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**Climate scientists' wide prediction intervals are more likely but perceived to be less certain**

Erik Løhre<sup>1,2</sup>, Marie Juanchich<sup>3</sup>, Miroslav Sirota<sup>3</sup>, Karl Halvor Teigen<sup>1,4</sup>, and Theodore G. Shepherd<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Simula Research Laboratory, Oslo, Norway

<sup>2</sup>Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Lillehammer, Norway

<sup>3</sup>Department of Psychology, University of Essex, UK

<sup>4</sup>Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Norway

<sup>5</sup>Department of Meteorology, University of Reading, UK

Short title: Wide intervals are perceived as uncertain

Corresponding author:

Erik Løhre

Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

Postboks 400, 2418 Elverum, Norway

Telephone: +47 41 42 01 35

E-mail: [erik.lohre@gmail.com](mailto:erik.lohre@gmail.com)

26 **Abstract** (149 words)

27 The use of interval forecasts allows climate scientists to issue predictions with high levels of  
28 certainty even for areas fraught with uncertainty, since wide intervals are objectively more  
29 likely to capture the truth than narrow intervals. However, wide intervals are also less  
30 informative about what the outcome will be than narrow intervals, implying a lack of  
31 knowledge or subjective uncertainty in the forecaster. In six experiments, we investigate how  
32 lay people perceive the (un)certainly associated with wide and narrow interval forecasts, and  
33 find that the preference for accuracy (seeing wide intervals as “objectively” certain) vs.  
34 informativeness (seeing wide intervals as indicating “subjective” uncertainty) is influenced by  
35 contextual cues (e.g., question formulation). Most importantly, we find that people more  
36 commonly and intuitively associate wide intervals with uncertainty than with certainty. Our  
37 research thus challenges the wisdom of using wide intervals to construct statements of high  
38 certainty in climate change reports.

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40 **Keywords:** uncertainty, intervals, IPCC, climate change, communication

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42       **1. Introduction**

43  
44           The knowledge of general principles governing the climate system is sufficient to  
45 make strong qualitative predictions about climate change. For instance, the Intergovernmental  
46 Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) leaves little room for doubt when concluding that  
47 “continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all  
48 components of the climate system” (IPCC 2013). In contrast, it is not possible to make precise  
49 quantitative predictions of exactly how the climate will change, even under a given forcing  
50 scenario (such conditional predictions are typically called projections). Thus, climate  
51 scientists generally issue predictions in the form of interval (range) forecasts (e.g., 0.3 to  
52 1.7°C temperature rise<sup>1</sup>, 0.26 to 0.55 m sea level rise) rather than point forecasts (e.g., 1.0°C  
53 temperature rise). Interval estimates allow a tradeoff between forecast precision and forecast  
54 certainty, or what Yaniv and Foster (1995) has described as a tradeoff between  
55 informativeness and accuracy. If a high degree of certainty (accuracy) is desired, one can  
56 forecast a wide interval (the rate of sea level rise [during the 21st century] will *very likely*  
57 exceed that observed during 1971 to 2010 [meaning more than a 20 cm rise]). This is  
58 commonly done in the IPCC reports when summary statements of high certainty are sought.  
59 Alternatively, if a high level of precision (informativeness) is desired, one can forecast a  
60 narrower interval with a lower degree of certainty (it is *likely* the sea level will rise between  
61 26 and 55 cm).

62           While a large body of research shows that people often misunderstand the verbal  
63 probability expressions (e.g., “very likely”, “unlikely”) used by the IPCC (Budescu et al.  
64 2009; Budescu et al. 2012; Budescu et al. 2014; Harris and Corner 2011; Harris et al. 2017;  
65 Harris et al. 2013; Ho et al. 2015; Juanchich and Sirota 2017), few studies have examined

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<sup>1</sup> All examples are taken from IPCC, 2013: Summary for policymakers. *Climate change 2013: The physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, T. F. Stocker, and Coauthors, Eds., Cambridge University Press.

66 how lay people respond to the use of intervals to communicate degrees of (un)certainty in the  
67 climate change domain (Dieckmann et al. 2015; Dieckmann et al. 2017; Joslyn and LeClerc  
68 2016; Løhre and Teigen 2017). We argue and demonstrate in this paper that the relationship  
69 between interval width (i.e., forecast precision) and certainty is ambiguous: a wide interval  
70 (an imprecise forecast) is “accurate” in the sense that it has a high probability of capturing the  
71 actual outcome, but its width also signals greater uncertainty about what the outcome will be,  
72 in comparison to a narrow interval (a more precise and hence more informative forecast). This  
73 ambiguity makes it important for forecasters to know whether lay people see wide intervals as  
74 more (or less) certain than narrow ones, and which of these two perspectives on intervals is  
75 more frequent and more intuitively appealing.

76         The two perspectives on the relationship between interval width and certainty may  
77 rely on two forms of certainty (Fox and Ülkümen 2011; Hacking 1975; Kahneman and  
78 Tversky 1982). On the one hand, certainty refers to our state of knowledge or belief. Such  
79 internal or subjective certainty is often expressed by statements where the subject is a sentient  
80 being (“I am 90% certain”), and using subjective terms like being confident, or sure (Fox and  
81 Ülkümen 2017; Ülkümen et al. 2016). But certainty can also be used in an external, more  
82 objective sense, reflecting variability, predictability and randomness in the outside world.  
83 Degrees of certainty are in these contexts often embedded in statements with an impersonal  
84 subject (“it is 90% certain”), and are used synonymously with degrees of probability,  
85 likelihood, or chance (Juanchich et al. 2017; Løhre and Teigen 2016).

86         With interval predictions, a wider interval allows for a greater degree of objective  
87 certainty (more hits and fewer misses). Even if the exact number of hits vs. misses can be  
88 assessed only retrospectively, after the outcomes are known, this general relationship can be  
89 claimed prospectively on purely logical grounds. Subjective certainty, however, might not  
90 increase with interval width. In fact, people may see wide intervals as cueing *uncertainty* and

91 lack of knowledge, for two reasons. First, more knowledge about a topic enables one to be  
92 more precise in one's statements about it (Yaniv and Foster 1997). Second, conversational  
93 norms suggest that people seek to maximize informativeness in communication (Grice 1975).  
94 The prediction "The temperature in Oslo will be between -35 and +35°C tomorrow" is true,  
95 with close to 100% certainty, but is also far too vague to be useful for someone preparing for  
96 a visit. A forecaster with higher subjective confidence may make a more precise, informative  
97 prediction ("The temperature at noon will be between 15 and 18°C"), which can be seen as  
98 conveying more certain expectations about tomorrow's weather.

99         Thus, different concepts of certainty might lead to different views on the implications  
100 of wide vs. narrow interval predictions. Those who find a wide interval to be more certain, by  
101 being more likely to include the true (actual) values, will in this paper be referred to as  
102 showing a *preference for accuracy*. In contrast, those who consider a wide interval to be less  
103 certain, by being less informative and expressing lower confidence about expected outcomes,  
104 display a *preference for informativeness*.

105         Previous research has found support for both types of preference (or "mindsets"). In  
106 line with the informativeness mindset, lay people expect experts to give narrower interval  
107 estimates than novices (McKenzie et al. 2008). Recipients of information prefer precise  
108 statements (Du et al. 2011; Jørgensen 2016), with narrow intervals occasionally preferred  
109 over wide intervals even when the wide interval includes the correct answer while the narrow  
110 interval does not (McKenzie and Amin 2002; Yaniv and Foster 1995). Teigen (1990) found  
111 that people placed more confidence in precise statements than in vague statements, but also  
112 that people chose the more precise statement when asked which statement they would be  
113 more skeptical about. Participants in a recent study received high and low probability  
114 forecasts made by climate change experts, and completed the forecasts by filling in  
115 corresponding intervals (Løhre and Teigen 2017). Some associated high probabilities with

116 wide intervals, but many did the opposite and assigned *narrow* intervals to high probabilities.  
117 Similar results were obtained when people were given wide and narrow interval forecasts, and  
118 asked to fill in missing probability values. Some participants assumed wide intervals were  
119 more probable, whereas others felt they were *less* probable than narrow intervals.

120         These studies leave open several important questions that we address in the present  
121 paper. (1) Is one “mindset” more prevalent than the other? (2) Can contextual and linguistic  
122 cues, which are known to change the way people think about probabilities (Løhre and Teigen  
123 2016; Nisbett et al. 1983; Reeves and Lockhart 1993; Ülkümen et al. 2016), also influence  
124 people’s views on the relationship between interval width and certainty? These two questions  
125 were investigated in Experiments 1-5, where we manipulated the focus of a question about  
126 certainty. We predicted that a question about which of two intervals is “more certain to be  
127 correct”, would promote reflections about objective certainty, accuracy and the probability of  
128 hits and misses, and should accordingly be answered in favour of the wide interval. On the  
129 other hand, a question about which interval “conveys more certainty”, would make thoughts  
130 about informational value and subjective certainty more salient, and induce people to find  
131 wide intervals to imply *less* certainty than narrow ones. (3) A third issue is which mindset  
132 people find more intuitive. Experiment 6 investigated people’s lay theories about interval  
133 width and probability, and asked people to rate how intuitively appealing two statements  
134 compatible with the two mindsets were.

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<Insert Table 1 about here>

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## 138         **2. Experiments 1-5: Effects of question type on the perception of wide vs. narrow** 139                 **intervals**

### 140                 **a. Participants**

141 The participants in these experiments (total  $N = 923$ , see Table 1) were university  
142 students from the UK and Norway who volunteered to participate or who received course  
143 credits for participation, and Amazon MTurk workers from the US who were paid to  
144 complete the questionnaires. Both of these types of convenience samples are typical in  
145 psychology experiments, and are often reasonably similar to community samples (Goodman  
146 et al. 2013; Paolacci et al. 2010). For the purpose of the current studies, namely to investigate  
147 subjective perceptions of interval forecasts of climate change, we would expect that  
148 participants from these samples should be at least as well-equipped (if not better) to interpret  
149 the information as more representative samples.

#### 150 **b. Materials and procedure**

151 In all experiments, the participants received interval forecasts of sea level rise and  
152 temperature rise by the end of the century from two different teams of climate scientists. One  
153 team issued a forecast with a wide interval (e.g., “The temperature will increase between 1.1°  
154 Celsius and 6.4° Celsius”), while the other team gave a forecast with a narrower interval (e.g.,  
155 “The temperature will increase between 2.2° Celsius and 5.4° Celsius”). The participants were  
156 asked, in three to four different conditions in the different experiments, to choose which  
157 prediction “conveys more uncertainty [certainty]” or which prediction “is more likely [certain,  
158 uncertain] to be correct”. These questions were formulated to focus on informativeness or on  
159 accuracy, respectively. An overview of the questions used in the different experiments is  
160 provided in Table 2, and more detailed descriptions of the procedure for each experiment is  
161 provided below. The full description of the scenarios, as well as separate statistical analysis of  
162 each experiment, can be found in the Supplementary materials (in the Results section, only  
163 the overall results are described). Several of the experiments also investigated secondary  
164 hypotheses, which are briefly described below, while more detailed descriptions and analyses  
165 are provided in the Supplementary materials.

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<Insert Table 2 about here>

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169 1) MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE VARIATIONS IN EXPERIMENTS 1-5

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In Experiment 1, we manipulated question type and reasons for variability in a 2 x 2 within-subject design. Participants completed a daily survey for 14 days. On the third day, the participants received questions about which interval “is most likely to be correct” and on day 6 which interval “conveys most uncertainty”. The same questions were repeated on days 9 and 11, but here, participants also received an explanation for the variability in the expert forecasts. The variability was explained by referring to temperature rise “in different countries” and sea level rise “in different parts of the world”. On day 14 participants rated their belief in climate change by answering four questions taken from Heath and Gifford (2006). For each scenario (temperature and sea level rise), participants could choose one of the two predictions or rate them as equal.

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Participants in Experiment 2 received the same questions as in Experiment 1, but this was a 2 x 2 design with question type and reason for variability varied between subjects. Hence, participants in different groups received questions either about which interval “conveys most uncertainty” or which interval “is most likely to be correct”, and either received an explanation for the variability in estimates or did not receive such an explanation.

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In Experiment 3, we attempted to control for some potential confounding factors in Experiments 1 and 2. Beside their focus on informativeness or accuracy, the questions used in the first two experiments differed in several respects. First, the term “uncertainty” was used in the informativeness-focus condition and the term “likely” was used in the accuracy-focus condition. These terms were assumed to be associated with different sources of uncertainty, with “uncertainty” being an internal/epistemic term, and “likely” an external/aleatory term



191 (Ülkümen et al. 2016). Second, the two terms differ in their *directionality* (Teigen and Brun  
192 1995, 1999). While “uncertain” has a negative directionality (i.e., it points towards the  
193 possibility that an outcome might not occur), “likely” has a positive directionality (i.e., it  
194 points towards the possibility that an outcome might occur). To better control for the source  
195 of uncertainty and directionality of the verbal probabilities used in the question, we used the  
196 two terms “uncertain(ty)” and “certain(ty)”, which are usually considered as reflecting  
197 epistemic uncertainty (Fox and Ülkümen 2011; Teigen and Løhre 2017; Ülkümen et al.  
198 2016). The word stem was hence kept constant, while directionality and question type varied  
199 between-subjects, with different groups of participants receiving the question about which  
200 prediction “conveys more [un]certainty” and which prediction is “more [un]certain to be  
201 correct”.

202         In Experiment 4, we removed the (arguably incorrect) “equal” option, so the  
203 participants chose between the wide and the narrow interval in each condition. Participants  
204 read the same temperature rise and sea level rise vignettes as in previous experiments in one  
205 of three conditions: uncertainty conveyed, certainty conveyed, and certain to be correct.

206         In Experiment 5, we added a third prediction that featured a narrower interval to each  
207 vignette, for two reasons: first, to highlight even more strongly that the teams differ in width  
208 of prediction intervals; and second, since the intervals in previous experiments were both  
209 quite wide, to include a very narrow interval that suggests high precision, but might be “too  
210 good to be true”. Participants read the sea level and temperature rise scenarios and for each  
211 selected one of the three forecasts as the one that conveyed more certainty, conveyed more  
212 uncertainty or was more certain to be correct, in three between-subjects conditions.

## 213         2) SECONDARY HYPOTHESES

214         In addition to investigating the prevalence of the informativeness and accuracy  
215 mindsets and their associations with different kinds of questions, Experiments 1-5 also

216 addressed some additional hypotheses. In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigated whether the  
217 accuracy mindset would be seen as more appropriate (i.e., wide intervals associated with  
218 certainty) in contexts where interval width could be related to variability. Predictions  
219 concerning a class of multiple outcomes might induce more distributional (“outside view”)  
220 thinking, with wide intervals reflecting external variability, in contrast to predictions of a  
221 singular outcome, where wide intervals are more easily taken to reflect the forecaster’s  
222 ignorance (Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; Nisbett et al. 1983;  
223 Reeves and Lockhart 1993). Hence, participants in different conditions in Experiments 1  
224 (within-subjects) and 2 (between-subjects) were told that the intervals described temperature  
225 rise “in different countries” and sea level rise “in different parts of the world”, while no  
226 explanation for the variability in the estimate was given in the other conditions.

227         In Experiment 3, we investigated whether perceptions of expertise could be influenced  
228 by question type, with the hypothesis that questions highlighting informativeness would lead  
229 to a stronger preference for experts giving narrow interval forecasts, as compared to questions  
230 highlighting accuracy. Therefore, after selecting the prediction that conveys more  
231 (un)certainty/is more (un)certain to be correct, participants in Experiment 3 rated which team  
232 seemed more trustworthy, seemed to have most knowledge (about temperature rise or sea  
233 level rise), seemed to have the best models (for predicting temperature rise or sea level rise),  
234 and which team seemed to be most competent. These ratings were done on scales from 1  
235 (definitely the team with the wide interval) to 5 (definitely the team with the narrow interval).

236         Experiment 4 investigated factors that might explain people’s preference for narrow  
237 intervals: their fluency and the perceived expertise of the speaker. Previous research has  
238 found that statements that are more fluent (i.e., easier to process), for example due to  
239 repetition or to heightened visibility, are judged as more truthful than less fluent statements  
240 (Arkes et al. 1989; Reber and Schwarz 1999). We expected that predictions with narrower

241 intervals might be easier to process than predictions with wider intervals, and that this  
242 heightened fluency could be a reason why people prefer narrow intervals. Narrow intervals  
243 might also be preferred due to the association between precision and expertise. Hence,  
244 participants in Experiment 4 rated the fluency of the predictions featuring a narrow and a  
245 wide interval, as well as the perceived expertise of the teams (see Supplementary materials for  
246 more details about the rating scales).

247 For exploratory purposes, we included in Experiment 5 three measures of individual  
248 differences that might be related to the degree of perception of wide intervals as more  
249 uncertain and narrow intervals as more certain. Specifically, strong climate change beliefs  
250 could explain a preference for wide intervals as certain, since wide intervals can incorporate  
251 more extreme climate change values. In addition, people who are more numerate, and people  
252 who are able to understand the probability of occurrence of more than one event (i.e., people  
253 who correctly assess that the probability of one of two events is greater than the probability of  
254 occurrence of each of those events), might be better able to appraise that a wider interval  
255 means a greater likelihood to be correct. Hence, we included a climate change belief scale  
256 (Heath and Gifford 2006), a numeracy scale (Lipkus et al. 2001), and a disjunction task  
257 (adapted from Costello 2009).

## 258 **c. Results**

### 259 1) EFFECTS OF QUESTION FOCUS

260 Participants in Experiments 1-5 received wide and narrow interval forecasts of sea  
261 level rise and temperature rise from two different (fictional) teams of climate scientists, and  
262 indicated which interval *conveyed more (un)certainty* (question focused on informativeness)  
263 or was *more likely [(un)certain] to be correct* (question focused on accuracy).

264

265 <Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 about here>

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267           Question focus strongly influenced certainty judgments (Figures 1 and 2). Participants  
268 largely chose the wide interval as the one that conveyed more uncertainty, and indicated that  
269 the narrow interval conveyed more certainty. Responses to questions about which interval  
270 was more likely or more certain to be correct were mixed: some experiments showed a small  
271 preference for the wide interval, while narrow and wide intervals were seen as equally certain  
272 in other experiments.

273           Figure 3 summarizes the overall results (for all experiments with three response  
274 options, i.e., all experiments except Experiment 4), with responses coded according to  
275 whether wide intervals are seen as more certain (consistent with the accuracy mindset),  
276 narrow intervals are seen as more certain (consistent with the informativeness mindset), or  
277 both intervals are seen as equally likely. Analysis of Experiments 2, 3 and 5, where question  
278 focus was varied between-subjects and three response alternatives (wide more certain, narrow  
279 more certain, equal/"medium" interval more certain) were provided, showed a clear effect of  
280 question focus,  $\chi^2(2, N=1080) = 213.373, p < .001$ . While wide intervals were clearly  
281 associated with uncertainty after informativeness-focused questions, more participants  
282 associated wide intervals with certainty after accuracy-focused questions. However, even for  
283 questions about correctness, where wide intervals should logically be chosen as more certain,  
284 only about 40% of the participants did so.

## 285           2) RESULTS FOR SECONDARY HYPOTHESES

286           In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigated whether giving people an explanation for  
287 variability, for instance by telling them that the forecasts concerned sea level rise "in different  
288 parts of the world", would facilitate the accuracy mindset (i.e., would make more people  
289 associate wide intervals with certainty). However, this hint about variability did not affect  
290 participants' interval choice in either Experiment 1 ( $p = .150$ ) or Experiment 2 ( $p = .303$ ).

291 We further examined whether the accuracy and informativeness mindsets led to  
292 different inferences about the forecaster. Participants in Experiment 3 rated whether they  
293 found teams giving wide or narrow interval forecasts to have more expertise, on scales from 1  
294 (definitely the team with the wide interval) to 5 (definitely the team with the narrow interval).  
295 The average of the ratings of the experts across scenarios (i.e., an average of the four  
296 questions per scenario) were slightly higher in the “conveys more”-conditions ( $M = 3.50$ ,  $SD$   
297  $= .73$ ) than in the “to be correct”-conditions ( $M = 3.29$ ,  $SD = .87$ ), and this difference was  
298 significant,  $F(1,234) = 3.991$ ,  $p = .047$ ,  $\eta^2_p = .017$ . In other words, the team with narrow  
299 intervals was rated more positively after informativeness-focused questions, indicating that  
300 making one or the other mindset salient can influence how well both the prediction and the  
301 communicator is received.

302 Experiment 4 investigated whether people find narrow intervals easier to process (i.e.,  
303 more fluent) and more related to expertise than wide intervals. As predicted, participants  
304 judged the narrow interval as being easier to process and as reflecting more expertise than the  
305 wide interval (see Supplementary materials for more details about these findings).

306 Finally, in Experiment 5 we set out to investigate individual differences that might be  
307 related to the preference for informativeness vs. accuracy. Specifically, we asked participants  
308 about their climate change beliefs, and gave them a test measuring numeracy, and a test  
309 measuring their understanding of disjunctive probabilities. However, there were no clear  
310 correlation patterns between interval choice and any of these three measures across groups,  
311 and the experiment did not have enough power to detect differences within each condition.

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313 **3. Experiment 6: Is it more intuitive to associate wide intervals with uncertainty**  
314 **than with certainty?**

315 Experiments 1-5 demonstrated that different question focus promotes different views  
316 about the relationship between certainty and interval width. However, the fact that only about  
317 40% endorsed wide intervals as “more certain to be correct”, indicates that it is more common  
318 to associate wide intervals with (subjective) uncertainty than with (objective) certainty. This  
319 raises the possibility that the lay view about the relationship between interval width and  
320 certainty is more in line with the informativeness mindset than with the accuracy mindset.

321 In support of this idea, research on confidence intervals has repeatedly shown that  
322 people produce intervals that are too narrow for the assigned degree of certainty (Moore et al.  
323 2016). This consistent overprecision (Moore and Healy 2008) is very hard to eliminate and  
324 suggests that the preference for informativeness may be a dominant intuitive response.  
325 Studies showing that recipients of information in general prefer narrow intervals illustrate a  
326 similar point (Du et al. 2011; Jørgensen 2016; McKenzie and Amin 2002; Yaniv and Foster  
327 1995), as does the preliminary finding that people with higher numeracy can (sometimes)  
328 better appreciate the trade-off between precision and certainty than those with lower  
329 numeracy (Løhre and Teigen 2017). Hence, we ran Experiment 6 to test the hypothesis of an  
330 intuitive preference for informativeness among lay people.

### 331 **a. Materials and procedure**

332 The opening paragraph of the survey in Experiment 6 explained that climate scientists  
333 sometimes use intervals when giving their predictions of future outcomes, and presented two  
334 predictions concerning the expected sea level rise in the Oslo fjord. One of the predictions  
335 contained a wide interval (minimum 20 and maximum 60 cm sea level rise) and the other  
336 prediction contained a narrow interval (minimum 30 and maximum 50 cm sea level rise).  
337 Participants (students at the University of Oslo, N = 105, see Table 1) were randomly  
338 assigned to either the wide condition, where it was pointed out that one prediction is wider

339 than the other, or to the narrow condition, where it was pointed out that one prediction is  
340 narrower than the other.

341 The text then explained that there are two different ways that one can think about the  
342 relationship between interval width and uncertainty, using the following formulation in the  
343 wide condition:

344 “ – On the one hand, WIDE intervals indicate that it is MORE UNCERTAIN what the  
345 outcome will be (the sea level could rise by anything from 20 to 60 cm, compared to 30 to  
346 50 cm for the narrow interval)

347 - On the other hand, it is MORE CERTAIN that projections using WIDE intervals will be  
348 correct (the forecast is correct if the sea level rises by anything from 20 to 60 cm,  
349 compared to 30 to 50 cm for the narrow interval)”

350 In other words, the accuracy mindset (seeing the wide interval as more certain to be  
351 correct) and the informativeness mindset (seeing the wide interval as indicating that it is more  
352 uncertain what the outcome will be) were explained to the participants. In the narrow  
353 condition, the text explained that narrow intervals could be seen as indicating that it is more  
354 certain what the outcome will be, or that it is more uncertain that predictions using narrow  
355 intervals will be correct. The order of the statements was counterbalanced in both conditions.

356 After reading the description of the different ways of thinking about intervals and  
357 uncertainty, participants were asked to rate how intuitive, natural, appealing, logical, and  
358 complicated they found the two ways of thinking, on scales from 1 (not intuitive/natural etc.  
359 at all) to 7 (very intuitive/natural etc.). Next, the participants were given tests of numeracy  
360 (Cokely et al. 2012; Schwartz et al. 1997) and cognitive reflection (Frederick 2005) to see  
361 whether individual differences in these abilities were related to a preference for  
362 informativeness or accuracy. Finally, participants were asked if they had already seen or  
363 responded to the cognitive reflection test online or in other experiments.

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<Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here>

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## **b. Results**

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Figures 4 and 5 display the ratings of the different mindsets for both wide and narrow intervals, and show that the view that wide intervals convey uncertainty was judged as more intuitive, natural, appealing, logical, and less complicated than the view that wide intervals are more certain to be correct. For simplicity we refer to this combination of attributes as more “intuitively appealing”. We also computed an average difference score to measure the degree to which one “mindset” was judged as more intuitively appealing than the other, by taking the “wide = uncertain” and “narrow = certain” ratings, which are in line with the informativeness mindset, and subtracting the corresponding “wide = certain” and “narrow = uncertain” ratings, which are in line with the accuracy mindset.<sup>2</sup> Thus, positive difference scores indicate that the informativeness mindset is seen as more intuitively appealing than the accuracy mindset. The average difference score for the five items (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .74$ ) did not differ between conditions,  $F(1,103) = .144, p = .706, \eta^2_p = .001$ . More interestingly, the average difference score across conditions was positive,  $M = .42, SD = 1.32$ , and differed significantly from 0,  $t(104) = 3.290, p = .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [.17, .68]$ . Hence, participants overall judged the informativeness mindset as more intuitively appealing than the accuracy mindset.

There was no significant correlation with the average difference score for either the cognitive reflection test ( $r = .01, p = .958$ ) or numeracy ( $r = .09, p = .355$ ). However, people with higher cognitive reflection and numeracy perceived *both* mindsets as more intuitive, as shown by positive correlations between CRT and the informativeness ( $r = .20, p = .040$ ) and

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<sup>2</sup> The only exception was for the ratings of how complicated the participants found the two ways of thinking. Here the “wide = uncertain” ratings were subtracted from the “wide = certain” ratings, and the “narrow = certain” ratings were subtracted from the “narrow = uncertain” ratings.



387 accuracy mindsets ( $r = .21, p = .037$ ), and between numeracy and the informativeness ( $r =$   
388  $.24, p = .014$ ) and accuracy mindsets ( $r = .14, p = .161$ ). Hence, higher scores on these  
389 measures indicate a tendency to find it intuitive to use intervals to express both certainty and  
390 uncertainty.

391

#### 392 **4. General Discussion**

393 The experiments reported in this paper fill a gap in the literature about climate change  
394 communication (Moser 2010; Pidgeon and Fischhoff 2011) by investigating lay perceptions  
395 of the relationship between interval width (forecast precision) and certainty. We found  
396 evidence of two alternative ways of thinking. Overall, independent of question focus, 45% of  
397 our participants<sup>3</sup> perceived narrow intervals as giving more certain knowledge about what the  
398 outcome will be, in line with what we have called a *preference for informativeness*; while  
399 26% of the participants perceived that wide intervals have a higher certainty of capturing the  
400 true value, displaying a *preference for accuracy*. These two opposite “mindsets” can be made  
401 more or less salient by drawing attention to different types of uncertainty. Questions about  
402 which interval conveys more (un)certainly (i.e., focusing more on subjective uncertainty) led  
403 to a consistent preference for informativeness, while questions about which interval is more  
404 certain/likely to be correct (i.e., focusing more on objective certainty) led to a response  
405 pattern more in line with the accuracy mindset.

406 Questions focused on informativeness led to a clearer response pattern (wide intervals  
407 seen as uncertain and narrow ones as certain) than did questions focused on accuracy. It is  
408 somewhat puzzling that people were so divided in their answers to the question about which  
409 interval is more likely/certain to be correct. Logically, wider intervals are objectively more

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<sup>3</sup> These percentages are based on all experiments with three response alternatives (wide more certain, narrow more certain, equal), i.e., Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5.

410 likely to capture the outcome value that will occur, as they cover both central (likely) and  
411 more peripheral (unlikely) values. Our results indicate that (perhaps for good reasons) people  
412 would like to know more precisely what the expected values are, and hence find it more  
413 intuitive to adopt the informativeness than the accuracy mindset, as shown in Experiment 6.  
414 Although the generalizability of the results should be investigated in non-western samples, we  
415 find it noteworthy that they are replicated in two different languages (Norwegian vs. English),  
416 in three different countries (Norway, UK, USA), and with both student and MTurk samples.  
417 Note also that our participants should be more educated and arguably more knowledgeable  
418 about these topics than more representative samples. Hence, one might expect an even  
419 stronger preference for informativeness in a more representative sample.

420         These results have important theoretical implications, particularly for the literature on  
421 overprecision (Moore et al. 2016). The intuitive preference for informativeness means that  
422 wide intervals are usually associated with uncertainty, and as a result, people may not  
423 understand or agree that they should widen their intervals to increase their certainty. This can  
424 be said to strengthen the conversational norms/informativeness account of overprecision  
425 (Kaesler et al. 2016; Yaniv and Foster 1995, 1997).

426         Climate scientists may choose to give wide intervals in order to present predictions  
427 with high certainty. Yet, our results show that wide intervals are a stronger signal of  
428 (subjective) uncertainty than of (objective) certainty, and the use of wide intervals may  
429 therefore undermine trust in climate scientists and their predictions. Although language that  
430 accentuates the accuracy mindset may make wide intervals more acceptable to the public (see  
431 Experiment 3), our results suggest that many recipients will still prefer narrow intervals, as  
432 suggested by 25% of the participants given accuracy-focused questions in our experiments  
433 (see Figure 3). Note, however, that in the current experiments, the participants only received  
434 intervals, and were asked about their perceptions of (un)certainty. In statements from the

435 IPCC, intervals are often accompanied by verbal or numerical probability statements (e.g.,  
436 “During the last interglacial period, the Greenland ice sheet *very likely* contributed between  
437 1.4 and 4.3 m to higher global mean sea level”) (IPCC 2013). A recent study showed that  
438 explicitly mentioning the high certainty of wide intervals can counteract the tendency of lay  
439 people to see such intervals as uncertain, with most people stating that a wide interval with  
440 90% probability was more certain than a narrow interval with 50% probability (Teigen et al.  
441 2018).

442           Nevertheless, the current evidence gives reason to be skeptical about the use of wide  
443 intervals to achieve high certainty in statements about climate change. However, presenting a  
444 precise interval along with a statement about the low certainty of such an interval is arguably  
445 not a much better option. One compromise solution would be to provide two intervals rather  
446 than one: a narrow (informative) interval paired with a wide (confident) interval, to satisfy  
447 both camps of readers. The drawback is that presenting two intervals simultaneously adds  
448 complexity to the communication of an already complex topic. Using graphical  
449 representations could be useful to simultaneously communicate informativeness and accuracy  
450 in a relatively simple way (Spiegelhalter et al. 2011). In any case, communicators should be  
451 aware that the current practice of claiming to be very certain about a very wide interval will to  
452 many readers sound like a contradiction in terms, which might damage rather than strengthen  
453 the public’s belief in climate science.

454

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458 on OSF ([https://osf.io/h95cj/?view\\_only=3ddfde9204f3497eaebf42aa0c091ade](https://osf.io/h95cj/?view_only=3ddfde9204f3497eaebf42aa0c091ade)).

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## Tables

Table 1. Demographics for the samples used in the different experiments.

Experiment no.	n	Sample	Mean age (SD)	Female	Male
1	81	University of Essex students	24.0 (6.5)	80.2%	19.8%
2	201	Amazon Mechanical Turk	37.9 (12.0)	51.7%	48.3%
3	238	Amazon Mechanical Turk	37.7 (11.2)	47.9%	52.1%
4	302	Amazon Mechanical Turk	34.6 (10.4)	44.4%	55.6%
5	101	University of Essex, snowball sampling	28.0 (13.1)	36.6%	62.4%
6	105	University of Oslo students	23.1 (4.9)	76.2%	23.8%

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
585 Table 2. Overview of questions, response options and design used in the different experiments  
 586 regarding interval predictions of climate change outcomes.  
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Experiment no.	Question(s)/ statements focused on informativeness: “Which interval conveys...”	Question(s)/statements focused on accuracy: “Which interval is...”	Response options	Design
1	“...most uncertainty”	“... most likely to be correct”	Wide, narrow, equal	Within-subjects
2	“... most uncertainty”	“... most likely to be correct”	Wide, narrow, equal	Between-subjects
3	“... more uncertainty” “... more certainty”	“... more certain to be correct” “... more uncertain to be correct”	Wide, narrow, equal	Between-subjects
4	“... more uncertainty” “... more certainty”	“... more certain to be correct”	Wide, narrow	Between-subjects
5	“... more uncertainty” “... more certainty”	“... more certain to be correct”	Wide, “medium”, narrow	Between-subjects
6	“Wide intervals indicate that it is more uncertain what the outcome will be” “Narrow intervals indicate that it is more certain what the outcome will be”	“It is more certain that projections using wide intervals will be correct” “It is more uncertain that projections using narrow intervals will be correct”	Ratings of the intuitive appeal of both statements	Within-subjects

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
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### Figures




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Figure 1. Choices of which interval conveys more certainty and uncertainty.




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Figure 2. Choices of which interval is more certain/likely and more uncertain to be correct.




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Figure 3. Overall preference for wide vs. narrow intervals as “more certain” for all experiments with three response options (Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5).



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Figure 4. Mean perceptions of two ways of thinking about wide intervals (wide is certain vs. wide is uncertain) in Experiment 6, error bars +/- 1 SEM.



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Figure 5. Mean perceptions of two ways of thinking about narrow intervals (narrow is uncertain vs. narrow is certain) in Experiment 6, error bars +/- 1 SEM.