

Is parliamentary attention to the EU strongest when it is needed the most? National parliaments and the selective debate of EU policies

Thomas Winzen (University of Mannheim)

Rik de Ruiter (Leiden University)

Jofre Rocabert (ETH Zurich)

Content


Appendix 1: Additional tables and figures	2
Appendix 2: Bivariate relationships between EU debates and explanatory variables by country	16
Appendix 3: Model equation and trace plots.....	21

Appendix 1: Additional tables and figures

Table A1. Policy areas in the dataset, compared to other datasets with policy areas

	Policy	Duttie et al (forthcoming)	Comp. Agendas: 'Maincapic'	Comp. Agendas: 'Sub-field' added to 'maincapic'
1	Budget and Finance	Monetary Policy	1 (Macroeconomics)	1420, 1501, 1502, 1504, 1505, 1507, 1542
2	Justice and home affairs	Justice & Interior	2 Civil Rights/liberties 9 Immigration 12 Law and crime	
3	Health & consumer protection	Health & Consumer	3 Health	1525
4	Agriculture	Agriculture	4 Agriculture and Fisheries	
5	Social policy & Education & culture	Social Policy	5 Labour/Employment 13 Social policy 6 Education 23 Culture and media	
6	Environment and energy	Environment & Energy	7 Environment 8 Energy	2103, 2104
7	Transport	Transport	10 Transport	
8	Economic regulation	Market	17 Space, Science, Technology and Communication	1500, 1521, 1524, 1526, 1530, 1540, 1541, 1595, 1599, 1522, 2003, 2007
9	External relations & defence	External Relations	18 External trade 19 International Affairs and foreign Aid 16 Defence	
10	Institutions	Institutions	20 EU Governance and government operations	Excluded 2003, 2007

Figure A1. Council and European Council attention to different policy areas



Note: To be able to compare, we standardized both measures to range from their minimum to maximum values. European Council attention is measured as explained in the main text. Häge (2016) measure Council working party attention as .5 days of sessions per time period (in our case per semester).

Table A2. Summary statistics for all variables, by country and policy type

		Regulatory policies					Core state policies				
		Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
AT	EU debates	360	1.1	1.6	0.0	9.0	240	1.2	2.0	0.0	12.0
	Government	360	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	240	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
	Election term	360	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0	240	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0
	Seat share	360	26.7	12.3	9.3	43.2	240	26.7	12.3	9.3	43.2
	Directives	360	4.4	3.6	0.0	16.0	240	0.7	1.6	0.0	8.0
	Proposals	360	2.7	3.7	0.0	18.0	240	2.4	5.4	0.0	38.0
	Intra-party dissent	360	2.9	0.8	1.2	4.0	240	2.9	0.8	1.2	4.0
	European Council	360	4.5	5.4	0.0	24.4	240	18.2	13.4	1.5	55.1
	Euroscepticism	360	-15.1	5.5	-29.0	-8.0	240	-15.1	5.6	-29.0	-8.0
	Overall debate	360	107.8	25.8	57.0	151.0	240	107.8	25.9	57.0	151.0
DE	EU debates	480	0.9	1.4	0.0	10.0	320	2.0	3.1	0.0	23.0
	Government	480	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	320	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
	Election term	480	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0	320	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0
	Seat share	480	23.0	13.5	7.8	41.6	320	23.0	13.5	7.8	41.6
	Directives	480	4.4	3.6	0.0	16.0	320	0.7	1.6	0.0	8.0
	Proposals	480	2.7	3.7	0.0	18.0	320	2.4	5.4	0.0	38.0
	Intra-party dissent	480	2.8	0.5	1.7	4.1	320	2.8	0.5	1.7	4.1
	European Council	480	4.5	5.4	0.0	24.4	320	18.2	13.4	1.5	55.1
	Euroscepticism	480	-46.5	7.3	-57.0	-30.7	320	-46.5	7.3	-57.0	-30.7
	Overall debate	480	169.4	53.2	27.0	258.0	320	169.4	53.2	27.0	258.0
ES	EU debates	240	0.1	0.4	0.0	4.0	160	0.5	0.9	0.0	5.0
	Government	240	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	160	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
	Election term	240	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.0	160	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.0
	Seat share	240	44.9	4.9	31.4	53.1	160	44.9	4.9	31.4	53.1
	Directives	240	4.4	3.6	0.0	16.0	160	0.7	1.6	0.0	8.0
	Proposals	240	2.7	3.7	0.0	18.0	160	2.4	5.4	0.0	38.0
	Intra-party dissent	240	1.3	0.4	0.8	1.9	160	1.3	0.4	0.8	1.9
	European Council	240	4.5	5.4	0.0	24.4	160	18.2	13.4	1.5	55.1
	Euroscepticism	240	-57.9	7.9	-65.0	-39.5	160	-57.9	8.0	-65.0	-39.5
	Overall debate	240	194.0	57.1	82.0	287.0	160	194.0	57.2	82.0	287.0
NL	EU debates	600	0.1	0.3	0.0	2.0	400	0.3	0.6	0.0	5.0
	Government	600	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	400	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
	Election term	600	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.0	400	0.2	0.4	0.0	1.0
	Seat share	600	15.2	9.7	2.0	29.3	400	15.2	9.7	2.0	29.3
	Directives	600	4.4	3.6	0.0	16.0	400	0.7	1.6	0.0	8.0
	Proposals	600	2.7	3.7	0.0	18.0	400	2.4	5.4	0.0	38.0
	Intra-party dissent	600	3.0	1.2	1.1	5.0	400	3.0	1.2	1.1	5.0
	European Council	600	4.5	5.4	0.0	24.4	400	18.2	13.4	1.5	55.1
	Euroscepticism	600	-64.8	5.2	-72.0	-56.7	400	-64.8	5.2	-72.0	-56.7
	Overall debate	240	198.2	52.9	125.0	299.5	160	198.2	52.9	125.0	299.5
UK	EU debates	360	2.5	2.8	0.0	18.0	240	3.8	4.4	0.0	23.0
	Government	360	0.4	0.5	0.0	1.0	240	0.4	0.5	0.0	1.0
	Election term	360	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0	240	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0
	Seat share	360	31.8	19.3	7.9	62.5	240	31.8	19.3	7.9	62.5
	Directives	360	4.4	3.6	0.0	16.0	240	0.7	1.6	0.0	8.0
	Proposals	360	2.7	3.7	0.0	18.0	240	2.4	5.4	0.0	38.0
	Intra-party dissent	360	3.9	1.8	1.5	7.2	240	3.9	1.8	1.5	7.2
	European Council	360	4.5	5.4	0.0	24.4	240	18.2	13.4	1.5	55.1
	Euroscepticism	360	-4.1	6.9	-14.0	5.9	240	-4.1	6.9	-14.0	5.9
	Overall debate	360	458.5	99.7	304.0	618.7	240	458.5	99.8	304.0	618.7


Figure A2. EU debates of centrist and challenger parties

Figure A2 provides further information on the EU debates of different parties, as indicated in the paper's section "Mapping parliamentary debates". The figure shows that British and German parties initiate more EU debates than their counterparts. This is also true of Austria. However, one should note important government effects. The Austrian SPÖ only starts initiating many EU debates upon joining the government. The British Liberal Democrats, the German Greens and FDP follow the same pattern. A closer look (not shown here) reveals that they co-sponsor government initiatives with their larger partners. Thus, they initiate more debates than in their opposition periods.

Figure A2 also provides additional information on challenger parties. The Left and PVV display some interest in the EU, albeit certainly not an unusual amount compared to the other parties. This is true too of the FPÖ and BZÖ, with the exception of them paying significant attention to the EU during their respective governmental terms in the early-mid 2000s. Afterwards their attention drops substantially. Close investigation (not shown) makes clear that they co-sponsored initiatives of their centrist government partner, the ÖVP, during this time. This gave them much more plenary time than after their time in government.

Finally, Figures A3 to A5 show that parties debate the entire range of EU policies with large variation over time and across parties.

Figure A3. The policy areas in which parties initiate EU debates




Figure A4. EU debates by party and policy in core state policies




Figure A5. EU debates by party and policy in regulatory policies




Figure A6. The distribution of EU debates by country and policy type




Table A3. Results in regulatory policies

	DE	HPDI		UK	HPDI		AT	HPDI		NL	HPDI		ES	HPDI	
	Mean	lower	upper	Mean	lower	upper	Mean	lower	upper	Mean	lower	upper	Mean	lower	upper
sigma_id	0.43	0.24	0.60	0.34	0.22	0.47	0.39	0.20	0.57	0.57	0.00	1.04	0.59	0.00	1.18
a	-0.58	-1.29	0.15	0.35	-0.54	1.20	-1.45	-2.25	-0.62	-2.30	-3.55	-1.02	-3.13	-5.20	-1.08
b_gov	0.47	0.16	0.75	0.41	0.09	0.74	1.71	1.15	2.30	-1.06	-1.93	-0.19	-0.27	-2.89	2.27
b_seats	0.08	-0.13	0.33	0.26	-0.11	0.56	0.42	0.05	0.82	0.53	-0.03	1.11	0.61	-0.39	1.64
b_elect	-3.04	-4.33	-1.88	-0.07	-0.47	0.35	-0.46	-1.00	0.06	-0.66	-1.60	0.19	-0.13	-1.97	1.70
b_eurcouncil	0.21	0.06	0.36	0.17	0.05	0.28	-0.09	-0.25	0.07	0.10	-0.25	0.43	0.37	-0.16	0.94
b_directives	0.17	-0.03	0.36	0.00	-0.14	0.15	0.02	-0.15	0.22	-0.06	-0.48	0.34	0.21	-0.53	0.87
b_dissent	0.05	-0.17	0.26	0.03	-0.48	0.39	-0.03	-0.34	0.29	-0.10	-0.72	0.54	-0.55	-1.77	0.66
b_proposals	0.28	0.14	0.43	0.14	0.02	0.26	-0.06	-0.22	0.10	0.12	-0.25	0.52	0.09	-0.47	0.61
sigma_party	0.18	0.00	0.59	0.46	0.00	1.31	0.38	0.00	1.11	0.63	0.00	1.36	0.70	0.00	1.81
sigma_policy	0.56	0.22	1.02	0.51	0.20	0.96	0.46	0.13	0.87	1.04	0.27	1.94	0.54	0.00	1.35
sigma_yearh	0.65	0.30	1.04	0.38	0.17	0.63	0.21	0.00	0.47	0.45	0.00	0.98	1.43	0.48	2.45
N	480			360			360			600			240		


Note: For reasons of space, we only show the variance parameters (sigma_) of the random intercepts and not the estimated intercepts themselves.

Table A4. Results in core state policies

	DE	HPDI		UK	HPDI		AT	HPDI		NL	HPDI		ES	HPDI	
	Mean	lower	upper	Mean	lower	upper	Mean	lower	upper	Mean	lower	upper	Mean	lower	upper
sigma_id	0.93	0.77	1.09	0.46	0.35	0.58	0.40	0.17	0.64	0.53	0.06	0.94	0.73	0.21	1.23
a	-0.16	-1.07	0.71	-0.05	-1.69	1.54	-2.08	-3.42	-0.67	-1.05	-2.15	0.00	-1.10	-2.85	0.61
b_gov	0.56	0.19	0.95	1.75	1.27	2.24	2.65	1.79	3.56	-1.31	-1.95	-0.66	-0.23	-1.74	1.28
b_seats	0.20	-0.16	0.70	-0.72	-1.27	-0.17	0.02	-0.51	0.50	0.46	-0.01	0.96	0.45	-0.16	1.11
b_elect	-0.73	-1.36	-0.11	0.34	-0.11	0.79	-1.48	-2.42	-0.58	-0.76	-1.41	-0.09	-0.85	-1.99	0.20
b_eurcouncil	0.22	0.03	0.41	0.23	0.10	0.36	0.14	-0.05	0.32	0.31	-0.01	0.61	0.16	-0.20	0.53
b_directives	-0.13	-0.37	0.11	-0.11	-0.29	0.07	0.04	-0.18	0.26	-0.30	-0.70	0.07	0.15	-0.32	0.61
b_dissent	0.01	-0.22	0.24	0.14	-0.61	0.81	-0.21	-0.64	0.18	-0.27	-0.83	0.27	-0.07	-0.66	0.55
b_proposals	0.26	0.11	0.41	0.05	-0.05	0.16	0.05	-0.11	0.21	0.07	-0.12	0.25	-0.06	-0.42	0.31
sigma_party	0.37	0.00	1.08	1.18	0.30	2.20	0.46	0.00	1.26	0.67	0.05	1.41	0.80	0.00	1.79
sigma_policy	0.55	0.08	1.20	0.89	0.34	1.62	1.00	0.40	1.79	0.69	0.04	1.44	1.02	0.36	1.90
sigma_yearh	0.28	0.00	0.55	0.45	0.21	0.74	0.32	0.00	0.59	0.32	0.00	0.68	0.25	0.00	0.66
N	320			240			240			400			159		


Note: For reasons of space, we only show the variance parameters (sigma_) of the random intercepts and not the estimated intercepts themselves.

Figure A7. Adopted directives and EU debate




Note: These figures are based on 20,000 draws of sets of parameter values from the posterior distribution. The line is the median predicted number of debates. Dark-gray areas: 70-percent HPDI. Light gray: 95-percent HPDI.

Figure A8. Proposals for directives and EU debate




Note: These figures are based on 20,000 draws of sets of parameter values from the posterior distribution. The line is the median predicted number of debates. Dark-gray areas: 70-percent HPDI. Light gray: 95-percent HPDI.

Figure A9. Results from full models for Britain and Germany



Note: This plot shows only parameters of interest. Full results are available from the replication material.


Figure A10. Distinguishing implementation and policy debates



Note: This plot shows only parameters of interest. Full results are available from the replication material.

Appendix 2: Bivariate relationships between EU debates and explanatory variables by country

Figure A11. European Council attention and EU debates across countries and policies



Note: See the section on country cases for the operationalization of capacity and motivation.

Figure A12. Directives and EU debate across countries and policies





Figure A13. Proposals (3-semester lag) and EU debate across countries and policies



Note: See the section on country cases for the operationalization of capacity and motivation.



Figure A14. Popular Euroscepticism and parliamentary EU debate, by country and policy

Figure A15. EU salience in the comparative party manifesto dataset and EU debate



Appendix 3: Model equation and trace plots

This appendix shows the full equation of the model referred to in the paper's section "Statistical analysis" (sub-section "model"). We also show trace plots for the models of British and German data, for key parameters of interest, respectively for regulatory and core state policies. The replication materials allow producing the remaining plots.

Equation

The full equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Debates}_i &\sim \text{Poisson}(\lambda_i), \\
 \text{Log}(\lambda_i) &= \alpha + \alpha_{[i]} + \alpha_{\text{party}[j]} + \alpha_{\text{area}[k]} + \alpha_{\text{year}[l]} + \beta_1 * \text{govt}_i + \beta_2 * \text{seats}_i + \beta_3 * \text{election}_i + \\
 &\quad \beta_4 * \text{dissent}_i + \beta_5 * \text{eurcouncil}_i + \beta_6 * \text{directives}_i + \beta_7 * \text{proposals}_i, \\
 \alpha &\sim \text{Normal}(0, 2), \\
 \alpha_{[i]} &\sim \text{Normal}(0, \sigma_i), \\
 \alpha_{\text{party}[j]} &\sim \text{Normal}(0, \sigma_{\text{party}}), \\
 \alpha_{\text{area}[k]} &\sim \text{Normal}(0, \sigma_{\text{area}}), \\
 \alpha_{\text{year}[l]} &\sim \text{Normal}(0, \sigma_{\text{year}}), \\
 \beta_1 - \beta_6 &\sim \text{Normal}(0, 2), \\
 \sigma_i &\sim \text{Normal}(0.5, 0.5) \ \& \ \sigma_i \geq 0, \\
 \sigma_{\text{party}} &\sim \text{Normal}(0, 1) \ \& \ \sigma_{\text{party}} \geq 0, \\
 \sigma_{\text{area}} &\sim \text{Normal}(0, 1) \ \& \ \sigma_{\text{area}} \geq 0, \\
 \sigma_{\text{year}} &\sim \text{Normal}(0, 1) \ \& \ \sigma_{\text{year}} \geq 0.
 \end{aligned}$$

An explanation of this model can be found in the paper's section "Statistical analysis" (sub-section "model").



*Regulatory policy***Figure A16. Germany, regulatory policies**

Figure A17. Britain, regulatory policies


*Core state policies***Figure A18. Germany, regulatory policies**

Figure A 19. Britain, core state policies