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Doctoral Thesis

The Role of State and Non-State Actors in Determining Violent and Nonviolent Tactics in Political Conflict

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The Role of State and Non-State Actors in Determining Violent and Nonviolent Tactics in Political Conflict

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to explain the choices of violent and nonviolent tactics in political conflict. It consists of three papers that focus on different aspects pertaining to the initiation and development of internal political conflict considering violence and nonviolence as potential mobilization outcomes. The overarching theme is the actor-centric approach to delineating the determinants of nonviolent and violent forms of opposition. This thesis focuses on state and non-state actors to elucidate how these can shape the type of opposition tactics. The first paper takes a macro perspective and argues that the state and its repressive repertoire determine the likelihood of violent and nonviolent mobilization tactics. This is because the state, via its different repressive tactics, shapes the motivation and opportunity for violence and nonviolence. This is the first study that disaggregates state repression and the

findings suggest that different types of repression affect opposition forms differently. The second paper focuses on the effect of state and non-state external supporters on the likelihood of rebel groups adopting nonviolent tactics. It shows that foreign states and diaspora as external sponsors in fact have different effects. Support from diaspora is consistently associated with an increased probability of adopting nonviolent tactics, while state supporters do not appear to have a consistent effect on these tactical decisions. The third paper examines the role of civil society in preventing the onset of civil war as a trajectory of political protest events. It shows that in contexts of already undergoing nonviolent resistance, high capacity civil society diminishes the risk of civil war as a protest trajectory. As such, this paper provides the first systematic empirical evidence on the role of civil society in political conflict. Overall, this thesis makes a contribution by explaining previously understudied aspects pertaining to the intersection between violent and nonviolent mobilization.

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All errors are my own.

Introduction

This thesis examines the determinants of violent and nonviolent forms of political conflict. Political conflict occurs across different institutional and socio-economic settings and it involves state as well as non-state actors. Opposition groups mobilize and through violent and nonviolent tactics they challenge the government to bring about change in the political status quo. Yet, there is a considerable variation in the method of opposition and the mobilization outcomes, violent and nonviolent. Some countries experience nonviolent resistance in the form of strikes, demonstrations and protests, others are marked by civil wars and extremist violence, and some face a mixture, or a change, between the two. In the 1980s, the Philippines experienced simultaneously a pro-democracy movement seeking to overthrow the Marcos regime, and a violent conflict between the government and the New People's Army part of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Moreover, opposition groups often switch tactics in the course of the struggle against the government. For instance, in its initial stages the political conflict in El Salvador can be characterized as nonviolent, but from 1980 onwards, the conflict between the government and the main opposition the Farabundo Marí National Liberation Front (FMLN) turned violent (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). The Western Sahara liberation movement Polisario started off with violent tactics, but then turned to nonviolent forms of opposition (Stephan and Mundy 2006).

The two principal questions that this thesis addresses are under what conditions and why internal political conflict takes on different tactics and forms of mobilization, violent and nonviolent. The analysis of these questions is important for three interconnected reasons. First, this analysis acknowledges, and subsequently demonstrates, that nonviolent tactics and forms of opposition are a viable alternative

to violence. This is a key notion, as it allows for investigations into the determinants of the full universe of opposition methods and tactics, which so far have been largely examined in separate studies. The joint examination of violent and nonviolent forms of opposition provides the basis for better inferences about political mobilization processes. Second, this thesis considers not only the initiation of a particular method of opposition or type of political conflict, but it also analyses the changes in opposition tactics as well as the mechanisms through which violence can transform into nonviolence and vice versa. These aspects and dynamics remain largely unaddressed by the extant literature, but this thesis provides an explanation to these tactical changes. Third, by identifying the predictors of violent and nonviolent tactics and political conflict, this thesis contributes to the better understanding of these different mobilization outcomes and in turn it opens avenues for the development of adequate mechanisms to moderate them.

The main argument of this thesis is that different actors and their attributes are the key determinants of the variation in tactics and forms of political conflict. The proposed theoretical mechanisms overall concentrate on motivations and opportunities for particular forms of opposition, or change thereof. This overarching framework is appropriate as it adequately captures the actor-centric approach to researching understudied aspects pertaining to the effects of state versus non-state and internal versus external actors. Specifically, this thesis looks at the effect of the state, diaspora and foreign states as external supporters as well as civil society on the likelihood of nonviolent and violent forms of opposition and political conflict.

The approach to the overarching research questions of this thesis is to break them down into three interrelated, but more specific questions that will be the focus of the three research papers that this thesis consists of. These three questions can be

summarized as follows. The first question, which is examined in the first paper of this thesis respectively, analyses the determinants of violent and nonviolent forms of political conflict. It asks under what conditions and why violence or nonviolence is more likely as a form of opposition in political conflict. The second paper provides an explanation on why violent groups adopt and switch to nonviolent tactics, thereby transforming the conflict and shifting it from the violent to the nonviolent domain. The final question, which is the focus of the third paper of this thesis, gives an explanation of the divergent trajectories of political conflict. In essence, it explains why nonviolent opposition can sometimes pave the way for high-intensity violence such as the onset of civil war, and sometimes such violent outcomes are avoided, but instead the nonviolent opposition expands substantially.

Motivation and Purpose

The topic of this thesis is motivated by political conflict developments such as the Colour Revolutions and the Arab Spring uprisings. The opposition methods, the use of violent and nonviolent tactics, and the trajectories of these political conflicts raise a plethora of questions about the determinants of violent and nonviolent forms of opposition. Even though the literature has identified various country characteristics that may be associated with a particular type of opposition tactics, there are still many facets and alternative explanations that remain unexplored. To this end, this thesis contributes to the broader debate on the determinants of nonviolence and violence as forms of political conflict by taking an actor-centric approach.

The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to enrich the understanding on violent and nonviolent forms of opposition and political conflict. To achieve this goal, the thesis studies the determinants of violence and nonviolence as opposition forms and

tactics as a function of the attributes of state and non-state actors. This thesis makes a contribution by providing several novel findings. First, it shows that previously unexplored types of state repression such as information, economic and social repression, affect the probability of violent and nonviolent opposition methods differently. This approach is in stark contrast to previous studies that have focused on very violent forms of state repression (e.g., Young 2013; Moore 1998; Davenport 2009; Ritter 2013). Second, this thesis finds that in fact non-state actors such as diaspora and civil society are effective moderators of domestic political conflict and opposition tactics. Moreover, these non-state actors can effectively overturn and prevent violent forms of opposition. Extant research only alludes to this notion, but it does not fully explore the possibility that diaspora and civil society can impede violence (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Bond et al. 1997; Marchetti and Tocci 2009). Third, the thesis analyses a specific aspect pertaining to the tactical shift from violence to nonviolence, which has not been studied systematically so far (e.g., Dudouet 2013). The findings show that violent groups with diaspora as external supporters are more likely to adopt nonviolent tactics.

Key Concepts

This thesis studies violent and nonviolent forms of political conflict and opposition tactics. It views political conflict as a contestation between an organized non-state opposition and the government. As such, political conflict takes place within the boundaries of the territory over which the government presides. Stated differently, this thesis is concerned with internal conflict. Additionally, this study is interested in political conflict outside regular channels such as electoral contestation. Thus, the thesis at hand looks at unconventional political conflicts because those disregard institutional mechanisms through which people can voice their

disagreements with the government (Schock 2013). Yet, unconventional political conflict may take different forms, violent and nonviolent.

Violent forms of political conflict are understood as the use of tactics and methods of opposition that seek the achievement of stated goals by inflicting physical harm, damage or complete elimination of the opponent. This thesis considers and examines civil wars as a distinct violent form of political conflict. The definition of civil war is adopted from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which views civil war as a contested incompatibility between a non-state actor and the government that involves at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (UCDP 2015). Violent tactics, therefore, are referring to the use of arms and munitions to harm the opponent.

Nonviolent forms of political conflict are viewed as methods and tactics of opposition that aim at reaching stated objectives by leveraging a variety of approaches that challenge the opponent and cause disruption without jeopardizing the physical integrity of the opponent. This speaks of nonviolent resistance as a specific form of political conflict. Nonviolent resistance can be viewed as an umbrella term that includes, among others, protests, demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins and various forms of deliberate non-cooperation directed against government authorities (Sharp 1990). Such resistance is non-mundane, creating disorder with the goal of increasing the costs to the state if it refuses to comply with the demands of the opposition (Bond et al. 1997).

The State of the Literature

Nonviolent and violent political conflicts, forms of opposition and tactics have generally been the subjects of two distinctive literature strands, contentious

politics and armed conflict. However, the past decade has seen considerable effort to study violence and nonviolence in joint frameworks. As a result, there has been a proliferation of studies that seek to explore the factors and mechanisms through which nonviolent and violent forms of opposition occur. Moreover, a number of studies have adopted comparative frameworks to study the effectiveness of violent and nonviolent tactics. For instance, the finding that nonviolent resistance, such as protests and demonstrations, tends to be more successful than violent opposition in achieving its stated goals has resonated with the conflict scholarship and paved the way for further inquires into the nexus between violence and nonviolence (Chenoweth et al. 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan 2012).

State repression has been by far the most common explanatory variable in studies on violent and nonviolent political conflict. Using various operationalizations, scholars have sought to capture the complex relationship between repression and conflict (e.g., Moore 2000; Davenport 1995; Pierskalla 2010; Earl 2011; Ritter and Conrad 2016; Danneman and Ritter 2014). Taken together, the studies on the repression-conflict nexus generally produce mixed results, which could be partly attributed to the highly endogenous relationship between repression and conflict. It is also important to reiterate that the vast majority of studies have considered very violent forms of repression that are particularly prone to reverse causality concerns. Yet, in this thesis I propose a novel understanding of state repression that accounts for information, economic and social repression, thereby distancing it from previous focus on repression understood as egregious human rights violations.

Other studies have also considered alternative approaches and mechanisms to explaining types of political conflict and opposition tactics. Some focus on gender

equality (Schaftenaar 2017), globalization effects (Karakaya 2018), geography (Butcher 2017), manufacturing and organized labour (Butcher and Svensson 2016) as well as regime type (Cunningham et al. 2017; White et al. 2015). Yet, none of these studies considers the role of non-state actors such as diaspora and civil society. Thus, this thesis addresses this paucity by focusing on state and non-state actors and their attributes as the determinants of nonviolent and violent tactics in political conflict.

Additionally, studies have focused on the conditions under which we observe a violent and nonviolent political conflict and opposition tactics at the initiation stage of the conflict (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Cunningham et al. 2017). Yet, it is equally important for research to examine the developments of the political conflict and the interplay between violence and nonviolence. For instance, there is still sparse research on the variation in opposition tactics. Some examine the diverse range of violent tactics that violent groups can leverage (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2018), while others focus on specific nonviolent tactics employed by self-determination movements (Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017). Furthermore, only a few studies look at tactical switches between violence and nonviolence, but either anecdotally or theoretically (Dudouet 2013; Pierskalla 2010). This thesis, specifically the second paper, examines militant groups' shift from violent to nonviolent tactics and thus, it contributes to explanations on the variation in opposition tactics. The second paper shows that when violent groups benefit from diaspora support, the adoption of nonviolent tactics, understood as either participation in politics or nonviolent resistance, becomes more likely.

The growing body of literature examining jointly violent and nonviolent forms of opposition also has started to consider looking at mobilization outcomes

such as nonviolent resistance and civil war as two-stage processes (Bartuseviius and Gleditsch 2019; Cunningham et al. 2017), where in the first stage of the process, studies consider contested incompatibilities or claims that could then pave the way to a specific type of mobilization for opposition. Essentially, these studies point to the idea that the path to a specific mobilization outcome should be viewed as a process and thus different stages of this process need to be assessed accordingly. This thesis, in particular the third paper, endorses this approach and it looks at the role of civil society in moderating and determining the trajectories of nonviolent protests. Therefore, the third paper takes protests as the initial phase that may (or not) pave the way to the onset of high-intensity violence such as civil war as a second phase of the political conflict process.

State and Non-State Actors

This thesis focuses on actors such as the state, diaspora, civil society, international non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations and their characteristics as the determinants of nonviolent and violent forms of opposition. The rationale behind this approach is that different actors are expected to have divergent influence, which in turn can affect the motivation and opportunity for violence and nonviolence as forms of political conflict. This divergent influence may be the result of the actors being internal or external as well as state or non-state. Acknowledging these dichotomies, this thesis discusses the functions and standing of these actors with respect to their role in determining violent and nonviolent tactics.

The state is seen as an actor that delimits the rules as well as the control in the society over which it presides. As such, the state uses a repressive repertoire

through which it can influence the motivation and opportunity for opposition, violent and nonviolent. Civil society, also on the internal dimension, can be viewed as a non-state actor that functions as an intermediary in the polity and has the potential to influence forms of opposition by moderating contention between the government and opposition groups. For instance, Bolivian civil society has demonstrated substantial ability to influence protest events by denouncing violence and showing support for the status quo or solely nonviolent opposition tactics (Boulding and Nelson-Núñez 2014).

On the external dimension, actors such as diaspora and foreign states as well as international non-governmental organizations may also impact political conflict abroad via the provision of support. By establishing a principal-agent relationship, these actors can then influence and control the choice of violent and nonviolent opposition tactics. Saudi Arabia, for example, as an external supporter to the Syrian opposition has sustained the ability of the group to violently oppose the regime (Jenkins 2014). On the other hand, there is evidence that the Tamil and the Irish diaspora influenced positively the violent conflicts in their countries of origin by supporting and influencing the opposition tactics of the LTTE and the IRA respectively (Golan and Gal 2009; Fair 2005).

This thesis adopts a motivation and opportunity framework and on this basis, it puts forward a set of hypotheses pertaining to the effect of different actors and their attributes on violent and nonviolent opposition tactics and political conflict.

Research Design

The overarching research questions of this thesis, as well as the specific questions addressed in each paper, presuppose the conduct of a systematic empirical analysis across space and time. This is because the large-N methodological

framework provides the opportunity to uncover patterns and associations that enable generalizations about the likelihood of a particular form of political mobilization outcome. The modeling strategy focuses primarily on different discrete choice models, as the hypothesized relationships and the nature of the relevant data require the use of such empirical models.

In terms of the data used for the empirical analyses, this thesis benefits from available data on violent and nonviolent opposition. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) data set (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) with a timeframe from 1945 to 2006 consists of a consensus population of 250 violent and nonviolent political conflicts, which have maximalist demands (e.g., regime change or secession) and at least 1,000 active participants. Thus, these data capture information on political conflicts that are marked by substantial participation. This data set is used to identify the initiation of nonviolent opposition in the first paper, as the unit of observation is the country-year. Moreover, these data provide information on violent groups that adopt nonviolent tactics in the second paper; the second paper part of the thesis focuses on the meso-level of analysis and explores violent group-years as the unit of observation.

Information on violent political conflict is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). The data record violent conflicts that reach 25 or more battle-related deaths due to an open conflict between an opposition group and the government in a given year. These data are used to obtain information on the onset of violent conflict in the first as well as the third paper. Additionally, the Mass Mobilization Data Project (Clark and Regan 2015) provides information on nonviolent opposition in the form of protest events, with a timeframe from 1990 to 2014. A protest event is defined as an assembly of at

least 50 people who have specific demands and take nonviolent action such as protests, demonstrations and sit-ins. These data are used in the third paper so as to explore the trajectories and transformation of nonviolent opposition with the country-year as the unit of observation.

With respect to information on the actors and their attributes, the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2017) provide a wide range of relevant indicators. This data set contains information on states' repressive repertoire such as attempts to repress civil society organizations (social repression), the media (information repression) and efforts to suppress public goods provision (economic repression). These are utilized in the first paper as proxies for different types of repression. Moreover, the V-Dem data has information on civil society and its characteristics that are used as a key explanatory variable in the third paper of this thesis. Data on external state and non-state actors that is relevant for the analysis in the second paper is taken from the NAVCO 2.0 data as it provides group-level attributes such as support.

Content of the Thesis

This thesis consists of three interrelated papers that explore distinct aspects pertaining to the determinants of violent and nonviolent forms of opposition and political conflict. Specifically, the first paper examines the effect of previously unexplored types of state repression on violent and nonviolent forms of opposition and political conflict. The paper focuses on information, economic and social repression, which are distinct types part of the state's repressive portfolio. As such, these repression types depart from operationalizations with predominant focus on violence and shed new light on the effects of repression. The argument is that

different types of repression delimit the motivation and opportunity for violent and nonviolent forms differently, and the results from the empirical analysis provide evidence for this notion.

The second paper looks at group-level opposition tactics and it explains under what conditions and why violent groups adopt nonviolent tactics. These are important questions that help with the development of a better understanding of the intersection between violent and nonviolent forms of political conflict. This paper takes external support from different actors, namely diaspora and foreign states, as the main explanation as to why some violent groups embrace nonviolent tactics and some do not. Through a principal-agent mechanism, diaspora and foreign states delineate the motivations and opportunities for violent groups to turn to nonviolence. The findings demonstrate that diaspora, as external supporters increase the probability of nonviolent tactics' adoption, while foreign states are not effective external supporters with respect to the decision to adopt nonviolence.

The third paper explains the variation in the trajectories of political conflict in terms of violent and nonviolent forms of opposition. It takes the role of civil society as the main determinant of whether protest events may pave the way for violence or an increased number of protest events. It argues that depending on its capacity, civil society may moderate the trajectories of political conflict and to prevent violent outcomes in settings where nonviolent opposition has already taken place. The proposed mechanism focuses on the ability of civil society to tap into the motivation and opportunities for forms of opposition and through violent-reducing mechanisms to prevent violent outcomes. The findings from the empirical analysis provide robust evidence that civil society can be an effective intermediary in

political conflict and prevent violence as a protest trajectory, but there are indications that civil society may also increase nonviolent opposition.

The conclusion provides an overview of the actor-centric approach to determining violent and nonviolent tactics in political conflict. It summarizes the main findings and discusses their implications for the state of the literature. Finally, the conclusion offers suggestions on avenues for future research.

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Paper 1: It's All the Same? Types of State Repression and Opposition Tactics

Abstract

Opposition to the government takes on violent and nonviolent forms and tactics to seek political change. Yet, there is a considerable ambiguity as to why in certain cases countries experience nonviolent resistance such as protests and demonstrations, while in other cases the opposition engages in violent tactics, precipitating the onset of civil wars. This paper seeks to contribute to explanations on the variation in violent and nonviolent tactics and forms of political conflict by exploring the role of different types of state repression. The main argument put forward is that the state uses different types of repression as a tool to delimit the opportunity and motivation for violent and nonviolent opposition tactics. Challengers to the political status quo, therefore, face divergent constraints and incentives for opposition depending on the type of repression. In contrast to extant research that has focused exclusively on very violent forms of repression and human rights violations, this paper considers economic, social and information repression as distinct repression types. By employing global panel data, this paper studies the effects of these different repression types on the probability of nonviolent resistance and civil war onset. The findings suggest that these repression types have a divergent impact on the probability of violent and nonviolent forms of political conflict. Information repression is the major driver of nonviolent resistance, but it has no effect on civil war onset. Contrarily, economic repression matters only for civil war onset, while social repression influence both nonviolent resistance and civil war, but in different ways. This paper puts forward a novel understanding of state repression and it contributes to research on the repression-opposition nexus by showing that the effect of different types of repression on opposition tactics is not the same.

Introduction

Nonviolent opposition such as protests, strikes and demonstrations, as well as high-intensity violence in the form of civil wars take place across different institutional and socio-economic contexts. In Egypt, for instance, the Kifaya movement engaged in nonviolent resistance against the Mubarak regime in the early 2000s. Egypt has been also one of the countries of the Arab Spring uprisings phenomenon. Another example is the nonviolent opposition against the Georgian President Shevardnadze that successfully achieved its goal of seeing the end of his rule in 2003 (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). Additionally, in recent years anti-austerity movements have organized across Europe and engaged in a plethora of nonviolent tactics to seek better socio-economic conditions. On the other hand, countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador have been confronted by violent civil wars in the late 1970s. Algeria also experienced a violent conflict where the Islamic Salvation Front used primarily violent tactics to seek regime change. In the same way, Kachin rebels in Burma/Myanmar targeted the regime with violence (UCDP 2015). The main goal of this paper is to explain this variation in the choice of violent and nonviolent opposition tactics and the form of political conflict. While previous research studies jointly violence and nonviolence as mobilization outcomes and opposition tactics, there are still many aspects to this tactical choice that remain unexplored. This paper, therefore, seeks to contribute to the understanding of these divergent forms of anti-government opposition[1] by taking the role of the state and

[1] Here the focus is on anti-government opposition and thus opposition concerning territorial independence or autonomy is not examined. The reason behind this decision is that different repression types are expected to affect differently the probability of opposition, both violent and nonviolent, depending on the goal of the opposition.

the types of repression as an important explanation as to why opposition takes the form of nonviolent resistance and civil war.[2]

The principal argument of this paper is that not all types of state repression have the same effect on opposition tactics and forms of opposition. The state uses different types of repression to control potential challengers to the political status quo. In this way, the state delimits the motivation and opportunity[3] for opposition in general and violent and nonviolent opposition tactics in particular. Distinguishing between information, economic and social repression, this paper argues that these distinct types of repression determine differently the choice of violent and nonviolent opposition tactics and political conflict.[4] This is because through these

[2] It is possible for a country to experience both a civil war and a nonviolent resistance in a given year. There is no reason to anticipate that violence and nonviolence happen always in isolation. However, the occurrence of both violent and nonviolent opposition and tactics is empirically quite rare (small-scale nonviolent and violent opposition are rarely recorded systematically).

[3] Moore (1995) puts forward the idea that any form of political conflict and opposition should be considered with respect to both opportunity and motivation.

[4] This paper studies violent and nonviolent opposition jointly as both are methods of irregular, not institutionalized opposition. The joint examination of violent and nonviolent types of opposition allows for a better understanding of opposition choices (as well as the factors that drive these choices) given that I consider a full set of unconventional, not institutionalized forms of opposition (see e.g., Cunningham et al. 2017 for similar motivation to study tactical choices). Moreover, the joint exploration explicitly acknowledges that nonviolent opposition and mobilization is a viable alternative to violence (this notion has been highlighted and empirically explored (see e.g., Stephan and Chenoweth 2008)). Hence, a failure to consider both violent and nonviolent forms of opposition could result in only a partial view of the unconventional methods opposition can take to change the status quo.

types of repression the state conditions differently the motivation and opportunity for particular opposition tactics, violent and nonviolent.

Information repression is defined as the attempts of the state to censor the media. By controlling or limiting the freedom of the media, the state determines the content and flow of information, which in turn delimits the motivation and opportunity for opposition. For instance, corrupt government officials often seek to censor the media to prevent the public from gaining information on their misconduct. In 2015, Brazil experienced a wave of nonviolent protests sparked by a corruption scandal involving high-ranking politicians. Media censorship and the ban on reporting on prominent politicians were an important factor in the onset of the nonviolent protests (Freedom House 2015). Thus, information repression is expected to increase the probability of nonviolent resistance, but to decrease the likelihood of civil war onset. Indeed, this is because media censorship attempts can incentivize nonviolent resistance, which is seen as a relatively more legitimate form of opposition than violence. Yet, violent opposition should be less likely to occur given the lack of (accurate) information on government's capabilities due to information repression.

Economic repression is understood in terms of whether the bulk of government spending is used on private or public goods. As public goods are an integral part of social welfare, depriving citizens from such benefits arguably harms their living standards as well as their socio-economic status and outlook, which in turn can trigger the motivation and opportunity for opposition. There are plenty of examples in history where people have opposed patronage politics, nepotism and economic mismanagement. For instance, after decades of grave economic mismanagement, President Mobutu of Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo was

confronted by organized opposition, which used violent tactics to put an end to his rule (The Economist 1997). The risk of both nonviolent resistance and civil war onset is expected to increase following economic repression: higher spending on private goods might please particularistic interests and keep the cronies or the ruling coalition of the government in check, but at the same time economic repression can lower the overall citizens' welfare and spark strikes and popular protests.

Social repression refers to the attempts of the state to prevent or suppress the activities of civil society organizations. Civil society organizations are seen as a platform for mobilization and an arena where citizens can debate social issues. Thus, these organizations can pose a considerable threat to the regime given their mobilization capacity. Social repression delimits the motivation and opportunity for opposition to the government. For example, despite repression, civil society organizations were key to the nonviolent resistance, the so-called Otpor movement, in Serbia and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. On balance, therefore, higher social repression should decrease the probability of nonviolent resistance, but increase the chance of civil war onset. The rationale behind this proposition is that more repressed civil society organizations limit the mobilization potential of nonviolent resistance, as it heavily relies on mass participation.[5] Yet, the onset of civil war requires the mobilization and armament of only a small number of committed participants who can pose a viable threat to the government using violent tactics.

So far there is no consensus on the effect of state repression on domestic opposition despite the fact that a large body of literature explores a variety of aspects

[5] Nonviolent resistance can begin with a small number of highly committed individuals, but the limited access to a mobilization platform such as civil society organizations risks the viability of the opposition as it is unlikely to overcome the threshold for mass mobilization (Granovetter 1978).

pertaining to the repression-opposition nexus (e.g., Carey 2006; Moore 1998; Francisco 1995; Lichbach 1987; Ritter and Conrad 2016; Davenport 2007). The vast majority of studies have also focused on very violent types of state repression such as torture, killings and disappearances (e.g., Conrad and Moore 2010; Poe and Tate 2006; Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub 2018). Yet, some studies have turned to less violent forms of repression, recognizing that the state has a vast repressive repertoire (e.g. Kim, Whitten-Woodring, and James 2015; Earl 2011). This paper makes a two-fold contribution to this literature. First, it disaggregates state repression and explores the separate effect of economic, social and information repression, which have not been studied before.[6] Second, while previous studies have been ambiguous regarding the form of opposition, violent and nonviolent, this paper looks at the impact of distinct repression types on the probability of nonviolent resistance and civil war onset.

The paper proceeds with an overview of the literature on the repression-opposition nexus. The subsequent sections put forward the general theoretical framework and propositions on the effect of types of repression on opposition tactics. Following this, the paper details the research design and in a subsequent section, it presents and discusses the results from the empirical analysis. There is a section discussing the robustness checks followed by a conclusion summarizing the key points of the paper and avenues for future research.

[6] In fact, extant research stresses the importance of viewing repression as a multifaceted concept and the need to study other types of repression beyond violent repression (see e.g., Earl 2003).

On the Repression-Opposition Nexus

The extant literature on the link between repression and organized opposition to the government can be divided into two broad strands. In the first strand, there are studies that take state repression as the focal point; some seek to explain repression as a function of a particular opposition activity (e.g., Carey 2010; Ritter 2013), while others view repression as the primary driver of opposition onset (e.g., Moore 2000; Lichbach 1987). In the second strand, there is a growing body of research that endeavours to explain violent and nonviolent forms of opposition in a comparative framework, and some studies factor state repression in their analyses (e.g., Karakaya 2018). This paper, therefore, speaks to both strands of the literature, as it puts emphasis on alternative and previously unexplored types of state repression, but it also seeks to explain the variation in violent and nonviolent opposition tactics.

Cunningham (2013) explores the tactical opposition choices of self-determination movements in a costs-benefits framework. Yet, her paper does not account for state repression. In the same vein, Schaftenaar (2017) seeks to explain the choice of opposition form by looking at the levels of gender equality, but the author does not consider repression as well. In a recent paper, Karakaya (2018) takes globalization as the driving force of the choice of opposition method and accounts for state repression, but in line with the vast majority of literature the author considers violent repression that is arguably capturing an already on-going conflict. Young (2012) shows that by repressing nonviolent opposition through very violent forms of repression, states can in fact trigger violent armed conflict. Unlike these studies, the present paper refrains from studying violent repression and instead it focuses on economic, social and information types of repression and their effect on nonviolent and violent forms of opposition.

Overall, there is no agreement among the scholarship on what the effect of repression is on the likelihood of an organized opposition to emerge and to challenge the status quo. Some claim that repression has a positive effect and it triggers opposition, others maintain that the effect should be negative, as state repression either prevents or eliminates challengers (see Davenport and Loyle 2012 for a survey of this literature). There are also studies that look at the middle levels of repression and argue that the ability to repress (or not) fully can open up the space for organized opposition to emerge (Pierskalla 2010). All these explanations seem plausible and there are historical cases to support them. The lack of consensus could be attributed partly to the fact that all these studies deem state repression as very violent and thus, it is not surprising that they confirm the principle that violence begets violence.

Recent studies also seek to inform future research by outlining the vast literature on the link between repression and opposition (DeMeritt 2016; Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Earl 2011). Among the key notions stemming from these studies is that there is a need to expand the understanding of both repression and opposition, and to consider different types thereof. To this end, the paper at hand studies the effect of information, economic and social repression on violent and nonviolent opposition tactics.

Repression Types as Opportunity and Motivation

At the centre of the literature on civil wars as well as nonviolent resistance are explanations on opposition against the state that could be viewed from the prism of either motivations for opposing the political status quo or opportunities for opposition (Most and Starr 1989; McAdam 1982; Tilly and Tarrow 2015; Gurr

1970). Here, it is argued that the type of state repression triggers the motivation and modifies the opportunity for mobilization. This notion is in line with Moore (1995) who views opposition, regardless of its form, to be dependent on both opportunity and motivation.

States use repression as a strategic tool to control their citizens and delimit the information they are allowed to possess, the social activities they can get involved in, and the economic opportunities they can have. In essence, via a repressive repertoire, the government seeks to delimit the types of sanctioned behavior, organization and activity. This understanding of state repression speaks to the idea of prevention rather than pre-emption and responsiveness (see e.g., Davenport 2007a; Danneman and Ritter 2014; De Jaegher and Hoyer 2019 for a discussion on pre-emptive repression and how states responds after the onset of opposition). Here the focus is on information, economic and social repression, which could be viewed as more subtle and preventive forms of repression than violent repression such as torture, kidnappings and killings.[7] Through information, economic and social forms of repression the government seeks to first control its citizens and second to prevent and minimize the possibility for organized opposition that could jeopardize government's ability to control its citizens in the future. In this

[7] While I cannot completely rule out the possibility that states anticipate organized opposition and decide to pre-emptively repress (see e.g., Ritter and Conrad 2016 for a discussion), I deem the types of repression I examine (information, economic and social repression) as less likely to be the result of an anticipated anti-government opposition. This is because the feasibility of launching such types of repression in a quick manner is limited and also these types of repression are unlikely to be effective in forestalling imminent opposition (note that this is not the case with violent repression where governments can promptly, for instance, kidnap, torture or kill opposition members).

sense, the government strategically and proactively, rather than reactively, uses information, economic and social repression.

Repression also shapes the channels for opposition against the state as well as the grievances that foster motivations for opposition. As such, repression can be a catalyst of frustration within the population since it limits freedoms and jeopardizes social welfare. This in turn can trigger the motivation for mobilization and subsequent opposition. The anti-government opposition assesses a set of strategic considerations when making the decision on a course of action, violent or nonviolent. The constraints already in place and imposed by the state inform the strategic choice of opposition. Thus, different types of state repression are expected to influence differently the decision on a particular opposition form.

The form of opposition is differentiated on the basis of the tactics used by the opposition, nonviolent and violent. Protests, strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins are all the repertoire of nonviolent resistance and are generally perceived as a more legitimate method of opposition. Moreover, nonviolence is often linked to the power of numbers, i.e. nonviolent resistance requires a high number of participants to go against the establishment and disregard conventional channels for opposition (Sharp 1990). Additionally, the effectiveness of nonviolent opposition in the face of state repression is a function of its level of organization, where better organized opposition can overcome severe repression (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014).

Civil war as a violent form of opposition has been studied in frameworks considering political opportunity theories. Studies have concentrated on civil war determinants such as state capacity (Fjelde and De Soysa 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010) or regime type (Hegre et al. 2001; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009;

Ellingsen 2000) with specific emphasis on anocracies to explain the onset of violent conflict. Overall, regime type is often linked to political capacity with regards to the level of development of political institutions. While this study does not dispute that regime type is an important consideration, here economic, social and information repression are examined as drivers of different opposition forms. Importantly, these types of state repression, unlike violent repression, are used across heterogeneous regime and institutional contexts. States with both strong and weak political institutions can be marred with corruption and vastly inefficient, and thus these can ignite grievances in the population that ultimately give way to opposition.

It is also important to delineate why negotiations are not a viable option and instead the dissatisfied require unconventional methods of opposition to achieve their demands. Barriers to bargaining are severe in situations where grievances and the motivation for opposition are high. The uncertainty regarding relative capabilities and the resolve between the state and the opposition exacerbates information and commitment problems. Due to asymmetric information, actors might misinterpret their capabilities and determination, and thus, eliminate the possibility for bargaining. Apart from the uncertainty resulting from information problems, there are also commitment problems that can further exacerbate the situation, diminish the chance for negotiations and open conflict can ensue. In essence, violent or nonviolent conflict becomes increasingly more likely given that a credible commitment is often neither available, nor enforceable. The commitment problem results from the inability to credibly commit for the government to not repress and for the opposition to not challenge the government in the future (Fearon 1995; Walter 2009). Moreover, governments might be unwilling to negotiate and consider concessions given that accommodating one opposition formation could

spark a domino effect and prompt other opposition groups to pursue accommodation of their claims (Walter 2006).

Information Repression

The state uses information repression for a variety of reasons, but arguably the most pertinent ones are related to preserving the reputation of the government and to delimiting available information on state capabilities. Moreover, the government might seek to protect its winning coalition via information repression and selective media censorship (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). As the media is considered to function as a watchdog and as a corrective of the government and its policies, the state has an incentive to moderate its operations. Some argue that even in very authoritarian states, the media can still be allowed to exert its watchdogging function as the regime can target specific journalists that report and inform about the government's mismanagement (Kim, Whitten-Woodring, and James 2015; Gohdes and Carey 2017). Thus, media censorship attempts are considered as an instrument of the government to distort the quality and quantity of information available to the public. Additionally, some governments are able to use subtle ways to repress its citizens: King, Pan, and Roberts (2017), for instance, demonstrate that the Chinese government does not censor social media posts describing dissatisfaction with the regime, but instead it actively seeks to suppress social media activity that exhibits potential for collective action. Hence, the case of China indicates that some governments can be selective in the ways they use information repression to insulate themselves from political challengers.

The media can be a powerful source of mobilization. Studies show how the media, social media in particular, affects political conflict dynamics (Gohdes 2015;

Zeitzoff 2017). In light of the motivation and opportunity framework, information repression motivates mobilization for opposition, as it unrightfully inhibits the flow of information and it is used as a misinformation instrument to shield the government against challengers. Additionally, such state interference with the media and information flows legitimizes demands for change and organized opposition. Information and commitment problems persist as obstacles to bargaining and hence, the emergence of opposition becomes likely. Yet, the effect of information repression differs with respect to the form of opposition that is likely to challenge the state. This is because information repression moderates the opportunities for mobilization for a particular type of opposition differently.

The fact that information repression is viewed as illegitimate reinforces collective grievances that enable the necessary coordination to build mobilization potential and subsequent opposition (Rasler 1996; King, Pan, and Roberts 2017). For instance, the mass nonviolent resistance in Tunisia was sparked, among other reasons, by information repression, but it did not involve any form of high-intensity violence. Even in situations where the media is biased and information repression is present, nonviolent opposition can overcome coordination problems via communication technology such as cell phones. In fact, extant research demonstrates how the use of cell phones can facilitate coordination among the opposition and even assist the resistance in avoiding physical repression (Christensen and Garfias 2018).

Information repression is likely to reinforce grievances in the majority of the population regardless of social characteristics such as ethnicity, class, age, gender etc. Nonviolent resistance encourages broad-based participation and the barriers to partaking are considerably low, as nonviolent opposition is voluntary, participants can opt out at any point and there are no particular skills required for participation

(Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). This is not the case for violent opposition, as mobilization for violence requires a shared identity given the high risk of engaging in violent action. Moreover, participation in violent opposition involves particular know-how such as the use of weapons, military training and preparedness for social isolation and the likely loss of life (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). Hence, the barriers to participation in violent opposition are quite high.

Violent tactics in general and civil war in particular are less sanctioned forms of opposition and in turn also less likely to garner popular support to sustain the opposition than nonviolent resistance. Consider the wide range of violent groups in the context of Uganda. Lewis (2017) demonstrates with granular data on all Ugandan violent groups that even though many groups attempted to violently challenge the state, only a very small number managed to effectively engage the state in military confrontation to then bring about the onset of civil war. The fact that so many opposition groups fail to consolidate perhaps can be interpreted as a lack of support base. On the basis of these notions, I develop the first hypothesis of this study:

Hypothesis 1: Higher information repression increases the probability of nonviolent resistance, but decreases the probability of civil war onset.

Economic Repression

States use economic repression to control the population and to ensure the political survival of the regime in power. At the same time, economic repression delineates the motivation and opportunity for challengers to the status quo to emerge. Here economic repression in essence entails the diminished provision of

public goods and services, while at the same time these resources are spent to serve particularistic interests. For instance, the government may engage in economic repression in situations where political survival is at stake or where government officials need to satisfy personal economic interests and as a result, they get involved in different types of possibly corrupt activities.

Political survival and regime durability depend on the distribution and allocation of national budget spending. A rich body of literature speaks to the idea that the reliance on coalitions to preserve political power is closely linked to the way national resources are allocated (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Escribà-Folch 2012). This is because of the need to guarantee the complacency of regime supporters, which are paramount in holding on to political power. According to selectorate theory, government spending is mostly devoted to public or private goods depending on the size of the winning coalition (the necessary size of support that the government must secure to be in power) (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005).[8]

Given resource constraints, the smaller the winning coalition, the greater the incentives are to devote resources on private rather than on public goods. If the government invests in public goods, instead, it might not be able to guarantee political survival even if the selectorate might be generally satisfied with public goods provision due to the fact that the loyalty and support of the small winning coalition is not certain.[9] More expenditure on particularistic goods ensures the support and loyalty of the winning coalition, but this could at the same time generate

[8] These considerations are, to a large extent, driven by regime type where democracies rely on a large selectorate (the size of the group that select the government in power) and a large winning coalition, while autocracies may have small or large selectorates, but the winning coalition is invariably small.

[9] Particularistic goods provision to a large selectorate or winning coalition remains generally impossible given resource constraints (Powell 2002).

grievances for the selectorate who is not benefitting from the government's spending. In essence, there is an in-group and out-group formation on the basis of who benefits from private goods expenditure. Similar in- and out-group formations could be considered in cases of different types of corruption (see e.g., Solaz, De Vries, and de Geus 2019).

Economic repression underscores such in-group and out-group division and heightens grievances that could give rise to motivation for mobilization. As bargaining problems are present due to both information asymmetries and lack of credible commitment devices, the emergence of an organized opposition to the status quo becomes more likely. Yet, overall, when the state does not provide public goods and services, both violent opposition and nonviolent resistance become more likely (Goldstone 1994).

The choice of opposition method, violent or nonviolent, however, might be linked to the characteristic of the in-group and out-group division. For instance, if the out-group is mainly consisting of members from an ethnicity different from the one of the in-group, mobilization along ethnic lines could be linked to high-intensity violence and civil war (this notion is in line with previous research indicating that ethnicity enables strong commitment and allegiance to the group which help to overcome the high barriers to participation in violent conflict (for further discussion see e.g., Eck 2009)). Yet, if the out-group is formed of heterogeneous members (on the basis of various social characteristics), then nonviolent resistance could be more likely. This is because nonviolent resistance allows for broad-based participation and barriers to participation are not insurmountable (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012). For instance, in 2015, Guatemala experienced nonviolent resistance consisting of people from all walks of life engaging in protests as a nonviolent tactic. They demanded the

resignation of top-ranked government officials who were involved in large-scale corruption and embezzlement at the expense of the national budget as well as gross economic mismanagement (Bukharin 2015).

Lower public goods' spending is linked to decreased social welfare, lower individual income and higher poverty rates. There is a consensus in the literature on civil war that poorer countries tend to be more likely to experience violence and the onset of civil war (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Hence, this lack of or diminished spending on public goods can contribute to the formation of violent groups that can challenge the state and ultimately trigger a civil war. Therefore, this line of reasoning can explain the civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, as this region has many of the poorest countries in the world.

Overall, the theoretical expectation is that more egregious economic repression may contribute to both nonviolent and violent opposition tactics. This argument is the basis for the second hypothesis of this study outlined below:

Hypothesis 2: Higher economic repression increases the probability of both nonviolent resistance and civil war onset.

Social Repression

Repressing civil society organizations is considered as a specific approach of the state to control, disengage citizens and to prevent any forms of collective action that might challenge and turn against the leadership. While this can be particularly pertinent to autocratic regimes, democratic polities also adopt this approach. For instance, there are growing concerns about the state of civil society organizations in

established democracies such as India, Hungary, Indonesia and Kenya (Puddington 2017).

By repressing civil society organizations, the state triggers motivation for opposition as citizens are prevented from forming associations and benefitting from the establishment of social networks and partnerships. These are an integral part of the process of socialization and the establishment of a favourable social life (Goldstone 1994). Social repression effectively denies this and in turn, it fosters grievances that are likely to precipitate mobilization for opposition. On one hand, social repression incentivizes opposition, but on the other hand, the space for the creation of mobilization infrastructure, through which the opposition can organize and effectively challenge the state, is greatly diminished. The repression of civil society organizations also eliminates the possibility for civil society to serve as a moderator between potential opposition and the government (Svensson and Lindgren 2013).[10] These constraints ultimately moderate the type of opposition that is likely to emerge.

With respect to nonviolent forms of opposition, such as protests and demonstrations, their effectiveness hinges on the power of numbers. Without mobilization platforms such as civil society organizations the challenge to overcome the collective action problem is likely to be insurmountable. Moreover, nonviolent resistance relies heavily on social capital and connectivity, which enable the nonviolent opposition to impose costs on the regime, for instance such as economic non-cooperation (Butcher and Svensson 2016).

[10] As argued in Paper 3, civil society, via its role as an intermediary in the polity, can help alleviate information and commitment problems and facilitate negotiations. Yet, social repression effectively raises the barriers to bargaining.

On the other hand, mobilization for violence is usually linked to a (relatively) small number of highly determined and committed individuals who possess access to arms and munitions, through which they can effectively challenge the state via military means. Violent group formation is often secretive and done by men who are prone to risk-taking. Moreover, mobilization for violence is often realized on the basis of a particular group identity, such as an ethnic identity, which undoubtedly facilitates coordination and communication necessary for successful mobilization (Denny and Walter 2014). Socio-political grievances such as the constraints that the state imposes on citizens are often the motivating force behind the formation of violent opposition groups. In fact, Lewis (2017) focuses on violent opposition groups' formation in Uganda and her rich micro-level data show clear support for the argument that social grievances are an important driver of violence.

On the basis of the notions discussed above, the theoretical expectation with regards to the effect of social repression on forms of opposition is that:

Hypothesis 3: Higher social repression decreases the probability of nonviolent resistance, but increases the probability of civil war onset.

Research Design

The main interest of this paper is the effect of different types of state repression on forms of opposition, violent and nonviolent. In order to systematically examine this effect, the paper leverages panel data covering 180 countries. This dataset is constructed on the basis of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). The former data

record nonviolent resistance cases from 1945 to 2006,[11] while the latter contain all anti-government civil wars form 1946 to 2011. The unit of observation is country-year.

Turning to the dependent variables, I take two binary variables that measure the onset of nonviolent resistance and civil war in order to capture the choice of opposition tactics. The nonviolent resistance onset variable is based on information from NAVCO 2.0 dataset[12] and it is a binary variable, which takes a value of one if there is a nonviolent resistance in a country-year. The civil war onset dependent variable is also dichotomous and it takes a value of one if there are at least 25 battle-related deaths due to violent opposition between the government and an organized opposition in a given country-year. This variable is constructed on the basis of information from the UCDP/PRIO data mentioned above. As this paper's interest is in the onset or initiation of specific opposition forms and tactics, consequent years after a recorded onset of nonviolent resistance and civil war are set to missing. I also ensure that the data on civil war onset do not include high levels of violence that are violent coups (Cunningham et al. 2017).

With regards to the key explanatory variables, information, economic and social repression are taken from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem)

[11] These data have information also on violent cases, most often violent insurgencies. However, these data are omitted given that the UCDP data records violent tactics and form of opposition in a more systematic way.

[12] Underreporting bias should also be acknowledged with regards to information on nonviolent resistance, as the NAVCO 2.0 data contain information on only mature and very large cases of nonviolent resistance, at least 1,000 participants, and thus, small, short-lived, and unsuccessful campaigns are not captured. Hence, inferences regarding the effect of repression on nonviolent resistance onset pertain to considerable cases of nonviolent opposition.

(Coppedge et al. 2017). The repression variables are generated by using Bayesian item response theory measurement model and are based on information from country experts' reports. The scale of the three repression variables is interval where higher values indicate higher freedom from a specific type of repression. Thus, lower values correspond to higher repression and a negative sign in the models would in fact be interpreted as an increasing probability of a particular form of opposition, nonviolent resistance and civil war.

Specifically, information repression refers to attempts of the government to censor the media.[13] In essence, this variable captures the government's efforts to influence the type of content published or broadcast and to intervene in the process of information dissemination (Coppedge et al. 2017). Economic repression, on the other hand, speaks to whether the bulk of government spending, particularly spending on infrastructure and social welfare, is used on private as opposed to public goods (Coppedge et al. 2017). Private goods' spending is usually targeting a specific subgroup or sector and hence it does not benefit everyone on equal terms. Thus, this variable measures the relative value of spending on private goods as opposed to public goods.[14] Finally, social repression is understood as the attempts of government to stifle the activity and organization of civil society organizations (Coppedge et al. 2017).[15] The state can use a wide range of tools to moderate this,

[13] This variable does not capture the Internet and Internet censorship per se. Specifically, I use the variable "Government censorship effort – Media" (v2mecenefm) from the V-Dem dataset.

[14] To be specific, I capture economic repression with the variable "Particularistic or public goods" (v2dlencmps) from the V-Dem dataset.

[15] Social repression is operationalized with the variable "CSO repression" (v2csreprss) from the V-Dem dataset.

varying from harassment, imposing legal obstacles, and general disruption of the activity of civil society organizations.[16]

As control variables, I use a variable capturing the logged values of the country's population as well as a covariate measuring the log-transformed gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. These data are taken from Gleditsch's (2002) expanded trade and GDP data. First, the population size of a country might have an impact on both the repression used by the state, but also on the likelihood of a particular type of opposition. I control for the country's population as a proxy for the size of the pool of potential participants in opposition (e.g., Carey 2009). There is also evidence to suggest that countries with larger populations tend to experience more violent conflict (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003). Additionally, more populous countries, for instance, might present a greater challenge for the government to establish and maintain control and hence, in such settings the government might resort to the use of specific repressive tactics to govern. For instance, public goods provision might be particularly challenging and governments could instead devote economic resources to selected constituencies in order to preserve control. The government could equally have an incentive to distort information as well as to hinder the activity of civil society organizations as tools to control large populations.

Regarding the GDP per capita variable, it is used as a proxy for economic development. The level of economic development can influence the likelihood of opposition via violent or nonviolent methods by sparking grievances and resolve to revise the status quo, but it might also impact governments' repressive repertoire. For instance, previous research shows that more economically advanced countries are associated with a decreased likelihood of eruption of violence and opposition

[16] I include descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variables in the appendix.

activity in general (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Hence, the kind of (economic) grievances that might motivate organized opposition with violent or nonviolent methods should be very limited in such settings. On the other hand, previous research suggests that wealthier and more economically developed countries exhibit more respect for a wide range of human rights and hence, such countries are more likely to experience less repression (Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012). Overall, lower levels of economic development might prompt the government to use repressive tactics to stifle grievances and potential subsequent opposition. Consider that states could use repression to mask inadequate economic development via information distortion. Additionally, unsatisfactory economic development could spark economic repression where only certain segments of society could benefit from the government's spending. It is also plausible that more limited economic development could prompt governments to use social repression to stifle civil society activity as a potential precursor of mobilization.

I also account for the level of democracy by using the revised Polity IV measure of democracy for each country-year. The variable has a range from -10 to +10, where lower values indicate autocratic regimes, while higher values, democracies (Marshall and Jaggers 2015). In this analysis, I take also the squared term of the variable so as to test for a possible nonlinear relationship. Democracies in general are better suited to accommodate demands by different societal factions and the mechanisms through which political change is made are often institutionalised. Hence, the level of democracy is likely to have an impact on the probability of opposition onset, violent and nonviolent. Previous research, for example, demonstrates that countries that are neither full autocracies nor full democracies are prone to the onset of violent opposition such as civil war (Hegre et

al. 2001). Furthermore, research on the onset of nonviolent opposition indicates that more democratic countries are less likely to experience such opposition, alluding to the idea that democracies provide the pertinent institutional channels through which citizens can voice dissatisfaction and seek redress (e.g., Schaftenaar 2017). I expect that the level of democracy might also impact the repressive tactics of the state. Following extant research, established democracies are linked to consistently lower levels of violent repression, but the level of democracy might influence other types of repression in different ways (Davenport 2007b). For instance, even though more democratic states are not very likely to engage in economic or social repression, such states might resort to some information repression to thwart the dissemination of news that could be viewed as damaging to the governing political elite.

To empirically test the theoretical propositions made earlier, I use probit models. This decision is based on the fact that the dependent variables, nonviolent resistance onset and civil war onset, are binary. I apply a one-year lag to the main independent variables to avoid potential simultaneity. Additionally, I account for the endogenous nature of repression empirically by leveraging conditional mixed process models (Roodman 2011) that clearly indicate that there is no endogeneity between the types of repression examined here and forms of opposition. The robustness section provides the results and further details on this approach. Cubic polynomials are included in the probit models to control for temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). Additionally, the models are estimated with standard errors clustered by country to enable intra-group correlation, but also to ensure that observations are independent across countries since systematic differences in the variance are possible.

Empirical Analysis

The principal argument of this paper is that different types of state repression delimit differently the motivation and opportunity for specific forms of opposition and subsequent political conflict. This study proposed that specifically higher levels of information repression should be associated with an increase in the probability of nonviolent resistance, but it will decrease the probability of civil war onset. It also hypothesized that more serious economic repression would spark the motivation and opportunity for both nonviolent resistance and civil war and thus increase the risk of countries experiencing opposition to the government. Finally, the paper claims that higher levels of social repression decrease the likelihood of nonviolent resistance onset, but actually increase the risk of civil war onset.

Having summarized the key theoretical propositions, Table 1 presents the results from the empirical analysis testing these hypotheses. To reiterate, the repression variables, information, economic and social repression, are coded as such that higher levels of the variable correspond to more freedom of a specific repression type; therefore, a negative relationship with the outcome would indicate that higher repression is linked to a higher probability of a particular opposition. This is the case for information repression. It has a statistically significant negative effect on the onset of nonviolent resistance, but a positive, albeit statistically insignificant, effect on the probability of civil war onset. These results partially support Hypothesis 1, as clearly information repression is an important determinant of nonviolent resistance, but the supposition that media censorship can trigger the motivation of highly committed individuals to challenge the state militarily is not confirmed. In fact, despite the lack of effect, the sign of the relationship shows that better information environments (i.e., contexts free of information repression) are positively linked to

violent opposition such as civil war. This result might not be surprising in light of research demonstrating that conflict and war can occur even if belligerents have complete information (Slantchev 2003).

Table 1 in here

The economic repression variable, also coded in a way that higher values should be interpreted as more freedom of economic repression, is statistically significant only in the models predicting the onset of civil war. The negative association of this variable with the dependent variable civil war onset in Models 3 and 4 indicates that in fact higher economic repression indeed is associated with an increased likelihood of civil war onset. Yet, there is a lack of effect of the economic repression on the probability of nonviolent resistance onset. This lack of effect can partially be attributed to the theorized (but not directly measured and tested) characteristics of the out-groups formed as a result of economic repression. Certainly, this aspect deserves further exploration in future work. Overall, here there is also only partial support for Hypothesis 2, as the results stipulate that economic repression is predictor of civil war only.

The full models for nonviolent resistance and civil war (Models 2 and 4 respectively) indicate that social repression has a different effect on opposition tactics and forms of political conflict. Higher freedom of social repression, or conversely lower repression, has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of nonviolent resistance onset. Hence, higher social repression negatively affects this nonviolent form of opposition and it is less likely that countries will experience it. On the other hand, social repression has also a consistently statistically

different effect from zero in the models on civil war onset. There, more freedom of social repression is linked to less risk of civil war onset. Stated differently, higher social repression contributes to the motivation and opportunity for risk-taking individuals to mobilize and challenge the state with violent tactics, ultimately contributing to the onset of civil war. Therefore, the results show clear support for Hypothesis 3.

Overall, the key take from the discussion of the results so far is that different types of repression affect the motivation and opportunity for opposition differently and thus, they contribute to divergent opposition outcomes. The results also indicate that countries with larger populations are more likely to experience nonviolent opposition forms as well as violent opposition forms. The positive coefficient speaks to the widely adopted view that violence is more prevalent in countries with larger populations (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), but also to the notion that larger population corresponds to a bigger pool for mobilizing participants for nonviolent resistance.

The level of economic development, measured as GDP per capita, appears to be a strong determinant of nonviolent opposition as well as violence. Yet, the direction of the association differs depending on the outcome of interest. Higher economic development increases the probability of nonviolent resistance, but it is negatively associated with the likelihood of civil war onset. These results are in line with the majority of the conflict literature that finds poorer states to be more conflict-prone (e.g., Sambanis 2001). The results also speak to the notion that nonviolent resistance such as protests and demonstrations are expected in economically developed contexts with stable middle class (Leventoğlu and Metternich 2018).

Regarding the level of democracy, the results show that countries in the middle levels of the Polity IV index, i.e. anocracies, tend to be more susceptible to experiencing nonviolent opposition as well as civil war. The curvilinear effect of level of democracy could be attributed to the notion that highly democratic states provide many conventional avenues for citizens to express dissatisfaction and resolve disputes with the political regime, while very autocratic regimes limit dramatically the opportunity space for collective action.

With respect to the substantive effects of the repression variables on the probability of violent and nonviolent form of opposition, Figures 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate the magnitude of the effects. First looking at the substantive effects of information repression in Figure 1, we see that when information is the highest, the probability of nonviolent resistance is the highest (about two percent), as lower values of the variable correspond to higher repression. Therefore, with increasing freedom of information repression, the risk of nonviolent resistance almost completely disappears.

Figure 1 in here

Figure 2 demonstrates graphically the effect of economic repression on the probability of nonviolent resistance and civil war onset. In essence, when economic repression is the highest (lower values of the variable), the probability of civil war onset is the highest (also about two percent). Yet, the economic repression variable does not influence the decision and choice to adopt nonviolent tactics judging by the flat horizontal line in the upper graph in Figure 2.

Figure 2 in here

With regards to the magnitude of the effect of social repression, Figure 3 displays the substantive effect. The graphs clearly show that this type of repression has divergent influence depending on the outcome of interest. More freedom of social repression is associated with higher probability of nonviolent resistance onset (when there is no social repression, the probability is about three percent). Hence, lower values of the variable, indicating higher repression, decrease the probability of nonviolent resistance onset. Contrarily, in the models on civil war onset, when the social repression is the highest, the probability of civil war onset is about five percent.

Figure 3 in here

The magnitude of the effects is not as sizable as one might expect, but they clearly corroborate the argument that different types of repression affect differently the probability of violent and nonviolent opposition tactics and forms of political conflict such civil wars and nonviolent resistance.

Robustness

As a robustness check, I estimate conditional mixed process (CMP) models (Roodman 2011). These models permit the concomitant estimation of the determinants of each repression type, economic, information, social repression, and the effect of these repression types on the form of opposition, nonviolent resistance and civil war. The CMP estimator is appropriate and useful given that it allows for

an unlimited number of equations and there are no restrictions on the type of dependent variables.

Table 2 presents the results from the CMP models. Each model contains four equations: three of them estimate the predictors of each repression type and one shows the effect of the estimated repression type on nonviolent resistance and civil war respectively (the variables in Equation 4 for both models in Table 2 are the same as the variables used in Models 2 and 4 in Table 1). Equations 1, 2 and 3 (in both Models 1 and 2) estimate each repression type as a function of the share of democracies in the region, the number of radios (taken from the Varieties of Democracy V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017)) and the level of economic development measured by GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002). Taken together, these variables gauge the costs and incentives of the state to apply a specific type of repression. First, with the variable capturing the share of democracies in the region, I address the possibility that the norms and practices of neighbouring countries might affect states' repressive tactics. There could be a diffusion of repressive tactics as governments might learn and emulate the repressive repertoire of countries in the same neighbourhood and region (Olar 2019). Second, with the covariate number of radios I capture the effect of news receivers on information, economic, and social repression respectively. Greater access to information receivers such as radios could moderate the incentives and costs for a particular type of repression. Previous research, for instance, presents the finding that the greater number of radios, the lower the repression and abrogation of human rights (Apodaca 2007). This is because higher access to such information receivers can reveal unlawful and controversial practices by the government and it might deter repression. Finally, the level of economic development could be a determinant of all three types of

repression: for example, lower economic development could prompt state authorities to use diverse repressive tactics to maintain control of the population and to suppress the emergence of grievances and potential subsequent mobilization.

With regards to the results from the two CMP models, the results in Equation 4 in both models mostly follow the findings presented in Table 1. The results in Equations 1, 2, 3 indicate that the larger the share of democracies in the region, the higher the freedom from information, economic and social repression. This speaks to the idea of diffusion of democratic norms that can contribute to lower levels of different types of repression. The number of radios is statistically significant predictor solely of economic repression: higher number of radios is associated with less economic repression. Finally, more economically developed countries undergo less information, economic and social repression.

The CMP model can demonstrate whether in fact a relationship is endogenous. If the residuals of the equations with the dependent variable, nonviolent resistance onset and civil war onset in this case, are correlated with the equations estimating a specific type of repression, this could be seen as a sign of endogeneity. This is indicated by the rho correlation coefficient. However, the rho coefficients of the combinations of equations clearly demonstrate that this is not the case.

Table 2 in here

In the appendix, I also estimate complementary log-log models (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) as alternative models. This type of model is appropriate here since both the onset of nonviolent resistance and civil war are rare events. The results do not change with this estimation strategy. The appendix also contains the probit

models from Table 1, but with an additional variable, violent repression. Given that the vast majority of the literature views repression as violent repression, I show that this variable tend to conceal a lot of the more nuanced types of repression that the state uses. I also perform various model diagnostics and tests to demonstrate the adequacy of the chosen estimation strategy.

Conclusion

This paper discusses the effect of previously understudied types of state repression on forms of anti-government opposition, violent and nonviolent. It examines information, economic and social repression as determinants of the motivation and opportunity for nonviolent resistance as a form of nonviolent opposition and civil war as type of violent opposition. The findings suggest that these divergent types of repression affect differently the use of nonviolent and violent tactics and the probability of the subsequent form of political conflict.

Information repression influences nonviolent resistance, but not violent opposition such as civil wars. In effect, media censorship efforts of the government spark nonviolent opposition, but the resulting inferior information environment deters violent opposition and outcomes. On the other hand, economic repression triggers mobilization for violent opposition: higher government expenditure on private goods sparks grievances, potentially related to economic mismanagement and substandard economic opportunities that motivate and allow violent entrepreneurs to challenge the government through violent means of opposition. Finally, social repression in the form of suppressing the activity and organization of civil society organizations lowers the opportunities for mobilization of nonviolent

resistance, but this type of repression allows for the formation of violent actors that can trigger a civil war.

The contribution of this paper consists of the novel disaggregated approach to repression and the consideration that repression can take various forms that are different from the customary understanding of state repression as violence in the forms of killings, torture and imprisonment. Therefore, this analysis provides a different take on the repression-opposition nexus. Yet, there are several aspects that may solicit further investigation. While this study introduces several novel repression typologies, future research may engage in more micro-level approaches to crystalizing the relationship of each type of repression on opposition against the government. For instance, within-country analyses can provide a richer understanding of the empirical associations that this paper has discovered. Additionally, future studies may focus on economic, social and information repression in separate analyses and further disaggregate the mechanisms within each repression type. Overall, this paper has provided the foundation for fruitful new analyses on the relationships between the state and organized opposition in its various forms and tactics.

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Table 1 Probit models of repression types and opposition tactics

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
	Nonviolent resistance onset	Nonviolent resistance onset	Civil war onset	Civil war onset
(Freedom from)				
Information repression	-0.186***	-0.145**	0.074	0.062
(Freedom from)	(0.051)	(0.066)	(0.046)	(0.056)
Economic repression	0.028	-0.010	-0.071*	-0.062*
(Freedom from)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Social repression	0.031	0.123**	-0.134***	-0.177***
	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Population (log)		0.225***		0.086***
		(0.026)		(0.030)
GDP per capita (log)		0.114**		-0.089**
		(0.051)		(0.043)
Polity		-0.044***		0.014
		(0.014)		(0.010)
$Polity^2$		-0.007***		-0.006***
		(0.002)		(0.001)
Time since last onset	-0.073***	-0.059**	-0.060***	-0.038**
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Time since last $onset^2$	0.003***	0.003***	0.002***	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time since last $onset^3$	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-2.054***	-4.924***	-1.746***	-1.626***
	(0.147)	(0.534)	(0.109)	(0.403)
Number of observations	8,682	7,131	8,945	7,342

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. All independent variables are lagged by one year (except for the polynomials). *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table 2 CMP models of repression types and opposition tactics

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)
	Nonviolent resistance onset	Civil war onset
Eq. 4		
(Freedom from) Information repression	-0.282**	0.044
	(0.141)	(0.089)
(Freedom from) Economic repression	0.064	-0.109*
	(0.145)	(0.062)
(Freedom from) Social repression	0.238*	-0.223**
	(0.137)	(0.096)
Population (log)	0.197***	0.091***
	(0.025)	(0.030)
GDP per capita (log)	0.019	-0.055
	(0.077)	(0.043)
Polity	-0.015	0.023**
	(0.015)	(0.009)
Polity^2	-0.006***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Time since last onset	-0.049*	-0.039**
	(0.025)	(0.017)
Time since last onset^2	0.002**	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time since last onset^3	-0.000**	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-3.983***	-1.848***
	(0.699)	(0.418)
Eq. 3: DV: (Freedom from) Social repression		
Share of democracies in the region (%)	0.028***	0.029***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Number of radios (log)	-0.012	-0.013
	(0.045)	(0.045)
GDP per capita (log)	0.239***	0.238***
	(0.078)	(0.078)
Intercept	-2.616***	-2.610***
	(0.520)	(0.520)
Eq. 2: DV: (Freedom from) Economic repression		
Share of democracies in the region (%)	0.006**	0.357***
	(0.003)	(0.086)
Number of radios (log)	0.076*	0.006**
	(0.045)	(0.003)
GDP per capita (log)	0.358***	0.075*
	(0.086)	(0.045)
Intercept	-3.235***	-3.228***
	(0.643)	(0.643)
Eq. 1: DV: (Freedom from) Information repression		
Share of democracies in the region (%)	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Number of radios (log)	0.002	0.001
	(0.048)	(0.048)
GDP per capita (log)	0.226**	0.225**
	(0.094)	(0.094)
Intercept	-2.833***	-2.830***
	(0.636)	(0.636)
Rho Eq. 1 & 4	-0.018	0.047
	(0.100)	(0.061)
Rho Eq. 2 & 4	-0.111	0.120
	(0.186)	(0.079)
Rho Eq. 3 & 4	-0.136	0.081
	(0.109)	(0.067)
Number of observations	7,535	8,166

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Figure 1. Information repression and opposition tactics



Notes: The graph presents the marginal change in the probability of nonviolent resistance (top graph) and civil war onset (bottom graph) as opposition tactics at different levels of (Freedom from) Information repression. All other covariates are held at their observed values. The repression variable is coded as such that higher values indicate freedom from information repression. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Figure 2. Economic repression and opposition tactics



Notes: The graph presents the marginal change in the probability of nonviolent resistance (top graph) and civil war onset (bottom graph) as opposition tactics at different levels of (Freedom from) Economic repression. All other covariates are held at their observed values. The repression variable is coded as such that higher values indicate freedom from economic repression. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Figure 3. Social repression and opposition tactics



Notes: The graph presents the marginal change in the probability of nonviolent resistance (top graph) and civil war onset (bottom graph) as opposition tactics at different levels of (Freedom from) Social repression. All other covariates are held at their observed values. The repression variable is coded as such that higher values indicate freedom from social repression. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Appendix

Descriptive statistics

Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.

Table A1 Descriptive statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DV: Nonviolent resistance onset	8,871	0.009	0.096	0	1
DV: Civil war onset	9,134	0.014	0.118	0	1
(Freedom from) Information repression	9,871	-0.006	1.642	-3.103	3.607
(Freedom from) Economic repression	9,871	0.311	1.312	-3.404	3.229
(Freedom from) Social repression	9,858	0.243	1.596	-3.567	3.342
Violent repression	4,654	4.778	2.322	0	8
Population (log)	8,703	8.887	1.671	4.110	14.096
GDP per capita (log)	8,703	8.259	1.203	4.888	13.357
Polity	8,259	0.499	7.496	-10	10
Polity^2	8,259	56.445	32.493	0	100
Time since last nonviolent onset	8,871	26.008	16.723	0	60
Time since last civil war onset	9,134	26.152	17.856	0	65

Key explanatory variables

Information repression



Notes: The graph presents the frequency distribution of the key explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Information repression. The variable has slight positive skewness (indicating that the mean is

slightly higher than the median), but it follows closely the shape of a normal distribution. The graph is created with Stata 14.0



Notes: The graph presents the average (Freedom from) Information repression over time with 95% confidence intervals. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.



Notes: The graph presents the distribution of the main explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Information repression, by showing the minimum and maximum values, the first quartile, the median (represented by the white line) and the third quartile. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
(Freedom from) Information repression (overall)	9,871	-0.006	1.642	-3.103	3.607
Between			1.353	-2.754	3.145
Within			0.979	-3.331	4.658

Notes: The table presents the between and within variation of the key explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Information repression.

Economic repression



Notes: The graph presents the frequency distribution of the key explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Economic repression. The variable is negatively skewed, indicating that the mean is less than the median. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.



Notes: The graph presents the average (Freedom from) Economic repression over time with 95% confidence intervals. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.



Notes: The graph presents the distribution of the main explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Economic repression, by showing the minimum and maximum values, the first quartile, the median (represented by the white line) and the third quartile. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
(Freedom from) Economic repression (overall)	9,871	0.311	1.312	-3.404	3.229
Between			1.115	-2.123	3.031
Within			0.697	-2.836	3.901

Notes: The table presents the between and within variation of the key explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Economic repression.

Social repression



Notes: The graph presents the frequency distribution of the key explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Social repression. The variable is positively skewed (indicating that the mean is bigger than the

median). The graph is created with Stata 14.0.



Notes: The graph presents the average (Freedom from) Social repression over time with 95% confidence intervals. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.



Notes: The graph presents the distribution of the main explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Social repression, by showing the minimum and maximum values, the first quartile, the median (represented by the white line) and the third quartile. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
(Freedom from) Social repression (overall)	9,858	0.243	1.596	-3.567	3.342
Between			1.288	-2.870	3.087
Within			0.983	-3.235	4.513

Notes: The table presents the between and within variation of the key explanatory variable – (Freedom from) Social repression.

Table A2 below presents the probit regression models with an additional type of state repression. This variable is taken from the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) repression data. It captures violent repression, defined as torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and disappearances. The variable is ordinal and it varies from zero to eight, where low values correspond to extreme repression, while higher values indicate freedom of such violent repression. Overall, the inclusion of the violent repression variable introduces changes to the results, mostly for the nonviolent resistance onset models, but also in the civil war onset models. This could be attributed to the fact that the violent repression variable might attenuate the effects of the other repression variables. This can be explained by the fact that other types of repression often accompany violent repression. Yet, the analysis of this paper contributes to a more nuanced understanding of state repression.

Table A2 Probit models of repression types and opposition tactics (including violent repression)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
	Nonviolent resistance onset	Nonviolent resistance onset	Civil war onset	Civil war onset
(Freedom from)				
Information repression	-0.203***	-0.125	0.197***	0.161*
(Freedom from)	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.074)	(0.083)
Economic repression	-0.000	-0.012	-0.037	0.012
(Freedom from)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.056)
Social repression	0.080	0.126	-0.242***	-0.257***
	(0.075)	(0.087)	(0.073)	(0.076)
Violent repression	-0.033	0.052	-0.116***	-0.088***
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Population (log)		0.215***		0.041
		(0.040)		(0.042)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.011		-0.140***
		(0.069)		(0.049)
Polity		-0.042**		0.012
		(0.017)		(0.013)
$Polity^2$		-0.008***		-0.004*
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Time since last onset	0.007	0.027	-0.015	-0.012
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Time since last $onset^2$	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time since last $onset^3$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-2.124***	-4.381***	-1.336***	-0.604
	(0.226)	(0.653)	(0.148)	(0.565)
Number of observations	3,538	3,376	4,026	3,807

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. All independent variables are lagged by one year (except for the polynomials). *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A3 shows the results obtained by using an alternative empirical model, the complementary log-log model. This model is used as a robustness check given that it is suitable in cases where the dependent variable captures a rare event of interest (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Here only one percent of the countries-years experience the onset of nonviolent resistance, while civil war is initiated in about one and a half percent. The results remain unchanged.

Table A3 Complementary log-log models of repression types and opposition tactics

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
	Nonviolent resistance onset	Nonviolent resistance onset	Civil war onset	Civil war onset
(Freedom from)				
Information repression	-0.501***	-0.365**	0.187	0.163
(Freedom from)	(0.140)	(0.165)	(0.115)	(0.131)
Economic repression	0.086	-0.020	-0.170*	-0.148*
(Freedom from)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.082)
Social repression	0.094	0.317**	-0.335***	-0.427***
	(0.133)	(0.154)	(0.108)	(0.123)
Population (log)		0.528***		0.197***
		(0.059)		(0.067)
GDP per capita (log)		0.298**		-0.225**
		(0.123)		(0.104)
Polity		-0.120***		0.033
		(0.035)		(0.025)
$Polity^2$		-0.019***		-0.014***
		(0.004)		(0.003)
Time since last onset	-0.196***	-0.136**	-0.148***	-0.079**
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Time since last $onset^2$	0.008***	0.007**	0.005***	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Time since last $onset^3$	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-3.930***	-11.045***	-3.175***	-2.801***
	(0.358)	(1.227)	(0.236)	(0.926)
Number of observations	8,682	7,131	8,945	7,342

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. All independent variables are lagged by one year (except for the polynomials). *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Diagnostics

The models are not affected by multicollinearity given that the average variance inflation factor is well below the accepted five VIF as an indication of potential collinearity problem. Information repression and social repression exhibit slightly higher values than the rest of the covariates, but they are still below the ten VIF, which is accepted to be a real cause for concern.

Collinearity diagnostics

	Table 1, Model 2	Table 1, Model 4
Variable	VIF	VIF
(Freedom from) Information repression	5.14	5.49
(Freedom from) Economic repression	1.51	1.50
(Freedom from) Social repression	4.72	5.11
Population (log)	1.06	1.04
GDP per capita (log)	1.63	1.60
Polity	3.72	3.94
Polity^2	1.43	1.43
Time since last onset	1.05	1.15
MEAN VIF	2.53	2.66
Number of observations	7,131	7,342

Additionally, I use the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests. The insignificant test statistic suggests that the models fit the data well.

Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (Table 1, Model 2)

N = 7,131
N of groups = 10
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 (8) = 3.27
Prob. > chi2 = 0.9164

Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (Table 1, Model 4)

N = 7,342
N of groups = 10
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 (8) = 7.87
Prob. > chi2 = 0.4465

Predictive power

To examine the predictive power of Models 2 and 4 in Table 1, I use receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves analysis. The area under the ROC curve of both models is substantially bigger than .5 (this is the same as predicting a flip of a coin). It is 0.8152 for Model 2 and 0.7454 for Model 4. Thus, the results are not due to random chance, because the models have satisfactory discrimination and they function well.

ROC curve analysis (Table 1, Model 2)



ROC curve analysis (Table 1, Model 4)



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Paper 2: What Matters Is Who Supports You: Diaspora and Foreign States as External Supporters and Militants' Adoption of Nonviolence

Abstract

Militant groups are usually committed to violent tactics to pursue their goals. Yet, in certain cases militants adopt nonviolent tactics and desist from violence. As internal conflict rarely remains isolated from outside influence, I argue that external supporters affect militant groups' tactical considerations. I expect that different external benefactors will have different effects on the probability of switching to nonviolent tactics. The focus here is on diaspora and foreign states as external supporters and I conduct a large-N analysis with violent group-level data. I find that external support from diaspora is positively associated with rebels' adoption of nonviolent tactics, while support from foreign states is not. In fact, foreign states as supporters are not as effective influencers as diaspora. The findings shed light on the important role of non-state actors in conflict dynamics and present evidence that challenges the notion that diaspora's involvement prolongs internal conflicts.

Introduction

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement, or more commonly referred to as Fatah, was waging armed resistance for about fifty years with varying degrees of intensity and different violent tactics. They fought over Palestinian liberation from Israel and used a variety of violent approaches, from assassination to full on armed incursions, to come closer to their political objective. Yet, from the mid-2000s the organization dramatically reconsidered its tactics. Fatah switched from armed to unarmed resistance and engaged in disciplined nonviolent activity such as demonstrations, and even participation in the political life of the Palestinian Authority (Qumsiyeh 2015). The same tactical shifts took place in the cases of Umma Liberation Party in Sudan, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front in Cambodia, and the African National Congress in South Africa. Even though the adoption of nonviolent methods of opposition is likely to have important implications for the development of the conflict, there is scarce analysis on the factors that drive militant groups to adopt nonviolence. This paper fills the gap in the literature by offering an explanation on why and under what conditions some militant groups resort to the use of nonviolent forms of resistance while others remain committed to an armed struggle. While some studies address different aspects pertaining to rebel groups' attributes and interactions (e.g. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; Otto 2017; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012), the work of Dudouet (2013, 2015) largely prompted the discussion on rebel groups' shift to nonviolence.

So far rebel groups' tactics have been viewed mostly on a spectrum of violence without assuming the possibility of extending this spectrum to a nonviolent

dimension.[17] For instance, the works of Bueno de Mesquita (2013) and Stanton (2013) have investigated the determinants of rebel groups' shifts to specific violent tactics such as terrorism. Here I examine rebel groups' adoption of nonviolent tactics, which is a largely unexplored topic, but it is expected to have implications for conflict dynamics and resolution. For instance, the transition of the Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CPN-M) to nonviolent tactics opened up the space for peace talks and significant reduction in violence (Thapa 2015). In the case of Northern Ireland, the Irish diaspora pressured for peaceful means of opposition and the transition to nonviolence of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) resulted in ceasefires (Golan and Gal 2009).

The adoption of nonviolent tactics hinges on organizational resources; rebel groups need to be aware of the possibility of nonviolence and to be capable to pursue it, i.e. they require resources (e.g., technical knowledge, infrastructure of resistance, legitimacy). I claim that external actors are well-suited to provide rebels with resources to influence them to adopt nonviolent tactics or even entry into politics. Yet, I expect that there is difference across external actors in terms of their ability and willingness to prompt rebels to employ nonviolence. This is because external actors differ in terms of reliability and sustainability of support provision and are expected to have different relations with the rebel group they support. Here I focus on foreign states and diaspora as external sponsors as this allows me to address the state versus non-state actors dichotomy and it is a good source of variation. Instead of concentrating on the type of support as some studies have done (Sawyer,

[17] Nonviolent movements can adopt violent tactics, but the determinants of this are likely to be different from those of rebel groups' adoption of nonviolence and are worth examining in separate work.

Cunningham, and Reed 2017), I argue that who the supporter is matters.

I develop different expectations for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics depending on whether the external supporter is a foreign state or diaspora. On balance, foreign states are more likely to sustain militant organizations through the provision of support, while diaspora assistance is expected to influence a turn to nonviolent tactics. For instance, Fatah's shift to nonviolent resistance was influenced by the Palestinian diaspora that were disapproving of the violent tactics the group was using to fight for Palestinian liberation (Qumsiyeh 2015). The tactical shift to nonviolence requires motivation and opportunity for a tactical reconsideration and external actors through the provision of support can supply both. Yet, state and non-state external actors have distinct agendas that they seek to pursue by providing material assistance, which in turn contributes to different opportunities for resource mobilization and method of opposition.

These theoretical propositions are examined by conducting a large-N analysis using group-level data.[18] So far, with a few exceptions (e.g. Cunningham 2013), the vast majority of studies have taken qualitative approaches to analyse such tactical switches (e.g. Dudouet 2013, 2015; Mitchell 2011). This paper presents the first systematic analysis on the effect of state and non-state external actors on rebel groups' tactical choices in general and the probability of a switch to nonviolence in particular. Establishing the determinants of these shifts in the method of opposition is important given that it would enable both researchers and practitioners alike to

[18] To build the dataset for this analysis, I use the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) that contains yearly organization-level information about a consensus population of violent and nonviolent campaigns, and the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) dataset on rebel groups that compete in elections (Matanock 2016). Further information on the data is provided in the research design section of the paper.

have a clear understanding of this aspect of conflict dynamics and also more rigorous explanations of rebel groups' tactical considerations.

The next two sections engage with a brief overview of the literature on external intervention and internal dissent so as to provide the basis for the theoretical framework and pertinent hypotheses detailed in the sections to follow. After the presentation of the core argument, the paper turns to the research design together with a detailed explanation of the data and motivations behind the particular use of certain measures for the theoretical concepts. Then the paper moves to the analysis where the main results are discussed, followed by a conclusion summarizing the key points.

External Support, Conflict Dynamics, and Tactical Shifts

Domestic conflict rarely remains isolated from external influence. The body of literature addressing foreign involvement into intrastate conflicts agrees that external actors affect conflict dynamics. Note that the involvement of foreign actors has an effect on the duration of the conflict (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005), on the conflict's intensity and outcome (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004), but also on conflict recurrence (Karlén 2017). Other studies have also shown the negative effect of specifically foreign state support on the duration and resolution of high-intensity civil conflict (Cunningham 2010; Regan and Aydin 2006; Regan 2002; Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2015). Even though these studies provide valuable insights into conflict dynamics, they do not address the question of why and under what conditions rebel groups reassess tactical choices and opt for potential switches. This is crucial for the study of conflict dynamics as tactical switches to nonviolence can be a vital factor for conflict de-escalation and resolution. Along the same lines, and

based on the aforementioned studies, external actors can also play a role in rebel groups' tactical considerations.

External forces influence the internal conflict through the provision of material backing to the rebel group. Yet, different external actors are likely to have a different effect on the resources available for opposition and, in turn, they would provide different resource mobilization opportunities for militants. The provision of support can affect rebel groups' capabilities and motivation, and has the potential to trigger a reconsideration of their tactics (Lichbach 1987). While it is conceivable that militant groups' success and particular attributes attract foreign assistance, previous research has found that in fact strong rebels, which can be expected to succeed, are less likely to receive external support (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). Moreover if a rebel group is anticipated to succeed, then it is plausible that external assistance will not be deemed necessary as it might affect the legitimacy of the opposition. External support can be seen as a tool to sustain the violent struggle or as a tool to pressure the group to change its tactics by resuming the fighting altogether and resorting to different means of contention. As a recipient of support, the rebel group finds itself in a binding position to its benefactor since its future actions are dependent on the supply of support. This claim speaks to the tenets of principal-agent theory.

A principal would use an agent as a low-cost strategy to pursue its interests in a conflict abroad. If an external actor provides support and the rebel group accepts it, both actors enter into a form of contract. The external supporter (principal) then gains influence over the rebel group (agent). It follows then that the provider of assistance can affect the method of opposition the group is using since it has an incentive to sustain the support (Bercovitch 2007). Salehyan (2010) uses the logic of

principal-agent theory to outline the costs and benefits for both foreign states and rebels in situations where external patrons delegate conflict to rebel groups. The author argues that foreign sponsors may lose control over their agents due to incomplete information, but the principal can still use enforcement mechanisms so as to pressure its agent into compliance. The rebel group, on the other hand, may lose its independence given that it needs to abide by the will of the foreign sponsor. Receiving support from an external patron can also alienate domestic constituencies which is likely to hurt the militant group's prospect for achieving its goals (Salehyan 2010). An important consideration that the author does not take into account is who the external sponsor is and how the identity of the patron can then impact differently the rebel group as the recipient of support.

Regarding the actors offering external assistance, foreign states and diaspora are the most prominent sponsors of resistance organizations. In the data used for this analysis, about half of violent group-years receive material support from diaspora, nearly sixty percent from foreign states, and only ten percent are recipients of assistance from international nongovernment organizations (INGOs).[19]A quantitative analysis on choices of contention in the Middle East demonstrates that groups receiving support from diaspora are more likely to choose protest activity and violent tactics as opposed to conventional opposition (Asal et al. 2013). Yet, this study does not show whether diaspora as supporters can influence militants to adopt nonviolent tactics. Additionally, it is limited to the Middle East that might not share the same characteristics with the rest of the world and it examines the choice of

[19] I control for support from INGOs, but INGOs as such are not the main focus of this paper. There could be a selection effect since INGOs would hardly support militant groups because of the fundamental principles linked to nonviolence and respect for human rights they stand for.

opposition methods at the onset of contention. Hence, it might well be that external supporters such as diaspora push organizations to engage in collective action outside institutionalized channels, but it is not clear whether violence or nonviolence as a method of opposition is more likely in the presence of external support, and from what actor.

Specific organizational attributes increase the propensity of rebel groups to attract external support (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011), but empowering them with resources and legitimacy might not come without certain conditions. A foreign supporter gains leverage over the militant group and a commitment to violence or nonviolence could be a potential condition that rebels must meet to secure the support (Salehyan 2010). The fact that a foreign agent supports a rebel group opposing the state also signifies clearly which party it sides with.[20] In this sense, the militant group receives the support both in material (e.g., resources) and nonmaterial (e.g., legitimacy, morale) terms since the act of assistance provision also brings to the forefront the notion of legitimizing it and indirectly denouncing the state as the other conflict party.

Diaspora and foreign states[21] would grant support in situations where they have a vested interest in the survival and/or prospective success of the rebels they are assisting. To elaborate, assistance could be provided as means to a particular end that would serve the interests of the foreign supporter. It is likely that the principal

[20] I assume that the same external actor does not provide explicit support both to the government and rebels. Any implicit/alleged support bestowed cannot be captured given the constraint of the data to record only open support.

[21] I treat external supporters, foreign states, diaspora, and INGOs as homogenous; due to data limitations as well as the necessity for a different framework, I leave external supporters' attributes and their effects to future research.

pursues its own agenda, whereby it has an incentive to prolong the domestic conflict by strengthening its agent or helping it in defeating the state as the other conflict party (Cunningham 2010). In other words, the external supporter to a militant group generally operates under the logic of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Yet, foreign agents could provide support due to particular linkages with the rebels such as common culture, religion, ethnicity, and ideology. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) received support from African states (shared ethnicity/culture) and from the United States (shared ideology) in the context of the Cold War (Wright 1997). Foreign supporters have the potential to influence the motivation to use specific methods to oppose the political status quo (Fortna 2004), but also the external benefactor can use the support it provides as leverage to direct the militants to resume or suspend violence.

From Bullets to Banners and Ballots

The literature on nonviolent resistance has focused primarily on explaining the determinants of nonviolent resistance (Cunningham et al. 2017; Butcher and Svensson 2016) and the effectiveness of nonviolent methods of opposition (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008; Butcher, Laidlaw Gray, and Mitchell 2018), but it has paid little attention to whether and why a rebel group would engage in nonviolent resistance. It is therefore important to determine why and how a rebel group would pursue its goals through nonviolent means of resistance, and even entry into electoral politics. The rebels can seek to legitimize their struggle since nonviolent means of resistance is widely perceived as a more sanctioned form of opposition. Through nonviolence, the militant group is better able to tap into widespread popular grievances and channel these against the established governing

authority (Sharp 1990). By gaining legitimacy through the use of nonviolence, the group has better chances of attracting popular support since the pursuit of nonviolent tactics and participation in the electoral process are by far more appealing forms of opposition to the public than violence. Nonviolent tactics could garner the necessary public support for the group to make substantial gains. The adoption of nonviolence can also provide a better bargaining position in potential negotiations with the government given a larger support base and legitimacy that the group acquires with the use of nonviolence. Stronger challengers to the political status quo have a higher capacity to force the state to mediation and potential settlement (Clayton 2013), while militants that provide services are more likely to bring governments to the negotiating table (Heger and Jung 2015). If we assume that the strength of the rebels hinges on popular support, legitimacy, and a closer connection to the public, then the choice of pursuing nonviolent tactics is expected.

However, it is unlikely that the militant group itself will reconsider tactics on its own.[22] It is far more possible that an external actor, equipped with knowledge and resources, presents the resisters with the opportunity to shift tactics. Dudouet (2013) studies militant groups' transition to nonviolence by looking at several cases and successfully conveys the intricacy of such transitions. Among others, the author focuses on the interaction between the rebel group and foreign actors as a plausible

[22] Critics might challenge this claim by arguing that unsuccessful violent tactics rather than outside support determine a tactical reconsideration. However, the adoption of nonviolence requires an awareness of nonviolent discipline and legitimacy that the group cannot attain on its own.

mechanism[23] behind militants' switch to nonviolence. Since the adoption of nonviolent tactics and/or participation in elections is not costless, rebels require resources to instigate any tactical changes. The external supporter can provide these necessary resources since the motivation to engage in nonviolence might be necessary, but not a sufficient condition to abandon violence.

There is a difference between rebel groups receiving support from an external actor and rebels that fund rebellion by exploiting domestic resources in terms of conflict intensity (Wood 2013). This suggests that we should carefully examine the supplier of support, as it is an important consideration that has been overlooked in previous studies on foreign intervention and conflict dynamics.

The liberation struggles of Polisario in Western Sahara and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia are instructive examples of the argument proposed here. Polisario received support from the Sahrawi diaspora (Stephan and Mundy 2006), while SWAPO relied only on foreign state assistance, from a number of African states as well as the Soviet Union (Saunders 2018). Even though both organizations had external material support, albeit from different actors, only Polisario transitioned to nonviolent tactics to pursue its goal, while SWAPO remained committed to an armed struggle. Following this example, different supporters are expected to have different standing with the militant group, and consequently divergent influence and ties. By supporting a militant group, an external actor provides the organization with legitimacy, and in this context the

[23] The rebel group can also make a mistake such as a disproportional violent attack and/or the unintended killing of innocent civilians that could then require a change of tactics. Such mishaps can certainly be linked to the withdrawal of popular support and vocal dissatisfaction with the rebels. Yet, a switch to nonviolent tactics remains unlikely in such circumstances given that nonviolence should not be feasible without widespread support.

supporter is also important given that some actors are likely to contribute more to internal legitimacy, while others to external legitimacy. The reliability of the support (Salehyan 2010) is also crucial for assessments of the impact this assistance can have on rebels' tactical decisions. Depending on the actor who provides the support, I anticipate that the militant group (as the recipient) will have different expectations as to how reliable the inflow of assistance is. Unfortunately, these intangible aspects are difficult to measure empirically, but this should not be a reason why we do not address them theoretically. Until more granular data are available, I focus on foreign states and diaspora as external supporters and theorize that the two external actors have divergent motives for providing support, different influence on the militant groups they support, and also that they explain why some militants adopt nonviolent tactics while others do not.

Who Enables the Adoption of Nonviolence?

Foreign states interfere in internal conflicts to pursue an interest that could be destabilizing the country to a further extent e.g. securing influence, or changing the political status quo (Salehyan 2010). Saudi Arabia, for instance, has provided material support to the Syrian opposition possibly to destabilize the county to a further extent, and to assist in the overthrow of the Assad regime that has strong ties with Iran which is perhaps the greatest rival of Riyadh in the region (Jenkins 2014). In this scenario, the interests of Saudi Arabia (the principal) and the Syrian opposition (the agent) are aligned and both have strong motivation to topple Assad. It is, however, unlikely that Saudi Arabia would use the provision of support as leverage to impose on the Syrian opposition a reconsideration of their violent tactics. The Saudis benefit from the instability in Syria and their only goal is to damage Iran

by helping anti-Assad forces to topple the Syrian dictator. Therefore, foreign states, driven by self-interest, are likely to support a non-state actor, as opposed to the government as the other conflict party, in cases where they try to tip the balance of power in favour of the militant group.

Yet, it is less likely that foreign states through the provision of support can make rebels consider the use of nonviolence as a feasible strategy. Supplied with resources from external states, militant groups are presented with a distinct resource mobilization opportunity: that is to remain committed to violence. First, external state patrons do not have the toolkit to educate and train rebels in disciplined nonviolent action that could substitute its violent tactics. Moreover, sending resources and sustaining the already undergoing armed rebellion is a much lower-cost strategy that satisfies the interest of the principal supplying the support. Since the rebel group operates within the broader society, the public could deem the intervention of a foreign state as illegitimate or unjustified, and in turn, undermine the feasibility of nonviolence. Stated differently, the viability of disciplined nonviolent action is associated with the approval of domestic audiences since nonviolence necessitates broad participation to successfully challenge the political status quo (Sharp 1990).

Foreign states, as principals providing support to a militant group as their agent, are unlikely to have profound considerations about potential victims and the distressing environment that civilians are subjected to as a result of perpetuating the violent conflict. Since the conflict is happening outside the borders of the foreign state supporter, it should not pose an immediate threat and thus the external patron does not have an incentive to seek de-escalation. Furthermore, foreign states as external patrons are likely to be less reliable given that they face domestic audience

costs and supporting a rebel group abroad can create a backlash resulting in a swift withdrawal of support at home. The rebel group on its part can hardly enforce the continuation of support and the receipt of assistance is at the discretion of its principal. This has implications both for the potential willingness of the rebel group and for the resources at its disposal for leading the opposition via nonviolent means. Therefore, on balance, foreign states are not expected to have the motivation to let their agents abandon their violent tactics.

Hypothesis 1: Foreign states as external supporters decrease the likelihood of militant groups adopting nonviolent tactics.

Instead, the primary concern of the principal would be to provide support to sustain the rebellion that could either prolong the suffering of the regime, or result in gains for the rebels. Since every change involves risk and the adoption of nonviolence certainly presents one, foreign state patrons are unlikely to wilfully endanger their investment by letting the rebel group employ their resources to tactics that might produce uncertain outcomes.

Diaspora as external supporters, on the other hand, is expected to have a vested interest in promoting stability in their country of origin and to advocate for peaceful methods of opposition. What usually unifies diaspora groups is their sense of attachment to their homeland and the formation of concrete identity and opinions about the internal affairs and developments of their country of origin (Lyons 2004). In-depth case studies demonstrate that diaspora can contribute to peace (Smith 2007) since it is logical that the absence of violence would enable diaspora to return to their homeland without fear, especially if they are residing abroad as a result of the

conflict. Furthermore, it is plausible that diaspora would not favour the destruction of their homeland by prolonged violent conflict, and their compatriots and family members suffering as a result of the war.

Research on civil wars and conflict resolution often identifies diaspora communities as entities that fuel conflict by providing support to rebels, while at the same time they remain unaffected by the conflict since they reside abroad (Collier et al. 2003). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) analyze the effect of diaspora on civil war onset using a measure of the proportion of emigrants in the US and the total population of the sending country as a proxy for diaspora donations. By contrast, here I measure support from diaspora in terms of whether or not diaspora provides material assistance to a militant group. Despite the fact that this proxy does not offer detailed information on the amount of assistance and possibly relevant characteristics of the diaspora, it is a superior measure given than it actually corresponds to the theoretical concept of interest. Others have also argued that diaspora have a particularly strong adherence to their homeland and their inability to reside there gives rise to grievances, fuelled by powerful emotions, that could contribute to prolonged conflict (Faist 2000). However, such analyses disregard the potential of rebel groups to adopt nonviolent means of resistance and to participate in the electoral process.

I claim that diaspora as patrons provide different motivation and resource mobilization opportunities to rebel groups from foreign states, and so they can facilitate the adoption of nonviolence better. More often than not, diaspora groups reside in countries free of violent conflict. This enables diaspora to provide technical assistance and training to the opposition group so that they have the means to resort to nonviolent tactics (Golan and Gal 2009). Additionally, the host society's norms

and values often have an alleviating effect on diaspora's otherwise heightened grievances making them likely proponents of nonviolence (Koinova 2011). The Tamil diaspora in the United States, for instance, managed to persuade LTTE militants to discontinue the violence and consider coming to the negotiation table (Fair 2005). The provision of support could be seen as the leverage that the Tamil diaspora used to pressure LTTE to lay down their arms. Furthermore, diaspora is often highly skilled and educated, and more likely than foreign states to be aware of the benefits of nonviolence. As such, diaspora unlike foreign state supporters has the capacity to diffuse to its compatriots the knowledge and know-how of nonviolent opposition (Qumsiyeh 2015).

Diaspora has stronger cultural links with rebels than external states. Studies on conflict mediation show that cultural similarities between an external intervener and rebels would lower coordination costs and would facilitate mediation (Bakaki, Böhmelt, and Bove 2016). The literature on third-party intervention also suggests that biased interveners have been more successful in reducing conflict (Regan 2002). In the context of this study, biasedness could entail close cultural ties with the militant group, and leverage given the assistance from diaspora. The Irish diaspora in the United States, for example, pressured IRA militants in Northern Ireland to suspend the fighting and engage in nonviolent resistance (Golan and Gal 2009).

Diaspora is better suited to provide resources and to invest in rebels being trained in disciplined nonviolent action. The influence of diaspora supporters originates from the close connection to the group given shared homeland and networks that enable a higher degree of reliability and in turn, make the adoption of nonviolence feasible. Additionally, diaspora as a supporter influence the motivation to adopt nonviolence since the provision of support gives legitimacy to the rebels

and contributes to the popularization of the struggle both within the country of origin but also abroad. Empowered with legitimacy, training, and resources, militant groups are more likely to consider the adoption of nonviolent tactics and even participation in the electoral process if this support is supplied by diaspora.

Hypothesis 2: Diaspora as foreign supporters increase the probability of militant groups turning to nonviolent tactics.

The case of Northern Ireland and the IRA serves as a useful example to provide anecdotal evidence to the proposed theoretical expectations. Historical accounts demonstrate that during the most violent period of opposition, the IRA had very little support, if any at all, from the Irish diaspora (Cochrane 2007). During the 1970s, perhaps the highest intensity phase, it was actually Libya under the Gaddafi regime that funnelled a substantial amount of weapons and resources to keep the armed struggle of the IRA (Dillon 1999). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddafi was committed to assisting organizations that he believed to have legitimate reasons to perpetrate violent acts to fight unjust colonial policies. The provision of weapons was a source of influence and a channel to gain international attention to the dedication Gaddafi had to help resisters fighting for liberation. He saw an opportunity to destabilize the United Kingdom further by sponsoring the IRA, as he perceived Britain to be an oppressor of the Irish people (Kawczynski 2011). Foreign states supporting a violent group are providing this assistance to pursue their own agenda and they have a vested interest in the militant group's perpetuation of violence as the Libyan regime demonstrates. Despite the fact that for a certain period of the conflict Irish diaspora was sending resources to the IRA, it was to a much

lesser extent and as noted above, the Irish diaspora played a critical role in discontinuing the violence. The Irish-American diaspora spread the strife of the IRA internationally, involved the US government, and ultimately gave them an alternative platform through which to continue the struggle but with nonviolent means (Edwards 2011).

Research Design

I expect foreign states and diaspora as supporters to have different influence and ability to affect rebel groups' tactical considerations and potential adoption of nonviolent tactics. Following Gurr (1993), the turn to nonviolent tactics encompasses activities ranging from the use of rhetoric to challenge the establishment through organized strikes, sit-ins, and collective and open demonstrations. I also extend this definition by including competition in elections as a tactic in the nonviolent domain of opposition activity. This inclusion is necessary since the turn to nonviolent opposition could also entail participation in the electoral process. To test the propositions, I construct a panel dataset based on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013), which contains a consensus population of two-hundred and fifty violent and nonviolent campaigns with maximalist goals that have operated in the time period 1945 and 2006. Those cases in the dataset that are entirely nonviolent are omitted, as the interest of this paper is to examine the potential of militant organizations to adopt nonviolence. The universe of cases consists of militant organizations taking part in

civil wars and insurgencies[24] and using violent methods to hurt the government. The unit of analysis is militant group-year.

Since the primary interest is in the adoption of nonviolent tactics, I consider these to incorporate both civil resistance and also participation in elections[25]. The Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) dataset (Matanock 2016) records violent groups that have the potential to participate in elections. I use these data to identify whether the militant organizations recorded in the dataset have turned to electoral participation.

Variables

The dependent variable, adoption[26] of nonviolent tactics, is binary which implies that a militant group can either adopt nonviolent tactics in a given year (recorded as one) or can remain committed to violence (coded as zero). It is coded on the basis of both NAVCO 2.0 and MGEP. I acknowledge that the event of interest is rare since only about 6 percent of the militant group-years in the data undergo a shift to nonviolence. The infrequency could be explained by the fact that any changes in the method of opposition involve uncertainty that could bring both desired and undesired consequences with regards to the outcome of the struggle.

[24] The codebook of NAVCO 2.0 notes that the violent cases of the consensus population are taken from a variety of sources such as the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars. See Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) for further information.

[25] This decision can be criticized on the basis that I combine nonviolent contentious tactics together with participation in elections. Yet, I am interested in whether or not the group adopts nonviolent tactics in broad terms. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis this is not seen as problematic.

[26] The adoption of nonviolence signifies that the militant group desists from using violent methods of resistance in the same year or that it participates in the first possible election.

There is an associated risk with such modifications, laying down arms and engaging in disciplined nonviolent direct action could be challenging. The challenges involve the potential inability to attract enough participants and support from the public given the violent history of the organization, and the expectation that the regime could suppress the organization using its past violent behaviour as justification for repressing it (Sharp 1990). The rarity of such events could also be linked to the fact that the shift involves not only ideological changes in strategy, but also logistics and material capability to execute this change. It is likely that the infrequency of adopting nonviolent tactics can impact the empirical analysis and to this end, I consider the rarity of the outcome methodologically by using statistical techniques to appropriately account for it.

Turning to the main explanatory variables, I include two variables that measure the existence of identified material support by external actor:[27] foreign states and diaspora. The key explanatory variables are obtained from NAVCO 2.0 and are both binary. Foreign state support takes a value of one if there is support granted to the militant group in terms of material resources and a value of zero if there is no such support. For the variable diaspora support, whereby diaspora refers to people residing abroad but sharing the same identity with the people in the country of origin, the same coding rule stands: the variable takes a value of one if there is material support granted by diaspora to the militant group and a zero if not (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). It is possible that a militant group can have more than one overseas supporter. That said, I rely on the 'weakest-link' approach to address any concerns about militant groups that receive support from several external agents in a year. In this context, at least one foreign actor supporting the resisters is enough

[27] The main independent variables capture incidence/instance of external support by actor.

to (potentially) trigger reconsideration and ultimately a shift in tactics (Bakaki, Böhmelt, and Bove 2016; Hirshleifer 1983). Finally, I lag the main explanatory variables by one year given that theoretically the external actor's support might not have an immediate effect on the group's tactical decisions.

The control variables capture primarily group attributes (all obtained from NAVCO 2.0) that might have an effect on the likelihood of adoption of nonviolent tactics and support from foreign states and diaspora. First, the involvement of INGOs might affect the choice of militant group tactics as INGOs usually seek the promulgation of specific norms and values that they advocate for through the provision of support (Mitchell and Schmitz 2014). Some scholars have argued that INGOs can act not as philanthropic organizations, but as interest groups that are concerned with particular economic objectives rather than a real contribution to building universal norms (Bloodgood 2011). Yet, transnational NGOs often provide training programmes aimed at organizations seeking to engage in disciplined nonviolent resistance (Schock 2004).

To capture the response from the state, I control for the level of state repression that is directed at the militant group. The variable is ordinal and ranges from no repression – the state accommodates or enters into talks with the opposition, to extreme repression indicating high degree of state violence against the group. At particular levels of repression, rebels could deem a specific tactic unfeasible and consequently, adopt different methods of opposition. There are a variety of studies that inform the literature on the effect of repression on the intensity and transformation of domestic conflict (e.g., Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998).

I control for the ethnic diversity of the militant group by including a binary indicator that records as one groups that have ethnic diversity in their membership.

Diverse organizations are able to source from a wider pool of participants and potential supporters, regardless of their ethnic background or religious affiliation. As such, they could be seen as more legitimate and inclusive, among others, and could be more likely to receive international attention and subsequent support. Ethnically homogenous rebels are often linked to outbreak of domestic violent conflict (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Denny and Walter 2014). Yet, one of the most powerful messages of nonviolent movements has been the inclusivity and participation regardless of ethnic background or religious affiliation.

The level of disunity of the rebel group can be a potential confounder because any division may jeopardize tactical reconsiderations. The variable is ordinal with four categories whereby higher values indicate active internal competition and greater disunity. Rebels' unity can also influence the overall performance of the group, and ultimately how the conflict ends (Cunningham 2006; Gates 2002). Additionally, I control for the size of the militant groups, as the number of people participating could determine adoption of nonviolence. I include an ordinal variable providing an estimate of the group's size with four categories where higher values relate to larger groups. It is established that without a high number of participants, disciplined nonviolent dissent becomes infeasible (Sharp 1990). Hence, even if organizations espousing violence want to adopt nonviolent tactics, this might be hindered by an inadequate number of participants.

I also control for the level of democracy since opening of the political system could affect the likelihood of change to nonviolent tactics. I take the Polity IV measure of democracy and its squared term to capture nonlinear effects (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2016). I consider the duration of the opposition since rebels fighting for many years might be more prone to tactical reconsiderations given that

they have exhausted the violent avenue of contention without success. Additionally, events such as the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attack led to substantial systemic shocks that could affect the tactics of militant organizations. To account for temporal dependence, I introduce a variable capturing time since last switch to nonviolent tactics and its quadratic, and cubic form so as to address concerns regarding the cyclical nature of tactical change to nonviolence (Carter and Signorino 2010). The cubic polynomials are generated on the basis of the outcome and they count the years since last switch to nonviolence.

Empirical Analysis

Given that the dependent variable is dichotomous, that is, there is either a tactical switch by adopting nonviolent tactics or rebel groups remain violent, I consider models with binary dependent variables. However, the change to nonviolent tactics is a rare event, only about 6 percent of violent-group years adopt nonviolent tactics. The standard logit and probit models for binary responses might not be the most appropriate choices since their transformations are symmetrical. As the event of interest, the tactical switch to nonviolence, is rare, the complementary log-log model is more suitable (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). This is because the complementary log-log model, also referred to as a Gompit model, is better able to accommodate the skewed distribution of the dependent variable than the standard logit and probit models. I estimate the complementary log-log models with robust standard errors clustered by militant group to allow for within-group correlation.

In the previous sections I argued that different external supporters, intervening in internal conflict through the provision of assistance to a militant group, have different effects on the probability of the supported rebels adopting

nonviolent tactics. I posit that states, as benefactors, are more likely to keep militant groups committed to violence, while through diaspora's support, militant groups are more likely to consider the use of nonviolence.

The results from the empirical analysis presented in Table 1 demonstrate strong support for Hypothesis 2, but rather modest evidence in support for Hypothesis 1. As expected, diaspora sponsors are consistently associated with an increase in the likelihood of rebels' adoption of nonviolent tactics. This empirical finding sheds light on the role of diaspora in domestic conflict dynamics in general and the influence diaspora can exert on militants' tactical decision-making in particular. It speaks to the proposition that diaspora, with their cultural ties to the rebels and vested interest in the development of the conflict, can have a moderating role, influencing militants to abandon violent tactics. As such, this study provides the first empirical evidence in support of qualitative studies that have argued that diaspora involvement in domestic conflict can have a pacifying effect on armed groups (Smith 2007).

Table 1 in here

State supporters, conversely, are negatively related to the outcome of interest as hypothesized, but there is significant effect only in Model 1 and 2. The negative association points to the finding that foreign governments are likely to use the provision of support as a conflict tool, arming the opposition and fuelling the rebellion. Yet, foreign states might not have high stakes in the conflict and/or they might be unable to effectively control the rebels they are sponsoring. Regardless of the nature of the interests foreign states follow by supporting a rebel group, it

appears also that state supporters are unable to provide the resources necessary for militant groups to reconsider their tactical choices. Therefore, organizational attributes of the militant group seem to be more relevant predictors than state support. It is also possible that the changing international system after the Cold War renders state support obsolete.

The effect of INGO supporters is statistically different from zero only in Model 2, but the direction of the relationship is positive and as expected across all models. INGOs are likely to be reluctant to support a rebel group given the commitment to universal norms and values that reject violence. Even though INGOs have the capacity to provide pertinent training programmes in disciplined nonviolent resistance (Schock 2004), their potential influence could become prominent after the conflict has ended.

Direct repression consistently has an effect on the probability of adoption of nonviolent tactics. Repression plays a role in groups' tactical considerations and shows that higher levels diminish the likelihood of militants adopting nonviolent tactics. This effect can be explained by considering that adopting nonviolent tactics under extreme repression is inherently difficult and it requires resources as well as popular support. Regarding the size of the militant organization, larger groups are associated with an increased likelihood of a shift to nonviolence. This is in line with the established view that nonviolent opposition requires a high number of participants (Sharp 1990).

The level of group disunity exhibits a negative effect; that is a greater disunity of the group decreases the probability of the adoption of nonviolent tactics. Cunningham (2013), for instance, finds that more factions within a rebel group are associated with a higher risk of civil war, and the negative coefficient of the variable

group disunity here also confirms the notion that higher disunity correlates with violence rather than nonviolence. Moreover, previous studies have shown that more united rebel groups have better control over the organization, which in turn could facilitate any strategic and tactical transformation, and/or peace negotiations (Staniland 2014).

Ethnically homogenous groups have been linked to the outbreak of armed conflict and as such, they are likely to sustain the violence rather than consider an alternative tactic (Denny and Walter 2014). Therefore, it is not surprising that militant groups that welcome ethnic diversity are positively associated with the switch to nonviolence. Additionally, one of the pillars of unarmed resistance is namely inclusivity and acceptance of participants from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. As such, this result only confirms this well-established notion.

With the variables 9/11 and Cold War I account for such momentous events that could affect the probability of militants switching tactics. While both variables reach statistical significance, only the Cold War variable is positively associated with the outcome of interest. The end of Cold War marked a systemic shift to reconciliation, democratization, and unarmed forms of opposition, replacing the proxy conflicts prevalent up to the early 1990s. Yet, the post-9/11 environment gave rise to increased radicalization that can explain the commitment to violence indicated by the negative association with the dependent variable.

Structural factors appear to be important, as the overall democratic status of a country seems to have a nonlinear effect on the potential shift to nonviolence. The positive sign of the quadratic term reflects the notion that an improving democratic score might render violent tactics unsubstantiated. Model 5 also includes the interaction term support from both states and diaspora and it does not have an effect

on the adoption of nonviolence by militant groups. Receiving assistance from these two external actors, with different agendas and influence, might be contradictory and ultimately, with no effect on the tactical decision-making of the militant group.

As far as the results from the empirical analysis show, some militant groups' attributes such as the size of the group might have an effect on the adoption of nonviolence, but the size of the group per se cannot theoretically substantiate the adoption of nonviolence. What is interesting is that the same support but from different actors has different effects on the probability of militants switching tactics to nonviolence. Figure 1 presents the marginal change in the probability of militants' adopting nonviolence given support from diaspora, foreign states, and INGOs respectively. In substantive terms, the probability of turning to nonviolence increases by about 7 percent when support from diaspora is present, while foreign states do not affect militants' tactical considerations. The magnitude of the effects is not as high as expected but this could be partially attributed to the relatively small sample size together with the fact that the outcome I model is very rare. On balance, the results show that states might not be able to project the same influence as non-state actors such as diaspora. This might be explained by the lack of close cultural ties and/or very different agendas that diaspora and foreign states as external supporters pursue.

Figure 1 in here

Within the principal-agent framework, the empirical analysis here demonstrates that in fact non-state actors such as diaspora are 'better' principals than states. External support from diaspora has an effect on militants' tactical choices, and there is confirmation that such assistance is associated with increased probability

of armed groups adopting nonviolence. This is likely a result of diaspora's vested interest in conflict de-escalation and diaspora's ability to better influence their compatriots to reconsider their tactics. Moreover, diaspora can provide rebel groups with the necessary resources to continue the opposition via nonviolent means. Foreign states providing material backing to a rebel group cannot impact rebels in the same way diaspora can. The influence of foreign governments is minimal and the material assistance bestowed is likely to be used to sustain the violent struggle rather than diminish it.

Going back to the original question of this study, militant groups are more likely to change tactics to nonviolence if they receive support from diaspora rather than foreign states. And this is because of the influence and resources available given support from a particular external actor. Overall, I show here that it matters who is your supporter. The findings of this analysis also point to the dichotomy of state versus non-state actors and I present evidence to suggest that non-state actors have a more prominent role to play in the analysis of internal conflict in general and rebel groups in particular.

Robustness

To increase confidence in the results I performed a battery of robustness checks and alternative model specifications available in the appendix. In order to address any concerns regarding potential endogeneity between the adoption of nonviolent tactics (the dependent variable) and foreign support by different actors (the main regressors), I estimate two recursive bivariate probit models. Some may argue that militant groups could switch tactics pre-emptively so as to secure assistance from a foreign benefactor. To address such concerns, I model both the

determinants of external support from diaspora and foreign states, and the predictors of change to nonviolent tactics simultaneously. The results hold and the lack of correlation between the equations alleviates the concern that the relationship between external supporters and change in tactics is endogenous.

The appendix also contains bootstrapped estimates for all models. By bootstrapping, I resample one thousand times my original sample so as to be able to have a better understanding of the population I am trying to study (i.e. militant groups). The results remain unchanged. I also perform a variety of diagnostic checks such as for collinearity, goodness-of-fit and predictive power.

I include alternative models to the complementary log-log model, namely I estimate logit and rare events logit models (Tomz, King, and Zeng 2002). I consider models with additional controls such as structural variables like Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and population variables as well as different types of state repression, and the results hold. The appendix also contains the main models without any time lags and an alternative coding of the main independent variables capturing exclusive support from one of the foreign actors since many rebels actually receive support from both states and diaspora. The results closely follow those in the main text. What is surprising is that the state support variable shows signs of statistical significance in some of the models. This suggests that there might be an overlap between support from diaspora and states that might take away the influence of state sponsors that have less ties to the rebels they are supporting. This triggers the question whether there is not a competition for influence from state and non-state actors and how this interplay affects conflict dynamics. These are interesting questions that can be addressed in future research.

Conclusion

External actors support militant groups for a variety of reasons and this study demonstrates that different foreign benefactors influence rebels' tactics in different ways. The provision of support can be seen as a tool for the external sponsor to impact on conflict developments. Since the study looks at material support bestowed by different actors, primarily diaspora and foreign states, it is intriguing that the same type of assistance, but from different actors, has diverging effects on the probability of rebels' adoption of nonviolent tactics. This finding points to the necessity to focus more on agent-based explanations of how rebels reconsider tactics. The fact that diaspora are consistently associated with increased likelihood of militants turning to unarmed tactics speaks to the idea that perhaps more non-state actors should be engaged in conflict management. The negative association between foreign states as sponsors and the prospect for a switch to nonviolence could be overcome if governments collaborate with diaspora and INGOs so as to utilize their vast resources not as a conflict, but rather as a conflict management tool. Even if not successful in establishing a strong principal-agent relationship, assistance from foreign states is linked to sustained violence. Group attributes such as the size of the militant group and the level of unity also might play a role in tactical reviews. Yet, these are likely to be linked to the feasibility of the adoption of nonviolent tactics. The initial decision to change tactics is more probable to be a result of an exogenous intervention such as the influence from a foreign benefactor through the provision of support.

Overall, this analysis contributes to studies on rebel groups tactical decisions and conflict dynamics more broadly, whereby demonstrating that non-state actors such as diaspora can play a central role in conflict de-escalation. To discontinue the

violence, militant groups necessitate first and foremost the external assistance and influence from actors that have a stake in reducing conflict. Diaspora, as a partial and interested party, is the principal agent that has the potential to impact tactics. This presumption also relates to studies that argue that biased interventions are more successful in bringing conflict parties together, and commencing negotiations (Regan 2002). In comparative terms, diaspora are the most biased external supporters since they have the cultural ties with rebels and also a vested interest in stopping the violence. This analysis presents empirical evidence that diaspora do not fuel conflict, and their overly negative image is perhaps unsubstantiated. Future research can build on this finding and pursue further disaggregated analysis on the role of external supporters in conflict dynamics. For instance, with the future availability of more fine-grained data, researchers will be able to identify the foreign benefactor, its attributes, and track bilateral exchanges with the militant group so as to be able to make better inferences. Currently, it is only possible to look at states, diaspora, and INGOs as homogenous external benefactors. It might be the case, though, that there is a considerable variation within each type of supporter. This variation could in turn provide clearer explanations of the mechanism through which different foreign benefactors are able (or not) to influence rebels' tactics and conflict developments by extension. Nevertheless, what researchers and policymakers can take from this empirical analysis is that external non-state actors have a central role to play in domestic conflict whereby they have the potential to influence militant groups to change tactics and adopt nonviolence. This is important because by reducing violence, militants transform the internal conflict and open up the space for reconciliation.

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Table 1 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adoption of nonviolent tactics

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Diaspora support$_{t-1}$	1.524***	1.593***	2.145***	2.120***	2.349***
	(0.388)	(0.475)	(0.569)	(0.622)	(0.784)
State support $_{t-1}$	-0.843***	-0.765***	-0.469	-0.244	0.214
	(0.307)	(0.296)	(0.313)	(0.382)	(0.940)
INGO support $_{t-1}$	0.468	0.807*	0.498	0.449	0.453
	(0.397)	(0.423)	(0.447)	(0.451)	(0.458)
Group size		0.345	0.455**	0.617**	0.618**
		(0.224)	(0.231)	(0.275)	(0.272)
Group ethnic diversity		0.481	1.312**	1.604**	1.590**
		(0.491)	(0.513)	(0.638)	(0.629)
Repression at group		-0.638***	-0.778***	-0.635**	-0.657**
		(0.187)	(0.216)	(0.307)	(0.315)
Group disunity		-0.439**	-0.464**	-0.498**	-0.503**
		(0.199)	(0.219)	(0.201)	(0.206)
9/11			-1.577**	-1.106*	-1.137*
			(0.747)	(0.613)	(0.637)
Cold War			0.290	0.618*	0.621*
			(0.319)	(0.375)	(0.367)
Duration			0.123***	0.093***	0.093***
			(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Polity				0.014	0.019
				(0.043)	(0.041)
Polity^2				0.017**	0.018**
				(0.008)	(0.007)
Diaspora*State support$_{t-1}$					-0.545
					(0.941)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.892***	-0.874***	-0.632***	-0.526***	-0.531***
	(0.183)	(0.261)	(0.197)	(0.186)	(0.189)
Time since last nonviolence^2	0.055***	0.052***	0.029**	0.024**	0.024**
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Time since last nonviolence^3	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.480***	-0.166	-2.233***	-3.767***	-3.922***
	(0.293)	(0.631)	(0.679)	(0.873)	(0.886)
Number of observations	1,100	991	991	850	850

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Figure 1 Marginal change in the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (Table 1, Model 4)



Notes: The graph presents the marginal change in the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics given the presence of diaspora, foreign states, and INGOs as external supporters with 1-year lag. All other covariates are held at their observed values. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Appendix

Descriptive statistics

In Table A1, I show the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis.

Table A1 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nonviolent tactics (DV)	1,447	0.054	0.226	0	1
Diaspora support	1,377	0.506	0.500	0	1
State support	1,412	0.596	0.491	0	1
INGO support	1,358	0.102	0.302	0	1
Group size	1,370	0.565	0.646	0	3
Group ethnic diversity	1,386	0.473	0.499	0	1
Repression at group	1,476	2.783	0.678	0	3
Group disunity	1,477	1.301	1.123	0	3
9/11	1,493	0.074	0.262	0	1
Cold War	1,493	0.299	0.458	0	1
Duration	1,493	10.705	10.245	1	59
Polity	1,273	-0.669	6.521	-10	10
$Polity^2$	1,273	42.942	28.455	0	100
Time since last nonviolence	1,447	8.099	9.539	0	58

Bivariate statistics

Diaspora support and State support

IV: Diaspora support	IV: State support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	328	350	678
Yes	219	423	642
Total	547	773	1,320

IV: Diaspora support	IV: State support			Total
	No	Yes	Missing	
No	328	350	3	681
Yes	219	423	54	696
Missing	24	68	24	116
Total	571	841	81	1,493

Nonviolent tactics and State support

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: State support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	507	791	1,298
Yes	38	36	74
Total	545	827	1,372

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: State support			Total
	No	Yes	Missing	
No	507	791	71	1,369
Yes	38	36	4	78
Missing	26	14	6	46
Total	571	841	81	1,493

Nonviolent tactics and Diaspora support

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: Diaspora support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	650	613	1,263
Yes	14	61	75
Total	664	674	1,338

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: Diaspora support			Total
	No	Yes	Missing	
No	650	613	106	1,369
Yes	14	61	3	78
Missing	17	22	7	46
Total	681	696	116	1,493

Below I present the same tables but with alternative coding for the main IVs, see also Table A3.

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: State support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	1,024	345	1,369
Yes	74	4	78
Total	1,098	349	1,447

DV: Nonviolent tactics	IV: Diaspora support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	1,189	180	1,369
Yes	49	29	78
Total	1,238	209	1,447

Substantive effects

It is likely that militant groups consider the behavior of the state when making decisions about their tactics. Figure A1 shows the marginal change in the probability of militants adopting nonviolent tactics at several levels of state repression, and given the presence of external support from diaspora and foreign states. The assistance from external governments does not have an effect on the outcome of interest. Yet, militants are able to overcome considerable levels of state repression with the support from diaspora. At the most extreme level of state repression, support from diaspora increases the probability of a tactical change to nonviolence by 6 percent.

Figure A1 Marginal change in the probability of adopting nonviolent tactics given different levels of state repression directed at the militant group (Table 1, Model 4)



Notes: The graph presents the marginal change in the probability of militants' adopting nonviolence given the presence of diaspora, foreign state and INGO external support at different levels of repression. All other covariates are held at their observed values. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Endogeneity concern

In Table A2, I model both the determinants of external support from diaspora and foreign states, and the predictors of militants' adoption of nonviolent tactics simultaneously. For each recursive bivariate probit model, the selection equation takes the support from an external actor as a dependent variable, while the outcome equation contains the adoption of nonviolent tactics as the response variable. Since I am estimating recursive bivariate probit models, it is possible to include the dependent variable from the selection equation in the outcome equation (Greene 2003). The null hypothesis for these models is that there is no correlation between the equations, i.e. they can be estimated separately. A statistically significant ρ (rho) estimate would be evidence against the null, i.e. the disturbances of the two equations are correlated and by extension, there could be basis for endogeneity concerns. However, for the models that I estimate, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation, which allows me to proceed with the analysis and to alleviate concerns that the relationship between external supporters and shift in tactics is endogenous.

Table A2 Recursive bivariate probit models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)
Diaspora support	0.689*	0.909***
	(0.394)	(0.297)
State support	-0.239	-0.474
	(0.194)	(0.403)
INGO support	0.138	0.135
	(0.259)	(0.255)
Group size	0.248*	0.256*
	(0.149)	(0.151)
Group ethnic diversity	0.507	0.551*
	(0.319)	(0.311)
Repression at group	-0.313**	-0.310**
	(0.151)	(0.140)
Group disunity	-0.167	-0.177
	(0.122)	(0.122)
9/11	-0.834	-0.833
	(0.524)	(0.521)
Cold War	0.204	0.205
	(0.205)	(0.205)
Duration	0.077***	0.076***
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.227***	-0.227***
	(0.075)	(0.076)
Time since last nonviolence^2	0.009**	0.009**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Time since last nonviolence^3	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.540***	-1.505***
	(0.441)	(0.419)
Selection equation	Diaspora support	State support
Group size	0.168	0.263
	(0.177)	(0.167)
Group ethnic diversity	-0.520**	0.011
	(0.261)	(0.226)
Repression at group	0.142	0.172
	(0.125)	(0.120)
Group disunity	0.205**	0.081
	(0.099)	(0.080)
Duration	-0.016	-0.030***
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Intercept	-0.471	-0.183
	(0.443)	(0.394)
ρ	0.136	0.144
	(0.168)	(0.251)
Number of observations	1,102	1,102

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Alternative empirical models

In Table A3, I show the results with alternative coding of the main explanatory variables. Namely, I recode the variables so that the variable "Diaspora support" captures exclusively support from diaspora. It takes a value of one if there is diaspora support, but no state support, and zero otherwise. The same coding is followed for the variable "State support". It takes a value of one if there is state support, but no diaspora support, and zero otherwise. The results closely follow those in the main text. What is surprising is that the state support variable shows signs of statistical significance across the models. This suggests that there might be an overlap between support from diaspora and states that might take away the influence of state sponsors that have less ties to the rebels they are supporting. This triggers the question whether there is not a competition for influence from state and non-state actors and how this interplay affects conflict dynamics. These are interesting questions that can be addressed in future research.

Table A3 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (alternative coding of main IVs)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Diaspora support	1.012***	0.821*	0.912***	0.795**
	(0.318)	(0.426)	(0.347)	(0.374)
State support	-1.492**	-1.999***	-1.784***	-1.592**
	(0.615)	(0.736)	(0.677)	(0.650)
INGO support	0.731*	0.899*	0.740*	0.862*
	(0.434)	(0.470)	(0.425)	(0.480)
Group size		0.260	0.367	0.476
		(0.296)	(0.284)	(0.346)
Group ethnic diversity		0.428	1.272*	1.511*
		(0.585)	(0.661)	(0.839)
Repression at group		-0.430*	-0.468*	-0.219
		(0.244)	(0.276)	(0.335)
Group disunity		-0.268	-0.237	-0.344*
		(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.206)
9/11			-1.441**	-1.337**
			(0.562)	(0.612)
Cold War			0.470	0.601
			(0.454)	(0.396)
Duration			0.112***	0.114***
			(0.020)	(0.040)
Polity				-0.023
				(0.058)
Polity^2				0.005
				(0.006)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.607***	-0.555***	-0.533***	-0.474**
	(0.128)	(0.195)	(0.170)	(0.187)
Time since last nonviolence^2	0.035***	0.030**	0.024***	0.020**
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Time since last nonviolence^3	-0.001**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.778***	-0.980	-2.439***	-3.599***
	(0.313)	(0.669)	(0.808)	(1.061)
Number of observations	1,318	1,183	1,183	1,011

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

In Table A4, I address any concerns that the models might not be correctly specified since in Table 1 (main table) only the key independent variables are lagged by 1 year. The results do not change.

Table A4 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (all independent variables lagged by 1 year)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Diaspora support	1.524***	1.479**	2.061***	1.805***	1.922***
	(0.388)	(0.574)	(0.565)	(0.578)	(0.680)
State support	-0.843***	-0.823***	-0.552*	-0.512	-0.286
	(0.307)	(0.307)	(0.301)	(0.380)	(0.760)
INGO support	0.468	0.439	-0.242	0.410	0.419
	(0.397)	(0.424)	(0.515)	(0.440)	(0.447)
Group size		0.250	0.261	0.568*	0.575*
		(0.303)	(0.317)	(0.324)	(0.314)
Group ethnic diversity		0.669	1.511***	1.715***	1.714***
		(0.542)	(0.550)	(0.628)	(0.628)
Repression at group		0.175	0.093	0.731*	0.725*
		(0.292)	(0.282)	(0.437)	(0.439)
Group disunity		-0.194	-0.154	-0.373*	-0.377*
		(0.218)	(0.229)	(0.200)	(0.201)
9/11			-1.674*	-1.450*	-1.469*
			(0.936)	(0.781)	(0.799)
Cold War			0.084	0.721**	0.723**
			(0.391)	(0.322)	(0.320)
Duration			0.135***	0.114***	0.114***
			(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Polity				0.009	0.012
				(0.040)	(0.040)
$Polity^2$				0.016**	0.017**
				(0.007)	(0.007)
Diaspora*State support					-0.561
					(0.937)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.892***	-0.857***	-0.621***	-0.518**	-0.519**
	(0.183)	(0.267)	(0.227)	(0.211)	(0.212)
Time since last $nonviolence^2$	0.055***	0.051**	0.027*	0.019	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Time since last $nonviolence^3$	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.480***	-2.393**	-4.513***	-7.427***	-7.524***
	(0.293)	(1.072)	(0.902)	(1.306)	(1.375)
Number of observations	1,100	992	992	850	850

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

In Table A5, I run the analysis without any time lags for the IVs. The results hold, but from a theoretical perspective it is more plausible that the support from a foreign benefactor might need 'time' to influence any potential tactical reconsiderations. I deem the lagging of the main IVs to be justified also on the basis of any concern for reverse causality. Table A5 shows that my findings hold even without any time lags.

Table A5 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (no time lags)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Diaspora support	1.629***	1.487**	2.218***	2.205***	2.288***
	(0.498)	(0.592)	(0.632)	(0.628)	(0.779)
State support	-0.786**	-0.832**	-0.353	-0.206	-0.043
	(0.320)	(0.362)	(0.322)	(0.432)	(0.904)
INGO support	0.491	0.752	0.300	0.496	0.498
	(0.439)	(0.494)	(0.477)	(0.455)	(0.458)
Group size		0.330	0.343	0.530	0.528
		(0.310)	(0.315)	(0.365)	(0.369)
Group ethnic diversity		0.416	1.432**	1.624**	1.620**
		(0.623)	(0.654)	(0.809)	(0.803)
Repression at group		-0.440*	-0.557**	-0.324	-0.326
		(0.250)	(0.251)	(0.349)	(0.349)
Group disunity		-0.303	-0.355	-0.492**	-0.492**
		(0.250)	(0.246)	(0.232)	(0.232)
9/11			-2.049***	-1.619**	-1.640**
			(0.769)	(0.663)	(0.696)
Cold War			0.402	0.706*	0.709*
			(0.418)	(0.374)	(0.374)
Duration			0.157***	0.126***	0.127***
			(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Polity				0.020	0.021
				(0.052)	(0.051)
$Polity^2$				0.015**	0.015**
				(0.007)	(0.006)
Diaspora*State support					-0.195
					(0.871)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.571***	-0.516***	-0.476***	-0.381**	-0.381**
	(0.134)	(0.196)	(0.161)	(0.167)	(0.167)
Time since last $nonviolence^2$	0.032***	0.028**	0.018**	0.014*	0.014*
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Time since last $nonviolence^3$	-0.000**	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-2.372***	-1.539	-3.788***	-5.344***	-5.415***
	(0.403)	(0.943)	(0.884)	(1.039)	(1.129)
Number of observations	1,217	1,102	1,102	947	947

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A6 presents models with additional controls. I include the variable GDP per capita (log) and Population (log) obtained from Gleditsch's (2002) expanded trade and GDP data. Physical repression is measured using the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 2017), in particular reports from the US State Department; the values range from one to five and higher values indicate higher repression. Political repression captures violations of the political rights of citizens and it is taken from Freedom House (Freedom House 2016). The values range from one to seven and higher values indicate higher repression.

Table A6 Complementary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (additional controls)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Diaspora support	2.209***	3.300***	3.530***	2.533***
	(0.669)	(0.990)	(1.063)	(0.639)
State support	-0.261	-0.594	-1.026**	-1.132**
	(0.409)	(0.409)	(0.485)	(0.531)
INGO support	0.492	0.990**	1.391**	2.449***
	(0.440)	(0.409)	(0.562)	(0.613)
Group size	0.553	0.874**	0.750**	1.218***
	(0.362)	(0.389)	(0.307)	(0.434)
Group ethnic diversity	1.554**	1.455	1.885**	1.143
	(0.789)	(0.901)	(0.864)	(0.887)
Repression at group	-0.295	-0.273	-0.256	-0.484
	(0.358)	(0.456)	(0.540)	(0.523)
Group disunity	-0.459**	-0.914***	-1.067***	-1.633***
	(0.215)	(0.217)	(0.268)	(0.504)
9/11	-1.494***	-1.637***	-2.195***	-2.147***
	(0.570)	(0.447)	(0.605)	(0.727)
Cold War	0.715*	0.731	0.409	0.243
	(0.374)	(0.516)	(0.621)	(0.505)
Duration	0.117***	0.108***	0.152***	0.129***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Polity	0.007	0.020	0.094	0.111
	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.084)	(0.093)
$Polity^2$	0.015**	0.018*	0.024*	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.013)
GDP per capita (log)	0.160	0.625**	0.446	0.392
	(0.288)	(0.299)	(0.282)	(0.319)
Physical repression		0.148	0.266	0.249
		(0.231)	(0.281)	(0.324)
Political repression			0.379	0.474
			(0.302)	(0.333)
Population (log)				0.674**
				(0.323)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.364**	-0.236	-0.208	-0.136
	(0.159)	(0.155)	(0.177)	(0.206)
Time since last $nonviolence^2$	0.013*	0.006	0.003	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Time since last $nonviolence^3$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-6.567**	-11.823***	-13.164***	-18.004***
	(3.000)	(3.075)	(3.834)	(5.742)
Number of observations	925	616	559	559

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A7 presents the logit estimations of the models. Since Gompit (complementary log-log) models are not that popular in political science, I show that my results remain unchanged even if I estimate the models with a logit link.

Table A7 Logit models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Diaspora support$_{t-1}$	1.611***	1.635***	2.234***	2.200***	2.492***
	(0.458)	(0.561)	(0.511)	(0.709)	(0.925)
State support $_{t-1}$	-0.958***	-0.866**	-0.495	-0.259	0.268
	(0.370)	(0.350)	(0.428)	(0.426)	(0.995)
INGO support $_{t-1}$	0.495	0.929*	0.404	0.435	0.443
	(0.470)	(0.508)	(0.633)	(0.498)	(0.508)
Group size		0.402	0.521*	0.784**	0.788**
		(0.286)	(0.288)	(0.323)	(0.321)
Group ethnic diversity		0.473	1.352***	1.648**	1.634**
		(0.554)	(0.435)	(0.731)	(0.718)
Repression at group		-0.764***	-0.868***	-0.700**	-0.727**
		(0.225)	(0.217)	(0.323)	(0.330)
Group disunity		-0.501**	-0.479**	-0.558**	-0.564**
		(0.229)	(0.199)	(0.224)	(0.229)
9/11			-1.637*	-1.251	-1.284
			(0.955)	(0.809)	(0.831)
Cold War			0.309	0.646	0.646
			(0.445)	(0.454)	(0.445)
Duration			0.139***	0.100**	0.099**
			(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Polity				0.030	0.037
				(0.047)	(0.044)
Polity^2				0.019**	0.021**
				(0.010)	(0.009)
Diaspora*State support$_{t-1}$					-0.656
					(1.023)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.905***	-0.875***	-0.671***	-0.573***	-0.580***
	(0.196)	(0.265)	(0.149)	(0.210)	(0.213)
Time since last nonviolence^2	0.055***	0.051***	0.031**	0.026**	0.027**
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Time since last nonviolence^3	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.350***	0.300	-2.041**	-3.716***	-3.895***
	(0.329)	(0.744)	(0.812)	(1.012)	(1.034)
Number of observations	1,100	991	991	850	850

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A8 presents the Rare events logit models (Tomz, King, and Zeng 2002). The model accounts for small sample bias in binary choice models where one of the categories in the outcome does not have many cases. Even with this specification, the results hold and there is evidence for the hypothesized relationships.

Table A8 Rare events logit models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Diaspora support	1.660***	1.531**	2.156***	2.090***
	(0.533)	(0.632)	(0.683)	(0.703)
State support	-0.868**	-0.903**	-0.414	-0.229
	(0.343)	(0.377)	(0.358)	(0.434)
INGO support	0.566	0.880	0.338	0.473
	(0.492)	(0.537)	(0.526)	(0.532)
Group size		0.354	0.370	0.579
		(0.314)	(0.315)	(0.388)
Group ethnic diversity		0.403	1.326**	1.511*
		(0.643)	(0.675)	(0.822)
Repression at group		-0.562**	-0.642**	-0.414
		(0.273)	(0.287)	(0.380)
Group disunity		-0.352	-0.354	-0.471*
		(0.249)	(0.256)	(0.255)
9/11			-1.911*	-1.547*
			(1.033)	(0.858)
Cold War			0.421	0.746*
			(0.393)	(0.413)
Duration			0.160***	0.122**
			(0.035)	(0.048)
Polity				0.025
				(0.051)
$Polity^2$				0.016**
				(0.008)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.565***	-0.477**	-0.414**	-0.294
	(0.143)	(0.192)	(0.168)	(0.179)
Time since last $nonviolence^2$	0.031***	0.023*	0.011	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Time since last $nonviolence^3$	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-2.246***	-1.059	-3.323***	-4.821***
	(0.417)	(1.006)	(0.931)	(1.182)
Number of observations	1,217	1,102	1,102	947

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A9 shows the bootstrapped estimates for all models. By bootstrapping, I resample 1,000 times my original sample so as to be able to have a better understanding of the population I am trying to study (i.e. all militant groups). The results from the statistical analysis demonstrate that the results stay the same even if using the resampling technique such as bootstrap.

Table A9 Bootstrapped complimentary log-log models for the probability of militant groups' adopting nonviolent tactics (1000 reps)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Diaspora support	2.218***	2.077***	2.288***
	(0.619)	(0.760)	(0.754)
State support	-0.353	-0.654	-0.043
	(0.368)	(0.878)	(0.792)
INGO support	0.300	0.297	0.498
	(0.477)	(0.472)	(0.512)
Group size	0.343	0.352	0.528
	(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.326)
Group ethnic diversity	1.432***	1.433***	1.620***
	(0.507)	(0.470)	(0.603)
Repression at group	-0.557**	-0.553**	-0.326
	(0.229)	(0.236)	(0.579)
Group disunity	-0.355**	-0.355**	-0.492*
	(0.174)	(0.177)	(0.252)
Cold War	0.402	0.403	0.709
	(0.423)	(0.419)	(0.480)
9/11	-2.049**	-1.998**	-1.640*
	(0.918)	(0.962)	(0.910)
Duration	0.157***	0.154***	0.127***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.041)
Diaspora*State support$_{t-1}$		0.371	-0.195
		(0.926)	(0.867)
Polity			0.021
			(0.039)
Polity^2			0.015**
			(0.007)
Time since last nonviolence	-0.476*	-0.476*	-0.381*
	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.198)
Time since last nonviolence^2	0.018	0.018	0.014
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.034)
Time since last nonviolence^3	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.002)
Intercept	-3.788***	-3.788***	-5.415***
	(0.916)	(0.916)	(1.669)
Number of observations	1,102	1,102	947

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by militant group in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Diagnostics

The models do not suffer from multicollinearity since the average variance inflation factor (as well as the individual values of the VIF for all variables) is well below the accepted 5 VIF as an indication of potential collinearity problem.

Collinearity diagnostics (Table 1, Model 4)

(N=948)

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Diaspora support	1.22	0.8228
State support	1.14	0.8752
INGO support	1.18	0.8490
Repression at group	1.05	0.9480
Group size	1.17	0.8553
Group disunity	1.20	0.8329
Group ethnic diversity	1.17	0.8534
9/11	1.39	0.7218
Cold War	1.40	0.7145
Polity	1.11	0.8086
$Polity^2$	1.20	0.8303
Time since last nonviolence	4.30	0.2327
Duration	5.01	0.1997
MEAN VIF	1.74	

I also perform the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. The insignificant test statistic suggests that the model fits the data quite well.

Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (Table A7, Model 4)

N = 850
N of groups = 10
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 (8) = 11.74
Prob. > chi2 = 0.1631

Predictive power

To examine the predictive power of Model 4, Table A7, I employ receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves analysis. Given that the area under the ROC curve of Model 4, Table A7 is substantially bigger than .5 (this is the same as

predicting a flip of a coin), this indicates satisfactory discrimination, i.e. the model performs well and the results are not due to random chance.

ROC curve analysis (Table A7, Model 4)



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Paper 3: More Protests, Less War: Civil Society as a Determinant of Protests' Trajectories

Abstract

Even though most countries experience nonviolent protest, there is considerable variation in terms of its trajectories. In certain cases, nonviolent resistance propagates into an increased number of protests, while in other cases it results into civil war. This paper seeks to explain this disparity by focusing on civil society's capacity as a determinant of protests' trajectories. Civil society capacity is understood as the level of participation in civil society organizations and their autonomy from the state. The core idea is that depending on its capacity, civil society serves as an intermediary and moderates, with various degrees of effectiveness, the motivation and opportunity for violence by leveraging various conflict-reducing mechanisms. Therefore, a high capacity civil society is expected to lower the risk of civil war as a protest trajectory. The findings from an empirical investigation with global panel data from 1990 to 2014 show support for this proposition. In addition, this paper puts forward empirical evidence to corroborate the notion that civil society and civil society organizations as such can contribute to substantial mobilization, but for nonviolence. This paper contributes to the conflict literature by focusing on the previously unexplored effect of civil society on mobilization processes and it provides the first systematic evidence to validate the supposition that civil society can act as a bulwark against high-intensity violence.

Introduction

There are numerous examples in history where people mobilized collectively to protest in an attempt to change the political status quo. For instance, in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings, people in Tunisia through Egypt, Libya, and Syria to Yemen engaged in largely nonviolent protests to seek political change. Yet, these countries undergoing mass nonviolent protests took on very different trajectories. In some cases, protests were contained, in others protests grew in number, while some countries were engulfed in a violent armed conflict.[28] The case of the Arab Spring uprisings is illustrative of the different trajectories that political conflict in the form of nonviolent resistance[29] can take, but the factors that may drive this variation remain largely unexplored. This paper seeks to fill this gap and explain why countries experiencing protest events go on such drastically different trajectories, specifically ones that result in high-intensity violence reaching the threshold of civil war.[30]

The central argument of this paper is that civil society, depending on its capacity, can act as an intermediary and shape domestic political conflict and its trajectories. Civil society is an aggregation of civil society organizations such as

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[28] The terms violent armed conflict and civil war are used interchangeably throughout the paper.

[29] I consider nonviolent resistance and protest as synonyms.

[30] Both nonviolent resistance and violent opposition reaching the threshold of civil war are non-institutionalized forms of organized opposition that challenge the government and seek revision of the political status quo through unconventional means. Hence, this study is focused on a set of unconventional methods of opposition. Extant research has sought to explain the onset of such types of unconventional opposition (see e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Cunningham et al. 2017), but the literature has rarely considered the conditions under which one form of non-institutionalized opposition such as nonviolent resistance can pave the way for another.

non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions, community groups, professional associations and others. The effectiveness of civil society in moderating conflict is a function of its capacity, defined as the level of participation in civil society organizations and their degree of independence from state control. Here I propose that among the countries that have experienced protests, those with a high capacity civil society should be less likely to experience the onset of civil war. High capacity civil society is better able to control the motivation and opportunity for violence as it can leverage diverse conflict-reducing mechanisms that can forestall violent outcomes. For instance, it can provide a better information environment, impede support and resources for violence, and instead, foster cooperation and alternative channels for expressing grievances. Greater capacity enables civil society to be a more effective intermediary in the polity and to delimit political conflict and its trajectories.

This mechanism might not necessarily work only in cases where there is an ongoing contention, but in such contexts civil society has the advantage of obtaining information from the already ongoing contention, which is not possible in other contexts without the presence of contention. The incentives for civil society to prevent violence from occurring – in general but also as a protest trajectory – stem from two foremost considerations: first, violence is highly costly and destructive, and unlikely to serve the interests of civil society given that violent contexts make the work of civil society organizations increasingly difficult. Moreover, civil society can offer alternative avenues for resolving incompatibilities between protesters and the government (e.g., civil society can facilitate the expansion of nonviolent contention).

The paper contributes to the literature by providing a previously unexplored alternative explanation of the divergent political conflict routes that countries experiencing nonviolent resistance can take. This paper can not only explain the developments in the countries part of the Arab Spring phenomenon, but it can also speak to the lack of large-scale violence resulting from protests in the European and Latin American contexts. Moreover, it explains why countries with very similar characteristics such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan experienced nonviolent resistance in the early 1990s, but only Tajikistan took on a violent trajectory and resulted into civil war. The paper addresses understudied aspects of conflict processes by recognizing that under certain conditions nonviolent resistance can pave the way for violent mobilization outcomes in the same fashion incompatibilities develop into different forms of mobilization (Bartuseviius and Gleditsch 2019).

This paper also enhances our understanding of the role of civil society in domestic conflict processes. Previous work on conflict outcomes emphasized aspects related to state attributes, external and environmental factors as the main explanations, but little attention has been paid to the role of civil society (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007; Cunningham et al. 2017; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). Murdie and Bhasin (2011) consider human rights organizations to explain domestic protest events. However, human rights organizations are only part of what constitutes civil society, so there is still a lack of an overall understanding and evidence on the effect of civil society on mobilization outcomes. This paucity begs for further exploration and complete investigation on the role of civil society.

Research so far has studied civil society largely with respect to democratization (e.g., Putnam 1993; Diamond 1994) and post-conflict humanitarian

assistance and peacebuilding (e.g., Belloni 2001; Fischer 2006) without explicitly discussing the connection with political mobilization. Some have considered the role of civil society in political conflict theoretically (Marchetti and Tocci 2009; List and Dörner 2012), but to date there is no clear systematic empirical evidence on the link between the two. This paper addresses this gap by presenting evidence that civil society may moderate political mobilization and in turn to affect conflict outcomes and its trajectories. The findings from an empirical analysis based on global panel data[31] capturing countries that have experienced protest events between 1990 and 2014 corroborate the proposition made earlier. The results indicate that among the countries that are undergoing nonviolent resistance, high capacity civil society lowers the probability of civil war onset.[32] However, additional empirical analysis uncovers a second effect: civil society may facilitate the expansion of nonviolent resistance in terms of the number of protest events. Taken together, these results provide strong indication that civil society is an important determinant of protest's trajectories.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section focuses on the concept of civil society and delineates the link with political conflict. Following this, I set forth the theoretical framework together with the proposed mechanisms and hypothesis. The following section details the research design followed by a discussion on the results from the empirical analysis. To increase confidence in the

[31] The data on protest events is taken from the Mass Mobilization Data Project (MMDP) (Clark and Regan 2015). The research design section of the paper contains a more detailed account on how the dataset is constructed.

[32] The focus is on center-seeking conflicts as civil society is expected to have a pronounced influence on the mobilization processes of such conflicts and less on those with an incompatibility over territory due to divergent logics of mobilization.

findings, the paper includes a section describing the battery of robustness checks conducted. Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of the findings and an overview of avenues for further research into the topic.

Civil Society and Forms of Political Conflict

The connection between civil society and political conflict has been understudied. This is partly because of the lack of consensus on the conceptualization of civil society and because it is notoriously difficult to operationalize the concept for systematic empirical analysis. Here I define civil society as an aggregation of civil society organizations such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions, community groups, professional associations and others, in which individuals form voluntary associations and act collectively to pursue common interests that in principle are separate from the state, the market, and immediate family (Mati, Silva, and Anderson 2010; de Tocqueville 1839; Putnam 1993). Thus, civil society serves as an intermediary and occupies the public domain of the polity. While there is certainly variation among civil society organizations as constituent parts of civil society, here the interest is in the overall capacity of civil society.

I differentiate civil societies on the basis of their capacity, defined as the degree of participation in and autonomy of civil society organizations. The former component of capacity refers to whether a diverse range of civil society organizations exist and the degree of citizen participation, while the latter speaks to the level of freedom for civil society organizations to form and their degree of autonomy from the regime (Bernhard et al. 2015). Yet, the autonomy of civil society and civil society organizations per se does not mean that the state does not provide

regulation on their activities. Thus, a high capacity civil society is one where civil society organizations are diverse, there is habitual citizen participation, and civil society organizations operate independently from the state.

Civil society is not synonymous with democracy and civil society as such is not a sufficient condition for a regime to be democratic (Bernhard et al. 2017). Even though civil society is an important component of the democratic polity, it can exist across various regime types. Consider countries as diverse as Morocco, Mozambique, or Bhutan, which are all non-democracies, but they still have certain levels of a functioning civil society.[33] Thus, authoritarian states might allow for civil society organizations to exist in order to stifle inclinations for democratization, while keeping the status quo intact (Spires 2011).

Civil society can be seen as a major source of political mobilization that in turn can trigger different forms of unconventional political conflict (Jenkins 1983). For instance, civil society can provide the medium through which nonviolent resistance organizations are able to emerge (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). Civic engagement reinforces pre-existing networks and close associations among individuals, which can give way to unprecedented mobilization (Putnam 2016). Alluding to the concept of social capital but never explicitly to civil society as such, Butcher and Svensson (2016) find that comprehensive social networks, which are economically interdependent with the state, make the onset of nonviolent mass resistance more likely. This finding confirms the notion that greater social connectivity via pre-existing networks, which are an integral part of a higher

[33] For 2010 autocratic countries like Morocco, Bhutan, and Mozambique, previously thought of having a non-existent civil society, in fact score in the second quartile (from low to high) on the variable measuring civil society capacity (Coppedge et al. 2017).

capacity civil society, is associated with a greater potential for nonviolent mobilization.

In the context of nonviolent resistance, various organizations part of civil society might not participate in the contention, but they can influence it. Anecdotal evidence suggests that civil society can have an effect on the trajectories of political conflict. Consider the student movement Otpor in Serbia, which engaged in disciplined nonviolent action against the oppressive state and kept close relations with civil society organizations, which were not taking active part in the opposition. Otpor preserved its commitment to principled nonviolence and civil society played a vital role in garnering widespread support and approval of the resistance (Nikolayenko 2012).

A small number of studies have inquired into the nexus between civil society and violent mobilization (Goodhand, Hulme, and Lewer 2000; Stacey and Meyer 2005; Larson 2016). However, it is argued that this line of investigation has been largely neglected because of the overwhelming focus on civil society as a normative concept (Kopecký 2003). Using local level data from the Netherlands during the Holocaust, Braun (2016) shows that religious minority groups within Dutch civil society were able to mobilize and help their fellow Jewish neighbours evade Nazi persecution. These civil society organizations acted as a bulwark to Nazi violence and as such they can serve as an illustrative example of the ability of civil society to moderate political conflict. On the other hand, Satyanath, Voigtlaender, and Voth (2012) demonstrate that in the context of Nazi Germany, places with higher density of civil society organizations enabled faster expansion of the Nazi Party than those with limited participation.

Kissane (2000) establishes that in the Irish context civil society and civil society organizations per se were unable to moderate the on-going civil war. However, the author looks at a particular conflict stage where violence has already erupted. In contrast, I examine the effect of civil society on the onset of violent armed conflict in contexts that have experienced nonviolent resistance. It is likely that civil society's effectiveness is more pronounced at different stages of political conflict. Perhaps due to their contextual limitations, these studies produce mixed findings with respect to the question on the role of civil society in moderating political mobilization's trajectories.

To date, there is also limited research on the trajectories of nonviolent resistance as a particular form of political conflict. A notable example is a recent book by Della Porta et al. (2018) that seeks to outline under what conditions protest can give way to the onset of civil war. The authors concentrate on repression, instability, and fragmentation as the main explanations, but they do not explicitly refer to the role of civil society. Overall, the focus so far has been on the state and its responses. For instance, Pierskalla (2010) shows formally that government repression is associated with protest escalation to violence. Klein and Regan (2018) present empirical evidence from a large-N statistical analysis to support this claim: when resisters make concessions extremely costly, the state uses high levels of coercion to respond to nonviolent resistance. Additionally, Nepstad (2011) argues that civil war becomes more likely when in the context of nonviolent resistance, segments of the military defect and form violent opposition against the regime. Others have also contributed to the literature on radical flanks by inquiring into the effects of violent segments of a nonviolent resistance campaign on the outcome of

the contention and on the response from the state (Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Tompkins 2015).

As these studies do not consider the role of civil society, it remains unclear, however, how and why civil society can impact the trajectories of political conflict, particularly in the context of nonviolent resistance. Some scholars have argued that the presence of protest activity is a good indicator of a strong and functioning civil society and as such, civil society can prevent protest events taking a violent trajectory (Bond et al. 1997). Della Porta et al. (2018) also allude to the idea that the state of civil society might play a role in shaping the trajectory of political protest and their in-depth case study approach provides some anecdotal evidence for this supposition. Yet, there is no clear mechanism proposed and this claim has not been tested empirically.

The extant literature discussed above indicates that the predominant explanations of conflict processes focus on the state and its responses, but there is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that civil society has the potential to moderate mobilization. To this end, this paper seeks to fill this gap by proposing a theoretical framework and by examining systematically the effect of civil society on political mobilization and its trajectories.

Civil Society, Protests' Trajectories, and Civil War

Scholars have advanced the notion that political conflict can be studied as a two-stage process where incompatibilities should be accounted for (as a first step) when seeking to explain and predict a specific type of mobilization (as a second step) (Cunningham et al. 2017; Bartuseviius and Gleditsch 2019). While this perspective is extremely helpful in offering a more detailed framework to explain

conflict processes, it is in a way limited to the stages from inaction to some form of action, violent and nonviolent. To clarify the approach, consider the case of the Arab Spring uprisings within the two-stage setup where in late 2010 incompatibilities became contested and mass nonviolent resistance ensued as a second step. This paper extends the approach by examining countries that experience nonviolent resistance and it seeks to explain why some go on a civil war trajectory, while others do not. Additionally, the paper explores an additional protest trajectory: namely, the expansion of protests events.

A large body of literature examines the conditions under which civil wars occur as a single mobilization outcome (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Gurr 1970; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Keen 2012), but it is less clear under what conditions and why prior mobilization can facilitate, or not, the onset of high-intensity violence. It is helpful to consider civil war onset as a specific trajectory in a broader context of political conflict (Florea 2017). Political conflict in the form of nonviolent resistance creates political opportunity structures (Tilly and Tarrow 2015) that can enable different forms of mobilization. Civil society is not inactive in turbulent times such as political crises marked by mass protests and has the potential to moderate mobilization. Civil society organizations in fact can be effective mediators in nonviolent resistance campaigns (Svensson and Lindgren 2013). This is because **c**ivil society and civil society organizations, as a constituent part, establish a bridge between the elites and the public. For instance, research on human rights organizations part of civil society details how such organizations are working closely with the public to influence policy-makers' work towards improvement of human

rights (Murdie and Bhasin 2011). The effectiveness of this intermediary role, however, is contingent on the capacity of civil society.

The argument here is that civil society can influence the motivation and opportunity for violence and to prevent the onset of civil war as a protest trajectory. In addition, civil society, considering its potential to moderate mobilization, is likely to facilitate nonviolent contention (via the expansion of protest events, for instance). Firstly, it is important to note why civil society, depending on its capacity, is particularly well-suited to moderate mobilization in contexts of an already ongoing contention rather than in situations without contention. Secondly, it is equally crucial to consider why civil society should be against violent outcomes such as civil war and instead in support of nonviolent methods of opposition.

During an already ongoing contention civil society, as well as the government and protesters, observe and learn about their capabilities (Powell 2004). Hence, in such situations it should be generally easier for civil society to identify radical elements and organizations prone to violence than in situations where no observable contestation has taken place.[34] Civil society has strong incentives to prevent violence and the onset of civil war first and foremost because of the fact that such instability would adversely affect the formation of voluntary associations and the work of civil society organizations. Moreover, civil society is capable, albeit to various degrees, to facilitate alternative channels for opposition short of violence (e.g., protests). Stated differently, civil society can amplify nonviolent resistance

[34] This is not to say that civil society cannot prevent conflict without an already ongoing contention. However, I expect that civil society's effectiveness in preventing violence should be more pronounced in such contexts because of civil society's ability to operate with greater information. Here the interest is in understanding the variation in protests' trajectories and thus, I leave to future research to explore the more general case of the role of civil society in preventing violence.

activity and thus remove any considerations of violent opposition. Therefore, the expectation that civil society will be likely to facilitate the growth of protests is not surprising.

Finally, civil society is particularly well suited to mediate between protesters and the state. For instance, civil society can alleviate concerns about state repression, particularly violent repression, by monitoring and reporting on developments on the ground and thus influencing popular support and attitudes about the demands of the opposition. Additionally, civil society, depending on its capacity, can offer assistance in alleviating not only information, but also commitment problems (Fearon 1995). Civil society can act on its intermediary role and support protesters' nonviolent activity, discourage violence and at the same time, civil society can lobby the government to abstain from using violent repression and to even facilitate possible forums for discussion and negotiation.

Research also indicates that the higher the capacity of civil society, the more likely it is for civil society to be concerned about social welfare and to act in the public rather than particularistic interest (Nannicini et al. 2013). Considering that violence and war are generally inefficient and costly (Fearon 1995; Walter 2009), it is conceivable that they are also socially undesirable outcomes. Moreover, high capacity civil society is built upon networks that reinforce social connectivity. Extant research demonstrates that higher connectivity builds trust, tolerance and reciprocity (Larson 2016; Larson and Lewis 2018). These are attitudes and norms that are not associated with extremities such as violence. Therefore, civil society with a greater capacity has a vested interest in forestalling civil war as a protest trajectory.

Consider the case of Bolivia and the deep political crisis in the mid-2000s. Nonviolent resisters had various demands pertaining to socio-economic as well as political changes. Yet, apart from some minor incidents of low-scale violence, the political conflict was kept within the nonviolent domain (Boulding and Nelson-Núñez 2014). The lack of violent outcomes, such as the onset of civil war, in Bolivia can be attributed to the relatively high capacity civil society. In fact, research on Bolivia in the context of the political crisis lends support for this notion. Bolivian citizens who were active members of civil society were in favor of stability and against any extremities such as the use of violence (Boulding and Nelson-Núñez 2014). Even though violence was not used as an opposition tactic, there is evidence to suggest that Bolivian civil society facilitated mobilization for nonviolence (Boulding 2014). This is in line with the claim that overall higher levels of civil society capacity should facilitate more nonviolent protest events.

Civil society can influence the likelihood of violence as a protest trajectory by leveraging different violence-reducing mechanisms, which are often interconnected, and impact the motivation and opportunity for violence. First, the greater connectivity and information flows characteristic of high capacity civil society (Butcher, Laidlaw Gray, and Mitchell 2018; Siegel 2009) make radical elements within society easier to identify and prevent from militarization. For instance, in countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone civil society harnesses societal connectivity and information flows in an effort to counteract violence and extremism by educating about their devastating consequences (Ismail 2013). In this way, civil society can influence both the motivation and opportunity for violence.

Government responses to nonviolent resistance, coercive or accommodative, tend to be associated with the radicalization of subgroups and with an increased

likelihood of subsequent violence (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). Yet, civil society, depending on its capacity, can contribute to avoiding violent outcomes. For instance, in Liberia women organizations part of civil society are seen as a bridge between political elites and local actors. As an integral part of the information flow and societal connectivity, these women civil society organizations reduce coordination problems and help to achieve better policy outcomes that alleviate local grievances (Gizelis 2019).

Civil society with limited capacity cannot function as an effective intermediary and communication breakdowns between the government and the opposition are expected. This in turn is likely to contribute to extreme and violent outcomes. The case of Syria in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings provides an instructive example. After severe repression from the Syrian regime as well as collapsed communication, the Free Syrian Army formed as a violent non-state actor (Bartkowski and Kahf 2013) and civil war ensued. Due to the inherent lack of capacity, Syrian civil society was an ineffective moderator and violent armed conflict was not prevented. Additionally, civil society was incapable of withdrawing support and resources from the Free Syrian Army despite viewing it with suspicion and deeming it as a largely illegitimate opposition actor that undermined the nonviolent resistance (Donker 2018). Contrary to the Syrian case, the relatively high capacity civil society in Tunisia effectively moderated the mass protests and political crisis, ultimately avoiding violent outcomes (Amrani 2015).

Potential violent challengers necessitate resources and popular support to launch and sustain an armed opposition, while civil society, depending on its capacity, can moderate their supply. This is because civil society provides the social base for collective action (Staniland 2012). Therefore, it is important that the

specific type of opposition method is viewed as justifiable since this can reinforce support for the operations (Reese, Ruby, and Pape 2017). Civil society with limited capacity is less likely to be able to influence support as a necessary resource for violent struggle. Going back to the case of Bolivia mentioned earlier, civil society's support for only nonviolent forms of opposition played a crucial role in preventing violent developments. In the case of Tajikistan, however, the limited capacity of civil society and the lack of alternative forms of opposition to pursue political change contributed to the civil war as a protest trajectory. Unable to serve as an effective intermediary, Tajik civil society failed to prevent elite exploitation of citizens and to discourage mobilization for violence (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011).

Civil society may also lower the motivation and opportunity for violence given the opportunities for alternative channels to address grievances and to bring about political change. Moreover, a high capacity civil society can influence and facilitate organized opposition via nonviolent means such as strikes, protests and demonstrations. Consider, for instance, how civil society has helped the cause of the Otpor movement in Serbia (mentioned in the previous section). Seen as a legitimate intermediary, a high capacity civil society not only reproduces networks of association, but it also provides a favourable environment for the exchange of divergent viewpoints and for a broad-based dialogue on contentious issues. In Bangladesh, for instance, local civil society sets up discussion forums to deliberate about various forms of extremism as a prevention mechanism (Oriot-Scappaticci and Schumicky-Logan 2018). Even if a small number of individuals were able to commit low-scale violence such as rioting and destruction of property, a high capacity civil society can provide the necessary infrastructure for dialogue and collective oversight of how this low-scale violence is managed.

This paper takes civil society capacity as a determinant of the trajectory of protests. On the basis of the arguments and mechanisms delineated above I develop the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Higher capacity civil society is associated with a decreased likelihood of the onset of civil war as a trajectory of political protest.

Civil society is also better able than the state to influence the motivation and opportunity for violence. On balance, civil society is likely to have better access than the state to undisclosed information about intentions and capacity to engage with violence, because of its reliance on pre-existing social networks. In fact, violent groups rely heavily on the compliance of civilians and civil society to keep information undisclosed about their activity, specifically at the stages of formation and consolidation (Lewis 2017). Secondly, civil society can foster dialogue and reconciliation of grievances through variety of channels, thereby lowering the risk of violence as a protest trajectory (Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz 2012). Governments are unable to do so as they do not have the same influence on and connection to societal actors as civil society. This is so partly because of the detachment of political elites from societal actors, often accompanied with a loss of legitimacy, but also due to the hierarchical nature of these relations.

Research Design

For the purposes of the empirical analysis I construct a dataset covering 161 countries within the timespan 1990-2014. The data are built on the basis of the Mass Mobilization Data Project (Clark and Regan 2015), which records protest events in a

country-year. A protest event refers to a gathering of at least 50 people that make claims directed towards the state using nonviolent means of resistance. These data do not capture protest activity between groups. With regards to the demands of protesters, they may vary from maximalist ones such as regime change to resistance against a particular policy (Clark and Regan 2015).

The empirical strategy is driven by considerations of the nature of the proposed hypothesis, which posits that among the countries that experience protest events, those with higher capacity civil society are less likely to see the onset of a civil war. I estimate a set of standard probit models of civil war onset on the basis of a constrained sample consisting of countries that have experienced protest events between 1990 and 2014. Given that the original unit of observation in the Mass Mobilization Data Project is protest-country-year, I aggregate the data so that the unit of observation is country-year (Clark and Regan 2015). I construct a binary variable that captures whether there was a protest event in a country-year on the basis of which I constrain the sample. The data show that nonviolent resistance has been quite prevalent in this timeframe given that more than 60 percent of country-years experience protest events.

The dependent variable captures the onset of civil war and it is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). The variable is binary and it takes a value of one if there are at least 25 battle-related deaths resulting from the use of violence between the government and a non-state actor in a given year. On-going years of violent armed conflict are set to missing. Following Cunningham et al. (2017), I factor out violent armed conflicts that are in fact violent coups. Finally, I focus the analysis on civil wars with a contested

incompatibility concerning the government given that theoretically civil society is expected to have pronounced influence over centre-seeking conflicts.[35]

Additionally, I further explore the claim that civil society can moderate political conflict by investigating empirically whether civil society can foster the expansion of nonviolent mobilization, as I claimed in the introductory and theoretical sections of the paper. To this end, I use as dependant variable the number of protest events in a country-year. Here the modelling approach focuses on count models, in particular zero-inflated negative binomial models due to concerns for overdispersion (see e.g., Long and Freese 2001 for an extensive discussion). Zero-inflated negative binomial models are appropriate due to the fact that two distinct processes can drive the large number of zero values in the dependent variable. Some countries might be predisposed to not experience protest events at all, while others could still face a risk of such kind of events but just not experience them (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Piazza 2011). In the appendix, I also present alternative count models together with Vuong tests that overall favour the use of zero-inflated negative binomial models.

Turning to the main explanatory variable, I measure the capacity of civil society by using the variable core civil society index taken from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2017).[36] This variable is created with Bayesian item response theory measurement model on the basis of country experts' reports. Due to the latent nature of the concept of interest, this variable is an ideal

[35] In the appendix, I also present models that consider all civil war onsets and the results are similar to those for conflicts over the government. Yet, theoretically the processes of mobilization are qualitative different in territorial and center-seeking conflicts.

[36] I include descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variable in the appendix.

proxy to operationalize the capacity of civil society. The scale is interval where higher values indicate a higher capacity civil society. It is important to note that the variable captures two dimensions, one focuses on the organizational, while the other on the participatory environment of civil society (Bernhard et al. 2017). The organizational environment refers to the levels of regulation by the regime to delimit the ability of civil society organizations to operate and act as an intermediary in the public domain, and also to the levels of state repression directed at civil society organizations. The participatory environment denotes the presence of diverse range of civil society organizations and the extent of participation therein (Bernhard et al. 2017). This variable ideally captures the notion of civil society capacity as it speaks both to its independence to operate as an intermediary, but also to the level of engagement, which is integral to its leverage as an intermediary.

With regards to the control variables, first I account for the level of economic development by using the log values of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Klein and Regan 2018; World Bank 2016). Previous research shows that more economically advanced countries are associated with less likelihood of high-intensity violence (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Additionally, more affluent nations might be also those where civil society is more active and with higher capacity given the ability of individuals to devote more time to non-economic activities.

There is also evidence to suggest that the prevalence of youth in the population is associated with more protest and even with the onset of violent armed conflict (Urdal 2004). Yet, it is also plausible that the predominance of younger people might be connected to participation in civil society organizations and thus it may affect civil society capacity. I take the variable youth bulge, which is the ratio

of youth (15 to 24 year-old people) to total population to account for these potential effects (Klein and Regan 2018; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015).

Democracies are considered better suited to manage domestic political conflict as they have the necessary conventional channels that can serve as an alternative to nonviolent resistance or armed conflict (Hegre 2014). Extant research supports this claim and shows that high-intensity violence is unlikely to break out in more democratic states. Additionally, we know from studies on democratization that civil society is an important aspect to the democratic system (e.g., Putnam 1993). Therefore, to control for these effects I use the revised Polity IV score variable as a proxy of democracy, which is measured on a scale from strongly democratic (+10 score) to strongly autocratic (-10 score) (Marshall and Jaggers 2015). I also include the squared term of the variable so as to test for nonlinear effects, as it could be that regimes in the middle range are more prone to high-intensity violence (Hegre et al. 2001; Vreeland 2008).

As I am exploring the potential onset of civil war in contexts that have already experienced protest, it is also important to account for the level of state repression. I include a variable measuring its level as more repressive environments might spark grievances and willingness for extreme violence that can result in violent armed conflict (Young 2012). It is also plausible to assume that state repression can impact the willingness and ability of citizens to participate in civil society organizations and in this way to affect the capacity of civil society. The variable is taken from the Political Terror Scale database, which has information on the level of state repression based on US State Department reports (Gibney et al. 2017). It is an ordinal covariate with five categories where higher values correspond

to higher levels of repression.

Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that more excluded groups from access to the state bring an increased risk in staging organized opposition against the government (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). This exclusion from a substantial segment of society has the potential to influence the capacity of civil society. To this end, I use the log values of the share of excluded population relative to the ethno-politically relevant population (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Klein and Regan 2018).

I incorporate two variables that can be viewed as proxies for the level of political conflict that might precipitate a particular conflict development. The first variable is measuring the number of participants in nonviolent resistance. It has four categories where the lowest one captures protests with participants between 50 and 99 people, while higher categories record protest size between 100 and 999, 1000 and 9999, and over 10,000 participants respectively (Klein and Regan 2018; Clark and Regan 2015). The second variable captures the overall number of protest events in a country-year. It is an interval level variable from the Mass Mobilization Data Project (Clark and Regan 2015). Moreover, increased nonviolent activity may affect the level of civil society capacity, in particular with respect to the participatory environment as previous research indicated that there is a close link between protests and civil society (Boulding and Nelson-Núñez 2014).

Finally, I use robust standard errors clustered by country to allow for within-country correlation. In order to account for temporal dependence, I include cubic polynomials (Carter and Signorino 2010).

Empirical Analysis

I propose that among the countries that experience protest events those with a higher capacity civil society are less likely to experience the onset of civil war as a protest trajectory. The rationale behind this contention is that civil society, depending on its capacity, may be an effective intermediary and influence the motivation and opportunity for violence. This is the basis for Hypothesis 1, and the results of the empirical analysis testing this proposition are presented in Table 1.

The probit models of civil war onset in Table 1 demonstrate that the main explanatory variable civil society capacity has a consistently negative association with the outcome of interest. Across all models the variable has an effect statistically different from zero. I find support for Hypothesis 1 as the results corroborate the proposition that a higher capacity civil society diminishes the likelihood of civil war onset as a protest trajectory. Following the proposed mechanism, these results indicate that a high capacity civil society indeed tends to act in the public interest, preventing mobilization for violent armed conflict by constraining the motivation and opportunity for violence.

Table 1 in here

With regards to the control variables, the variable capturing level of democracy and its squared term show evidence for a nonlinear effect, indicating that anocracies tend to be more prone to violent outcomes as a protest trajectory. However, this notion is supported only in Model 2 and 3. In the remaining two models, only the democracy variable is positively associated with the dependent variable and it has an effect different from zero. Interestingly, these findings indicate

that among the countries that have already experienced nonviolent resistance, more democratic ones can also be more prone to violence. This suggests that democracy might be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to avoid violent outcomes. In fact, established democracies such as Colombia, India, and Northern Ireland have experienced such high-intensity violence.

There is also a negative and statistically significant relationship between the outcome and the GDP per capita variable across all models. This result is in line with the notion that poorer countries tend to be more conflict-prone, which is well-established in conflict research (Sambanis 2001). Youth bulges do not appear to have an effect on armed conflict as a protest trajectory. Yet, the larger the share of excluded population, the higher the risk of civil war onset and this result is in line with the literature (e.g., Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). The effect of repression is as expected, indicating that high levels of state repression increase the risk of civil war onset. Finally, both variables that measure the number of protest participants and events respectively do not have an influence on the outcome of interest. The lack of effect suggests that the level of political conflict in the form of nonviolent resistance is a less important determinant of protest trajectories than civil society capacity.

Overall, the findings presented in Table 1 suggest that civil society capacity is an important predictor when considering civil war as a distinct trajectory of nonviolent protest. Figure 1 presents graphically the substantive effect. When civil society capacity is at its highest level, the risk of civil war onset is just about one percent. This is a sizable decrease given that civil society with very limited capacity is associated with almost 10 percent probability of civil war as a protest trajectory. Controlling for various factors previously identified as correlates of civil wars, the

empirical findings indicate that civil society is an important intermediary of political conflict and through its various violence-reducing mechanisms it can substantially minimize the likelihood of civil war.

Figure 1 in here

The results above can speak to the ability of civil society to moderate the motivation and opportunity for violence in contexts already undergoing nonviolent resistance. Additionally, below I present the results from an empirical analysis that sheds light on the claim stated at the beginning of the paper; namely that civil society, depending on its capacity, might facilitate more nonviolent mobilization. Table 2 shows the results on the effect of civil society capacity on the number of protest events in a country-year. The expectation is that higher capacity civil society should be associated with an increased number of protest events and the results show support for this supposition. The civil society capacity variable has a statistically significant positive effect on the dependent variable number of protest events, conditional on protest having already occurred. This suggests that civil society may not only prevent violent outcomes as a protest trajectory, but it may also facilitate the propagation of nonviolent protest, and to overall moderate domestic political crises.

Table 2 in here

The results show that more repressive environments spark more protest events and that the level of democracy does not play any role in explaining the

spread of nonviolent mobilization. This speaks to the notion that state repression might backfire and contribute to an increase in the overall nonviolent resistance in a form of political jiu-jitsu (Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014) and that civil society, depending on its capacity, may contribute to these developments.

Figure 2 in here

Following the propositions made here, civil society has an important role as an intermediary in assisting nonviolent resistance by creating an environment enabling resistance despite high levels of state repression. Figure 2 indicates that conditional on protest occurrence civil society with the highest capacity is associated with about four protest events per year. It is also accurate to assert that civil society may keep resistance to the nonviolent domain and avoid violent outcomes. For instance, this line of reasoning can explain why nonviolent protests in countries like Spain, Brazil, and Argentina have propagated, but never escalated to high-intensity violence.

Robustness

I conduct a variety of robustness checks and diagnostics, which I detail at length in the appendix. First, I consider alternative measures of civil society capacity such as the number of environmental and human rights non-governmental organizations (Murdie and Stapley 2014; Smith and Wiest 2005), and the civil society participatory environment taken from the V-Dem dataset. I also estimate a model where the main independent variable, civil society capacity, is measured by the residuals obtained from a separate model estimating the effect of various

democracy-related covariates on civil society capacity. This robustness check demonstrates that the effect of civil society is a separate phenomenon from that of the level of democracy. The results from the models with alternative main independent variables closely follow those presented in Table 1.

Second, I estimate the probit models with lagged independent variables and the results remain the same. Moreover, I use a conditional mixed process recursive estimator (Roodman 2011). This technique allows me to model simultaneously the predictors of civil society capacity as well as those of civil war onset as a protest trajectory. If the residuals of the two equations are correlated, this could be a concern for endogeneity. However, the models show that this is not the case and the results speak to any endogeneity concerns.

Third, I use empirical models such as complementary log-log models (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) as well as rare events logit models (Tomz, King, and Zeng 2002) given that the event of interest, civil war onset as a protest trajectory, could be considered as rare (only three percent of the cases experience onset). I also estimate probit models with alternative control variables. The results remain unaltered after these robustness checks.

Additionally, I estimate region and year fixed effects logit models, as regions such as the Middle East or Latin America have specific characteristics that might influence the results. Finally, I use a bootstrapping technique through which I resample and replace 1,000 times my original sample in order to obtain better information about the population under investigation, i.e. countries that have experienced protest events. The effect of the main explanatory variable is robust to all alternative specifications.

Conclusion

While it is widely known that nonviolent resistance takes place in various settings, the trajectory of protest events, or what happens next, has so far been understudied. It is particularly important to examine civil war onset as a protest trajectory, as armed conflict tends to have devastating consequences. This paper takes on this task and it argues that on the basis of its varying levels of capacity, civil society can moderate the motivation and opportunity for violence as a protest trajectory. Through various conflict-reducing mechanisms, such as providing superior social connectivity and informational flows as well as alternative mechanisms for addressing grievances, and delimiting resources and popular support for forms of opposition, civil society with higher levels of capacity lowers the risk of civil war onset as a protest trajectory. The empirical analysis provides robust evidence that civil society has an important role in political conflict and the results corroborate the theoretical proposition.

Additionally, this paper demonstrates that civil society may also facilitate the expansion of protest events. Civil society may be an effective intermediary and moderate political conflict, and while it can prevent violent outcomes, it may also spark further mobilization, but for nonviolent resistance. These findings are non-trivial as they speak to the previously unknown effect of civil society on domestic conflict developments. This paper shows that civil society has a substantial potential to exert agency and to affect mobilization outcomes. Here the focus has been on the capacity of civil society, but future research may focus on other civil society attributes such as the connections between civil society and other internal or external actors. Moreover, studies can further research on conflict processes by taking a disaggregated approach to explore sub-national variation in the effects of civil

society. Data unavailability has prevented such analyses, but future work might take more qualitative approaches or focus on data collection efforts.

The findings of this analysis also have policy implications. This paper presents systematic evidence that bottom-up approaches to high-intensity violence prevention can be effective. Strengthening civil society and increasing its capacity can significantly diminish the potential for nonviolent resistance events to escalate, and this is accurate across different socio-economic and political contexts. Civil society has a vital role as an intermediary and it has the substantial potential to moderate protests' trajectories.

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Table 1 Probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Civil society capacity	-1.123***	-1.746***	-1.759***	-1.263**	-1.267**
	(0.230)	(0.416)	(0.413)	(0.528)	(0.527)
Polity		0.052***	0.052***	0.049**	0.047**
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Polity^2		-0.008***	-0.008***	0.001	0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.149**	-0.154**	-0.185**	-0.212***
		(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.079)	(0.082)
Youth bulge			-0.011	0.040	0.042
			(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.046)
Excluded population (log)				0.094*	0.098**
				(0.051)	(0.050)
Repression				0.403***	0.387***
				(0.105)	(0.106)
Number of protest participants					0.066
					(0.102)
Number of protest events					0.012
					(0.021)
Time since last onset	-0.238***	-0.225***	-0.225***	-0.213**	-0.213**
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Time since last onset^2	0.021***	0.019**	0.019**	0.021*	0.021*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Time since last onset^3	-0.001***	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-0.565***	1.116***	1.364	-1.616	-1.613
	(0.169)	(0.376)	(0.896)	(1.389)	(1.430)
Number of observations	1,893	1,778	1,773	1,339	1,338

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table 2 Zero-inflated negative binomial models of protest events

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Count model (non-certain zero)			
Civil society capacity	0.940***	1.065**	1.174***
	(0.361)	(0.470)	(0.427)
Polity		0.025	0.014
		(0.017)	(0.015)
Polity^2		0.002	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Repression		0.234***	0.321***
		(0.064)	(0.061)
Excluded population (log)		0.009	0.004
		(0.053)	(0.047)
GDP per capita (log)			0.206***
			(0.070)
Youth bulge			-0.004
			(0.028)
Intercept	0.559**	-0.546	-2.121**
	(0.282)	(0.489)	(0.923)
Inflated logit (certain zero)			
Polity	-0.150***	-0.402***	-0.334*
	(0.029)	(0.149)	(0.176)
Polity^2	0.008	0.092*	0.066
	(0.010)	(0.050)	(0.058)
GDP per capita (log)	0.223	1.949	1.602
	(0.173)	(2.153)	(1.919)
Youth bulge	0.051	-0.134	-0.122
	(0.111)	(0.187)	(0.174)
Repression	-1.398***	-1.983	-1.504*
	(0.347)	(1.265)	(0.817)
Intercept	-1.426	-22.535	-17.416
	(2.585)	(26.648)	(24.621)
Number of observations	3,297	2,589	2,589

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. Vuong tests favouring zero-inflated negative binomial models instead of negative binomial models are shown in the appendix. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Figure 1. Substantive effects of civil society capacity on civil war onset



Notes: The graph presents the marginal change in the probability of civil war onset as a protest trajectory at different levels of civil society capacity. The graph is based on Model 5, Table 1. All other covariates are held at their observed values. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Figure 2. Substantive effects of civil society capacity on number of protest events



Notes: The graph presents the marginal change in the count of protest events, conditional on having protest events, at different levels of civil society capacity. The graph is based on Model 3, Table 2. All other covariates are held at their observed values. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Appendix

Descriptive statistics

In Table A1 below, I show the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis.

Table A1 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Civil war onset (DV)	1,903	0.030	0.171	0	1
Civil society capacity	2,365	0.700	0.237	0.011	0.979
Polity	2,301	3.818	5.988	-10	10
Polity^2	2,301	50.422	31.741	0	100
GDP per capita (log)	2,264	7.529	1.455	3.972	11.045
Youth bulge	2,347	18.422	2.867	9.416	26.274
Excluded population (log)	1,834	1.928	1.433	0	4.524
Repression	2,249	2.880	1.102	1	5
Number of protest participants	2,374	1.948	0.949	0	3
Number of protest events	2,375	4.611	5.692	1	91
Time since last civil war onset	1,903	9.827	6.947	0	24

Key independent variable – Civil society capacity



Notes: The graph presents the frequency distribution of the key explanatory variable – Civil society

capacity. The variable is negatively skewed (the mean is less than the median). In substantive terms, this means that the bulk of the countries between 1990 and 2014 have had high capacity civil society. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.



Notes: The graph presents the average Civil society capacity over time with 95% confidence intervals. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.



Notes: The graph presents the distribution of the main explanatory variable – Civil society capacity, by showing the minimum and maximum values, the first quartile, the median (represented by the white line) and the third quartile. Circles represent outliers. The graph is created with Stata 14.0.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Civil society capacity (overall)	2,365	0.700	0.237	0.011	0.979
Between			0.249	0.016	0.979
Within			0.099	0.064	1.065

Notes: The table presents the between and within variation of the key explanatory variable – Civil society capacity.

In the tables to follow I present a variety of robustness checks. I consider alternative measures of the theoretical concept as well as different regression models to strengthen confidence in the findings. Overall, the results across different model specifications remain the same, which is ultimately a positive sign in support of the hypothesised relationship.

In table A2, I show the results from the models with the right-hand variables lagged by one year (apart from the polynomials). There is no simultaneity issue, as the results remain the same even with the lagging of all independent variables.

Table A2 Probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset (lagged right-hand variables)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Civil society capacity	-1.070***	-1.480***	-1.483***	-1.174**	-1.171**
	(0.233)	(0.440)	(0.439)	(0.548)	(0.538)
Polity		0.030	0.030	0.023	0.024
		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Polity^2		-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.003	-0.003
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.122*	-0.123	-0.112	-0.105
		(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.087)
Youth bulge			-0.002	0.036	0.036
			(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Excluded population (log)				0.076	0.075
				(0.053)	(0.053)
Repression				0.118	0.127
				(0.107)	(0.109)
Number of protest participants					-0.026
					(0.074)
Number of protest events					-0.006
					(0.016)
Time since last onset	-0.197**	-0.169**	-0.169**	-0.078	-0.078
	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Time since last onset^2	0.017**	0.014	0.014	0.001	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Time since last onset^3	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-0.711***	0.572	0.624	-1.115	-1.105
	(0.204)	(0.430)	(1.070)	(1.291)	(1.340)
Number of observations	1,810	1,707	1,703	1,347	1,346

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. All right-hand variables are lagged by 1 year (excluding the polynomials). *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Theoretically civil society capacity should have an impact on centre-seeking conflict onset (as a protest trajectory) the most. Yet, I also present evidence in Table A3 that the effect is preserved on the full sample of violent armed conflict onsets. The consistently negative and statistically significant coefficient of the civil society capacity variable suggests that civil society can be an effective mediator in potential disputes over both territory and government.

Table A3 Probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset (all conflicts, both centre-seeking and territorial)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Civil society capacity	-0.979***	-1.624***	-1.640***	-1.303***	-1.336***
	(0.333)	(0.365)	(0.371)	(0.459)	(0.457)
Polity		0.061***	0.061***	0.058***	0.058***
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Polity^2		-0.005	-0.005	0.003	0.003
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.220***	-0.227***	-0.246***	-0.265***
		(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.092)	(0.095)
Youth bulge			-0.013	-0.012	-0.011
			(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Excluded population (log)				0.039	0.041
				(0.059)	(0.060)
Repression				0.526***	0.510***
				(0.126)	(0.123)
Number of protest participants					0.002
					(0.074)
Number of protest events					0.020
					(0.016)
Time since last onset	-0.435***	-0.393***	-0.393***	-0.514***	-0.522***
	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.104)	(0.100)
Time since last onset^2	0.037***	0.033***	0.033***	0.061***	0.063***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Time since last onset^3	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Intercept	0.015	1.989***	2.309***	0.098	0.196
	(0.204)	(0.430)	(1.070)	(1.291)	(1.340)
Number of observations	1,961	1,835	1,830	1,387	1,386

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

To dispel any concerns about endogeneity, I leverage a conditional mixed process (CMP) recursive estimator (Roodman 2011). With this approach I am allowed to model simultaneously the determinants of civil society capacity (equation 1, Table A4), and those of civil war onset as a project trajectory, whereby I include civil society capacity as the key predictor (equation 2, Table A4). The advantage of the CMP estimator is that the number of equations is not limited and also the dependent variables can be binary, ordinal or interval level. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the equations. If the ρ (rho) estimate is statistically significant, this will be evidence against the null, which would mean that the residuals of the equations are correlated and by extension, there could be basis

for endogeneity concerns. However, the models in Table A4 demonstrate that rho is not statistically significant and thus, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation. This approach alleviates concerns about potential endogeneity.

Table A4 CMP models of protest trajectory: civil war onset

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Eq. 2: DV: Civil war onset			
Civil society capacity	-1.190***	-2.335***	-2.254**
	(0.266)	(0.639)	(1.065)
Polity		0.068***	0.074**
		(0.023)	(0.032)
Polity^2		-0.008***	0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.135**	-0.199**
		(0.061)	(0.085)
Youth bulge			0.039
			(0.044)
Excluded population (log)			0.101**
			(0.050)
Repression			0.356***
			(0.114)
Number of protest participants			0.068
			(0.102)
Number of protest events			0.012
			(0.021)
Time since last onset	-0.236***	-0.209***	-0.202**
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.085)
Time since last onset^2	0.021***	0.017**	0.020
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Time since last onset^3	-0.001***	-0.000*	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Intercept	-0.522***	1.362***	-0.953
	(0.185)	(0.406)	(1.450)
Eq. 1: DV: Civil society capacity			
HROs (log)	0.060***	0.061***	0.061***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Regime: Military/Civil	-0.026	-0.026	-0.026
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Regime: Military	-0.061	-0.060	-0.059
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Regime: Other	-0.048	-0.048	-0.048
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Polity	0.024***	0.024***	0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Repression	-0.044***	-0.045***	-0.044***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Intercept	0.546***	0.547***	0.544***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Rho	0.049	0.164	0.212
	(0.089)	(0.139)	(0.204)
Number of observations	2,169	2,098	1,689

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. Base category for the regime variable is civilian regime. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Regarding the independent variables in the models in Table A4, the covariates in equation 2 are the same as those in models presented in the main text (Table 1). In equation 1, first I include an interval level variable that measures the number of human rights non-governmental organizations (HROs) in a given country-year. The variable is obtained from replication data from an article by Murdie and Stapley (2014) and it is natural log transformed. With this variable I capture the effect of HROs on the overall capacity of civil society. HROs may influence the capacity of civil society with respect to both the organizational and participatory environment. For instance, the presence of a greater number of HROs might boost the capacity of civil society by providing the necessary infrastructure for increased participation in various civil society organizations. Additionally, more HROs might also improve the organizational environment for civil society by monitoring and reporting, nationally and internationally, on unlawful and repressive state actions directed at civil society.

Next, I incorporate the Regime variable, which is a nominal variable with four categories whereby civilian regimes take a value of one, civilian/military regimes – a value of two, military regimes – a value of three, and other regimes – a value of four (Klein and Regan 2018 replication data, but also see (Banks and Wilson 2014)). The variable accounts for the segment of society that controls the government, which in turn might impact the capacity of civil society. For instance, previous research indicates that military regimes might seek to co-opt civil society (and hence limit its independence) in order to ensure compliance with the policies of the regime (McCarthy 2015).

In addition, I control for the level of democracy with the revised Polity IV score variable, which is measured on a scale from strongly democratic (+10 score) to

strongly autocratic (-10 score) (Marshall and Jaggers 2015). The inclusion of this variable can be substantiated by the notion that more democratic countries might provide the necessary infrastructure to spur the growth and strengthening of civil society.

Finally, the variable Repression is taken from the Political Terror Scale database, which has information on the level of state repression based on US State Department reports (Gibney et al. 2017). It is an ordinal covariate with five categories where higher values correspond to higher levels of repression. Including this covariate in equation 1 in all models in Table A4 allows me to control for the level of repression, which is likely to influence civil society capacity by delimiting the organizational space for civil society activity, its independence, as well as the degree to which citizens are able to participate in civil society.

Some might cast doubt on the approach by arguing that civil society is an inherent part of a democratic polity and that I am basically capturing the level of democracy with the civil society capacity variable. To address these concerns I take a two-pronged approach. First, I present the results with alternative main independent variables used in previous research that are closely related to the theoretical concept of interest (these are discussed below in Tables A5, A6 and A7 respectively). Secondly, I regress the main independent variable on the Polity variable and its square term as well as the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) electoral democracy index (Coppedge et al. 2017). This is an interval level variable with a range from zero to one, where higher values indicate better scores on the electoral democracy index. This variable captures the idea that an electoral democracy is the building block of any other conceptualization of democracy, as the principle of

holding free and fair election is integral to democracies (Coppedge et al. 2017). The rationale behind this approach is that the residuals of this regression should be devoid of any 'democracy-related' influence. I estimate all models with the variable civil society - clean, which essentially captures civil society capacity without potential democracy-related influence (i.e., the residuals of the regression) (Table A8; see Table A8a for the ordinary least square regression used to estimate the residuals).

In Table A5 I use an alternative main independent variable – civil society participatory environment taken from the V-Dem dataset. The variable is interval and it captures the level of involvement of citizens in civil society organizations. Higher values indicate more involvement (Coppedge et al. 2017). The civil society participation variable demonstrates a consistently negative relationship with the outcome of interest, which is in line with the theoretical expectations. Yet, the variable is not statistically significant in Models 4 and 5, demonstrating that only involvement with civil society organizations is not enough to allow civil society to act as an influential mediator in domestic political conflict. Still, there is some support for the relationship between civil society and civil war onset as a protest trajectory.

Table A5 Probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset (alternative main independent variable: civil society participatory environment)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Civil society participation	-0.165***	-0.145*	-0.145*	-0.155	-0.158
	(0.059)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.103)	(0.106)
Polity		0.013	0.014	0.028*	0.026
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Polity^2		-0.007***	-0.007***	0.001	0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.158**	-0.157**	-0.191**	-0.218**
		(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.087)
Youth bulge			0.001	0.052	0.054
			(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Excluded population (log)				0.120**	0.125***
				(0.049)	(0.048)
Repression				0.426***	0.410***
				(0.103)	(0.103)
Number of protest participants					0.068
					(0.100)
Number of protest events					0.012
					(0.022)
Time since last onset	-0.243***	-0.236***	-0.237***	-0.208**	-0.208**
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Time since last onset^2	0.021***	0.020***	0.020***	0.020*	0.021*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Time since last onset^3	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-1.166***	0.222	0.200	-2.621*	-2.635*
	(0.111)	(0.374)	(0.969)	(1.393)	(1.441)
Number of observations	1,893	1,778	1,773	1,339	1,338

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A6 presents the probit models with an alternative main independent variable – number of human rights organizations. This variable is obtained from replication data from an article by Murdie and Stapley (2014) and it measures the number of human rights non-governmental organizations in a country; the variable is natural log transformed. It is important to mention why this variable might be a relevant alternative. The number of human rights organizations (HROs) accounts for the presence of civil society organizations and usually HROs are particularly active in pressuring the government to improve and strengthen human rights practices (this partially speaks to the idea of the organization environment for civil society organizations). Therefore, it could be viewed as a relevant alternative to measure

civil society capacity. The variable is statistically significant from zero and it has a negative association with the dependent variable as hypothesised. Hence, the results hold.

Table A6 Probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset (alternative main independent variable: human rights organizations (HROs))

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
HROs (log)	-0.246***	-0.284*	-0.317**	-0.399**	-0.419**
	(0.078)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.168)	(0.169)
Polity		-0.011	-0.009	-0.000	-0.002
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Polity^2		-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.001
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.106	-0.091	-0.062	-0.062
		(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.109)	(0.110)
Youth bulge			0.076	0.064	0.063
			(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Excluded population (log)				0.068	0.062
				(0.080)	(0.078)
Repression				0.259**	0.263**
				(0.127)	(0.126)
Number of protest participants					-0.055
					(0.113)
Number of protest events					0.017
					(0.024)
Time since last onset	-0.252*	-0.128	-0.121	0.001	-0.003
	(0.144)	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.203)
Time since last onset^2	0.010	-0.009	-0.010	-0.025	-0.025
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Time since last onset^3	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Intercept	-0.463**	0.334	-1.154	-2.086	-1.942
	(0.234)	(0.677)	(1.357)	(1.387)	(1.480)
Number of observations	933	801	801	762	761

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

In Table A7 I show the results from models with another alternative main independent variable – number of environmental and human rights non-governmental organizations. This approach is adapted from Murdie and Stapley (2014) who add the numbers of environmental organizations (obtained from Smith and Wiest (2005)) to those of human rights organizations. The rationale behind this is that both environmental and human rights organizations account for a broader

understanding of civil society and its capacity. Even with this key explanatory variable the results hold; only in Model 3 the variable loses statistical significance, which is perhaps due to the inclusion of the youth bulge variable.

Table A7 Probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset (alternative main independent variable: environmental organizations)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
HROs and Environmental org.	-0.022***	-0.015*	-0.015	-0.025**	-0.029**
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Polity		0.011	0.011	0.026	0.025
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Polity^2		-0.003	-0.003	0.002	0.003
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.171*	-0.168*	-0.160	-0.201*
		(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.120)	(0.116)
Youth bulge			0.027	0.003	0.008
			(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Excluded population (log)				0.099	0.113
				(0.067)	(0.069)
Repression				0.557***	0.544***
				(0.146)	(0.149)
Number of protest participants					0.172*
					(0.101)
Number of protest events					0.007
					(0.034)
Time since last onset	-0.240	-0.226	-0.222	-0.071	-0.063
	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.160)	(0.157)
Time since last onset^2	0.003	-0.004	-0.005	-0.026	-0.027
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Time since last onset^3	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Intercept	-0.859***	0.377	-0.156	-2.080	-2.249
	(0.153)	(0.576)	(1.128)	(1.537)	(1.545)
Number of observations	856	794	794	759	758

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A8 presents the results with the variable civil society - clean, obtained by regressing different democracy-related variables on the civil society capacity variable (the regression is shown in Table A8a). The findings hold even to this robustness check.

Table A8 Probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset (alternative IV: civil society - clean)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Civil society - clean	-2.082***	-2.229***	-2.229***	-2.316***	-2.334***
	(0.672)	(0.597)	(0.595)	(0.704)	(0.702)
Polity		-0.001	-0.001	0.013	0.010
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Polity^2		-0.006**	-0.006**	0.003	0.003
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.203***	-0.206***	-0.245***	-0.275***
		(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.083)	(0.088)
Youth bulge			-0.006	0.037	0.038
			(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Excluded population (log)				0.101*	0.106**
				(0.054)	(0.054)
Repression				0.427***	0.412***
				(0.107)	(0.108)
Number of protest participants					0.051
					(0.105)
Number of protest events					0.016
					(0.020)
Time since last onset	-0.260***	-0.240***	-0.240***	-0.225**	-0.228**
	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Time since last onset^2	0.022***	0.020***	0.020***	0.022*	0.023*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Time since last onset^3	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Intercept	-1.222***	0.445	0.593	-2.027	-1.973
	(0.114)	(0.373)	(0.915)	(1.372)	(1.419)
Number of observations	1,852	1,778	1,773	1,339	1,338

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A8a OLS models to obtain the civil society-clean variable

Independent variable	Model (1)
Polity	0.013***
	(0.003)
Polity^2	-0.002***
	(0.000)
Electoral democracy index	0.729***
	(0.069)
Intercept	0.366***
	(0.026)
Number of observations	3,699
R-squared	0.815

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The model is estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

In the tables to follow I show check whether the effect of civil society holds even in alternative empirical models and with the inclusion of different control variables.

In Table A9 I use as a robustness check a complementary log-log model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005), which is deemed appropriate when the dependent variable is rare. In fact, here in the constrained sample of countries that have experienced protest events, there are about three percent of centre-seeking civil war onsets. The results hold even with the complementary log-log model.

Table A9 Complementary log-log models of protest trajectory: civil war onset

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Civil society capacity	-2.318***	-3.768***	-3.793***	-3.393***	-2.418**
	(0.467)	(0.930)	(0.920)	(1.040)	(0.980)
Polity		0.108***	0.109***	0.117***	0.092**
		(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.038)
Polity^2		-0.014**	-0.014**	-0.006	0.004
		(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.308**	-0.317**	-0.361**	-0.385**
		(0.125)	(0.130)	(0.145)	(0.177)
Youth bulge			-0.024	0.090	0.100
			(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.085)
Excluded population (log)				0.317***	0.182*
				(0.093)	(0.094)
Repression					0.821***
					(0.210)
Number of protest participants					0.123
					(0.212)
Number of protest events					0.012
					(0.047)
Time since last onset	-0.505***	-0.453***	-0.456***	-0.588***	-0.461***
	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.185)	(0.177)
Time since last onset^2	0.044***	0.038**	0.039**	0.062**	0.049*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Time since last onset^3	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.002*	-0.002
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Intercept	-0.800***	2.623***	3.161*	0.063	-3.800
	(0.308)	(0.729)	(1.821)	(2.144)	(2.790)
Number of observations	1,893	1,778	1,773	1,343	1,338

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A10 shows the results from rare events logit models (Tomz, King, and Zeng 2002) as alternative empirical models. The rare events logit is commonly used when the binary dependent variable is a rare event. In light of the results shown in Table A10, it is possible to conclude that the relationship between civil society capacity and protest trajectory, namely civil war onset, is robust even to this model specification.

Table A10 Rare events logit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Civil society capacity	-2.394***	-3.839***	-3.874***	-2.523**	-2.510**
	(0.484)	(0.930)	(0.922)	(1.069)	(1.051)
Polity		0.110***	0.110***	0.096**	0.091**
		(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Polity^2		-0.015***	-0.015**	0.004	0.004
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.311**	-0.319**	-0.348**	-0.390**
		(0.129)	(0.135)	(0.175)	(0.182)
Youth bulge			-0.029	0.089	0.091
			(0.075)	(0.093)	(0.095)
Excluded population (log)				0.170*	0.176*
				(0.102)	(0.101)
Repression				0.853***	0.822***
				(0.227)	(0.227)
Number of protest participants					0.101
					(0.222)
Number of protest events					0.027
					(0.049)
Time since last onset	-0.507***	-0.460***	-0.462***	-0.436**	-0.431**
	(0.143)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.188)	(0.190)
Time since last onset^2	0.043***	0.038**	0.038**	0.042	0.042
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Time since last onset^3	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Intercept	-0.672**	2.842***	3.489*	-3.346	-3.323
	(0.328)	(0.774)	(1.926)	(2.972)	(3.030)
Number of observations	1,893	1,778	1,773	1,339	1,338

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A11 includes the probit models, but with alternative control variables. First, I include a population (log) variable obtained from Gleditsch's (2002) expanded trade and GDP data in Model 1 and I exclude the youth bulge variable. Second, in Model 2 I use an alternative measure of state repression from the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) repression data. The variable measures the extent to which the state represses its citizens via torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and disappearance. It can vary from zero to eight, where low values indicate extreme repression with respect to the above oppressive tactics (in essence, the variable speaks to the freedom of such oppressive tactics). In Model 3, I use the previously mentioned electoral democracy index from the V-Dem dataset as an alternative measure of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2017). Finally, in Model 4 I include a variable measuring state coercion against protesters, it takes a value of one if the state coerced protesters and zero otherwise (Clark and Regan 2015). The results hold across all four models with alternative controls.

Table A11 Probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset (alternative controls)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Civil society capacity	-1.327**	-1.317**	-2.156***	-1.290**
	(0.533)	(0.534)	(0.579)	(0.537)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.216***	-0.256***	-0.340***	-0.206**
	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.100)	(0.085)
Excluded population (log)	0.096*	0.123**	0.121**	0.097*
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.050)
Number of protest participants	0.060	0.057	0.042	0.065
	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.103)
Number of protest events	0.013	0.001	0.020	0.007
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Repression (PTS)	0.400***		0.459***	0.374***
	(0.109)		(0.096)	(0.106)
Polity	0.047**	0.065***		0.048**
	(0.021)	(0.024)		(0.020)
$Polity^2$	0.001	-0.002		0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)
Youth bulge		0.005	0.042	0.039
		(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.046)
Population (log)	-0.008			
	(0.068)			
Repression (CIRI)		-0.235***		
		(0.051)		
Electoral democracy index			2.897***	
			(0.806)	
State coercion of protest				0.145
				(0.154)
Time since last onset	-0.209**	-0.175**	-0.236***	-0.208**
	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.087)
Time since last $onset^2$	0.021*	0.017	0.024*	0.021*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Time since last $onset^3$	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Intercept	-0.699	1.503	-1.599	-1.598
	(0.966)	(1.319)	(1.426)	(1.445)
Number of observations	1,338	1,325	1,366	1,337

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A12 presents the results from region and year fixed effects logit models. It could be that regions, rather than countries per se, such as the Middle East or Latin America have specific characteristics that might influence the results and cannot be capture by a standard logit or probit model. Even with this specification, the results do not change.

Table A12 Fixed effects logit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Civil society capacity	-0.867***	-1.448***	-1.431***	-1.788***	-1.457***
	(0.298)	(0.447)	(0.417)	(0.434)	(0.442)
Polity		0.060***	0.051***	0.053***	0.058***
		(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Polity^2		-0.008***	-0.005*	-0.008***	-0.007**
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP per capita (log)		-0.315***	-0.305***	-0.215***	-0.336***
		(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.071)	(0.089)
Youth bulge		-0.042	-0.041	-0.009	-0.039
		(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.041)
Number of protest participants			0.149*	0.161*	0.146
			(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.092)
Number of protest events			0.017*	0.011	0.012
			(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Time since last onset	-0.053	0.021	-0.205***	-0.001	0.032
	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.070)	(0.107)	(0.101)
Time since last onset^2	0.005	-0.003	0.017**	-0.002	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Time since last onset^3	-0.000	0.000	-0.000**	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	-0.564	3.334***	2.321**	1.712*	2.951**
	(0.376)	(1.268)	(1.169)	(1.029)	(1.316)
Year FE	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Region FE	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Number of observations	1,440	1,344	1,760	1,353	1,343

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Region and year dummy variables are not reported. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

In Table A13 I present the results form the bootstrapped probit models. Specifically, with the bootstrapping technique I resample 1,000 times my original sample so as to be able to have a better understanding of the population under investigation, i.e. countries that have experienced protest events. The effect of the main explanatory variable remains unchanged.

Table A13 Bootstrapped probit models of protest trajectory: civil war onset

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Civil society capacity	-1.746***	-1.263**	-1.267**
	(0.451)	(0.612)	(0.607)
Polity	0.052***	0.049**	0.047**
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Polity^2	-0.008***	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.149**	-0.185*	-0.212**
	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.102)
Youth bulge		0.040	0.042
		(0.047)	(0.053)
Excluded population (log)		0.094	0.098
		(0.058)	(0.060)
Repression		0.403***	0.387***
		(0.129)	(0.127)
Number of protest participants			0.066
			(0.116)
Number of protest events			0.012
			(0.027)
Time since last onset	-0.225***	-0.213**	-0.213**
	(0.074)	(0.108)	(0.102)
Time since last onset^2	0.019**	0.021	0.021
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Time since last onset^3	-0.000*	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Intercept	1.116***	-1.616	-1.613
	(0.403)	(1.592)	(1.632)
Number of observations	1,778	1,339	1,338

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Diagnostics

The models do not suffer from multicollinearity since the average variance inflation factor (as well as the individual values of the VIF for all variables) is well below the accepted 5 VIF as an indication of potential collinearity problem.

Collinearity diagnostics (Table 1, Model 5)

(N=1,338)

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Civil war onset (DV)	1.07	0.9381
Civil society capacity	3.16	0.3162
Polity	3.55	0.2818
$Polity^2$	2.27	0.4396
GDP per capita (log)	2.69	0.3723
Youth bulge	2.14	0.4681
Excluded population (log)	1.15	0.8706
Repression	1.74	0.5759
Number of protest participants	1.30	0.7677
Number of protest events	1.25	0.8025
Time since last civil war onset	1.12	0.8951
MEAN VIF	1.95	

I carry out the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. The insignificant test statistic suggests that the model fits the data satisfactorily.

Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (Table 1, Model 5)

N = 1,338
N of groups = 10
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 (8) = 5.19
Prob. > chi2 = 0.7372

Predictive power

To examine the predictive power of Model 5, Table 1, I employ receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves analysis. The area under the ROC curve of Model 5, Table 1 is substantially bigger than .5 (this is the same as predicting a flip of a coin); in fact, it is .8695. This indicates satisfactory discrimination, i.e. the model performs well and the results are not due to random chance.

ROC curve analysis (Table 1, Model 5)



In Tables A14 and A15 I present robustness checks for the count models. Even though the relationship between civil society capacity and nonviolent mobilization, particularly the propagation of protest events is not the main concern of this paper, this aspect is tangential and of importance. As shown in the main count models in Table 2, in fact higher civil society capacity is associated with an increased number of protest events, which suggests that civil society can be seen as a moderator of political conflict and in turn this is evidence to suggest that civil society can influence the trajectories of protest.

In Table A14 I estimate the full count model using a negative binomial model, ordinary least square regression and Poisson regression model as alternative model specifications. The results in Table A14 indicate that civil society capacity is consistently associated with an increased number of protest events even if estimated with different models. This is in line with the results presented in Table 2 in the main text of the paper.

Table A14 Alternative count models for number of protest events

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
	Negative binomial	OLS	Poisson
Civil society capacity	1.228***	2.102**	0.925**
	(0.430)	(0.978)	(0.404)
Polity	0.024	0.077*	0.032*
	(0.016)	(0.045)	(0.019)
$Polity^2$	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Repression	0.349***	0.908***	0.320***
	(0.061)	(0.170)	(0.053)
Excluded population (log)	0.028	0.025	0.016
	(0.050)	(0.125)	(0.051)
GDP per capita (log)	0.151**	0.468**	0.180**
	(0.072)	(0.225)	(0.080)
Youth bulge	0.008	0.052	0.015
	(0.030)	(0.087)	(0.030)
Intercept	-2.125**	-5.624**	-2.155**
	(0.951)	(2.538)	(0.926)
Number of observations	2,589	2,589	2,589

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Table A15 shows the results from three zero-inflated negative binomial models where each model has an alternative key independent variable. The explanatory variables are the same as in the probit models in Tables A5, A6 and A7. The results hold.

Table A15 Zero-inflated negative binomial models for number of protest events (alternative main independent variables)

Independent variable	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Count model (non-certain zero)			
HROs	0.223**		
	(0.089)		
Civil society participation		0.231***	
		(0.073)	
HROs and Environmental org.			0.010*
			(0.005)
Polity	0.026*	0.025*	0.030**
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Polity^2	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Repression	0.126*	0.282***	0.129*
	(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.072)
Excluded population (log)	0.025	0.004	0.043
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.044)
GDP per capita (log)	0.110	0.201***	0.102
	(0.074)	(0.067)	(0.081)
Youth bulge	-0.003	-0.005	0.021
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.034)
Intercept	-0.896	-1.360*	-0.809
	(0.924)	(0.811)	(0.986)
Inflated logit (certain zero)			
Polity	-0.215***	-0.358***	-0.230***
	(0.049)	(0.113)	(0.056)
Polity^2	0.003	0.073**	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.015)
GDP per capita (log)	1.213***	1.781	1.314***
	(0.385)	(1.432)	(0.472)
Youth bulge	-0.034	-0.131	-0.012
	(0.129)	(0.173)	(0.157)
Repression	-0.200	-1.634**	-0.128
	(0.534)	(0.728)	(0.615)
Intercept	-10.521**	-19.420	-12.239**
	(4.783)	(18.431)	(5.156)
Number of observations	1,655	2,589	1,527

Notes: The table presents variable coefficients, robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models are estimated with Stata 14.0.
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Results from Vuong tests for models in Table 2 in the main text

The Vuong tests below[37] assess whether a zero-inflated negative binomial is more appropriate than a negative binomial model on the basis of the data. Judging by

[37] Note that I do not present these in the main table (Table 2) in the paper due to the fact that the test does not permit robust standard errors.

the large z statistic and the p value of zero, there is a statistically significant difference between the two, which indicates that the zero-inflated negative binomial model is preferred.

Table 2, Model 1: z = 7.58 Pr>z = 0.0000
Table 2, Model 2: z = 4.77 Pr>z = 0.0000
Table 2, Model 3: z = 5.53 Pr>z = 0.0000

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Conclusion

This thesis engages with the answers to two interrelated questions pertaining to the variation in tactics and forms of opposition and political conflict. Namely, this thesis is concerned with explaining under what conditions and why domestic political conflict takes violent and nonviolent forms and tactics. This study approaches these research questions by adopting an overall theoretical framework on the motivation and opportunity for a specific opposition form (Moore 1995; Most and Starr 1989). It puts forward the argument that state and non-state actors and their characteristics are the foremost drivers of the variation in the choice of violent and nonviolent opposition tactics and forms of political conflict. The rationale behind this proposition is that different state and non-state actors delineate the motivation and opportunity for a specific opposition form.

In line with the overarching research questions, this thesis consists of and examines three distinct but closely connected questions that are studied in detail in three papers. The first paper seeks to explain why and under what conditions opposition to the government undertakes violent and nonviolent forms of opposition. The second paper is concerned with explaining why and under what conditions militant groups, using violent tactics, adopt nonviolence as a form of opposition. Lastly, the third paper looks at why domestic nonviolent protests sometimes take on a violent trajectory such as the onset of civil war.

Key Findings and Contribution

The thesis at hand explores the role of state and non-state actors as a determinant of violent and nonviolent opposition tactics and political conflict. The findings of this thesis consist of three novel results.

First, the thesis demonstrates that the state as a distinct actor leverages formerly understudied types of state repression to delimit the motivation and opportunity for the initiation of nonviolent and violent forms of opposition. In essence, it shows that information, economic and social repression respectively delimits the forms of opposition in divergent ways. The contribution related to this result is stemming from the departure of studying state repression in violent terms and in paving the way for future research on types of repression different from violent types of repression.

The second novel finding pertains to the result that diaspora as external supporters, previously thought of conflict-inducing actors (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004), in fact can influence violent groups' adoption of nonviolent tactics. This result is important as it demonstrates that non-state actors have a vital role in determining the tactics and forms of opposition to the government. Thus, this finding contributes to the understanding of tactical shifts as well as the role of non-state actors in conflict dynamics.

The third finding establishes that civil society can facilitate nonviolent resistance, while it may also buttress violent forms of opposition and political conflict. This is a non-trivial result as to date the scholarship has viewed civil society as a bystander of political conflict developments and a possibly beneficial actor only in post-conflict settings. In contrast, this thesis clearly shows that civil society can moderate the forms and tactics of domestic political conflict.

Future Research

Studying the choices and transformations of opposition tactics and forms of political conflict is an important research agenda. One of the reasons why this is so is linked to the fact that violent forms of opposition are associated with irreparable

human costs and loss of life. Even though nonviolent opposition can be disruptive and create economic damages to achieve its goals, it is by far more constructive than violence. Violent forms of opposition have devastating short and long-term effects. Apart from the death of combatants and innocent civilians, the damage of violent forms of political conflict such as civil war are contributing to negative socio-economic consequences such as destruction of property, infrastructure and societal havoc. Therefore, it is imperative to study the determinants of both forms of opposition in order to channel unconventional opposition to the government through nonviolent rather than violent domains.

On the basis of the findings of this thesis, future research may take several paths. Subsequent studies may endeavour to take more granular actor-centric approaches to understanding the micro-foundations of violent and nonviolent opposition tactics and forms of political conflict. As such these studies, might seek to focus on the individual or the group level to uncover important dynamics conditioning the choice of opposition that currently are impossible to examine due to data unavailability.

Future research may seek to focus on disaggregating further the tactics employed in political conflict as well as their substitution (e.g., Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2018; Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017). The findings of the second paper contribute to this research goal. Case studies using disaggregated data may allow for even more fine-grained understanding of the role of state and non-state actors in domestic conflict processes. The first paper of this thesis, for example, shows the effect of different types of repression that states use on the forms of opposition. Yet, it might be fruitful to also distinguish between different agents of

the state who perform these types of repression (e.g., Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014).

Finally, this thesis demonstrates that non-state actors have a substantial role in shaping domestic political conflict and opposition tactics. The third paper of the thesis, for instance, presents evidence that civil society as a non-state actor may moderate political conflict processes. This suggests that future research may endeavour to explore further this role in sub-national settings. Moreover, on the basis of the findings of the second paper, future studies may seek to further explore the role of diaspora groups by disaggregating such influential external support and to further elucidate their effects on domestic violent and nonviolent forms of opposition and political conflict.

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