Unpacking the relationship

between political institutions and

conflict recurrence

by

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Summary

What role do political institutions play in determining whether countries coming out of conflict manage to remain peaceful or revert to war? The current literature has addressed this question either from a highly aggregated perspective, by analyzing a country's regime type, or has focused on one specific institution only, namely post-conflict elections. Results of the first approach show no clear connection between democracy and conflict recurrence, while results of the second have led several authors to warn of the destabilizing effects of elections in post-conflict contexts. In this dissertation I instead show that specific types of political participation can significantly increase a country's chances to remain peaceful.

Three main chapters unpack the relationship between political institutions and conflict recurrence. The first chapter looks at how local elections can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence by providing the population with access to the political system and giving the post-conflict elite an opportunity to influence policy-making. The second chapter takes a closer look at the role institutional change, in the form of constitution-writing, can play in stabilizing post-conflict countries. The third chapter then turns the focus to international efforts to promote peace after civil war and uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), rather than quantitative analyses as in the first two chapters, to identify successful strategies of international peacebuilding.

Overall, this thesis expands the current literature by disaggregating the political-set up of post-conflict countries and demonstrating that 1) specific political institutions have a pacifying effect 2) institutional change can be good for peace and 3) international support to political processes and governance is an important strategy in building sustainable peace.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Most post-conflict countries struggle immensely to sustain peace. Almost 50% of all countries that suffered a civil war between 1946 and 2011 experienced renewed conflict, resulting in new suffering, human loss and destruction.[1] In 2013, only 5% of all active civil wars – if not protracted for two decades or more – had never experienced conflict before (Fiedler et al., 2016). How to sustain peace in post-conflict countries has therefore become the focus of much international efforts as well as a large scholarly debate (Collier et al., 2008, Mason et al., 2011, Walter, 1999, Walter, 2004, World Bank, 2011). This thesis contributes to the existing literature by unpacking the relationship between specific political institutions and conflict recurrence.

As the numbers above demonstrate, the risk of conflict recurrence is constantly looming large in post-conflict countries. Although violent conflict came to an end, a post-conflict situation must be seen as a continuous (bargaining) process in which either side can quickly decide to reject the current arrangement and go back to war. This regards the belligerents of the previous conflict – the former rebel group(s) and government. At the same time new conflict can also erupt from new rebel groups emerging, either

[1] Based on own data presented in Chapter 2. Walter (2014) and Collier et al. (2008) present similar figures.

because the post-conflict set-up fuels new grievances or provides them with the opportunity to act upon existing ones. Furthermore, the population is also a central actor in post-conflict settings, as it is here that old or new rebel groups can try to mobilize supporters if the benefits of peace are not felt.

Challenges in post-conflict countries hence abound: after years of intense military confrontation, the infrastructure and the economy need to be rebuilt and internally displaced peoples and refugees taken care of. Former rebels need to reintegrate back into civilian life and find new employment opportunities. At the same time, reforms of the military and police are essential to increase citizen security. Polarized segments of society need to be reconciled and channels of peaceful conflict management established. New groups will often have to be accommodated into the political system and state institutions need to be reformed or rebuilt.

Empirical research on conflict recurrence has analyzed a wide variety of factors to understand what makes renewed violence in post-conflict countries more likely, focusing in particular on characteristics of the previous conflict, the extent and type of international engagement in the post-conflict country as well as socio-economic and political factors characterizing the post-conflict state (Mason, et al., 2011, Quinn et al., 2007, Walter, 2010, Walter, 2004). The thesis connects and contributes to this debate by shedding new light on how political participation and institutional change can contribute to peace.

Contribution to the previous literature on democracy, political institutions and conflict recurrence

The approach used in this dissertation address two main shortcomings of the existing literature on conflict recurrence. Firstly, most research has approached the relationship between conflict recurrence and political institutions from a too highly aggregated perspective, by looking at the role of regime type for post-conflict peace. Despite a large body of literature on the determinants of conflict recurrence, the empirical evidence regarding this relationship remains inconsistent (Collier, et al., 2008, Hegre and Nygård, 2015, Mukherjee, 2006, Quinn, et al., 2007, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). This thesis therefore approaches the relationship between political participation and conflict recurrence by disaggregating political features across regime types. This includes both the first chapter, which looks at different types of elections and the second, which looks at constitutional change.

Secondly, the thesis expands the current literature by moving away from post-conflict elections at the national level as the only very specific institution that so far has gained widespread attention (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). It has almost become common knowledge that democratization, while possibly leading to more stable regimes in the long-run, can cause instability in the short-run (Cederman et al., 2010, Mansfield and Snyder, 2002, Mansfield and Snyder, 2008, Mansfield and Snyder, 2005). The main argument behind this

relationship is that democratizing states are troubled by weak state institutions that exacerbate the potential for conflict. Although the argument applies to democratization more generally, national elections are normally seen as most critical by these authors as they can reinforce political and societal divisions and introduce stark competition into an already volatile and fragile context (Cederman et al., 2012, Hegre, 2014). And indeed, several studies show that very early post-conflict elections at the national level can be harmful for peace (Brancati and Synder, 2011, Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). In line with this argument, the international community has been criticized for pushing post-conflict countries to hold elections and then leaving these countries to their own faith (Paris, 2004). Several authors therefore warn of the destabilizing effects of democratization and national elections, as well as international support to such processes (Burnell, 2006, Jarstad and Sisk, 2008, Paris, 2004).

To summarize, the current literature has studied the relationship between political institutions and conflict recurrence either from a highly aggregated perspective, by analyzing a country's regime type, or has focused on one specific institution only, namely national level post-conflict elections. Results of the first approach show no clear connection between democracy and conflict recurrence, while results of the second have led several authors to warn of the destabilizing effects of elections in post-conflict contexts. In this dissertation I instead argue and show that specific types of political participation in the post-conflict context can significantly increase a country's chances to remain peaceful.

By taking a closer look at the relationship between political participation and conflict recurrence, the thesis adds to the peace and conflict literature more generally, since conflict recurrence has still to be explained more fully. But the thesis also has implications that go beyond the literature focusing on armed conflict. Conflict is inherent to any society, although it only turns violent in some. How institutions can help to manage conflict within societies is hence interesting from different academic perspectives. Finally, the thesis should also be of interest to the political science literature more generally as well as comparative law, because it provides more detailed insights into the working of local elections and constitution-making, two key political institutions that have become the focus of individual research agendas.

Overall, this thesis therefore contributes to the conflict recurrence literature as well as the wider political science literature by disaggregating the political-set up of post-conflict countries and demonstrating that 1) specific political institutions have a pacifying effect 2) institutional change can be good for peace and 3) international support to political processes and governance is an important strategy in building sustainable peace.

Main concepts

Before presenting the three chapters in more detail, some core concepts need to be clarified. First, this dissertation specifically focuses on explaining *systemic* rather than *dyadic* peace. This means that it is not only interested in explaining why peace between two specific parties sticks or not, but whether entire countries manage to overcome their violent past and remain peaceful, which allows analyzing peace in a more holistic manner (following Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2009, Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Mason, et al., 2011). This approach is more encompassing but at the same time also more stringent, because there are likely to be different mechanisms at play explaining why either formerly warring parties or post-conflict countries as a whole remain peaceful. Second, when this thesis talks about *conflict*, it does so based on the widely used UCDP/PRIO definition. According to this definition, armed conflict is characterized by all of the following features: the use of armed forces, a minimum of 25 battle deaths, the government of a state as one primary party to the conflict and an incompatibility over the government or territory (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). *Civil war*, in turn, is a particularly intense armed conflict, leading to 1000 battle deaths or more. Third, in line with the negative conception of peace often employed in the peace and conflict literature, a *post-conflict situation* can rather simply be described as a "situation in which open warfare has come to an end" (Junne and Verkoren, 2005:1).

For some cases the application of this definition is straightforward. In the Nepalese civil war, for example, two clear cut sides opposed each other – the king and the Maoist rebels. The war came to an end through the signing of a "Comprehensive Peace Agreement" in 2006, after which Nepal can clearly be considered a post-conflict country. However, conflicts can end in many ways, with the blurry category of "fading out" actually constituting the most common form of conflict end (Kreutz 2010). Also many, if not most, conflicts are more complicated, with several rebel groups challenging the government at the same time, such as the current war in Syria. Peace agreements are at times agreed upon with some but not all rebel groups, as in Burundi where the Arusha agreement of 2000 included 14 rebel groups but excluded the two largest ones. Furthermore, different conflicts can overlap, as was the case in Indonesia with two main secessionist conflicts – Timor-Leste and Aceh – both beginning in the 70s, but Timor-Leste's coming to an end in 1999, but Aceh not until 2005. The systemic perspective taken in this dissertation implies that in order to be considered a post-conflict country *all* major conflicts have to have ended. As already laid out above, this does not mean that these are stable situations. Quite to the contrary, as Junne and Verkoren (2005:1) note: "Such situations remain tense for years or decades and can easily relapse into large-scale violence". Nevertheless, in line with the negative definition of peace proposed by Galtung (1964), post-conflict situations marked by the absence of war are considered to be at *peace*, whereas any renewed armed conflict occurring in a post-conflict country is considered a *recurrence* of conflict.

Regarding the explanatory variables, I follow the definition by North (1990), according to which *institutions* are the formal and informal rules and norms that organise social, political and economic relations, although the focus in this dissertation lies on the formal institutions underlying political relations, such as elections or the constitution. *Political regimes* in turn describe different forms of government that consist of a set of formal and informal institutions. One main distinction of political regimes is between democratic and authoritarian regimes, but more fine-grained differences exist and each regime type can be disaggregated into further sub-types (Bartusevicius and Skaaning, 2018, Mason and Greig, 2017). Finally, I follow the definition by Kaase and Marsh (1979:42) in that *political participation* can be defined as 'all voluntary activities intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system'.

Main argument and underlying theoretical assumptions

In this thesis, it is assumed that at its core armed conflict is about furthering policy change (Cunningham, 2011, Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, Walter, 2004). For violent conflict to occur, two conditions have to be met – a group has to have both the *incentives* to rebel as well as the *capacity* for rebellion (Mason and Greig, 2017).

Incentives for rebellion exist when an organized group is dissatisfied with the status quo and strongly wants to implement policy change – stark grievances exist (Gurr,

1968). The systematic exclusion of groups from political power, strong state repression or highly uneven resource distribution that only benefit certain economic elites, all represent potential political incentives to go to war.

The second central condition in order for armed conflict to occur is that a group has the capacity to mount a rebellion, which in turn depends on their military capacity and civilian support base (Mason and Greig, 2017). A rebel group's military capacity is influenced by several factors, such as whether they were defeated in the previous war, agreed to a demobilization process, whether a strong leadership exists and more generally the availability of arms or lootable resources to fund rebellion. Furthermore, rebel groups depend on a civilian support base within the population to engage in armed conflict. This is because every rebel group needs to mobilize recruits and they do not have conventional armies they can rely on to do so (Walter, 2004).

For grievances to turn violent – and hence war to occur – a group has to be convinced that policy change is necessary and can be best pursued through war, not peaceful means. One often made assumption in this regard is that a group's choice to resort to war is based on a cost-benefit calculation (Mason and Greig, 2017). Both incentives and capacity affect the cost-benefit calculation of rebel groups. War is per se a risky and costly strategy when pursuing policy change. However, if the expected payoffs from war are high while the expected costs of war are relatively low, renewed violence becomes more likely (Cunningham, 2011, Walter, 2004). While political and economic

factors determine what payoffs a group can expect from winning a war or reaching a peace deal, their military capacity, the existence of a civilian support base and information on the previous war in turn affect how costly the war is judged to be.

What determines whether conflict recurs in post-conflict situations? The rational, bargaining theory of war usually sees one of three problems as the cause of war 1) issue indivisibility, 2) lack of information 3) credible commitment problems (Fearon, 1995). Post-conflict situations are particularly characterized by credible commitment problems (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, Walter, 1997, Walter, 1999). This means that both sides may claim they want to adhere to peace, but since a post-conflict situation is essentially a situation of anarchy they cannot trust each other to do so. Instead both sides have to fear that any concessions they make will be exploited by their opponent to defeat them militarily or politically. This is exacerbated by the fact that no external enforcement mechanism exists that could enforce the peace between the two sides.

More specifically, two types of commitment problems characterize post-conflict societies (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). Firstly, both sides have to commit to laying down arms, which means reducing each side's military capacity for rebellion, for example through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. The second credible commitment problem regards the political set-up of the post-conflict regime and the willingness to peacefully contest for power. Most importantly, the side that achieves political control has to be able to credibly commit that they will not use

their new position to politically exclude their former enemy and hold on to power indefinitely (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). The second stage of the commitment problem hence addresses the political incentives for rebellion.

Peace can then be explained by political institutions or international support reducing the incentives and capacity for rebellion as well as alleviating the commitment problems marking post-conflict situations. All three chapters of this dissertation explicitly or implicitly rely on this rational approach to explain conflict recurrence.

Overview over the dissertation

The first chapter of this dissertation takes a closer look at the specific political institutions a post-conflict country exhibits, focusing on different types of electoral participation. Going beyond arguments put forward by democratic civil peace theory, I argue that it is not democracy per se, but rather very specific political institutions that should be able to reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict. More specifically, the theory put forward holds that in order to contribute to peace, institutions need to firstly enable access to broad segments of the population. This can limit mobilization possibilities of rebel groups, thereby reducing the capacity for renewed conflict. Secondly, institutions can reduce the incentives for conflict recurrence if they provide former and potentially future rebel groups with the possibility to influence policy change through institutional means. This is because this raises the cost of war vis-à-vis

a peaceful pursuit of their political interests. Based on this theory, only local elections should be able to reduce the risk for conflict recurrence because they are the only type of electoral participation that can provide both broad based access to the population and influence to the post-conflict elite. Using newly available data from the Varieties of democracy (V-dem) project for the time period between 1946 and 2011, I systematically analyze and compare the effect of electoral participation at all three levels of government – the national, the regional and the local level. The analysis demonstrates that indeed only local elections are significantly and robustly associated with less conflict recurrence.

The second chapter looks at how writing a new constitution influences post-conflict countries' prospects for sustainable peace. The scholarly debate on post-conflict constitution building has focused heavily on the content of the constitution and institutional design questions (Bastian and Luckham, 2003, Lijphart, 2004, Reilly, 2001, Simonsen, 2005). In this chapter, I instead posit that a constitution writing process in itself can deter future violence. I argue that two mechanisms explain why this is the case: First, a constitution-making process can make former adversaries work together, build trust between them and thereby help overcome the commitment problems characterizing post-conflict societies. Second, a constitutional momentum can also increase trust between the state and its citizens, rebuild state-society relations and thereby reduce mobilization possibilities of rebel groups. Based on data by the Comparative Constitutions Project, the analysis reveals that managing to write a new

constitution indeed significantly reduces a country's risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. Using hand-coded data on the exact beginning and end-dates of the post-conflict constitution-making process furthermore demonstrates that it is important to allow sufficient time for the constitution-making process, underlining the hypothesized relevance of bargaining and trust building.

The third chapter asks how external actors can help post-conflict countries to sustain peace and whether support to political institutions plays an important role here. The question of how effective different types of peace support are and which combinations of support are most conducive to sustain peace in countries emerging from violent conflict has so far remained open. This chapter therefore unpacks the broad category of peacebuilding to look beyond peacekeeping or general aid flows in order to identify which components or combinations of international support can contribute to sustained peace. Five areas of engagement are distinguished, based mainly on OECD/DAC data: peacekeeping, non-military security support, support for politics and governance, to socio-economic development and to societal conflict transformation and their effects on alleviating the commitment problem and reducing capabilities for rebellion discussed. Analysing 36 episodes of countries coming out of major civil wars after 1990 with configurational analysis (fuzzy-set QCA), the results show that 1) peacekeeping is but one important component of effective post-conflict support, 2) supporting governance can be an effective international strategy of peace support and 3) only combined international efforts across all types of support can address difficult

contexts. In addition, the findings show that countries neglected by the international community are at a high risk of experiencing conflict recurrence.

The three chapters complement each other, as they analyse the role of political institutions for conflict recurrence from different angles. The first chapter zooms into the political set-up of post-conflict countries, by taking a careful look at the *concrete political institutions* they exhibit. The second chapter then looks at *institutional change* in the form of constitution-writing processes. In many countries such processes decide which political institutions the post-conflict country will adopt. The final chapter then brings external actors into the picture, by disaggregating peacebuilding and demonstrating that *external support to politics and governance* can play an important role in stabilizing post-conflict societies. This category of peacebuilding support includes support to constitution-making processes and the institutions identified in the first chapter, thereby underlining the insights of the first two chapters.

Policy implications

The thesis also has very clear policy implications. The largest debates in the quantitative literature on conflict recurrence have centered around time-invariant factors or features that cannot easily be changed, such as how the type of ending of the previous conflict affects a country's risk of experiencing renewed war. Others only warn of democratization, more specifically post-conflict elections, but do not provide

strategies how to deal with them or real alternatives. The literature warning of post-conflict elections, for example recommends international actors to focus on institution-building before supporting elections (Flores and Nooruddin, 2012, Mansfield and Snyder, 2007, Paris, 2004). However, it remains entirely opaque what this is supposed to mean as "it is not clear (…) precisely what the exact institutional developments or preconditions are—only that they take time to develop" (Joshi et al., 2017:8). The results provided by this dissertation instead provide policy makers with much more concrete information on what might work. The first chapter points towards a specific type of political participation, which can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence: local elections. The second chapter takes a closer look at whether and under which conditions institutional change in the form of constitution-building can contribute to peace – again a very concrete entry point where international actors can become active. Finally, by disaggregating peacebuilding in the third chapter, international engagement and conditions for its effectiveness become the explicit focus of study. So far, the literature has not been able to show what types of international support beyond peacekeeping can contribute to peace. The results here show that support to politics and governance constitutes an effective alternative for international actors seeking to support peace in post-conflict situations.

Chapter 2: Different types of electoral participation and conflict recurrence

Introduction

One factor that remains highly disputed in the discussion on conflict recurrence is the role of a post-conflict country's political set-up. Many studies include regime type into their analyses but fail to find a consistent effect (Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2009, Mukherjee, 2006, Walter, 2004). Regarding specific political institutions, particularly post-conflict elections at the national level have gained widespread attention with several authors showing that post-conflict elections, more specifically early elections in new democracies, can lead to renewed conflict (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012). While these studies have produced highly relevant and interesting insights, they focus exclusively on national level politics. In this chapter, I instead widen the focus and analyze the effect of different types of electoral participation – at the national, regional and local level – on peace. More specifically, I argue and show that electoral participation at the local level is important to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence in countries coming out of civil war.

Most scholars writing on the positive effects of democracy on intrastate peace cite political participation as one important mechanism[2] (Hegre and Fjelde, 2010, Mason, et al., 2011, Mukherjee, 2006, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). The argument holds that democratic states should be well equipped to resolve conflict through non-violent means because they exhibit institutions that encourage participation, thereby providing aggrieved groups with several channels to voice dissent. This should make it less costly for a group to pursue policy change through peaceful channels rather than through war, reducing the risk of conflict recurrence. While this argument rightfully points toward the importance of participation in reducing the risk of conflict recurrence, it remains underdeveloped: although democracies provide more channels to participate, they are not significantly associated with less conflict recurrence. To address this gap I first develop a more differentiated theoretical argument as to when participatory institutions should reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. I argue that only those types of electoral participation that can ensure access to large parts of the post-conflict elites to influence policy making while at the same time enabling broad participation within the population reduce the risk of renewed conflict. Applying this framework to different types of electoral participation – at the national, regional and local level – then shows that only local elections fully satisfy the influence and access hypotheses and should be expected to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. Using newly available data from

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2 The other being „institutional constraints“. In order to allow for a parsimonious, yet detailed discussion, this chapter focuses on the aspect of participation and leaves it to future research to take a closer look at those institutions that constrain the executive and how they might influence conflict recurrence.

the Varieties of democracy (V-dem) project, makes it possible to then measure several types of electoral participation individually and assess their effect on a country's risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. In line with the theoretical expectations, not all types of electoral participation are consistently related to less conflict recurrence, only local elections are.

This chapter contributes to the existing literature by being the first to systematically analyse the effect of local elections on conflict recurrence. Its contribution lies in not only pointing out the relevance of one specific political institution that significantly reduces the risk of conflict recurrence, but systematically comparing different types of elections. This chapter thereby provides both scholars and policy makers with much more specific insights on which types of institutions can be crucial for peacebuilding. Sustainable Development Goal 16.7 of the Agenda 2030 calls upon countries to "ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels". The results of this chapter suggest a stronger focus should be laid upon systematically strengthening the different levels of government.

The chapter is structured as follows: the first section reviews the relevant literature on political participation and conflict recurrence. The second section provides the theoretical background on why specific participatory political institutions should reduce a country's risk of conflict recurrence and applies it to national, regional and

local elections. The third section presents the data used while the fourth section presents and discusses the results. The fifth section concludes.

Existing research on political participation and conflict recurrence

At the most aggregate level, research has addressed the question of political participation's effect on peace by including a measure of regime type when analyzing conflict recurrence. The democratic civil peace approach has long argued that channels for participation should be important to reduce the risk of conflict as they provide dissatisfied groups with non-violent channels to voice their dissent and pursue policy change and that for this reason democracies should experience less conflict. However, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between regime type and conflict recurrence remains mixed.[3] Some authors find that being democratic significantly increases a country's likelihood to remain at peace (Hegre and Nygård, 2015, Mukherjee, 2006). In contrast, Collier, et al. (2008) find that strict autocracies have a significantly lower risk of experiencing repeat civil war. However, most authors simply do not find any statistical effect of democracy or autocracy on the likelihood of conflict

[3] Several excellent literature reviews on the relationship between democracy and peace more generally (both interstate and intrastate) exist (Cederman et al., 2008, Hegre, 2014, Hegre and Fjelde, 2010).

recurrence (Quinn, et al., 2007, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). Others have therefore approached the question by disaggregating across regime types. Mukherjee (2006), for example, does not find a significant difference between the two main types of democracy – parliamentary vs. presidential, whereas Mason and Greig (2017) show that certain types of autocracies are more susceptible to renewed war than others and that this effect depends on the outcome of the previous war. Bartusevicius and Skaaning (2018) in turn differentiate between five regime types, based on the electoral competition they exhibit, and find that unconstrained "polyarchies" are the least likely to experience conflict recurrence. While differentiating between different types of democracy and autocracy is a first step at taking a closer look at how political participation affects conflict recurrence, this approach does not offer insights on the relationship between individual political institutions and conflict recurrence.

A second strand of research focuses on the role of elite participation for conflict recurrence. The literature on power-sharing agreements is relevant here, which focuses on the concrete clauses included in negotiated settlements and how these influence whether peace endures or not. Interestingly, most authors find that although military and territorial power-sharing[4] prolong peace after civil war, no such effect of political power sharing - including proportional representation as the electoral system or the

[4] How exactly these concepts are defined and operationalised differ. Military power-sharing usually includes the merging of the two armies or assignment of military posts to former rebels. Territorial power-sharing is by most authors conceived as either federalism, regional autonomy or the establishment of self-governed zones.

assignment of posts in the cabinet or civil service to former belligerents - can be found (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008, Martin, 2013).[5] In contrast, both Marshall and Ishiyama (2016) & Matanock (2017) find that allowing former rebels to participate in the political arena is an important predictor of post-conflict peace. While they do provide important insights, these approaches all focus on the post-conflict elite and fail to take into account how participation through the population affects a country's prospects for peace

A third strand of the literature analyzing political participation has focused on one specific type of electoral participation: national-level elections. It is a relatively well established finding that while established democracies are rather stable, the process of democratization can lead to conflict (Cederman, et al., 2010, Hegre et al., 2001, Hegre and Fjelde, 2010, Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, Paris, 2004). Especially elections are said to hold the potential to spark violent conflict, because they introduce a strongly competitive element into a highly fragile (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Burnell, 2006, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012, Paris, 2004). Several studies confirm that under specific circumstances, post-conflict elections can spark civil war recurrence (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Cederman, et al., 2012, Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012, Joshi, et al., 2017). Flores and Nooruddin (2012) argue that the timing of elections is critical. They find that early elections in new

[5] Only the study by Mattes and Savun (2009) finds the exact opposite, namely that political power-sharing significantly increases the duration of peace after negotiated settlement, while military and territorial power-sharing does not.

democracies are particularly at risk to lead to renewed violence. Brancati and Snyder (2012) confirm that timing is important. At the same time, several variables beyond timing can influence whether elections result in renewed violence including for example, the strength of the state and security institutions, the choice of the electoral system, the capacity of the electoral administration as well as presence of international actors and election observers (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Höglund et al., 2009, Joshi, et al., 2017, Matanock, 2017, Reilly, 2008). What the literature so far shows is therefore that certain factors, such as the timing and context can lead to elections sparking new conflict, whilst others can reduce this risk. Focusing specifically on the extent of participation at the national-level by looking at voter turn-out in national elections a similarly divergent picture emerges. Walter (2015) finds higher turn-out marginally decreases the risk of conflict recurrence. However, Letsa (2017), to the contrary, finds a significant, positive relationship between voter turnout in the first post-conflict elections and the risk of renewed war. According to the literature, national elections can hence contribute to conflict resolution in some cases but have also spurred conflict in others. While this research has produced highly relevant and valuable insights, voting in national elections clearly only constitutes one dominant mode of electoral participation. The question which role subnational elections play for peace after civil war remains unanswered. Brancati (2006) is a notable exception in this regard, because she shows that decentralization, more specifically regional elections, can both decrease and increase the risk of conflict. However, her analysis is restricted to ethnic conflict in democracies and also does not take local elections into account.

To summarize, the current literature has mostly studied the relationship between political participation and conflict recurrence either from an aggregated perspective looking at regime type, an elite perspective or by focusing on national elections. It remains to be studied more systematically, however, what effect different types of elections, especially at the subnational level can have on conflict recurrence. To address this gap, I theoretically develop an argument as to why specific channels of political participation should reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, and apply this to elections at the different levels of government. To this end, the next section first puts forward a general model explaining conflict recurrence and then shows how different types of elections affect this model.

Theory and Hypotheses

I assume that at its core, armed conflict is about furthering policy change (Cunningham, 2011, Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, Walter, 2004). For violent conflict to occur, two conditions have to be met – a group has to have both the *incentives* to rebel as well as the *capacity* for rebellion (Mason & Greig 2017).

Incentives for rebellion exist when an organized group is dissatisfied with the status quo and strongly wants to implement policy change – stark grievances exist (Gurr, 1968). The systematic exclusion of groups from political power, strong state repression

or highly uneven resource distribution that only benefit certain economic elites, all represent potential political incentives to go to war. The second central condition in order for armed conflict to occur is that a group has the capacity to mount a rebellion, which in turn depends on their military capacity and civilian support base (Mason and Greig, 2017). A rebel group's military capacity is influenced by several factors, such as whether they were defeated in the previous war, agreed to a demobilization process, whether a strong leadership exists and more generally the availability of arms or lootable resources to fund rebellion. Furthermore, rebel groups depend on a civilian support base within the population to engage in armed conflict. This is because every rebel group needs to mobilize recruits in order to go to war since they do not have conventional armies they can rely on to do so (Walter 2004).

For grievances to turn violent – and hence war to occur – a group has to be convinced that policy change is necessary and can be best pursued through war, not peaceful means. One often made assumption in this regard is that a group's choice to resort to war is based on a cost-benefit calculation (Mason and Greig, 2017). Both incentives and capacity affect the cost-benefit calculation of rebel groups. War is per se a risky and costly strategy when pursuing policy change. However, if the expected payoffs from war are high while the expected costs of war are relatively low, renewed violence becomes more likely (Cunningham, 2011, Walter, 2004). While political and economic factors determine what payoffs a group can expect from winning a war or reaching a

peace deal, their military capacity, the existence of a civilian support base and information on the previous war in turn affect how costly the war is judged to be.

Explaining conflict recurrence in post-conflict situations

What determines whether conflict recurs in post-conflict situations? The rational, bargaining theory of war usually sees one of three problems as the cause of war 1) issue indivisibility, 2) lack of information/uncertainty 3) credible commitment problems (Fearon, 1995). Post-conflict situations are particularly characterized by credible commitment problems (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011, Walter, 1997, Walter, 1999). This means that both sides may say they want to adhere to peace, but since a post-conflict situation is essentially a situation of anarchy they cannot trust each other to do so. Additionally, no external enforcement mechanism exists that could enforce the peace. Instead both sides have to expect that as soon as they become weaker the other side will renege on their promises and will try to defeat them militarily or politically.

Two types of commitment problems characterize post-conflict societies (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). Firstly, both sides have to commit to laying down their arms, which means reducing each side's military capacity, for example through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. The second credible commitment problem regards the political set-up of the post-conflict regime and the willingness to peacefully contest for power. Most importantly, the side that achieves political control

has to be able to credibly commit that they will not use their new position to politically exclude their former enemy or other parts of the population and thereby hold on to power indefinitely (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). The second stage of the commitment problem hence addresses the political incentives for rebellion.[6]

Political participation and conflict recurrence

Most scholars writing on the positive effects of democracy on civil peace cite political participation as an important mechanism (Hegre and Fjelde, 2010, Mason, et al., 2011, Mukherjee, 2006, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). This argument holds that democratic states should be well equipped to resolve conflict through non-violent means because they exhibit institutions that encourage and enable participation, thereby providing aggrieved groups with several channels to voice dissent. The main rationale here is that political systems providing channels of participation make it less costly for a group to pursue policy change through peaceful means rather than through war and thereby reduce the incentives for renewed conflict. Channels of participation hence present diverse ways to influence policy making. And because I assume that armed conflict is

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6 For conflicts that end in a peace agreement the above described problems are evident. For those that end in an outright military victory it is maybe less so. Nevertheless, as Flores and Nooruddin (2011) argue, commitment problems persist: "(…) outright military victories do not eliminate the credible commitment problem, as leaders must still convince citizens that they will forego political retribution, allowing minority groups that formerly supported the defeated parties to participate in politics and live without fear of state-sponsored discrimination. The nature of the credible commitment problem therefore shifts away from forging credibility among former combatant groups (as in peace agreements) and towards making credible promises to citizens. Though the credible commitment problem may reduce in complexity, it does not disappear."

about furthering policy change they should be able to play a role in whether post-conflict countries experience conflict recurrence. However, as the literature review demonstrated, it is not the case that countries that have diverse channels to participate, namely democracies, are necessarily better able to avoid conflict recurrence. I argue that this is because only specific types of political participation can influence countries' chances to remain peaceful after having experienced civil war.

I assume that political participation can decrease the risk of conflict recurrence, if it reduce *both* the incentives and the capacity for renewed war. Firstly, inclusive channels of participation that allow the population at large to participate in political life should reduce the capacity for rebellion. This is because, as laid out above, rebel leaders need dissatisfied parts of the population in order to mobilize recruits. The more the political system is able to provide *all* citizens with chances to participate in politics, the less likely will they be susceptible to mobilization attempts from rebel leaders. Secondly, in order to reduce the incentives for renewed war, it is important that the post-conflict elite – the previous government and rebel group(s), but also leaders of potentially new rebel groups – have a realistic chance to influence policy making. If instead the post-conflict political set-up offers them no chances to express and address their political concerns, renewed war becomes more attractive to achieve ones aims. Participation that provides both *access* to all parts of the population and *influence* to the different elements of the post-conflict elite should therefore be able to address the commitment problem prevalent in post-conflict societies. This is because providing both the

population and the post-conflict elite with possibilities to influence policy- and decision-making can be taken as an indication of the government's commitment to refrain from excluding its opponents in the now peaceful contest for power. Because it is unlikely that one political institution can entirely eliminate the incentives or capacity for renewed war, I theorize that only those channels of political participation that are able to reduce both the incentives and the capacity for renewed war can increase the chances of post-conflict peace. In the next section I apply this theory to the three main types of electoral participation – elections at the national, regional and local level.

Types of electoral participation and conflict recurrence

Voting in national elections is the most classic form of participation and the one current research has mostly focused on. On the one hand, some have argued that post-conflict elections provide a channel to peacefully contest for power and are vital for stability because only they can create a legitimate post-conflict government (Reilly, 2002). In Nepal, for example, relatively free and fair elections were held in 2008, two years after the signing of a peace agreement. They allowed a reconfiguration of the political system to now include the party of the former Maoist rebels as one central political actor and constituted an important step in keeping peace (Grävingholt et al., 2013). On the other hand and as pointed out above, several authors have drawn attention to the fact that post-conflict elections can also be highly problematic for peace, as they can introduce stark political competition into an already fragile context (Paris, 2004, Reilly,

2002). Cleavages from the war can be reinforced through electoral competition and at the same time strong state institutions that can prevent the rise of extremist parties are often lacking. Especially if the monopoly of violence has not been successfully reestablished, election losers may decide to rather revert to war to further their policy aims. Angola is a much cited example in this regard (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Paris, 2004, Reilly, 2002). Based on a peace agreement negotiated in 1991, national elections were held in 1992 in order to promote peace. In the run-off of the presidential race the two main candidates represented two former liberation movements. When it became clear that one party (Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Indpendence of Angola) had only slim chances to win the race, they rejected the election altogether and instead returned to war (Reilly, 2002). Statistical analyses confirm that particularly premature, national elections can increase the risk of conflict recurrence in post-conflict contexts (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Flores and Nooruddin, 2012).

According to the theory presented here, voting in national elections can be seen as granting political participation to the population, but it does not clearly offer the post-conflict elite possibilities to influence policy making. This is because they seldom represent a level playing field and are very difficult to access, especially for minority groups (Brinkerhoff, 2011). Additionally, the stakes tend to be very high, particularly in majoritarian systems where a "the-winner-takes-it-all" logic prevails. Because national elections can provide broad based access to the population, but not equally guarantee influence to the post-conflict elite, I expect that:

H1: National elections do not reduce the risk of conflict-recurrence

In contrast, according to the framework presented here, subnational elections should be able to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. This is firstly because they are easier to access as participating in them requires less resources than national level politics. Furthermore, former rebels or minorities have higher chances of winning in subnational elections, as they often represent a very clear-cut, local constituency (Brinkerhoff, 2011). Political positions at the local or regional level can be attractive political posts, with some discretion over financial resources and the opportunity to climb the political ladder into national level politics (Myerson, 2006). At the same time, stakes in subnational elections are often not as high as in national elections and they can focus more on service delivery (Brinkerhoff, 2011).

Although the role specifically of subnational elections in post-conflict societies has not received much scholarly attention, there are authors that argue that subnational elections should precede national elections in post-conflict contexts, due to their stabilizing effects (Diamond, 2006, Reilly, 2016). Reilly (2002) argues that subnational elections are important to develop a functioning party system and familiarize voters with the functioning of politics. In Kosovo, for example "national elections were postponed in favour of municipal polls, where the stakes are much lower and the responsibilities of elected officials were focused on service delivery rather than

national issues. (...) Evidence suggests, that by involving local actors in the process of governing while lengthening out the transition to full-blown national elections, a more mature and responsible form of party politics has begun to develop" (Reilly, 2002:124). Aceh is another example where local elections contributed to strengthening peace. Country-wide direct elections of local governors were introduced in Indonesia in 2004, but out of fear of furthering secessionist claims only national parties were allowed to nominate candidates. In the Helsinki agreement that ended the decade long Acehnese war for independence in 2005 the former rebels successfully negotiated that independent candidates were allowed to run. This resulted in a former GAM member, Irwandi Yusuf, being victorious in the 2006 elections. The access to political power and resources this enabled can be seen as one of the main reasons why Aceh has remained stable since[7]. Electoral competition at the local level also seems to have had an important, positive effect on the relationship between the local population and the Indonesian state: "By allowing its critics to assume executive responsibilities (…), the Indonesian center finally delivered a signal that it was serious about granting substantial autonomy rights to its politically most sensitive provinces – something it had been reluctant to do in the past, with disastrous consequences for its image (…) (Mietzner, 2007:38). Survey data shows that 64% of respondents felt more positively toward the central government after these local elections (Mietzner, 2007). Although the effect of local elections has not received extensive scholarly attention through statistical analyses, the study by Brancati and Snyder (2012) also suggests that

[7] Based on 35 interviews the author held in Banda Aceh in November 2017.

subnational electoral participation should be studied more systematically. The authors find that premature elections can increase the risk of renewed war, but only find robust, significant effects when restricting their analysis to national elections.

It is not clear though, whether both local and regional elections should have the same effect. Regional elections in post-conflict settings have received more scholarly attention than local elections and the evidence of their effect on peace is mixed. Brancati (2006), (2009) for example, shows that decentralization in the form of regional elections can reduce the risk of ethnic conflict in democracies, but only if it does not encourage the emergence of regional parties. This is because regional parties can strengthen ethnic identities, favor specific constituencies and mobilize violent groups.

To summarize, both local and regional elections represent an opportunity for the population at large to become politically active. At the same time, they offer more concrete possibilities for the post-conflict elite and minorities more generally to influence policy making. However, since regional elections can also spur secessionist conflict by strengthening regional parties, I expect and test whether:

H2: Local elections reduce the risk of conflict recurrence

H3: Regional elections do not reduce the risk of conflict recurrence

Data & Measurement

The dependent variable of the analysis is conflict recurrence, which I construct from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict database (ACD). In order to code conflict recurrence it is first necessary to identify post-conflict countries. Three coding decisions are important in this regard. First, as I am interested in the effect of specific political institutions in countries that have experienced *major* civil conflict[8], I use UCDP's Battle-Related Deaths Dataset and PRIO's Battle Deaths Data to identify only those countries that have experienced conflicts, which led to at least 1000 battle deaths in 2 years.[9] Second, as many countries experience multiple, overlapping conflicts, I follow Mason, et al. (2011) and Flores and Nooruddin (2009) in that *all* conflicts in a country had to have ended in order for a peace spell to begin. Third, a country had to experience a minimum of one calendar-year of peace in order to enter a peace spell so that intermissions in fighting are not coded as long term peace (for a similar approach, see Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012, Walter, 2015). This produces 88 peace spells in 56 countries between 1946 and 2011.[10]

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8 This focus on the effect of elections in severe conflict cases follows the approach taken by Brancati & Snyder (2012).

9 This per definition includes all countries that experienced 1000 battle deaths in one year. At the same time it is not as lenient as a 500 battle death criterion that for example Sambanis (2008) applies.

10 See appendix for a list of post-conflict episodes.

Recurrence is the outbreak of any conflict once a country has entered a peace spell. In the year a country experiences renewed conflict with 25 battle deaths or more the peace spell ends.[11] This holds regardless of the time period since the ending of the last conflict and whether the conflict involves the old and/or new conflict parties. I include conflicts between the same and new parties because I am interested in systemic, not only dyadic peace (following Collier, et al., 2008, Flores and Nooruddin, 2009, Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Mason, et al., 2011). Conflict recurrences are a clear subset of the 408 conflict onsets ACD codes – 63 instances of armed conflict are recurrences according to the definition presented here. Given that there are 88 peace spells, this means that a vast majority - 70% - of the post-conflict cases experience renewed violence. The analysis covers all country years of the 88 peace spells, coded 0 if no recurrence occurred in a given year and 1 otherwise.

I rely on data by V-dem[12] to measure the different types of electoral participation. Firstly, I want to capture more traditional participation through *national elections*. To this end, I use V-dem's elected official index to measure whether national elections for the legislature or executive take place. At the subnational level, indicators were chosen that measure whether local and regional elections exist. Local elections fill government posts at the level of town, cities and counties, whereas regional elections address the second-highest level of government, referred to as cantons, departments, provinces,

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11 If a peace spell does not experience a recurrence it ends in 2014 or the year the country ceased to exist.

12 All analyses are based on the data version 8.0 (Coppedge et al., 2016)

regions or states, depending on the country context. *Local elections* and *regional elections* both take a value of 1 if all posts (executive and legislative) for the respective level are filled through elections and are otherwise coded as 0.

Control variables

In line with existing research I control for several factors known to have significant effects on the likelihood of a country experiencing conflict recurrence, thereby accounting for alternative explanations for conflict recurrence. At the same time the control variables capture several factors that could influence what type of post-conflict institutions countries exhibit. Many authors find that conflicts, which have caused more deaths, are more likely to repeat themselves, whereas longer wars lead to less conflict recurrence (Fortna, 2004, Hartzell et al., 2001, Mason, et al., 2011, Walter, 2004). *Duration* is a measure of the length of the previous conflict in days, based on the ACD. In case of overlapping conflicts, their duration was aggregated. Similarly, s*everity* counts the aggregate number of battle deaths over the conflict period, based on UCDP's Battle-Related Deaths Dataset and PRIO's Battle Deaths Data. I use the natural logarithm of both variables. Regarding the ending of the previous conflict, recent research finds that decisive victories by rebels are particularly likely to make peace stick (Quinn, et al., 2007, Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012, Toft, 2010). To determine how the previous war ended, I use UCDP's conflict termination dataset and code whether the conflict ended in a *rebel victory* compared to negotiated settlements, government

victories or simply fading out (Kreutz, 2010). Cunningham (2011) shows that civil wars involving several parties can be more difficult to settle durably. Based on the ACD *Number of factions* is coded as 2 both if a country experienced several conflicts with different rebel groups at the same time or if there was only one conflict, but several rebel groups active within it. Empirical evidence shows that countries with higher income are less prone to conflict recurrence, and there is also a clear correlation between income and the level of democracy (Collier, et al., 2008, Fortna, 2004, Walter, 2004). *Income* is based on GDP per capita data by Gleditsch (2002) and transformed using the natural logarithm. Furthermore, third-party peacekeeping is a well-established factor that has been shown to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence (Collier, et al., 2008, Fortna, 2004, Hegre and Nygård, 2015, Mason, et al., 2011, Sambanis, 2008, Walter, 2004). At the same time, international actors might push post-conflict countries to establish participatory institutions. I use the International Military Intervention Data by Kisangani and Pickering (2008) until 2005 and then SIPRI data from 2005 onwards to identify whether UN-peacekeeping forces *Unpko* were present at any point during the conflict or post-conflict period. Furthermore, it has been shown that civil war onset diffuses – countries with neighbors experiencing conflict are more susceptible to conflict themselves (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). I use Gleditsch and Ward's (2001) Minimum Distance database and define countries that have 25km or less between them as neighbors. *Neighboring conflict* is based on the ACD and codes whether any of these neighbors is experiencing conflict of 25 battle deaths or more. To control for the wider political context, I introduce democracy as an additional control

variable, based on V-dem's polyarchy measure, as democratic regimes can be expected to be more likely to have elections at all levels of government. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables presented in this section.

Table 1: Summary statistics for variables of Chapter 2

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
Conflict recurrence	Dependent	1,113	.0566038	.2311878	0	1
Local elections	Core	1,103	.6364461	.4812405	0	1
Regional elections	Core	998	.3046092	.4604725	0	1
National Elections	Core	1,113	.7001285	.4501637	0	1
Duration (ln)	Control	1,070	6.437704	2.183114	0	10.04377
Severity (ln)	Control	1,113	9.252177	1.546099	6.907755	14.00199
Rebel victory	Control	1,094	.1361974	.343155	0	1
GDP (ln)	Control	1,045	7.994221	1.046482	5.093505	10.31
Nr. Of factions	Control	1,113	1.393531	.4887525	1	2
Peackeeping operation	Control	1,113	.230009	.4210275	0	1
Neighboring conflict	Control	1,113	.5004492	.5002246	0	1
Level of democracy	Control	1,113	.4205554	.2734596	.0253011	.922789
Peace years	Control	1,113	15.19227	14.15005	1	66
Peace years^2	Control	1,113	430.8491	732.0289	1	4356
Peace years^3	Control	1,113	16303.8	39407.59	1	287496

Analysis

The hypotheses are tested on 56 countries in the time period between 1946 and 2011, with the country years of 88 peace spells as units of analysis. Using a time-series cross-sectional logit regression model, I test whether elections at different levels of

government significantly impact a country's risk of experiencing repeated conflict. In order to account for time dependencies in my data, I use cubic polynomials, controlling for different forms of time: t_1, t_2 and t_3. Furthermore, I cluster the standard errors according to countries to account for geographic dependencies. The independent variables and the control variables were all lagged by one year to reduce the risk of endogeneity – mistakenly taking effects of conflict recurrence for its cause. Another possibility would be to use survival analysis. However, since I am interested in whether peace failed or not and not how much time elapsed until peace failed, I prefer to use logistic regression. Survival analysis is included in the robustness checks and does not alter the results.

Before turning to the main results, I briefly discuss the control variables. I confirm several findings of other authors: higher income in the post-conflict phase reduces the risk of renewed war, whereas more factions involved in the last conflict increases the risk of conflict recurring. The signs of UN-peacekeeping, democracy and neighboring conflict correspond to theoretical expectation, but the coefficients are not, or not consistently, statistically significant. The measure of the severity and duration of the previous conflict are both statistically significant, but in the opposite direction of what some other authors find – longer civil wars are more likely to result in renewed violence whereas more severe civil wars reduce these risks. This suggests that drawn out, but relatively low-intensity conflicts are more difficult to settle durably. While these results at first might seem surprising, they do however, correspond to certain theoretical

expectations – many have argued that high casualty rates should reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, because they reveal information on the high costs of future armed conflict (Mason, et al., 2011, Walter, 2004). Furthermore, not all authors find consistent effects regarding theses variables. Kreutz (2010) for example does not find length or intensity to be significantly related to conflict recurrence, whereas Gates et al. (2016) also find that longer wars are significantly more likely to recur. Also contrary to other research, I find rebel victories to significantly increase a country's risk of experiencing renewed violence. This could stem from the fact that rebel victories can lead to highly authoritarian regimes (Lyons, 2016). It is likely that these divergent findings stem from whether one is analyzing systemic or dyadic peace, how battle deaths and duration are aggregated and which conflict exactly is considered as the last conflict. While they cannot be further explored here, they do warrant further analysis.

In line with the theoretical expectations, the main results show interesting variation amongst the different types of electoral participation. The coefficient for national elections is positive – hence suggesting they might increase the risk for conflict recurrence – but not statistically significant. The coefficient for regional elections, in turn is negative, pointing towards reducing the risk of conflict recurrence, but also not statistically significant. In line with my theoretical expectations, the holding of local elections, in contrast, is statistically significantly associated with less conflict recurrence ($p=0.029$). On average, countries that have local elections are half as likely

to experience conflict recurrence compared to those that do not. Table 2 summarizes the regression results.

Table 2: The effect of types of electoral participation on conflict recurrence

	(1)	(2)	(3)
National elections	0.0287		
	(0.494)		
Regional elections		-0.160	
		(0.363)	
Local elections			-0.815*
			(0.372)
Rebel victory	1.533**	1.575*	1.639**
	(0.555)	(0.688)	(0.578)
GDP	-0.464*	-0.558**	-0.479*
	(0.193)	(0.191)	(0.207)
Multiple factions	0.768*	0.849**	0.777**
	(0.303)	(0.326)	(0.296)
UN Peacekeeping	-0.714	-0.851+	-0.769
	(0.495)	(0.515)	(0.531)
Neighboring conflict	0.475	0.399	0.317
	(0.396)	(0.402)	(0.395)
Duration	0.243*	0.284**	0.265**
	(0.0948)	(0.0897)	(0.0914)
Prior ethnic war	-0.0733	0.246	0.0839
	(0.392)	(0.404)	(0.427)
Severity	-0.361*	-0.466**	-0.326*
	(0.156)	(0.127)	(0.144)
Democracy	-2.286+	-1.970	-1.201
	(1.333)	(1.423)	(1.272)
t	-0.0543	-0.0330	-0.0364
	(0.0680)	(0.0794)	(0.0665)
t2	0.00119	-0.000517	0.000849
	(0.00325)	(0.00381)	(0.00314)
t3	-0.000000339	0.0000332	0.000000584
	(0.0000378)	(0.0000462)	(0.0000358)
Constant	2.010	3.055	1.562
	(2.068)	(1.930)	(2.119)
Observations	1002	902	992
R^2	0.12	0.13	0.13

Standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Robustness checks

To test the robustness of the results several steps were taken. First, when available, additional V-dem indicators were employed to measure the effect of different types of elections. For national elections, I analyze whether the extent of participation through higher voter turnout positively influences peace, based on data from Vanhanen (2000). I also test whether the quality of national elections matters, based on V-dem's clean elections index. Neither indicator yields significant results, although both now display a negative coefficient. The analyses conducted here hence does not suggest that the holding of national elections significantly impacts on a country's risk to experience conflict recurrence. Additional data on subnational elections is more scarce. Next to the indicators on subnational elections, V-dem codes whether governments at the subnational national level exist. In line with the main results presented above, the indicator for the local level is significant, while the regional indicator is not. However, that countries do not have any type of local government is extremely rare and only applies to a few country years in Azerbaijan and Greece. This result should therefore not be interpreted too strongly. V-dem also codes the de facto power of regionally or locally elected officials vis-à-vis unelected officials. Neither indicator is significant. This suggests that enabling participation through elections might be more important than the actual power subnational offices hold. This is underlined by the fact that V-dem's subnational elections index, which measures whether elections at the local or regional level take place is again statistically significant. As the main analysis

demonstrates, this result can be explained by local, rather than regional elections. Table 3 provides the regression results of all additional indicators used.

Table 3: Regression results: Additional V-dem indicators for subnational elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voter turnout	-0.0106						
	(0.00974)						
National elections free		-1.285					
		(0.851)					
Local gov. exists			-1.282*				
			(0.579)				
Regional gov. exists				-0.0483			
				(0.353)			
Power of local gov.					0.0862		
					(0.168)		
Power of regional gov.						0.0714	
						(0.132)	
Subnational elections							-0.367**
							(0.126)
Rebel victory	1.685**	1.494**	1.583**	1.520**	1.614**	1.509*	1.604**
	(0.506)	(0.528)	(0.565)	(0.588)	(0.534)	(0.644)	(0.570)
GDP	-0.486*	-0.434*	-0.484*	-0.468*	-0.430*	-0.520**	-0.420*
	(0.220)	(0.202)	(0.198)	(0.193)	(0.204)	(0.175)	(0.213)
Multiple factions	0.681+	0.733*	0.755*	0.767*	0.780*	0.802*	0.731*
	(0.362)	(0.309)	(0.302)	(0.304)	(0.318)	(0.329)	(0.309)
UN Peacekeeping	-0.889	-0.713	-0.728	-0.712	-0.703	-0.752	-0.913
	(0.573)	(0.508)	(0.498)	(0.510)	(0.545)	(0.458)	(0.558)
Neighboring conflict	0.203	0.439	0.463	0.474	0.466	0.439	0.518
	(0.375)	(0.385)	(0.397)	(0.393)	(0.422)	(0.405)	(0.399)
Duration	0.327**	0.250**	0.247**	0.243**	0.142	0.283**	0.262**
	(0.0986)	(0.0886)	(0.0926)	(0.0913)	(0.100)	(0.0874)	(0.0863)
Prior ethnic war	0.190	-0.111	-0.0187	-0.0758	-0.0210	0.257	0.220
	(0.366)	(0.389)	(0.404)	(0.416)	(0.442)	(0.394)	(0.380)
Severity	-0.453**	-0.356*	-0.365*	-0.361*	-0.326*	-0.451**	-0.294*
	(0.119)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.150)	(0.140)	(0.132)	(0.142)
Democracy	-1.962	-0.861	-2.179+	-2.253+	-2.480+	-2.338+	-1.319
	(1.316)	(1.368)	(1.244)	(1.250)	(1.356)	(1.266)	(1.339)
Constant	2.780	1.717	3.408	2.096	2.167	2.769	0.302
	(2.005)	(2.107)	(2.314)	(2.025)	(2.113)	(1.896)	(2.113)
Observations	944	1002	1002	1002	953	885	1002
	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.14

Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.0$. Specifications of time included, but not reported here

Second, I test whether the results are sensitive to the definition of post-conflict situations. To test this, the criterion for what constitutes a post-conflict situation is first reduced to whether the previous conflict led to 1000 battle deaths in one year or more and then expanded to include all countries that have experienced conflicts of up to 500 battle deaths in one year. The results remain unchanged. Furthermore, it was analysed whether local elections can also explain severe recurrence – here measured as violence leading to at least 500 battle related deaths. The coefficient for local elections is now marginally significant (p= 0.054). Furthermore, the periods of analysis were cut to 30, 20 and 15 years in order to make sure that the results are not driven by outliers where recurrence occurred long after the last conflict. In both cases the results hold. Lastly, all models were re-estimated using different types of regression analyses. First, rare events logistic regression based on Firthlogit was used to account for the fact that conflict recurrence is highly unlikely – the distribution between 1s and 0s for the dependent variable is highly uneven with only 6% (63) of country-years experiencing recurrence and 94% (1,050) non-recurrence. All results remain unchanged. Second, survival analysis was used to measure the core variables' effect on the duration of peace – a common equivalent to using logistic regression analysis to analyze conflict recurrence – and again the results are confirmed. Overall the results of the different robustness tests suggest that local elections are robustly and significantly associated with a lower risk of experiencing conflict recurrence.

Conclusion

This chapter moved away from the prevailing focus on electoral dynamics at the national-level, instead arguing and showing that local elections can contribute to peace. Proponents of the democratic civil peace theory have long argued that one mechanism via which democracy contributes to peace is by providing non-violent channels to participate. This chapter contributes to this debate by scrutinizes this claim and developing the main argument further. More specifically, it suggests that there should be less conflict recurrence in post-conflict countries that exhibit institutions which a) encourage the participation of large segments of society and that b) allow the post-conflict elite to influence policy-making. I argue that not all types of electoral participation satisfy both the influence and access assumption, but local elections do. In line with the theoretical argument put forward, the analysis of all countries that experienced civil war between 1946 and 2011 shows that local elections are significantly associated with less conflict recurrence, while divers indicators for participation through national or regional elections are not.

Overall, this chapter underlines the benefits of tackling the question on the relationship between political institutions and conflict recurrence from a more disaggregated approach. At the same time, the insights provided here also suggests several avenues for further research. One central question this chapter leaves unanswered is how these

local elections, that are important to prevent conflict recurrence, came about and how this affects countries' prospects for peace. Studying institutional change at the local level in post-conflict societies could provide interesting insights in this regard. Furthermore, the purely quantitative analyses could be complemented by qualitative analyses of how exactly the post-conflict elite or population at large make use of local elections to further their political aims. Furthermore, this chapter focused on one specific type of participation only. Participation through political parties or civil society could also be important, alternative channels for participation in post-conflict contexts, and their effects remain to be better studied and understood. Finally, data restrictions remain a challenge. V-dem is the first to provide comprehensive data on local elections worldwide, thereby making it possible to systematically study their effect. However, the fact that no alternative data sources are available make it difficult to assess the sensitivity of the results, especially because V-dem codes expert opinions. Also more detailed information on local elections is difficult to obtain, but could be highly useful in understanding their effect better. This could include the exact dates on when local elections were held, the parties that competed in them or the level of voter turnout. This would make it possible to study the relationship between local level electoral participation and peace in much greater detail.

What do these results mean for external actors aiming to support sustainable peace in post-conflict societies? SDG 16.7 of the Agenda 2030 calls upon countries to "ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels".

The results of this chapter suggest that particularly participation beyond the national level can contribute to peace in post-conflict societies. However, international actors often lay their focus on developments at the national level. Strengthening participation and accountability at the local level should therefore be an important starting point for external engagement geared at strengthening peace. It is more likely that democracies will have local elections, but the argument and analysis do include, and can be applied, to non-democratic regimes. Especially in context where participation at the national level is difficult to achieve, strengthening the local level might be a promising alternative. At the same time the analysis only offers a static view on the relationship between local electoral participation and peace. Whether the process of widening participation by introducing local elections might have similarly destabilizing effects as democratization more generally remains for further research. While international actors should hence very carefully consider whether to push for the introduction of local elections, the strengthening of electoral politics at the local level could benefit from more international attention.

Appendix 1

Table 4: Population of cases of Chapter 2

Country	*Previous civil war*	*Recurrence (from 25 battle related deaths)*
Angola	1975-2002	2004
Argentina	1974-1977	
Azerbaijan	1991-1995	1997-1998
Bolivia	1946	1952, 1967
Bosnia- Herzegovina	1992-1995	
Burundi	1994-2006	2008
Cambodia	1967-1975	1978-1998
Cambodia II	1978-1998	
Cameroon	1960-1961	1984
Chad	1966-1972	1976-1984
Chad II	1976-1984	1986-1987
Chad III	1986-1987	1989-1994
Chad IV	1989-1994	1997-2003
Chad V	2005-2010	
Chile	1973	
China	1946-1950	1956
China II	1956	1959
China III	1959	2008
Congo	1997-1999	2002
Costa Rica	1948	
Dominican republic	1965	
DR Congo	1964-1965	1967
DR Congo II	2006-2008	2012 (ongoing)
El Salvador	1979-1991	
Ethiopia	1964-1996	1998 (ongoing)
France	1961-1962	
Georgia	1991-1993	2004
Greece	1946-1949	

Guatemala	1965-1995	
India	1948-1951	1956-1959
India II	1956-1959	1961-1971
India III	1961-1971	1979 (ongoing)
Indonesia	1950	1953,
Indonesia	1958-1961	1965,
Indonesia	1975-1988	1990-1992
Indonesia	1997-2005	
Iran	1979-1988	1990-1991
Iraq	1958-1959	1961-1970
Iraq	1961-1970	1973-1996
Iraq	1973-1996	2004 (ongoing)
Israel	1949-2012	2014 (ongoing)
Ivory Coast	2002-2004	2011
Laos	1960-1961	1963-1973
Laos	1963-1973	1989-1990
Lebanon	1958	1975-1976
Lebanon	1975-1976	1982-1986
Lebanon	1982-1986	1989-1990
Lebanon	1989-1990	2014 (ongoing)
Liberia	2000-2003	
Morocco	1975-1989	
Mozambique	1977-1992	2013
Nepal	1996-2006	
Nicaragua	1977-1979	1982-1990
Nicaragua	1990	
Nigeria	1966-1970	2004, 2009
Pakistan	1971	1974-1977
Pakistan	1974-1977	1990
Paraguay	1947	1954
Peru	1982-1999	2007-2010
Philippines	1946-1954	1969 (ongoing)
Russia	1946-1950	1990-1991
Russia	1993-1996	1999-2014 (ongoing)
Rwanda	1990-1994	1996-2002

Rwanda	1996-2002	2009-2012
Rwanda	2009-2012	
Serbia	1991	1998-1999
Serbia	1999	
Sierra Leone	1991-2001	
Somalia	1986-1996	2001-2002
South Africa	1966-1988	
South Vietnam	1955-1964	
South Yemen	1986	
Sri Lanka	1971	1984-2001
Sri Lanka	1984-2001	2003
Sri Lanka	2005-2009	
Sudan	1963-1972	1976, 1983 (ongoing)
Syria	1979-1982	2011 (ongoing)
Tajikistan	1992-1998	2000
Thailand	1982	2003 (ongoing)
Turkey	1984-2013	
Uganda	1979-1992	1994-2011
Uganda	1994-2011	2013 (ongoing)
Yemen (North)	1948	1962-1970
Yemen (North)	1962-1970	1979-1982
Yemen (North)	1994	2009-2014 (ongoing)
Zimbabwe	1973-1979	
Overall number of recurrences		63 (vs. 1050 0s)

Chapter 3: The power of deliberation: How post-conflict constitution-making processes can contribute to peace

Introduction

This chapter[13] contributes to the debate on conflict recurrence by focusing on one factor I argue has not received enough attention – constitution-making processes. Every fourth country coming out of conflict writes a new constitution.[14] Because a successful constitution-making process establishes a new and potentially permanent governance framework that regulates access to power, it is often seen as a main part of a political transition necessary in post-conflict states. Constitution-making has therefore become a central component of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies (Samuels, 2006). A prominent discussion has been whether the design of the new political institutions – embedded in a new constitutions or a peace agreement – can help reduce the risk of renewed conflict. While content certainly seems to matter, these discussions have focused on very technical details including the institutional design of power-sharing institutions and electoral systems (Bastian and Luckham, 2003, Lijphart, 2004, Reilly, 2001, Simonsen, 2005). What this debate does not address is whether there is an effect of the constitution-making process itself. Writing a new constitution can be a

[13] A version of this chapter has received an R+R from the *Journal of Peace Research*.

[14] Calcuation based on data presented in the data section.

complicated and difficult process that detracts considerable funds and energy from political actors. However, if the process itself contributes to making peace stick, then it should be no question that these efforts are worth it. However, it is not clear whether writing a new constitution indeed enables a more secure transition from war to peace.

In this chapter, I argue that a constitution-making process can deter future violence. Two mechanisms can be brought forward to explain why this might be the case – first, a constitution-making process can make the main political actors of a post-conflict country, including former adversaries, work together, build trust between them and thereby help overcome the commitment problems characterizing post-conflict societies. Second, a constitutional momentum can increase trust between the state and its citizens, rebuild state-society relations and thereby reduce mobilization possibilities of rebel groups. Based on these arguments, this chapter develops two hypotheses on the effect of constitution-making processes on peace in post-conflict countries and tests them empirically on all post-conflict cases between 1946 and 2011. It is thereby the first to systematically theorize and analyze the effect of constitution-making processes on post-conflict peace.

The results show that writing a constitution indeed significantly reduces a country's risk of experiencing renewed conflict. Based on newly coded data, the analysis also demonstrates that it is important to allow sufficient time for a constitution-making process, suggesting that processes, which allow for extensive bargaining are more

beneficial for peace. Overall, this chapter thereby contributes to the discussion on how to make post-conflict processes more stable and points toward institutional development in form of constitution-making as an important factor to do so. It thereby firstly contributes to the literature on peacebuilding and conflict recurrence. Secondly, the chapter also contributes to the literature on constitution-making, which has begun to analyze the effect of constitution-making but so far has failed to systematically investigate the effect on peace. Thirdly, this chapter also has strong policy implications: post-conflict contexts are extremely difficult to stabilize and strongly influenced by factors that cannot be impacted – e.g. characteristics of the previous war. Writing a constitution, however, can be encouraged and supported. This chapter hence generates findings which can be directly relevant to efforts to stabilize post-conflict countries.

This chapter is structured as follows – the next chapter discusses the available literature on the effect of constitutions in post-conflict contexts, demonstrating that the attention has so far laid on the content of the constitution rather than the constitution-making process itself. The third section then develops an argument as to why and under which circumstances constitution-making should reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. The fourth section presents the data used and the fifth section the results of the analyses. The sixth section addresses the issue of endogeneity. The seventh and final section concludes.

Previous literature on post-conflict constitution-making

Understanding conflict recurrence has become an independent strand of research within peace and conflict studies. While other literature focuses on explaining why conflict breaks out in the first place, what explains how long conflicts endure and how they are ended, this strand of research aims to understand what prevents post-conflict countries from sliding back into war. One large debate within this literature has focused on characteristics of the previous conflict to explain renewed violence. How the previous war ended plays a particularly prominent role in this discussion (Mason, et al., 2011, Toft, 2010). A second large debate focuses on the role of external actors in supporting peace, particularly through peacekeeping (Beardsley, 2011, Fortna, 2008, Sambanis, 2008). The third group of identified relevant factors are the economic and political set-up and development of the post-conflict country (Hegre and Nygård, 2015, Mason, et al., 2011, Walter, 2004, Walter, 2015). This chapter connects to this third strand by focusing explicitly on institutional development in post-conflict societies. More specifically, it takes a closer look at the role constitution-making processes can play for post-conflict peace and argues that the process of writing a constitution can help build post-conflict peace.

Regarding the role of constitution making in post-conflict settings, the most prominent strand of political science research has focused on the question of the appropriate

design of a constitution. The large debate on whether the consociational[15] or the centripetal approach is to be preferred in highly divided and post-conflict societies marks this field (Horowitz, 2001, Lijphart, 1977, Lijphart, 1999). The main difference between the two is that while the consociational approach aims to overcome conflict by requiring "the inclusion of all groups in government" (Horowitz, 2008:1215-16) the centripetal approach strives to build institutions that can help "transcend group differences by encouraging groups to cooperate around common political goals" (Samuels, 2006:672-73). This large debate has very much centered upon whether power-sharing – ensuring representation of groups territorially, in the military or in the government – should be implemented and which electoral model should be preferred after conflict.

Empirically, some indications exist that power-sharing can help secure peace (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007, Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Martin, 2013). However, there is still a large debate on which type of power-sharing - military, territorial or political – contributes to peace. Most authors find that military and territorial power-sharing leads to less conflict recurrence, while political power-sharing does not (Derouen et al., 2009, Ginsburg et al., 2009, Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008, Martin, 2013, Mattes and Savun, 2009). At the same time, several authors also caution that power-sharing might be good for peace in the short-term, but less beneficial in the long-term, as it can also perpetuate divisions, rather than help to overcome them (Jung, 2012,

[15] Also referred to by some authors as consensus democracy or power-sharing more generally.

Samuels, 2006). An empirical problem with this literature is that it only addresses a very narrow set of cases, by only analyzing dyadic peace after peace agreements. Regarding the electoral system many concur that proportional representation is to be preferred but highly technical discussions regarding the ideal institutional design of electoral systems are still ongoing (Horowitz, 2008, Reilly, 2001).

Beyond the discussions on the content of constitutions in the form of power-sharing institutions, practically no systematic, empirical research on the effect of constitutions on peace in post-conflict settings exists. Several case studies provide interesting insights on constitution-making in specific cases, but are not able to draw more general conclusions because they do not employ comparative designs (Bannon, 2007, Benomar, 2004, Ihonvbere, 2000, Miller, 2010, Selassie, 1998, Wheatley and Mendez, 2013). Using statistical analyses Walter (2015) finds that having a written constitution significantly reduces a country's risk of experiencing civil war recurrence. However, as almost all post-conflict countries have a written constitution this factor only holds limited explanatory power. Additionally, this leaves the question about the impact of the process of undergoing constitutional change – which only 1/3 of post-conflict countries do - unanswered.

A second strand of literature relevant for this chapter comes from comparative constitutionalism. This literature is rooted in comparative law and has analyzed post-conflict situations as very specific circumstances for constitution-making (Samuels,

2006, Widner, 2008). [16] Overall, this literature is mostly highly descriptive, which is why both Wallis (2014) and Ginsburg, et al. (2009) note a lack of systematic research on the impact of constitution-making processes on several outcomes, including peace. Only Widner (2008) tries to compare and explain violence five years prior to ratification and five years after ratification. However, the author herself admits that the measures used are too crude to allow for drawing strong conclusions from them. Within this literature, attention has also gone to understanding the effect of constitution-making on other outcomes, such as democratization or the longevity of the constitution (Saati, 2015, Wheatley and Mendez, 2013). Eisenstadt et al. (2015) for example show that countries that write a new constitution, and particularly those that do so in participatory manner, experience statistically significant increases in their level of democracy afterwards. There is also a research on the issue of constitutional endurance (Elkins et al., 2009, Widner, 2008) and whether how the constitution is written effects the types of provisions included (Ginsburg, et al., 2009, Negretto, 2016, Samuels, 2006). While these studies represent first attempts from comparative law and political science to systematically address the effects that constitution-making process can have, how constitution-making effects peace has also not been addressed by this literature.

To summarize, the political science literature has focused on the content of the constitution to explain post-conflict peace. The comparative constitutionalism literature in turn mostly provides detailed accounts of individual cases or provides

[16] Some of the arguments developed by this literature will be presented in the next section.

systematic analyses of other outcomes, such as democratization or constitutional endurance rather than peace. Case studies seem to indicate that constitution-making processes can make a difference, but this has not been systematically analyzed on a larger number of cases. There is hence a clear gap with regard to understanding how constitution-making processes impact on post-conflict peace.

Theory & Hypotheses

New constitutions are usually written in reaction to a political crises or major political events (Brown, 2008, Elster, 1995, Negretto, 2016).[17] Most typically, these include a) independence b) a change of authoritarian leadership, c) a regime transition; or c) the ending of a conflict (Negretto, 2016).[18] Two or more of the four factors can co-occur – such as in Eritrea, which wrote a new constitution after having come out of a conflict that led to its independence from Ethiopia. Or the prominent example of South Africa, which embarked on a regime transition after conflict, accompanied by a major constitution writing process, which established democracy in the country. Constitutions are hence usually written to signal a clear break with the previous regime and in order to redefine the ground rules for how the country will be governed.

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[17] Examples of constitution-writing in stable times also exist, but are rare. They include Sweden 1974, Switzerland 1999 or Finland 2000 (Negretto, 2016).

[18] Less prominent reasons according to Negretto (2016) include either stronger shifts in party competition, the need to modernize the political system or to adapt the constitution to new practices that have evolved and have been unofficially practiced already.

New constitutions are written both in democratic and autocratic regimes. Ginsburg and Simpser (2013) differentiate four major functions of constitutions. Firstly, both in autocracies and democracies constitutions can serve as coordination tools that organize the state's institutions and clarify responsibilities. Precommitment can be a second, important function of a constitution – it allows rulers to set limits to their own power. Although more pronounced in democratic constitution-making, examples of authoritarian rulers limiting their own power through constitutions also exist (Ginsburg and Simpser, 2013). Third, constitutions can be instruments to signal policy intent, both in democracies and autocracies. Finally, in authoritarian settings, constitutions can be used for window dressing - giving the country pseudo democratic institutions or using a democratically worded constitution and knowingly violating it to demonstrate an authoritarian leader's power to the opposition. Regarding the writing of a new constitutions - democratic constitution-making most often occurs during regime transitions, when the new political regime needs to be designed and focuses on how to balance power and constrain leaders (Brown 2008). In an autocratic setting a new constitution is often used by leaders to coordinate intra-elite competition and to try to consolidate their power (Ginsburg and Simpser, 2013, Landau, 2013).

Not all post-conflict countries aim to write new constitutions after conflict. One, simple explanation which post-conflict countries embark on constitution-writing processes is

necessity.[19] If a civil war has resulted in independence, a new constitution is often necessary to provide the basis for the new state and help it gain international recognition (Negretto, 2016). Beyond independence, a more general explanation for constitutional change is that the relative bargaining strength of groups within a polity has changed (Voigt, 1999). This is clearly the case after many conflicts. Negotiated settlements usually lead to the inclusion of new political actors into the regime and can become part of countries' transition to democracy, as was the case in Nepal or South Africa. Rebel victories change the power-structure fundamentally, installing a new main political actor in the country. The victorious rebel group in Ruanda, for example, used the constitution-writing process to restructure the state according to its liking. Finally, also a government victory can alter the power relations in a country and lead to post-conflict constitution-making. If a government was able to crush its opponent it can use a new constitution to consolidate this superior position, constitutional amendments in Sri Lanka being a case in point. As pointed out before, constitution-making usually occurs after profound political change. Whether or not post-conflict countries will aim to engage in constitution-writing therefore should depend on whether the previous conflict is seen as such a major political crises or whether it has significantly altered the power relations within the country.

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[19] The question of why countries adopt new constitutions in general and in post-conflict settings in particular has surprisingly not been studied systematically. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully discuss this issue here, I briefly sketch some ideas on when we should see post-conflict constitution-making to take place and leave it to others to further develop and test these arguments.

Table 5 displays the number of post-conflict episodes that have gone through constitution-making processes, differentiated according to the ending of the civil war preceding the constitution-writing process. It shows that post-conflict constitution-making occurs after all types of ending, but also demonstrates that it is least likely when a conflict has simply faded out – a post-conflict situation in which the power structure in the country can be expected to have remained relatively untouched by the conflict. I therefore assume that most post-conflict constitution-making is initiated either because constitution-making is seen as a conflict management tool or as a reaction to shifts in power relations caused by the conflict[20]. Table 5 also makes clear that most post-conflict episodes do not experience constitution-making, which is not surprising, given that it is a rare event more generally. However, the data also shows that a considerable number of countries do engage in constitution-making after having experienced internal violence and the effect of undergoing such a constitution-writing process on peace needs to be studied more systematically.

[20] At the same time, in some cases post-conflict constitution-making might occur without having a strong connection to the previous conflict. Constitutional review might have been a pending issue in the country predating the conflict, or new problems arise in the post-conflict phase that are relatively unrelated to the conflict but result in constitution-making. That post-conflict constitution-making does not have to have a clear connection to the previous conflict does not call the theory developed in the next section into question. Whether a constitution-making process contributes to peace should not depend on whether it was initiated because of the conflict, but whether it enables trust building between the elite and the state and its citizens in the post-conflict phase.

Table 5: Post-conflict constitution-making after different types of conflict end

	Agreement	Gov. Victory	Rebel victory	Low activity
No new constitution	55 (81%)	49 (73%)	9 (36%)	59 (83%)
Post-conflict constitution	13 (19%)	18 (29%)	16 (64%)	12 (17%)

This short introduction into the question why post-conflict countries choose to write new constitutions suggests that it is the countries in more severe crises that do so. As Elster (1995:394) notes "the task of constitution-making generally emerges in conditions that are likely to work against good constitution-making. Being written for the indefinite future, constitutions ought to be adopted in maximally calm and undisturbed conditions. (…) (Instead) the call for a new constitution usually arises in turbulent circumstances (…)." This suggests that the following analysis on how post-conflict constitution-making – the writing of a constitution in the aftermath of violent conflict – contributes to peace does not suffer from a selection bias of easier cases. Instead countries that write new constitutions after conflict represent more difficult case at a higher risk of reverting back to war. The next section elaborates how constitution-making in such post-conflict contexts can contribute to peace.

How post-conflict constitution making can contribute to peace

Post-conflict societies are marked by stark mistrust – after years of military confrontation, neither of the formerly warring parties can credibly commit to the peace process and both parties live in the fear that the other will reignite conflict (Walter, 1997). In order for peace to sustain, former enemies hence have to overcome the mistrust and suspicions they hold against each other. Walter (Walter, 1997, Walter, 2004) has extensively and convincingly argued that external actors can help internal enemies overcome these commitment problems, but external actors are not always equally active in post-conflict situations. I instead argue that a constitution-making process can also help overcome commitment problems and thereby contribute to reducing the risk of civil war recurrence.

Two arguments explain how constitution-making processes can contribute to peace after conflict – one offers an elite-centric explanation, while the other focuses on state-society relations. The elite-centric mechanism holds that because constitution-making encourages the major political actors of the post-conflict state to jointly define how access to power will be regulated it can build compromise and trust between them. The state-society mechanism in turn stresses the legitimacy and public support for the new state that a constitution-making process can create.[21] Although the logic is slightly

[21] Two other, less important arguments why constitution-making could impact on post-conflict peace can be made. First, agreeing to engage in a constitution-making process signals the parties' commitment to the peace process (Benomar, 2004). Second, I would argue that if former adversaries

different depending on the regime context, both mechanisms work in the same direction both in democracies and autocracies.

The elite-centric mechanism

Writing a constitution can be seen as an important negotiation process in the post-conflict period (Horowitz, 2008). In this line of thinking, Ginsburg, et al. (2009:211) claim that "It is common to think of constitutions as products of various competing interest groups organized along economic goals, ethnic claims, or political ideology" and Hart (2010:20) writes: „Constitution making is a contest over the distribution, redistribution, and limitation of power". Conceiving of constitution-making as a bargaining process in the post-conflict phase makes clear that it essentially allows rebels and governments to continue their negotiation about the future of the country, but within an institutionalized process rather than on the battlefield. If the process is very inclusive, other excluded groups and thereby potentially new rebels can equally be included in this negotiation process. This does not imply such processes to necessarily be smooth, to the contrary they are often highly complicated and conflictual. Because a constitution is "a system which establishes the fundamental rules and principles by which a state is governed" (Samuels, 2006:664) and thereby regulates access to power, there is bound to be conflict over how such a post-conflict constitution

jointly agree on these rule and principles the likelihood that they will abide by them instead of going back to war should be higher.

should look. At the same time a constitution-making process not only consists of intensive, complicated bargaining, but it is also highly focused on finding compromise. Constitution-making is hence best described as a mixture of "battles fought and compromises struck" (Landau, 2013:633). Because compromises need to be found at various stages throughout the constitution-making process, post-conflict constitution-making should be seen as iterative rounds of bargaining and finding compromises. I argue that it is through this that trust can incrementally be built between the post-conflict elite.

Firstly, it needs to be decided who will write the new constitution – with the decision usually having to be made between a constitutional commission or a constituent assembly as well as the degree the public will be able to participate.[22] Fiji and South Africa are both examples where the question on process stirred highly intense discussions and it took months to find an agreement on these issues. Second, if a constitutional commission is to write the new constitution, bargaining and compromise will have to be struck on who is appointed as commissioners. If the constitution is written through an assembly, political actors will have to work together even more closely in committees debating and adopting drafts of specific parts of the constitution. Deadlock can occur during the drafting process and often special bodies are created in order to deal with particularly decisive issues. This joint work on a constitution can

[22] See Widner (2008) or Ginsburg et al. (2009) for detailed descriptions of the different processes and procedures applied in constitution-making processes.

have "educative features", which Brown (2008:11) describes as follows: "Messy, protracted drafting serves the underappreciated purpose of preparing various parties for the operation of normal democratic politics. (…) Forming alliances, crafting consensus (or at least majority) positions, compromising, and trading are critical elements for leaders in any democratic system." Thirdly and finally, a final draft of the constitution has to be adopted by parliament. A highly important and unique feature of constitution-writing processes is that they require broad consensus – final drafts usually require either unanimity or a 2/3 majority to be adopted. In order to produce a constitution, a broad compromise between the main political actors is necessary. This means that any post-conflict country that has successfully ended a constitution-writing process by writing and adopting a new constitution, has gone through an intense inter-elite dialogue. A constitution-making process hence consists of a number of stages and requires the actors involved to work together, debate and find compromise at every one of them. I argue that this can incrementally build trust between former adversaries.

While more pronounced in democratic constitution-making, the importance of bargaining through constitution-making can also be applied to autocratic contexts. As Ginsburg and Simpser (2013: 3) note: "(…) even authoritarian constitutions often reflect processes of collective choice among elites with divergent interests. Therefore, despite the fact that authoritarian rulers enjoy more discretion than their democratic counterparts in deciding when and how to draft a constitution, it may be incorrect to assume that authoritarian constitutions reflect optimizing behavior on the part of a

unitary ruler." Even in authoritarian settings, a certain degree of bargaining will hence often be involved in adopting a new constitution. Additionally, autocratic rulers can consolidate their power through a revision of the constitution. The elite-centric mechanism in authoritarian setting hence is more about autocratic rulers increasing their repressive capacities, which can be used to avoid further conflict.

The state-society mechanism

The second mechanism works through state-society relations and applies equally to democracies and autocracies. A constitution-making process has the potential to reconcile the people and rally them around a common goal: "constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there." (Samuels, 2006:664). In countries torn from war, a constitution-making process can hence be an opportunity to not only stipulate public support for a peace process but also confer legitimacy to the (possibly new) state institutions. Tushnet (2012:1984) notes, "(I)n nations with heterogeneous populations—an increasingly large proportion of the world's nations—a constitution can serve as an expression, perhaps the only one available, of national unity". Positively influencing the relationship between the new state and its citizens, i.e increasing trust in state institutions, should in turn reduce recruitment possibilities for future conflict. This is important as groups depend on a civilian support base to mount the capacity for civil war. In a democratic setting, positively influencing trust in state institutions

through constitution-making is ideally achieved by creating a document, which represents all interests in a society, thereby rebuilding national unity. In an autocratic setting "the process of writing the constitution serves a political purpose. It allows the regime to be seen as engaged in an important project" (Ginsburg and Simpser, 2013:13), thereby garnering trust and support from the population. In this vain, Klein and Sajó (2012) note that "even an imposed constitution may gain acceptance and even legitimacy". Based on the two mechanisms laid out above, the first hypothesis holds:

H1: Writing a new constitution reduces the risk of conflict recurrence

The importance of the length of the constitution-writing process

An implication of the first hypothesis is that in order to contribute to peace after conflict it should be important that sufficient time is given to the constitution-making process. This is because substantial deliberation that produces a compromise cannot be achieved in a few months. While early research on constitution-making processes depicted negotiations in them as enlightened bargaining (Elster, 1995), this view has also been called into question (Brown, 2008). Post-conflict constitution-making processes should be particularly conflictual as finding compromise on the future political structure of the country is bound to be controversial and complicated. The Constituent Assembly in Nepal was dissolved twice, Tunisia's constitution-making process was disrupted by political assassinations and also in South Africa – the most prominent, positive example

of post-conflict constitution-making – there was considerable deadlock and at several instances it seemed that the process could derail. However, this bargaining and deliberation – although not particularly enlightened, can potentially have a transformative effect, as Brown (2008:683) notes: "Inclusiveness, consensus, and design of long-term institutions might lead the actors to an outcome that is more durable and just, even if it takes place wholly through a combination of haggling, threats, and partisanship that leaves little room for public-spirited deliberation."

A longer process hence stands for one that includes true bargaining because comprise needs to be found on issues that are disputed and not easily resolved. In this vain, Wallis (2014:304), for example, concludes: "an unhurried timetable is preferable, as it (…) allows the draft constitution to reflect lessons learned, and leaves time to build consensus (…)". Similarly, practitioner guidelines are urging international actors to not hurry constitution-writing processes because "Bringing people together, building trust, and developing shared ownership takes time" (Brandt et al., 2011:9) and "If constitution-making allows sufficient time for consultations, a genuine agreement among stakeholders may be reached."(Benomar, 2003:16).

An example of the opposite, namely a very tight time-table, was post-conflict constitution-writing in Timor-Leste. Writing to the United Nations complaining about the tight deadline set to write a new constitution, civil society actors lamented "A Constitution is a complex document embodying fundamental choices about the type of

country an independent East Timor will be. (…)". The Timorese "need time to consider and debate so that they are able to form opinions, time to hold discussions in order to seek consensus where opinions are divided, and finally time to officially record their views. None of this can happen in three months."[23] Nevertheless, the process was only allowed to occupy a few months and a new constitution was passed in 2002. Timor-Leste experienced another major violent crisis in 2008. In contrast, the South African process took five years and South Africa has not returned to civil war since.

Because time is needed to allow for substantial bargaining, deliberation and the building of compromise, which in turn should be beneficial for peace, I also test the following, second hypothesis:

H2: Longer constitution-making processes reduce the risk of conflict recurrence

Data

To measure my dependent variable, *conflict recurrence*, I first use the UCDP/PRIO database to identify all relevant cases: countries that have experienced conflict – leading to at least 25 battle related deaths – where all conflicts have come to an end and peace has prevailed for at least 12 consecutive months. I consider any outbreak of new

[23] The full text can be found at: http://www.etan.org/news/2001a/03ngoconst.htm

violence in these post-conflict phases, by the same or new rebel groups, causing at least 25 battle related deaths, as conflict recurrence. Peace periods end either with renewed conflict or in 2011. This means that I am analyzing systemic, not dyadic peace, as peace can only begin once *all* conflicts in a country have ended and *any* renewed conflict is considered as conflict recurrence.

In order to identify successful constitution-making processes in post-conflict periods I rely on data by the comparative constitutions project (CCP data). The CCP data provides, amongst other issues, country-year data on whether a new constitution was adopted. To test the first hypothesis that post-conflict constitution-making can positively influences a country's chances of peace, the binary indicator *new constitution* measures whether a post-conflict country was able to write a new constitution at any time in its post-conflict phase. The post-conflict phase is defined as a maximum of 15 years after having experienced conflict (it is shorter if renewed conflict broke out).[24] Because the CCP does not provide exact dates for the adoption of the new constitutions, those cases in which the new constitution was written in the same year the conflict ended pose a problem. In these cases, qualitative sources were used to determine whether the constitution was written before or after the conflict came to an end and only the latter coded as 1. CCP also provides data on constitutional amendments. Although amendments can sometimes be of very far-reaching nature,

[24] This means constitution-writing processes in Russia (27 years), Zimbabwe (34 years), Morocco (22 years), Kenya (28 years) and Bolivia (42 years) were not considered.

they can also be simply “cosmetic” (Wheatley and Mendez, 2013). Since the different types cannot be easily distinguished, amendments are not included here. Several countries, including South Africa and Nepal, wrote an interim constitution before embarking on the bigger project of writing an entirely new constitution. Since a lot of bargaining occurs also in the later stages, the date of the adoption of the final constitution, not the interim constitution, was coded. New constitutions can also be written during conflict and become integral parts of peace agreements that end a war, as was the case in Bosnia in 1995. I do not consider them to be cases of post-conflict constitution-making. The main difference between constitutions as peace agreements (and peace agreements more generally) and post-conflict constitution-making is that the former only focus on warring parties, but the latter are likely to include more political actors, ideally even the entire post-conflict elite. Since the mechanism linking post-conflict constitution-making to peace works through the process of bringing the elite together with the aim of finding a compromise of how power will be allocate in the post-conflict country, I only focus on cases of constitution-making after conflict. Of the 236 peace episode 59 are coded as having experienced post-conflict constitution-making.

Secondly, in order to test the second hypothesis that longer post-conflict constitution-making processes reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, it is necessary to construct a proxy for the length of the constitution writing process. This is because while it is possible to code the exact date when a constitution was adopted in a post-conflict

period, data for the beginning of a constitution-making process is unreliable. Online sources used to identify adoption dates were: the constitute project, the constitution writing and conflict resolution project (Princeton University) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) site. Because this variable aims to approximate the length of the constitution-making process, the date of the adoption of the constitution (through a referendum or the parliament for example) was coded rather than the later occurring promulgation.[25] Based on these data, I construct an indicator *time*, which measures the number of days elapsed between conflict end and the adoption of the constitution. I assume that if this period is very long, so was the constitution-making process. In order to account for the fact that the length of the process might matter more in the early than the later stages, I use the natural logarithm. This makes it possible to assess the second hypothesis that longer constitution-making processes ensure bargaining takes place and thereby reduce a country's risk of experiencing conflict recurrence.

I control for a number of factors the conflict recurrence literature has consistently found to influence the outbreak of conflict recurrence and that could explain constitution-making as well. First, this regards characteristics of the previous war. Several authors find short and intense previous wars to be more likely to break out again and it might be that specific types of previous wars condition constitution-making. I measure the

[25] Since the date of the promulgation is usually shortly after adoption, it is highly unlikely that employing the latter would change the results.

aggregated *Intensity* and *Length* of the previous conflict(s), based on the UCDP armed conflict data and the battle death data provided by UCDP & PRIO. I also consider whether the previous conflict had a primarily ethnic component - *Ethnic Conflict* and whether it involved more than one rebel group challenging the government *Nr. of factions* – both are factors, which could make post-conflict constitution building more difficult. If a country experienced several, consecutive conflicts, the characteristic of the last one was taken. I also control for the outcome of the previous conflict, using data provided by Kreutz (2010). I focus on whether a conflict ended in a *rebel victory*, as this is where most post-conflict constitution-making occurs. To assess the economic situation in the post-conflict period, I include a country's *GDP* per capita using data from Gleditsch (2002). GDP can also be seen as a proxy for state capacity – which might be necessary to create the complex procedures and institutional structure needed for constitutional review processes. I also control for the presence of *UN Peacekeeping* using data from IMI and SIPRI, as they are known to reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence and might encourage post-conflict countries to write new constitutions. To measure more concretely how active external actors are, I also include a measure of the amount of external *Aid* the post-conflict country receives, as constitutional-review processes often depend on support by donors. To control for the content of the constitution, I include a measure of whether the country uses a proportional electoral system *PR system* as well as its level of *Democracy*, relying on data from V-dem. Employing a control for democracy is also necessary because constitution-making processes are often an important component of democratization more generally. All

control variables are lagged by one year. Descriptive statistics on the variables employed can be found in Table 6.

Table 6: Summary statistics for variables of Chapter 3

Variable	*Variable type*	*N*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Min*	*Max*
Recurrence	Dependent	2,599	.056945	.2317821	0	1
New constitution	Core	2,599	.3936129	.4886447	0	1
Time	Core	1,023	7.39165	.946375	3.044523	8.609225
Severity	Control	2,597	6.553471	2.548332	2.302585	14.00199
Duration	Control	2,599	4.491671	2.963718	0	9.573802
Ethnic conflict	Control	2,541	.3754427	.4843323	0	1
Rebel victory	Control	2,561	.1370558	.3439735	0	1
GDP	Control	2,578	7.95102	1.071716	4.888995	10.79657
Nr. Of factions	Control	2,599	1.190843	.3930409	1	2
Democracy	Control	2,548	.4042365	.2650564	.0164474	.9559249
Proportional representation	Control	2,384	.3716443	.4833454	0	1
UN eacekeeping	Control	2,599	.1223548	.3277581	0	1
Aid	Control	2,555	4.70e+08	1.50e+09	0	5.18e+10
Neighboring conflict	Control	2,599	.5044248	.5000766	0	1
Peace years	Control	2,599	12.7045	11.62086	1	63
Peace years^2	Control	2,599	296.3967	518.7417	1	3969
Peace years^3	Control	2,599	9399.883	24849.51	1	250047

I employ a logistic regression, with the binary conflict recurrence indicator as the dependent variable. Another possibility would be to use survival analysis. However, since I am interested in whether peace failed or not and not how much time elapsed until peace failed, I prefer to use logistic regression. Survival analysis is included in the robustness checks and does not alter the results. Because the unit of analysis is country-year data, three cubic polynomials are included to account for the fact that observations are not independent from each other with regard to time and standard errors are clustered according to country due to heterogeneity and non-constant variances in the data.

Results

Before describing the results of the main, independent variables, I briefly discuss the results with regard to the control variables employed. Throughout several model specifications, I find several factors to significantly impact a country's risk to experience conflict recurrence. In line with the previous literature, conflicts that involve several factions are found to be more likely to recur, whereas higher levels of GDP and the presence of UN peacekeeping consistently reduce a country's risk of conflict recurrence. Contrary to others, I find rebel victories to be significantly associated with a higher likelihood of conflict recurrence. The results also show that longer and less severe previous wars might increase the risk for conflict recurrence, but both variable fail to consistently reach statistical significance. It is likely that these divergent findings stem from whether one is analyzing systemic or dyadic peace, how battle deaths and duration are aggregated and which conflict exactly is considered as the last conflict. While space restrictions make it impossible to investigate these issues here, this calls for further analyses in the future.

Model 1 tests the first hypothesis that writing a new constitution reduces a country's risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. The analysis lends support to the first hypothesis: there is a negative, statistically highly significant effect ($p=0.006$). Countries that write a new constitution are statistically significantly less likely to experience conflict recurrence. Computing marginal effects shows, that if a post-

conflict country manages to write a new constitution the risk of conflict recurrence is reduced by half from 5% to 2,6%. Despite arguments to the contrary, it seems that the mere process of writing a constitution can already suffice to increase the chances for sustainable peace.

Table 7: The effect of writing a new constitution on conflict recurrence

	Model 1
New constitution	-0.721**
	(0.260)
Severity	-0.0923+
	(0.0496)
Duration	0.0760
	(0.0511)
Ethnic conflict	0.635**
	(0.190)
Rebel victory	0.790*
	(0.337)
GDP	-0.288**
	(0.0991)
Nr. of factions	0.456*
	(0.227)
UN Peacekeeping	-0.824**
	(0.308)
Aid	3.27e-11
	(3.21e-11)
Neighboring conflict	0.246
	(0.231)
PR System	-0.137
	(0.252)
Democracy	-0.263
	(0.465)
Constant	-0.386
	(0.912)
Observations	2326
R^2	0.09

Standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, specifications of time included, but not reported here

Second, I test the hypothesis that the more time elapses between conflict end and the writing of a constitution, the more likely that peace will hold. This means reducing the population considerably, as only those cases in which a new constitution was written are compared. Table 8 presents the results of Model 2. The sign is negative, as the hypothesis would suggest and is highly statistically significant (p=0.000). This supports the hypothesis that it is important to allow sufficient time for the constitution-making process.

Table 8: The effect of the timing of the constitution-making process on conflict recurrence

	Model 2
Time	-1.029**
	(0.250)
Severity	-0.122
	(0.111)
Duration	0.224
	(0.141)
Ethnic conflict	0.293
	(0.538)
Rebel victory	1.740**
	(0.501)
GDP	-0.579*
	(0.254)
Nr. of factions	1.516*
	(0.743)
UN Peacekeeping	-1.480*
	(0.640)
Aid	-3.63e-10
	(4.35e-10)
Neighboring conflict	-0.0178
	(0.610)

PR System	-1.110^{+}
	(0.612)
Democracy	-0.0548
	(1.159)
Constant	5.304^{+}
	(2.854)
Observations	935
R^2	0.19

Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, specifications of time included but not reported

Figure 1 plots the marginal effects of timing of the constitution-making process on the probability of conflict recurrence, clearly showing, how the risk of conflict recurrence is reduced, the more time has elapsed between conflict end and the new constitution.

Figure 1: Marginal effects of timing on the probability of conflict recurrence



Note: Only very few countries write the constitution in less than a year after conflict end, which makes the marginal effects unreliable and confidence intervals very large for these observations. This is why in light of the distribution, the figure starts at 5, which is approximately log (365), hence capturing countries that needed one year or longer.

To further test the second hypothesis, I also gathered information on the start dates of all post-conflict constitution-making process. Combined with the dates of adoption, this makes it possible to make a more accurate measure of the length of the constitution-making process. However, since reliable sources are lacking for several cases, the subsequent analysis should be interpreted more cautiously.

Whenever available, and ideally confirmed by two different sources, the exact date of when the constitution-making process began was coded. Often this is the case when a constitutional assembly or committee met for the first time to begin their discussions on the new constitution. In order to not overestimate the length of the process, those processes on which some information was missing were treated conservatively. This concerns almost half of the cases. In many cases only information on the month was available, so that the process was coded to have begun at the end of that month.[26] In the four cases where only a beginning year could reliably be established, the process is coded as having begun at the end of that year. The variable *process length* then measures the number of days passed between the beginning of the process and the adoption of the constitution. Finally, if there was no process, but simply a new constitution was suddenly put forward by the executive, the process was coded as extremely short – namely one day. The data reveals that on average, post-conflict

[26] Information on the day the constitution-writing process was not available for 35 out of the 74 post-conflict constitution-making processes identified.

constitution-making takes almost two years, namely 23 months. More specifically, most post-conflict constitutions are written in up to one year (38%), a considerable share in up to 2 years (21%), 19% in 3 to 10 years and finally, some constitutions are adopted without any process (22%). Outliers with particularly long constitution writing processes are Cuba (10 years), Chile (7 years), Angola (7 years), and Laos (7 years). Table 9 presents the results of a logistic regression analyzing the relationship between the duration of the constitution-making process and conflict recurrence.

Table 9: The effect of the length of the constitution-making process on conflict recurrence

	Model 3
Process length	-0.000656^{+}
	(0.000344)
Severity	-0.0937
	(0.0912)
Duration	0.196^{+}
	(0.111)
Ethnic conflict	1.034^{+}
	(0.589)
Rebel victory	1.674**
	(0.602)
GDP	-0.256
	(0.209)
Nr. of factions	1.112^{+}
	(0.591)
UN Peacekeeping	-0.671
	(0.649)
Aid	-5.12e-10
	(4.81e-10)
Neighboring conflict	0.494
	(0.448)
PR System	-0.783

	(0.554)
Democracy	0.333
	(1.030)
Constant	-3.547*
	(1.632)
Observations	935
R^2	0.15

Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, specifications of time included but not reported

As can be seen from Table 9, the analysis provides some support for the proposition that longer post-conflict constitution-making processes are beneficial for peace. The coefficient measuring the duration of the constitution-making process is negative and marginally significant (with p=0.057).[27] The poorer quality of the data on when exactly a constitution-making process began means these results need to be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, they do suggest that the mechanism brought forward in this chapter exists.

Robustness checks

To corroborate the statistically significant findings, several steps were taken. First, I use data from Eisenstadt, et al. (2015) to employ a different measure of whether a new constitution was passed in the post-conflict period. Also with this different coding of

[27] A few cases exist, where the constitution was adopted in the post-conflict period, but the deliberation began before the conflict ended. To account for the fact that then the bargaining mechanism could only partially come into play, another variable was created reducing the duration of the process in these case from conflict end to adoption. The results remain unchanged.

whether a new constitution was adopted the analysis shows that post-conflict countries that adopt a new constitution are statistically significantly less likely to experience conflict recurrence. Second, it was tested whether the results change when defining a maximum amount of years until when renewed violence still constituted conflict recurrence. Reducing the analysis to the first 30, 20 or 15 years did not change the results, both main variables remain negatively and statistically significantly associated with conflict recurrence. Third, I control for power sharing, based on data from Gates et al. (2016) and the results remain unchanged. Fourth, I calculate all models using firthlogit, because conflict recurrence is a highly rare event – the data include only 161 instances of recurrence but 2,744 (94.4 %) country years which remained stable. All results remain robust to this model specification. Finally, some scholars prefer to use survival analysis when analyzing conflict recurrence, as these models calculate how long it takes until a certain event takes place. Using both the cox proportional hazard model or the Weibull model provides further support for the results: both writing a new constitution and leaving more time for the constitution-making process are statistically significantly associated with a lower risk of conflict recurrence.

Addressing the issue of endogeneity

When analyzing constitution making processes, their characteristics and the relationship to an outcome such as peace (or democratization) one concern has to be the issue of endogeneity (Eisenstadt, et al., 2015, Wheatley and Mendez, 2013, Widner,

2008). Firstly, it is possible that the correlations found here in fact indicate a relationship that runs in the other direction – maybe peace is causing constitutional-review processes. More specifically, the analysis so far could only be picking up on cases where the constitution-making process ended late because it started late – hence peace had already been established and started to stick. In order to assess the claim of reversed causality, I ran another analysis with the data on when exactly the constitution-making process started. If it were true that rather than the length of the process the fact that peace has already been established is important, one would expect there to be a significant, negative relationship between the amount of time that elapses between the end of the conflict and the beginning of the constitution-making process. However, the analysis of whether processes that start later are more conducive to peace does not yield significant results – more time between conflict end and beginning of the constitution-making process does not significantly reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. Table 10 summarizes the respective results.

Table 10: The effect of the time elapsed between conflict end and beginning of the process

	Model 4
Beginning of constitution-making process	-0.00423 (0.00459)
Severity	-0.203 (0.135)
Duration	0.390* (0.157)
Ethnic conflict	0.409 (0.633)
Rebel victory	1.732** (0.660)
GDP	-0.462* (0.198)

Nr. of factions	1.052 (0.839)
UN Peacekeeping	-0.450 (0.648)
Aid	-4.72e-10 (5.55e-10)
Neighboring conflict	-0.0358 (0.504)
PR System	-0.946 (0.624)
Democracy	0.975 (1.008)
Constant	-1.705 (1.871)
Observations	750
R^2	0.18

Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, specifications of time included but not reported

Furthermore, the fact that the second hypothesis is confirmed in the statistical analysis rules out that only those countries adopt new constitutions where it is particularly easy to do so. If the result that adopting a new constitution were endogenous, one would expect that only those post-conflict countries adopt new constitutions where there is already a large consensus between the political actors. This in turn would mean that they are very quickly able to decide upon a new constitution. The fact that the analysis shows that on the contrary those countries, which take longer to write the constitution and adopt it later in their peace process are those that remain more stable calls endogeneity problems into question.

But a different cause of endogeneity might still exist – possibly there is a third factor causing both the constitution-making process and peace, which is not captured by the

control variables. Although omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out entirely, the next section looks into several cases in order to address this concern. If the mechanisms stipulated in the chapter do indeed hold, this should be traceable in specific cases, making it less likely that a third, unobserved variable is causing peace. Anecdotal evidence from three cases reveals that the mechanisms stipulated in this chapter could indeed explain how constitution-making contributes to peace. The South African case demonstrates that constitution-making can constitute a trust-building bargaining process in the post-conflict period, speaking to the elite-centric mechanism. Data for Venezuela and Mozambique in turn suggests that constitution-making might have contributed to increased trust in state institutions, thereby alluding to the state-society mechanism.

South Africa as an example of the trust-building effects of constitution-making

The first mechanism pertains to cases where deliberation over the constitution helps to increase trust between the diverse political actors in a political system. Studying this mechanism should be approached from a qualitative perspective. However, systematically selecting a case to do so is difficult because a) the binary nature of the analysis means any case that has written a new constitution and has remained peaceful is an equally good fit and because b) the literature on post-conflict constitution making has mostly focused on very few, prominent examples only (South Africa as a positive case and Timor-Leste as a problematic case). Because it is the only positive case where

extensive, qualitative data is available, South Africa was chosen as a plausibility probe. Although it cannot be considered a typical case of civil war, it should be considered an ideal case of democratic constitution-making: it is the most studied and widely referenced positive example of post-conflict constitution making (Barnes and De Klerk, 2002, Miller, 2010). If the mechanism stipulated in the theory section cannot be found here, we should not expect to be able to find it in other cases either. Therefore, South Africa can serve as a helpful qualitative check of whether the mechanism stipulated can be traced.

In the armed conflict that lasted from 1981-1988 the government of South Africa faced violent opposition from the armed wings of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africa Congress (PAC), who aimed to end apartheid. The constitution-making process consisted of two steps – from March to November 1993 closed negotiations between all 19 parties (the ANC and the government being the main ones) took place, which resulted in a transitional government and an interim constitution. This interim constitution entailed agreed-upon, core principles for the new constitution. In the second step an elected constitutional assembly wrote a new constitution. Here country wide consultations between the public and those involved in the constitution-making process played a major role. Both the negotiations in the constitutional assembly and the outreach activities made political opponents work together as "politicians who were previously at war with one another, (were) talking jointly to the people" (Ebrahim and Miller, 2010:135). But also more generally, the constitution-making process clearly

helped build trust between the formerly warring parties, also because sufficient time was scheduled for the process: “The length of the overall process also enabled parties to hone their negotiating skills and fully develop their substantive positions. Moreover, direct contacts throughout the slow buildup to substantive negotiation gave interlocutors the opportunity, on the Afrikaner side, to shed their demonized perceptions of the ANC, and on the ANC side, to become sensitized to white fears” (Ebrahim and Miller, 2010:147). More generally, de Klerk (2002: 19) describes the effects of the constitutional process on the participants as follows: “During the transition, South Africans started to debunk misperceptions and myths about each other. As trust increased, they began to make the political compromises necessary for a mutually acceptable future”. In the end, a process that was not without difficulties, accompanied by violence in the country and despite the threat of deadlock looming for a longer period of time – the constitution writing process was successful and a new constitution adopted in 1996 (Barnes and De Klerk, 2002). Through the new constitution “a high degree of consensus was achieved among parties representing a wide range of ideological perspectives” (Ebrahim and Miller, 2010:144) while at the same time rallying the people of South Africa behind the nascent “new South Africa” (De Klerk, 2002:16). Overall this anecdotal evidence suggests that constitution-making processes can enable dialogue and build trust between the main political actors of a polity as well as strengthening state-society relations.

Increased state legitimacy in Mozambique and Venezuela

The second mechanism put forward in the theoretical section holds that constitution-making can contribute to peace by increasing trust between the citizens and the state. Unfortunately, cross-national data on citizens' trust in state institutions is extremely scarce for post-conflict countries. Relevant data could only be obtained for two countries contained in the dataset: Mozambique, which came out of conflict in 1992 and adopted a new constitution in 2004 and Venezuela, where the conflict ended in 1992 and a new constitution was written seven years later. Again, it is therefore not possible to carefully select cases to test whether the mechanism holds, but seeing whether it does hold in the two cases where data is available can provide a useful, first test. To this end, levels of trust in national parliaments – a central state institution and one that was asked about in both in the Afrobarometer and Latinobarometer survey the data was taken from – can be compared across the two countries.

Comparing Mozambique before and after the new constitution of 2004 suggests a strong effect with the mean level of trust in the national parliament rising from 1.79 to 2.39. When asked about how much they trust the national parliament in 2002 over 40% respondents stated "Not at all" or "A little bit". In 2005, this had reduced to under 20%. In Venezuela, we also see a very clear increase – here those respondents that expressed that they have "A lot of confidence" in the national parliament grew from about 8% to 13% and those that at least have some confidence from 12% to 20%. Venezuela is a

particularly interesting case, because this constitutes constitution making, which enabled authoritarian tendencies, but the mechanism nevertheless seems to hold. Overall, these figures suggest that the second mechanism stipulated in the chapter might indeed exist. Figure two summarizes the responses in the two countries.

Figure 2: Levels of trust in the national parliaments in Mozambique and Venezuela in %



Source: Afrobarometer & Latinobarometer

Overall, these – admittedly preliminary – insights into three cases give some suggestive evidence that the mechanisms put forward, which explain why writing a constitution and the length of the process should matter for peace, indeed hold.

Conclusion

This chapter investigated the effect of constitution-making processes on conflict recurrence. I put forward two main arguments why constitution making should be beneficial for post-conflict peace. First, constitution-making can engage former adversaries in a continued bargaining situation which - by demanding compromise and building trust between them – can help overcome commitment problems. Second, a constitution-making process can strengthen state-society relations by creating new, legitimate state institutions. Testing the effect of constitution-making on 237 peace periods between 1950 and 2011 confirms that writing a new constitution significantly reduces a country's risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. The analysis of the duration of the constitution-making process suggests that this result cannot be simply explained by endogeneity problems and that longer processes, which allow for bargaining and building trust between the main political actors of the post-conflict system, are more beneficial for peace.

The research presented here could be expanded in several regards. First, further data-collection efforts would be necessary to concretely test the two causal mechanisms put forward on how constitution-making can contribute to peace. Cross-national data on trust in political institutions, which is currently unavailable, could be used to assess whether post-conflict constitution-making increases trust in state institutions, whereas in depth case studies of constitution-writing processes could shed further light on

whether and how bargaining in constitution-making processes can build trust between political opponents. The second question that remains unanswered is the importance of international influence on post-conflict constitution making processes. International donors often support constitution-building and it is possible that those processes that receive international support are more likely to produce results that stick. At the same time examples exist where international actors have pressured countries to quickly write a new constitution shortly after conflict has ended. As this analysis suggests, this could be to the detriment of post-conflict constitution-making process' effect on peace. Taking a closer look at international engagement in post-conflict constitution building could shed light on the question how important external influences are. Third, the analysis does not look more deeply into the provisions the respective constitutions entail. While the results presented here strongly suggest that constitution-processes by themselves can reduce the risk of civil war recurrence, the interplay of process and content needs to be further analyzed.

Overall, this chapter clearly shows that constitution making processes can positively impact on post-conflict peace. While much previous work on conflict recurrence has focused on other important, but static factors, constitution-making processes can be encouraged and supported. The chapter thereby adds to the literature on conflict recurrence by demonstrating the importance of institutional change in post-conflict societies and identifies one issue that post-conflict countries can actively pursue in order to increase their chances of sustained peace. The results thereby also have clear

policy implications. International actors have been supporting constitution-making processes in post-conflict countries under the assumption that this can strengthen peace. The analyses presented here indeed show that such international engagement can be worthwhile, as a successful constitution-making process can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. However, the second important result is that constitution-making processes occurring in the post-conflict phase need time. International actors often pressure countries to complete this difficult process very quickly or only pay attention to the main fighting parties of the conflict. Instead supporting broad dialog and discussions – even if this means the process might become more complicated and drawn out than anticipated – and at the same time working toward a consensus should be the more promising avenue to strengthen peace through constitution-making processes.

Chapter 4: Identifying pathways to peace: How international support can help prevent conflict recurrence

By Karina Mross, Charlotte Fiedler and Jörn Grävingholt[28]

Introduction

The current literature on peacebuilding is in many regards ambiguous about the role specific elements of peace support can play for post-conflict peace. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the same type of support can be favourable or detrimental depending on context factors. Arguments have been made that peacebuilding without sufficient attention to security is likely to fail (Holm and Eide, 2000), yet that extensive security support that is not embedded in domestic institutions may also be ill-guided (Ryan, 2009). To some, economic support is the key variable of success (Collier et al., 2003), while others claim that too much economic support can impact on a country in a similarly detrimental way as natural resource rents unless it is embedded in a broader strategy of political reforms (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Political, and in particular democratic, reforms, in turn, have been criticized to sow the seeds of unrest rather than

[28] Both Karina Mross and Charlotte Fiedler are the lead authors of this chapter. A version of this chapter is currently under revision at *International Security*.

help stabilise a country (Mansfield and Snyder, 2008). In sum, the effect of most types of external peacebuilding support might to a large degree depend on the combination with other elements of support or with certain context factors.[29]

Against this background, this chapter takes a comprehensive look at external support for post-conflict countries. It seeks to identify patterns of international engagement that are associated with sustained peace after civil war. To do so, we analyse combinations of international support across the five main areas of engagement in post-conflict peacebuilding: support for politics and governance; for socio-economic development; for societal conflict transformation; peacekeeping; and non-military support for security. We thus ask the question: How do external actors need to combine different types of support to contribute to sustained peace after civil war?

We use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to examine which combinations of international support (i.e., of different types official development assistance (ODA) and peacekeeping) are regularly associated with sustained peace. The analysis covers 36 post-conflict episodes after 1990. Our configurational analysis is combined with three case studies – Cambodia, Indonesia and Liberia. Based on 90 interviews with domestic and international experts they complement the main findings derived from the QCA.[30]

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[29] Following a definition provided by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:para 21), we refer to peacebuilding support as external activities aimed at preventing the recurrence of violence in post-conflict societies.

[30] Most interviewees worked at multi- or bilateral aid agencies, INGOs or local NGOs, in academia or the media. See appendix.

This chapter is a novel contribution to the literature on peacebuilding in several regards. Compared to previous research, our analysis is firstly more comprehensive because we take the whole range of peacebuilding activities into account in an encompassing, yet disaggregated way. Second, by applying a configurational analysis we are able to identify whether different types and combinations of peacebuilding support are particularly beneficial and whether this varies between different country contexts. Additionally, for the countries covered in this chapter, and on the basis of project level information provided by AidData, we have created what to the best of our knowledge is the first dataset to comprehensively document aid flows to all areas of societal conflict transformation.

Among the patterns we identify, four findings stand out: first, peacekeeping is only one important component of effective post-conflict support. Second, supporting governance can also be an effective international strategy of peace support. Third, only a combination of all types of support explains sustained peace also in cases with a high risk of conflict recurrence. More generally, we find that international support clearly matters: no case without any substantial external support avoided civil war recurrence. The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2 discusses the existing research on different areas of international support for peacebuilding and their impact. Section 3 presents details of the research design and the methodology applied. Section 4 presents our findings before we conclude in section 5.

Peacebuilding after civil war

What do we know about the possibilities of external actors to contribute to peace after civil war? Although international actors regularly become active in post-conflict countries in a multiplicity of ways – by sending peacekeeping troops, providing ODA or engaging in mediation, for example – systematic knowledge about international impact on post-conflict peace remains limited (Findley, 2018). Research on post-conflict aid has mostly focused on aggregate effects of ODA flows, coming to mixed results (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, Findley, 2018, Flores and Nooruddin, 2009, Walter, 2010) or conducted sector-specific analyses (Girod, 2012, Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008). Systematic comparisons between and across sectors, however, are lacking.

More conclusive evidence exists on the effect of peacekeeping on civil war recurrence. It is a well-established finding that the international community can play an important role in stabilizing post-conflict countries by providing peacekeeping troops (Collier, et al., 2008, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, Fortna, 2004, Hegre et al., 2015, Mason, et al., 2011). Walter (1997) has convincingly argued that the international community's impact results from the fact that external actors can help solve the commitment problem in post-conflict contexts – neither side can guarantee it will not resort to violence as it has to fear the other side will exploit such a situation of weakness of their opponent. Peacekeepers can separate the two sides, help with the demobilisation process and take over duties of the local military or police and thereby

help overcome the security dilemma. One of the most influential studies in this line of research shows that multidimensional peacekeeping[31], which combines troop deployment with developmental elements of peacebuilding support, has so far proven to be the most effective approach in promoting peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).

The effectiveness of multidimensional peacekeeping suggests that broader strategies than just troops are needed if the international community wants to impact on peace in post-conflict countries. However, it seems unclear exactly what such an effective strategy could look like. Hoeffler (2014:75) concludes in a recent literature review that "our knowledge about the optimal policy mix of economic, diplomatic and military interventions is still limited". She basically confirms what Patrick and Brown (2007:132) found back in 2007: "There is little accumulated knowledge about how best to combine development, governance, rule of law, security and other interventions in fragile states". This chapter aims to fill this gap by not only disaggregating ODA and studying different areas of engagement – security, politics and governance, socio-economic development and societal conflict transformation – but also analysing their interplay with peacekeeping troops.

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[31] Defined by Doyle and Sambanis (2000:791) as: "(…) missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight (…)".

Analytical framework – how can peacebuilding support contribute to peace?

One central assumption guides this chapter: building peace in a society that experienced civil war is an inherently domestic process, which can, however, be influenced by external actors. External actors can influence domestic dynamics by setting incentives and supporting actors and institutions that can contribute to peace. Similarly, Chetail (2009:10) writes about peacebuilding support: "Its *raison d'être* is to support the indigenous forces of a country coming out of conflict". Although some authors argue that countries should rather be left to their own fate, even at the risk of state failure (Herbst, 2004, Weinstein, 2005), or that external interventions have been ineffective if not harmful (Paris, 2004), evidence also exists that external actors can contribute to promoting peace (Fiedler, 2018, Fortna, 2004, Zürcher et al., 2013).

Based on the academic literature as well as practitioner guidelines we disaggregate international peacebuilding into five areas of engagement: peacekeeping, security ODA, politics and governance, socio-economic development and societal conflict transformation (Barnett et al., 2007, Smith, 2004, World Bank, 2011). As the following discussion of different strands of literature shows, it is widely assumed, but not undisputed, that engagement in each of these areas contributes positively to peace in post-conflict situations.

Peacekeeping

Supporting the reestablishment of security is perhaps the most obvious pillar of international support aimed at preventing the recurrence of civil war. Its premise is that establishing basic security for the state and its citizens against internal and external threats is a precondition for all other activities related to peace and development. Interventions directly aimed at restoring basic security include the deployment of peacekeeping forces by the UN or other international organisations. Peacekeeping represents the military dimension of international peacebuilding support. The logic of peacekeeping is based on the idea of installing a third party that can arbitrate and enforce the peace or ceasefire (agreement). Such an external security guarantee addresses the credible commitment problem present in post-conflict societies, where former warring factions need to agree and adhere to measures that most likely reduce their power – such as demobilization or democratic elections (Walter, 2002). As mentioned above, ample quantitative evidence exists that peacekeeping significantly decreases the likelihood of renewed violence (Collier, et al., 2008, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, Fortna, 2004, Fortna, 2008, Hegre, et al., 2015). This is particularly noteworthy, since peacekeeping is often employed in especially challenging circumstances where the recurrence of conflict is highly likely (Fortna, 2004).

Non-military security support (security ODA)

Besides direct provision of security by military means, security support (non-military) also plays a prominent role in development cooperation in post-conflict contexts. Re-establishing public security helps to create a sense of safety in society that allows the resumption of basic social functions and normal routines. Moreover, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes also directly address the credible commitment problem by reducing the ability to renege on previous commitments to peace. Security ODA includes demining activities and small arms control, as well as more complex efforts aiming to re-establish and consolidate the state's monopoly of violence. Among them are DDR programmes and security sector reforms (SSR), which focus on professionalising the state security forces (including the armed forces, police, security services and intelligence) and establishing democratic control over them. Especially, DDR and SSR are widely perceived by policy-makers as being crucial for sustainable peace, but the few available academic cross-country analyses provide mixed evidence (Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008, Krebs and Licklider, 2015, Toft, 2009). However, it has been shown that under specific circumstances, e.g. before the first post-conflict elections, a DDR process can significantly reduce the risk of civil war recurrence (Brancati and Snyder, 2012, Joshi, et al., 2017). Overall, we expect a pacifying effect of security ODA.

Politics and Governance

Support for politics and governance, which includes democracy support, has become a central component of international efforts to establish peace in post-conflict societies. The underlying rationale is that functioning democracies prevent the recurrence of conflict by providing non-violent channels to express and deal with competing interests and grievances. Support for politics and governance typically includes assistance to elections, constitution-writing, building state capacity and strengthening the rule of law, human rights and civil society.

Good governance has been idenified as a factor that is robustly correlated with less civil war recurrence. Two recent studies show that states which are governed better – measured through a strong bureaucracy, the extent of rule of law or the level of corruption, for example – are signficiantly less likely to experience civil war recurrence (Hegre and Nygård, 2015, Walter, 2015).

Regarding democracy, the picture is more diverse. On the one hand, the international community has been strongly criticized for pursuing a "liberal peacebuilding" strategy, which pushes post-conflict countries to democratise and hold elections early on. This is said to endanger peace as democratisation more generally and elections in particular can be associated with renewed conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, Paris, 2004). On the other hand, many regard fostering democratic structures as a crucial step towards

long-term peace, and research demonstrates that full democracies are a regime type that rarely breaks down (Call and Cousens, 2007, Carothers, 2007, Hegre, et al., 2001). A study by Savun and Tirone (2011) shows that democracy support can reduce democratising countries' risk of experiencing internal strife. Even in post-conflict situations, democracy support can effectively foster peace (Mross, 2018). Furthermore, both Matanock (2017) and Smidt (2016) show that international election monitoring, an important component of international support for politics and governance in post-conflict countries, can stabilise elections. Overall, this suggests that although democratisation can be associated with conflict, support for politics and governance can compensate for this effect and contribute to peace in post-conflict societies.

Socio-economic development

Supporting socio-economic development is another important area of peacebuilding. Improving the living conditions of the population – so the reasoning goes – can alleviate grievances, restore confidence in state institutions, give the population a stake in peace and hence reduce the risk of arms being taken up again. Some activities in this area directly address the legacy of conflict, such as supporting physical reconstruction or the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people. Others are not unique to the post-conflict context and constitute the bulk of general ODA: infrastructure projects, the provision of basic services as well as more long-term policies for growth and employment.

The relationship between ODA – which largely consists of support for socio-economic development – and conflict recurrence is unclear. Walter (2010) and Flores and Nooruddin (2009) find no direct effect on recurrence. Even worse, warnings have been issued that aid in fragile states might produce adverse effects similar to the "resource curse" and thus erode domestic institutions (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Collier and Hoeffler and their co-authors, on the other hand, present various studies demonstrating a positive effect of aid on post-conflict growth (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Collier, et al., 2008).

Efforts to promote socio-economic development in post-conflict settings are supported by various findings in econometric research: for one thing, it is well-established that a high level of GDP per capita in a country is associated with a reduced likelihood of internal conflict (Collier, et al., 2003, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Holtermann, 2012, Sambanis and Hegre, 2006). Focussing more specifically on post-conflict situations, some quantitative research has shown that growth reduces the probability of a return to warfare (Collier, et al., 2008, Quinn, et al., 2007), although others have raised doubts about this finding (Dahl and Høyland, 2012). In sum, it seems fair to conclude that socio-economic development is not a guarantee against recurrence but increases the likelihood of a country remaining peaceful. We therefore expect international support in this area of engagement to contribute to peace.

Societal conflict transformation

An area of support distinct from those mentioned so far is aid targeted at helping post-conflict societies deal with their violent past and transform into peaceful societies. We refer to this area of support as societal conflict transformation (SCT). Former enemies – at the local as well as at a national, political level – have to learn to coexist peacefully. The main aim of SCT is hence to "mend the `social fabric´" by resolving grievances and overcoming societal divisons (Skaar et al., 2015). We adapt the concept by Skaar, et al. (2015) and conceptualize SCT to consist of four sub-areas: truth, justice, reconciliation and victim restitution. *Truth* aims to reveal atrocities committed during the conflict, *Justice* to hold perpetrators accountable for past abuses. *Reconciliation* aims to heal wounds of the past and overcome grievances within society whereas *Victim Restitution* offers compensation to individuals for harms and losses suffered. Our concept of societal conflict transformation is similar to, but not identical to the idea of Transitional Justice (see for example the definitions discussed in La Rosa and Philippe, 2009)[32].

Support for truth and justice is often based on the assumption that establishing peace requires processing a society's legacy of violence. This is supposed to build trust within society and legitimacy for the new order. Some critics have argued that initiating a debate on past abuses can divide a society even more (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003).

[32] Our concept of SCT includes components of transitional justice and a wide array of dialogue supporting activities. Unlike some transitional justice concepts, however, SCT does not include institutional reforms or means that improve the security situation such as DDR or SSR.

However, more recent, quantitative studies mostly find either no effect or a positive effect of the different instruments of transitional justice on peace (Lie et al., 2007, Loyle and Appel, 2017). We therefore assume that support for SCT can contribute to sustained peace.

We take an inductive approach to identify if certain patterns and combinations of international support can explain sustained peace. While peacekeeping has been shown to reduce the risk of civil war recurrence, the relative success of multidimensional peacekeeping supports the notion that security is crucial, but not enough (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). For example, some suggest that extensive security support that is not accompanied by institutional reform may be ill-guided (Ryan, 2009). Likewise, while some consider economic support the key variable of success (Collier, et al., 2003), others claim that it needs to be embedded in a broader strategy of political reforms (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). Political, and in particular democratic, reforms, in turn, have been criticized to sow the seeds of unrest rather than help stabilise a country (Mansfield and Snyder, 2008). In sum, the effect of most types of external peacebuilding support might to a large degree depend on the combination with other elements of support or with certain context factors. For example, focusing international efforts on mainly one type of support might work in contexts with a lower risk for recurrence, but more difficult contexts might call for international engagement in several or all five areas of peacebuilding. To answer these questions this chapter analyses international peacebuilding support in a comprehensive, yet disaggregated

way, by taking all five areas of peacebuilding into account and systematically looking at the combinations between them to explain peace after civil war.

Research design, method and empirical strategy

To identify effective international strategies of peace support, we use Qualitative Comparative Analysis on 36 cases of post-civil war peacebuilding. To this end, we disaggregate international support by multilateral and bilateral OECD/DAC[33] donors across five areas of engagement while controlling for a country's predisposition for conflict recurrence.

Introducing Qualitative Comparative Analysis

QCA is a relatively recent addition to the repertoire of rigorous comparative methods in the social sciences.[34] QCA is ideally suited for our purpose due to its unique strengths: First, it focuses on the effect of combinations of conditions; second, it allows identifying diverging paths to the same outcome, with each path characterised by a specific configuration of conditions. Third, the set-theoretic logic underlying QCA is in line with our research interest: we aim to better understand if substantial amounts of

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33 Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

34 QCA owes much of its growing popularity in recent years to the path breaking work by Charles Ragin (e.g., (Ragin, 1987, Ragin, 2008, Rihoux and Ragin, 2009)) as well as Carsten Schneider and Claudius Wagemann (2012, 2010). For excellent examples of its application, see (Bara, 2014, Lindemann and Wimmer, 2018, Mello, 2012).

certain types and combinations of external support are *sufficient* to sustain peace. An additional advantage of QCA for our analysis is the fact that due to its underlying methodology it works well with relatively small numbers of cases, such as the 36 post-conflict episodes in our population.

The logic of QCA is based on set memberships. In its dichotomous ('crisp-set') version, QCA variables will adopt the values of 1 (member) or 0 (non-member). Our analysis uses fuzzy-set QCA, which classifies cases according to what degree their membership in a set is present. The *calibration* process transforms observational data into fuzzy-sets on a scale from 0 and 1. Defining the cross-over point at 0.5, that separates members of a set from non-members, is central to calibrating a set. A central element of QCA is the truth table. Each row in the truth table represents one possible combination of the conditions, and cases are assigned to the row that represents them best. Based on the empirical data, the truth table also indicates if the configuration represented in a row can be considered sufficient for the selected outcome.[35] Due to limited empirical diversity, usually some rows are "logical remainders" – theoretically possible but empirically not observed combinations. Algorithm-based logical minimisation reduces the combinations (rows) that are considered sufficient for the

[35] In this process, the raw consistency threshold set by the researcher specifies the level of inconsistency allowed in considering a combination of conditions (i.e. truth table row) sufficient for the outcome. The threshold should be tailored to the research at hand and can, for example, be guided by a gap between truth table rows with higher and lower consistency scores (see Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).

outcome to the simplest possible solution term without violating any of the statements made by them.

Different types of solutions can be reached depending on the treatment of logical remainders.[36] The *parsimonious solution* is based on assumptions about logical remainders that are most conducive to simplifying the solution term. However, some of these assumptions can contradict our knowledge about causal relations. *Intermediate solutions* address this problem by excluding "difficult counterfactuals" – those contradicting our knowledge about the world – from the logical minimisation procedure. We focus on the intermediate solution because we have strong directional expectations with regard to certain conditions. We report the parsimonious solution in the appendix.

Two main *parameters of fit* inform the interpretation of QCA results: scores of consistency and of coverage.[37] The consistency score indicates the degree to which the empirical data is fully in line with a result, or how much deviation occurs. If the findings pass a plausible consistency threshold, the coverage score provides information on the

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36 On the meaning and treatment of different types of solutions see (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).

37 A third, the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) score indicates how far a condition might be considered simultaneously sufficient for the outcome and its negation (simultaneous subset relations).

share of the outcome that is explained by the results[38], that is, how comprehensive or trivial the findings are. Both scores run between 0 (worst) and 1 (perfect).

The population: post-civil war cases

To analyse international peacebuilding support in countries that emerged from civil war, we use the UCDP/PRIO dataset to identify post-conflict peace episodes. UCDP/PRIO provides data on *armed conflicts* that are characterised by all of the following features: the use of armed forces, a minimum of 25 battle deaths per year, the government of a state as one primary party to the conflict and an incompatibility over the government or territory.[39] We consider a country involved in several armed conflicts as *one* system in conflict, which is why our analysis takes *countries* that emerged from conflict – rather than conflict dyads that ended – as units of analysis. Because we are interested in the effects of international support after *civil war* we reduce this group of countries to those where violence was particularly severe. In a slight deviation from a common practice in civil war research, we posit that all conflicts combined must have led to at least 1,000 battle deaths *in any two consecutive years* during the conflict period. This threshold broadens the number of cases eligible for inclusion and, *inter alia*, allows including cases that barely missed the 1,000 threshold in one calendar year. Finally, we consider a civil war "over" when a country has

38 Or even more specifically, the share of the membership in the outcome.

39 We use the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset v. 4-2016.

experienced a minimum of one calendar year of peace, understood as the absence of *any* armed conflict on its territory. That year would then count as the first year of a peace period. The logic of this definition implies that the same country can enter our dataset more than once if a peace episode breaks down after more than one year and results in renewed civil war that ends again.

Our period of observation includes all peace episodes that began in 1990 or later, because it was only in the 1990s that international peacebuilding emerged as a regular practice. At the same time, this choice of period allows us to discount effects that could be attributed to the fundamental shift in the international system that was brought about by the end of the Cold War. Based on the above criteria, we arrive at a list of 36 peace episodes in 28 different countries.[40]

The outcome: sustained peace

Consistent with our definition of post-conflict episodes, we define peace as the *absence of major armed conflict* after civil war. In order to explain 'sustained peace', we add the notion of longevity, or durability, and consider peace as sustained if peace lasted at least for five years. Clearly, the intensity of renewed violence also matters. Therefore, we create a fuzzy-set that ranges from entirely peaceful to full recurrence of civil war,

[40] See data matrices in the appendix for a full list of cases.

considering post-conflict countries that experienced renewed minor conflict (below 100 battle deaths per year) still as relatively peaceful.[41]

Measuring international support

We conceptualize four of our conditions, namely substantial security ODA, substantial international support for politics and governance, for socio-economic development, as well as for societal conflict transformation as official development assistance given to these specific purposes. We approximate substantial support in these areas through financial contributions provided by OECD/DAC donors and multilateral organizations. To identify the volumes provided, we use the AidData database and their purpose codes, which indicate which topic an aid project focuses on.[42] We use ODA commitments, because the quality of data on disbursements is very poor, especially in the earlier periods. This comes with the caveat that we thereby capture all activities that were planned rather than only those that were implemented. Nevertheless, commitments disclose what developmental activities donors and recipient countries jointly agreed upon and constitutes a good approximation of international engagement across the different issue areas.

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41 We use the direct method of calibration for the outcome and the areas of engagement.

42 The AidData purpose codes are often very close to the better known CRS (Creditor Reporting System) codes of the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) of the OECD. The advantage of is that it includes not only what donors themselves reported, but also incorporates information from project descriptions or annual reports.

Support for *politics and governance* is well captured by AidData's purpose code 151 "Government and Civil Society", which includes topics such as elections, civil society, legal and judicial development or government administration. Developmental activities connected to security (*security ODA*), including DDR and SSR efforts, are measured using AidData's purpose code 152 "Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security". The indicator for support for *socio-economic development* covers topics such as education, health, social services and infrastructure.[43] Since the same volume of aid is likely to have a different effect depending on the size of a country, ODA commitments are measured per capita. Peacekeeping support is measured through the number of military personnel provided for activities relating to the internal conflict. Because concrete troop numbers were not easily available, we compiled this information ourselves, combining the data provided by SIPRI, the International Military Intervention Dataset and the homepages of the individual missions.

In the case of societal conflict transformation (SCT) additional coding efforts were required. While SCT covers activities reported as ODA, no AidData or CRS code exists to capture this area of engagement. We therefore compiled the to our knowledge first dataset of projects in this area, using project information provided by AidData.[44] To

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[43] It is measured using the sum of all ODA commitments, minus those for Politics and Governance (151) and Security (152). We also decided to exclude debt relief and aid to refugees in donor countries. Their impact on the ground is less immediate, and including them could bias our results, suggesting that donors were highly active when in fact they were not.

[44] The only other effort to quantify international engagement in the area of transitional justice comes from Muck & Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2012), which, however, focuses on trials and truth commissions only.

this end, we conducted a two-step coding process that combined mechanical pre-selection with subsequent hand coding. For the mechanical coding, a list of search terms was developed that capture one or more of the central elements of SCT – Truth, Justice, Victim and Reconciliation. In a second step, hand coding based on project descriptions was used to identify SCT projects. The commitments per project were transformed into yearly aggregates in order to be comparable with the data used to identify support in the other areas of engagement.

In order to capture international engagement provided after civil war we measure support in the first up to five post-conflict years. For cases that experienced recurrence in less than five years after peace was established, only the peaceful years were taken to calculate the average amount of support provided. Since no strong theoretical basis exists for whether support should be considered *substantial*, we used evident gaps between the amounts received (ODA or peacekeeping troops) by different countries to differentiate between substantial support and non-substantial support in the calibration process.[45] Table 11 summarizes the conditions capturing international engagement, data sources as well as the calibration thresholds chosen.

[45] The calibration patterns for all five areas of international engagement can be found in the appendix.

Table 11: Data sources and calibration thresholds chosen to measure international engagement

Conditions: International peacebuilding support	**Data**	**Indicator**	**Fuzzy-set:** Qualitative Anchors		
			0	**0.5**	**1.0**
Substantial support for socio-economic development	AidData: **Entire ODA minus** - 151 (Government and Civil Society) - 152 (Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security") - 930 (Refugees in donor countries) - 600 (Action related to debt)	ODA commitments, per capita	20$	58$	150$
Substantial support for politics and governance	AidData: CRS 151		1$	4.4$	13$
Substantial support for societal conflict transformation	AidData: Hand coded based on all projects		0$	0.5$	1$
Substantial security ODA	AidData: CRS 152		0.1$	1,6$	10$
Substantial peacekeeping	Sipri + IMI + handcoding	No. peacekeeping troops	0	500	11000

Measuring a country's predisposition for conflict

Although it is possible for external actors to contribute to peace, many domestic factors influence the risk of civil war recurrence. Approximating a case's 'predisposition' for conflict recurrence is important for two reasons: 1) to control for local and international factors besides peacebuilding support known to influence civil war recurrence and 2) to account for the fact that different contexts might require different types of international support.

We measure a country's predisposition for conflict based on factors the quantitative literature has relatively consistently identified to increase a country's risk of civil war onset or recurrence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Collier, et al., 2008, Quinn, et al., 2007, Sambanis and Hegre, 2006, Walter, 2004). Six factors are included to approximate a particularly high risk of recurrence. The first three are characteristics of the previous conflict: its duration, intensity and number of factions. The next three have a more structural nature: the level of income, resource dependency and whether or not there is conflict in the neighbourhood.[46] The six factors are then aggregated to control for those cases with a particularly high risk of conflict recurrence.

The first characteristic of the previous conflict regards the presence of *multiple factions* during a conflict. This can increase the complexity of building a peaceful post-war order and the risk of spoilers disturbing the fragile peace (Cunningham, 2011, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, Rudloff and Findley, 2016, Stedman, 1997). A *short previous war* may provoke new wars by demonstrating to potential rebels that a battle might be quickly fought and won (Quinn, et al., 2007, Walter, 2004). Similarly, *less intense previous wars* could be more likely to be followed by new conflicts because they make renewed conflict appear less costly (Mason and Greig, 2017, Walter, 2004). Considering less intense wars to lead to civil war recurrence is not in line with some

[46] The cited studies have also included other factors into their analyses, but the results are less conclusive. This is why the type of ending of the previous conflict, (political) inequality, power-sharing or regime type are not included (Collier, et al., 2008, Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, Mattes and Savun, 2009, Quinn, et al., 2007, Toft, 2010).

findings in quantitative research, which posit that more intense wars are more likely to recur (Quinn, et al., 2007, Walter, 2004). However, running regression analyses on our data supports the opposite relationship, indicating that less intense wars are significantly related to less civil war recurrence.[47] We therefore include less intense previous wars as a component in the predisposition variable.[48]

More structural factors also impact the risk of recurrence. *Low economic development* can increase the risk of civil war recurrence out of two reasons. First, the post-conflict society is not able to benefit from a peace dividend that reduces incentives to return to war. Second, low GDP could stand for weak state capacity more generally, which indicates that state institutions are not strong enough to channel and prevent violent conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Holtermann, 2012). *Natural resource dependency* can undermine governance, weaken the state and at the same time increase the potential for rebels to finance a rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012). Finally, *conflicts in neighbouring countries* can exacerbate the risk of recurrence through negative spill-over effects (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, Sambanis and Hegre, 2006). More information on the concrete measurement and data sources used for each variable can be found in the appendix.

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47 See the appendix for results. We use a simple, binary logistic model and account for the time-series cross-sectional nature of the data by employing three cubic splines as well as robust standard errors according to countries.

48 Testing the aggregated variable in a regression analysis we find that this seems to capture the risk of conflict much more adequately – it is significantly related to civil war recurrence, while an aggregation including "intense previous war" is insignificant. The respective regression analyses can be found in the appendix.

To control for a particularly challenging context for international engagement, we consider cases that exhibit four or more of these factors to be at a high risk of civil war recurrence. The resulting indicator seems to capture the concept of a predisposition for conflict very well – 12 peaceful cases and 15 recurrence cases are correctly classified. However, 'predisposition' is not a perfect predictor of civil war recurrence: In five cases, the predisposition was low, but conflict occurred and in four the predisposition was high but conflict did not materialize.

Findings

We use fuzzy-set QCA to search for successful patterns of international support that explain peace.[49] In the following, we present the intermediate solution, which is derived based on two directional expectations: Based on the literature review, we expect that a high predisposition is negative for peace, and peacekeeping troops are conducive to peace.

It is good practice in QCA to start with an analysis of necessity, even if we are primarily interested in the relationship of sufficiency. Our analyses suggest, however, that none

[49] Using the packages QCA (Dusa, 2018, Dusa, 2007) and SetMethods (Medzihorsky et al., 2018) within the R project (R Core Team, 2018).

of our conditions or their combinations is necessary for peace.[50] For the analysis of sufficiency, we identify the clearest gap in the data and consider those truth table rows as sufficient for the outcome (and hence include them in the analysis) that have a raw consistency score above 0.75.[51]

Analysing 36 episodes of countries coming out of major civil wars after 1990 reveals four alternative paths to peace (see table 12). While providing peacekeeping troops is one of them, three further, robust paths to peace can be identified. First, we find that security ODA can contribute to peace, but second, that so can supporting politics and governance. Third, peace prevails in cases that received substantial international efforts across all types of support.

All paths, except the encompassing approach, are also characterised by the absence of certain conditions (depicted by empty circles). Evidence from the case studies suggests, that absences of certain types of support do not represent necessary elements of a support strategy (which would imply that certain types of support should remain absent) but rather reflect constraints to what international actors were able or allowed to contribute. We elaborate on this issue in the "limitations" section below. The absence of "high conflict predisposition" in three out of four paths, by contrast, yields an

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50 Or for conflict recurrence. No condition or combination passes both the test of consistency and relevance of necessity, i.e. not being trivial. See the appendix for the results of an analysis of necessity.

51 Moreover, this consistency threshold ensures that PRI is above 0.7 to avoid that very small sets are included for the outcome and its negation. The truth tables can be found in the appendix.

interpretable pattern: paths 1–3, which focus on one element of support only, are limited to cases without a high predisposition for recurrence. Only the encompassing approach in path 4 addresses also cases with a high risk of recurrence.

The solution is consistent (with an overall consistency score of 0.86) – as are the individual paths. The coverage of the overall solution of 0.63 indicates that we are able to explain two thirds of all cases that remained peaceful through these four alternative pathways to peace. There are no contradictory cases, that is, cases which are represented by a path but do not share the outcome. [52] Two cases – Tajikistan and Peru – deviate in degree: although representing the respective paths relatively well, they did not remain entirely peaceful.

[52] Also called ‘deviant cases for consistency in kind’.

Table 12: Intermediate solution peace

Conditions / Paths	PRED	PK	SC	SE	PG	SCT	Cases	Consistency	Raw cov	Uni cov
1 Protecting peace	○	●	○			○	**Tajikistan, Mozambique**	0.75	0.12	0.05
2 Securing peace	○		●	○		○	**Angola**, **Sri Lanka_10**, Cambodia	0.85	0.20	0.06
3 Institutionalizing peace	○				●	○	**Indonesia, Nicaragua, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Serbia+Kosovo,** Cambodia	0.87	0.37	0.20
4 Encompassing approach		●	●	●	●	●	**Sierra Leone**, **Liberia_04**, **Bosnia**	0.89	0.23	0.15
Solution	~PRED*__PK__*~SC*~SCT + ~PRED*__SC__*~SE*~SCT + ~PRED*__PG__*~SCT + __PK*SC*SE*PG*SCT__ => PEACE							0.86	0.63	

Note: The full circles depict the presence of a condition, the empty circles its absence. Empty cells indicate that a particular condition is not a necessary part of the path, as it includes both cases with and without this condition present. PRED: High conflict predisposition, PK: Peacekeeping, SC: Security ODA, SE: Socio-economic development, PG: Politics and governance, SCT: Societal Conflict Transformation. ~ denotes the absence of a condition in the solution term. Cases are peace episodes, represented by country names. For countries with multiple peace episodes, a number attached to the name denotes the start year of the respective episode. Cases in bold are "uniquely covered cases", i.e., they are explained by one path only. Raw cov: Raw coverage, Uni cov: unique coverage.

Our general finding that international support can make a difference is seconded by examining those cases that did not remain peaceful. Strikingly, all countries that did not receive any substantial support across the five areas of engagement experienced civil war recurrence.[53] This comprises a total of 10 cases, including Iraq, Liberia after

[53] This can be deduced from examining the truth table and is confirmed by an XY-plot, which reveals that only one case contradicts this statement in degree. Table, graph and a full QCA of recurrence are included in the appendix .

1996, Serbia after 1992, as well as Ethiopia and Yemen. One might assume that this can be explained by donors simply not engaging in particularly difficult contexts. However, four of these countries actually display a low predisposition for conflict and could therefore have rather been regarded as "easy" cases by the international community. At the same time, almost 1/3 of our cases with a high predisposition nonetheless received substantial engagement in at least one area – hence, a clear pattern of international actors "cherry picking" easy contexts does not emerge. The fact that all cases that did not receive any substantial support experienced recurrence therefore allows to conclude that a general lack of attention by the international community, or the provision of merely negligible support to a peace process clearly paves the way for recurrence.

Robustness checks

A vivid methodological discussion around QCA has evolved. On the one hand, some strongly criticize the method, either theoretically or based on empirical weaknesses they uncover (Krogslund et al., 2014, Lucas and Szatrowski, 2014, Munck, 2016, Paine, 2016). On the other hand, several QCA experts have also shown where these critical studies have weaknesses of their own (Baumgartner and Thiem, 2017, Ragin, 2014, Rihoux and Ragin, 2004, Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). To address the main concerns these discussions have raised, we run an extensive number of robustness

checks.[54] Krogslund, et al. (2014) show that minor changes in the parameters, particularly the inclusion scores and the raw data anchors, can impact on the results. We therefore varied all thresholds within plausible limits to corroborate the robustness of our results. This concerns the raw consistency threshold chosen for the logical minimization process, but also the anchors for the calibration of the conditions and the outcome. The results hold, as also when dropping all cases consecutively. Changing the period of analysis of international support from the first five post-conflict years to four or six again confirms the four paths, and so does calibrating crisp- instead of fuzzy-sets. Furthermore, Baumgartner and Thiem (2017) show that both the conservative and intermediate solution can be problematic. While we believe that the existence of directional expectation are a good reasons to focus on the intermediate solution in this study, the parsimonious solution yields almost identical results[55]. Finally, another problematic aspect of QCA are model ambiguities (Baumgartner and Thiem, 2015, Rohlfing, 2015, Thiem, 2014). However, they do not occur in our analysis.

In order to further assess the plausibility of the QCA results, we complement them with insights from three illustrative case studies. To this end, we selected typical cases for the most interesting paths (all except one which mainly confirms previous research).[56] The main insights drawn from the case studies are based on 90 semi-structured

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54 For literature on robustness checks in QCA see Schneider and Wagemann (2012), Skaaning (2011).

55 Both the parsimonious and the conservative solution can be found in the appendix.

56 For more details on the selection see appendix. For selecting cases based on QCA see Schneider and Rohlfing (2013).

interviews conducted in Cambodia (Phnom Penh), Indonesia (Jakarta & Banda Aceh) and Liberia (Monrovia) with national and international stakeholders and analysts in November 2017. Interlocutors were national stakeholders from the government, administration and civil society (including think tanks and the media) as well as national and international representatives from the diplomatic and donor community (including bi- and multilateral donors as well as INGOs). A full list of interviewees and their organizational affiliation can be found in the appendix. All interviews were systematically coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti. Nevertheless, the QCA provides the main results of the chapter and the case studies are only meant to complement the QCA results. They were used as plausibility probes to test whether the QCA results hold when assessed qualitatively, better understand the relevance of the absent conditions and contextualize the relevance of international support for sustaining peace.

Discussion: Pathways to peace

The QCA yielded three main findings: first, support for security (either peacekeeping or non-military support) can be key to sustain peace, yet (second) so can support for politics and governance. Third, of all the patterns identified, only an encompassing approach was successful in cases with a high risk of conflict recurrence. This section discusses the solution drawing on insights from three case studies: Cambodia,

Indonesia and Liberia. Moreover, it identifies contextual factors that might explain the cluster of cases in one path.[57]

Protecting and securing peace

The first of our four paths, "Protecting peace", is characterised by substantial peacekeeping in cases without a high predisposition of civil war recurrence and in the absence of substantial security ODA or SCT support. As stated above, a path that highlights the importance of peacekeeping does not come as a great surprise given previous research. Somewhat unexpectedly though, this path covers only two cases – Mozambique and Tajikistan. In addition, both countries share an interesting commonality. In either case, one party to the conflict used its initial grip on power to consolidate its position at the expense of free political competition once international peacekeeping had contributed to stabilising the situation. Although major outbreaks of renewed violence were avoided in both countries, their long-term political dynamics give reason for concern. Tajikistan has seen an increasing exclusion of political opposition, including former warring factions, which has raised doubts about the longevity of the country's post-civil war peace (ICG, 2016). Mozambique has moved in a similar direction despite a change in government after presidential elections in 2014. International peacekeeping, it seems, was useful to reduce the immediate risk of

[57] As peacekeeping has already been shown by previous research to be an effective type of peace support, we abstained from country case research for this path and discuss it only briefly.

conflict recurrence. Issues with the exclusion of political opponents, however, have remained and contributed to periodic instability.

Another security-related path to peace in our results is characterised by a substantial provision of non-military security support, which is why we refer to it as "Securing peace". Cases covered by this path are not in the "high predisposition" category of countries. In addition, they received neither substantial amounts of support for societal conflict transformation nor in the field of socio-economic development. Security ODA comprises international security support that is non-military. It focuses on developmental activities connected to security. This includes disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and security sector reform (SSR) as well as demining activities and small arms control.

Cambodia illustrates the pattern of "Securing peace".[58] Despite an internationally sponsored peace agreement in 1991, the civil war between the Government of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge came to a final end only in 1998 when most remaining rebel fighters accepted an offer to demobilise and return into society. By then, Prime Minister Hun Sen had managed to secure his rule and forced his major rivals into exile. Hun Sen's power consolidation defied earlier international efforts to oversee a negotiated peace settlement that included all parties to the conflict.

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[58] This section is informed by more than 20 expert interviews conducted in Phnom Penh in November 2017.

International support for Cambodia post-1998 reflected the political circumstances of a "victors' peace": Having won the civil war in 1998, the government was largely able to dictate the terms of peace and be selective in opening the doors for external support. International non-military support for security was welcomed because assistance in the field of humanitarian demining was much needed. Three decades of warfare had left the country with a legacy of hundreds of thousands of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance. As much of this was the consequence of Western military involvement during the 1970s and 1980s, many Western donors engaged heavily in humanitarian demining after the end of the conflict.

Interviewees agreed, however, that peace in Cambodia lasted due to a combination of factors in which international support did not play the most crucial role: a strong ruling party managed to provide basic security and portray dissent as a threat to the country's stability. At the same time economic growth provided jobs for an impoverished population and the resources needed by the government to secure the buy-in from a new power elite. External assistance in the field of humanitarian demining contributed by helping foster a sense of increasing security in everyday life.

Comparing Cambodia to the other cases covered by the "Securing peace" path (Angola after 2002 and Sri Lanka after 2009), it appears that this pattern might represent a typical scenario of authoritarian consolidation by a ruling party in the aftermath of

military victory. In Angola, the ruling MPLA established peace in 2002 after having defeated the UNITA rebels and killed their leader Jonas Savimbi. Since then, "the MPLA government has successfully recast itself as the party of stability and peace, and embarked on an ambitious reconstruction drive financed by growing oil revenues and oil-backed credit lines" (BTI, 2018:3) that have helped to establish a neo-patrimonial type of rule. In Sri Lanka, after a first peace period had broken down, violent conflict was ended at the hands of President Rajapaksa through a heavy military campaign against the rebel Tamil Tigers. Their defeat set the scene for an increasingly authoritarian and exclusionary rule that lasted until 2015.

In sum, the cases indicate that the pattern of "Securing peace" might be dictated more by necessity than by design. Rather than being instrumental in bringing about peace, international support seems to have gone where it was allowed to do so, helping to secure a peace that was already won by the government. At the same time, questions need to be asked as to the longevity of a peace that is built upon the increasing exclusion of political opponents.

Institutionalizing peace

We find one path to peace, "Institutionalizing peace", which does not include any type of security support. Instead, support for politics and governance provides an alternative pathway to sustain peace in cases with a low predisposition for conflict and in absence

of support for SCT. This path explains the largest share of cases, demonstrating the important role support for politics and governance can play in post-conflict situations. Indonesia is a case in point when looking at how developments with regard to politics and governance as well as donor support in this area can contribute to peace.[59] Indonesia has struggled with various internal conflicts – the two most prominent civil wars being Timor-Leste, a region which gained independence after violent struggle in 2002, and Aceh, which fought for independence for almost 30 years but in the end remained a part of the country as part of a negotiated settlement reached in 2005. Since then Indonesia has managed to remain relatively stable.[60] Interviewees concurred in the observation that this is mainly due to Indonesia's decentralization process, which was part of the reform packages adopted after Indonesia's transition toward democracy in 1998. In Indonesia, decentralization has increased possibilities for participation at the sub-national level as well as resources being controlled more directly by the local governments. This has reduced grievances and improved relations toward the national government, although corruption remains a problem. Decentralization was not only specifically designed to alleviate existing conflicts, but also included institutional safeguards against further secessionist conflict. The safeguards for example include parties having to be national in scope. Moreover, powers were devolved directly to the lower-level district, in order to avoid empowering provinces, which could take up

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59 This section is informed by over 30 interviews conducted in Jakarta and Banda Aceh in November 2017.

60 There has been an ongoing, low-intensity conflict in Papua. However, all interviewees agreed that the conflict did not and does not seriously threaten peace in Indonesia.

independence movements of their own. The only exception in this regard is Aceh, which gained the right to establish local parties through the peace agreement. It is exactly this possibility to participate locally, as well as gaining greater power over fiscal resources that interview partners mentioned as the most crucial factors explaining why Aceh has remained peaceful. The international community strongly supported decentralization, both at the national level and in Aceh, which could explain why the pattern of international support focusing on politics and governance is associated with peace in this pathway.

Almost all cases in this path – namely Peru, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Serbia (including Kosovo), embarked on a democratization process either shortly before or after the conflict ended. The only exception is Cambodia, a multiply covered case[61], which however, is well captured by the path "Securing peace". As in Indonesia, all of these democratization processes were accompanied by a devolution of government through a decentralization process. More generally, this path represents cases where donor engagement in the area of politics and governance is combined with a domestic process of reforms geared towards sharing resources and political power between the national, regional and local level. The results therefore suggest that donor engagement can help to stabilize a democratization process. While not all countries successfully transformed into democracies, they did not slide back into more

[61] Multiply covered means that according to the underlying data, two paths explain the case equally well, so that both logics could be at play.

authoritarian systems either and remained peaceful. Our results are thereby in line with Savun & Tirone's (2011) finding that democracy support helps avert the negative effects democratization can have on peace, but specifically confirms it for post-conflict cases. Overall, these findings speak to the debate whether supporting democracy in a post-conflict context can help to strengthen peace, or risks triggering renewed violence. Although democratization might sometimes have conflict inducing effects, *international engagement* aimed at building political institutions and democracy can in fact contribute to peace after civil war.

The encompassing approach

The fourth path identified by the QCA is the 'Encompassing approach'. With combined support across all areas of engagement, this is the only path to peace that applies to post-conflict countries irrespective of their predisposition. An encompassing approach can be observed in Bosnia, Liberia (after 2003) and Sierra Leone. It suggests that external support that embeds security related efforts in support for politics, socio-economic development as well as societal reconciliation can contribute to peace and is even able to overcome a negative predisposition.

Liberia constitutes a prime example of such comprehensive support.[62] Since the 2003 peace agreement ended almost 15 years of two devastating civil wars, Liberia has not

[62] The following discussion is based on 40 interviews conducted in Monrovia in November 2017.

experienced renewed violent conflict. Interviews suggest that the large-scale, multi-dimensional international support made an important contribution. The large UN peacekeeping mission stabilized the situation, facilitating the demobilization of combatants and subsequent conduct of democratic elections. At various instances, it prevented an escalation of violence. Accompanying these political developments, humanitarian assistance and quick impact projects helped to alleviate the most urgent socio-economic needs, until basic infrastructure – roads, schools, hospitals – could be rebuild and the provision of social services improved.[63] Substantial efforts to train and equip government institutions helped to rebuild the largely defunct state and facilitated a normalization of the situation. Numerous hearings held throughout the country by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission allowed victims to express their grievances and addressed perceptions of impunity, even though the overall conduct and implementation of the TRC received much criticism. In sum, the path shows that it is important to embed international support for security in broader developmental activities whilst combining them with efforts to strengthen a country's political institutions and reconcile the war-torn society.

The three cases explained by the path "Encompassing approach" – Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone – share a relatively complex conflict context, where a number of factors coincided. All civil wars involved several fighting factions, were characterized by regional conflict dynamics, ethnic polarization and large-scale atrocities against

[63] Even though the situation remains precarious until today.

civilians. They left the countries with a devastated economy, and a weak or even dysfunctional state. All three cases are small states, in which comprehensive peace agreements mediated by international actors ended the civil war, which facilitated such comprehensive international engagement. The results speak to the findings of previous research that multidimensional peacekeeping is particularly effective by going beyond a mere security focus and embedding support in broader developmental and political activities.

Limitations

Contrary to our expectations, three of our four paths are characterized by the absence of specific types of international support. It is not entirely straightforward how these absences should be interpreted. On the one hand, the absence of SCT support in three paths speaks to debates in the field of transitional justice. Some aspects of this type of support (such as truth commissions and investigations of war time crimes) might conflict with efforts to build a peaceful post-war order if they reignite animosities instead. On the other hand, the fact that SCT support was absent across many cases that remained peaceful could simply reflect the non-willingness of the government of the day to deal with such a politically sensitive issue. As indicated when presenting the results, our best interpretation is that the absences of certain types of support in any of the paths reflect constraints to what international actors were able or allowed to contribute, not their strategic choices. This is supported by the evidence from our case

studies. In Cambodia – a country that had experienced some of the gravest mass atrocities in modern history – societal conflict transformation was not deemed a priority by the government since an open dealing with the past would have threatened to reach into the highest levels of the new power elite. A special tribunal was not established until 2003, and it took another three years to come into operation. Similarly, Indonesia has had no process of dealing with the past – even the mass killings connected to anticommunist purge in the 1960s remain a sore topic for any national government. For Aceh, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was initiated by the local parliament in 2016 – over 10 years after the conflict had ended and against the wishes of the national government. Absences of international support in the area of SCT could then primarily be explained by the unwillingness of national partners to deal with these sensitive issues. Finally, it is also important to note that some of the other absences would be much more difficult to explain, such as why the provision of troops should be particularly beneficial to peace in the absence of non-military security support. Therefore, we interpret the paths mainly based on the conditions present.

The problem discussed above also raises the question more generally, whether the patterns of international support found to be associated with peace in the analysis represent a conscious, strategic decision by international actors or rather the country context and the type of support that was possible within this environment. Regardless of whether external support contributed to the countries remaining peaceful, another question is *why* donors provided a specific combination of support. Clearly the patterns

of support found can partially be explained by the specific context: all countries in the "Institutionalizing peace" path were experiencing a democratic opening, hence making substantial donor engagement in the area of politics and governance possible. The countries in the path "Securing peace" exhibit the exact opposite context, as they are characterized by authoritarian tendencies where donor engagement had to be limited to specific areas. The cases represented by the "Encompassing approach" in turn are marked by particularly devastating civil wars creating high needs for international engagement while at the same time these small, politically weak countries clearly enabled such substantial donor engagement in all five areas. The case studies indicate that the paths should be understood as a mixture of a country context that permits certain types of engagement and international actors being able and willing to use these areas to contribute to the country remaining peaceful.

Conclusion

How can international actors effectively support peace after civil war? This chapter is the first to unpack the broad category of peacebuilding to look beyond peacekeeping or general aid flows to identify which components or combinations of international support can contribute to sustained peace. Analysing 36 episodes of countries coming out of major civil wars after 1990 reveals four key insights. Firstly, our results confirm the findings of quantitative studies that peacekeeping can make a difference, yet also demonstrate that it is but one important component of effective post-conflict support. Secondly, a focus on support for politics and governance can also be effective. This

pathway covers a large share of the cases, which underlines that while support for security can be key, it is not the only way to effectively support sustainable peace in a post-conflict situation. Thirdly, only a combination of all types of support explains sustained peace also in cases with a high risk of conflict recurrence. Finally, and more generally, the analysis demonstrates that international support matters. All ten cases that did not receive substantial support in any of the areas of engagement experienced recurrence. This includes cases both with a high and a low predisposition for renewed conflict. Hence, a general neglect of a country emerging from civil war by the international community seems to be an almost certain pathway to renewed violence.

The analysis consistently explains the majority of post-conflict countries that remained peaceful by taking a closer look at the type and combinations of international support these countries receive. To better understand the so far unexplained cases, it might be necessary to take new context factors into account – such as the regime type or whether the conflict ended through a military victory or a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, several results could be looked at more closely in an even more disaggregated manner. The support for politics and governance condition for example is still very broad, encompassing many different types of international engagement of which only some components might be associated with peace. Taking a closer look at differences between support provided by different types of international actors, such as bilateral or multilateral donors, might also yield interesting insights.

The findings have clear policy implications. International actors have been supporting post-conflict countries for almost two decades now. Our analysis shows that such international support can indeed make a difference. This analysis also demonstrates that different country contexts condition what types of support can be provided. In light of the controversial debate about detrimental effects of democratization on peace, it is particularly interesting to note that international support for politics and governance in democratizing post-conflict contexts can in fact contribute to peace after civil war.

Appendix 2

Data matrices

Table 13: Data matrix with calibrated conditions

Cases (peace periods in brackets; "present" denotes peace until end of observation period in 2015)	Support for politics & governance	Support for socio-economic development	Support for societal conflict transformation	Security support	Peacekeeping troops	Predisposition for conflict	Peace	Acronym
Angola (2003 - present)	0.18	0.08	0.12	0.59	0.05	0	0.86	AGO
Azerbaijan (1996 - present)	0.04	0.53	0.05	0.05	0.05	1	0.7	AZE
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996 - present)	1	1	0.58	0.98	1	1	0.95	BIH
Burundi (2007 - 2007)	0.69	0.36	0.71	0.52	0.05	1	0.42	BDI
Cambodia (1999 -)	0.55	0.38	0.21	0.59	0.05	0	0.95	KHM
Chad I (1995 - 1996)	0.38	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.05	1	0.05	TCD
Chad II (2004 - 2004)	0.05	0.15	0.05	0.07	0.05	1	0.02	TCD2
Chad III (2011 - 2014)	0.16	0.1	0.08	0.13	0.05	1	0.36	TCD3
Congo (2000 - 2001)	0.18	0.05	0.1	0.97	0.05	1	0.45	COG
DRC I (2002 - 2005)	0.18	0.13	0.12	0.43	0.94	1	0.11	DRC1
DRC II (2009 - 2010)	0.25	0.15	0.2	0.56	0.99	1	0.01	DRC2
El Salvador (1992 - present)	0.99	0.92	0.07	0.95	0.31	0	0.95	SLV
Ethiopia (1997 - 1997)	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.05	0	0.11	ETH
Georgia (1994 - 2007)	0.15	0.66	0.05	0.05	0.58	1	0.15	GEO
Guatemala (1996 - present)	0.9	0.59	0.24	0.6	0.1	0	0.95	GTM

Indonesia (2006 - present)	0.55	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0	0.95	IDN
Iraq (1997 - 2003)	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.06	0.05	0	0	IRQ
Lebanon (1991 - 2013)	0.62	0.91	0.05	0.05	0.05	1	0.48	LBN
Liberia I (1997 - 1999)	0.43	0.13	0.06	0.15	0.05	1	0	LBR
Liberia II (2004 - present)	0.97	0.93	1	0.95	0.97	1	0.95	LBR2
Libya (2012 - 2013)	0.67	0.02	0.95	0.99	0.05	1	0.33	LBY
Mozambique (1993 - present)	0.26	0.58	0.06	0.31	0.8	0	0.9	MOZ
Nepal (2007 - present)	0.24	0.14	0.55	0.57	0.05	0	0.95	NPL
Nicaragua (1991 - present)	1	0.96	0.08	0.05	0.05	0	0.95	NIC
Peru (2000 - present)	0.92	0.67	0.07	0.06	0.05	0	0.81	PER
Rwanda I (1995 - 1995)	0.67	0.47	0.7	0.06	0.8	1	0	RWA
Rwanda II (2003 - 2008)	0.82	0.59	0.63	0.12	0.05	0	0	RWA2
Serbia + Kosovo (2000 - present)	1	0.96	0.45	0.94	1	0	0.95	S+K
Serbia (1993 - 1997)	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.05	1	0.01	SER
Sierra Leone (2002 - present)	0.98	0.62	0.87	0.77	0.89	0	0.95	SLE
Sri Lanka I (2002 - 2004)	0.33	0.68	0.68	0.56	0.05	0	0	LKA
Sri Lanka II (2010 - present)	0.17	0.32	0.43	0.54	0.05	0	0.95	LKA2
Tajikistan (1999 - present)	0.08	0.39	0.05	0.06	0.99	0	0.51	TJK
Uganda I (1993 - 1993)	0.06	0.29	0.05	0.06	0.05	0	0.01	UGA
Uganda II (2012 - 2012)	0.23	0.24	0.12	0.06	0.05	1	0.08	UGA2
Yemen (1995 - 2008)	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.05	0	0	YEM
Qualitative anchors (Full non-membership, point of indifference, full membership)	(1, 4.4, 13)	(20, 58, 150)	(0, 0.5, 1)	(0.1, 1.6, 10)	(0, 500, 11000)			

Table 14: Data matrix of raw values of data before calibration

		ODA commitments (2010 constant USD) per capita				Troops		
Cases (Peace periods in brackets; "present" denotes peace until end of observation period in 2015)	Acronym	Support for politics & governance raw	Support for socio-economic development raw	Support for societal conflict transformation raw	Security ODA raw	Peacekeeping raw	Predisposition raw	Peace raw
Angola (2003 - present)	ANG	2.64	26.11	0,16	2.64	0	3	37
Azerbaijan (1996 - present)	AZE	0.77	61.15	0	0.09	0	5	72
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996 - present)	BIH	24.03	260.65	0,56	12.77	35000	4	0
Burundi (2007 - 2007)	BDI	6.71	50.79	0,65	1.88	0	4	201
Cambodia (1999 - present)	KHM	5.04	51.55	0,28	2.65	0	3	0
Chad I (1995 - 1996)	TCD	3.82	28.13	0	0	0	4	989
Chad II (2004 - 2004)	TCD2	1.08	35.23	0,02	0.31	0	5	1250
Chad III (2011 - 2014)	TCD3	2.47	29.73	0,08	0.65	0	5	272
Congo (2000 - 2001)	COG	2.67	19.93	0,13	11.11	0	4	167
DRC I (2002 - 2005)	DRC1	2.61	33.97	0,17	1.46	10206	4	736
DRC II (2009 - 2010)	DRC2	3.16	35.96	0,27	2.3	17888	6	1473
El Salvador (1992 - present)	SLV	16.79	133.97	0,05	9.97	368	2	0
Ethiopia (1997 - 1997)	ETH	0.32	14.98	0	0	0	3	733
Georgia (1994 - 2007)	GEO	2.41	79.05	0	0.05	1648	4	621
Guatemala (1996 - present)	GTM	10.92	69.03	0,3	2.71	132	2	0
Indonesia (2006 - present)	IDN	5.01	23.7	0,04	0.15	0	2	0
Iraq (1997 - 2003)	IRQ	0.05	3.49	0,01	0.17	0	3	12929
Lebanon (1991 - 2013)	LBN	5.79	132.06	0	0.11	0	4	126
Liberia I (1997 - 1999)	LBR	4.07	33.87	0,03	0.7	0	4	1787
Liberia II (2004 - present)	LBR2	14.78	141.17	1,64	10.16	13371	5	0
Libya (2012 - 2013)	LBY	6.52	9.41	0,99	14.45	0	5	322
Mozambique (1993 - present)	MOZ	3.19	68.51	0,05	1.19	5360	1	27
Nepal (2007 - present)	NPL	3.09	34.74	0,54	2.45	0	3	0
Nicaragua (1991 - present)	NIC	43.8	158.16	0,08	0.05	0	1	0
Peru (2000 - present)	PER	11.54	80.19	0,07	0.22	0	3	50
Rwanda I (1995 - 1995)	RWA	6.48	56.41	0,64	0.19	5500	4	2044

Rwanda II (2003 - 2008)	RWA2	8.85	69.78	0,59	0.57	0	3	1824
Serbia + Kosovo (2000 - present)	S+K	31.92	154.28	0,47	9.53	29600	3	0
Serbia (1993 - 1997)	SER	0.06	2.47	0	0.37	0	4	1404
Sierra Leone (2002 - present)	SLE	15.21	72.8	0,83	5.07	8006	3	0
Sri Lanka I (2002 - 2004)	LKA	3.58	81.81	0,62	2.32	0	1	10165
Sri Lanka II (2010 - present)	LKA2	2.57	48.53	0,46	2.03	0	1	0
Tajikistan (1999 - present)	TJK	1.52	51.96	0	0.15	15856	3	98
Uganda I (1993 - 1993)	UGA	1.15	46.31	0	0.17	0	3	1610
Uganda II (2012 - 2012)	UGA2	2.99	42.96	0,15	0.23	0	4	864
Yemen (1995 - 2008)	YEM	1.5	28.5	0	0.04	0	2	6778

Figure 3: Calibration patterns SE, PG and Security ODA



Figure 4: Calibration patterns SCT and PK



Details on condition ‘Predisposition’

Table 15: Measurements of the components of predisposition

Variable	Indicator	Time of measurement	Assigning membership scores of 1, if	Data source
High resource dependency	Share of resource rents in % of GDP	Post-conflict year (of the first five) with highest gdp	> 30 % (Iraq as an anchor case)	WDI
Conflict in the neighbourhood	Neighbouring country experiencing conflict	Up to 5 post-conflict years	1 neighbour experiences conflict	UCDP (Conflict), Gleditsch & Ward (Neighborhood)
Multiple factions	No. of factions	Previous conflict	> 2 factions	UCDP
Few battle deaths	Number of battle deaths	Previous conflict	<0.7 battle deaths per thousand of population & <10.000 absolute battle deaths	PRIO & Uppsala
Short prior conflict	Conflict years	Previous conflict	< 4.5 years	UCDP
Low income	GDP per capita	Last 2 conflict years	< 1005 USD (WB definition of low-income country)	WDI

Table 16: Regression analyses of components and specifications of the PRED variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GDP	-0.000384^{+}							
	(0.000201)							
Multiple factions		0.766						
		(0.724)						
Intensity			-0.239*					
			(0.113)					
Length				-0.0175				
				(0.0334)				
Neighboring Conflict					1.324**			
					(0.494)			
Resource Dependency						0.0276**		
						(0.00957)		
PRED (intensity negative)							1.226*	
							(0.496)	
PRED_intensity_positive								0.337
								(0.575)
t	0.0492	0.0208	0.0254	0.00688	0.103	0.0448	0.110	0.0207
	(0.277)	(0.270)	(0.277)	(0.268)	(0.280)	(0.278)	(0.303)	(0.272)
t2	-0.00958	-0.0105	-0.00930	-0.00905	-0.0148	-0.0122	-0.0161	-0.0104
	(0.0277)	(0.0275)	(0.0274)	(0.0269)	(0.0280)	(0.0280)	(0.0292)	(0.0275)
t3	0.00000571	0.00000818	0.00000802	0.00000588	0.0000123	0.0000112	0.0000123	0.00000766
	(0.0000331)	(0.0000341)	(0.0000336)	(0.0000328)	(0.0000335)	(0.0000335)	(0.0000353)	(0.0000337)
Constant	-1.961**	-3.014**	-2.040**	-2.223**	-3.567**	-2.964**	-3.274**	-2.496**
	(0.511)	(0.836)	(0.493)	(0.496)	(0.669)	(0.572)	(0.767)	(0.553)
Observations	377	377	377	377	377	377	377	377

Standard errors in parentheses, $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Models 1-6 present the results of regression analyses to determine the directions of the different components of the predisposition variable (PRED). All signs, except for intensity are in the expected direction. The last two models compare the PRED variable with intensity included in a negative (Model 7) or positive (Model 8) specification, showing that including intensity as suggested by Model 3 leads to a PRED variable that is significantly associated with recurrence.

Truth tables

Table 18: Truth table for outcome = peace

PRED	SE	PG	SCT	SC	PK	OUT	incl	PRI	Cases
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.9	0.84	S+K
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.9	0.84	SLE
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.88	0.72	MOZ
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.88	0.83	BIH,LBR2
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.82	0.77	SLV,GTM
0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.81	0.53	TJK
0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.81	0.76	AGO,LKA2
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.8	0.72	KHM
0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.8	0.75	NIC,PER
0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.77	0.69	IDN
0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.75	0.66	NPL
1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0.68	0	BDI,LBY
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.66	0.19	AZE
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.66	0	LBN
1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.65	0	COG
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0.59	0.43	LKA
0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0.56	0.39	RWA2
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.42	0	RWA
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.41	0.34	ETH,IRQ,UGA,YEM
1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.41	0	GEO
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.37	0	DRC2
1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.31	0	DRC
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.27	0.04	TCD,TCD2,TCD3, LBR,SER,UGA2

Table 17: Truth table for outcome = recurrence

PRED	SE	PG	SCT	SC	PK	OUT	incl	PRI	Cases
1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	DRC
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	DRC2
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	RWA
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	BDI,LBY
1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	GEO
1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.95	0.86	LBN
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.94	0.92	TCD,TCD2,TCD3,LBR, SER,UGA2
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.92	0.81	AZE
1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.87	0.62	COG
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.72	0.33	TJK
0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0.72	0.61	RWA2
0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0.7	0.57	LKA
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.69	0.65	ETH,IRQ,UGA,YEM
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0.68	0.28	MOZ
0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.52	0.34	NPL
0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0.48	0.28	KHM
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.47	0.31	IDN
0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0.47	0.16	S+K
0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.46	0.16	SLE
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.4	0.24	AGO,LKA2
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.25	NIC,PER
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0.4	0.23	SLV,GTM
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.4	0.17	BIH,LBR1

Testing for necessary conditions

Table 19: Necessary conditions

	PEACE			RECURRENCE		
conditions	incl	RoN	cov.r	incl	RoN	cov.r
~PRED	0.7	0.7	0.62			
PG	0.69	0.82	0.73			
~PG				0.78	0.75	0.74
SE	0.63	0.85	0.74			
~SE				0.8	0.7	0.71
~SC				0.83	0.65	0.69
SC + PK	0.65	0.76	0.65			
~SCT*~SC				0.75	0.68	0.68

No condition or combination thereof reaches sufficiently high consistency, relevance and coverage scores to be interpreted as necessary conditions. Listed here are those combinations or individual conditions with the highest consistency and coverage scores.

XY-plot and QCA for conflict recurrence

Figure 5: Relation of sufficiency for conflict recurrence



This plot displays the membership of cases in the configuration 'no substantial support across all areas' and the outcome 'recurrence'. Only Tajikistan deviates in degree from a relationship of sufficiency (it is located below the diagonal in the upper-right corner). No cases fully contradict the statement of sufficiency (deviant cases for consistency in kind would be located in the lower right corner). Hence, the lack of any substantial support across all areas can be considered quasi-sufficient for recurrence.

Table 20: Intermediate solution for recurrence

Conditions / Paths	High conflict predisposition	Peace-keeping	Security ODA	Socio-economic development	Politics & governance	Societal Conflict Transformation	Cases	Consistency	Raw cov
1	●			○	○	○	TCD, TCD2, TCD3, LBR, SER, UGA2, DRC1, **COG; DRC2**	0.93	0.41
2	●		○		○	○	TCD, TCD2, TCD3, LBR, SER, UGA2, DRC1, AZE**, GEO**	0.9	0.4
3	●	○	○		●	●	**RWA**	1	0.1
4	●	○		○	●	●	**BDI, LBY**	0.98	0.11
5	●	○	○	●			AZE**, LBN**	0.81	0.13
Solution	PRED*~SE*~PG*~SCT + PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC + PRED*~SE*PG*SCT*~SC + PRED*~SE*PG*SCT*~PK + PRED*SE*~SCT*~SC*~PK => RECUR							0.87	0.53

~ Denotes the absence of a condition. Cases in bold are "uniquely covered cases, i.e., they are explained by one path only. For full country names and post-conflict periods see the data matrix (Table 13 & 14).

We do not assume that international peace support actually triggers renewed violence, i.e. that our conditions explain recurrence, which is why we focus on the analysis of peace. Therefore, it is unclear how the paths that include presences of support should be interpreted. Did support for SCT and politics and governance or socio-economic development, respectively, contribute to recurrence, or was it not enough to prevent recurrence in the absence of the other types of support? To interpret these patterns, in-depth case studies would be required. In the case of Burundi it was clearly not the case that conflict recurrence can be traced to support provided in these areas.[1] Therefore, the main conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that in a large share of cases the absence of support across most areas of engagement explains conflict recurrence.

[1] Mross K. (2015) *Fragile steps towards peace and democracy: Insights on the effectiveness of international support to post-conflict Burundi*, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik.

XY-plots & case selection for illustrative case studies

QCA results displayed as XY-plots are ideally suited to guide the selection of case studies. The qualitative case studies focus on typical cases, which can be found in the upper-right corner above the diagonal. We selected one case for the second, third and fourth path, which are the most interesting paths since they go beyond previous research and are highly consistent. To avoid that fading memory or the frequent staff-turnover in international organizations compromise the interviews, we selected cases whose peace period started not more than two decades ago. Liberia is selected for path 4. For path 3, we selected Indonesia, whose peace period started relatively recently in 2006. For path 2 we selected Cambodia, which is particularly interesting since it is also explained by path 2 and the case study thus also serves to better understand which of the two paths holds greater explanatory power in this case (all other cases are uniquely covered, that is explained by one path).

Figure 6: XY Plot of the "Protecting Peace path



Figure 7: XY Plot of the "Securing Peace" path



Figure 9: XY-plot of the ‘Institutionalizing peace’ path



Figure 8: XY-plot of the ‘Encompassing approach’ path



Figure 10: XY-plot of solution term



Robustness tests

Table 21: Overview of robustness tests

Change	incl, PRI, cov	Solution (relationship of sufficiency for peace)
Standard model (raw consistency 0.75)	0.854, 0.833, 0.65	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
Higher raw consistency (0.8)	0.864, 0.829, 0.488	~PRED*~SE*~PG*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
Lower raw consistency (0.7)	0.864, 0.837, 0.639	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
Parsimonious solution	0.864, 0.835, 0.724	~PRED*PK + ~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SCT*SC + SE*PG*SC
Conservative solution	0.866 0.839 0.642	~PRED*PG*~SCT*~PK + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC*~PK + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK + (~PRED*SE*PG*SC*PK) (*MA)
4-year period	0.878, 0.855, 0.674	~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*PG*~SCT*~SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SC*PK
6-year period	0.888, 0.864, 0.638	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
Using crisp instead of fuzzy-sets	0.93, 0.925, 0.774	~PRED*PG_CS*~SCT_CS + ~PRED*~SE_CS*~PG_CS*SC_CS + ~PRED*SE_CS*~SCT_CS*~SC_CS*PK_CS + SE_CS*PG_CS*SCT_CS*SC_CS*PK_CS
Without PRED	0.827, 0.773, 0.682	SE*PG*~SCT + ~SE*~PG*SC*~PK + ~SE*~SCT*SC*~PK + SE*PG*SC*PK (*MA)
Changing calibration thresholds		
Point of indifference (0.5 threshold): **H**igher & **L**ower		
PG_PIH	0.863, 0.833, 0.584	~PRED*SE*PG_PIH*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG_PIH*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~PG_PIH*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG_PIH*SCT*SC*PK
PG_PIL	0.863, 0.835, 0.637	~PRED*PG_PIL*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG_PIL*SCT*SC*PK

SE_PIH	0.878, 0.852, 0.618	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_PIH*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SE_PIH*~SCT*PK + SE_PIH*PG*SCT*SC*PK
SE_PIL	0.863, 0.835, 0.64	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_PIL*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE_PIL*PG*SCT*SC*PK
SCT_PIH	0.861, 0.835, 0.69	~PRED*PG*~SCT_PIH + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT_PIH*SC + ~PRED*~SCT_PIH*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SC*PK
SCT_PIL	0.87, 0.844, 0.641	~PRED*PG*~SCT_PIL + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT_PIL*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT_PIL*SC*PK
SC_PIH	0.863, 0.836, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC_PIH + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_PIH*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC_PIH*PK
SC_PIL	0.862, 0.834, 0.63	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC_PIL + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_PIL*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC_PIL*PK
PK_PIH	0.863, 0.835, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_PIH + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_PIH
PK_PIL	0.863, 0.835, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_PIL + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_PIL
Full inclusion threshold: Inclusion **H**igher & **L**ower		
PG_IL	0.863, 0.835, 0.635	~PRED*PG_IL*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG_IL*SCT*SC*PK
PG_IH	0.867, 0.84, 0.638	~PRED*PG_IH*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG_IH*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG_IH*SCT*SC*PK
SE_IL	0.864, 0.837, 0.641	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_IL*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE_IL*PG*SCT*SC*PK
SE_IH	0.863, 0.835, 0.632	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_IH*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE_IH*PG*SCT*SC*PK
SCT_IH	0.858, 0.829, 0.633	~PRED*PG*~SCT_IH + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT_IH*SC + ~PRED*~SCT_IH*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT_IH*SC*PK
SCT_IL	0.871, 0.845, 0.642	~PRED*PG*~SCT_IL + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT_IL*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT_IL*SC*PK

SC_IH	0.862, 0.834, 0.63	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC_IH + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_IH*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC_IH*PK
SC_IL	0.863, 0.836, 0.635	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC_IL + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_IL*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC_IL*PK
PK_IH	0.864, 0.837, 0.639	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_IH + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_IH
PK_IL	0.863, 0.835, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_IL + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_IL
Full exclusion threshold: Exclusion **H**igher & **L**ower		
PG_EH	0.865, 0.837, 0.633	~PRED*PG_EH*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG_EH*SCT*SC*PK
PG_EL	0.86, 0.831, 0.634	~PRED*PG_EL*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG_EL*SCT*SC*PK
SE_EL	0.866, 0.839, 0.631	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_EL*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE_EL*PG*SCT*SC*PK
SE_EH	0.863, 0.835, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE_EH*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE_EH*PG*SCT*SC*PK
SCT_EH	0.864, 0.836, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT_EH + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT_EH*SC + ~PRED*~SCT_EH*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT_EH*SC*PK
SCT_EL	0.863, 0.835, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT_EL + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT_EL*SC + ~PRED*~SCT_EL*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT_EL*SC*PK
SC_EH	0.865, 0.838, 0.638	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC_EH + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_EH*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC_EH*PK
SC_EL	0.862, 0.834, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC_EL + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC_EL*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC_EL*PK
PK_EH	0.866, 0.841, 0.629	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK_EH + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK_EH
Dropping cases		
dropped: Angola	0.856, 0.828, 0.631	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK

dropped: Azerbaijan	0.863, 0.835, 0.658	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.856, 0.826, 0.635	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Burundi	0.863, 0.835, 0.647	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Cambodia	0.855, 0.822, 0.583	~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Chad I	0.863, 0.835, 0.633	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Chad II	0.865, 0.838, 0.633	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Chad III	0.863, 0.835, 0.645	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Congo	0.863, 0.835, 0.648	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: DRC I	0.863, 0.836, 0.631	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: DRC II	0.873, 0.847, 0.633	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: El Salvador	0.852, 0.82, 0.613	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Ethiopia	0.863, 0.835, 0.635	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Georgia	0.863, 0.835, 0.637	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Guatemala	0.856, 0.822, 0.583	~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Indonesia	0.862, 0.832, 0.616	~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK

dropped: Iraq	0.868, 0.841, 0.639	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Lebanon	0.863, 0.835, 0.649	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Liberia I	0.866, 0.839, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Liberia II	0.852, 0.82, 0.613	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Libya	0.858, 0.824, 0.683	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + ~SE*PG*SCT*SC + PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Mozambique	0.883, 0.863, 0.598	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Nepal	0.858, 0.829, 0.643	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Nicaragua	0.853, 0.819, 0.573	~PRED*~SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*PG*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Peru	0.854, 0.823, 0.573	~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Rwanda I	0.867, 0.84, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Rwanda II	0.89, 0.867, 0.639	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Serbia + Kosovo	0.857, 0.827, 0.637	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Serbia	0.863, 0.835, 0.633	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Sierra Leone	0.856, 0.826, 0.633	~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Sri Lanka I	0.887, 0.864, 0.639	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK

dropped: Sri Lanka II	0.857, 0.827, 0.638	~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Tajikistan	0.888, 0.87, 0.615	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Uganda I	0.868, 0.841, 0.639	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Uganda II	0.863, 0.835, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
dropped: Yemen	0.869, 0.843, 0.639	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
Changing the outcome condition (peace)		
PEACE	0.863, 0.835, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
PEACEUP	0.862, 0.834, 0.654	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
PEC2	0.865, 0.842, 0.611	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
PEACE_FIL	0.853, 0.826, 0.641	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
PEACE_FIH	0.863, 0.835, 0.634	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
PEACE_PIL	0.856, 0.824, 0.641	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
PEACE_PIH	0.856, 0.824, 0.641	~PRED*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*~SE*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*~SCT*~SC*PK + SE*PG*SCT*SC*PK
PEACE_HIIK	0.827, 0.682, 0.691	~PRED*~SE*~PG*SC + ~PRED*~SE*PG*~SCT + ~PRED*PG*~SCT*SC + ~PRED*SE*PG*SC*PK + PRED*SE*~SCT*~SC*~PK + ~SE*~PG*~SCT*SC*~PK + ~PRED*SE*~PG*~SCT*~SC*PK
Using coincidence analysis		

Using cna (con 0.85, cov 0.65)	0.866 0.649	~PRED*SC + ~PRED*PG*~SCT + PG*SC*PK <-> PEACE (*MA)
Using cna (con 0.8, cov 0.7)	0.809 0.723	~PRED *PG + ~PRED *SC + PG*SC <-> PEACE (*MA)
Legend: incl = consistency, PRI = Proportional Reduction Inconsistency, cov = coverage, (*MA) = model ambiguity occurred: two models that differ in one path can explain the data		

List of interviewees

Table 22: List of interviewees

Country of analysis	**Origin of interviewee**	**Organizational affiliation**	**Date**	**Location**
Indonesia	International	INGO	13.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	International	Bilateral cooperation	14.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	Academic/Think tank	15.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	Academic/Think tank	15.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	NGO	15.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	International	INGO	16.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	International	Bilateral cooperation	20.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	Academic/Think tank	20.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	Academic/Think tank	22.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	Bilateral cooperation	22.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	INGO	22.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	INGO	22.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	INGO	23.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	International	Bilateral cooperation	23.11.2017	Jakarta

Indonesia	International	INGO	24.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	Bilateral cooperation	24.11.2017	Jakarta
Indonesia	Domestic	Policy expert	27.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	NGO	27.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	Former rebel movement	27.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	NGO	27.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	Former rebel movement	27.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	Multilateral agency	27.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	NGO	27.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	Policy expert	28.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	Academic/Think tank	28.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	Journalist	28.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	Politician	28.11.2017	Banda Aceh
Indonesia	Domestic	NGO	29.11.2017	Jakarta
Cambodia	International	Bilateral cooperation	31.10.2017	Telephone
Cambodia	International	Bilateral cooperation	08.11.2017	Telephone
Cambodia	International	Bilateral cooperation	09.11.2017	Bonn
Cambodia	International	INGO	10.11.2017	Telephone
Cambodia	International	Bilateral cooperation	13.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Bilateral cooperation	13.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	Domestic	Bilateral cooperation	14.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	INGO	16.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	Domestic	INGO	18.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	NGO	20.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Bilateral cooperation	20.11.2017	Phnom Penh

Cambodia	International	Bilateral cooperation	20.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Multilateral agency	21.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	Domestic	NGO	21.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Other local institution	21.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	Domestic	Government	22.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	NGO	22.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	NGO	22.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	Domestic	NGO	23.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Academic/Think tank	23.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Policy expert	23.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Academic/Think tank	23.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	Domestic	Academic/Think tank	24.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Bilateral cooperation	24.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Cambodia	International	Policy expert	24.11.2017	Phnom Penh
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	16.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Bilateral cooperation	17.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	NGO	17.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	Government	20.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	20.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Multilateral agency	20.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	INGO	20.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	21.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	21.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	Government	22.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	INGO	22.11.2017	Monrovia

Liberia	Domestic	Government	23.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Multilateral agency	23.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Multilateral agency	23.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	24.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	INGO	25.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	Journalist	27.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	Government	27.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Multilateral agency	28.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	INGO	28.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	28.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	28.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Bilateral cooperation	29.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Multilateral agency	29.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	30.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	30.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	30.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	Multilateral agency	30.11.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Bilateral cooperation	01.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Bilateral cooperation	01.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	Multilateral agency	01.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	01.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Multilateral agency	04.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Bilateral cooperation	04.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	NGO	04.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Bilateral cooperation	04.12.2017	Monrovia

Liberia	Domestic	NGO	04.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Bilateral cooperation	05.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	Domestic	Government	05.12.2017	Monrovia
Liberia	International	Multilateral agency	26.01.2018	Telephone

All interviews were based on a semi-structured guide (see next page). Most interviews were held in person and usually lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. First interviews at the German Embassy were used to get a good overview over the donor landscape and provided contacts to the relevant bi- and multilateral donors as well as first suggestions on interesting NGOs, think tanks, universities, media outlets etc. Further interviewees were identified through snow-balling. Many interviews were recorded, but this depended highly on the country context. In Indonesia only one interview asked for hand-written notes instead of recording, in the more difficult, Cambodian context, mostly hand-written notes were used. Further information regarding the content of the interviews can be made available by the authors upon request.

Questionnaire for case studies (Indonesia as example)

1. On the situation more generally

- Do you consider Indonesia to be peaceful?
- What were the major challenges Indonesia was facing to sustain peace in 2005?
- Why do you think Indonesia has remained relatively peaceful? Which factors contributed to sustaining peace?
    - Were there important developments at the national level, that can explain peace at the regional level?
    - Why did Aceh remain stable?
    - Why has no other, large scale conflict erupted or a low-scale conflict like Papua escalated?
- Were there any specific, critical moments, where a return to large-scale violence would have been possible?
    - What prevented recurrence in these moments?

2. The different peacebuilding areas

- What role has governance and democratization played for peacebuilding in Indonesia?
- So far there have not been any serious attempts at transitional justice at the national or local level. But Indonesia is nevertheless relatively peaceful. Was it maybe important for peace not to engage in this area, or does it rather threaten sustainable peace?
- Have there been efforts in the area of Security Sector Reform, or would this be necessary?
- How is the situation economically? Was there a peace dividend felt (especially in the conflict-affected regions)?

3. Donor engagement

- What were donor priorities in the first five to eight post-conflict years?
- Was there any shift or sequencing of aid in those first years?
- Were donors able to contribute to Indonesia more generally and Aceh more specifically remaining peaceful?
- Who and how? (through support they provided or support that could have been problematic, but they decided not to provide)

4. The identified path

- Do you think this (explain path) describes the pattern of aid to Indonesia well (compared to other post-conflict countries)?
    - Was there indeed substantial support in only one area?
- Do you think the absence of support to transitional justice was important for peace?

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This thesis unpacked the relationship between political institutions and conflict recurrence. Chapter 2 took a closer look at local elections as an important channel of political participation in post-conflict countries, Chapter 2 at constitution-writing processes after conflict and Chapter 3 at peacebuilding strategies of international actors. Each chapter generated interesting insights, thereby adding to the previous literature.

Chapter 2 argued and showed that specific political institutions, namely certain channels of political participation, can have a pacifying effect. In order to do so, they have to provide access to the political system to all segments of society. At the same time, they must offer the post-conflict elite the chance to influence policy-making. Local elections satisfy the access and the influence condition and are significantly associated with less conflict recurrence. Chapter 3 then turned to a specific type of institutional change, namely post-conflict constitution making. It shows that countries, which manage to write a new constitution after conflict are significantly more likely to remain peaceful. The fact that especially longer constitution-writing processes are associated with peace underlines the theoretical argument that these processes can contribute to peace if they enable extensive bargaining and thereby trust-building between the different political actors of the post-conflict state. Chapter 4 looked at

international efforts to promote peace after civil war. The results show that international engagement can make a difference and that supporting political institutions and governance can be just as efficient as security-focused international peacebuilding interventions.

Contribution to the academic literature

The dissertation contributes to the current literature in several ways. Firstly, Chapters 2 and 3 assess claims of the literature that have so far remained untested. Proponents of the democratic civil peace theory have long argued that one mechanism via which democracy contributes to peace is by providing non-violent channels to participate. The first chapter scrutinizes this claim and develops it further by proposing a theoretical argument as to why some channels of political participation should be able to reduce conflict recurrence, specifically local elections. Second, many expect that constitution-writing can contribute to peace, but this claim has to date not been assessed empirically. The third chapter of this dissertation both puts forward empirical evidence that there is indeed a positive relationship between post-conflict constitution making and peace as well as a theoretical argument why this is the case.

Secondly, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 show that it is possible to identify specific types of political institutions – or institutional change – that contribute to peace. Given that the

existing literature does not show a clear link between either regime type or political power-sharing and less conflict recurrence, one could conclude that political factors are not decisive in explaining conflict recurrence. Moreover, the literature clearly shows that premature post-conflict elections at the national level can destabilize post-conflict countries, which could lead to the conclusion that political participation is not only irrelevant, but in fact dangerous. This dissertation strongly calls such conclusions into question. Instead it demonstrates that it is possible to identify specific political institutions and types of institutional change that in fact increase a country's chances of remaining peaceful. These results are further underlined by one of the main findings of Chapter 4. The path "Institutionalizing peace" in which international support to politics and governance contributes to peace is the path that explains most of the cases.

Thirdly, the dissertation generates new insights by unpacking broad categories the literature has so far been working with. Chapter 2 disaggregates regime type and instead looks at local elections as one very specific channel of political participation. Chapter 4 departs from the broad category of peacebuilding in order to be able to analyse international engagement in post-conflict contexts more concretely than current approaches that focus on peacekeeping or aid more generally. Both chapters are able to show that specific aspects of the broader categories are consistently associated with sustainable peace.

Policy implications

The findings of this dissertation have clear policy implications. Firstly, they provide policy makers with concrete insights on which domestic political institutions can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. This is particularly important because many others only warn of democratization, more specifically post-conflict elections, but are not able to present alternative strategies. The literature warning of post-conflict elections, for example recommends international actors to focus on institution-building before supporting elections. However, it remains entirely opaque what this is supposed to mean as "it is not clear (…) precisely what the exact institutional developments or preconditions are—only that they take time to develop" (Joshi, et al., 2017). The results in this thesis instead provide policy makers with very concrete suggestions on potentially promising areas of engagement. Regarding political participation, the results of the dissertation suggest that local elections can contribute to sustained peace and should therefore receive international attention. Importantly, these institutions can also be supported in autocratic contexts, without necessarily pushing for democratization, which is known to have potentially destabilizing effects in these types of contexts.

Writing a new constitution, the topic of the third chapter, is often promoted by international actors in post-conflict situations. For example, Security Council

Resolution No. 2254, which was passed in 2015 and lays out the basis for a road map for peace talks in Syria, explicitly identifies the need to draft a new constitution. The findings of this dissertation show that writing a new constitution can indeed contribute to peace, hence lending support to international efforts in this area. At the same time the third chapter also demonstrates that it is vital to allow enough time for these often very complicated processes. International actors frequently pressure post-conflict countries to go through these processes very quickly, which according to the results of this dissertation could run counter to building sustainable peace. Finally, the fourth chapter demonstrates more generally that international engagement can contribute to peace and shows which specific types of international support can be helpful in different contexts. The results at hand show that support to politics and governance constitutes an effective strategy for international actors seeking to support peace.

Limitations

This dissertation has two main limitations. Firstly, although several steps were taken to reduce the risk of endogeneity biasing the results, it still poses a challenge in each of the chapters. One additional way to address endogeneity would be to better understand the origins of the institutions and processes analysed. Independent analyses that look at and explain aid allocation to post-conflict states or the question of which post-

conflict states adopt new constitutions would be promising avenues for further investigations in this regard.

Secondly, the fourth chapter shows that it can be beneficial to complement quantitative findings with qualitative insights. Both the second and third chapter rely almost purely on quantitative analyses. Systematic, comparative analyses of post-conflict constitution-making could help better understand under which conditions constitution-writing contributes to peace. Further analysing the causal mechanisms put forward in the third chapter would also mean taking a closer look at determinants of trust – both between citizens and citizens and the state – in post-conflict societies. Process tracing based on qualitative data could also be interesting to take a closer look at the mechanism behind the pacifying effect of local elections identified in the second chapter. Questions here would be how they are used by the different political actors in the post-conflict period – the population, former rebels or potential new rebels – to further their political aims and interests.

Avenues for future research

The dissertation also opens up several avenues for future research. A first one would be to even further disaggregate several of the categories used in this dissertation. In order to keep each chapter as parsimonious as possible, very specific and narrow

subjects were focused on, leaving other interesting aspects out of the analysis. For example, the first chapter only looks at local elections as one very specific channel for participation. Analyses of other types of participation, such as through political parties or civil society, could also generate further insights into the connection between political institutions and conflict recurrence. Another prominent argument in the democratic civil peace theory is that institutional constraints are key in explaining why democracies should be able to avoid conflict (recurrence). It would be possible to also take a closer look into this argument, differentiate between different types of institutional constraints and whether they reduce a country's risk of experiencing conflict recurrence. Similarly, although already presenting a more disaggregated approach, the fourth chapter still deals with quite broad categories of international peacebuilding. Several of the five identified areas of peacebuilding, such as politics and governance, still encompass many different types of international support and could be looked at in a more detailed manner. Also the current analysis combines aid commitments across all different types of international actors. Taking a closer look at how the results vary depending on the type of aid donor (multi- vs. bilateral for example) could uncover interesting variation.

One central question the second chapter leaves unanswered, is how the local elections that are important to prevent conflict recurrence come about. Further research could analyse whether these institutions developed before, during or after the conflict and how this affects their effect on post-conflict peace. Such endeavours would also

connect well to the literature on sequencing democratization, which calls for allowing a period of institution-building in post-conflict contexts. What institutions can be and are built in post-conflict societies hence represents one promising avenue for future research with potentially strong policy implications.

Generating new data based on the insights provided by this dissertation would be another avenue for further research, as data availability for post-conflict countries remains highly limited. Regarding international engagement, complete disbursement data on ODA would be a valuable addition, as well as geocoded data that allows analysing where exactly aid is going. Gaining more information on local elections, when exactly they take place and the extent of voter turnout, for example, could also help study in more detail how political participation at the local level affects conflict recurrence.

Finally, the results of two control variables consistently contradict some assumptions of the current literature on conflict recurrence. Several of the analyses show that less intense civil wars are more likely to recur, as are conflicts that ended in a rebel victory. Since theoretical arguments can be made for both, it would be worthwhile to look into these differences more systematically. Explanations could be that the results differ between analyses of systematic and dyadic peace, specific measurement approaches or time spans analysed. More generally, such an approach would also imply a more careful

discussion of the concept of “conflict recurrence”, its different empirical definitions and the different kinds of scenarios it entails.

To summarize, this thesis expands the current literature by disaggregating the political-set up of post-conflict countries and demonstrating that 1) certain types of political participation have a pacifying effect 2) institutional change, in the form of constitution-writing, can be good for peace and 3) international support to political processes and governance is an important strategy in building sustainable peace. The dissertation opens up several avenues for further research while also generating valuable implications for policy-makers, most importantly that support to political participation in post-conflict countries can contribute to sustainable peace.

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