this elevated role, and the contentious nature of Prevent, led to scrutiny of the personal values and motivations of interlocutors. This included an internal community debate about representation of diverse interests and religious values that challenged the MCB's leadership role in Chapter 6. At the same time there was on-going interrogation of the political values and objectives of participants in the new policy community that were illustrated by the persistent accusations of entryism, such as the various Policy Exchange reports. The consultation exercises, such as the 2005 workshops, and the engagement of different advisors,

were attempts to structure input in a way that could navigate these tensions. In contrast *'The Islamist'* became an influential personal account of recruitment to Hizb ut-Tarir that helped to influence the shift toward a more selective approach to engagement in Chapter 7 (Hussain 2007). It gained legitimacy due to the author's overt conversation to liberal form of Sufist Islam but at the same time was challenged for universalising the experience of a former extremist to the wider Muslim community.

Despite the conflicts around Prevent there were clearly moments where evidence played a crucial factor in integrating the new paradigm. At the same time the importance of advisors was illustrative of the lack of a clear and stable reference point within government for evaluating decisions. In this context the Choudhury literature review helped to support the broader engagement with the community described in Chapter 6 by emphasising positive mobilisation of Muslim identity activism. On the other hand *'The Islamist'* provided a compelling and influential account that influenced the more explicit challenge to Islamist ideas during Chapter 7, but without addressing wider questions of social change (Hussain 2007). In contrast, the evidence that the Streets project diverted individuals away from harmful activism was ultimately discarded for being linked to a theological model that became politically unacceptable. These differing fortunes illustrate how although the new paradigm was shaped by evidence it was rarely free of institutional and normative debates and trade-offs (Civil servant 2).

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the features and limitations of the two competing models of security provided the conceptual framework for decision-making. The influence of the two models focused decision-making on the parameters of the relationship between government and society in security policy and influenced which arguments gained traction in decision-making. The approach was brought together by Labour's political strategy and reform agendas that enabled coordinated action through a distributed policy community. At the heart of much

of the debate was how to balance the a series of trade-offs linked to the need to address short-term security concerns as part of a process longer-term social change. The debate between the two conceptual models shaped the emergence of practical policy options with different approaches to the core trade-offs. In this respect the combination of both models represented a new conceptual framework for negotiating decision-making.

The agenda presented government with the paradoxical challenge of providing leadership on social integration whilst establishing its own legitimacy to do so effectively. Prevent was based on an acknowledgement that government action was constrained by the need to maintain its own legitimacy at the risk of exacerbating social alienation and grievances. At the same time government was also under pressure to act as a guarantor of rights and as a reference point for social integration. In this context ideas associated with social integration gained a leading role in policy making, as both a short-term tactical instrument, long-term objective and guiding rationale for institutional reform. Decision-making had to navigate principled and tactical debates about the extent to which cultural diversity and political grievances should be accommodated. Therefore as a policy Prevent embodied the political debate about integration and government authority that had motivated its original development.

In practice, the dialogue between the two fundamental models of government and security framed the development of two policy options, which can be characterised as the integration and enforcement approaches. Both approaches accept the core principle that Prevent should be based on a consensual partnership between government and civil society in order to address short and long-term objectives. The integration approach that was initially adopted focused on broadening engagement with the Muslim community to disrupt radicalisation by addressing indirect political grievances. It emphasised the inherent benefits of engagement as a process of collective action that would help to support the development of integrated identities and shared values over the longer term. In contrast the enforcement approach frames radicalisation as a means for identifying and targeting interventions to divert individuals or groups from harm. Engagement in this model focused on supporting effective interventions in partnership with

community organisations and institutional partners that shared an up-front and overt commitment to shared liberal values and British identity.

Rather than being mutually exclusive the two models represented different approaches to the agenda's central constraints and trade-offs. This chapter has illustrated how the shift toward the narrower enforcement approach was in part indicative of the consensus behind the importance of integration policy to the longer-term objectives of Prevent. However, the complexity of the framework for managing political conflict and social change meant that the integration led approach was always vulnerable to being framed as part of the problem. It introduced a wide range of problems onto the policy agenda that increased the breadth of the government response. However, it also introduced different views of the aims and objectives of Prevent across local and national decision-making. This was exacerbated by the dual status of Muslim identity in both models of Prevent, as both a problem and vehicle for reform. The resulting conflict over community engagement led to the emphasis on a narrower more focused enforcement approach to Prevent.

Although highly contentious, in some respects the practical focus on community engagement helped to minimise sensitive questions about responsibility for the causes of terrorism within the core policy community. Viewed in this way the concept of radicalisation helped to frame a shared debate about the roles government and society could play in supporting collective or targeted action. The focus on community engagement pushed the debate about values based engagement into a second order agenda for the core policy community, albeit a very sensitive one that ultimately undermined trust in decision-making. Even in Chapter 7 the shift to a values based approach was justified in order to clarify the terms of engagement and resolve growing conflict over Prevent. Equally, many of the key decisions were explicitly concerned with perceptions and patterns of engagement, both within the core policy community and across wider issues networks. However, Prevent was always constrained by the same problems that motivated its development, namely limited trust that government could lead an equitable process of integration.

Ultimately, the strengths and limitations of the Thomas and John models of government and security provided the conceptual foundation for decision-making. The political pressure to demonstrate a comprehensive response introduced a fundamental tension about the roles of society and government into policy-making. Prevent explicitly recognised the social roots of extremism and terrorism, the limits of government capacity and the role of society in delivering short and long-term solutions. However, the debate around integration demonstrated competing ideas about the importance of process and outcomes to Prevent and the necessary role of government leadership. This included competing views on who was responsible for segregation, alienation and extremism. Similarly the debate about extremism incorporated fundamental questions about the accommodation of difference and dissent and the nuances of the distinction between private and public views. At the heart of this challenge was the persistent tension over how society and government should mediate between majority and minority views. Ultimately these tensions precluded a settled consensus about the scope and aims for Prevent.

Chapter 10: Contribution and conclusions

Introduction

This thesis has shown that Prevent represented a new framework for decision-making that focused security policy on the relationship between government and society. It developed as a solution to the political and operational complexity of responding to home grown terrorism following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. The framework extended the capacity of government to deliver short-term security priorities through a longer term process of social integration. In this respect the dialogue between both fundamental models of government and security established the conceptual and institutional framework for decision-making. Central to this framework was the development of a new policy community that balanced the interests of distributed institutional relationships with central government leadership. The policy agenda was integrated around a debate about the causes of radicalisation and the associated development of solutions to the threat of home grown terrorism. Therefore Prevent was a new framework for decision-making that balanced the strengths and limitations of the two competing models of security.

This study started from a premise that a preventative approach to terrorism is a valuable undertaking because political violence is unhealthy for democracy and the wellbeing of society. The findings from this study further emphasise the difficulty facing democratic governments of exercising effective authority over individual citizens and society in order to prevent violence. This problem is most difficult and most urgent where the democratic foundations of legitimacy are being challenged by radical movements that capitalise on salient political grievances and identities. Prevent was an opportunity to reduce the use of coercive powers by dealing with social grievances and alienation and diverting individuals before they do harm to themselves or wider society. However, the approach opened up challenging questions about government's priorities and assumptions in relation to minority social identities and the space available for alternative political views. As a result Prevent was fundamentally about how to

managing conflict over values and identities whilst delivering short term interventions and longer-term change.

The development of Prevent clearly illustrated the importance of leadership in order to navigate complex practical and political problems. The approach was predicated on creating a coalition of support to define and challenge extremist ideas whilst developing capacity and trust in targeted interventions. Creating this coalition entailed a series of complex and politically contested tactical and strategic trade-offs about who should participate and who should have been excluded. Draw the boundary too wide and trust and solidarity breaks down from within. Draw the boundary too narrow and efforts can be superficial, alienating and reinforce existing grievances. Prevent shows how government can use explicit and implicit compulsion and influence to evolve these boundaries. At the same time it has to balance the risk that it may disempower and alienate social groups with negative, or positive, consequences for social and political integration and the aims of the agenda. Ultimately the long term questions is how individuals and groups can be empowered to resolve differences and grievances through the democratic institutions of government and civil society.

A question this study hasn't set out to answer was whether Prevent actually prevented terrorism. What it can answer is whether Prevent was successful on its own terms. The evidence presented here is of a very mixed picture. The conflict around Prevent and the narrowing of the agenda shows that neither the Labour or the Conservative Liberal Democrat coalition governments covered by this study established a sustainable consensus across a broader policy community that could deliver long-term change. Instead, Prevent was a focal point for a range of grievances and suspicions about the hard and soft surveillance of Muslims and Muslim identity. Neither did it address structural questions of racism, discrimination and empowerment that influenced patterns of social alienation. However, in reality these objectives were beyond the ambition for Prevent. In practical terms it enabled demonstrable collective action in the politically sensitive period after 7/7, it supported tentative improvements in local partnerships

with police and local authorities and also developed diversionary interventions such as Channel.

The case presented here was particular to the United Kingdom and the political focus on security and the Muslim community in the period after 9/11 and 7/7. Nevertheless, the lessons from the process, in particular the challenges of establishing the legitimacy and authority of a response to political threats are relevant to different national contexts. For example, in the French model of strong rights-based liberal secularity there may be more acceptance of a strong government asserting a shared civic culture, in contrast with the UK's norms based model of liberal multi-culturalism. However, the point still stands that overly assertive leadership may alienate social or political groups if government does not respond to cultural and political norms on the ground. At the same time other states rooted in different multi-cultural models, such as Australia or Canada, may need to consider how government can play an active role in fostering an inclusive social and political identity for certain minorities in response to a specific threat.

In both cases the challenge is to strike a balance between the practicalities of engaging with dynamic social diversity in an on-going process of integration, both to prevent violent extremism and enable an effective response where necessary in the short and long term (Kaldor 2003; Saggar 2010a; Sen 2006). At the same time Prevent was focused on a social and ethnic minority identity, in this case the Muslim community, that made up about 5% of the UK population. As a result policy making tended to focus on the Muslim community rather than wider structural questions, including the majority population. This contrasts with cases of social and political conflict that involve the mobilisation of a much larger minority identity grouping. In these cases the group may be large enough to mobilise effective representation of its interests via democratic institutions. However, the risk remains, such as was the case in the Northern Ireland conflict before the Good Friday agreement, that a large minority may be locked out of the institutions of government, creating space for radical and potentially violent

political movements. In this context the challenge of legitimacy and authority remains the same but the pressure for more substantial institutional reform is likely to be far greater.

Embedded in the question of how Prevent may be applied to other countries or conflicts is whether such a contentious policy is worth the trouble. One of the tensions at the heart of the agenda was whether it was a security policy at all or a vehicle for dealing with the politics of the Muslim community. In some respects this suspicion was valid. Nevertheless, this study argues that in practice Prevent took a political conflict that was already taking place and institutionalised it into a structured policy dialogue. The politics in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 both motivated the development of Prevent but at the same time exposed failures of legitimacy that were rooted in a previous deficit of engagement. The lesson here is surely that government should treat engagement with civil-society as an on-going exercise to actively address grievances and alienation, prevent space for radicals to operate and maintain the authority of shared institutions. Success will still requires a careful balance between the pre-requisites and the process of integration, including the breadth and depth of engagement and the balance between an open socially led process and government leadership.

Contribution

This thesis differs from other accounts because it explores Prevent as a decision-making process that was shaped by negotiation between institutions and ideas (Thomas 2017). Crucial to this development was the Labour government's dual response to the practical and political challenge from terrorism. The approach sought to underpin the legitimacy of government enforcement by adapting ideas of social inclusion to address the social origins of grievances and alienation. This decision expanded the scope of Prevent by establishing a new set of reciprocal and consensual relationships with the Muslim community and local agencies. At the same time these relationships placed constraints on government decision-making due to the trade-offs between the short and long-term aims of Prevent and conflicts over the values of the policy community. The resultant conflict within the new policy community, including between

government and the Muslim community, and between national and local government, undermined support for Prevent. This ultimately led to a compromise approach under the Coalition government that narrowed and centralised control of the agenda.

The development of Prevent was based on developing a comprehensive response to terrorism. The first challenge focused on how to expand the scope of the response in a context where the authority and legitimacy of government and its agencies was part of the problem. The second challenge focused on how large the policy community could grow in order to establish a viable coalition in support of the agenda without creating internal conflict about shared values and motivations. The third challenge centred on establishing empirical foundations to guide and legitimise decision-making around the trade-offs between the short and long-term objectives of Prevent. These trade-offs served to establish two preventative policy models, enforcement and integration, that represented alternatives approaches to the core policy trade-offs. Ultimately the compromise reached at the end of the period represented a choice in the context of new government priorities, reduced funding and a less immediate terrorist threat.

Ultimately this study's main contribution is the argument that Prevent was the product of a discursive negotiation between different views of the relationship between government and society. This contrasts with Hall's zero sum model of paradigmatic policy change and leads the study to conclude that Prevent was not a simple incremental extension of Thomas nor a conclusive shift to John (Hall 1993). Rather, the dialogue between both models focused decision-making on the relationship between government and society and pushed the security agenda into new institutional and conceptual terrain. It brought the interests of the Muslim community into decision-making whilst creating new opportunities for government to assert wider influence over social values and beliefs through the governance of an expanded policy community (6 et al 2002; Newman 2001a). This process could be characterised as a securitisation of social policy, particularly the scrutiny of Muslim identity. However, this would also mask the limits placed on government, including the multi-polar process of debate

about the causes of terrorism, social identity and legitimacy, that were key to the development of Prevent.

Neither does this mean that Prevent represented a stable framework for decision-making. Instead, Prevent represented a negotiated but limited and flawed settlement. From the abstract ideational perspective Prevent embedded the importance of addressing the causes of terrorism and promoting integration into decision-making. The consideration of a wider set of beliefs and ideologies and the causes of grievances and alienation was a clear departure from security policy prior to 9/11 and was retained in the new phase of the agenda in 2011. From the practical institutional perspective the growing conflict over Prevent also demonstrated the limits of the new framework's sustainability. Nevertheless, although heavily qualified, there was a degree of consensus that civil society organisations and local non-enforcement agencies had an important role to play in effective security policy. Even if involvement was subject to stronger central control, the question of how to secure their effective participation remained a central theme of the 2011 strategy and beyond, as it had throughout the development of Prevent.

Hobbes and Locke

This study was examined the development of Prevent against two conceptual models of government and security, Thomas and John, that were inspired by Hobbes and Locke respectively. These models were used as a way of understanding the institutional and conceptual development of Prevent and how patterns of authority evolved in decision-making. Ultimately this study argues that Prevent represented a new institutional and ideational framework that integrated and balanced features of both models. This framework expanded the capacity and reach of government at the cost of recasting the institutional and political constraints on its decision-making. The different organising principles and assumptions of the two models can be traced throughout the key decisions, from the initial policy crisis, the development of a distributed and consensual response and the subsequent consensus around reform. However, this does not mean that ministers and civil servants were regularly citing the

Leviathan or the Treatise of Government to justify their decisions. It does serve to illustrate how these two major historical traditions can be traced forward into contemporary debates to provide a framework for understanding the evolution of Prevent and its trade-offs.

The study has argued that ideas associated with the two models exerted implicit and explicit influence throughout the development of Prevent. The ideas of both models can be seen in the focus on the relationship between government and society to deliver a short-term response to terrorism that was embedded in a long-term process of social change. The example of David Blunkett citing Hobbes in his 2002 contributions on citizenship and security further illustrates how the ideas and concepts of the two models influenced the way policy was framed and communicated (Stone 2012; Blyth 2013). Both models are based on long standing theories of the state that are embedded in political theory modules at British universities and are typically taught together. Furthermore, both models represent cultural and political preferences that have exerted tangible influence on government with consequences for patterns of violence over time (Pinker 2011). In this respect the influence of these two models on Prevent should not be surprising.

The influence of both models also framed the challenge of establishing a consensus behind the legitimacy of government authority within an integrated society. Prevent was a direct response to the dual political challenge to the legitimacy of government authority and the status of Muslims in British society. From the Hobbesian perspective of model Thomas, Prevent was a tool that supported the capacity of government to prevent terrorism. It was supported by those who emphasised the importance of asserting government's role to protect citizens and enforce political norms around the rule of law. From the Lockian perspective of model John, Prevent was a process for addressing the reasons why individuals were attracted to the ideas of terrorism and was supported by those who believed in the importance of a social consensus to underpin the authority of government. Ultimately it was a practical response to the need to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of enforcement and the need to manage social conflict over question of developing a shared national identity and values.

Ultimately the new framework for decision-making centred on the shared importance of establishing trust and credibility between government and society. Prevent was founded on a process of distributed engagement to improve confidence in government and to support the integration of the Muslim community. At the same time it also led to conflict over the boundaries of participation and influence. The debate about non-violent extremism was a tangible question about the objectives of Prevent that intersected with questions about the parameters of shared social values and identity. This ultimately coalesced around support for the authority of government, respect for the rule of law and an outward commitment to a British identity and liberal principles of non-discrimination. At the same time conflict also centred on the consistency of this framework, including the space for diversity of identity, freedom of personal conscience and public dissent. In this area this study would support the argument that Prevent both inadvertently, and at times deliberately, subjected the minority Muslim community to unfair and racist scrutiny.

The difficulty of establishing consistency and trust illustrates a cyclical and inextricably linked relationship between social consensus and government authority. This process is at the heart of the contrast between the investment in a collective sovereign in Hobbes's Leviathan and the negotiated authority described in Locke's treatise of government (Hobbes 1996; Locke 1996). This feedback loop was a factor in the predominantly tactical framing of decision-making throughout Prevent. There was a need to give sufficient space for the Muslim community to engage with Prevent on its own terms. At the same time there was also pressure on government to lead social change. Both positions were accepted by all who participated in the core policy community. The question was around the degree to which the Muslim community should set the policy agenda and establish the boundaries of acceptability versus a democratically elected government largely motivated by the perspective of the non-Muslim majority. This ultimately led to a dual focus on the minority Muslim community as both targets and partners for change that ensured this balance was under persistent scrutiny.

Ultimately, navigating the trade-offs between both Thomas and John represented the primary axis that guided decision-making. Decisions attempted to navigate a path toward a social consensus that would support the authority of government. As a result Prevent explicitly and implicitly incorporated ideas from both models by embedding the short-term benefits of engagement into a long-term processes social change. Furthermore the combination of both models explicitly recognised the limits of both government's and civil-society's ability to deal with the complex problem of terrorism. The crisis of the Thomas model was rooted in the failure of a narrow enforcement approach to deal with the political dimensions of the problem. Equally there was a widespread acknowledgement, especially in the Muslim community, that only government had the capacity and authority to lead effective action in both the short and long term. By integrating both models Prevent represented a single framework for decision-making focused on undertaking collective action to prevent terrorism through social integration and targeted interventions.

Policy change

The conclusion that Prevent was the product of negotiation between the two models contrasts with Hall's zero sum model of change (Blyth 2013; Hall 1993; Pierson 2000a; Schmidt 2010). With the caveat of being a single case, this tends to support the more discursive model of change that is influenced by both institutions and ideas (Schmidt 2010). The initial framing of the crisis emerged from an internal acknowledgement of the contradictions and failure of the incumbent model. At the same time Labour's home affairs and social inclusion strategy created conceptual and institutional space for a dual approach and from here the two models produced an iterative series of policy trade-offs. These questions were resolved through the wider policy and political context, the alignment of institutional support, the framing of arguments in relation to the alternative standpoint and the practical capacity to take decisions. This process was framed by an interactive dialogue that was centred on the institutional and conceptual axis between the two models.

In order to assess whether this was an example of paradigmatic change the process can be compared against the tests outlined in Chapter 3. There is clearly a high volume of decision-making, as illustrated by the three Contest strategies and two dedicated Prevent strategies during the period. There is evidence that new ideas on social inclusion that originated from outside the incumbent security community framed decision-making. There is evidence of institutional change given the evolution membership of the policy community and coalitions of support, even if the relationships were conditional, unstable and limited. This ultimately meant that decisions balanced the two models to maintain a viable policy community which produced the two second order policy options described in the previous chapter. This is indicative of paradigmatic change. However this study argues that Prevent did not develop as a zero-sum competition between two fully conceived models of policy. Rather the two models framed the options for decision-makers, which shaped the institutional settlement that in turn structured decision-making.

Importantly, the debate about the causes of terrorism helped to integrate the two models into one conceptual framework for decision-making (Stone 2012). Throughout the development of Prevent, radicalisation provided a conceptual rationale for broadening the ideational and institutional frame of security policy. In addition, the framing of radicalisation as a neutral and diffuse social process facilitated the expansion of engagement with the Muslim community and beyond in opposition to an 'out group' of violent extremists. At the same time the potential breadth of this model also created conflict over the effectiveness of interventions and the legitimate scope of the agenda, particularly in relation to Islamic identity and foreign policy. For example, the debate about whether belief and ideology was a cause or symptom of radicalisation acted as a proxy for a debate about the relative importance of structural discrimination, social values and identity and responsibility. As a result the causal model was both central to the broadening of Prevent and the conflict that characterised it.

The importance of the concept of radicalisation to integrating the new paradigmatic framework contrasts to a degree with Blyth's slightly pessimistic account of evidence as a self-reinforcing

factor for incumbent paradigmatic models (Blyth 2013). This study emphasises the political origins of Prevent and its development was characterised by political conflict about values and institutional interests. Equally, its development was influenced by an empirical debate about the causes of terrorism, policy options and evaluations of success. As Blyth notes in line with Hall, Pierson and Schmidt, this debate was closely tied to institutional preferences and the evolving political context (Hall 1993; Pierson 2000a; Schmidt 2010). However, evidence helped to bring together more abstract theorist approaches to decision-making with the institutional frame of practitioners muddling through toward a viable policy (Lindblom 1959). This supports the likes of Wildavsky who see evidence as part of an iterative process of persuasion that helps to navigate ideas about a problem alongside institutional interests and preferences (Wildavsky 1979).

Prevent also illustrated how empirical arguments can help to integrate abstract ideas about the policy problem together with practical institutional considerations (Lindblom 1959). At the same time it is important to clarify the types of evidence that were influential in this process. Prevent was a conceptual response to the changed security environment but its prioritisation was largely driven by street level feedback about community alienation. This combination sets institutional feedback as a reference point for decisions alongside abstract empirical and ideational stories about the policy problem (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Lindblom 1959; Stone 2012). This does not mean that Prevent was purely referenced against institutional interests or abstract beliefs, but that different forms of evidence engaged with different aspects of decision-making. Polling and academic research contributed to describing a phenomena, policy research helped to define the policy options and institutional feedback set out the tactical factors that were necessary to deliver a viable policy. In this context Prevent was very much a product of the collective process, or art, of navigating an interlocking framework of ideas, institutions and empirical authority.

The development of Prevent also demonstrates the challenge of implementing a contentious policy agenda through the explicit and implicit institutional checks and balances of liberal

democratic government. Decision-makers had to navigate a series of tactical steps and strategic trade-offs that were necessary to develop a viable institutional response to the political and practical challenge of terrorism and extremism. In this case the boundaries were negotiated by different institutional objectives and conceptual visions of the policy to form a new framework for decision-making. Furthermore the study illustrates the latent tension between the need to challenge institutional and ideational boundaries as part of a process of change whilst being responsive to the need to avoid counter-productive conflict. Those trying to influence this process were faced by similar tactical and strategic calibrations around participating in decisions or challenging the principles and assumptions of the process. How policy-makers approach these trade-offs, for better or for worse, are ultimately strategic and tactical calculations.

Endo and exogenous factors

The process of change represented an interplay between endo and exogenous influences in the decision-making process (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; John et al 2013; Lipsky 1997; Rhodes 1997; Sabatier & Weible 2007). Exogenous influences were fundamental to the process of institutional and ideational change at the heart of Prevent. In short, Prevent was a direct and practical response to the external challenge of terrorism. The most obvious input was the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq which shifted the overall risk assessment of the security services and the political agenda. Similarly Labour's decision to prioritise Prevent was a direct response to the Madrid attacks in 2004 whilst the public focus on Prevent after 2005 was directly related to the 7/7 attacks. The significance of these events also encouraged the Muslim community and agencies to engage with Prevent despite their reservations about the agenda. At the same time the compromise approach that narrowed the scope of Prevent occurred in the context of an evolving security climate and the Coalition government's focus on fiscal consolidation following the 2008 financial crisis.

Prevent was also an explicitly political response to the political challenge facing the government (John et al 2013). At the heart of Prevent was an attempt to establish a consensus to challenge the views of radical Islamist activists who promoted a view of the world that divided Islam and Muslims from the Christian west. In addition Labour's decision to prioritise Prevent also responded to feedback about the political alienation of the Muslim community, including potential electoral threats in local constituencies and wider sensitivity to political protests about the Iraq war. At the same time Prevent responded to political pressure to adopt a robust stance toward Islamist extremism. For example, the shift toward a more assertive definition of extremism in 2009 was in the context of increasing support for critics of multi-culturalism in the Conservative party and the BNP. The 2011 compromise was also a product of the politics of Coalition that balanced values based engagement with negative liberalism and civil liberties.

Equally the actual development of Prevent is best understood by looking at the endogenous institutional factors that structured and constrained decision-making (Bulpit 1998; Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Rhodes 1997). In particular, many of the key decisions that shaped Prevent were expressly focused on establishing and maintaining a viable consensus across a broader policy community. The breakdown in the authority of the conventional approach to security was in part driven by street level feedback about the impact of policing on community relations and the legal constraints on policy makers (Lipsky 1997). The importance of street level feedback was further entrenched by the adoption of a tactical approach to community engagement through distributed decision-making that emphasised local discretion. As a result the feedback between members of the new policy community shaped the key decisions throughout Prevent. This included adopting a neutral approach to extremism to facilitate engagement and the subsequent consensus around a narrower model in order to manage the growing conflict over values.

The grey area between endo and exogenous inputs also highlights the challenge of studying decision-making in what are ultimately open systems (Sabatier & Weible 2007). For example,

Prevent itself was in part a reaction to the impact of the government's own response to the terrorist attacks, which included the ramping up of enforcement powers and the invasion of Iraq. Putting aside whether these interventions were justified given the threat from al-Qaeda they are nevertheless examples of the feedback loop in government decision-making. Other examples include the structural legacy of government's failure to address racism and segregation that had created the opportunity for Islamist groups. This line of thinking could even extend to the post-colonial roots of Islamist political ideas, a view that was dismissed as absurd by Blair in 2006. More conventionally key ideas that shaped Prevent, such as the influence of social inclusion on the model of radicalisation, were exogenous to the incumbent security policy community. Likewise, the opportunities for various local events, ideas and interests to influence decision-making through the distributed model became a key factor in the search for control in 2011.

Incommensurability

The conclusion that Prevent represented a new framework based on two competing models contradicts Hall's conventional model of paradigmatic change (Hall 1993). However, the findings presented here, particularly the instability of the policy community, reinforces Hall's proposition that combining competing models leads to dysfunctional policy. Prevent was structured around a sensitive balance between the models that created a series of trade-offs with consequences for the aims of Prevent. In practice the conflict centred on the extent to which government was a neutral arbiter that could enable social integration without resorting to coercion that would undermine its own authority and legitimacy (Almond 1988; Arendt 1970; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). The John model emphasised a distributed process of negotiation and mediation of social interests and identities in order to develop social cohesion. In contrast the Thomas model emphasised the legitimacy of government as a central point of reference for social interests and identity.

The link between these dimensions was embedded into the disputes over the values and status of the Muslim community and the process of integration. Decision-making was structured into a tactical balance between establishing trust and confidence in the agenda whilst also pushing a process of change. Push too far and support for the policy broke down within the policy community, leading to disengagement by the Muslim community. Fail to push far enough and government came under political pressure to demonstrate clearer leadership and action. This structured decision-making into an incremental process that sought a viable balance between the two models. The process of striking a practical balance between abstract models again takes us back to the theorist and pragmatist model of Lindblom (Lindblom 1959). Members of the core policy community had the opportunity to introduce their interests and ideas into decision-making. At the same time their influence was contingent on them recognising the constraints associated with balancing the competing models.

Equally, Prevent did not represent a stable framework for decision-making. For example there were on-going questions about its practical impact on preventing terrorism, an inherently tricky question to measure. Neither is it clear whether Prevent was the right framework or whether the decisions taken within it were effective or rational in Blyth's Bayesian sense (Blyth 2013). Blyth's model tends to frame the issue of success and failure as political questions rooted in institutional interests and abstract ideas. In the case of Prevent decision-making was often expressly focused on managing institutional conflict over values and interests but itself became a focal point for grievances and conflict. Many members of the policy community had the option of withdrawing support which both emphasised the need for institutional consensus whilst undermining the stability of the reciprocal relationships that were central to the distributed model. This raises questions about the success of Prevent on its own terms as a way of establishing support for the government's response to terrorism.

Fundamentally Prevent was a strategy for managing political conflict around the response to terrorism. On one level this is obvious, Prevent was expressly intended to address political violence and was founded on a deep consensus that political violence was corrosive to the

collective and individual rights of citizens and society. The combination of the two competing models was the result of the need to maintain confidence in government's ability to deal with the complexity of home grown terrorism. The focus on the relationship between government and society was also an explicit recognition of the need to manage political conflict over the response. It was also a part of a response to political conflict that was ultimately driven by the ideology of radical Islamists and linked to dynamics of national identity and integration. From this perspective Prevent sought to manage political conflict by creating space for the Muslim community to participate in the response to a complex problem.

Integration and diversity

This study has also shown how Prevent was a microcosm of the debate about integration and cohesion in Britain. In the development of Prevent, integration policy was both a conceptual tool, methodology and objective. Therefore Prevent is also illustrative of the tensions inherent in integration, the accommodation of diversity and the resolution of grievances (Cantle 2012; Modood 2007; Saggar 2010a; Sen 2006). One of the main lessons from this study was that integration, and by extension, confidence in government, cannot simply be asserted. At the same time neither can integration proceed in a meaningful way without a commitment to shared objectives. Expanding the policy community necessitated a process that gave participants confidence that they could shape decisions and their outcomes. However, this trust also required agreement on the objectives of the process and the shared values of participants. As a result Prevent, was persistently framed as a threat to or overly accommodating of minority differences.

The study shows the dual importance of trust in the authority of government and the acceptance of different identities in integration policy. The limitations of the narrow Thomas model of security was rooted in the failure to maintain its legitimacy amongst the groups that experienced its effects the most. Equally, the failures of the John model was rooted in the failure to create a clear consensus about the parameters and objectives for the new policy

community. This created the circular challenge of establishing trust in the process that was contingent on establishing shared principles through a process of dialogue. Tactical decision-making was inevitable in order to balance engagement with change in a way that recognised the fluidity of identity whilst also responding to structural imbalances in the process. In this respect actively drawing Muslim perspectives into decision-making was an essential measure to address a structural deficit in most public institutions.

During that time Prevent was also challenged by opponents of the inherent compromises that were involved in such a process. Although much of this debate focused on the Muslim community itself it was also emblematic of the contemporary political tension between national and liberal political identities. There was a basic consensus around the rule of law and non-violent political change. At the same time there was conflict around the legitimacy of dissent, the experiences of the Muslim community and the role of government. Perhaps most importantly there was a dual, and often contradictory, framework of national and liberal identity that is the subject of a wider debate around Europe that extends far beyond the Muslim community. The two dimensions represented a shifting framework that exacerbated concern about how fairly and consistently Muslim identity was being treated in integration and security policy. At the same time Prevent was also exposed to criticisms from those who exclusively viewed integration through liberal or national lenses.

Prevent also illustrates the dual dimensions of integration. The Hobbesian Thomas model emphasised the role of government in protecting individual rights and as a neutral reference point for integration. At the same time the Lockeian model John exerted a dual institutional pressure to conform to a liberal social identity and an expressed British identity as a condition of participation in decision-making (Hall 1993; Powell & DiMaggio 1983). The combination of Hobbes and Locke meant that legal frameworks such as the Human Rights Act and non-discrimination laws became important reference points for testing the private views of minority groups and individuals. Furthermore, the pressure to affirm a British identity often put these principles to one side, or positioned them as inherently British. At the same time Muslims and

the Muslim community was framed through one identity that masked the personal nuances of heritage, education, employment, age and values.

This type of contradictory framework creates obvious problems for the relationship between government and minority groups such as the Muslim community. In some respects Prevent recognised the legacy of institutional racism that can be traced from the MacPherson report to the public sector duty in the Equality Act 2010 (MacPherson 1999).[39] It emphasised the need to establish confidence in the consistency of government counter terrorism policy amongst the Muslim community. Equally, political scrutiny of Islamism challenged the neutral tactical approach to community engagement but there was limited substantive interrogation of the inconsistencies and contradictions of majority attitudes against the nascent framework of British values. This tension was ultimately resolved by making a distinction between public and private views and the delegation of community engagement to local levels, away from the centralised Prevent agenda. This allowed more space for a means based engagement with the Muslim community based on a outward commitment to the shared set of British values but without resolving mistrust about the motivations, values and beliefs of different groups.

Ultimately, the separation of integration and security policy was a tactical retreat from the complexities of integration policy. Both the Labour and Conservative governments pushed for engagement based on a positive outward commitment adherence to liberal values and British identity, as captured in Cameron's idea of muscular British liberalism. This was intended to move away from a 'negative' liberal model of multi-cultural integration that allowed space for different social identities and private attitudes, even where these may not be liberal in themselves (Cantle 2012; Modood 2007). However, the practicalities of community engagement meant that the push toward an assertive liberal approach in Prevent from 2009 onwards paradoxically may have resulted in a retreat back to a negative liberal model of

[39] The Equality Act places an expectation on public authorities to have due regard to the aims of the act by removing or minimising disadvantages suffered by people due to their protected characteristics; taking steps to meet the needs of people from protected groups where these are different from the needs of other people and encouraging people from protected groups to participate in public life or in other activities where their participation is disproportionately low.

community engagement. The assertive values based approach was only made possible by separating Prevent from wider questions of integration policy, protecting local discretion over community engagement outside of Prevent. Ultimately the growing conflict around Prevent and the changed financial climate resulted in a retreat from more active engagement with the issue of shared social and political identity.

This further illustrates the importance of institutional capacity and leadership when addressing the dual challenge of process and principles inherent to integration (Saggar 2010a; Cantle 2012). The tactical trade-offs associated with maintaining a viable consensus whilst demonstrating meaningful change required clear leadership that could give different groups confidence in the objectives and fairness of the process. Prevent was simultaneously motivated and undermined by the breakdown in trust between the Labour government and most of the Muslim community, and beyond, over the invasion of Iraq. Religious and racial identity politics, including the growing political assertiveness of nativist identity groups, also narrowed the focus onto the social and political integration of Muslims. Prevent did make some contribution to cohesive political and social values through collective action at local levels. Nevertheless ideas of national identity and liberalism were too often seen as instruments that were used to challenge Muslim identity rather than a means of empowerment and integration.

New Labour and the Conservatives

Prevent also seems to have occupied the odd status of being a highly political agenda that didn't become an electoral issue. Some of this was a question of timing. Both the 2001 election and, in particular, the 2005 elections happened before the attacks in those years. In the 2010 election the Conservatives emphasised a critique of Labour's economic management and whilst presenting a socially liberal form of conservatism. Ultimately, Prevent's complexity and sensitivity excluded it from electoral platforms and it was never specifically addressed in the Labour or Conservative manifestos covered by this study. This is in part indicative of the benefits of a paradigmatic consensus that took complex decisions away from direct electoral

scrutiny. At the same time Prevent was highly sensitive to political scrutiny from outside the core policy community. The dynamic can be traced from the initial concern about the electoral mobilisation of the Muslim community following the invasion of Iraq. The political positioning of Prevent can also be traced through the more assertive stance in the context of growing nativist political dynamics from 2005 onwards.

In practice the concept of Prevent as a pre-criminal model of intervention was a point of consensus between the main parties but with different emphases. The Conservatives and New Labour both emphasised strong government leadership. For New Labour Prevent was a 'third way' strategy that mitigated the political impact of strong enforcement powers and the invasion of Iraq. The approach recognised the constraints on government but sought to exert influence on civil society and local authorities through a distributed model of networked governance. The Conservative approach was fundamentally wedded to the politics of compromise inherent to the Coalition. This balanced a more assertive approach to engagement whilst leaving more space for autonomous civil society and local decision-making, that was also linked to the wider strategy for implementing spending cuts. Crucially Prevent embedded the ideas of inadvertent social causes of terrorism and extremism through the model of radicalisation that contrasted with the traditional Conservative focus on individual responsibility. Even the shift to a targeted approach was framed by the safeguarding model behind Channel.

The Conservative's focus on upfront shared values contrasted with Labour's initial adoption of a more tactical approach to engagement. In many respect New Labour's own modernist reformist identity facilitated the original development of Prevent whilst also undermining trust in the way that it dealt with questions of extremism and social identity. New Labour's framing of policy encouraged the evidence led debate about the causes of terrorism. In addition the neutral framing of extremism helped to establish a distributed policy community that extended the influence of central government, including with local civil-society organisations. At the same time this also led to conflict over the consistency of national and local decision-making and the coherence of the policy community that ultimately undermined Labour's ability to

move the extremism agenda forward in 2009. This produced conflict with the Muslim community around liberal values and attitudes from one dimension and the growing electoral pressure to reassert a national identity in definitions of extremism from the right. As a result New Labour struggled to navigate the tactical nuances that were central to the networked governance approach.

The difficulty faced by both governments demonstrates the importance of leadership when dealing with complex questions of social integration. It highlights the difficulty of maintaining confidence in the neutrality and consistency of government across diverse social groups whilst also asserting shared social values and identity, particularly where there is growing competition between minority and nativist political identities. Ultimately Labour struggled to implement a more sophisticated model whilst the Conservatives focused on clarity and consistency at the cost of the agenda's scope and reach. In reality, the challenge that faced Labour was the same problem that had motivated Prevent in the first place, i.e. the breakdown in trust with the Muslim community over the invasion of Iraq and anti-terrorism law. Iraq was such a divisive issue that Labour, and particularly Tony Blair, struggled to establish the necessary trust that Prevent was a genuine attempt to develop a collective response to terrorism. It is possibly arguable that a different international response post 9/11 may have made Prevent unnecessary but that is a counter-factual question and out of the scope of this study.

Future research

This study has examined the original development of the Prevent strategy. There would now be merit in examining how the policy has evolved in the years since 2011 (Thomas 2017). This research would use the same analytical framework to compare how the balance between the distributed consensual model and centralised government leadership and the associated trade-offs have evolved in Prevent. The research would examine how the balance has responded to the evolving threat, including the rise of ISIS and the growth of the internet for recruitment and the dissemination of propaganda. In particular it would be important to assess the implications

of the introduction of a statutory Prevent duty on public authorities in 2015, how this has reconfigured the policy community and the associated constraints and influence on decision-making. There have also been on-going debates about the appropriate breadth of the policy, including approaches to non-violent extremism in education, as was illustrated by the 'Trojan Horse' case in Birmingham schools.[40]

Building on this, many of the issues highlighted in the study are also contemporary issues of importance beyond the UK. It would be of interest to develop the analytical models of the state, Thomas and John, used in this study as part of a comparative assessment of preventative counter terrorism policy across different countries. This would include assessing how other western European countries have approached preventing terrorism, plus countries such as Australia, the US or Canada with similar liberal political traditions to the UK. At the same time it would also be of interest to examine how this framework would apply in non-western states with different traditions and relationships between government and civil-society. It would be important for this research to assess a case of dealing with violent political movements associated with a large minority, or even a majority group. The research would compare different approaches to the relationship between security and integration policy and how the structure of the relationship between government and civil-society shaped decision-making.

A third area for further research would focus on the model of the policy process used in this study to improve the theoretical relationship between ideas and institutions in policy change. Specifically this research would focus more explicitly on the act of persuasion, including how ideas are used to align institutional interests and values, or vice versa, to create authority for decisions, as this represents a gap potential weakness in this study. This study would aim to contribute further to the debate between Hall, Schmidt and Blyth to explore the relationship

[40] The Trojan Horse case was based on an apparent Islamist plot to take over the governance of a series of Birmingham schools, including both faith and non-denominational schools. Inspections of the schools and academies by Ofstead and the Education Funding Authority and a subsequent review by Peter Clark, a former counter terrorism police officer, on behalf of the government highlighted concern about individuals with positions of influence in the schools promoting Islamist and Salafist teaching, to the detriment of the broader educational curricula.

between ideas and institutions in a negotiated process (Hall 1993; Blyth 2013; Schmidt 2010). Of particular interest here would be the balance that is struck between aligning with dominant institutional and ideational framings to gain support whilst also driving change in line with paradigmatic ideas and associated values or interests. This would include the tactical and strategic trade-offs that face members of policy communities, including the role of utilitarian versus values based approaches, and what constitutes a successful advocacy strategy.

The final opportunity for further research would be an examination of how policy making in relation security and integration is responding to populist political trends (Stoker 2018). The process examined in this study was largely framed by liberal ideas of networked governance that largely integrated autonomous decision-making around utilitarian ideas, often whilst minimising the explicit values question of non-violent extremism. However, populist trends across Europe and the US, both from the nationalist right and the socialist left, are challenging this model of government. Populist politics tends to focus on exercising the authority of the state on behalf of an indivisible view of the interests and values of society and claim to assert popular control of increasingly globalised economies and societies from unaccountable elites. This is in direct contrast with a more liberal models of governance that have emphasised the benefits of protecting the space between government, civil-society and economic interests over direct popular accountability. An updated version of this study, would examine how the relationship between government and civil society is evolving in this changing political climate.

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Annexe A: Interviews

Interview sample

This section provides further details on the individuals interviewed for the study. 16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who were identified through literature or through recommendations during the course of the research. Interviews targeted a set of advisors primarily from Muslim backgrounds who worked in or with the civil service on Prevent, plus permanent civil servants involved in the original development of Prevent. Perspectives were also sought from organisations that were associated with decision-making, including at street level.

The main weakness was the gender balance of the sample. This was in part a reflection of the male imbalance of advisors involved in Prevent, something that has been commented on in analyses and commentary at the time. There were women who were involved and influenced the development of Prevent who were not directly involved in this study but whose views I have attempted to record and represent in this study. The other weakness was related to the breadth of interviews, including those on the outside who were critical of the policy itself and the breadth of street level views. In these cases primary and secondary literature was used to support the study's findings.

Although the study was not affected notably by non-participation there are some important observations to share. Some individuals declined to participate, both actively and through non-response. The most notable of these were individuals associated with the Muslim Council of Britain at the time. Other notable gaps included individuals involved in Policy Exchange and Quilliam. Some individuals deferred direct engagement by referring to reports that reflected their views of Prevent.

The main challenge was generating trust with respondents. Access was facilitated by personal contacts and my professional credentials. However, there was a noticeable wariness of

respondents at the outset of interviews. This was addressed through strong reassurance about anonymity and clarification about the research agenda and my personal credibility. Given the small sample pool and the sensitivity of participants extreme care has been taken to protect the identity of individuals who participated.

1. Advisor 1: Male. Independent advisor to government affiliated with significant Islamic religious institution who worked with the Home Office and DCLG and other relevant bodies throughout the period. Interview held on 20 June 2014

2. Advisor 2: Male. Academic and independent advisor to government who worked with the Home Office and DCLG throughout the period. 5 August 2014

3. Advisor 3: Male. Independent advisor to government affiliated with Islamic organisations who worked with the Home Office and DCLG throughout the period. 14 October 2014

4. Advisor 4: Male. Former ministerial advisor from 2009 until 2012 on faith communities. 31 January 2015

5. Advisor 5: Female. Civil servant who advised the Home Office and DLCG on the development of the initial prevent strategy. 22 October 2014

6. Advisor 6: Independent advisor to government who advised the Home Office and DLCG on community cohesion and Prevent. 18 December 2014

7. Advisor 7: Male. Former civil servant who worked with the Home Office during early development of Prevent and initial Muslim community engagement up to 2006. 22 September 2014.

8. Civil servant 1: Male. Former senior civil servant who joined DCLG team just prior to set up to develop the first full Prevent strategy. 15 December 2015

9. Civil servant 2: Male. Former senior civil servant who transferred from Home Office

to DCLG and worked on initial development of Prevent until 2007. 9 December 2014

10. Regional government officer: Male. Civil servant involved in coordinating regional Prevent work from 2007 to 2011 plus previous experience of set up of a safer neighbourhood partnership in urban local authority between 2005 and 2006. 1 October 2014

11. Local government officer: Male. Prevent and community safety lead for inner London borough 2008 onwards. 5 November 2014

12. Local government chief executive: Male. Former chief executive of large city local authority from 2005 to 2011 that had significant relevance to Prevent and wider Contest strategy. 30 September 2014.

13. Police Officer: Male. Former investigating officer with the metropolitan police who had involvement in Muslim community engagement work. 5 August 2014

14. Chief Constable: Male. Former chief police officer with active involvement of initial development of Prevent activity through the Association of Chief Policy Officers from 2002 to 2007. 24 November 2014.

15. Government minister: Male. Former Labour government minister, secretary of state and backbencher between 2001 and 2010. 2 December 2014.

16. Political advisor: Male. Former political advisor to Labour government minister between 2008 and 2010. 30 February 2015

Interview topic guide

Interviews were conducted using a semi structured topic guide. Interviews followed a broad structure to examine whether policy changed; in what way; and why. The interview was based around four main grand tour questions:

a. Your role in it – your objectives, actions, any evolution
b. Your observations about the policy – aims, instruments, outcomes
c. How you think it changes over time – events, phases, trends
d. Who was influential – how and why

The interviews also tested the study hypotheses through questions that were tailored to the interviewee and their involvement in the process (see Annexe B, main hypothesis). Testing questions sought to clarify certain decisions and interrogate what they may say about whether the period represented a reframing of security policy from a narrow centralised model to a more consensual distributed approach. This included encouraging narrative reflection on:

- How the policy and decision making evolved during the period across the main approaches – violent extremism v non-violent extremism & targeted direct interventions v developmental indirect approaches. (See Annexe B, Hypothesis A).
- The ideas in the process including their origins such as integration, social justice, national political identity, crime reduction, reform v. communitarianism, hearts and minds, clash of civilisations & risk. (See Annexe B, Hypothesis B).
- The process that drove change – whether it was a centralised home office led and managed process or a decentralised process involving a variety of government and civil-society actors (See Annexe B, Hypothesis C.

Testing questions for each interview were developed around the following topic framework that was also used to guide follow up questions when in conversation with interviewees to test their responses.

<table>
<tr><th>Primary Question</th><th>Sub question</th><th>Themes</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Why did the interviewee believe the policy introduced?</td><td>What were the objectives of the policy?</td><td>Stop terrorist attacks
Mitigate the impacts of terrorism
Address the causes of terrorism
Reform security policy</td></tr>
<tr><td>Who was involved?
Who ultimately had the most influence?</td><td>Security policy actors
Social policy actors
Civil society actors
‘Uncivil’ society actors</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">In what way did the interviewee think the policy changed over time?</td><td>How did the policy change?</td><td>Targeted
Developmental
Extremism
Violence</td></tr>
<tr><td>When did the changes occur?</td><td>2001 - 2005: prioritisation
2005 - 2008: development
2008 - 2011: implementation and review</td></tr>
<tr><td>What were the main policy instruments?</td><td>Law
Funding
Targets
Education</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">How did the interviewee to influence the process influenced? What about others in the process?</td><td>What were the interviewees objectives?</td><td>Outcomes
Values
Interests
Compliance</td></tr>
<tr><td>What resources were used?</td><td>Advocacy
Evidence
Agenda setting
Decision making</td></tr>
</table>

Annexe B: Analytical framework

Analysis of data, including interview transcripts and primary documents was guided by the study's hypotheses and analytical frames.

Main hypothesis: Prevent was an example of paradigmatic change

The overall study was guided by the following hypothesis – Prevent represented a change in policy from model Thomas to Model John. This hypothesis acted as the main reference point for the collection and analysis of data and the overall conclusions. The following table sets out the expectations and features of a Prevent policy based on either of the models.

Theory	**Hypothesis**	**Coding examples**
Ideas: Paradigmatic change should result in a new internally coherent ideational framework for policy development and implementation that is incommensurable with a previously incumbent ideational framework (Hall 1993). A new paradigmatic framework should include changes in all of the following	Prevent was founded on the following ideas and beliefs: a. Security is achieved through the principles of consensual sovereignty – the tradition of Locke b. Terrorism is the manifestation of a social and political process of radicalisation that is caused by alienation and segregation c. Policy should prevent the causes of terrorism upstream by addressing the root causes of radicalisation d. Solutions must be non-coercive and developmental and should avoid	"Radicalisation is a long term process of polarisation and alienation caused by the social and political structure of society" "It is achieved 'upstream' by addressing the root causes of terrorism that cause alienation and tacit support" "Long term models of social and political integration are essential for addressing these root causes" "Radicalisation is caused by foreign policy/ terrorism policy/ majority racism and prejudice" "Radicalisation is caused by Islamic fundamentalism/ extremism/ self segregation"

elements (Daigneault 2013, Stone 2013): • Principles and values • Analysis of causes and phenomena • Aims and objectives • Hypotheses about solutions	exacerbating the causes of radicalisation These ideas replaced the incumbent model of policy: e. Security is achieved by government as the sovereign protector of the rights of its citizens – the Hobbes tradition f. Terrorism is caused by the tactics and strategy of extreme groups g. Terrorism is prevented by disrupting groups and individuals who are active participants in terrorism h. Solutions must focus on identifying, tracking and controlling any individuals or groups suspected of being involved in terrorism	"This was a radical rethink to our previous approaches to security and integration policy" "Security is the responsibility of almost all public agencies and civil organisations that work with society and Muslim communities in particular"
Process: A paradigmatic change should involve a process that has the following features: • Increased volume of actors and inputs in the policy process • Increased authority of actors previously on the	Decision-making should be plural and prioritise the development of consensus: a. The authority of security services to determine policy is undermined by an increase in domestic recruitment. b. A larger volume of inputs will be incorporated into the process from the following communities: • political and media sources	"The events of the time meant it was essential to take a new look at how we did security policy" "There were a lot of new groups/ a free for all of groups trying to influence policy" "Many of the ideas of the time came from non-security communities" "We had not previously tried to influence policy as our ideas were not listened to"

margins of a policy subsystem, • Lessened authority of the arguments of dominant actors (Hall 1993, Rhodes 1997)	• social policy community • community organisations • policy reform advocates • northern Ireland	"This was an opportunity to influence security policy that we had not seen before" "There were lots of ideas around, many of them untested but many of them were potentially valid and useful"
Outcomes: A paradigmatic change is associated with an increased volume of policy change that translates into practical and substantive change, including: • New or reformed institutions • Re-allocation of resources, • Statutory instruments • Front line implementation	A high volume of change would be necessary in order to drive reform of across a new policy community: • A new policy community, and associated advocacy coalitions, that incorporates the CLG, Local authorities and community groups alongside security and policing. • New investment in solutions based on pre criminal preventative models of security. • New or reformed statutory instruments designed to address the root causes of radicalisation, including non-discrimination and terrorism legislation. • New practices for policing, foreign policy, integration and community engagement, education and social services.	"We now work in much closer and constructive partnership with the police/ Muslim community/ local authorities/ education institutions" "The local prevent boards were an important feature in developing a new coherent community to develop and implement policy" "There were shared allies for our approach to the causes and solutions of radicalisation in the police/ local authorities/ community/ education" "We now actively consider the potential negative impacts that our actions and policies may have on radicalisation throughout our work" "There is a broad consensus that a principled framework for defining non-violent extremism is an important basis for informing our work" "We changed our approach to security operations in order to take into account their

		negative impacts on communities and alienation" "We have a working consensus on the definition of radicalisation around against which we are able to evaluate the effectiveness of our work"
Incremental change		
Ideas An incremental or second order change would update some but not all of the ideational elements of the dominant security paradigm: a. Security is achieved by the state as the sovereign protector of the democratic and human rights of its citizens – the Hobbes tradition b. Terrorism is caused by the tactics and strategy of extremist groups c. Terrorism is prevented by disrupting groups and	An incremental process would likely result in the following changes to model Thomas: • Security is achieved by government as the sovereign protector of the rights of its citizens – Hobbesian tradition (No change) • Terrorism is caused by the tactics and strategy of extremist groups (no change) • Terrorism is prevented by disrupting active terrorists and violent extremist groups – plus change to non violent ideological relatives and tacit supporters • Solutions must focus on tracking and controlling suspected terrorists and extremists - but will only be effective if supported by a wider community	"Radicalisation is the rational and strategic process of groups and individuals adopting violent tactics to achieve political aims" "Preventing terrorism is achieved 'downstream' by catching criminals, isolating supporters and turning sympathisers" "Community policy is important for managing relations and producing intelligence to identify these groups and individuals" "There were community concerns that could be addressed as a trade off for cooperation in the policy" "We had to bring Muslim communities on board to make it the new policy work and to avoid controversies"

individuals who are active participants in terrorism d. Solutions must focus on identify, tracking and control any individuals suspected of being involved in terrorism		"Ultimately non violent extremism that contributed to terrorist recruitment should also be a target for security policy" "Definitions of extremism should be used tactically based on the needs to disrupt terrorism and extremists" "Achieving security is primarily the responsibility of police and security services"
Process: An incremental change is likely to be dominated by a relatively closed group of policy makers who negotiate the interpretation of external trends and signals through clearly defined transactional relationships of power and authority.	In incremental change will likely involve a process where security policy makers sought updated their own policy and practice. Ideas would be drawn from the experiences of northern Ireland, with additional inputs sought from the CLG and community groups to establish viable models of implementation.	"Home grown recruitment in the Muslim community was new issue to deal with" "The experience of northern Ireland showed us that we would only be effective if we took into account wider community issues" "The heightened security threat meant that we needed to try everything to make our work more effective" "The political profile of security and foreign policy meant that we needed to be seen to be doing something new" "We had to bring other policy communities on board in order to make it work as there would be aspects security and policing could not achieve"

		"This was a home office led agenda but they were looking for ideas and suggestions to inform their thinking" "We were already doing a lot of ground level community cohesion work with Asian communities after the summer riots of 2001" "Any definition of extremism needed to be based on the principles and practice of existing laws to maintain support through implementation"
Outcomes: There is an updating of some of the elements of the policy: • New or reformed institutions • allocation of resources • statutory instruments and • front line implementation of solutions	An incremental change would likely produce • Allocation of resources to a stand-alone policy to improve community relations. • Developing targeted solutions based on early interventions, such as youth justice support. However other elements of the policy are likely to see little change on the ground: • Security policy community continues to be distinct, with limited cooperation or exchange	"In practice Prevention was a limited consideration in our work" "By doing work that would benefit the community we also helped to prevent radicalisation" "By addressing community concerns about crime also helped to prevent radicalisation" "Prevent helped us to improve soft intelligence relationships with community groups" "We used Prevent to monitor potential terrorist suspects and extremist groups more effectively" "We use definitions of extremism tactically to avoid controversy or isolate problematic groups"

	• Non security agencies continue to see prevention as secondary element of their work • Statutory instruments play a limited or second order political role in the policy	"The local prevent boards were useful for a time but were not significant players in local or national policy" "There has not really been a substantive change in our relationship with other agencies locally on this issue" "we introduced the 2006 religious discrimination legislation to keep the Muslim community on side" "The glorification of terrorism offence was partly a political move to address concern about radicals" "The glorification of terrorism offence was important tool for framing the definition of extremism but ultimately has limited practical use in law"

Process tests

In order to examine whether Prevent was an example of paradigmatic change the study focused on the process of decision-making. To do this the study used a series of process tests to examine three indicators of paradigmatic change: the volume of decisions; the origins of ideas and evidence of institutional change.

Hypothesis A: Was there an increased volume of decision-making?

This test represented a contextual indicator of paradigmatic change founded on the idea that intense decision-making is indicative of new inputs into decision-making, including endogenous and exogenous inputs. In addition it is also considered indicative that new ideas and institutional relationships will re-shaping decision-making.

The study tested this hypothesis by tracing how the relative prioritisation and implementation of different policy solutions during the period. A paradigmatic change would be associated with an increased volume of first and second order changes in policy, this includes decision to

- New or reformed institutions
- Allocation of resources,
- Introduction of new legislation
- Changes to front line implementation

In order to trace the volume of first and second order decision-making the study used a schema of different policy options against which different decisions could be traced. These models were based on existing literature on prevent and were used to help position first and second order decisions.



Axis:

- Enforcement – “the priority was identifying and controlling individuals who are potentially involved in terrorism”
- Community partnership – “the priority was improving relationships in order to develop effective policy and solutions”
- Integration – “the priority was improving the condition and integration of Muslim community”
- Isolating non-violent extremists – “the priority was defining and isolating extremist groups”

Quadrants (anti clockwise from top left):

- Means based engagement – “the priority was improving intelligence from the whole Muslim community regardless of religious or political views”
- Multiculturalism – “the priority was developing diverse community identities to improve resilience to extremism”

- Cohesion – “the priority was developing a stronger single cultural and political identity to improve resilience to extremism”
- Principles based engagement – “the priority was improving links with culturally and politically moderate Muslim groups”

Test B: Were new ideas were introduced into the policy making process? (ideas)

The second test focused on the ideas that framed decisions, including their origins and foundations. For paradigmatic change the following conditions will need to be met:

- Volume – larger number and more diverse range of ideas
- History – that have limited prior application in security policy

For paradigmatic change the study should find data in interviews and documents that indicates a greater presence of the following non-security ideas that have limited previous practical application in security policy:

- Islam, integration and segregation
- Social justice, inclusion and alienation
- National identity and civic education
- Preventative crime reduction
- Public policy reform

For incremental change the study should find data in interviews and documents that indicates continuing presence of the following ideas that have a history of practical application in security policy:

- Hearts and minds
- Consociationalism and communitarianism
- Clash of civilisations
- Risk

Test C: Did the institutional structure of decision-making change? (institutions)

The third test examined the institutional structure of decision-making. A paradigmatic change should find evidence of changes in intuitional support for decisions, including alignment of values and interests and the advocacy strategies employed by participants. Paradigmatic change would include:

- Increased volume and range of actors and inputs in the policy process
- Increased authority of actors previously on the margins of a policy subsystem
- Lessened authority of the arguments of dominant actors

Test D: Comparison against the paradigmatic models

The table below sets out alternative hypotheses for the tests and further detail of what would indicate paradigmatic or incremental change. It illustrates the different expectations for the framing of decisions, the patterns of institutional support and the ideational framing of arguments and decisions in a case of incremental or paradigmatic change. In this framework:

- Model Thomas was positioned as the incumbent model therefore process indicators of incremental change or characteristics associated with model Thomas were treated as indicative of model Thomas.
- Model John was positioned as the challenging model therefore process indicators of paradigmatic change or characteristics associated with model John were treated as indicative of model John.

Process	**Narrative**	**Inputs** – events and trends that influenced decision making.	**Institutions** – participants in the process and the alignment of their interests and priorities.	**Ideas** – the concepts and arguments and evidence that shaped decision-making.
Model John Paradigmatic change	• It was a negotiated plural process that set out to address the root causes of violence without a clear framework for prioritising causes and associated solutions. • The policy developed through policy entrepreneurs with competing policy models for preventing terrorism,	The policy was produced through a competitive process between home office and CLG that responded to: • The increased home grown terrorist threat, including Madrid • Political concerns about community integration and identity • A desire to control resources and authority	The majority of actors: • Saw the process as an opportunity to influence the trajectory of security and social policy • Believe that they had viable policy solutions that could justifiably be repurposed • Acknowledge that they have voluntarily taken on board certain elements from the policy Some actors exerted influence by: • Drawing on feedback from across the policy community to produce demonstrable solutions • Developing a definition of extremism that drew	• Existing counter terrorism policy was causing more harm than good. Ultimately prevention means addressing the causes of alienation that are rooted in community experiences and needs, this was demonstrated by: ○ Foreign and home office briefing 2003 ○ Cantle report and cohesion programme ○ Muslim community consultation in 2005

	most notably in the CLG. • There was flexibility to accommodate different approaches to policy, including reinterpretation of objectives and solutions on the front line, which was fed into the overall policy.	associated with an expanded security agenda	on/ appropriated the principles of opponents • Relying on political support to influence the agenda Other actors exerted influence by: • Resisting incorporating feedback from across the policy community to produce new solutions • Relying on discretionary powers to influence the interpretation and impact of the agenda	○ Demos 2006 report ○ Academic and commissioned research • Although foreign policy is a cause of political alienation and recruitment, the solutions to radicalisation are to be found within the Muslim community itself: ○ Tony Blair ○ Cantle report ○ Policy exchange reports • The issue of radicalisation is evidence that multiculturalism has failed and it is essential that extremism be defined: ○ Media coverage ○ Political representation ○ Policy exchange reports

				• It is possible to define extremism as separate from Muslim communities by drawing on/ appropriating the principles of democracy, non-violence and non-discrimination. Key evidence: o Tony Blair o Policy exchange reports o Funding of Quilliam foundation • The association of the security agenda with models of community cohesion and counter extremism are counter productive to integration, key evidence: o Review of prevent spending in 2009/10

				○ Review of prevent by CLG select committee ○ Alienation of local and national Muslim community groups from policy process
Model Thomas Incremental change	• It was a centralised process managed by the home office that set out with the objective of improving relations with Muslim community organisations in order to manage negative impacts of	The policy was primarily defined and led by core policy makers in the home office responding to • The increased home grown terrorist threat, including Madrid • Rulings by the law lords curtailing detention	The majority of actors: • Felt a duty to or were required to participate in the policy • Sought to prevent damage or promote their interests and priorities • Primarily contributed existing policy solutions with limited adaptation • Have largely disengaged from the policy apart from where directed to do so by the Home Office.	• Existing policy was insufficient for addressing home-grown terrorism, this was demonstrated by a. Foreign & home office briefing 2003 b. Protests and discontent amongst communities c. Examples of home grown radicalisation • "Community support is essential for improving

	policing and improve intelligence. • The policy sought to combat extremism as the principle root cause of terrorism from the outset but had to move through a staged process of building support around a viable delineation. • Policy makers experimented with available policy solutions, including integration and community policing, and	without charge, 2004	Some actors exerted influence by: • Demonstrating direct impacts on the prevalence of home grown terrorism and extremism • Articulated a definition of extremism grounded in law • Relied on capacity and resources to influence the overall approach of the agenda Other actors exerted influence by: • Resisting the programme due to suspicions of its objectives and definition of extremism • Relying on discretionary powers to limit the reach and impact of the agenda	intelligence and managing the impact of counter terrorism policing. Addressing the communities social concerns will be an important aspect of this. This was demonstrated by: a. Northern Ireland b. 2001 riots c. Demos 2006 report d. 2005 consultation exercise • Extremism must primarily be addressed in the Muslim community as it is this group that are the target of recruiters" • It is possible to define extremism as separate from Muslim communities by drawing on/ appropriating the principles of democracy,

	repurposed them to address prevention and extremism.			non-violence and non-discrimination. Key evidence: ◦ Tony Blair ◦ Funding of Quilliam to develop and promote definition of Islamism • Integration is important but its benefits are not direct and its association with security policy and politics can be counter productive. Key evidence: ◦ Review of prevent spending in 2009/10 ◦ Review of prevent by CLG select committee ◦ Conflict with key Muslim organisations