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Bias and Negligence with Freedom of Information

Argenziano, Rossella and Weeds, Helen (2019) 'Bias and Negligence with Freedom of Information.' The Economic Journal, 129 (624). 2979 - 2998. ISSN 0013-0133

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We analyse decision-making in the presence of Freedom of Information (FOI) rules. A decision-maker chooses whether to acquire costly information to inform his decision regarding a policy action. If information is not disclosed voluntarily a monitor may open a costly investigation, using FOI to access the information. A finding of biased decision-making or negligence in information acquisition generates a reward to the monitor and a penalty to the decision-maker. We find that strengthening FOI to reduce the cost of investigation may increase negligence without necessarily reducing bias. Moreover increasing the reward for discovering negligence can paradoxically increase negligence in equilibrium.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 05 Dec 2018 12:41
Last Modified: 05 Feb 2020 11:15

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