List of tables

List of figures

Please note:

The tables can be found below.

The figures can be found below and also as tiff-files (submitted together with this document).

The notes corresponding to the figures can be found below.

Table 1. Models of new differentiations, 1973-1989

	1	2	3	4
Period:	**1973-1989**	**1973-1989**	**1973-1989**	**1973-1989**
Domain:	**Market**	**Agriculture**	**Regulation**	**Core state powers**
Wealth	-.106 (.042)*	-.153 (.046)*	-.217 (.040)*	*Not applicable*
Euroscepticism	.014 (.009)'	.033 (.013)*	.046 (.017)*	
Ideology	.235 (.079)*	.066 (.181)	-.120 (.075)	
Yearly trend	-.093 (.025)*	-.049 (.034)	-.013 (.021)	
Constant	-3.036 (.585)*	-3.657 (.877)*	-4.250 (.500)*	
Obs	4867	7586	2141	
Pseudo r^2	0.056	0.055	0.075	
Pseudolikelihood	-612.166	-758.311	-138.032	

Note: ' $p <.1$, * $p <.05$. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Core state powers: There are only 23 new laws without any differentiation in this area before 1990.

Table 2. Models of new differentiations, 1993-2011

	1	2	3	4
Period:	**1993-2011**	**1993-2011**	**1993-2011**	**1993-2011**
Domain:	**Market**	**Agriculture**	**Regulation**	**Core state powers**
Wealth	-.019 (.022)	-.033 (.012)*	-.038 (.016)*	.138 (.019)*
Identity	.015 (.015)	.021 (.010)*	-.006 (.016)	.077 (.040)'
Ideology	.070 (.142)	-.063 (.080)	.138 (.074)'	.276 (.132)*
Yearly trend	.013 (.040)	-.063 (.013)*	-.021 (.032)	.015 (.033)
Constant	-5.481 (.701)*	-3.613 (.301)*	-4.849 (.453)*	-4.975 (.810)*
Obs	11843	6755	8696	5265
Pseudo r^2	0.003	0.017	0.010	0.139
Pseudolikelihood	-452.845	-474.318	-477.909	-649.501

Note: ' $p <.1$, * $p <.05$. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 1. Differentiation in EU legislation over time

Figure 2. The effect of wealth on differentiation, 1973-1989

Note: The vertical axis on the left and the trend lines display the probability of a new differentiation, estimated with *Clarify* (Tomz et al. 2003). The estimated effects are based on the results in Table 1. Euroscepticism is held at "0" (no distance from the EU average in a given year); the yearly trend and ideological distance are set to their means.

Figure 3. The effects of wealth, identity, and ideology on differentiation in core state powers


Note: The vertical axis on the left, and the trend lines, display the probability of a new differentiation, estimated with *Clarify* (Tomz et al. 2003). The estimated effects are based on the results of model 4 in Table 2. Wealth and identity, unless plotted, are held at "0" (no distance from the EU average in a given year); the yearly trend and ideological distance, unless plotted, are set to their means.

Figure 4. Classification performance

Full model v. wealth and identity removed

Full model v. wealth removed

Full model v. identity removed

Note: Based on model 4 in Table 2. Horizontal axis: Classification cut-off – if the model estimates a differentiation probability exceeding this cut-off point, a case is classified as a positive outcome. The classifications are then compared to the observed outcome.