

## Appendix


This is the online appendix of the following article: Winzen, Thomas, Christilla Roederer-Rynning, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2014. "Parliamentary Co-Evolution: National Parliamentary Reactions to the Empowerment of the European Parliament." *Journal of European Public Policy*.

**Table A1. Operationalisation of the main variables**

Variable	Operationalisation
Cultural liberalism-conservatism	<p>The Chapel Hill surveys ask experts to rank parties on a 0 (liberal) to 10 (conservative) scale based on the following statement. The scores of several experts for one party are averaged.</p> <p>'Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.'</p>
Economic left-right	<p>As cultural liberalism-conservatism but based on the following Chapel Hill survey statement.</p> <p>'Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.'</p>
Popular Euroscepticism	<p>At least once a year, the Eurobarometer asks respondents to state whether they regard their country's membership in the EU "a good thing", "neither good nor bad" or "a bad thing. We measure popular Euroscepticism as the percentage responding "a bad thing" minus the percentage responding "a good thing". In case there are two surveys in a year, we take the average of both</p>
Party support for the European Parliament	<p>The CH surveys ask experts to assess party leadership positions towards the EP as follows: 1: strongly opposes; 2: opposes; 3: somewhat opposed; 4: neutral; 5: somewhat in favour; 6: favors; 7: strongly favors.</p> <p>'What position did the party leadership take over the course of 2006 on the following policies? First, take the position of the party leadership in 2006 on the powers of the European Parliament (EP).' [Note: question from the 2006 survey; emphasis in the original]</p>
Parliamentary support for the European Parliament	<p>We measure parliamentary support as the average position of parliamentary parties weighted by their seat share.</p>
The strength of national parliamentary oversight institutions in EU affairs:	<p>We use an index based on the most important rules and structures parliaments use to control national governments in EU decision-making: access to EU documents; access to an explanatory memorandum by the government on issues under negotiation at the EU level; the existence of a European Affairs Committee; the involvement of sectoral standing committees in monitoring EU affairs; the availability of a parliamentary scrutiny reserve that delays EU level commitments until domestic scrutiny ends; and ability to issue a binding negotiation mandate to government. This measure ranges between 0 and two. For reasons of space, we cannot describe the composition of this index in greater detail here (more detail is available in Winzen 2012, 2013).</p>
Control variables	<p>Party support for European integration (based on Chapel Hill surveys).</p> <p>A categorical variables distinguishing time periods after different treaties, namely Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon.</p> <p>A measure of domestic committee strength (Martin &amp; Depauw 2011).</p>

Note: The Chapel Hill (CH) expert surveys were conducted in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2010. We interpolate party positions for each year between two adjacent surveys assuming linear trends (as noted, there is very little variation between the years in any case). However, for parties that are not included in two adjacent surveys (say, a party that is included in 1999 and 2006 but not 2002) we do not interpolate positions. For 90 percent of the country-year observations between 1999 and 2010 our data contains 90 percent or more of the parties represented in parliament. Sources: see main article (section on Data).

**Figure A1. Party support for the EP and explanatory variables**



Note: Based on data from the years 1999-2010. Dotted lines are linear and quadratic trends.

**Table A2. Explanations of party support for the European Parliament (cross-sections before 2010)**


<b>Model</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Year of cross-section	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006
Liberal-conservative (gal-tan)	-0.2 (0.05)*		-0.2 (0.04)*	-0.09 (0.03)*	-0.2 (0.04)*
Left-right dimension (economic)		0.07 (0.05)	0.2 (0.04)*	-0.07 (0.03)*	0.1 (0.04)*
Party support for European integration				0.6 (0.06)*	
Country dummy variables					Yes
Constant	5.7 (0.3)*	4.5 (0.3)*	5.2 (0.3)*	2.6 (0.3)*	5.2 (0.6)*
Observations	132	132	132	132	132
r-square	0.1	0.02	0.2	0.7	0.5

<b>Model</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Year of cross-section	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002
Liberal-conservative (gal-tan)	-0.3 (0.05)*		-0.4 (0.04)*	-0.09 (0.02)*	-0.4 (0.06)*
Left-right dimension (economic)		-0.04 (0.08)	0.2 (0.06)*	-0.1 (0.02)*	0.2 (0.07)*
Party support for European integration				0.7 (0.04)*	
Country dummy variables					Yes
Constant	6.0 (0.4)*	4.9 (0.5)*	5.7 (0.5)*	1.9 (0.3)*	6.0 (0.5)*
Observations	85	85	85	85	85
r-square	0.2	0.004	0.3	0.8	0.6


<b>Model</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Year of cross-section	1999	1999	1999	1999	1999
Liberal-conservative (gal-tan)	-0.3 (0.05)*		-0.4 (0.04)*	-0.2 (0.05)*	-0.4 (0.04)*
Left-right dimension (economic)		-0.06 (0.07)	0.2 (0.05)*	-0.04 (0.04)	0.2 (0.06)*
Party support for European integration				0.5 (0.08)*	
Country dummy variables					Yes
Constant	6.2 (0.4)*	5.2 (0.5)*	5.9 (0.4)*	3.2 (0.6)*	6.7 (0.4)*
Observations	101	101	101	101	101
r-square	0.2	0.009	0.3	0.7	0.6

Note: ° p<.1, \* p<.05. The 2010 cross-section is included in the main text. Models 1-4 are OLS estimations with robust, country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Model 5 has robust standard errors and includes country-dummy variables.

Figure A2. Average institutional support for the European Parliament, 1999-2010



**Figure A3. Parliamentary oversight institutions and support for the European Parliament**



Note: Y-axis: Parliamentary support for the European Parliament. X-axis: The strength of parliamentary oversight institutions in EU affairs. Dotted line: Linear relationship.

*Robustness checks: party support for the European Parliament*

We tested the robustness of the results in Table 1 in several ways. First, our measure of party support for the EP is slightly skewed. Squaring the measures makes the distribution look more normal but does not affect the conclusions. Second, we added a control variables that identifies parties that have been in government at least once in the period covered by the Chapel Hill data to capture a general impact of being in the party mainstream. This variable has no notable effect on the impact of cultural conservatism. The measure itself has a significant positive effect in some models but not consistently and never if we also control for a party's EU support. Moreover, the effect of economic left-right is further undermined, turning insignificant in several models. Third, a party's governing status has no consistent effect itself and does not affect the effect of cultural conservatism. Fourth, a measure for a party's seat share in the European Parliament does not have a consistent effect itself and does not affect the results. We also added this variable as a difference between a party's seat share in the EP and the national parliament, again without finding a consistent effect of the measure itself or an impact on the remaining results. Fifth, the residuals of all 2010 models are largely normally distributed. We also confirmed this for Models 3 and 4 for all other cross-section. Sixth, for Model 4 (in all cross-sections) we examined whether the results depend on the inclusion of any particular country, which is not the case.

*Robustness checks: national parliamentary oversight institutions*

We tested the robustness of the results in Table 2 in several ways. First, the effect of EP support remains stable when we add a dummy variable to identify Central and East European Countries. Second, the residuals of the models are roughly normally distributed. There is a slight tendency for the models to predict lower levels of oversight than what is actually observed. The residuals in Model 6 with the lagged dependent variable cluster closely around 0. Third, the effect of EP support does not depend on the inclusion of any particular country. By exception, the effect of EP support is only significant at the .1 level in two cases in Model 3 and in two other cases in Model 4. However, the effect of EP support in the Models 5 and 6 depends considerably on having all countries in the analysis. This is probably because all observations are needed to disentangle the effects of EP and EU support in Model 5 (EU support is, however, never significant). In Model 6, the problem is the lack of variation which makes the results sensitive to the exclusion of any country that actually displays variation over time.

*Further explanations of the theoretical arguments related to party support for European integration and the European Parliament*

The main text argues that a party's support for the EP does not depend on its placement on the economic left-right dimension. Yet, it depends on its placement on the cultural liberal-conservative dimension. We briefly elaborate the relationship between EP support and the two cleavages, including more recent arguments that further clarify the connection between the cultural cleavage and the EP. To begin with, we doubt that there is a link between party support for the EP and a party's economic left-right position because the EP is an institution that does not as such defend or reflect a stand for or against economic liberalism (Hooghe *et al.* 2002). The policies of the EP depend on its party composition and, thus, electoral outcomes that vary over time. Potentially, economic right or left parties might shift their EP support depending on the EP's current party make-up. Yet, as we will see later on, there is simply too little temporal variation in party positions to justify developing this argument.

Yet, the empowerment of the EP raises issues that speak clearly to a party's cultural liberalism or conservatism. Although the empowerment of the EP is not a commitment to a particular economic policy, it is a commitment to a particular form of democratic representation (Jachtenfuchs *et al.* 1998; Schimmelfennig 2010; Cheneval & Schimmelfennig 2013). This form of representation is based on political allegiances that transcend national borders and a civic conception of political community made of individuals with claims to political rights and representation. To date, there is no European *demos* in a sense comparable to the nation-state *demos* with a strong sense of identity, a well-established public sphere and intermediary organisations. This form of representation is likely to be unproblematic for culturally liberal parties. These parties appreciate the expansion of individual rights and do not oppose a thin conception of political community since they are sceptical of strong community norms that constrain individual freedom. In contrast, parties on the right are defenders of the national political community. They take a sceptical stance on whether democratic representation beyond the nation-state is possible and they are suspicious of the EP's claims to represent a European *demos* that transcends national allegiances.

In sum, while we acknowledge that support for integration will shape a party's support for the EP, we suggest that the overlap is not perfect. While integration support depends on a party's economic and cultural ideological placement, support for the EP depends only on the latter.

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