Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2006) Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency. Economics Letters, 93 (2). pp. 163-168. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2006) Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency. Economics Letters, 93 (2). pp. 163-168. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2006) Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency. Economics Letters, 93 (2). pp. 163-168. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006
Abstract
We consider a circular city model as in Ellison [Ellison, G., 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071], where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best-response. If interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors, payoff-efficient equilibria, and not risk-dominant ones, can be uniquely selected. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | local interactions; coordination games; learning; mutation |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2012 15:10 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2024 16:42 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2641 |