Aaskoven, Lasse (2019) Partisan-Electoral Cycles in Public Employment: Evidence from Developed Democracies. Political Studies, 69 (2). pp. 190-213. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719874296
Aaskoven, Lasse (2019) Partisan-Electoral Cycles in Public Employment: Evidence from Developed Democracies. Political Studies, 69 (2). pp. 190-213. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719874296
Aaskoven, Lasse (2019) Partisan-Electoral Cycles in Public Employment: Evidence from Developed Democracies. Political Studies, 69 (2). pp. 190-213. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719874296
Abstract
According to both early empirical findings and theoretical expectations of partisan preferences, left-wing parties in government ought to prefer higher levels of public employment for both ideological and opportunistic reasons. In contrast, using country-fixed effects in a panel of 22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, this article finds no evidence of left-wing governments systematically increasing public employment. However, there is evidence that left-wing governments increase public employment in election years, which gives rise to an opportunistic, partisan-electoral cycle in public employment. In line with the logic of core-voter targeting and political budget cycles, incumbent left-wing parties seem to increase the number of their potential core voters when they are needed most.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | partisanship, public employment, political budget cycles, elections |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 02 Oct 2019 11:29 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 19:58 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/25481 |
Available files
Filename: Partisan-Electoral-Cycles in Public-Employment accepted version.pdf