Gottardi, Piero and Tallon, Jean Marc and Ghirardato, Paolo (2017) Flexible contracts. Games and Economic Behavior, 103 (C). pp. 145-167. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013
Gottardi, Piero and Tallon, Jean Marc and Ghirardato, Paolo (2017) Flexible contracts. Games and Economic Behavior, 103 (C). pp. 145-167. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013
Gottardi, Piero and Tallon, Jean Marc and Ghirardato, Paolo (2017) Flexible contracts. Games and Economic Behavior, 103 (C). pp. 145-167. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013
Abstract
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents, that is of adopting flexible contracts, relative to the use of rigid, non-discretionary contracts. The main focus of the paper lies in the analysis of the costs of delegation, primarily agency costs, versus their benefits, primarily the flexibility of the action choice in two different environments, one with risk and one with ambiguity.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | D86; D82; D81; Delegation; Flexibility; Agency costs; Multiple priors; Imprecision aversion |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Sep 2019 13:02 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 20:28 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/25365 |
Available files
Filename: Revision3GEBDec15.pdf