


Table 1. Correlations between measures of Eurosceptic politicization

	Gov't support	Gov't dissent	Opposition support	Extra-parl. Eurosceptic party
Gov't dissent	-0.62			
Opposition support	0.08	-0.10		
Extra-parl. Eurosceptic party	-0.08	0.06	-0.03	
Euroscepticism	-0.24	0.38	-0.33	0.06


Figure 1. Differentiation and government Euroscepticism




Note: Croatia and the Czech Republic were omitted. They have only had 1 and 4 differentiation opportunities, respectively. In the case of the Czech Republic, the Lisbon Treaty fell under the responsibility of a caretaker government for which we cannot establish party positions on the EU.

Figure 2. Euroscepticism beyond government

Opposition EU support



Extra-parliamentary Eurosceptic party



Popular Euroscepticism






Figure 3. Results




Note: Observations: 362. Countries: 14. Policies: 11. Treaties: 9. Bars: 95%-Highest Posterior Density Intervals. This plot shows the estimates for the main variables in a basic model, a model including control variables for existing differentiation and referendums, and a multilevel model. The appendix includes a full results table (**Error! Reference source not found.**).

Figure 4. Government EU support and the predicted probability of differentiation



Note: The predicted probabilities were estimated with the other variables at their means. Governmental EU support was standardized with mean 0 and unit changes corresponding to standard deviations. A standard deviation corresponds to 0.8 units on the original 1-7 EU support scale (see Table A1).

Figure 5. Excluding individual countries



Note: The figure shows the results of the multilevel model after excluding observations from individual countries. Panel a) shows the results for government EU support. Panel b) shows all main variables for a model excluding observations from the UK.