Voudouris, Alexandros A (2019) A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints. Information Processing Letters, 143. pp. 28-33. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2018.11.004
Voudouris, Alexandros A (2019) A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints. Information Processing Letters, 143. pp. 28-33. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2018.11.004
Voudouris, Alexandros A (2019) A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints. Information Processing Letters, 143. pp. 28-33. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2018.11.004
Abstract
We study the social efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of a set of available (advertising) positions to a set of competing budget-constrained users (advertisers). Specifically, we focus on the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP), the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism (VCG) and the Expressive Generalized First Price auction (EGFP). Using liquid welfare as our efficiency benchmark, we prove a tight bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy and stability of these mechanisms for pure Nash equilibria.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Accepted to Information Processing Letters |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Analysis of algorithms; Position mechanisms; Liquid welfare; Budget constraints; Liquid price of anarchy |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Science and Health Faculty of Science and Health > Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 20 May 2020 11:34 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 16:16 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/27266 |
Available files
Filename: liquid.GSP.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0