Maheshri, Vikram and Mastrobuoni, Giovanni (2021) The Race Between Deterrence and Displacement: Theory and Evidence from Bank Robberies. The Review of Economics and Statistics (3). pp. 1-45. DOI https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00900
Maheshri, Vikram and Mastrobuoni, Giovanni (2021) The Race Between Deterrence and Displacement: Theory and Evidence from Bank Robberies. The Review of Economics and Statistics (3). pp. 1-45. DOI https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00900
Maheshri, Vikram and Mastrobuoni, Giovanni (2021) The Race Between Deterrence and Displacement: Theory and Evidence from Bank Robberies. The Review of Economics and Statistics (3). pp. 1-45. DOI https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00900
Abstract
Security measures that deter crime may unwittingly displace it to neighboring areas, but evidence of displacement is scarce. We exploit precise information on the timing and locations of all Italian bank robberies and security guard hirings/firings over a decade to estimate deterrence and displacement effects of guards. A guard lowers the likelihood a bank is robbed by 35-40%. Over half of this reduction is displaced to nearby unguarded banks. Theory suggests optimal policy to mitigate this spillover is ambiguous. Our findings indicate restricting guards in sparse, rural markets and requiring guards in dense, urban markets could be socially beneficial.
Item Type: | Article |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 31 Jan 2020 16:22 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 16:35 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/26618 |
Available files
Filename: deter_displace_RESTAT.pdf