

Chapter 1

The ethical ambivalence of holism: An exploration through the thought of Carl Jung and Gilles Deleuze

Roderick Main

Among the many ways in which the concept of holism has been used since it was coined almost a hundred years ago (Smuts 1926) two polarised extremes stand out. On the one hand, holism – briefly, the doctrine that the whole is more than the sum of its parts¹ – has been championed as the solution to a range of scientific and cultural problems associated with the condition Max Weber termed disenchantment (1919: 139, 155). For example, as Anne Harrington has related, various life and mind scientists in the German-speaking world during the first decades of the twentieth century sought to develop ‘a new science of Wholeness’ that, as well as solving scientific problems that seemed intractable to an analytic approach, would counteract the cultural sense of alienation and meaninglessness that was seen as stemming from ‘the old science of the Machine’ with its ‘mechanistic, instrumentalist thinking’ (1996: xv-xvi). Later in the twentieth century Morris Berman, lamenting how a disenchanted worldview had ‘destroyed the continuity of the human experience and the integrity of the human psyche’ and ‘very nearly wrecked the planet as well’, proposed holism as a key component in an urgently needed ‘re-enchantment of the world’: ‘*Some* type of holistic, or participating, consciousness and a corresponding socio-political formation’, he wrote, ‘have to emerge if we are to survive as a species’ (1981: 23). Similar sentiments also inform many of the more recent manifestations of

holistic thought in spirituality, therapy, ecology, and other areas (Hanegraaff 1998: 119-58; Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Fellows 2019).

On the other hand, holism has been charged with facilitating the emergence of totalitarianism and its associated ills. Organicistic and other holistic tropes were part of the Nazi rhetoric, for instance, and for at least some scientists in the interwar German-speaking world there were very real connections between the holism promoted in their scientific work and their support for aspects of Nazi ideology, such as the expectation that individuals should subordinate their self-interest in order to serve the organic whole, the Volk, of which they were parts (Harrington 1996: 175-78). While Harrington notes that ‘the history of German holism is a history of many stories and [...] other political relationships [than conservative, antidemocratic, and totalitarian ones] were possible, and in various ways, persuasive’ (ibid.: 208), other commentators have argued that the connection between holism and totalitarianism is intrinsic. Karl Popper, for example, identified holism as one of the presuppositions, along with historicism and essentialism, that typically leads to totalitarian political formations (1945, 1957). More recently, Jozet Keulartz concluded a discussion of holism in the thought of Jan Christiaan Smuts, Alfred North Whitehead, and late twentieth-century ecology with the claim that ‘the link between holism and totalitarianism does not rest exclusively on historical coincidence but may well be the consequence of an internal relationship’ (1998: 141; see also Cooper 1996).

The ethical ambivalence that seems to attach to holism – where it is seen alternatively as the solution to a range of social, cultural, and political ills or as a major cause of such ills – is explored in the present chapter through an examination of

the work of the Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). Jung's professional life overlapped with the emergence of the principal forms of both twentieth-century holism and twentieth-century totalitarianism. His work is itself deeply holistic (Smith 1990; Main 2019) and has been construed as, on the one hand, re-enchanting (Main 2011, 2013, 2017) and, on the other hand, problematically implicated with Nazism and anti-Semitism (Grossman 1979, Maidenbaum and Martin 1992). It thus exemplifies the problem under discussion.

The question that this chapter addresses, then, is what are the ethical implications of holism, and more particularly whether the case of Jung suggests that there is indeed an intrinsic relationship between holistic and totalitarian forms of thought. The approach taken to exploring these issues involves first highlighting salient aspects of Jung's holistic thought and the ethical benefits, individual and social, that arguably stem from it. This positive picture is then confronted with a perspective deeply critical of holistic thought and its possible totalitarian implications – the perspective of the French post-structuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995).² Deleuze was demonstrably influenced by Jung and developed ideas that have many affinities with Jung's (Kerslake 2007; Holland 2012: 310-13), and he also, like Jung, reflected deeply on the problem of the whole throughout his professional life (Ansell-Pearson 2007: 5). This makes it all the more interesting that on the particular issue of holistic thought Deleuze appears to have taken a position almost opposite to Jung's. Rather than pore over historical or biographical issues, however, the chapter examines some of the metaphysical assumptions underpinning Jung's and Deleuze's thought, particularly in relation to transcendence and immanence, in order to assess the extent to which Deleuze's criticisms of holistic thought as intrinsically totalitarian

might be answerable from the perspective of Jung's holism. It also considers whether this confrontation has any implications for understanding the thought of Deleuze.

Jung's holistic thought

The appropriateness of designating Jung's work as a form of holism, despite his not having used this specific term himself,³ is supported by a number of considerations that have been discussed elsewhere (Main 2019). These include the pivotal and pervasive importance of the concept of wholeness in his work; the parallels between his thought and that of contemporaneous thinkers widely designated as holists; his explicit influence on subsequent self-proclaimed holists; and the close fit of his ideas with various characterisations and formal definitions of holism (ibid.: 61-63). For the purpose of the present discussion, there are several points to highlight.

As a psychiatrist and psychotherapist Jung's primary concern was with processes of psychological healing and development. Increased 'human wholeness' (1944: §32) was important to him because he envisaged this as the goal of those processes. He characterised such wholeness as consisting in a union of opposites (1911-12/1952: §460; 1946: §532; 1958: §784), most generally as 'the union of the conscious and unconscious personality' (1940: §294), and he designated this united state with the concept of the self (1955-56: §145), the 'archetype of wholeness' (1951a: §351; 1952a: §757). The self, or wholeness, found expression in a multitude of symbols for Jung, among which the mandala was of particular importance (1944: §§323-31). The overall process of developing such wholeness he called 'individuation' (1928: §§266-406). Jung's thought is holistic, then, in that it presupposes the possibility of psychological wholeness, and that presupposition

informs both how psychological processes are understood and how psychotherapy is done.

While Jung was primarily concerned with psychological wholeness, he considered that the process of developing psychological wholeness could lead in the direction of a wider wholeness that included the world beyond the psyche. At one level, the world beyond the psyche included the social world. Jung was not a social holist in the usual sense of holding that social entities have properties that are irreducible to the behaviours of the individuals composing those social entities (1957: §§504, 553-54). Nevertheless, he considered that the pursuit of wholeness at the individual level, insofar as it ‘makes us aware of the unconscious, which unites and is common to all mankind’, could ‘[bring] to birth a consciousness of human community’ (1945: §227). As he wrote in connection to this, ‘Individuation [the process of realising the wholeness of the self] is an at-one-ment with oneself and at the same time with humanity, since oneself is a part of humanity’ (ibid.).

At another level – or other levels – the world beyond the psyche included for Jung the physical and spiritual worlds. In the concluding chapter of his late work *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (1955-56: §§654-789) Jung presented his model of psychological development in terms of three ‘conjunctions’ (or a conjunction in three stages) as described by the sixteenth-century alchemist Gerhard Dorn. The first conjunction or stage was the union of the psyche and spirit, or of the mind within itself, a realisation of inner psychic integration (ibid.: §§669-76). The second conjunction or stage was the union of the integrated psyche with the body or with the world of physical reality (ibid.: §§677-93). The third and final conjunction or stage

was the union of the integrated mind and body with the world of potential, the unitary source of all actualisations, the ‘one world’ or *unus mundus* (ibid.: §§759-75). This conception implied that realisation of wholeness could involve two forms of integration that were empirical or immanent: the integration of the mind within itself and the integration of the internally integrated mind with the body and with the external world. Besides this, however, the conception also implied that realisation of wholeness could involve a third form of integration that was non-empirical or transcendent: the integration of the integrated mind-body with its unitary source. At its deepest levels Jung’s holism was thus cosmic and mystical as well as psychological and social.

The possibility of holistic relations existing between, as well as at, different levels of reality is reflected in Jung’s sometimes suggesting that the relationship between psychological wholeness and the wholeness of humanity or of the world could be understood as one between microcosm and macrocosm. Jung sometimes invoked this idea in his discussions of society, describing the individual person as ‘a social microcosm, reflecting on the smallest scale the qualities of society at large’ (1957: §553; see also §540). More often, however, he introduced the idea in relation to the cosmological visions and transformative practices of premodern, non-Western, and especially esoteric, above all alchemical, thinkers (1944: §472; 1952b: §§923, 925-26, 928-29, 937).

Although Jung did not generally present his thinking about wholeness in terms of the relationship between wholes and parts, as do most formal definitions of holism (Phillips 1976: 6; Esfeld 2003), such terms and ways of understanding are arguably

implicit in his view (Main 2019: 61-63). Like more explicitly holistic thinkers, Jung prioritised the perspective of wholeness when dealing with subject matter, in his case the human personality or more specifically the self, that could not be adequately understood in terms of a purely analytic approach (Phillips 1976: 6-12; Jung 1952b: §§821, 864). Like explicit holists, he saw this whole as more than the sum of its parts (Phillips 1976: 12-15); that is, the self was for him more than an aggregate of the contents comprising it: in shorthand, the conscious ego, the shadow, and the other archetypes of the collective unconscious (Jung 1944: §44; 1951a: §43; 1955-56: §145). He also considered that the self, as the whole, determined the nature of its parts (Phillips 1976: 16); that is, to the extent that it was the ‘organiser of the personality’ (Jung 1958: §694) the self determined the nature of the conscious ego, shadow, and other archetypes. Again like explicit holists, Jung did not think the parts could be understood if considered in isolation from the whole (Phillips 1976: 17-19); in his terms, since the manifestations of the ego, shadow, and other archetypes at any time were related to their role in the process of individuation, which in turn was governed by the self (Jung 1928, 1944), it was not possible adequately to understand the ego, shadow, and other archetypes in isolation from the self. Finally, Jung saw the parts as dynamically interrelated or interdependent (Phillips 1976: 19); the ego, shadow, and other archetypes evinced for him precisely such interrelationship and interdependence, as described throughout his mature discussions of his psychology (1928; 1940: §302; 1944; 1955-56; see also Smith 1990; Cambray 2009: 33-36).

In sum, Jung’s conception of wholeness, while primarily psychological, extended to include the social world, the physical world, and the spiritual world, and the connections among these various domains of experience were sometimes framed

in terms of the relationship between microcosm and macrocosm. Although he did not use the term ‘holism’ himself, his concept of wholeness can be quite closely fitted with formal analytic definitions of holism.

The ethical implications of Jung’s holistic thought

For Jung, attending to wholeness could generate not only certain kinds of knowledge but also distinct ethical benefits. At the individual level, the principal ethical benefit of attending to wholeness was that it enabled persons to address their one-sidedness and the pathologies that Jung considered to stem from one-sidedness (1937: §255, 258). By becoming more conscious of aspects of their whole personality that had been operating unconsciously, they would be less likely to project these aspects onto others (1951a: §16).

At the social level, we have already seen that Jung considered development towards wholeness of the self as a process that made individuals conscious of their shared collectivity (1945: §227). In a more specifically political register, he also argued that, insofar as the self or wholeness with which individuation brings a person into relationship transcends empirical experience (1957: §509; 1958: §779), it could serve, as belief in God had traditionally done, as an ‘extramundane principle capable of relativising the overpowering influence of external [social and political] factors’ and in particular could prevent a person’s ‘otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass’ (1957: §511; see also McMillan 2020). More widely still, in the light of his late concepts of synchronicity, the psychoid archetype, and the *unus mundus* Jung suggested that there might be a universal interconnectedness among all aspects of reality, including between psyche and matter (both organic and inorganic) (1955-56:

§§662, 767). This would have implications for human responsibility towards the natural as well as cultural and social environments (Fellows 2019).

Finally and most pertinently for the present discussion, Jung's holistic thought represented a response to the condition of disenchantment. For the wholeness promoted by Jung's psychological model involves the integration, or at least reconciliation or harmonising, of factors normally treated as separate and irreconcilable within the framework of disenchantment: irrationality and rationality, transcendence and immanence, value and fact, religion and science. Weber's fragmentary but influential statements about disenchantment imply, at least in an 'ideal-typical' case (Asprem 2014: 39-40), four main propositions. As concisely summarised by Egil Asprem, these are that there is no genuine mystery or magic, so that 'nature can in principle be understood by empiricism and reason [alone]' (2014: 36; Weber 1919: 139); that 'science can know nothing beyond the empirically given' and therefore 'metaphysics is impossible' (Asprem 2014: 36; Weber 1919: 140-142); that values cannot be derived from facts and hence 'science can know nothing of meaning' (Asprem 2014: 36; Weber 1919: 142-144, 146); and finally, because empiricism and reason provide no evidence for the putative transcendent realities and values of religion, that science and religion are irreconcilable and consequently one can only embrace religion by putting aside science, that is, by making an 'intellectual sacrifice' (Weber 1919: 155; Asprem 2014: 36).

Against this, Jung, with the inclusion in his holistic psychological model of the unconscious, the non-rational, and the irrepresentable, implied the impossibility of ever fully or adequately grasping nature by empiricism and reason alone (1963: 390;

Main 2017: 1111). With his openness to anomalous, mystical, and other forms of numinous experiences, his understanding of symbols and myths as ‘the revelation of a divine life in man’ (1963: 373), and his formulation of transcendental concepts such as the archetype in itself, synchronicity, and the *unus mundus*, he implied (even while he may have denied) the possibility of metaphysics (Jung 1947/1954; 1952b; 1955-56: §§759-75; Main 2017: 1111-13). And with his inclusion, in order to achieve a ‘whole judgement’ (1952b: §961), of the functions of feeling and intuition and of a form of acausal connection through meaning (synchronicity), he implied the possibility of meaning and value, no less than of order and fact, being objective features of reality (Jung 1921; 1952b; Main 2017: 1113-14). Taken together these aspects further implied that religion and science were reconcilable and both contributed perspectives essential to a whole picture of the world (Main 2017: 1114-15). In thus comprehensively challenging disenchantment Jung’s holistic thought also challenged the ethical implications of disenchantment that so troubled many cultural commentators throughout the twentieth century (ibid.: 1001-2).

Deleuze’s criticisms of holistic thought

Jung’s crediting of anomalous and numinous experience, his willingness to develop concepts such as synchronicity that can accommodate such experience, and his interest in premodern and esoteric attempts to articulate these kinds of experience and concept already place his thought about disenchantment and its undoing beyond the pale for many commentators (Macey 2000: 212). Deleuze, however, would have been unlikely to reject Jung’s thought for these reasons. For he too was interested in experiences or ‘encounters’ (1968a: 176) that shock common sense, in developing novel concepts based on such experiences, and in exploring what Hermeticism and

related currents might have to offer modern thought (Kerlake 2007: 159-88; Ramey 2012). Nevertheless, within Jung's thinking about the whole there are several features, including ones associated with his esoteric sources, that reflect ideas Deleuze, in his thinking about the whole, did specifically target.

Deleuze was positive about the concept of the whole when, as in Henri Bergson's thought, it was conceived as something 'neither given nor giveable' (1983: 9), that is, as something that does not have a pre-given or fixed nature or static endpoint but is in a process of continual becoming and creativity. '[I]f the whole is not giveable', Deleuze maintained, 'it is because it is the Open, and because its nature is to change constantly, or to give rise to something new' (ibid.). He thus insisted that the whole not be confused with 'a closed set of objects' (ibid.). The whole was, rather, 'that which prevents each set, however big it is, from closing in on itself, and that which forces it to extend itself into a larger set' (ibid.: 16).

It was against closed wholes that Deleuze levelled his criticism, in particular against formulations of the whole as either pre-existent or the goal of some future realisation, as organic in the sense that the whole governed and gave meaning to the parts of which it was composed, and as constituted by internal relations that determined its essence. In the 1972 revision of *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze contrasted two ways in which a fragment or sign could 'speak':

[A fragment or sign can speak] either because it permits us to divine the whole from which it is taken, to reconstitute the organism or the statue to which it belongs, and to seek out the other part that belongs to it – or else, on the

contrary, because there is no other part that corresponds to it, no totality into which it can enter, no unity from which it is torn and to which it can be restored. (Deleuze 1972: 112)

The former way reflects the view of the ancient Greeks as well as of Medieval and Renaissance Platonism (ibid.). The latter way reflects modernist literature such as Marcel Proust's *À la Recherche du Temps Perdu*, in which, wrote Deleuze, 'One would look in vain [...] for platitudes about the work of art as an organic totality in which [as in holistic conceptions] each part predetermined the whole and in which the whole determines the part' (ibid.: 114). In the fragmented universe of Proust's novel, 'there is no Logos that gathers up all the pieces, hence no law attaches them to a whole to be regained or even formed' (ibid.: 131). For Deleuze, the whole is precisely the multiplicity of fragments – fragments that are related to one another only through 'sheer difference' and not through being parts of either an original or a future whole (Deleuze and Guattari 1972: 42). As Deleuze and his co-author Félix Guattari expressed it in *Anti-Oedipus*: 'We no longer believe in a primordial totality that once existed or in a final totality that awaits us at some future date'. Rather:

We believe only in totalities that are peripheral. And if we discover such a totality alongside various separate parts, it is a whole *of* these particular parts but does not totalise them; it is a unity *of* all of these particular parts but does not unify them; it is added to them as a new part fabricated separately.

(Deleuze and Guattari 1972: 42)

Earlier in this chapter I drew on a formal definition of holism (Phillips 1976) to demonstrate how closely Jung's thought fits with such definitions. The author of that definition, Denis Phillips, concluded that in holism as it has generally been understood in the social sciences the kinds of relations of the parts of a whole both to the whole that they constitute and to one another are identical to the 'internal relations' theorised by neo-Hegelian thought (ibid.: 7-20). 'The parts of an organic [i.e., holistic] system are internally related to each other', writes Phillips (ibid.: 7), such that any change to the relations alters the parts and hence also the whole: in other words, 'entities are *necessarily* altered by the relations into which they enter' (ibid.: 8). As Patrick Hayden has clarified in a discussion of Deleuze's empiricism, this implies that systems and entities have essences from which their relations derive (Hayden 1995: 284-85). In the understanding of wholes affirmed by Deleuze, by contrast, relations are not derived from the essence of things or from their parts but are external to them, so that the relations can be changed without affecting the terms related (ibid.: 286). This leads to a view of entities and systems, including 'wholes', as not essences but constructions (ibid.: 286-87; see also Roffe 2010: 304-5).

The problem for Deleuze with the three interrelated notions of pre-existent (or original) and future (or restored) wholes, organicism, and internal relations was that they each presupposed and reinforced the idea of transcendence, that is, the idea that there is a level of reality separate from, superior to, and governing the empirical world. Pre-existent or future wholes imply beginning or end points outside the process of becoming, of which any experiential wholes are either degraded or not yet fully realised versions. They also imply determinism and finalism, both of which negate the openness and creativity of becoming.

No less problematically, organicism postulates a unity over and above and governing its organs or parts, with the subordinated parts drawing their meaning only from their function within the whole. Moreover, the organic view of wholes privileges individual living organisms over other forms of nature, such as the inorganic and the social (Protevi 2012: 248-49), thereby giving rise to an image of the whole of nature that in fact reflects only some of its forms. This was particularly problematic for Deleuze since, as John Protevi explains, he saw organisms as tending to assume ‘habituated patterns’ or ‘strata’, resulting in ‘a centralised, hierarchical, and strongly patterned body’ (2012: 257), which prevents the body from being ‘open to new orderings and new potentials’ (ibid.).

Finally, the notion of internal relations with its essentialist implications also, as Hayden explains, underpins a view of reality as ‘an organic, stable, and absolute unity that transcends the empirical world [...] a fixed Whole that transcends its parts’, in contrast to Deleuze’s preferred empiricist view, based on external relations, of reality as ‘a series of shifting contingent wholes that form the immanent and open network of the world’ (Hayden 1995: 286-87). The contrasting ethical, social, and political implications of these holistic and empiricist views that Deleuze respectively criticises and favours are well summarised by Hayden:

On the one hand, essentialism and the paradigm of internal relations [i.e., organicistic holism] leads [*sic*] in the direction of extreme centralization and totalization, the subordination of individuals to transcendental principles, and passivity in the face of social and political homogeneity. On the other hand,

pluralist empiricism and the theory and practice of external relations promotes [*sic*] decentralization and multiplicity, resistance to supposed universal necessities, and action with respect to the possibilities of creating new types of social and political association. (Hayden 1995: 287; see also Goodchild 2001: 158-59; Braidotti 2012; Patton 2012)

Organicistic holism in Jung

Where Deleuze condemned the notions of original and restored wholes, organicistic thinking, and internal relations because of their explicit and implicit appeals to transcendence, Jung arguably drew on all of these notions in support of his concept of wholeness. For example, he referred to ‘the production and unfolding of the original, potential wholeness’ (1917/1926/1943: §186); to ‘the *a priori* existence of potential wholeness’, on account of which, he stated, ‘the idea of *entelechy* [a vital principle guiding an organism’s or system’s development and functioning] instantly recommends itself’ (1951a: §278); and to an ‘apocatastasis’ or ‘anamnesis’ in which the ‘ever-present archetype of wholeness’, the ‘original state of oneness with the God-image’, would be restored (ibid.: §73; see also 1955-56: §§152, 660, 662). He described the *unus mundus*, with which the re-integrated mind-body is united in the third of Dorn’s conjunctions, as ‘the potential world of the first day of creation, when nothing was yet “in actu”, i.e., divided into two and many, but was still one [...], the eternal Ground of all empirical being’ (1955-56: §760).

Again, Jung included approvingly among the ‘forerunners’ of his deeply holistic concept of synchronicity (Main 2019) the Ancient Greek thinker Hippocrates and the Renaissance esoteric thinker Pico Della Mirandola, in both of whom

organicism is explicit. For Hippocrates, as Jung quoted directly, ‘all things are in sympathy. The whole organism and each one of its parts are working in conjunction for the same purpose’ (in Jung 1952b: §924); while for Pico Della Mirandola, as Jung summarised, the world was ‘one being, a visible God, in which everything is naturally arranged from the very beginning like the parts of a living organism’ (Jung 1952b: §927). Jung’s frequent references in his alchemical works to microcosm and macrocosm and notions of the ‘Anthropos’, ‘Original Man’, and ‘Adam Kadmon’ also imply an organicistic perspective (1944, 1951a, 1955-56).

It is less easy to find clear evidence of Jung’s having been influenced by the notion of internal relations, as this is an idea stemming from philosophical traditions with which he did not directly engage. There are, however, indirect connections. The modern formulation of the idea of internal relations mainly derived from Hegel’s philosophy of the Absolute (Phillips 1976: 7-20). As Glenn Magee has demonstrated, though, Hegel’s own conception of the universe as an internally related whole was deeply influenced by the Hermetic notion that ‘everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else’ (2001: 13-14). For Jung’s part, even though he did not refer to the concept of internal relations as such, several of his ideas appear to suggest it: for example, his view of the mutual determination and dynamic interrelationship and interdependence of the self as the whole and the ego, shadow, and archetypes as its parts (Phillips 1976: 7-20; Main 2019: 61-63); and his statements, apropos synchronicity and the *unus mundus*, about ‘the universal interrelationship of events’ and ‘an inter-connection and unity of causally unrelated [i.e., externally unrelated] events’ (1955-56: §662).⁴

Finally, while Jung, like Deleuze, could express suspicion of the constricting and protective uses of transcendence – as when he charged the alchemists he otherwise so valued of having attempted to ‘entrench themselves behind seemingly secure positions in the Beyond’ with their ‘metaphysical assertions’ (1955-56: §680) – he nevertheless did not share Deleuze’s zeal for rooting out transcendence entirely. On the contrary, he insisted that ‘[t]he concept of psychic wholeness necessarily involves an element of transcendence on account of the existence of unconscious components’ (1958: §779). Again, after noting that ‘the self can become a symbolic content of consciousness’, he continued by also stressing that ‘it is, as a superordinate totality, necessarily transcendental as well’ (1951a: §264). And the final chapter of *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, while acknowledging the inevitable uncertainty of any representation of transcendental reality, nonetheless concludes by affirming that ‘[t]he existence of a transcendental reality is indeed evident in itself’ and ‘[t]hat the world inside and outside ourselves rests on a transcendental background is as certain as our own existence’ (1955-56: §787).

Prima facie, Jung’s endorsement of the notions of original and restored wholes, organicistic thinking, internal relations, and transcendence suggests that his thought might be deeply vulnerable to a Deleuzian critique that would charge it with advocating a concept of the whole that intrinsically is static, promotes hierarchical and totalitarian relations intrapsychically, interpersonally, and culturally, and overall stymies creativity and open relationship. In the remainder of this chapter, I propose a perspective for thinking about Jung’s and Deleuze’s concepts of the whole, as well as of the relation between their bodies of thought more generally, from which this apparent vulnerability might be addressed.

Panentheism and the open whole

Christian McMillan, who has undertaken the most rigorous interrogation to date of the metaphysical logic and potential ethical dangers of Jung's concept of the whole from a Deleuzian perspective (McMillan 2015), has identified some possible ways in which it could be argued, in response to the Deleuzian critique, that Jung's thought does after all support the idea of an open whole. One response would involve establishing connections between Jungian and Deleuzian thought in relation to contemporary scientific developments with which both thinkers can be aligned, such as in experimental physics, the philosophy of science, and the theory of emergence, where these fields promote the idea of open systems (ibid.: 21-25). Another response would be to focus on Jung's concept of synchronicity as providing a form of post-phenomenological access to the real through the 'shock' that synchronistic experiences give to normal thought and sensibility (ibid.: 21, 246-49). Other possible responses would involve reimagining some of Jung's more controversial concepts as "openings" to "enchanted Others" (McMillan 2018: 195) – concepts such as *esse in anima* (psychic reality), the psychoid, archetypes, and (again) synchronicity, each of which keeps the whole open by providing ways 'to think about the dynamic fluidity of [the] boundaries [of the psyche]' (ibid.). All of these responses would involve advancing a purely immanent interpretation of Jungian psychology.

The alternative response that I propose, rather than cast or recast Jung as a purely immanent thinker, queries the desirability and perhaps feasibility of eliminating transcendence. In anticipation, I distinguish between two different ways of understanding transcendence and argue that the kind of transcendence opposed by

Deleuze was in fact also opposed by Jung, while the (different) kind of transcendence found in Jung is also discernible in Deleuze. From this perspective, Jung's and Deleuze's respective bodies of thought, including their ways of conceiving the whole, turn out to be quite close allies in challenging the first kind of transcendence, which arguably is what spawns both disenchantment and totalitarian thought.

Theism, pantheism, and panentheism

Deleuze's opposition to transcendence was epitomised by his assertion that 'the task of modern philosophy' was 'to overturn Platonism' (1968a: 71), with its subordination of sensible objects to intelligible (transcendent) ideas. The same opposition also drove his lifelong efforts to develop a philosophy of pure immanence (1968b, 2001), an aspiration expressed most blatantly in his admiration for Spinoza, whom he called the 'prince' and even the 'Christ' of philosophers because he 'never compromised with transcendence' but constructed a 'plane of immanence' that 'does not hand itself over to the transcendent, or restore any transcendence', thereby inspiring 'the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions' (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 48, 60).

This alignment with Spinoza and aspiration towards pure immanence suggest that Deleuze's philosophy can be characterised as pantheistic (1968b: 333).⁵ The definitive feature of pantheism is that it equates the divine with the world (nature, the cosmos), that is, it sees the divine as being no more than the world (Mander 2012; Buckareff and Nagasawa 2016: 2-3).⁶ Among other things, this clearly implies that the divine is not separate from the world and is necessarily implicated in and affected by the world.

Pantheism strikingly contrasts with classical theism, such as underpins the mainstream religious thought of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In classical theism the divine is considered to be essentially separate from the world, to be unaffected by the world, and to be more than the world (Cooper 2006: 14-15; Buckareff and Nagasawa 2016: 1-2). It is against this conception of divine-world relations that Deleuze's criticisms of transcendence and alignment with pantheism appear to be levelled. For this classical theistic conception provides the pattern for relations where a separate eminent principle – the divine (or the one, or the mental) – is considered to be realer, more valuable, and regnant over that from which it is separated – the world (or the many, or the physical). Significantly, this same separation between the divine and the world was seen by Weber as the deep root of disenchantment (1904-5: 61, 178; Main 2017:1102-4).

However, pantheism is not the only way of conceiving the relationship between the divine and the world that would challenge classical theism. Akin to pantheism, but with a significant difference, is panentheism. Panentheism can be concisely defined as 'the belief or doctrine that God includes and interpenetrates the universe while being more than it' (*Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* 2002: 2080). Recognising that it comprises several varieties, Michael Brierley defines panentheism more fully but still generically in terms of the following three premises: 'First, that God is not separate from the cosmos [...]; second, that God is affected by the cosmos [...]; and third, that God is more than the cosmos' (2008: 639-40; see also Cooper 2006: 17-19; Buckareff and Nagasawa 2016: 2-3). Through the first two of Brierley's premises panentheism is akin to pantheism, while through the third it differs.

Specifically, panentheism affirms a kind of transcendence in that it considers the divine to be more than the world. But this transcendence differs from that of classical theism in that it expressly holds that the divine is not separate from the world and that the divine is affected by the world. Another way of expressing the differences between classical theism, pantheism, and panentheism would be to say that the relationship between the divine and the world in classical theism is chiefly characterised by transcendence, in pantheism is chiefly characterised by immanence, and in panentheism involves a balance between transcendence and immanence (cf. Asprem 2014: 281). As we shall now see, the perspective of panentheism could be a helpful framework for making sense of the tension we have uncovered between Jung's and Deleuze's respective concepts of the whole and their ethical implications.

Jung as an implicit panentheist

As I have argued in detail elsewhere (Main 2017: 1105-11), Jung's psychological model can be construed as underpinned by a form of implicit panentheism. This construal depends on Jung's effectively having equated the unconscious with God: 'Recognising that [numinous experiences] do not spring from his conscious personality, [man] calls them mana, daimon, or God', Jung wrote, adding: 'Science employs the term "unconscious"' (1963: 368) – a position that is as much a sacralisation of psychology as it is a psychologisation of the sacred (cf. Hanegraaff 1998: 224-29). Jung's statements about God, or the God-image, in *Answer to Job* and elsewhere, depict God as not separate from the world, as affected by the world, and as more than the world (1952a: §§631, 686, 758); and correlatively his statements about the unconscious depict it as not separate from consciousness, as affected by

consciousness, and as more than consciousness (1952a: §§538, 555, 557-58; 1963: 358; Main 2017: 1108-10).

Construing Jung's thought as panentheistic supports the characterisation of it at the beginning of this chapter, where it was shown to be holistic and to challenge the propositions underlying disenchantment. Thus, a recent study of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832), who coined the term 'panentheism' in the early nineteenth century, argues that Krause's concept not only anticipated recent thinking about holism but still provides an insightful theoretical framework for it (Göcke 2018: 196-200). Indeed, Brierley's generic definition of panentheism arguably could be applied to holism: that is, in holism the whole is not separate from the parts, is affected by the parts, and yet is more than the parts. With regard to disenchantment, I have detailed in a previous publication how the metaphysical logic of panentheism undoes each of the defining features of this condition, using Jung's thought as an illustration (Main 2017). And it is worth noting that Western esotericism, perhaps the most literal carrier of enchantment as well as one of the deep cultural influences on holistic thought (Hanegraaff 1998; Dusek 1999: 99-205) and a major source for Jung, has in its turn been convincingly shown to be based on panentheistic thought (Magee 2001: 8-9; Hanegraaff 2012: 371; Asprem 2014: 77-79, 279-84).

Even more pertinently, however, construing Jung's thought as panentheistic shows how his concept of the whole, together with the involved notions of original and restored wholes, organicism, and internal relations, might remain open and not after all be vulnerable to the Deleuzian critique. If Jung's concept of the whole, that is, the self, is both transcendent and immanent, it both exceeds the possibility of being

completely expressed (insofar as it is an archetype in itself) and receives an on-going multiplicity of necessarily partial empirical expressions (archetypal images). The dynamic between the transcendence and immanence here keeps the concept open by ensuring that, while the archetypal images express ever-different aspects or formulations of wholeness, no archetypal image is a final or complete expression of the whole. Each image gives an approximate expression that resolves the tensions and problems being experienced at the time, but that resolution, as now a conscious image, itself immediately and recursively becomes part of a new set of tensions and problems, which in turn requires resolution through the emergence of another archetypal image. In other words, the transcendent aspect of the whole is kept from being static by its non-separation from and ability to be affected by the world of becoming; while the immanent aspect of the whole is kept from being static by being continually destabilised by the 'more' of the transcendent.

Jung's openness to such a dynamic concept of transcendence, where the transcendent is envisaged as implicated with becoming, can be seen when he states at the beginning of 'Answer to Job' that 'we can imagine God as *an eternally flowing current of vital energy that endlessly changes shape* just as easily as we can imagine him as an eternally unmoved, unchangeable essence' (1952a: §555, emphasis added). More empirically, his recognition that even the most stable, symmetrical, and ordered symbols of wholeness are necessarily subject to continual change was expressed in his observation that the mandala – the paramount symbol of the self (1963: 221) and the 'empirical equivalent' of the *unus mundus* (1955-56: §661) – transforms from one manifestation to the next (1944: §§122-331; 1963: 220-22). As he wrote, citing Part

Two of Goethe's *Faust*: 'Only gradually did I discover what the mandala really is: "Formation, Transformation, Eternal Mind's eternal recreation"' (1963: 221).

As well as keeping open his overall concept of the whole, the mutual implication of transcendence and immanence in Jung's panentheistic thought similarly ensures that his conceptions of original and restored wholes, organicism, and internal relations remain open. For example, in his statements about the restoration of an original wholeness (apocatastasis), Jung described the self as a state of 'potential wholeness' (1917/1926/1943: §186; 1951a: §278) and the *unus mundus* as 'the potential world of the first day of creation' (1955-56: §760). But what it means to realise this state or world of potential is to achieve 'a synthesis of the [immanent] conscious with the [transcendent] unconscious' (ibid.: §770), that is, a synthesis in which empirical consciousness reconnects with and becomes able more fully to express the *unus mundus* as a source of open-ended creativity. Again, insofar as Jung's statements about organicism and microcosm-macrocosm relations refer, directly or indirectly, to symbols of the self (such as the Hermetic notion of the 'Anthropos' and its synonyms), then this organicism and the related notion of microcosm-macrocosm are no more promoting a closed system than is the concept of the self. Finally, any version of internal relations that can be found in Jung's work is similarly not closed, for the 'universal interrelationship of events' (1955-56: §661) postulated by Jung on the basis of synchronicity accords with what 'can be verified empirically' (1952b: §938). It is a potential but contingent and open relationship that, by transgressing normal spatiotemporal and psychophysical limits, can connect even the most distant and divergent events (ibid.: §840). But it is explicitly not, as in Leibniz, for example, 'a complete pre-established parallelism' expressing an 'absolute

rule' (ibid.: §938). In a statement with relevance for the influence on him of pre-modern and esoteric thought generally, Jung described synchronicity as 'a *modern differentiation* of the obsolete concept of correspondence, sympathy, and harmony' (1951b: §995; emphasis added). It was a 'modern differentiation' precisely by virtue of being based on 'empirical experience and experimentation' (ibid.).

Deleuze as an implicit panentheist

As well as helping to make sense of how Jung's thought, despite its appeals to transcendence, can remain open, creative, and relational, the metaphysical logic of panentheism can help in resolving some difficulties that attach to Deleuze's attempt to articulate a philosophy of pure immanence. While Deleuze's efforts to root out all trace of transcendence from his philosophy have been found compelling and helpful by some commentators (e.g., Albert 2001; Ansell-Pearson 2001; Adkins 2018), others have found reasons to question this project. Alain Badiou, for example, has argued that Deleuze, with his 'metaphysics of the One' (2000: 10), far from reversing Platonism, himself establishes a 'Platonism of the virtual' (ibid.: 45). Phillip Goodchild has noted that, paradoxically, Deleuze's 'plane of immanence', as well as being *transcendental* in the Kantian sense of being 'a presupposition about the nature of thought', is also *transcendent* in the Kantian sense inasmuch as it is 'a matter of being' (2001: 158). Again, Peter Hallward, while acknowledging that Deleuze's 'affirmation of absolute and immanent creativity certainly blocks any invocation of a transcendent "creator"', has suggested that this comes at the ethical and political cost of implying 'a philosophy that seeks to escape any mediation through the categories of subjectivity, history and the world' (2006: 3). And Christopher Simpson has argued that the extreme form of transcendence opposed by Deleuze is a caricature – 'God as

a static, univocal eternity – absolute in its immutability and stasis beyond time and becoming, and so unable to relate to the world’ (Simpson 2012: 78) – and that it is this caricature that generates the problematic ‘dualism between God and the world’ (ibid.) that Deleuze finds so objectionable. Like Badiou, Simpson also finds that Deleuze himself effectively reintroduced a form of transcendence through his concept of the virtual:

Deleuze’s actual and virtual are both real, but the virtual [...] is ultimately more real, the ““good” transcendental creative factor’ having a definite privilege and priority over the ““bad” static and representable created element’, over ‘the illusory solidity of the actual’. In this way Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism yet reflects a neo-Platonic or Gnostic dualism. (Simpson 2012: 79, quoting Justaert 2009: 542-43)

The weight of these criticisms of Deleuze’s understanding of transcendence is certainly debatable, but one way in which they could be eased would be to see his thought as involving not a theistic but a panentheistic form of transcendence. The principal ground for making this move is that the same set of logical relationships that is found between the divine and the world in panentheism, and between the unconscious and consciousness in Jung’s thought, can be found between the virtual and the actual in Deleuze’s thought. The virtual (a field of potentiality comprising a multiplicity of ‘problematic ideas’) and the actual (specific occurrences representing the solutions to problematic ideas) are the two main characterisations of reality in Deleuze, and they reciprocally determine each other in an open-ended process of creativity (1968a: 214-74). Thus, for Deleuze, the virtual is not separate from the

actual, since both are aspects of the same reality (ibid.: 260-61, 350); is affected by the actual, through ‘a double process of reciprocal determination’ (ibid.: 260; cf. the reference to ‘counter-actualisation’ below); and is more than the actual, inasmuch as the actual does not resemble and cannot fully express the virtual (ibid.: 260-1, 264).⁷

That this construal of Deleuze’s thought may not be entirely unwarranted is suggested by the helpful perspective on his views of transcendence offered by James Williams (2010) and Kristien Justaert (2012), both, significantly, drawing on the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. In language reminiscent of Deleuze, Whitehead had written about how ‘[t]he vicious separation of the flux from the permanence leads to the concept of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent world, with deficient reality’ (1929: 346). Yet Whitehead did not, as Deleuze did, aim to resolve this separation by eliminating transcendence and advocating pure immanence. As Williams explicates:

For Whitehead, separated transcendence is pure stasis, meaningless because no change whatsoever can take place within it, a timeless and momentum free block. Yet pure immanence is equally nonsensical, since as pure flux we cannot explain its valued forward momentum and novelty, it becomes free of any realities and without sense. (Williams 2010: 98)

Whitehead conceived of the divine as dipolar, having both a transcendent ‘primordial nature’ and an immanent ‘consequent nature’ (1929: 31, 343-45). Williams explains that the two movements stemming from these two natures correspond to the two co-existing movements described by Deleuze as explication and complication (Williams

2010: 102; see Deleuze 1968b: 175-76), and he suggests that the relations resulting from the two movements for Whitehead precisely match Deleuze's description: '*The multiple is in the one* which complicates it, as much as *the one is in the multiple* that explains it' (Deleuze 2003: 244, quoted in Williams 2010: 101; Williams's emphasis). Put in terms of Deleuze's alternative vocabulary of the virtual and the actual, this is to say that the actual is in the virtual and the virtual is in the actual. Just as for Whitehead's metaphysics there is a 'creative circle moving from abstract eternal realm through a creative transformation in the actual and back to a now transformed virtual real', so in Deleuze's thought, as expressed for example in *Logic of Sense* (Deleuze 1969: 149-151), 'Ideas or sense move through surface or intensity to an actual realm, where a counter-actualisation reworks the form and power of the virtual, sending it back to return again as new creativity' (Williams 2010: 96). In terms echoing characterisations of panentheism, Williams concludes that 'Deleuze's work is open to an interpretation where immanence and transcendence are never treated as fully separable, but rather must be considered as essentially and indivisibly related as processes' (2010: 102; cf. Ramey 2012: 207). Justaert makes this complex set of relationships even more explicit:

In Whitehead's philosophical system, the actual (God's consequent nature or the many) influences and even changes the virtual (God's primordial nature or the one); and while the primordial nature of God is a form of pure potentiality for Whitehead, his consequent nature is both physical and actual. The actual therefore ensures that the virtual does not become a static transcendence.

Indeed, there are continuous fluxes and becomings between the two ways of

being. 'It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God', Whitehead concludes. (Justaert 2012: 77, quoting Whitehead 1929: 348)

Whitehead was one of the twentieth-century philosophers whom Deleuze most revered.⁸ Yet, far from eschewing the notions of organicism and internal relations, Whitehead considered these notions integral to how he understood the nature of reality as process: he referred to his philosophy as 'the philosophy of organism' (1929: 18 *et passim*) and he invoked internal relations, not just external relations, to make sense of the 'actual occasions' that he considered to be the basic units of reality (ibid.: 308-9). Although, like Jung, he did not appear to be aware of the concept of panentheism, his reflections on 'God and the World' at the conclusion of *Process and Reality* have been foundational for process panentheism, one of the most prominent currents of contemporary panentheistic thought (Cooper 2006: 165-193). Together these features of Whitehead's philosophy suggest, *pace* Deleuze, that the notions of transcendence, original and restored wholes, organicism, and internal relations can be understood in ways compatible with a rigorously articulated philosophy of becoming and process. In turn, this makes plausible the suggestion that Deleuze's own philosophy could be productively construed as panentheistic.

The more widely held view of Deleuze appears to be that, although his work involves 'a certain thought of unity', nevertheless 'we cannot consider him to be a "holist" in any direct sense' (Roffe 2010: 305). In light of the above panentheistic considerations, however, Justaert would disagree:

Deleuze's (and even Spinoza's) metaphysics reflects a holistic and monistic view of creation: the One (God/Being) and the many (creation/beings) are two sides of the same coin. They are related to each other through the act of expression. God expresses Himself in the whole of creation in the same way. (Justaert 2012: 30)

Conclusion

From the perspective of a panentheistic metaphysics, it appears that Jung's holistic thought can escape the kinds of criticism that Deleuze levelled against forms of transcendence that foster totalitarianism. Such problematic forms of transcendence stem from a theistic metaphysics, which considers there to be an essential separation between the divine and the world. However, the form of transcendence that can be found in Jung and that informed his explicit and implicit use of the notions of original and restored wholes, organicism, and internal relations was panentheistic and as such denied any essential separation between the divine and the world. Arguably, Jung was as opposed as was Deleuze to theistic transcendence, for it was the divine-world separation of theistic transcendence that also spawned the condition of disenchantment against which so much of Jung's own critical energy was exerted (Main 2017: 1102-4). In the end, Deleuze and Jung appear to have shared a common critical target in theistic transcendence.

The case of Jung's psychology thus suggests that at least some influential forms of holistic thought have no intrinsic relationship to totalitarianism. Indeed, Jung's psychology even provides an example of how holistic thought can be deployed as a prophylactic against totalitarian thought, as when Jung argued in 'The

undiscovered self' that realisation of the wholeness of the self through individuation can serve, as religion had once done, as a counterbalance to the mass-mindedness out of which totalitarianism was prone to emerge (1957; see also McMillan 2020).

The holism that Jung promoted centres on a concept, the self, which involves a synthesis of (immanent) ego-consciousness with the (transcendent) unconscious. This involvement of the unconscious ensures that the concept of the whole informing conscious thought remains in a process of transformation, open to ever-new possibilities of connection and creation. For Jung it was one-sided and fixated ego-consciousness rather than the self that was associated with the problematic forms of despotic thought traced by Deleuze to transcendence. This is evident from Jung's comments about the 'new ethic' that Erich Neumann identified as implied by the depth psychological aim of uniting consciousness and the unconscious in the individuation process:

[Neumann] compares the relation to the unconscious with a parliamentary democracy, whereas the old ethic [a collective morality based on ethical rules] unconsciously imitates, or actually prefers, the procedure of an absolute monarchy or a tyrannical one-party system. Through the new ethic, the ego-consciousness is ousted from its central position in a psyche organized on the lines of a monarchy or totalitarian state, its place being taken by *wholeness* or the *self*, which is now recognized as central. (Jung 1949: §1419)

If there are problematic associations of Jung's thought with totalitarian currents of his day, these, such as they may be, would appear to exist despite rather than because of the structure of his thought, and need to be examined historically and biographically.

This said, there is scarcely ground for complacency. For it is possible for ego-consciousness to fall out of relationship with the unconscious at any point, especially when, as is often and even typically the case, the confrontation of ego-consciousness with the unconscious is painful or otherwise difficult. At that point, the integration so far achieved by ego-consciousness could indeed become defensively fixed and thereby provide the basis for the development of totalitarian formations. Awareness of this possibility, sharpened by the confrontation with Deleuzian thought, adds urgency to the task of maintaining the relationship between ego-consciousness and the unconscious, which for Jung would mean persisting vigilantly in the lifelong process of individuation.

For Deleuze's philosophy, in its turn, the confrontation with Jung's thought, in particular the suggestion that has emerged that Deleuze could also be understood as an implicit panentheist, might help to reframe some of the problems that certain scholars have found with his understanding of transcendence and his attempt to articulate a philosophy of pure immanence. Finally, viewing Deleuze as an implicit panentheist could also provide a context within which some of Deleuze's important, but in his own writings less foregrounded, influences could emerge more fully into view, including those of Western esotericism, Whitehead, and not least Jung.

Acknowledgement

Work on this chapter was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council [AH/N003853/1].

Notes

¹ For a detailed discussion of the issues involved in defining holism, see Main, McMillan, and Henderson (2020).

² In view of Popper's explicit criticism of the alleged totalitarian implications of holism, his philosophical perspective might have been an alternative one to use for confronting Jung. However, the holism that Popper criticises is specifically social holism – the view that social entities have properties that are irreducible to the behaviours of the individuals composing those social entities – and Jung, while seemingly a thoroughgoing holist in relation to the development of individuals, was himself critical of social holism (1957, §§504, 553-54). In their study of medical holism between 1920 and 1950 Christopher Lawrence and George Weisz (1998) observe that 'there have been two rather different holistic responses to modernity', one emphasising 'the need for *individual* wholeness, plenitude, or authenticity' and the other 'the submergence of the individual within a larger entity — nation, race, religious community, nature' (1998: 7). Popper's target was the latter response. Jung's holism concerns itself with the former.

³ The term 'holism' was not coined until 1926 and appeared in a work written in English (Smuts 1926). Jung, like many other German-speaking intellectuals, continued to use the established term *Ganzheit* and its cognates (*Ganzheitlichkeit*, etc.) rather than *Holismus*, the derived German form of the English neologism.

⁴ Sean Kelly draws detailed parallels between Jung's concept of the self and Hegel's concept of the Absolute in a study centring on the two thinkers' shared implicit notion of 'complex holism' (Kelly 1993). While Kelly does not himself foreground the concept of internal relations, his study arguably provides a basis for doing so.

⁵ Deleuze himself characterised his thought, along with Spinoza's, as atheistic (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 92). This does not necessarily contradict their characterisation as pantheistic. Since the eighteenth century, pantheism has often been charged with being equivalent to atheism, inasmuch as the pantheistic denial of any distinction between God and the world can seem to do away with the need for any separate discourse about God. Furthermore, in one sense pantheism certainly is 'atheistic' in that it negates classical theism. However, neither Deleuze nor Spinoza would have approved a form of atheism that denied the sacredness of the world or the role of the infinite within it. They aimed not to banish the divine from their thought but to locate, or re-locate, it entirely within the world (nature, cosmos), if not as the world.

⁶ There are, of course, multiple ways of understanding pantheism, theism, and panentheism and the borders between them are often difficult to determine. For the purpose of setting out my broad argument in what follows, it has seemed sufficient, as well as practical, to adopt quite wide, generic definitions of the terms.

⁷ Also suggestive of panentheism is Deleuze's formulation that '[t]he problem is at once both transcendent and immanent in relation to its solutions' (1968a: 203).

⁸ For further discussion of the relationship between Deleuze and Whitehead, see Robinson (2009).

References

(In the citations and reference list, dates within parentheses refer to the date of original publication. The date of edition consulted, if different, appears after the publisher in the reference list.)

- Adkins, B. (2018). To have done with the transcendental: Deleuze, immanence, intensity. *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 32(3): 533-543.
- Albert, E. (2001). Deleuze's impersonal, hylozoic cosmology: The expulsion of theology. In M. Bryden (Ed.), *Deleuze and Religion*, 184-195. London and New York: Routledge.
- Ansell-Pearson, K. (2001). Pure reserve: Deleuze, philosophy, and immanence. In M. Bryden (Ed.), *Deleuze and Religion*, 141-155. London and New York: Routledge.
- Ansell-Pearson, K. (2007). Beyond the human condition: An introduction to Deleuze's lecture course. *SubStance* #114 36(3): 1-15.
- Asprem, E. (2014). *The Problem of Disenchantment: Scientific Naturalism and Esoteric Discourse 1900-1939*. Leiden: Brill.
- Badiou, A. (2000). *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being* (L. Churchill, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Berman, M. (1981). *The Reenchantment of the World*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Braidotti, R. (2012). Nomadic ethics. In D. Smith and H. Somers-Hall (Eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, 170-197. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Brierley, M. (2008). The potential of panentheism for dialogue between science and religion. In P. Clayton and Z. Simpson (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science*, 635-651. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buckareff, A. and Nagasawa, Y. (2016). Introduction: Alternative conceptions of divinity and contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. In A. Buckareff and Y. Nagasawa (Eds.), *Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine*, 1-20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cambray, J. (2009). *Synchronicity: Nature and Psyche in an Interconnected Universe*. College Station, TX: Texas A and M University Press.
- Cooper, D. (1996). *Verstehen, holism and fascism*. *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 41*: 95-107.
- Cooper, J. (2006). *Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the present*. Nottingham, UK: Apollos.
- Deleuze, G. (1968a). *Difference and Repetition* (P. Patton, Trans.). London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- Deleuze, G. (1968b). *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (M. Joughin, Trans.). New York: Zone, 2013.
- Deleuze, G. (1969). *The Logic of Sense* (C. Boundas, Ed.; M. Lester and C. Stivale, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
- Deleuze, G. (1972). *Proust and Signs: The Complete Text* (R. Howard, Trans.). London: Athlone, 2000; original French publication 1964).
- Deleuze, G. (1983). *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, Trans.). London: Athlone Press, 1992.
- Deleuze, G. (2001). *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*. New York: Zone.

- Deleuze, G. (2003). Les plages d'immanence. In D. Lapoujade (Ed.), *Deux Régimes de Fous*, 244-246. Paris: Seuil.
- Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F. (1972). *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H. Lane, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F. (1991). *What is Philosophy?* (H Tomlinson and G. Burchell, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- Dusek, V. (1999). *The Holistic Inspirations of Physics: The Underground History of Electromagnetic Theory*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Esfeld, M. (2003). Philosophical holism. In *Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems*. Paris: UNESCO/Eolss Publishers [<http://www.eolss.net>].
- Fellows, A. (2019). *Gaia, Psyche and Deep Ecology: Navigating Climate Change in the Anthropocene*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Göcke, B. (2018). *The Panentheism of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832): From Transcendental Philosophy to Metaphysics*. Berlin: Peter Lang.
- Goodchild, P. (2001). Why is philosophy so compromised with God? In M. Bryden (Ed.), *Deleuze and Religion*, 156-166. London and New York: Routledge.
- Grossman, S. (1979). C. G. Jung and National Socialism. *Journal of European Studies* 9: 231-59.
- Hallward, P. (2006). *Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation*. London and New York: Verso.
- Hanegraaff, W. (1998). *New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Harrington, A. (1996). *Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Hayden, P. (1995). From relations to practice in the empiricism of Gilles Deleuze. *Man and World* 28: 283-302.
- Heelas, P. and Woodhead, L, with B. Seel, B. Szeszynski, and K. Tusting (2005). *The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion in Giving Way to Spirituality*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Holland, E. (2012). Deleuze and psychoanalysis. In D. Smith and H. Somers-Hall (Eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, 307-36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jung, C. G. (1911-12/1952). *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Sir H. Read, M. Fordham, and G. Adler, Eds.; W. McGuire, Exec. Ed.; R. F. C. Hull, Trans.) [hereafter *Collected Works*], vol. 5, *Symbols of Transformation*, 2d ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.
- Jung, C. G. (1917/1926/1943). On the psychology of the unconscious. In *Collected Works*, vol. 7, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, 2d ed., 1-119. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.
- Jung, C. G. (1921). *Collected Works*, vol. 6, *Psychological Types*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.
- Jung, C. G. (1928). The relations between the ego and the unconscious. In *Collected Works*, vol. 7, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, 2d ed., 121-241. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.
- Jung, C. G. (1937). Psychological factors in human behaviour. In *Collected Works*, vol. 8, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 2d ed., 114-125. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

- Jung, C. G. (1940). The psychology of the child archetype. In *Collected Works*, vol. 9i, *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, 2d ed., 149-181. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.
- Jung, C. G. (1944). *Collected Works*, vol. 12, *Psychology and Alchemy*, 2d ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.
- Jung, C. G. (1945). Psychotherapy today. In *Collected Works*, vol. 16, *The Practice of Psychotherapy*, 2d ed., 94-110. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.
- Jung, C. G. (1946). The psychology of the transference. In *Collected Works*, vol. 16, *The Practice of Psychotherapy*, 2d ed., 163-323. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.
- Jung, C. G. (1947/1954). On the nature of the psyche. In *Collected Works*, vol. 8, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 2d ed., 159-234. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
- Jung, C. G. (1949). Foreword to Neumann: 'Depth psychology and a new ethic'. In *Collected Works*, vol. 18, *The Symbolic Life*, 616-22. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.
- Jung, C. G. (1951a). *Collected Works*, vol. 9ii, *Aion*, 2d ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.
- Jung, C. G. (1951b). On synchronicity. In *Collected Works*, vol. 8, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 2d ed., 520-531. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
- Jung, C. G. (1952a). Answer to Job. In *Collected Works*, vol. 11, *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, 2d ed., 355-470. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

- Jung, C. G. (1952b). Synchronicity: An acausal connecting principle. In *Collected Works*, vol. 8, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 2d ed., 417-519. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
- Jung, C. G. (1955-56). *Collected Works*, vol. 14, *Mysterium Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy*, 2d ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
- Jung, C. G. (1957). The undiscovered self (Present and future). In *Collected Works*, vol. 10, *Civilization in Transition*, 2d ed., 245-305. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
- Jung, C. G. (1958). Flying saucers: A modern myth of things seen in the skies. In *Collected Works*, vol. 10, *Civilization in Transition*, 2d ed., 307-433. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
- Jung, C. G. (1963). *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (A. Jaffé, Ed.; R. and C. Winston, Trans.). London: Fontana, 1995.
- Justaert, K. (2009). Gilles Deleuze: Évaluation théologique. *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 65(3): 531-544.
- Justaert, K. (2012). *Theology After Deleuze*. London: Continuum.
- Kelly, S. (1993). *Individuation and the Absolute: Hegel, Jung and the Path Toward Wholeness*. New York: Paulist Press.
- Kerslake, C. (2007). *Deleuze and the Unconscious*. London: Continuum.
- Keulartz, J. (1998). *The Struggle for Nature: A Critique of Radical Ecology* (R. Kuitenbrouwer, Trans.). London: Routledge.
- Lawrence, C., and Weisz, G. (Eds.) (1998). *Greater than the Parts: Holism in Biomedicine 1920-1950*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Macey, D. (Ed.) (2000). *The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory*. London: Penguin.
- Magee, G. A. (2001). *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Maidenbaum, A., and Martin, S. (1992). *Lingering Shadows: Jungians, Freudians and Anti-Semitism*. Boston: Shambhala.
- Main, R. (2011). Synchronicity and the limits of re-enchantment. *International Journal of Jungian Studies* 3(2): 144-58.
- Main, R. (2013). Myth, synchronicity, and re-enchantment. In L. Burnett, S. Bahun, and R. Main (Eds.), *Myth, Literature, and the Unconscious*, 129-46. London: Karnac.
- Main, R. (2017). Panentheism and the undoing of disenchantment. *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science* 52(4): 1098-1122.
- Main, R. (2019). Synchronicity and holism. In *Analytical Psychology Meets Academic Research: Avignon Conference 2018*, 59-74. *Revue de Psychologie Analytique* (Hors série).
- Mander, W. (2012). Pantheism. In E. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition) [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/pantheism/>].
- McMillan, C. (2015). The 'image of thought' in Jung's 'Whole-Self': A critique. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Essex, UK.
- McMillan, C. (2018). Jung and Deleuze: Enchanted openings to the Other: A philosophical contribution. *International Journal of Jungian Studies* 10(3): 184-198.

- McMillan, C. (2020). The 'image of thought' and the State-form in Jung's 'The undiscovered self' and Deleuze and Guattari's 'Treatise on nomadology'. In R. Main, C. McMillan, and D. Henderson (Eds.). *Jung, Deleuze, and the Problematic Whole*. London and New York: Routledge.
- McMillan, C., Main, R., and Henderson, D. (2020). Introduction. In C. McMillan, R. Main, and D. Henderson (Eds.), *Holism: Possibilities and Problems*, 1-14. London and New York: Routledge.
- Papadopoulos, R. (2006). Jung's epistemology and methodology. In R. Papadopoulos (Ed.), *The Handbook of Jungian Psychology: Theory, Practice and Applications*, 5-53. London and New York: Routledge.
- Patton, P. (2012). Deleuze's political philosophy. In D. Smith and H. Somers-Hall (Eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, 198-219. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Phillips, D. C. (1976). *Holistic Thought in Social Science*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Popper., K. (1945). *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Popper, K. (1957). *The Poverty of Historicism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Protevi, J. (2012). Deleuze and life. In D. Smith and H. Somers-Hall (Eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, 239-264. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ramey, J. (2012). *The Hermetic Deleuze: Philosophy and Spiritual Ordeal*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Robinson, K. (Ed.) (2009). *Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson: Rhizomatic Connections*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Roffe, J. (2010). Whole. In A. Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary*, rev. ed., 304-5. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (2002). 5th ed. (W. Trumble and A. Stevenson, Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Simpson, C. (2012). *Deleuze and Theology*. London: Bloomsbury/T & T Clark.
- Smith, C. (1990). *Jung's Quest for Wholeness: A Religious and Historical Perspective*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Smuts, J. (1926). *Holism and Evolution*. London: McMillan.
- Weber, M. (1904-5). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Weber, M. (1919). Science as a vocation. In Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 129-55. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1929). *Process and Reality: Corrected Edition* (D. Griffin and D. Sherburne, Eds.). London and New York: Macmillan, 1979.
- Williams, J. (2010). Immanence and transcendence as inseparable processes: On the relevance of arguments from Whitehead to Deleuze interpretation. *Deleuze Studies* 4(1): 94-106.